The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.
The Issue Whether the Petitions filed by Ambar Trail, Ltd.; Sierra Meadows Apartments, Ltd.; and Quail Roost Transit Village IV, Ltd., should be dismissed for lack of standing.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created under Florida law to administer the governmental function of financing or refinancing affordable housing and related facilities in Florida. Florida Housing administers a competitive solicitation process to implement the provisions of the housing credit program, under which developers apply and compete for funding for projects in response to RFAs developed by Florida Housing. The RFA in this case was specifically targeted to provide affordable housing in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The RFA introduction provides: 2 As this Recommended Order of Dismissal is based upon a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the three Petitions filed by the Petitioners in this consolidate case are accepted as true, and the Findings of Fact are derived from the four corners of those Petitions, see Madison Highlands. LLC v. Florida Housing Finance Corp., 220 So. 3d 467, 473 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), and facts that are not otherwise in dispute. This Request for Applications (RFA) is open to Applicants proposing the development of affordable, multifamily housing located in Miami- Dade County. Under this RFA, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (the Corporation) expects to have up to an estimated $7,195,917 of Housing Credits available for award to proposed Developments located in Miami-Dade County. After Florida Housing announced its preliminary funding award decisions for RFA 2019-112 for Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Miami-Dade County, each of the Petitioners filed Petitions challenging the decisions. Petitioners do not allege that Florida Housing improperly scored or evaluated the applications selected for funding, nor do they contend that Petitioners' applications should be funded. Instead, Petitioners allege that the evaluation was fundamentally unfair and seeks to have the entire RFA rescinded based on alleged improprieties of one responding entity and its affiliates. Petitioners claim that the evaluation process was fundamentally unfair is based entirely on allegations that several entities associated with Housing Trust Group, LLC (HTG), combined to submit 15 Priority I applications in contravention of the limitation in the RFA on the number of Priority I applications that could be submitted. Even assuming Petitioners' assertions are correct, there is no scenario in which Petitioners can reach the funding range for this RFA. In order to break ties for those applicants that achieve the maximum number of points and meet the mandatory eligibility requirements, the RFA sets forth a series of tie-breakers to determine which applications will be awarded funding. The instant RFA included specific goals to fund certain types of developments and sets forth sorting order tie-breakers to distinguish between applicants. The relevant RFA provisions are as follows: Goals The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) proposed Development that (a) selected the Demographic Commitment of Family at questions 2.a. of Exhibit A and (b) qualifies for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal as outlined in Section Four A. 11. a. The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) proposed Development that selected the Demographic Commitment of Elderly (Non-ALF) at question 2.a. of Exhibit A. *Note: During the Funding Selection Process outlined below, Developments selected for these goals will only count toward one goal. Applicant Sorting Order All eligible Priority I Applications will be ranked by sorting the Applications as follows, followed by Priority II Applications. First, from highest score to lowest score; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Proximity Funding Preference (which is outlined in Section Four A.5.e. of the RFA) with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.lO.e. of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Development Category Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.4.(b)(4) of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Applicant's Leveraging Classification, applying the multipliers outlined in Item 3 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications having the Classification of A listed above Applications having the Classification of B); Next, by the Applicant's eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Funding Preference which is outlined in Item 4 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); and And finally, by lotterv number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. This RFA was similar to previous RFAs issued by Florida Housing, but included some new provisions limiting the number of Priority I applications that could be submitted. Specifically, the RFA provided: Priority Designation of Applications Applicants may submit no more than three (3) Priority I Applications. There is no limit to the number of Priority II Applications that can be submitted; however, no Principal can be a Principal, as defined in Rule Chapter 67- 48.002(94), F.A.C., of more than three ( 3) Priority 1 Applications. For purposes of scoring, Florida Housing will rely on the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Rev. 05-2019) outlined below in order to determine if a Principal is a Principal on more than three (3) Priority 1 Applications. If during scoring it is determined that a Principal is disclosed as a Principal on more than three (3) Priority I Applications, all such Priority I Applications will be deemed Priority II. If it is later determined that a Principal, as defined in Rule Chapter 67-48.002(94), F.A.C., was not disclosed as a Principal and the undisclosed Principal causes the maximum set forth above to be exceeded, the award(s) for the affected Application(s) will be rescinded and all Principals of the affected Applications may be subject to material misrepresentation, even if Applications were not selected for funding, were deemed ineligible, or were withdrawn. The Petitioners all timely submitted applications in response to the RFA. Lottery numbers were assigned by Florida Housing, at random, to all applications shortly after the applications were received and before any scoring began. Lottery numbers were assigned to the applications without regard to whether the application was a Priority I or Priority II. The RFA did not limit the number of Priority II Applications that could be submitted. Review of the applications to determine if a principal was a principal on more than three Priority 1 Applications occurred during the scoring process, well after lottery numbers were assigned. The leveraging line, which would have divided the Priority I Applications into Group A and Group B, was established after the eligibility determinations were made. All applications were included in Group A. There were no Group B applications. Thus, all applications were treated equally with respect to this preference. The applications were ultimately ranked according to lottery number and funding goal. . If Florida Housing had determined that an entity or entities submitted more than three Priority I Applications with related principals, the relief set forth in the RFA was to move those applications to Priority II. Florida Housing did not affirmatively conclude that any of the 15 challenged applications included undisclosed principals so as to cause a violation of the maximum number of Priority I Applications that could be submitted. All of the applications that were deemed eligible for funding, including the Priority II Applications, scored equally, and met all of the funding preferences. After the applications were evaluated by the Review Committee appointed by Florida Housing, the scores were finalized and preliminary award recommendations were presented and approved by Florida Housing's Board. Consistent with the procedures set forth in the RFA, Florida Housing staff reviewed the Principal Disclosure Forms to determine the number of Priority I Applications that had been filed by each applicant. This review did not result in a determination that any applicant had exceeded the allowable number of Priority I Applications that included the same principal. One of the HTG Applications (Orchid Pointe, App. No. 2020-148C) was initially selected to satisfy the Elderly Development goal. Subsequently, three applications, including Slate Miami, that had initially been deemed ineligible due to financial arrearages were later determined to be in full compliance and, thus, eligible as of the close of business on January 8, 2020. The Review Committee reconvened on January 21, 2020, to reinstate those three applications. Slate Miami was then recommended for funding. The Review Committee ultimately recommended to the Board the following applications for funding: Harbour Springs (App. No. 2020-101C), which met the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal; Slate Miami (App. No. 2020-122C), which met the Elderly (non-ALF) Goal; and Naranja Lakes (App. No. 2020-117C), which was the next highest-ranked eligible Priority I Application. The Board approved the Committee's recommendations at its meeting on January 23, 2020, and approved the preliminary selection of Harbour Springs, Slate Miami, and Naranja Lakes for funding. The applications selected for funding held Lottery numbers 1 (Harbour Springs), 2 (Naranja Lakes), and 4 (Slate Miami). Petitioners' lottery numbers were 16 (Quail Roost), 59 (Sierra Meadows) and 24 (Ambar Trail). The three applications selected for funding have no affiliation or association with HTG, or any of the entities that may have filed applications in contravention of the limitation in the RFA for Priority I applications. The applications alleged in the Petitions as being affiliated with HTG received a wide range of lottery numbers in the random selection, including numbers: 3, 6, 14, 19, 30, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49, 52 through 54, and 58. If Petitioners prevailed in demonstrating an improper principal relationship between the HTG applications, the relief specified in the RFA (the specifications of which were not challenged) would have been the conversion of the offending HTG applications to Priority II applications. The relief would not have been the removal of those applications from the pool of applications, nor would it have affected the assignment of lottery numbers to any of the applicants, including HTG. The Petitions do not allege any error in scoring or ineligibility with respect to the three applications preliminarily approved for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioners lack standing and dismissing the Petitions with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Brittany Adams Long, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Tana D. Storey, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 (32302) Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioners have been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondents, as alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioners on March 13, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Ingrid Gomez and Luis Moran, are married. They and their son moved into Coral Gardens Apartments in early 2000. Petitioners entered into a one-year lease on January 13, 2000. The lease was not renewed at the end of one year, and Petitioners, thereafter, lived in their apartment as month-to- month tenants. Coral Gardens Apartments is a 36-unit apartment complex located in Naples, Florida. Many of the residents are minorities. Respondent DeMarco Investments is the absentee owner of the complex, which is managed through a Fort Myers company called Services-Taylor Made, Inc. Respondents Jim and Judy Hill were hired to manage the complex in March 2003. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill sent a notice to all tenants that stated as follows, set forth verbatim:1/ Now we have [sic] ask you to please make sure that when you give your children snacks, drinks, or what ever [sic] to eat that you the parent would make sure your children discard the trash inside the unit or in the dumpster. Apparently this went in one ear and out the other. Now all unit [sic] has to suffer this price because no one wants to help keep the trash up by disposing of it yourself [sic]. The adults are getting just as bad. So every unit is going to pay an additional $35.00 a month trash clean up fee. You want to live trashy MOVE across the street. So when you pay your July Rent pay an extra $35.00 to pay for the person that has to clean up YOUR trash. I sent out letters to everyone that it was $25.00 and if it didn't improve I would raise it. Well I didn't inforced [sic] the $25.00 and it hasn't changed at all. So it [sic] in effect for sure now [sic]. YOU WILL PAY $35.00 WITH JULY'S RENT. Now you don't want to pay it next month then start picking up the TRASH! Also from now on you put furniture out at the dumpster it will cost you $50.00 first piece and $15.00 per piece after that. They charge me to come and get the stuff then I charge you. The camera's [sic] will be watching and don't get caught. I hate to inform all of you we are not the old managers, the old owners, the old maintenance personal [sic]. We are new and we are the LAW here. We are working to improve this place and if you can't help with keeping this place clean then I DON"T [sic] want to here [sic]. I AM NOT GOING TO LIVE IN A TRASHY PLACE! After receiving this notice, Mr. Moran and Mr. Novarro went to the manager's office to discuss the propriety of the proposed $35.00 trash pick-up fee. Mr. Moran stated to Ms. Hill that he believed an imposition of such a fee on tenants was against the law. Mr. Moran testified that Ms. Hill stated, "I am the law." Mr. Moran demanded that Ms. Hill give him the phone number of Mr. DeMarco. He told her, "I want to talk to the owner of the circus, not the clowns." Mr. Moran testified that at this point, Ms. Hill became apoplectic. She called Mr. Moran "a fucking nigger Latino." Mr. Novarro, whose English was very sketchy, confirmed that Ms. Hill used those words. Ms. Gomez, who speaks relatively fluent English, testified that on another occasion Ms. Hill stated that she was "tired of the fucking negros Latinos." This raised a question whether Ms. Hill also used the term "negros" in her confrontation with Mr. Moran and whether it became "nigger" only in the imperfect translation. In any event, Ms. Hill's use of the word "fucking" was unambiguous and certainly indicated a racial animus against Mr. Moran, who is indeed a black Latino. In a second notice to all tenants dated June 22, 2003, Ms. Hill acknowledged tenant complaints about the $35.00 fee. She had "consulted the Florida Landlord/Tenant Act and state officials in Tallahassee," and concluded that she was required to rescind the $35.00 trash fee. Thus, the controversial fee was never collected. Dennis Gomez, Petitioners' middle-school-aged son, testified that Ms. Hill told him she would pay him $5.00 per week to pick up trash on the property. Mr. Moran told Dennis not to accept, because tenants paid Ms. Hill $10.00 per month to clean up the property. Dennis testified that after he refused the offer, Ms. Hill told him that he had to pick up the trash anyway because he "was a slave." When Dennis asked why he was a slave, Ms. Hill stated that Dennis' father was a "nigger and a slave," and that made Dennis a "slave, too." Dennis Gomez' testimony is not credible. There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth in his story, but Dennis' obvious embellishments of his conversations with Ms. Hill render his testimony of doubtful probative value. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill served Petitioners with a seven-day notice to vacate the premises, because of her confrontation with Mr. Moran. However, the notice was never enforced and the Petitioners stayed on until August 1, 2003, when they voluntarily terminated their tenancy. There was a problem with the return of Petitioners' deposit. Ms. Gomez contacted Mr. DeMarco, who returned the deposit to Petitioners after a two-month delay caused by cash flow problems with his businesses. Mr. DeMarco credibly testified that he knew nothing of the controversy between Petitioners and Ms. Hill until he received the Housing Discrimination Complaint. His only contact with Petitioners was the telephone conversation with Ms. Gomez in August 2003 concerning the Petitioners' deposit. From the weight of the testimony, it is apparent that there was a great deal of animosity between Petitioners and the Hills. The notices authored by Ms. Hill were crude and insulting, but were not directed toward Petitioners in particular. There is credible evidence that on at least one occasion Ms. Hill uttered a derogatory and insulting racial comment to Mr. Moran. However, the record evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. Hill took any action against Petitioners on the basis of their race or familial status. The $35.00 trash fee notice was provided to all tenants. The fee itself was never collected. Petitioners were given a seven-day notice, but it was never enforced. Petitioners chose to vacate their tenancy. No adverse action whatever was taken against Petitioners. DeMarco Investments was unaware of the hostile situation between Petitioners and the Hills. Mr. DeMarco's delay in returning Petitioners' deposit was due to legitimate business reasons.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Whether the amount claimed by Petitioner for attorney's fees and costs is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent agency is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Sections 760.20 - 760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, the Respondent agency may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statues, on behalf of the aggrieved party. On February 3, 1993, Polly Leggitt filed a complaint with the Respondent agency and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Complaint named Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her. On March 24, 1993, the Respondent agency notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the Complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days, the Respondent agency would investigate the Complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The notice further provided that final administrative disposition of the Complaint would be completed within one year from the filing of the Complaint, which would be on or about February 3, 1994. A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the Complaint. Following the formal hearing, this Administrative Law Judge made certain findings of fact which were incorporated in the Recommended Order. Those findings held, inter alia: Robert Stitzel was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments. Carole Naylor, at the direction of the manager Frank Cutrona, sent Ms. Leggitt letters rejecting her application for an apartment unit at Regency Place Apartments because there was no apartment of the kind she wanted that was available and further that her income was insufficient to qualify her for housing at that place. Cutrona died on December 26, 1996. Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Place Apartments had a policy which requires income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager. Stitzel demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by the manager and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency Place Apartments. The agency made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Stitzel based its action solely upon her handicap. Evidence was presented that Regency Place Apartment's requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt's mother's agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt's income was $281.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140.00, thus rendering her income short by $308.66 per month. The motivation for rejecting the application was that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify. There was no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Place Apartments, other than conjecture. There was no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it did not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive was proven. There was nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt's legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application. There was no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents in the Administrative Charge. Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicated that the sole basis for rejecting Leggitt's application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Place Apartments. Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there was no evidence of any quantifiable damages presented at the hearing. In the Conclusions of Law, it was determined that the Motion to Dismiss should have and was granted on the grounds that the Respondent agency failed to comply with the statutory time requirements: Under the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, "the Secretary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after filing of the Complaint . . . unless it is impracticable to do so." 42 U.S.C. s 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute also provides that if "the Secretary is unable to complete the investigation within 100 days" after complainant files the complaint, the Secretary "shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." 42 U.S.C. s. 3610(a)(1)(c). This same provision is found in the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Section 760.34, Florida Statutes (1995), and Chapter 60Y-7, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Administrative Code provides as follows: "Section 60Y-7004(8)(b) If the Commission is unable to complete its investigation within 100 days, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." Section 60Y-7.004(10) The Commission will make final administrative deposition of a complaint within one year of the date of receipt of the complaint, unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission is unable to do so, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." It is undisputed in this case that the Respondent agency did not file its determination until August 28, 1996, over three and one-half years from the time Leggitt filed her complaint. It is also undisputed that the Respondent agency never notified Petitioner, or the other parties, that it would be unable to complete the investigation within 100 days as required by statute. Nor did it notify Stitzel in writing why an administrative disposition of a Complaint had not been made within one year of receipt of the Complaint. Petitioner established that the Respondent agency violated the statutory time limits and that the three and one- half year delay in filing the Respondent agency's Notice of Probable Cause caused the proceedings to be impaired and was to Petitioner's extreme prejudice. At the attorney's fee hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to the cause for the extreme delay in the filing of the Administrative Charge, or the rationale for filing the Charge two and one-half years after the expiration of the statutory deadline for filing said charges. At the attorney's fees hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to why it claimed to be substantially justified in finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Charge. The Petitioner, demonstrated that, at the time the matter was initiated, Regency Place Apartments was a business operating as a limited partnership and that Robert Stitzel was the general partner; that the principal place of business was in Florida; and that it did not have more than 25 full-time employees. Petitioner retained counsel to defend it on the charges contained in the Notice of Determination, Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge, and Petitioner was the prevailing small business party. Counsel for Petitioner expended 76 hours on this matter, not including time expended on the Petition for Attorney's Fees or time expended following his appearance before the Commission prior to the issuance of the final order. Counsel's billing for Petitioner's time at an hourly rate of $200 is reasonable in this case. The Petitioner's billable costs of $609.75 are reasonable.
The Issue The issue for determination in this bid protest proceeding is whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”) intended award of tax credits for the preservation of existing affordable housing developments was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the Findings of Fact are as follows: Parties Petitioner, Madison Point, is a Florida limited liability company and the designated applicant for funding through the RFA to construct an 85-unit development for low- income elderly persons in Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, American Residential Development, LLC, is the designated developer for the proposed development. Intervenor, Heritage Oaks, is a Florida limited liability limited partnership in the business of providing affordable housing. Heritage Oaks is an applicant for financing in response to the RFA to construct an 85-unit development for low-income elderly persons in Pinellas County, Florida. Intervenor, HTG Hudson, is a Florida limited liability company in the business of developing affordable housing. HTG Hudson was an applicant for financing in response to the RFA to construct an 87-unit development for low-income elderly persons in Pinellas County, Florida. However, all issues regarding HTG Hudson have been resolved pursuant to a settlement agreement which was attached as Exhibit “A” to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, HTG Hudson’s application is ineligible for funding. Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes, and for the purpose of this proceeding, an agency of the State of Florida. Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. Affordable Housing Tax Credits The low-income housing tax credit program (commonly referred to as “tax credits” or “housing credits”) was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. These credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. The effect is that it reduces the amount that the developer would have to borrow otherwise. Because the total debt is lower, a tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the tax credits. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. Florida Housing is authorized to allocate tax credits, State Apartment Incentive Loan (“SAIL”) funding, and other funding by means of request for proposal or other competitive solicitation in section 420.507(48), and adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60, to govern the competitive solicitation process for several different programs, including the program for tax credits. Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing allocate its tax credits, which were made available to Florida Housing on an annual basis by the U.S. Treasury, through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3). Application Process In their applications, applicants request a specific dollar amount of housing credits to be given to the applicant each year for a period of 10 years. Applicants will normally sell the rights to that future stream of income tax credits (through the sale of almost all of the ownership interest in the applicant’s entity) to an investor to generate the amount of capital needed to build the development. The amount which can be received depends upon the accomplishment of several factors such as a certain percentage of the projected “total development cost” (total costs incurred in the completion of a development); a maximum funding amount per development based on the county in which the development will be located; and whether the development is located within certain designated areas of some counties. This, however, is not an exhaustive list of the factors considered. Tax credits are made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of an RFA. An RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in rule 67-60.009(3). The RFA at issue here is RFA 2016-113, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties. The RFA was issued on October 28, 2016, and responses were initially due December 8, 2016. The RFA was modified on November 10, 2016, and, among other revisions, the application deadline was extended to December 30, 2016. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated $14,669,052 of housing credits to qualified applicants in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties. In response to RFA 2016-113, 43 applications were submitted for funding, including Madison Point and Heritage Oaks. Madison Point submitted application No. 2017-232C seeking $1,660,000 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of an 80-unit development in Pinellas County. Heritage Oaks submitted application No. 2017-201C, seeking $1,660,000 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of an 85-unit development in Pinellas County. The RFA sets forth the information required to be provided by an applicant, which includes a general description of the type of projects that will be considered eligible for funding and delineates the submission requirements. In order to be considered for funding selection, the application must meet all of the eligibility requirements set forth in the RFA. The eligibility requirements include, among other things, “[a]ll “Mandatory Items” described in section five of the RFA.” The RFA sets forth a list of mandatory items that must be included in a response including, but are not limited to, appropriate zoning, site control, development category, and occupancy status of any existing units. As part of the general development information, the RFA requires applicants to select a development category applicable to its proposed development. This is a mandatory item of the RFA. Applicants are instructed to select amongst the following categories: New Construction (where 50 percent or more of the units are new construction) Rehabilitation (where less than 50 percent of the units are new construction) Acquisition and Rehabilitation (acquisition and less than 50 percent of the units are new construction) Redevelopment (where 50 percent or more of the units are new construction) Acquisition and Redevelopment (acquisition and 50 percent or more of the units are new construction) Once disclosed in the application, the development category cannot be changed. In the RFA, “new construction” while capitalized is not a defined term. However, rule 67-48.002(98), defines “redevelopment” as follows: With regard to a proposed Development that involves demolition of multifamily rental residential structures currently or previously existing that were originally built in 1986 or earlier and either originally received financing or are currently financed through one or more of the following HUD or RD programs: Sections 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. §1701q), 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. §1701), 514, 515, or 516 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. §1484), 811 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. §1437), or have PBRA; and new construction of replacement structures on the same site maintaining at least the same number of PBRA units; or With regard to proposed Developments that involve demolition of public housing structures currently or previously existing on a site with a Declaration of Trust that were originally built in 1986 or earlier and that are assisted through ACC; and new construction of replacement structures on the same site, providing at least 25 percent of the total new units with PBRA, ACC, or both, after Redevelopment. Although the Rehabilitation Category is defined, it is not relevant for purposes of this proceeding. Additionally, the RFA requires applicants to answer whether the proposed development consists of: a) 100 percent new construction units; b) 100 percent rehabilitation units; or c) a combination of new construction units and rehabilitation units, and state the quantity of each type. This is a mandatory item of the RFA. Selection Process Florida Housing received 43 applications seeking funding in RFA 2016-113. Florida Housing’s executive director appointed a Review Committee of Florida Housing staff to evaluate the applications for eligibility and scoring and to make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, the applications were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked. The Review Committee determined that, among other applicants, the applications of Heritage Oaks and Madison Point were eligible for funding. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, Heritage Oaks was recommended to the Board of Directors to be selected for funding within Pinellas County. The Review Committee developed a chart listing its funding recommendations for the RFA to be presented to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors. On May 5, 2017, Florida Housing’s Board of Directors met and considered the recommendations of the Review Committee for RFA 2016-113. Also, on May 5, 2017 following the Board meeting, Petitioners, and all other applicants in RFA 2016-113, received notice that Florida Housing’s Board of Directors determined whether applications were eligible or ineligible for consideration for funding, and that certain eligible applicants were selected for award of tax credits. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets, one listing the “eligible” and “ineligible” applications in RFA 2016-113 and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund on the Florida Housing website, www.floridahousing.org. Of the 43 applications submitted, 37 were deemed “eligible” and six were deemed “ineligible.” In that May 5, 2017, posting, Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to seven applications, including Heritage Oaks. Madison Point was deemed eligible but not selected for funding. Madison Point timely filed a Notice of Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings. Heritage Oaks intervened as a named party and intervention was granted. The scoring decisions at issue in this proceeding are related to Florida Housing’s decision to award funding to Heritage Oaks based on its responses regarding occupancy status and local government contribution. The RFA specifies an “application sorting order” to rank applicants for potential funding. The first consideration in sorting eligible applications for potential funding is application score. The maximum score an applicant can achieve is 28 points. In the case of a tie score, Florida Housing incorporated a series of “tie breakers” into the sorting process. The tiebreakers for this RFA, in order of applicability, are: First, by Development Category Funding Preference; Second, by a Per Unit Construction Funding Preference; Third, by a Leveraging Classification based on the amount of total Florida Housing funding per set-aside unit; Fourth, by the eligibility for the 75 or More Total Unit Funding Preference; Fifth, by satisfaction of a Florida Job Creation Funding preference, which applies a formula to reflect the estimated number of jobs created per $1 million of funding; Lastly, if necessary, by randomly assigned lottery number. The RFA set out a selection process for eligible applicants, after the sorting and ranking process outlined above. That selection process consisted of selecting the highest ranking eligible application for a proposed development in each of the following counties first: Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas. If funding remained after those selections, then the highest ranking eligible unfunded application in Broward would be selected next. Heritage Oaks and Madison Point selected the elderly non-Assisted Living Facility (“ALF”) demographic and the proposed developments were located in Pinellas County. Florida Housing’s preliminary agency action selected Heritage Oaks for funding for Pinellas County. Heritage Oaks’ Application Heritage Oaks’ proposed development site consists of approximately 4.99 acres. Heritage Oaks’ proposed development site contains existing roads owned by Pinellas County. Heritage Oaks indicates that its proposed development site was comprised of scattered sites. There are existing housing units on Heritage Oaks’ development site. However, Heritage Oaks’ application indicates that “there are no existing units.” Heritage Oaks’ application selected “new construction” as its development category. Heritage Oaks’ proposed development involves demolition of currently-occupied, multifamily, public housing rental structures that were originally built in 1986 or earlier and either originally received financing or are currently financed through one or more of the following HUD or RD programs: Sections 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. § 1701 q); 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1701); 514, 515, or 516 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. § 1484); and 811 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437). Development Category In response to the RFA requirements, Heritage Oaks selected “New Construction” as its development category. Heritage Oaks also indicated that its proposed development consists of 100 percent new construction. Mr. Evjen acknowledged that Heritage Oaks’ proposed development involves the demolition of existing structures on the proposed development site and the construction of 85 new units. Mr. Evjen explained that the proposed development includes 71 senior units in a three-story, mid-rise building, and seven duplex buildings, which would include the other 14 units on the proposed development site. The testimony at hearing indicated that at the time of the application deadline, Heritage Oaks’ proposed development did not satisfy all of the criteria set forth in the definition of redevelopment, as set forth in paragraph 18, supra. At hearing, Mr. Evjen and Ms. Blinderman testified that to qualify as redevelopment, at least 25 percent of the new units must receive Project Based Rental Assistance (“PBRA”). PBRA units are those with a rental subsidy through a contract with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or the Rural Development Services (formerly the Farmer’s Home Administration) of the United States Department of Agriculture. See Fla. Admin. Code Rules 67-48.002(72), (85), and (98). Heritage Oaks intends to develop the proposed development with Pinellas County Housing Authority (“Housing Authority”). At the time of the application deadline, the Housing Authority was in discussions with HUD regarding the final count, if any, of PBRA units. The lack of a resolution with HUD is beyond the authority of Heritage Oaks and remains uncertain. As of the application deadline, Heritage Oaks could not know if 25 percent of its new units would receive PBRA and, therefore, could not classify the proposed development as redevelopment. While it may be possible that Heritage Oaks’ proposed development may meet the definition of redevelopment at some point in the future, at the time of the application it did not meet the definition. At hearing, no testimony or documentary evidence was offered to establish that the proposed development currently falls within the definition of redevelopment. Respondent found this classification to be acceptable. Petitioners assert that it is reasonable that Heritage Oaks would meet the threshold to satisfy the criteria for the redevelopment category. However, it was more reasonable that Heritage Oaks would not meet the threshold and be ineligible for funding, if the redevelopment category had been incorrectly selected. Therefore, the evidence supports that it was reasonable for Heritage Oaks to identify its development project as new construction. Occupancy Status Petitioners also argue that Heritage Oaks should not be awarded funding because it failed to disclose the occupancy status of existing units on the proposed development site. In the RFA, the subheading and language for section four (A)(5)(e)(3) provides as follows: Number of Units in Proposed Development: The Applicant must indicate which of the following applies with regard to the occupancy status of any existing units: Existing units are currently occupied Existing units are not currently occupied There are no existing units The section then instructs the applicant to refer to section four (A)(5)(e) of the RFA instructions before answering the occupancy status question. The RFA instructions at section four (A)(5)(e) provide as follows: e. Number of Units in Proposed Development: The Applicant must state the total number of units. Note: The proposed Development must consist of a minimum of 50 total units. Proposed Developments consisting of 75 or more total units will be eligible for the 75 or More Total Unit Funding Preference (outlined at Section Four B.2. of the RFA). If the Elderly Demographic Commitment (ALF or Non- ALF) is selected at question 2.b. of Exhibit A, the proposed Development cannot exceed the maximum total number of units outlined in Item 1 of Exhibit C of the RFA. The Applicant must indicate whether the proposed Development consists of (a) 100% new construction units, (b) 100% rehabilitation units, or (c) a combination of new construction units and rehabilitation units, and state the quantity of each type. The Applicant must indicate the occupancy status of any existing units at question 5.e.(3) of Exhibit A. Developments that are tentatively funded will be required to provide to the Credit Underwriter a plan for relocation of existing tenants, as outlined in Item 2.b.(6) of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form. The plan shall provide information regarding the relocation site; accommodations relevant to the needs of the residents and length of time residents will be displaced; moving and storage of the contents of a resident’s dwelling unit; as well as the approach to inform and prepare the residents for the rehabilitation activities. In response to this RFA requirement and the cited RFA Instructions concerning Occupancy Status, Heritage Oaks indicated that “there are no existing units” in its proposed development. However, Mr. Evjen testified that there were existing units on the development site as of the application deadline and some of those units were occupied. Heritage Oaks pointed out that a review of the RFA reflects that it is organized in an outline format with headings and subheadings. For example, section four concerns information to be provided in the application. Section four A(5) then requests general development information. Section four (A)(5)(e) requests information concerning the number of units in the proposed development. Mr. Evjen further testified that, based on review of the RFA and the instructions, Heritage Oaks took a three-step approach in responding to the occupancy status question. Heritage Oaks properly answered the first two questions. First, Heritage Oaks provided the total number of units as 85. Second, Heritage Oaks indicated that “all 85 units would be new construction.” In the final question, Heritage Oaks considered whether any existing units would remain as a “part of its proposed development.” Because no existing units would be part of its proposed development, Heritage Oaks responded “there are no existing units” in its proposed development. However, the term “proposed” was not used in question 5.e.(3) as was the case in the prior questions in the same subsection. Mr. Evjen also testified that he read the question as “if there are rehab[ilitation] units, are they occupied? Heritage Oaks’ erroneous interpretation of the question resulted in its failure to provide an accurate answer. The question simply requested the “occupancy status of any existing units.” The question was clear and unambiguous. The parties have stipulated that there are existing housing units on the Heritage Oaks proposed development site. However, Heritage Oaks’ application indicates that there are no existing units. The representation that there were no existing units was a false statement of material fact. It is worth noting that the parties stipulated at the beginning of the hearing that there is no allegation of fraud or intentional deception. There is also no evidence in the record of intentional deception and therefore, there is no finding by the undersigned that Heritage Oaks engaged in intentional misconduct. However, whether intentional or not, Heritage Oaks’ representation of no existing units is a false statement. According to Mr. Reecy, Florida Housing asks the question regarding occupancy status of existing units because Florida Housing wants to make sure that the developer can handle the cost issues related to relocation and that the relocation needs of the existing tenants will be met. Additionally, Mr. Reecy testified that Florida Housing relies upon applicants to accurately respond to questions in the RFA because, at the time of scoring, no independent research is conducted to verify responses. Regarding a relocation plan, Heritage Oaks relies on the Declaration of Trust’s requirement to have a tenant relocation plan as a remedy for the failure to properly respond to the occupancy status question. However, the Declaration of Trust is a HUD requirement that is not controlled by Florida Housing. In fact, Mr. Evjen testified that Heritage Oaks’ co-developer was researching terminating the Declaration of Trust. Given the fact that Heritage Oaks could terminate its Declaration of Trust, the Declaration of Trust does not provide adequate assurance that the tenants in the existing housing units will be adequately relocated once Florida Housing allocates its funding. Florida Housing has a material interest in ensuring that tenants located in existing housing units are properly and adequately relocated during the development phase of any Florida Housing-funded development. Accordingly, Florida Housing’s scoring decision with regard to Heritage Oaks’ response to the occupancy status question was contrary to the terms of the RFA and clearly erroneous. Heritage Oaks is ineligible for funding under RFA 2016-113. Local Government Contribution At section four (A)(10)(b), an applicant can obtain 10 points if it can demonstrate a high level of local government interest in its project via an increased amount of local government contribution. To satisfy this requirement, an applicant must attach a properly completed and executable Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification of Contribution-Loan Form (“loan form”). The RFA establishes a contribution threshold amount which qualifies an application for the local government area of opportunity points. The RFA defines “local government areas of opportunity” as follows: Developments receiving a high level of Local Government interest in the project as demonstrated by an irrevocable funding contribution that equals or exceeds 2.5 times the Total Development Cost Per Unit Base Limitation (exclusive of any add-ons or multipliers), as provided in Item 7 of Exhibit C to the RFA, for the Development Type committed to for the proposed Development. The minimum local government areas of opportunity funding amounts are outlined in section four A.10.b. of the RFA. A single jurisdiction (i.e., the county or a municipality) may not contribute cash loans and/or cash grants for any other proposed development applying in the same competitive solicitation in an amount sufficient to qualify as Local Government Areas of Opportunity, per the competitive solicitation. In response to this RFA requirement, Heritage Oaks submitted Attachment 15, a loan form from Pinellas County, Florida, in the amount of $551,000. Based upon the minimum local government area of opportunity funding amounts established in the RFA, this amount qualified Intervenor Heritage Oaks for 10 points. Petitioners challenge Intervenor Heritage Oaks’ loan form for two reasons. First, Petitioners opine that the face value of the commitment and the net present value included in the loan form cannot be the same amount and, therefore, a calculation error must have occurred. Petitioners rely on examples of various calculations found in the RFA. Next, Petitioners allege that the loan form was not properly signed and no final approval was given by Pinellas County. Intervenor Heritage Oaks provided a loan form from Pinellas County. The loan form committed Pinellas County to a loan in the amount of $551,000. Mr. Bussey, the individual who processed the application and award of commitment, indicated that the commitment was a loan that would be forgiven as long as certain requirements were met and kept. Mr. Bussey further indicated that there were no loan payments or interest rates associated with the loan. Accordingly, he indicated that the loan value was the net present value of the loan, which means the commitment amount and the net present value for the Pinellas County loan is the same number, $551,000. While Petitioners allege that the loan form was not appropriately signed and no final approval had occurred, the greater weight of the evidence shows otherwise. Specifically, Petitioners opine that either a resolution or some action by the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners or the County Administrator was necessary as asserted by their witness, Mr. Banach. While Mr. Banach was critical of the loan verification form, he acknowledged that he is not an expert regarding the process for Pinellas County loan contribution and he did not process the loan application. He further acknowledged that Mr. Bussey, the individual who processed the loan, found no error with the form. The evidence shows that the loan form was executed by Charles Justice, who at the time of the loan form’s execution was the Chairman of the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners. Mr. Bussey explained the process for approving the loan form and indicated that Mr. Justice, as Chairman, had the authority to sign the loan form. Mr. Bussey also pointed out language in the loan form which provides as follows: “This certification must be signed by the chief appointed official (staff) responsible for such approval, . . . Chairperson of the Board of the County Commissioners.” Mr. Justice is one of the designated individuals the form itself indicated is acceptable. Mr. Bussey indicated that no further approvals were necessary. At hearing, Florida Housing indicated that the loan form submitted by Heritage Oaks satisfied the requirements of the RFA and this position was not shown to be erroneous or unreasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order rescinding the intended award to Heritage Oaks and designating Madison Point and America Residential Development, LLC, as the recipients of the funding under RFA 2016-113. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Marisa G. Button, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Michael G. Maida, Esquire Michael G. Maida, P.A. 1709 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Douglas P. Manson, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. 1101 West Swann Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606-2637 (eServed) Paria Shirzadi, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. 1101 West Swann Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606-2637 (eServed) Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) J. Timothy Schulte, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser, & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street, Suite 600 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Sarah Pape, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser, & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street, Suite 600 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC 1725 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Kate Flemming, Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Housing and Finance Corporation's intended decision to award low income housing tax credits for an affordable housing development in Miami-Dade County to Rio at Flagler, LP (Rio), was contrary to solicitation specifications, and if so, whether that determination was clearly erroneous or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504. One of its responsibilities is to award low-income housing tax credits, which developers use to finance the construction of affordable housing. Tax credits are made available to states annually by the United States Treasury Department and are then awarded pursuant to a competitive cycle that starts with Florida Housing's issuance of a RFA. In this case, the RFA was issued on November 21, 2014, modified slightly on January 30, 2015, and required the filing of applications by February 10, 2015. According to the RFA, Florida Housing is expected to award up to an estimated $4,367,107 of housing credits for the following demographic set- aside: housing projects targeted for either the family or elderly population in Miami-Dade County. The credits will be awarded to the applicants with the highest total scores. Pinnacle submitted Application No. 2015-211C seeking $2,560,000.00 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of a 104-unit residential rental development to be known as Pinnacle Heights. Rio submitted Application No. 2015-217C seeking $1,940,000.00 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of a 76-unit residential development to be known as Rio at Flagler. The agency's Executive Director appointed a review committee comprised of Florida Housing staff to evaluate the applications for eligibility and scoring. Fifty-three applications were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked pursuant to the terms of the RFA, administrative rules, and applicable federal regulations. Applications are considered for funding only if they are deemed "eligible," based on whether the application complies with various content requirements. Of the 53 applications filed in response to the RFA, 43 were found to be eligible, and ten were found ineligible. Both Pinnacle and Rio were found eligible for the family/elderly demographic. The RFA specifies a sorting order for funding eligible applicants. All eligible applicants in the family/elderly demographic, including Pinnacle and Rio, achieved the maximum score of 23 based on criteria in the RFA. Recognizing that there would be more applications than available credits, Florida Housing established an order for funding for applicants with tied scores using a sequence of six tiebreakers, with the last being a lottery number assigned by the luck of the draw. Applications with lower lottery numbers (closer to zero) are selected before those with higher lottery numbers. Both Pinnacle and Rio received the maximum 23 points and met all tiebreaker criteria. In other words, both had so- called "perfect" applications. The ultimate deciding factor for perfect applications is a randomly generated lottery number that is assigned at the time each application is filed. Rio's number is four, while Pinnacle's number is six. Because Rio had a lower lottery number than Pinnacle, Florida Housing issued its notice of intent to award tax credits to Rio and another applicant (with a lower lottery number) not relevant here. Pinnacle timely filed a formal written protest. As amended, Pinnacle's protest is narrowed to a single issue -- whether the bus stop identified in Rio's application is a Public Bus Transfer Stop, as defined in the RFA. A failure to comply with this provision would lower Rio's total proximity score and make it ineligible to receive tax credit funding. The RFA specifies two Point Items in the family/elderly demographic category. The first Point Item is "Local Government Contributions," for which a maximum of five points could be awarded. The second is "Proximity to Transit and Community Services," for which points are awarded based on the distance between the proposed development and the selected transit and community service. A maximum of six proximity points are allowed for Transit Services, while a maximum of 12 proximity points are allowed for Community Services for a total maximum of 18 proximity points. Under the terms of the RFA, if an applicant achieves a minimum of 12.25 proximity points for Community Services and Transit Services, a "point boost" up to the maximum total score of 18 proximity points is added to the applicant's score. Rio's transit score of six points is the focus of this dispute. The RFA lists five types of Transit Services that an applicant can self-select to obtain proximity points, including Public Bus Stop (maximum two points) and Public Bus Transfer Stop (maximum six points). Applicants may select only one type of transit services on which to base their transit score. Depending on the type of transit service selected, an applicant may receive up to a maximum of six points for Transit Services. To verify the information in the application, an applicant must submit a Surveyor Certification Form, which is completed and signed by a licensed surveyor. In making its preliminary decision to award tax credits, Florida Housing relies on the information provided in the form and does not second-guess the surveyor. Issues regarding the accuracy of the information in the form are presented through challenges by other applicants. Because Rio had only ten points for proximity to Community Services, it needed at least 2.25 transit points in order to obtain the minimum 12.25 proximity points necessary to achieve a point boost up to 18 points and be in the running for funding. Accordingly, Rio's application sought six points for the project site's proximity to a Public Bus Transfer Stop. A Public Bus Transfer Stop is defined on page 19 of the RFA as follows: This service may be selected by Family and Elderly Demographic Applicants. For purposes of proximity points, a Public Bus Transfer Stop means a fixed location at which passengers may access at least three routes of public transportation via buses. Each qualifying route must have a scheduled stop at the Public Bus Transfer Stop at least hourly during the times of 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and also during the times of 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year-round basis. This would include both bus stations (i.e. hubs) and bus stops with multiple routes. Bus routes must be established or approved by a Local Government department that manages public transportation. Buses that travel between states will not be considered. In sum, a Public Bus Transfer Stop is a fixed location at which passengers may access "at least three routes of public transportation via buses," with each route having a scheduled stop at that location at least hourly during morning and afternoon rush hours, Monday through Friday, on a year-round basis. To comply with this requirement, and based upon oral information provided by customer service at Miami-Dade Transit Authority (Authority), Rio selected a bus stop located at West Flagler Street and Northwest 8th Avenue. Rio represented that this location was served by three qualifying routes: Route 6 (Coconut Grove), Route 11 (Florida International University- University Park Campus), and Route 208 (Little Havana Circulator). The RFA requires that a bus route be established or approved by the "local government department" that manages public transportation, in this case the Authority. Florida Housing defers to the local government in determining whether a selected bus route is a qualifying bus route within the meaning of the RFA. The head of the local government department that manages public transportation is Gerald Bryan, the chief of service planning and scheduling. By deposition, Mr. Bryan testified that the location selected by Rio has only two qualifying routes: 11 and 208. Route 6, the third route relied upon by Rio, does not run hourly during the requisite rush hour times as required by the RFA and therefore is not a qualifying route. With only two qualifying routes, the transit service selected by Rio is a Public Bus Stop for which only two points, rather than six, can be awarded. Had this information been available to Florida Housing when it reviewed Rio's application, Rio's proximity score would have been less than 12.25, making it ineligible to receive a point boost and achieve the maximum total score of 18 proximity points. Because Rio is ineligible for funding, the next applicant in line is Pinnacle, as it has the next lowest lottery number among the eligible applications that received 23 points. Rio does not dispute that Route 6 fails to make the requisite stops during rush hours to be considered a qualifying route. However, it contends that Route 11 functionally serves as two distinct routes because it has two separate destinations: the Mall of the Americas and Florida International University Park Campus. But whether Route 11 is a single route or two routes is a determination that must be made by the local government, and not the applicant. Mr. Bryan testified that the Authority established Route 11 as a single route with two separate termination points. He further explained that it is a standard practice for a single route, such as Route 11, to have more than one terminus in order to provide a higher level of customer service. Because Florida Housing does not second guess the determination of the local government, the undersigned has rejected Rio's assertion that the bus stop is a Public Bus Transfer Stop. Without the inclusion of the six proximity points for this type of transit service, Rio's application is not eligible for funding in this cycle.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order finding that Rio's application is ineligible for funding and that Pinnacle's application should be selected for funding under RFA 2014-116. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Kate Fleming, Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1367 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. Post Office Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1367 (eServed) Betty C. Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1367 (eServed) J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1591 (eServed) Gary J. Cohen, Esquire Shutts and Bowen, LLP 1500 Miami Center 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-4329 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination in this matter is whether Respondents engaged in acts of housing discrimination against Petitioners on the basis of race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Donald Travis and Lisa Harrell, are a bi-racial couple (Mr. Travis is African-American and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons subject to protection under Florida's Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, and Ms. Harrell is white). They have two sons who are bi-racial (one is African-American and white, the other is white and Asian). Petitioners lived in Apartment 163 at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506. Respondents, John and Anne Cutler, are the owners of two four-plex apartments at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506, including the unit occupied by Petitioners that gave rise to this matter. They are both retired educators who own and operate their apartment rental business in their retirement. In their teaching and professional careers, both have instructed students of various races and national origins. Petitioner, Donald Travis, is a veteran of Desert Storm and has been treated for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He regularly takes medications to treat anxiety and depression. On April 4, 2008, Petitioners moved into Apartment 163, which had been recently painted, carpeted, and had a new ceiling fan and light installed in the living room. Everything went smoothly between Petitioners and Respondents for several months. Mr. Cutler had to unplug the downstairs toilet with a plunger a few times, but everything else seemed to be in working order. Both Mr. and Ms. Cutler considered Petitioners to be good tenants. As summer approached, Mr. Travis asked Mr. Cutler about installing a screen door for the sliding glass doors. This could not be done without replacing the entire sliding glass doors. When Apartment 131 became vacant, its screen door was moved to Petitioners' apartment. The screen door had a slit in it, which Ms. Cutler repaired with tape. When Apartment 132 became vacant, the good screen door from that apartment was used to replace the taped one in Petitioners' apartment. Respondents tried to keep everything in working order in Petitioners' apartment. When Petitioners' refrigerator door would not close, Respondents replaced the refrigerator. Respondents thought Petitioners were happy with their apartment. Petitioners called Respondents about a plumbing leak and said feces was running down the wall. The leak and pipe were fixed by B & G Plumbing. Petitioners were shown the water shut-off valve in case of future leaks. Petitioners believe that Respondents treated them differently from other tenants in the apartment buildings. Petitioners believe that other tenants were allowed to keep pets in their apartments while they were not. Respondents allowed tenants who had pets when they purchased the apartments to keep them, but banned pets on all future rentals. The rent for Petitioners' apartment, including water, sewer, and garbage, was $650.00. Petitioners always paid their rent on time. Petitioners asked to be moved into a better unit since they believed their unit was inferior to others in the complex. Petitioners wanted to move into Apartment 162 which, in their opinion, was in much better shape than their unit. Respondents offered to put new carpet into Apartment 162 before Petitioners moved in, but they refused. Petitioners decided to leave the apartment because they believed the maintenance was not properly performed. On December 5, 2008, the day Petitioners made known their desire to leave the apartment, Mr. Travis confronted Mr. Cutler. Mr. Cutler offered Apartment 132 to Petitioners because it was ready for occupancy after its occupants had moved out. Apartment 133 would soon be ready, and was also offered to Petitioners. Mr. Travis angrily refused to move into any apartments in the two four-plexes. He yelled at Mr. Cutler and told him he hated him. This exchange was witnessed by a neighbor, Gary Denton. Mr. Cutler offered to let Petitioners move out without penalty, and agreed to return their $650.00 deposit. Petitioners accepted the offer and received the deposit in full as well as a waiver of the first five days' rent for December and an additional four days of rent to allow them time to pack and move. Petitioners accused Respondents of renting one four-plex to whites only and the other to minorities. At the time Petitioners moved out, both four-plexes had tenants of different races. As of the date of the hearing, five of the six total units rented were to non-white tenants. Only one was rented to a white couple.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: John Cutler Anne Cutler 5970 Limestone Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Donald Travis Lisa Harrell 1008 West Young Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
