The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Conval-Care, Inc., is entitled to the payment of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, from the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest to the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated November 4, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), notified Conval-Care, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Conval-Care"), that it intended to impose an administrative fine on Conval-Care pursuant to Section 409.913(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Conval-Care contested the proposed fine and requested a formal administrative hearing, including a request that it be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The matter was designated case number 92-0126 and was assigned to the Honorable Judge Robert T. Benton, then Hearing Officer Benton. On June 30, 1993, following a formal hearing held on March 24, 1993, Hearing Officer Benton entered a Recommended Order recommending dismissal of the sanctions letter of November 4, 1991. The findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton, in Conval-Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 92-0126, are hereby adopted to the extent relevant to this proceeding. On September 19, 1993, the Department entered a Final Order. The Department accepted and incorporated into its Final Order the findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton. The Department, however, rejected Hearing Officer Benton's conclusions of law to the extent that he not had concluded that Conval-Care lacked authority to reject the demand for its records which was the subject of the proceedings. The Department concluded that, in light of the fact that Conval-Care had acted on the advice of counsel, it would reduce the fine from $25,000.00 to $5,000.00. The Department's decision was appealed by Conval-Care. On December 16, 1994, the District Court of Appeal, First District, filed an opinion reversing the Department's Final Order. Mandate from the First District was entered January 3, 1995. On February 14, 1995, Conval-Care filed a Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs in this case. Conval-Care requested an award of $15,000.00 as a small business party pursuant to the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Attached to the Petition were the Final Order entered by the Department, the Recommended Order, the First District's Opinion and Mandate, an Attorney's Affidavit stating the nature, extent and monetary value of the services rendered and costs incurred in the proceedings, the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Conval-Care in 1991 and the Department's November 4, 1991 sanctions letter. On March 2, 1995, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest of the Department (hereinafter referred to as "AHCA"), filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 10 In its Response, AHCA admitted all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 and 8 through 9 of the Petition. AHCA denied the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Petition. Paragraph 7 of the Petition alleged the following: 7. The action of DHRS, in filing the admini- strative complaint against CCI, was not sub- stantially justified because there was no reasonable basis in law or fact to support the issuance of its letter seeking to impose an administrative fine upon CCI. Attached to the Response was an Affidavit from John M. Whiddon in support of its position that its actions were substantially justified. The Affidavit does not add any alleged credible justification not presented to Hearing Officer Benton or the First District Court of Appeal. AHCA did not assert in it Response the following: that the costs and attorney's fees claimed in Conval-Care's affidavit were unreasonable; that Conval-Care is not a prevailing small business party; that circumstances exist that would make an award unjust; or that AHCA was a nominal party only. AHCA also did not "either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs claimed or file a counter affidavit [specifying each item of costs and fee in dispute] along with its response." Finally, AHCA did not request an evidentiary hearing in its Response. The only issue which AHCA asserted in its Response was at issue in this proceeding is whether AHCA's actions were substantially justified. On April 6, 1995, an Order to Provide Information was entered. Although the parties had not requested an evidentiary hearing, the undersigned entered the Order soliciting input from the parties before the undersigned decided whether a hearing was necessary on the one issue raised by the Department. In the Order, the parties were given an opportunity to provide input concerning the procedures they believed should be followed to resolve this matter. The parties were specifically requested to answer certain specified questions, including the following: 1. Do the parties believe that an [sic] hearing is necessary to resolve any factual disputes and/or for purposes of oral argument before a decision is rendered? * * * 5. Do the parties agree that the documents attached to the Petition and the Response should be considered in rendering a decision in this case? . . ." Conval-Care filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that there was no need for a hearing. Conval-Care asserted that a hearing would be improper unless Conval-Care consents to one. Conval-Care also asserted that all of the documents attached to petition should be considered. AHCA filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that "[t]he Respondent feels a hearing in this matter is essential." AHCA did not provide any explanation of why it believed a hearing was necessary or any discussion of whether a hearing was authorized under the applicable statutes and rules. AHCA also indicated in its response that it "agrees that the documents attached to the Petition and Response should be considered in this case " On May 19, 1995, an Order Concerning Final Order was entered. Based upon a review of the pleadings and the lack of explanation from either party to justify an evidentiary hearing, it was concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary. Therefore, the parties were informed in the May 19, 1995 Order that a hearing would not be held in this case. The parties were also informed that they could file proposed final orders on or before May 30, 1995. Conval-Care filed a proposed order. AHCA did not. Neither Conval-Care nor AHCA timely requested an evidentiary hearing in this case. Both parties agreed that the documentation filed with Conval- Care's Petition and AHCA's Response could be relied upon in reaching a decision in this case. Based upon AHCA's failure to contest most of the relevant issues in this proceeding, the only issue which requires a decision if whether the Department's actions against Conval-Care were substantially justified. The documents, including the Mr. Whiddon's Affidavit filed by AHCA with its Response, sufficiently explain why the Department took the actions it took against Conval-Care which led to this proceeding. No evidentiary hearing was, therefore, necessary. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in this matter were substantially justified. The Department could have sought the information it wanted by pursuing available discovery. Counsel for Conval-Care even remained the Department of the availability of discovery. The Department, however, rather than pursuing the information which it indicated it needed, elected to pursue a punitive action against Conval-Care rather than obtaining the information through discovery. The Department's reason for pursuing punitive actions against Conval-Care was not convincing to Hearing Officer Benton. Despite this fact, the Department entered a Final Order upholding its actions and imposing a fine of $5,000.00 for refusing to provide it with information which it could have obtained through other means. The First District Court reversed the Department's Final Order opining that the Department "lacked a legitimate investigatory purpose for demanding the records" which gave rise to its action against Conval-Care. Finally, the entire record in this case failed to indicate that there was any basis in law or fact to substantially justify the actions of the Department.
Findings Of Fact On December 22, 1987, the undersigned held a formal hearing in the underlying case, (DOAH Case No. 87-3084), and on February 4, 1988, issued a Recommended Order to the Florida Real Estate Commission in which it was concluded that the Petitioners had violated various provisions of the Florida Statutes and that disciplinary action was appropriate. Specific disciplinary action was recommended as to each Petitioner. In its Final Order, predicated upon the above mentioned Recommended Order, the Commission adopted the undersigned's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law but found the recommendation for punishment as to both Petitioners was inadequate. The Commission increased each period of suspension, rejected the recommendation for stay and automatic remission as to the suspensions, and imposed an administrative fine on each Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioners appealed the Final Order to the Second District Court of Appeal which, in an opinion filed February 17, 1989 affirmed the Commission's findings of guilt but reversed the penalties imposed by the Commission and remanded with instructions to approve the Hearing Officer's recommended penalties. It is on the basis of this appellate action that Petitioners, claiming to be prevailing small business parties, initiated the instant action. Petitioners are requesting attorney's fees in the amount of $5,261.28 for the appellate action which resulted in the District Court of Appeals reducing the penalty imposed by the Commission to that recommended by the Hearing Officer. This fee and cost figure is the cumulative of charges incurred and represented on 11 monthly billing statements starting 06-01-88 and extending through 04-01-89. Only the last eight, starting with the 09-01-88 billing, state the hours spent providing service. The Florida Legislature has defined a "prevailing small business party" at Section 57.111(3)(c), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Peggy Watkins and operates Watkins Health Care Center. The center employs under 25 employees and earns less than two million dollars in revenue. Peggy Watkins was the prevailing party in the exemption hearing, P.W. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 94-1729C, Rendition No. HRS-95-192-FOF- RCD (Fla. DHRS F.O. issued August 3, 1995), which is the action underlying the request for fees and costs in this case. The underlying exemption action in this case resulted from the Department's denial of Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification from employment in a caregiver capacity to disabled adults on February 14, 1994. The disqualifying factor used by the Department in its decision was a confirmed report of adult abuse, FPSS Number 92-021519 involving the exploitation of W.W. a disabled adult. The report stated in part: Capacity to consent: . . . W.W. does not have the capacity to consent. Findings/classification": W.W. has been living in a mobile home owned by Peggy Watkins for the past four and one half years. It is filthy, run down, and according to local realtor, Yvonne Mediate, would only be worth $150/month, if it were to be cleaned. W.W. actually pays Peggy Watkins $600/month, not including utilities, which he has to pay for separately. She also takes $200 out of his check every month prior to depositing it, and provides no receipts nor gives any explanation as to how this money is spent. Separate checks are drawn on W.W.'s account for food, gas and incidentals, etc. Out of $1,074/month he receives, he has not saved a penny in the four and a half years that Peggy has been payee on his check She provided no receipts for any of the appliances she claims to have bought him and he has no appliances either. She claims that he has sold his appliances for drugs. W.W. denies that this is so . . . , a drug screen was done and W.W.'s system was found to be free of drugs. . . . . Although W.W. complained loud and long about the misappropriation of his funds, at the begin- ning of this investigation, it wasn't long before he did a 180 degree turn about Improper management of finances: verified. . . . The evidence at the exemption hearing demonstrated that there were multiple payments for utilities throughout the course of any given month. Also the evidence at the hearing showed that the Department considered a document which purported to outline a rental/services agreement between Petitioner and W.W. The agreement indicated that Petitioner's rent included utilities and housekeeping services which appeared not to be being performed or paid out of the rent. Given these facts, there is no question that the Department acted reasonably in relying on the confirmed adult abuse report as a basis for denying the Petitioner's request for exemption. As it turned out the evidence at the exemption hearing cast serious doubt on the strength of the abuse report and it was recommended that she be granted an exemption which recommendation was adopted in the Final Order. However, those facts do not demonstrate the Department was not justified in relying on the abuse report as it was established and maintained in the Department's abuse registry in making its initial decision in that case. At the time of making its decision the Department had to decide issues of credibility and reliability in weighing whether to grant Petitioner an exemption. The Hearing Officer's determination was at odds with the determination of the Department, however, the Department's reliance on the veracity of the reports in its abuse registry was not unreasonable. Finally, the total attorney's time spent on this case based on the amendments and deletions to the attorney's affidavit made at the hearing is 97.4 hours. Given the numerous changes made to the affidavit at the hearing and the inclusion of time and work spent on behalf of Petitioner in her other cases, the evidence did not demonstrate a reliable factual basis for the amount of time spent by Petitioner's attorney relative to this proceeding. Given these facts, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of Attorney's fees and costs.
The Issue Are the February 13, 2014, letters of Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division), requiring totalisator reports to "identify the Florida [permitholder] in reports as both host and guest when applicable," statements that amount to a rule, as defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (2013).1/
Findings Of Fact Florida permits and regulates betting on greyhound racing,2/ jai alai games,3/ quarter horse racing,4/ and harness racing.5/ The Division is responsible for administration of Florida's statutes and rules governing this betting. JKC and OPKC are separate, individually permitted facilities. Jacksonville Greyhound Racing owns and operates both the JKC and the OPKC. It is not, however, a party to this proceeding. The betting system is a pari-mutuel system. This "means a system of betting on races or games in which the winners divide the total amount bet, after deducting management expenses and taxes, in proportion to the sums they have wagered individually and with regard to the odds assigned to particular outcomes."6/ Each race, contest, or game is an "event."7/ The aggregate wagers called "contributions" to pari-mutuel pools are labeled "handle." § 550.002(13), Fla. Stat. An "intertrack wager" is "a particular form of pari-mutuel wagering in which wagers are accepted at a permitted, in-state track, fronton, or pari-mutuel facility on a race or game transmitted from and performed live at, or simulcast signal rebroadcast from another in-state pari-mutuel facility."8/ The JKC offers intertrack wagering at its permitted facility located in Jacksonville, Florida. It does not offer live events. The OPKC offers intertrack wagering and wagering on live events conducted at its permitted facility in Orange Park. The Racetracks are host tracks when they transmit live greyhound racing to other in-state and out-of-state facilities for off-track wagers.9/ They are guest tracks when wagers are made at their separate permitted locations on pari-mutuel races or games conducted at third-party facilities.10/ Florida statutes and the Division's rules require detailed reports from permitholders to the Division and other permitholders, including tables of wagers, pool data, and winnings.11/ These reports are generated by "totalisators." A totalisator is "the computer system used to accumulate wagers, record sales, calculate payoffs, and display wagering data on a display device that is located at a pari-mutuel facility."12/ The Division's Form DBPR-PMW-3570 requires host permitholders to report intertrack wagering "handle" by guest on a monthly basis. The host permitholders must sign and attest to the accuracy of the information submitted in the form. Also, Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.023(2) requires generation of reports for each pool within each contest to be printed immediately after the official order of finish is declared. On March 9, 2012, the Division issued a letter to AmTote International ("AmTote"), a licensed totalisator company, and copied Jacksonville Greyhound Racing, notifying AmTote that Florida permitholders and the Division would need a breakdown of the handle of the Racetracks in order to pay appropriate purses, taxes, or other liabilities. It sent a similar letter to other totalisator companies. This was an effort to be accommodating and flexible. The letter concluded: "Please continue to provide handle information broken down by source, which is required by rule to all those in the state of Florida who have been users of that information in the past." The Racetracks rely upon AmTote to provide their totalisator services. Between March 2012 and March 2014, AmTote commingled the Racetracks' wagering data into a single "community," reporting all wagering as coming from the OPKC in order to reduce interface fees paid for the totalisator service. The guest track wagering data and reports exchanged with the other totalisator companies from the Racetracks show up on the AmTote settlement files as OPKC. The reports do not differentiate between wagers made at each of the Racetracks. Before March 1, 2012, AmTote segregated wagering data as coming from either JKC or OPKC. During the two years reported by the Racetracks as a single community, the Racetracks separately provided Florida host tracks a supplemental report breaking down the sources within the common community. The Racetracks provided these supplemental reports--via email or other means--to assist Florida host tracks with reporting requirements. They did not provide them simultaneously with the other reports and data. There were frequently errors that had to be identified and corrected. In an effort to be flexible and work with the Racetracks, the Division tolerated this method of reporting for two years. But it created problems for both the Division and for the other permitholders in the state. On February 13, 2014, the Division prepared and issued correspondence to AmTote, as well as the two other Florida totalisator companies, announcing that it intended to require proper reporting of the data required by rule, including reports of each permitholder. The letter states: This letter is to address the issue of proper and complete identification of each individual permitholder in totalisator reports. Rule 61D-7.024(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires all Florida pari-mutuel permitholders to use an electronically operated totalisator. Rule 61D-7.023(9), F.A.C. states in part, ". . . Each report shall include the permitholder's name . . .," and Rule 61D-7.024(4), F.A.C. states in part, ". . . reports shall be kept logically separate . . . ." Further, Rule 61D-7.023(1), F.A.C. states, "The totalisator licensee shall be responsible for the correctness of all tote produced mutual accounting reports. " In accordance with Florida Administrative Code, the division requires each permitholder to be properly and uniquely identified by totalisator reports provided to the division and to the permitholders. In addition, the totalisators are responsible for the correctness of all tote produced mutual accounting reports. Reports provided after February 28, 2014 must properly identify the Florida Permitholder in reports as both host and guest when applicable. Improper identification of permitholders will be considered a violation of the Florida Administrative Code. On March 11, 2014, AmTote began segregating wagering data from the Racetracks in compliance with the February 13, 2014, letter. The Racetracks will incur additional financial costs if AmTote ends the reporting of all wagering data as coming from OPKC for purposes of reports provided to other totalisator companies licensed in Florida and begins segregating their wagering data by individual permitholders. These costs stem from additional interface fees incurred outside the regulatory jurisdiction of Florida. The only evidence of these costs is the testimony of Matthew Kroetz, vice-president of Operations for Jacksonville Greyhound Racing. The testimony of Mr. Kroetz about the cost of the required change is confusing because he mingles assumed costs for a third closed track as if it were reactivated and operational. Bayard Raceways is that track. The Racetracks' parent company owns it. But the likelihood and timing of that reactivation is speculative. In addition, Bayard is not a party to this proceeding. Neither is the parent company. Mr. Kroetz' testimony establishes that the current cost for the two petitioners is a total of $1,500 per month. He projects that costs for reporting, as the letter requires, would be $4,500 per month for the two Petitioners and the track that may reopen in the future. That testimony is unrebutted and consistent with his testimony that the recurring fees for all three tracks would total over $50,000 annually. It is accepted as accurate. But the $3,000 increase from $1,500 to $4,500 per month is not due solely to the reporting requirement. It is also due to lumping in the non-active track. The evidence does not support including that track, the opening of which is speculative. The monthly fee for the two operating tracks is $1,500 divided by two or $750. Subtracting that, as the current cost for an existing track, from the $3,000 increase, lowers the estimated increase to $2,250. Dividing that by three gives the increased monthly cost per track, or $750 per track. This results in the projected annual cost increase for each of the Racetracks of $9,000. Although Mr. Kroetz testified in summary that the changes would result in an increased cost of "about a thousand dollars per month per facility," that testimony is not persuasive. It is inconsistent with the more detailed testimony relied upon above and would require the improbable and unsupported conclusion that the monthly increase would be more than the existing fees.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 29, 1993, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issued an agency action letter which rejected certain of Petitioner's cost reports in calculating the Medicaid reimbursement to which Petitioner was entitled. As a result, the Medicaid reimbursement to Petitioner was reduced. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed a challenge to the agency action, and the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings, DOAH Case No. 93-3687. Such case was assigned to Judge Arrington and scheduled for hearing in Miami for October 14-15, 1993. On October 12, 1993, the Department filed a suggestion of mootness which led to the withdrawal of the agency action letter, the acceptance of Petitioner's cost reports, and, presumably, to the recalculation of the Medicaid reimbursement favorable to Petitioner. On May 2, 1996, the agency, now the Agency for Health Care Administration, entered a final order adopting the recommended order. On July 1, 1996, the Petitioner filed the instant motion for attorney's fees and costs and supporting memorandum of law together with the exhibits thereto. On or about September 6, 1996, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively motion to strike Petitioner's motion for attorney's fees and costs, and argued that the Petitioner is not entitled to fees pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes; that the affidavit submitted by Petitioner does not comply with the statute; that Petitioner is not a prevailing party under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes; and that the relief requested exceeds the maximum award of $15,000.00. Such responses relate only to the initial pleading filed, however, and not to the amended request filed on February 12, 1997. Petitioner has a net worth of not more than $2,000,000.00 and its principal place of business is Dade County, Florida. Petitioner's attorney's normal billing rate for general matters is $250.00 and he expended in excess of 100 hours of time in the litigation of the underlying matter. Petitioner has requested $87,500.00 in attorney's fees as the prevailing party in the principal case and $21,875 for litigation on the issue of fees and costs. Petitioner alleged it is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Sections 57.105 and 57.111, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to attorneys' fees.
Findings Of Fact On June 4, 1992, Respondent transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings file materials containing allegations that Petitioner was guilty of child abuse and Petitioner's demand for a hearing. The file was assigned DOAH Case No. 92-3396C. After several continunaces, DOAH Case No. 92-3396C was set for final hearing March 30, 1993, in Tampa. By letter dated March 23, 1993, Respondent, through the District Administrator of District 7, stated to Petitioner: [Respondent], during the trial preparation phase of this case, has voluntarily decided to reclassify your role in the incident in question. As a result of this reclassification, you are no longer identified as having committed abuse or neglect with respect to the alleged incident and the [abuse] report will be changed accordingly. On March 26, 1992, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case. On April 15, 1993, an Order Closing File was entered. On May 3, 1993, Petitioner commenced the above-styled proceeding by filing a Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs together with an affidavit of fees and costs. On May 7, 1993, Respondent filed a response demanding that the motion be dismissed. DOAH Case No. 92-3396C was initiated based on the complaints of a minor who charged that Petitioner, her uncle, had sexually abused her for six years on a weekly basis. Respondent's protective investigator spoke with the alleged victim, who repeated these charges, as well as to her parents, who believed her, and to a mental health counsellor, who either said she believed the alleged victim or at least did not say that she did not believe alleged victim. Petitioner steadfastly denied the charges. However, the protective investigator did not contact him prior to closing the case as proposed confirmed. Nor did the protective investigator contact the alleged victim's physician, who would have informed the protective investigator that physical examination of the vagina of the alleged victim disclosed no abnormal findings. The physician would have stated that the alleged victim evidently had not previously engaged in sexual intercourse, which would have contradicted the alleged victim's charges against Petitioner. The record does not disclose that the alleged victim ever recanted. The record contains no direct evidence of an improper purpose on the part of Respondent. In effect, Petitioner urges that such a purpose be inferred from the circumstances. As long as the alleged victim stood by her earlier statements, there remained a genuine issue of fact. Under all of the circumstances, her statement may not have been entitled to much weight. Perhaps evaluating the evidence in like manner, Respondent wisely concluded that its resources could be better directed than litigating DOAH Case No. 92-3396C. But the persistence of the alleged victim in charging Petitioner with sexual abuse undermines the inference that Respondent pursued the prosecution of Petitioner for an improper purpose. In the absence of stronger evidence contradicting the alleged victim's charges, Petitioner fails to show that Respondent maintained the prosecution for an improper purpose.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2005), and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact By Final Order filed November 18, 2005, in Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate vs. Hilda Bell and Sharmic Realty Properties, Inc., Case Nos. 2001-80091 and 2001-80092, DOAH Case No. 04-4470, the Florida Real Estate Commission, hereinafter Commission, approved and adopted the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by the undersigned as its own and ordered that the ruling of the undersigned was accepted as the ruling of the Commission.3 By Recommended Order issued August 9, 2005, the undersigned recommended to the Commission that a final order be entered finding that Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty did not commit the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Administrative Complaint.4 Hence, the ruling of the Commission was the dismissal of the Administrative Complaint filed against Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty. No dispute exists that the Division of Real Estate was the state agency that initiated the administrative action against Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty conducted in a Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, proceeding. The administrative action against Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty was initiated by the Division of Real Estate for alleged violations of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes (2000).5 No dispute exists that the Division of Real Estate was not a nominal party in the administrative action. No dispute exists that Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty were prevailing parties in the administrative action. Sharmic Realty is incorporated in the State of Florida. Ms. Bell is the sole officer and director of Sharmic Realty. The domicile of Ms. Bell is the State of Florida. The principal office of Sharmic Realty is in the State of Florida, being located in Lauderhill, Florida. At the initiation of the administrative action, the evidence demonstrates that Sharmic Realty employed three agents, which included Ms. Bell. However, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the total number of employees of Sharmic Realty at the time of the initiation of the administrative action. No evidence was presented to demonstrate the net worth of Sharmic Realty at the time of the initiation of the administrative action. The attorney, who represented Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty in the administrative action, filed an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs incurred, with an itemized account of such attorney's fees and costs. The attorney's fees incurred total $30,961.53, and the costs incurred total $617.07. At no time did the Division of Real Estate contest or dispute the attorney's fees or costs incurred by Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty or the reasonableness thereof. Prior to filing an administrative complaint against Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty, an investigation was performed by the Division of Real Estate, which was reduced to writing.6 Among other things, the investigative file contained the following: (a) documents from the file of Sharmic Realty, showing deposit monies paid by the Buyer of realty for whom Sharmic Realty was the agent; (b) copies of letters, provided by the Complainants, from the agent of the Sellers of the realty to Sharmic Realty making a demand for the deposit monies on the ground that the Buyer failed to comply with the terms of the contract for the sell of the realty; (c) a letter from the Complainants that indicated that the Seller’s agent provided the letters in (b) above to them; (d) a summary statement from the investigator that Ms. Bell admitted to him, during his interview of her, that she had not notified the Division of Real Estate of conflicting demands on the deposit monies and a good faith doubt as to who should receive the deposit monies; and (e) a document showing, and a confirmation from Ms. Bell, that Sharmic Realty had returned the Buyer's deposit to him. The investigative file was submitted to a Probable Cause Panel of the Division of Real Estate. The Probable Cause Panel reviewed the “complete file” in the matter involving Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty and heard from counsel of the Division of Real Estate.7 The investigative file supported a commission of the alleged violations by Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty. The Probable Cause Panel found that probable cause existed to file an administrative complaint against Ms. Bell and Sharmic Realty. The evidence demonstrates and a finding is made that the decision made by the Probable Cause Panel was reasonably based on fact and law and that, therefore, the Division of Real Estate had a reasonable basis in law and fact to proceed with an administrative action against Ms. Bell and Shamric Realty.
Findings Of Fact Terry G. Jewell is the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, wherein Jewell engages in business as a real estate broker-salesman. His net worth is less than $2,000,000. In DOAH Case No. 87-2192, the Division filed an Administrative Complaint dated April 20, 1987, wherein the Division essentially alleged that Jewell was co-owner and agent for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of constructing homes; that Jewell, as vice- president and agent for Sun Country Homes, entered into a contract with the Koblinskis to build their house; that Sun Country Homes received approximately $74,900.00 to build the home; that Sun Country Homes did not pay certain materialmen and contractors; and that Jewell did not pay the outstanding liens. The Division sought revocation and other penalties against Jewell's license as a real estate broker-salesman, alleging that Jewell was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction. After hearing, a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on September 25, 1987, recommending dismissal of the Administrative Complaint. The recommendation was based on findings that Jewell's contacts with the Koblinskis were solely as an officer, co-owner and agent for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc.; that all sums paid by the Koblinskis were to Sun Country Homes and were deposited to its corporate account; that the president of Sun Country Homes mismanaged the corporate funds and did not pay some of the subcontractors on Koblinskis' home, that Jewell quit the corporation then he found out about this; that Jewell did all he could to assist the Koblinskis once he had resigned from the corporation; that the president of the corporation disappeared with the Koblinskis' money; and that Jewell did not benefit from the funds paid by the Koblinskis to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc. The recommendation was based on conclusions of law that the contract was between the Koblinskis and Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc.; that Jewell had no intent to deceive the Koblinskis; that it is well settled law that disciplinary action cannot be taken against a real estate broker's license for conduct not connected with the licensee's business as a broker; and that Jewell did not violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. The Final Order of the Division, through the Florida Real Estate Commission, adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation in the Recommended Order and dismissed the Administrative Complaint. The affidavit which initiated this action was filed on February 5, 1988, and was later supplemented by the Petition for Small Business Party's Attorney's Fees and Costs. The affidavit, which was an application for an award of fees and costs, was timely, having been filed within 60 days after the date on which Jewell became a prevailing small business party. In this case, the 60 days is calculated from the date on the Certificate of Service showing mailing of the Final Order to the parties. See Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes. According to the affidavit of William C. Andrews, and the statements of account attached thereto, Jewell incurred legal fees of $3,252.50 and costs of $957.21. These fees and costs are found to be reasonable since the Division has not filed a counter affidavit or response questioning their reasonableness. According to the Petition, the disciplinary action in DOAH Case No. 87- 2192 was substantially unjustified at the time it was initiated: because the Administrative Complaint was an attempted disciplinary action taken against Petitioner's real estate broker-salesman's license for conduct not connected with the licensee's business as a broker-salesman, and there was a complete absence of evidence to show any wrong doing on the part of the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for certifying persons as minority business enterprises. Petitioner applied for certification as a minority business enterprise. Petitioner is a minority business enterprise within the meaning of Section 288.703(2), Florida Statutes. 1/ Petitioner is a small business concern, domiciled in Florida, and organized to engage in commercial transactions. Petitioner is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Ms. Sandra A. Pichney, vice president, and by Mr. D.B. Young, president. Petitioner engages in the roof consulting business. Ms. Pichney owns 51 percent of Petitioner's outstanding stock. Ms. Pichney is a member of a minority group for purposes of Chapter 288. The remaining 49 percent of Petitioner's outstanding stock is owned by Mr. Young. Mr. Young is a licensed architect. No professional license is required for Petitioner to engage in the business of roof consulting. Petitioner has all of the occupational licenses required to engage in the commercial transactions required to conduct its business. Ms. Pichney has 16 years experience in the roof consulting business. Ms. Pichney controls the daily management and operations of Petitioner's business. Ms. Pichney: manages and operates the office; and is responsible for payroll, accounts receivable, and general financial matters. Ms. Pichney conducts field visits, estimates jobs, reviews projects, and rewrites specifications. Ms. Pichney is the person who signs checks for Petitioner in the ordinary course of Petitioner's trade or business. Mr. Young is authorized to sign checks but only signs checks in emergencies. Ms. Pichney hires and fires personnel. Ms. Pichney consults with Mr. Young, but the ultimate responsibility is born by Ms. Pichney. Ms. Pichney reviews specifications and design work for specific projects and makes amendments where appropriate. Original specifications and design work are prepared by Mr. Young and other personnel. Mr. Young, and other personnel, can be terminated by Ms. Pichney without cause. Mr. Young can be terminated as an employee at any time by Ms. Pichney, without cause. Mr. Young has no employment agreement or shareholder agreement with the company. The board of directors are comprised of Ms. Pichney and Mr. Young. Any director may be dismissed by a majority of the shareholders. As the majority shareholder, Ms. Pichney can terminate Mr. Young, as a director, without cause. Ms. Pichney and Mr. Young receive salaries and monthly draws. Although salaries are equal, monthly draws and dividends are distributed in proportion to the stock ownership of each shareholder. Ms. Pichney has exclusive use of the company car. Ms. Pichney's stock ownership has increased over the last two years because Mr. Young has been unable to attend to the demands of Petitioner's business due to Mr. Young's divorce. Ms. Pichney has properly reported the increase in stock ownership, for purposes of the federal income tax, and has, and will, pay the requisite income tax on her increased stock ownership. Ms. Pichney and Mr. Young consult with each other in making significant decisions in the ordinary course of Petitioner's business. However, the ultimate responsibility for those decisions is born by Ms. Pichney.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Parson & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Overhead Door Company of Tampa Bay (Parsons & Associates), is a Florida corporation, having been incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida in March, 1992. The principal place of business for Parsons & Associates is 5134 W. Idlewild, Tampa, Florida. The Petitioner corporation engages in the business of the sale, installation, and repair of overhead doors, both residential and commercial. The corporation has ten (10) full-time employees and one (1) part-time employee. The only stockholders of the Petitioner corporation are: Gail Parsons, the minority owner; and her son-in-law, Robert Briesacher. Gail Parsons owns eighty (80 percent) of the stock of Parsons & Associates. Robert Briesacher, who is not a minority, owns the remaining twenty (20 percent) of the Petitioner corporation. Gail Parsons was the incorporator of Parsons & Associates when it was initially incorporated. She also is its President. Robert Briesacher is the Vice-President. Prior to the incorporation of Parsons & Associates, Gail Parsons, who has a Bachelor of Business Administration degree, worked for the Better Business Bureau. Robert Briesacher had previous experience in the overhead door business, having worked for Overhead Door Company of Clearwater. Briesacher, who at the time was engaged to marry Parsons's daughter, learned from Overhead Door Corporation (the manufacturer) that the manufacturer intended to establish a distributorship in Tampa. Briesacher told Parsons about it. While Briesacher had the knowledge and experience to successfully sell, install, and repair both residential and commercial overhead doors, he had no money to invest in the business opportunity and had no experience running his own business. Thinking that she might be able to help her daughter and future/present son-in-law, and herself, by combining her capital and business and financial skills with his knowledge and technical skill in the automatic door business, Parsons suggested to Briesacher that they go into business together. He readily agreed, and the pursued the opportunity with the manufacturer. Parsons incorporated the business, registered the fictitious name, compiled the business plan, developed the cash flow projections (with Briesacher's help), found the office/warehouse space (which the manufacturer had to approve), and negotiated, executed, and personally guaranteed the lease agreement and negotiated the Distributorship Agreement with the manufacturer. Briesacher provided none of the initial start-up monies for the Petitioner. Gail Parsons is the financial interest holder in the corporation, having made all the initial contributions to capital ($38,000), as well as making all the personal loans to the corporation thereby accepting all the financial risk. Parsons personally guaranteed the promissory note, the credit agreement, contracts required to be personally guaranteed and the warehouse lease. The Distributorship Agreement is a standard Overhead Door Corporation agreement common to all distributors nationwide. It is customary for a manufacturer like Overhead Door Corporation to offer a distributor incentives-- like yellow page advertisement, signage, and telephone numbers--in order to gain market penetration. In the case of Parsons & Associates, Overhead Door supplied a telephone number (the number Overhead Door previously had bought from the prior distributor in Tampa), a year's worth (about $10,000) of yellow page advertising, and some signage. The total fair market value of the incentives to Parsons & Associates was approximately $31,000, but the marginal cost to the manufacturer was less. In the initial months of operation of the business, Gail Parsons had to rely on Briesacher and the first employee they hired, Charles Martin, who worked under Briesacher at Overhead Door of Clearwater, to teach her what she had to know about the technical aspects of the business. She had to learn about the Overhead Door products and the basics of how to install them. This knowledge, which she quickly acquired, soon enabled her to take service orders, schedule the orders, supervise the day-to-day activities, perform trouble-shooting over the telephone and handle all of the sales calls. Meanwhile, Robert Briesacher was in the field with Martin installing and servicing Overhead Doors. Briesacher currently corresponds with the factories on product orders, schedules and supervises the installers, and takes the physical inventory. Commercial bidding is only one portion of the total corporate sales, which includes residential new construction, residential service and residential retrofit. Over ninety-five (95 percent) percent of the business of Parsons and Associates is handled over the telephone from the office where Parsons spends virtually one hundred (100 percent) percent of her time. Parsons is personally responsible for the majority of the residential sales, including negotiating and contracting with contractors, and negotiating and entering into the agreement to provide installation services for Home Depot door sales. Business from negotiating, estimating, and bidding on contracts in the field is a relatively small portion of the company's overall revenues. Gail Parson is involved in the interviewing of prospective employees, including Martin and Charles Jarvis. She confers with Briesacher, but she alone controls hiring and firing. She possesses the knowledge to evaluate employee performance and has demonstrated her supervisory authority and evaluation skills in exercising her authority to fire an employee. Actually, it is not difficult to evaluate the performance of installers: service calls on warranty work and customer complaints generally tell her all she needs to know. The Petitioner/corporation has both commercial and residential outside sales persons who prepare bids for the Petitioner. The minority owner, Gail Parsons, establishes the geographic and profit margin parameters, which ultimately control the bidding process. She inspects all bids prior to executing the contracts, thereby further controlling who, where and under what terms the Petitioner corporation does business. In fact, Parsons recently rejected an accepted bid and cancelled the job because it was too far from Tampa. While both Gail Parsons and Robert Briesacher are authorized to sign checks for Parsons & Associates, Briesacher has signed less than five checks, out of the thousands of checks written. Parsons and Briesacher draw the same salary. However, their salaries are commensurate with the work they perform for the company. Parsons has chosen the salary levels; Briesacher does not even know what Parsons's salary is. Parsons also is entitled to an 80/20 split of any future distributions as a result of the operation of the company. Briesacher has the use of a company truck, while Parsons does not. However, Briesacher is a part-time installer and service man, while Parsons is not. All installers/service technicians at Parsons and Associates have the use of company trucks, not just Briesacher. Currently, in addition to controlling the entire corporation and making all of the business decisions, Gail Parsons sets inventory parameters, purchases the inventory, sells doors in the showroom, knows the purchased products, is responsible for accounts receivable, handles the payroll, and assists in the scheduling and supervising of the installers.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE). RECOMMENDED this 14th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1268 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found; the rest is accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected to the extent that it implies that Briesacher has no financial interest. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected, as contrary to facts found, to the extent that it implies Parsons knew it all from the start and that Parsons "supervised" Briesacher and Martin installing and servicing doors; in fact, there was a learning curve. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 8.-11. Accepted and incorporated. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 3.-4. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (She makes sales and trouble- shoots, and is no longer just learning those aspects of the business.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, except for actually installing and servicing doors, Parsons also does the same jobs as Briesacher to some extent, and some of Briesacher's functions are ministerial in light of Parsons's management decisions. Penultimate sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; he proposed "piece-work" but Parsons participated in the final decision. (Since it is standard in Florida, it was not a difficult or controversial decision.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, "joint responsibility" should not be construed to mean "equal authority." Parsons has the final say.) Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, while Parsons's knowledge and skill does not exceed the others' in the area of installing and servicing doors, she has enough knowledge to control the business. The characterization "very broad" in the last sentence is rejected as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, again, while Parsons's knowledge and skill does not exceed the others' in the area of installing and servicing doors, and while she does not personally install and service doors, she has enough knowledge to control the business. 10.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Again, while Parsons and Briesacher, and other employees, share responsibilities, Parsons has the knowledge necessary to control the business and has dominant control over the business. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan D. Kaplan, Esquire 6617 Memorial Highway Tampa, Florida 33615 Wayne H. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel Suite 312, Ninth Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
