The Issue Whether Respondent's conduct in recruiting, selecting, and hiring Robert Denson as Associate University Attorney was improper and justifies imposition of University discipline pursuant to Rule 6C-5.27, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Ultimate facts are conclusions reached by applying inference and logic to evidentiary facts. See, Feldman v. Department of Transportation, 389 So.2d 692, 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The following conclusions address the charges brought against Biggs by the University. XII. Preselection A preponderance of evidence does not establish that Biggs preselected or decided to hire Robert Denson prior to recruiting and evaluating other applicants for the job of Associate University Attorney. Although Biggs was impressed with Denson's performance as an Assistant Dean and, no doubt, felt Denson could be an effective Associate University Attorney, such facts, in themselves, do not establish preselection. There is no evidence that Biggs ever encouraged Denson to seek employment as an Associate University Attorney; at the time of the alleged preselection, Biggs believed Denson planned to enter private practice. 16/ With such a belief, it would have been improbable that Biggs decided, in advance, that Denson would be his choice. Prior to learning of Denson's interest in the position, Biggs engaged in conduct designed to broaden the applicant search and open the position to increased numbers of out-of-state female and black applicants. 17/ Denson's ultimate selection and employment under those broadened search criteria does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that the criteria were originally devised with Denson in mind. Out of over 70 applicants, the Search Committee independently selected Denson as its number two choice. It was not until after his justifiable rejection of the Committee's number one choice that Biggs decided that Denson was the most qualified applicant and should be selected. His tenacious efforts to defend that decision are consistent with his conviction that his decision was correct. XIII. Service on the Search Committee Biggs did not know and was not reasonably on notice that his service on the Search Committee was contrary to University Search and Screen Procedures. At the time, the published procedures did not expressly prohibit a hiring authority from serving on a Search Committee which he or she appoints; neither did the guidelines infer or give reasonable notice that such action was proscribed. Although Biggs served on the Search Committee, the weight of evidence indicates the Committee functioned in an independent manner: its discussions were free and open, its decisions were made by consensus. Biggs neither manipulated its decisions nor unduly influenced its discussions. XIV. Hiring "Unqualified Applicant for the Position Biggs reasonably believed that the SUS requirement of Florida Bar membership had been "waived" by the University's Personnel Office. This conclusion is based on Personnel's action in advertising the position and subsequently screening and approving applicants; on Biggs' prior experience in obtaining waivers of the Florida Bar membership requirement; and on Personnel's inconsistent decisions and interpretations regarding waivers. When Biggs announced his decision to hire Denson, Willits protested that the SUS Florida Bar membership requirement had not, in fact, been "waived"; however, the final decision was then placed before the University Personnel Director, Robert Button. Biggs asked Button whether Denson met the minimum job qualifications and could be hired. (P-27.) Button answered that exceptions (a term seemingly synonymous with waivers) were allowed only for affirmative action purposes, that he did not see how an exception could be applied to hire a white male when there were qualified blacks and women who exceeded the minimum qualifications but that the decision on whether or not to hire Denson must be made by Biggs. Button did not say that Denson could not be hired, or that such a hiring would be disapproved by Personnel. Biggs reasonably construed this to mean that Personnel questioned the wisdom of his hiring Denson but that the decision was a permissible one which was his, and his alone, to make. If Denson could not be hired without violating University fair hiring practices, he had a right to expect that Button would have told him so. Biggs also had reasonable cause to believe that he could successfully justify hiring Denson on his merits--an impressive applicant with unique experience and demonstrated competence. XV. Compliance with the Affirmative Action Policy Biggs' hiring of Denson was not proscribed by any provision of the University's Affirmative Action Plan, a fact seemingly admitted by the University's personnel officer--the person charged with monitoring compliance with the Plan. (Tr. 320-321.) No showing was made that the Plan placed a mandatory duty upon Biggs to hire a black or female applicant who he reasonably concluded was less qualified than a white male. Search Committees were created, in part, to ensure affirmative action and equal employment opportunity; Biggs hired the second choice of his Committee after reasonably rejecting its first choice. Due process requires that charges against an accused be specific in nature. Care must be taken when accusing persons of violating affirmative action policies which are often couched in vague or general terms. XVI. Discrimination in Employment By his recruitment and selection of Denson, Biggs did not discriminate against female or black applicants on the basis of sex or race. His action was not motivated by discriminatory intent; any inference to the contrary is effectively negated by his prior nondiscriminatory hiring decisions and his effort to increase the number of female and black applicants for Carole Taylor's vacant position. His overriding objective was to select the best and most qualified applicant. His failure to select a black or female applicant who he reasonably considered less qualified than a white male cannot and should not be considered impermissible discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the University of Florida enter a Final Order dismissing its charges against Thomas S. Biggs, Jr. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an instructor of mathematics at Glades Junior High School in Dade County, Florida. On May 10, 1967, Petitioner received a Rank III teacher's certificate from the Respondent. Petitioner has been certified as a Rank III teacher since that time. Petitioner most recently requested reevaluation of her certificate status on or about September 15, 1975. Petitioner sought certification as a Rank II teacher. The Respondent denied the request. Petitioner was awarded a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Hunter College on June 19, 1940. Petitioner was awarded a Bachelor of Law Degree by St. Johns University School of Law in September, 1943. At the time that Petitioner enrolled in the St. Johns University School of Law, the St. Johns University School of Law did not require that candidates for admission possess an undergraduate Bachelor's Degree in order to be enrolled. Candidates for admission were required to have completed at least two years of college in order to be enrolled.
The Issue The central issue in case no. 88-2368 is whether Respondent should be suspended for thirty workdays due to misconduct in office. The central issue in case no. 88-3315 is whether Respondent should be dismissed from employment due to misconduct in office, gross insubordination, and incompetency.
Findings Of Fact COPIES FURNISHED: Marlene Rodriguez 16333 Wood Walk Miami Lakes, Florida 33014 Frank Harder Twin Oaks Building, Suite 100 2780 Galloway Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mrs. Madelyn P. Schere Assistant School Board Attorney School Board of Dade County Board Administration Building, Suite 301 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Dr. Joseph A. Fernandez Superintendent of Schools Dade County Public Schools 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: With regard to case no. 88-2368, that the School Board of Dade County enter a final order affirming the administrative decision to suspend Respondent for a thirty workday period for misconduct in office. With regard to case no. 88-3315, that the School Board of Dade County enter a final order affirming the administrative decision to dismiss Respondent from employment for misconduct in office, incompetence, and gross insubordination. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 88-2368, 88-3315 RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraph 1 is accepted with the exception of George C. Clark, Mr. Clark's testimony was offered by deposition. Paragraph 2 is accepted. Paragraphs 3-4 are accepted. Paragraph 5 is rejected as a recitation of testimony, not specific facts adduced by such testimony; some of the recitation being without basis. It is found that Respondent did not follow school policies regarding the discipline administered to students, that Respondent was aware of the correct procedures, and that Respondent continuously had trouble regarding classroom management. Paragraph 6 is accepted. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraph 9 is accepted but is unnecessary to the conclusions reached in this cause. Paragraph 10 is accepted not for the truth of the matters asserted therein but as a indication of the student-teacher relationship between Respondent and one of the students she taught. Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 are accepted. Paragraph 14 is accepted not for the truth of the matters asserted therein but see p.9 above. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted not for the truth of the matters asserted therein but see p.9 above as it relates to the hearsay contents of the letter. Other portions of the paragraph which conclude respondent knew discipline procedures but did not follow them, or knew notice policies but did not follow them are accepted. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are accepted. Paragraphs 19,20,21, and 22 are accepted only to the extent addressed in findings of fact, paragraphs 7,8,9, and 10; otherwise, the proposed findings are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or unsupported by admissible evidence. Paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 26, the first two sentences are accepted, the balance is rejected as hearsay or unsupported by the record in this cause. Paragraphs 27, 29, and 30 are accepted. (Petitioner did not submit a paragraph 28) In the future, proposed findings submitted which do not conform to the rules of the Florida Administrative Code will be summarily rejected. Petitioner is cautioned to review applicable rules, and to cite appropriately. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraph 1 is accepted with the clarification that Clark's testimony was offered by deposition. Paragraph 2 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 3, according to the evidence in this case, Repodent taught at Miami Gardens Elementary School (Leon was her principal there) and North Carol City Elementary School (Sawyer and Brown were her principals there). Other schools may have been assigned during her periods of "special assignment" but the record is insufficient to establish Respondent's performance while on such assignments. The record is insufficient to make the legal conclusion addressed in paragraph 4, consequently, it is rejected. The Board addressed a recommendation to terminate Respondent's employment; however, the record does not establish final action was taken. The facts alleged in paragraph 5 are too voluminous to address in one paragraph. Petitioner's continued use of a recitation of the testimony does not constitute findings of fact. Pertinent to this case are the following facts adduced from Petitioner's paragraph 5: that Respondent's overall performance was unacceptable, that Respondent failed to direct students who were off task, that Respondent made an excessive number of referrals for discipline, and that the atmosphere in Respondent's class was not conducive to learning. With the exception of the last sentence in paragraph 6, it is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. See finding made regarding paragraph 5, case no. 88-2368. Paragraph 8 is rejected as contrary to the specific evidence presented. Paragraph 9 is accepted. Paragraphs 10-14 are accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected with the exception of the last sentence; the time sequence referred to is not specified in the record. The record does establish, however, that Respondent did not make progress in correcting noted areas of deficiency. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are accepted. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have duplicate numbers for the following paragraphs: 15,16, and 17. The second set of these paragraphs are addressed below. Second paragraph 15 accepted not for the truth of the matters asserted but as an indication of the teacher-student relationship between Respondent and her student. Second paragraph 16 is accepted. Second paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraphs 19-22 are accepted.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to the relief requested in his Step Three salary grievance with Florida A&M University (FAMU).
Findings Of Fact In school year 2008-2009, Petitioner was a tenured professor at Stetson University College of Law (Stetson) in St. Petersburg. The FAMU College of Law, located in Orlando, was recruiting new faculty to improve its stature and academic standing. Besides Petitioner's academic stature as a tax and business law professor, the College of Law was then only provisionally accredited by the American Bar Association, and it sought an individual, such as Petitioner, who could help the College of Law achieve and retain full accreditation. Like other state universities, College of Law faculty members are either on a nine-month (academic calendar), ten- month, or 12-month (annual calendar) contract. A 12-month contract is justified when a faculty member has regular year- round teaching, research, and/or administrative duties. In late 2008, Petitioner was first contacted by the Dean of the College of Law, LeRoy Pernell, regarding a teaching position for the upcoming school year 2009-2010. By letter dated February 26, 2009, Dean Pernell informed Petitioner that he would recommend his appointment as a tenured, full professor under a nine-month contract at a salary of $177,000.00. See Pet'r Ex. 1. Had he returned to Stetson for the 2009-2010 academic year, Petitioner's base salary would have been $154,230.00, plus "benefit costs," including a summer teaching supplement and a tuition-matching program for his family, which totaled more than Dean Pernell's initial offer. See Pet'r Ex. 3. Accordingly, Petitioner rejected the offer and asked for a compensation package of around $200,000.00. Although Dean Pernell had no authority to establish a salary level, he agreed to recommend that Petitioner receive a salary of $180,000.00 for a nine-month faculty contract, rather than $177,000.00, and to "commit to providing a funded summer research grant to equal no less than $15,000 for summers 2010- 2012, assuming continuing availability of funding." See Pet'r Ex. 2. These proposed changes were handwritten on the initial offer letter previously tendered by Dean Pernell. Dean Pernell's offer letter required that Petitioner work 12 months -- nine months as a professor and three months in a research role. The new offer was memorialized by the Dean in a third version of the initial offer letter dated February 26, 2009. As the testimony at hearing confirmed, the final version of the letter simply incorporated Dean Pernell's handwritten changes found on the second version and reads in pertinent part as follows: This is to advise you that by a vote of the faculty and my full support, I am recommending that you be appointed to the faculty of the Florida A&M University College of Law as a professor. The formal letter of offer from the Senior Vice President and Provost of Florida A&M University is forthcoming. This recommendation is as a tenured Professor [of] Law. The recommendation is that this appointment be effective commencing with the 2009-2010 academic year and commencing with a salary of $180,000.00 for a 9 month contract. In addition, I will recommend that the College of Law commit to providing you a funded summer research grant equal to no less than $15,000.00 for the summers 2010-2012, assuming continued availability of funds. See also Jt. Ex. 9, p. 3. The authority to make formal employment and salary offers to faculty members lies with the Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs, who at that time was Dr. Cynthia Hughes-Harris. See FAMU Reg. 1.021; Jt. Ex. 2. She was not required to accept the recommendation of Dean Pernell and could make an offer that fit within FAMU's administrative and budget considerations. Dean Pernell made this clear during his negotiations with Petitioner. On April 20, 2009, Provost Hughes-Harris informed Petitioner by letter that FAMU was offering him a full-time position with the College of Law. The letter stated in part as follows: I am pleased to offer you a 12 month, full- time position as a full Professor and also, Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development in the College of Law. Your position as professor is with tenure, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees will meet regarding this matter no later than June 2009. The annual salary of $180,000 with a $20,000 stipend for administrative responsibilities will be paid on a bi-weekly rate of $7,662.83. The appointment period is for the fiscal year, which will begin on July 1, 2009 and end on June 30, 2010. Jt. Ex. 1. While Provost Hughes-Harris' offer essentially matched the compensation recommended by Dean Pernell, the terms of the offer deviated in two material respects. First, rather than a nine-month faculty contract, Petitioner was offered a 12-month faculty contract. Second, rather than a "summer research grant" to supplement his salary, he was offered a 12-month position as Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, which required that he perform administrative duties on a year-round basis. Because of administrative duties, his teaching responsibilities were limited to a "maximum of two courses per academic year while Associate Dean." Id. The bottom line here is that Petitioner was offered the same compensation recommended by Dean Pernell, but he now had year-round administrative duties. Petitioner voluntarily accepted the offer on April 28, 2009. See Jt. Ex. 1, p. 2. At hearing, Provost Hughes-Harris denied ever receiving a copy of any offer letter by Dean Pernell, except the initial offer letter of $177,000.00. However, Provost Hughes- Harris did not make employment and salary offers without conferring with the recommending dean, and she acknowledged that there "was certainly conversation" with Dean Pernell before the offer letter was tendered. While she could not recall any details regarding that conversation, she recalled that her offer letter was for a 12-month faculty contract, and there was no way to "blend" a nine-month teaching contract with a 12-month administrator contract. This is because a nine-month position and a 12-month position require separate contracts and cannot be combined. Each employment contract signed by Petitioner included the following conditions: This Employment Contract between Florida A&M University Board of Trustees (FAMU) and the Employee is subject to the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida as constitutionally permissible, and the regulations, policies and procedures of [the] U.S. and the Florida Board of Governors and FAMU as now existing or hereafter promulgated. * * * This Employment Contract supersedes any and all prior agreements, contracts, understandings, and communications between the Employee and FAMU, whether written or oral, expressed or implied, relating to the subject matter of this Employment Contract and is intended as a complete and final expression of the terms of the Employment Contract between FAMU and the Employee and shall not be changed or subject to change orally. Jt. Ex. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Petitioner commenced employment with the College of Law in July 2009 and continued working as Associate Dean and a full Professor until the summer of 2015. During that period of time, he taught at least one class in the fall and spring semesters and performed administrative duties as Associate Dean on a year-round basis. By then, regular pay adjustments had increased his base salary for fiscal year July 1, 2015, through June 30, 2016, to $189,304.30, plus a supplement of $20,000.00 as Associate Dean. See Jt. Ex. 6. When Dean Pernell stepped down as Dean in the summer of 2015, by letter dated June 15, 2015, the new Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs, Marcella David, appointed Petitioner Interim Dean while a search for a new Dean was undertaken. Besides the base salary and supplement he already received as Associate Dean, Petitioner was given an additional supplement of $10,000.00 for serving as Interim Dean, for a total supplement of $30,000.00. See Jt. Ex. 8. On June 26, 2015, Petitioner voluntarily signed the offer letter confirming his acceptance. Id. Provost David's letter informed Petitioner that "upon cessation of [his] appointment as Interim Dean of the College of Law and return to the position of Associate Dean," his salary would "be adjusted consistent with applicable FAMU Board of Trustee Regulations and Policies." Id. This obviously meant that once a new Dean was hired, and he reassumed the position of Associate Dean, he would no longer receive the extra $10,000.00 supplement. For the first time, the letter specifically advised Petitioner to be aware of Regulation 10.102 and Policy 2005-15. Id. Prior to that time, no reference to specific regulations or policies was made. However, each employment contract placed him on notice that all FAMU policies and regulations applied to employment contracts.1/ Regulation 10.102 and Policy 2005-15 govern pay actions when faculty members serving in an administrative position return to a faculty only position. This meant that if Petitioner resumed full-time teaching with no administrative duties, he would be subject to the terms of those provisions. Before signing the June 15, 2015, offer letter, Petitioner did not ask how the Regulation and Policy would affect his base salary if he returned to a full-time faculty position since more than likely he assumed he would again serve as Associate Dean and a tenured professor. Subsections (11) and (12) of Regulation 10.102 read as follows: When the assignment of Faculty serving in an administrative position such as Vice President, Dean, Director, or Department Chair is changed, the pay and appointment period shall be adjusted to reflect the new responsibilities. Pay adjustments shall be completed in accordance with the Board of Trustees Policy 2005-15 (Separation and Return of Senior Administrative and Academic Officers to Faculty), as now or hereafter amended. An employee's base salary shall be adjusted 81.8 percent when changing from a twelve-month appointment to a nine-month appointment. An employee's base salary shall be adjusted by 122.2 percent when changing from a nine-month appointment to a twelve-month appointment. Jt. Ex. 10, p. 2. Section IV., Policy 2005-15, "Salary upon Change in Assignment to a Faculty Position," describes three ways in which to calculate an employee's salary after being reassigned from an administrative to faculty position. It reads as follows: New Hire as Administrator If the employee was hired upon initial appointment as an administrator, his or her new salary will be the median salary of the employees within the same professorial rank and discipline. Tenured Faculty Prior to Becoming an Administrator. If the employee was previously a tenured faculty member prior to becoming an administrator, his or her new salary will be the salary held by the employee immediately prior to the time of the administrative appointment and any increases received by the faculty during the time of service as an administrator. These separate compensations will be noted in the appointment letter. Other Consideration Notwithstanding the provisions of IV.A. and IV.B., any agreed upon salary arrangement negotiated by the President or President's designee upon appointment as an administrator shall also be considered. Jt. Ex. 3, p. 2. On January 4, 2016, A. Felecia Epps was selected as the new Dean of the College of Law, with a start date of January 4, 2016. After assuming the position, Dean Epps restructured the College of Law leadership and its personnel. A determination was made that Petitioner would not continue in his role as Associate Dean and he would return to a full-time position as instructional faculty. Because Petitioner no longer had the position and responsibilities as Associate Dean, and would work only nine months each year as a professor, he was tendered a new contract on March 3, 2016, which adjusted his base salary downward from $189,304.00 to $148,306.00. See Jt. Ex. 5. This calculation was consistent with Regulation 10.102(12). The term of employment was from August 1, 2016, through May 5, 2017, with no special supplements or conditions. The new salary represented compensation based on a nine-month contract as a professor rather than a 12-month contract with dual duties. According to Provost David, who tendered the offer, this salary adjustment was in accord with section IV.A., Policy 2005-15, which governs salary changes for employees who are reassigned from an administrative position to a faculty position and were hired upon initial appointment as an administrator. She explained that Petitioner was initially hired by the College of Law as Associate Dean, and upon cessation of that appointment, section IV.A. provides that the employee's new salary "be the median salary of the employees within the same professorial rank and discipline." She further explained that the provision assumes the person being appointed as a new administrator is a faculty member, as it would not otherwise refer to the employee as having a professorial rank. This interpretation of the Policy is a reasonable one and not clearly erroneous. On March 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a grievance arguing that he was entitled to the same compensation ($180,000.00) agreed upon when he was initially hired as a professor in 2009, plus annual accruals. On March 18, 2016, Petitioner signed the contract under protest and subject to his grievance. See Jt. Ex. 5. The current median salary of faculty members in the College of Law is $148,306.00, which is the same as the adjusted salary first offered Petitioner in March 2016. Petitioner points out, however, that at least three current College of Law faculty members of similar experience and expertise, hired just before or after he was hired in 2009, were given nine-month employment contracts with a base salary of around $180,000.00. Ten days before the final hearing, Provost David tendered Petitioner another employment contract that increased his annual base salary from $148,306.00 to $154,850.92. See Jt. Ex. 4. The rationale for this increase was first outlined in Provost David's memorandum dated May 13, 2016, which denied Petitioner's Step Two grievance. See Jt. Ex. 9, p. 6. As further explained by Provost David at hearing, by "generously" interpreting section IV.C., Petitioner's appointment as Interim Dean could be treated "as a new appointment as an administrator with a base salary identified there on a 12-month basis of $189,000 and change, which allowed me to add approximately $6,000 to the median salary that was calculated under Paragraph A." Faculty members with a 12-month contract accrue both vacation and sick leave. A nine-month faculty member does not. Petitioner is aware of this distinction. After this dispute arose, Petitioner requested a pay-out of his unused accrued vacation leave and was given $31,912.32.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida A&M University enter a final order denying Petitioner's Step Three grievance. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: During the 1984-85 and 1985-86 academic years, Respondent attended Highland Oaks Junior High School. During the 1985-86 academic year, Respondent was absent thirty-six (36) times, tardy thirty (30) times, and under suspension for twenty-eight (28) days. The Respondent did not receive a final grade for the 1985-86 academic year because he was transferred to Jan Mann Opportunity School on May 29, 1986. The last grading period for which Respondent received grades for the 1985-86 academic year was the third grading period which covered February 3, 1986 through March 27, 1986. For that grading period, the Respondent received five "F's" and one "D" for academic performance. When a teacher or other staff member at Highland Oaks Junior High School has difficulty with a student's behavior, the teacher may submit a report of the incident to the front office, The reports are called Student Case Management Referral Forms and are reserved for serious behavior problems. During the 1985-86 academic year, nine Student Case Management Referral Forms were written regarding Respondent's behavior. On December 2, 1985, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent was rude and disruptive in class and did not serve detention as requested. On December 10, 1985, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent was disruptive in class and was so out of control that while swinging his arms, he struck one of his teachers in the mouth (apparently unintentional). The Respondent was suspended for five days. On January 9, 1986, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because the Respondent used provocative language to one of his teachers. On February 7, 1986, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent repeatedly talked back and was very disrespectful and defiant to one of his teachers. The Respondent was suspended for three days. On March 7, 1986, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent cut class and was returned to the school by police. On April 21, 1986, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent was found in the hallway cutting class by administrators at approximately 9:00 a.m. The Assistant Principal told the Respondent to report to the office. The Respondent did not report to the office as requested, and at 3:00 p.m., a second Student Case Management Referral Form was written on April 21, 1986, because of Respondent's failure to obey the Assistant Principal's directives to report to the office. On May 5, 1986, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent used profanity in class. The Respondent was suspended for five days. On May 12, 1986, a Student Case Management Referral Form was written because Respondent cut class and was with a group of boys who set off a fire alarm. The Respondent was suspended for five days. Ms. Van Dam is the building substitute teacher at Highland Oaks Junior High School and substituted in many classes where the Respondent was present. The Respondent was very defiant and resisted authority in all Ms. Van Dam's classes. The Respondent failed to obey simple requests and stated that he did not have to do certain things and that no one could force him to do certain things. On one occasion, Ms. Van Dam asked the Respondent to change seats. The Respondent replied, "F--- you, I will not change seats". During one class period, the Respondent went under an art table and refused to come out. Respondent's conduct consistently caused Ms. Van Dam to interrupt her normal classroom lessons. Ms. Emma Garcia-Mendoza is an art teacher at Highland Oaks Junior High School and had Respondent as a student during the 1984-85 and 1985-86 academic years. In all classes, the Respondent was disruptive and defiant. On one occasion, the Respondent was out of his seat, and Ms. Garcia-Mendoza told the Respondent to sit down two or three times. Respondent refused to sit down and walked out of class without permission. During class, Respondent had a habit of blurting comments out, not directed to anyone in particular. On one occasion, the Respondent returned to class after a suspension and was annoying a female student in the back of the room. Ms. Garcia-Mendoza told the Respondent not to bother the other student and told Respondent to move. The Respondent shouted to Ms. Garcia-Mendoza, "F--- you, you f---ing b----, I hate you", and walked out of the door. On another occasion, Respondent got into an altercation with another student, and when Ms. Garcia-Mendoza attempted to break-up the altercation, the Respondent pulled his fist back as if to strike Ms. Garcia- Mendoza, but stopped. The Respondent's conduct consistently caused Ms. Garcia- Mendoza to interrupt her regular classroom instruction and routine. Mr. Arnold Golditch teaches manufacturing or "shop" at Highland Oaks Junior High School. Golditch had Respondent as a student for the 1984-85 academic year and part of the 1985-86 academic year. The Respondent had a habit of blurting out comments in class and getting up and walking around during the lesson. The Respondent was consistently defiant during the 1985-86 academic year. Mr. Golditch was required to move the Respondent's seat on several occasions. The Respondent's conduct consistently required Mr. Golditch to interrupt his prepared classroom lesson. Ms. Margaret Stanley is a guidance counselor at Highland Oaks Junior High School. During the 1984-85 academic year, each of Respondent's teachers complained to Ms. Stanley about Respondent's disruptive behavior and work performance. Particularly, the teachers complained that the Respondent would talk out in class. During the 1984-85 and 1985-86 academic years, Ms. Stanley held many conferences with the Respondent and his mother. The conferences did not result in any changed behavior on the Respondent's part. Mr. Fontana, the assistant principal at Highland Oaks Junior High School, held a conference with Respondent's mother during the 1985-86 academic year but her reaction was mainly one of hostility. For the 1984-85 academic year, the Respondent received three "F's", one "C" and one "Incomplete" as final academic grades.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order affirming the assignment of Respondent to Jan Mann Opportunity School-North. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of September, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2398 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case: Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2 and 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact IS, 16 and 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Assistant Board Attorney Dade County Public Schools 1450 N.E. Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 James C. Bovell, Esquire 1401 Ponce de Leon Blvd. Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Ms. Eldie Samuels 2529 N.E. 191st Street, Apt. 4 North Miami Beach, Florida 33100 Dr. Leonard Britton, Superintendent Dade County Public Schools Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Judith Brechner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On February 6 & 7, 1993, Petitioner, Alecia J. Miller, was the President of the student body of the University of South Florida. Petitioner, B. Mitchell Crandall, was serving as student Attorney general, a student government office. Both incumbents received financial remuneration for their services. The University of South Florida, (USF), is an institution of higher education, located in Tampa, and a part of the Florida State University System. Its President, Francis T. Borkowski, is the chief administrative officer of the university and responsible for its overall operation and administration. He is delegated statutory authority and may, within that authority, exercise such functions and take such actions as are necessary to achieve educational and other goals of the institution. The student government at USF is an integral part of the University and is subject to the direction and control of the university President and other supervisors responsible for the administration of the university's function. On February 6, 1993, Barbara J. Sherman, Interim Vice President for Student Affairs at USF, in a letter to President Borkowski, communicated her concern over the "situation involving student government leaders and the Student Coalition." She noted the continuing efforts by her and her staff to facilitate a compromise of their differences by which the parties to the dispute could be brought together for solution and the lack of success those efforts had met with. She also noted that many of the concerns of the Student Coalition appeared valid and, noting the inability of the parties to agree upon any resolution of the problem, concluded that its continuing existence was contributing to an erosion of the academic climate for a substantial number of students involved on both sides of the issues. Vice President Sherman also concluded that administration intervention was necessary to restore an orderly environment which would be conducive to the educational business of the institution. To facilitate that end, Sherman recommended certain actions be taken by Borkowski which included the deactivation of certain functions of the executive branch of student government. On February 7, 1993, these recommendations were approved in total for immediate implementation by President Borkowski. As a result of that decision, the office of Student Body President and Vice President were immediately deactivated and the incumbents, including Petitioner Miller, were directed to vacate the student government offices. Borkowski's actions also included a scheduled termination of the appointment of cabinet officers, one of whom was the other Petitioner, Mr. Crandall. As a result of this action, Petitioners claim a significant decrease in the amount of monetary compensation they receive as student officers. Pursuant to the Constitution of the Student Body of the University of South Florida, the executive and legislative powers of the student body are vested in student officers including a president and student senators elected by a majority vote of the student body. The executive officer of the association, the Student Body President, has specific responsibilities which include the selection of student members of the University's activity and service, health, and athletic fee committees who act on the setting of student fees. Among other functions of the Student Body President are participation in the selection of student representatives to serve on various Board of Regents committees, and the selection of student representation in public employee bargaining negotiations involving the University. The student senate has limited authority over the allocation and expenditure of the student activity and service fund, subject to the veto of the University President. The student government association as a whole has been granted specific statutory rights and responsibilities which include the mandatory consultation of the University President with the association on proposed projects using capital improvement trust fund fees and other functions as well. Taken together, it is clear that the student government association serves as a representative body to negotiate with the University President on many issues. Sherman's letter to Borkowski also recommended the establishment of a commission on student governance " to be comprised of students with diverse interests and concerns along with appropriate faculty and administrative representatives." The proposed charge to this commission indicated a major consideration would be to "respond to the serious accountability issues identified through the several comprehensive university audits of student government operations. "
The Issue Whether Respondent, Uceda School of Orlando, Inc. (Uceda Orlando), discriminated against Petitioner, Matalyn Johnson (Ms. Johnson), based on her race and disability when it failed to hire her. The specific issue to be determined is whether Uceda Orlando was an “employer” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2020) (FCRA).1
Findings Of Fact Ms. Johnson is an African-American female who has a speech impediment caused by a stroke and/or cancer. She applied for an ESL teaching position at a school located on Kirkman Road in Orlando, Florida.3 Uceda Orlando operates a school located at 5425 South Semoran Boulevard in Orlando, Florida. Uceda Orlando was incorporated in 2003. Juan Uceda (Mr. Uceda) is the registered agent and at all relevant times was the president and director of Uceda Orlando. Uceda OBT operates at least two schools located in Orlando, Florida: (1) at 12934 Deertrace Avenue, Suite B; and (2) at 4586 South Kirkman Road (Uceda Kirkman). Uceda OBT was incorporated in 2010. Charo Uceda (Ms. Uceda) is the registered agent and president of Uceda OBT. ESL TEACHER POSITION Angel Rodriguez was a teacher who worked at Uceda Kirkman from April 2019 to February 2020. For the time relevant to these proceedings, Mr. Rodriguez was supervised by Ricardo Sanchez. According to Mr. Sanchez's W-2 forms, he was paid by "Uceda School of Orlando – OBT, Inc." Mr. Sanchez, who interviewed Ms. Johnson and made the decision not to hire her, was employed by Uceda OBT. In November 2019, Mr. Rodriguez submitted his resignation letter to Uceda Kirkman.4 Mr. Sanchez asked Mr. Rodriguez if he knew of anyone who could teach ESL in his place. Mr. Rodriguez suggested Ms. Johnson for the position. 3 "ESL" stands for "English as a second language." 4 Mr. Rodriguez continued to work as a substitute teacher at Uceda Kirkman after he resigned. Mr. Rodriguez worked with Ms. Johnson at an Orange County public middle school. He told Ms. Johnson about the ESL position he was vacating at Uceda Kirkman and encouraged her to apply. Ms. Johnson applied for the ESL position. Based on the overwhelming evidence at the hearing, it is clear that Ms. Johnson applied for Mr. Rodriguez's vacant position with Uceda Kirkman (operated by Uceda OBT) and not for a position with a school operated by Uceda Orlando. Ms. Johnson is a public middle school teacher in Orange County. She has a bachelor's degree in English with a minor in Spanish. She is certified to teach ESL classes to students in sixth through twelfth grades. Although Ms. Johnson's application was not entered into evidence, her unrebutted testimony and the testimony from Mr. Rodriguez established that she was qualified for the ESL position. Ms. Johnson interviewed for the position with Mr. Sanchez. She later heard from Mr. Sanchez that she did not get the position. On January 13, 2020, Ms. Johnson received an official notification that she had not been selected for the ESL position. The email was from "Uceda School of Orlando-Kirkman," and stated in relevant part: Subject: Application for ESL Teacher at Uceda School of Orlando-Kirkman Thank you for applying to the ESL Teacher position at Uceda School of Orlando-Kirkman. Unfortunately, Uceda School of Orlando-Kirkman has moved to the next step in their hiring process, and your application was not selected at this time. INTERRELATION OF INDIVIDUAL UCEDA SCHOOLS Mr. Uceda is the father of Ms. Uceda and Doris Uceda. Together the three co-founded the Uceda English Institute (UEI) in the 1980s, which is a chain of federally-accredited ESL schools. There are numerous locations or branches of UEI in Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and New York. Each UEI school is separately owned and incorporated, and each is overseen by different administrators. The schools that were discussed at the hearing were owned by Mr. Uceda's family members, including his daughters and grandchildren. Ms. Uceda testified that she currently owns and operates Uceda OBT, which has two campuses: the Deertrace campus and Uceda Kirkman. Ms. Uceda also either has a financial interest or is on the board of UEI schools located in Boca Raton, Florida; Westin, Florida; and Elizabeth, New Jersey. Ms. Uceda has 100% ownership interest in Uceda OBT and is the only officer of Uceda OBT. She does not have any ownership interest nor does she serve in any capacity with Uceda Orlando. Mr. Uceda has no ownership interest in and does not serve in any capacity with Uceda OBT. Although Mr. Rodriguez believed that all "Uceda schools" were owned "by the same people," there was no evidence of this at the hearing. When asked what entity paid his salary, Mr. Rodriguez did not know. He testified that he thought all "Uceda schools" shared employees and students. However, he could not provide any examples and admitted that he only worked at Uceda Kirkman. Ms. Uceda convincingly testified that employees who work at one Uceda school can apply to work at another Uceda school, but they are paid separately and not allowed to just move back and forth. She also explained that Uceda OBT and Uceda Orlando have separate accounting records, bank accounts, lines of credit, payroll preparation, telephones, and offices. They do not share employees or administrators. According to the corporate documents introduced at the hearing, Uceda OBT and Uceda Orlando have different operating addresses, different registered agents, and different officers and directors. Although Ms. Uceda was listed as an officer of Uceda Orlando in the past, she has not served in any capacity at Uceda Orlando since 2013.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Ka'Juel Washington, Esquire The Washington Trial Group, PLLC 37 North Orange Avenue, Suite 500 Orlando, Florida 32801 For Respondent: Chris Kleppin, Esquire The Kleppin Law Firm 8751 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 105 Plantation, Florida 33324
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Matalyn Johnson against Uceda School of Orlando, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Ka'Juel Washington, Esquire The Washington Trial Group, PLLC 37 North Orange Avenue, Suite 500 Orlando, Florida 32801 Chris Kleppin, Esquire The Kleppin Law Firm 8751 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 105 Plantation, Florida 33324 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Instructor of Social Studies presently teaching History of Law and Law and Society at Coral Gables Senior High School in Dade County, Florida. Petitioner has been an Instructor of Social Studies at Coral Gables High School since August, 1963. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Miami in 1963. Petitioner was awarded a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Miami College of Law in May, 1974. Prior to July 1, 1974, the Petitioner had been certified as a Rank III teacher in the elementary and secondary schools. On August 20, 1974, the Respondent issued a Rank II Teacher's Certificate to the Petitioner. The effective date of the certificate was July 1, 1974. Petitioner was certified to teach social studies in secondary schools, English in junior high school, and to teach in the junior colleges. On October 25, 1974, the Respondent issued a Rank I teacher's certificate for teaching in junior college to the Petitioner. In July and August, 1975, the Petitioner sought certification as a Rank I teacher. This request was denied by the Respondent by letter dated September 2, 1975. (See: Petitioner's Exhibit F). This action followed the denial of Rank I status. A Juris Doctor degree is the initial legal degree that is available. The Juris Doctor degree is considered the terminal professional legal degree in that no additional degrees are necessary in order to engage in the practice of law. Advanced legal degrees are available at some, but not all, law schools. These degrees are an L.L.M., or Master of Law degree, and a J.S.D. or S.J.D., or Doctor of Juridical Science degree. The J.D., or Juris Doctor degree, is of fairly recent vintage. The initial legal degree at most law schools was, until the past ten or twenty years, designated an L.L.B., or Bachelor of Law degree. The J.D. designation has become popular due to added prestige add recognition that it provides. A J.D. degree is not in any way substantively different from an L.L.B. degree. A J.D. degree is in fact a Bachelor's degree in the specialized field of law.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination (Complaint) was timely filed, so that his allegations of discrimination can be investigated.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Chinese national and was hired by USF in 1994 as an assistant professor in the Department of Government and International Affairs. USF is a state university. In 2002, Petitioner was promoted to an associate professor at USF. On an undisclosed date, he was given tenure. Petitioner's duties included teaching, research, publication, and service to the community. He also supervised graduate students in the preparation of a thesis for their studies. In 2010, Petitioner was suspended for one year. For violating the terms and conditions of his first suspension, on May 23, 2013, USF issued Petitioner a Notice of Suspension (Notice) informing him that he was suspended a second time, for two years without pay, from June 3, 2013, to August 6, 2015. This meant he had no regular Department, College, or University responsibilities for which he was needed, and he was not expected to be on campus during the suspension. Also, he had no teaching or work assignments during this period of time. Among other things, the Notice advised Petitioner that no employer contributions towards his benefits, including health insurance, would be made by USF during the two-year period. However, the Notice provided Petitioner with the name, email address, and telephone number of a University contact person to coordinate his benefits while he was suspended. During his suspension, Petitioner returned to China a number of times. On May 24, 2013, Petitioner sent an email to Dr. Dwayne Smith, Senior Vice Provost & Dean of the Office of Graduate Studies at USF, acknowledging his receipt of the Notice and calling his suspension a "racially discriminative and vindictive action." He further advised Dr. Smith that he would "make an open response to the whole university" and file a grievance regarding the suspension. On June 21, 2013, Petitioner filed an internal grievance regarding his suspension pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between USF and United Faculty of Florida (Union). On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a Notice of Arbitration with USF's Office of the Provost, indicating his intent to arbitrate the matter. However, the Union subsequently declined to proceed with arbitration, no arbitration was scheduled or conducted, and the grievance was withdrawn. Petitioner agrees that USF did not prevent him from arbitrating the dispute. On May 4, 2015, or a few months before his suspension ended, Petitioner filed his Complaint with the EEOC. The Complaint was later referred to the FCHR and was date-stamped on January 25, 2016. It alleged race and national origin discrimination and retaliation. Whether there is a workshare agreement between the two agencies that allows the EEOC complaint to operate as a dual filing with the FCHR, with the same filing date, is not of record. In any event, for purposes of this Recommended Order, it makes no difference whether the filing date is May 4, 2015, or January 25, 2016. The allegations in the Complaint were investigated by an FCHR investigator. Among other things, she conducted a 90-minute, unrecorded telephonic interview with Petitioner in April 2016 and reviewed his responses to a questionnaire. Although Petitioner contended at hearing that he raised additional allegations during the telephone interview, there is no credible evidence to support this claim. The investigator also spoke with persons at USF and received USF's written reply to the charges. After the review was completed, the FCHR determined the most recent allegation of discipline occurred on May 23, 2013, the Complaint was untimely, and it had no jurisdiction to investigate the charges. Other than the suspension, the Complaint does not identify any other discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation during the 365 days preceding the date of filing the Complaint. The deadline for filing a complaint regarding the suspension expired in May 2014. Petitioner did not seek to amend his Complaint to add new charges before the FCHR began its investigation. At hearing, however, he testified regarding a number of grievances, including a less-than-satisfactory evaluation received for the fall semester 2015; difficulty in arranging premium payments on his health insurance and changing coverage from family to single while he was suspended; unfair student evaluations he received for two courses he taught in the fall of 2015; and his inability to supervise a graduate student's literature review in the fall of 2015. All of these events occurred long after he was suspended, involved different actors and types of conduct, were dissimilar from each other, and should have been raised by timely amending his Complaint or by filing a new complaint with the FCHR. Petitioner offered no proof that he was misled or lulled into inaction by USF or FCHR. Rather, Petitioner explained that he waited to file his Complaint with the EEOC until after the grievance was resolved, and he had not yet retained an attorney to represent him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Suite 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Richard F. Meyers, Esquire The Meyers Firm, P.A. Post Office Box 16308 Tampa, Florida 33687-6308 (eServed) Craig S. Dawson, Esquire Office of the General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, CGS301 Tampa, Florida 33620-9951 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Suite 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
