The Issue Whether Respondent, a registered nurse, committed the acts alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of nursing pursuant to Chapters 20, 456, and 464, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida, having been issued license number RN 832942. In the fall of 1997, Respondent enrolled in FAU's ARNP program, which she continued until the spring of 1999, when she was dismissed from the program. Respondent was dismissed from FAU's ARNP program after she received a failing grade (an F) in a required clinical course (NGR 6602L). All students in the FAU ARNP program are required to make a grade of B or higher in clinical courses to continue in the program. On May 7, 1999, Ellis Younkin, the Graduate Program Coordinator for FAU and an associate dean, advised Respondent in writing that she had been dismissed from the ARNP program. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was advised of her right to seek permission to retake the clinical program she had failed and her right to appeal her dismissal from the ARNP program. Respondent attempted to gain permission to retake the clinical program and to appeal her dismissal from the ARNP program. In the spring of 2000, after her dismissal from the FAU ARNP program, Respondent asked Dr. Morris, a physician in private practice, to be her preceptor for the FAU clinical program she had failed (NGR 6602L). Respondent told Dr. Morris that she had failed the earlier clinical program (NGR 6602L), but she misled Dr. Morris into believing that she was nevertheless a student in good standing in the FAU ARNP program by her statements and by the papers she showed him, including an outdated preceptor request form, a cooperative agreement form, and a form cover letter. In the spring of 2000, when Respondent had the dealings with Dr. Morris described in this Recommended Order, Respondent knew or should have known that she had been dismissed from the FAU ARNP program and she knew or should have known that her actions to appeal that dismissal had not stayed her dismissal from the program. The preceptor arrangement was for Respondent to perform the clinical duties of an ARNP under Dr. Morris's supervision and responsibility for a total of 60 hours. Dr. Morris would thereafter evaluate her performance and submit that evaluation to the FAU ARNP program. Because of Respondent's deception, that arrangement was a sham. The FAU ARNP program requires that all preceptor arrangements and the physicians who are to serve as preceptors be approved before a preceptor program begins. When he agreed to the preceptor arrangement with Respondent, Dr. Morris was unaware that FAU required prior approval of a preceptor program, and he believed that Respondent would be responsible for any required paperwork. Respondent never requested the FAU ARNP program's approval of her preceptor arrangement with Dr. Morris, nor did she request authorization from FAU for Dr. Morris to serve as her preceptor. Between May 2 and May 26, 2002, pursuant to her arrangement with Dr. Morris, Respondent routinely talked to patients alone in the examination room about the reasons for the patient's visit, to obtain a medical history, and to ascertain the patient's current medication regime. Respondent would make a diagnosis and create a treatment plan, which could include the prescription of medication, for Dr. Morris's consideration. Dr. Morris would next come in and examine the patient. Respondent wrote patient notes in the medical records that were subsequently reviewed and co-signed by Dr. Morris. Respondent performed acts in Dr. Morris's office that were beyond the scope of her license as a registered nurse. Ms. Harriett Brinker testified, credibly, that as a registered nurse Respondent could not prescribe treatment plans for patients, nor could she prescribe medication. Respondent completed approximately 60 hours of clinical work with Dr. Morris under the guise of the preceptor arrangement. Dr. Morris would not have permitted Respondent to perform the work she performed in his office but for the sham preceptor arrangement. Respondent asked Dr. Morris to submit certain paperwork pertaining to the preceptor arrangement that had been completed, including an evaluation of her performance as an ARNP student, to FAU's School of Nursing. Thereafter, Dr. James Fisher, Associate Provost at FAU, contacted Dr. Morris about the paperwork he had submitted to FAU at Respondent's request. Dr. Morris learned from Dr. Fisher that Respondent was not a graduate nursing student at FAU. Until his conversation with Dr. Fisher, Dr. Morris believed that Respondent was a student in good standing in the FAU ARNP program. After working for Dr. Morris, Respondent provided FAU with her work evaluations from Dr. Morris, medical records from patients she had cared for, clinical encounter logs containing patient-specific information, and a taped recording containing a series of questions posed by Respondent to one of her patients and the patient's responses. The questions and answers pertained to the level of care Respondent provided the patient. Respondent did not have the permission of Dr. Morris or of any patient to provide these medical records to FAU. G.M. is a patient Respondent saw when she was serving as an ARNP student while she was enrolled in the FAU clinical course NGR 6602L. Dr. Archie McLean was Respondent's supervisor for that clinical course. Respondent hand-copied a portion of G.M.'s medical record and submitted it to FAU. Respondent did not have the permission of Dr. McLean or of G.M. to copy G.M.'s medical records or to submit the copied record to FAU at the time she did so. G.M. subsequently gave Respondent permission to use his copied medical record in the manner she did.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Sections 464.018(1)(h) and 456.072(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as set forth in this Recommended Order. For each violation, Respondent's license to practice nursing in the State of Florida should be reprimanded; she should be fined in the amount of $1,000.00 ($750 for the Count I violations and $250 for the Count II violation); she should be required to take continuing education classes on the topic of patient's rights and the topic of nursing ethics; and her license should be placed on probation for four years for the Count I violations and four years for the Count II violation, which should be served concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2003.
The Issue The Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 99-4377, charged Respondent with violating Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (failure to practice medicine with care, skill and treatment); Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (failure to keep written records justifying treatment); Section 452.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes (violation of a rule of the Board or Department) by violating Rule 64B8-9.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, relating to legibility of medical records, in connection with Respondent's emergency room treatment of Patient B.W. on July 21, 1995. The Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 99-4378, charges Respondent with violation of Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes (being unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness, use of any material, or as the result of any mental or physical condition).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the incidents alleged in the Administrative Complaints, Respondent was a licensed medical physician in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. ME 0016828. Respondent specialized in internal medicine and emergency medicine but has never been board certified in any specialty. Respondent's license has been delinquent since January 31, 2000, but because delinquent licenses may be subject to renewal, the Petitioner has persisted in prosecuting these cases. DOAH Case No. 99-4377 On July 21, 1995, B.W., a 56-year-old female, presented to Respondent in the emergency room of Florida Hospital Waterman, with complaints of chest, epigastric, and left shoulder pain. B.W. had a history of dermatomyositis, for which she had been taking 100 mg of Prednisone for a month, along with other medications. Prednisone in such large doses can cause gastrointestinal irritation, ulceration, and bleeding. The day before, B.W. had been prescribed Imuran by her rheumatologist for immunologic problems. Dermatomyositis is a degenerative disease of skeletal muscle that can lead to a multitude of complications, including rheumatologic problems evidenced by abnormal laboratory results. The standard of care in the examination and treatment of a patient with chest pain requires an emergency physician to obtain a history including a complete medical history, family history, and social history. Additionally, in order to meet the standard of care, the emergency physician must perform a complete physical examination, including a review of systems. The emergency room records for Respondent's treatment of B.W. show the information contained above in Finding of Fact No. 4. The emergency room records do not show that Respondent obtained or documented a complete medical history, family history, or social history of B.W. Respondent violated the standard of care in that he failed to obtain or document a complete medical history, family history, or social history of B.W. Respondent also violated the standard of care in that he failed to perform or document a complete physical examination, including a review of systems. Respondent ordered an electrocardiogram (EKG), a chest X-ray, a complete blood count (CBC), complete cardiac enzymes testing (CPK and CKMB), and a metabolic profile or chemistry panel (MPC). He also did a rectal exam which was negative for blood. He did all appropriate tests. He did not fail to order any appropriate tests. The EKG and the chest X-ray yielded normal results, but B.W.'s blood count revealed several abnormal values, including a decreased platelet of 21,000 and a markedly elevated white count of 24,000. A platelet count of 21,000 is extremely low and grounds for major concern, as is the elevated 24,000 white count. Together, in the presence of the other symptoms and abnormal blood values present, which included low RBC, anemic hemoglobin, and low hemocrit, the standard of care requires that an emergency physician obtain a consultation with a specialist, such as a rheumatologist or a hematologist. In light of all the foregoing results and normal corpuscular volume, which B.W. also had, the emergency physician should have recognized that B.W. did not have simple iron deficiency anemia. Under some circumstances, the emergency room physician's consultation with B.W.'s primary care physician, who in this case was also a rheumatologist, would have been sufficient. Respondent maintained that he had obtained a history from B.W. as set forth in Finding of Fact No. 4, and an oral report from the hospital lab technician to the effect that a blood test ordered by B.W.'s treating rheumatologist the preceding day, July 20, 1995, had shown a platelet count of 18,000, and that because Respondent presumed B.W.'s platelets were increasing with the use of Imuran plus other factors, Respondent did not admit B.W. to the hospital, but, instead, discharged her without even consultation. Despite Respondent's foregoing explanation, it is clear that Respondent did not record or document on B.W.'s chart his oral conversation with the lab technician, if, in fact, such a conversation occurred. This was below the acceptable standard of medical care and record-keeping for an emergency room physician. Respondent stated that he felt that because the treating rheumatologist had not admitted B.W. to the hospital or transfused B.W. the previous day, she should not be admitted or transfused on July 21, 1995. He stated that he also relied on a medical text (Merck's Manual) which allegedly states that platelet transfusions should not be given until the count falls to 10,000. Respondent stated that he ruled out a myocardial infarction on the basis that both the CKMB on B.W. and the CKMB Index were not elevated and B.W.'s EKG was normal. However, Dr. Tober, who is certified in emergency medicine, testified more credibly that he had never seen a CPK test so high; that interpretation of CPK and CKMB in such a patient as B.W. would be confounded by the co-existence of the dermatomyositis, grossly throwing off these tests in an acute cardiac setting, sometimes causing several EKGs to come back normal in the course of a myocardial infarction; that B.W.'s extremely low platelet count should cause great concern about the hemologic system and clotting response if B.W. started to hemorrhage; and that the suspiciously low lymphocytes and all blood parameters should have caused Respondent not to discharge B.W. prior to a consultation with a specialist. Respondent failed to meet the standard of care by the treatment he rendered to B.W., in that he did not obtain a consultation from either the primary care physician, another rheumatologist, or a hematologist, before discharging her. That standard of care requires an emergency physician to determine an appropriate diagnosis and treatment as related to the patient's complaint and results of examinations. Respondent violated the standard of care in that he merely wrote into B.W.'s chart a portion of her medical history, "dermatomyositis," instead of a current diagnosis which addressed her current abnormalities when she presented in the emergency room. Thus, Respondent did not discern an appropriate diagnosis while appropriately treating B.W.6 Respondent's chart on B.W. is illegible to the extent that Dr. Tober was unable to read most of 23 lines of it. Because proper care of patients requires that medical records be sufficiently legible for successive professionals to discern what the writer has done and analyzed, I find that Respondent is guilty of keeping written medical records that are illegible and difficult to decipher. I do not consider Hospital Waterman's failure to provide dictation or transcription equipment and/or personnel to excuse this flaw. DOAH Case No. 99-4378 On or about July 14, 1995, Respondent was convicted of driving under the influence and placed on probation for 12 months, and his driver's license was revoked for 12 months. About two years later, on July 12, 1997, Respondent's vehicle collided with another vehicle. Respondent and the driver of the other car were injured. Blood was drawn from Respondent at the hospital. Laboratory studies performed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement revealed that Respondent's blood alcohol level was 0.10 grams of ethyl alcohol per 100 ml. Under Florida law, a driver is legally intoxicated when his blood alcohol level is 0.08 grams of ethyl alcohol per 100 ml or higher. On August 12, 1997, Respondent was arrested and charged with one count of serious bodily injury while driving under the influence, and two counts of property damage while driving under the influence. On July 2, 1998, Respondent entered a plea of guilty7 to one count of serious bodily injury while driving under the influence and was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years, one month, and eight days. On or about January 13, 1998, Walter J. Muller, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist, performed a psychiatric evaluation of Respondent. Dr. Muller diagnosed Respondent with major depression, dysthymic disorder, and alcohol abuse, pursuant to The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV. At that time, these conditions were active and not in remission. The diagnosis of major depression correlates with impaired social and occupational functioning. A diagnosis of dysthymic disorder is an indication of impairment and the inability to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients. A diagnosis of alcohol abuse can be an indication of inability to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients, but would depend upon when the abuse is occurring and how long it has been since the abuse occurred. In the expert opinion of Dr. Raymond Pomm, who is board certified in adult psychiatry and general psychiatry, with added qualifications in addiction psychiatry, and who relied on Dr. Muller's evaluation, the combined three diagnoses of major depression, dysthymic disorder, and alcohol abuse revealed that, to a degree of reasonable medical certainty, Respondent was unable to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients on the date of Dr. Muller's report. Respondent was evaluated at Menninger Clinic in Kansas, on or about May 26, 1998, and diagnosed with alcohol dependence. After six weeks of treatment at the Menninger Clinic, Respondent was released as being "in early remission." The treating physician made a number of recommendations for rehabilitation of Respondent, including treating his alcohol dependence by entering into a monitoring contract with the Physician's Resource Network in Florida and requiring a further evaluation by a neurologist of Respondent's apparently diminished cognitive skills. Dr. Pomm did not have the opportunity to read the entire evaluation by the Menninger Clinic, and did not rely upon it in forming his opinion of Respondent's inability to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients. However, according to Dr. Pomm, there is no cure for alcohol dependence. It is a life-long illness, which is incurable, and which at best, can only be "in remission." In Dr. Pomm's opinion, one who is alcohol-dependent cannot practice with skill and safety to patients without undergoing a monitoring program. While I accept Respondent's testimony that he has remained sober since approximately May 27, 1998, because he has been in prison, I also note that Respondent has not entered into a monitoring contract or been monitored in a recovery program because he has been in prison. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Respondent's circumstances have changed sufficiently since January 13, 1998, so as to demonstrate that he is able to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients in the real world.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of all violations charged, and as a penalty therefore, suspending Respondent's license to practice medicine in Florida until such time as Respondent presents to the Board and proves that he can practice with skill and safety. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to practice medicine should be suspended, revoked or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 450, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint dated March 1, 1984. The Amended Administrative Complaint in this proceeding alleges that Respondent, either individually or in concert with other attending physicians, ordered or prescribed certain nephrotoxic drugs to a patient who suffered from renal impairment, "that Respondent failed to appropriately monitor such medication or its effects," and that the patient suffered renal failure and vestibular and cochlear impairment. It is alleged in the complaint that Respondent therefore violated Section 458.331(1)(t) Florida Statutes, by committing gross or repeated malpractice or failure to practice medicine at an acceptable level of care, skill, and treatment. The complaint also alleges that Respondent altered patient records by inserting false laboratory reports, additional progress notes, and other additions, and failed to appropriately document the justification for the patient's course of treatment, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(i),(1), and Florida Statutes. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of 9 witnesses and submitted 7 exhibits in evidence. Respondent called 5 witnesses, and the parties stipulated to the expected testimony of Dr. Maynard Taylor. During the course of the hearing, Petitioner introduced into evidence a deposition of Respondent which was taken in a civil proceeding in the Pasco County Circuit Court to which Respondent was not a party, but which involved the same medical treatment provided to patient Michael Marotta that resulted in the Administrative Complaint herein. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The Hearing Officer determined that any admissions made by the Respondent that are reflected in the deposition were admissible in this proceeding pursuant to Section 90.803(18), Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted a posthearing list of purported admissions contained in the deposition, and Respondent filed a response thereto conceding that some of the statements by Respondent constituted admissions and that others did not. Those statements of Respondent which are deemed to constitute admissions are included in the following findings of fact. Petitioner also sought to have its Request for Admissions deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 1.370, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, due to Respondent's untimely response thereto. Respondent opposed Petitioner's request on the ground that his response was timely under the rules of discovery and, even if such rules were inapplicable in an administrative proceeding, he should be granted relief due to excusable neglect or inadvertence. Although Respondent's claims are not deemed meritorious, certain of the requests for admissions which were denied by Respondent were not in conformance with the evidence presented at the hearing. Those admissions which are properly considered to be within the scope of discovery requests are reflected in the following findings of fact. The proposed recommended orders filed by the parties have been fully considered and those portions thereof not adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary or irrelevant, or unsupported in law or fact.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Nrisingha Das Mukherjee is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, and was so licensed at all times material to the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint. On October 1, 1979, Michael Marotta, then sixty years old, was admitted to the West Pasco Hospital, New Port Richey, Florida, by Dr. Jack Lund. His complaints were a severe cough and chest pains. He had experienced shortness of breath with increasing severity for several days prior to admission, with a productive cough and generalized malaise. He had a long-standing pulmonary history, including tuberculosis at age twenty, with right lower partial lobectomy in 1949. He had been treated for hypertension since 1954 or 1955. The physician's admission diagnosis was bronchial pneumonia. (Testimony of Michael Marotta, Reines, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) During Marotta's hospitalization, it was determined by Dr. Lund that he had cancer of the colon. Dr. Lund then contacted the Respondent on October 9, 1979, for assistance with the surgical management of the patient. Respondent determined that surgery was required, but called in Dr. Jeffrey Reines, a cardiologist and internist, for a consultation on October 10, 1979. (Testimony of Lund, Reines, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Dr. Reines examined the patient and his consultation report reflected impressions of atherosclerosis, possible coronary artery obstructive disease, chronic restrictive pulmonary disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, resolving bronchitis or pneumonia, tachycardia, probable cecal carcinoma and an abnormal cardiogram. He found that the patient was a high-risk candidate for the contemplated surgical procedure because of his cardiac status and poor pulmonary status, and therefore felt it might be necessary to postpone the surgery for a short period of time for transfusional therapy, pulmonary function testing, and pulmonary psysiotherapy. (Testimony of Reines, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) As a result of Dr. Reines' recommendations, surgery was postponed until October 15, 1979, at which time Respondent performed an exploratory laparotomy, a hemicolectomy, and a cholecystectomy on patient Marotta. During surgery, the patient experienced an episode of bradycardia for a short period of time whereby there was a decrease in the patient's heart rate and blood pressure. (Testimony of Reines, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) After surgery, the patient suffered acute renal failure and he was transferred on October 16, 1979, to Community Hospital in New Port Richey for dialysis treatment. Since that time, he has had to remain on dialysis, and additionally has suffered impairment in balance and hearing functions. Marotta had never previously experienced kidney, balance or hearing problems. (Testimony of Reines, Michael Marotta, Marie Marotta, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Prior to the time that Respondent entered the case on October 9, 1979, Dr. Lund had prescribed drug therapy, including garamycin, penicillin, lasix, and lanoxin. Additionally, the patient was given an IV pyelogram (IVP) and cholecystogram which are used to determine kidney and gallbladder functions. Respondent prescribed erythromycin, neomycin, keflin, and utilized a neomycin wash during surgery. Prior to surgery, Respondent had also ordered an aminoglycocide for the purpose of cleansing the bowel of gram negative organisms. Dr. Reines had also ordered garamycin for the patient prior to surgery. After surgery, Respondent prescribed teflin, gentamycin, and lasix. However, all drugs were discontinued on October 16, 1979. (Testimony of Reines, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) The antibiotic and other drugs used in the treatment of Marotta are potentially nephrotoxic, particularly when used by patients with impaired renal function. In addition otoxicity can occur in patients with preexisting renal damage who are treated with garamycin. It is therefore necessary that close monitoring of renal function be maintained even in patients with normal renal function if they develop evidence of nitrogen retention, as shown by laboratory tests. Neomycin presents similar problems and concurrent use of the two drugs, together with diuretics such as lasix, should be monitored closely for patients with impaired renal function. (Testimony of Willey, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 4) Tests performed on Michael Marotta when he was admitted to West Pasco Hospital indicated that there might be some kidney function impairment. However, during the course of treatment, his kidneys were monitored by standard tests and his kidney function was deemed to be adequate until subsequent to the surgical procedure. Conflicting evidence was received at the hearing concerning the adequacy of such testing. In addition, false BUN and creatinine test results purporting to have been performed on October 3, 5, and 7, 1979, were prepared and made a part of Marotta's medical record by an unknown person at an unknown time subsequent to the period of hospitalization. However, it is found that insufficient evidence was presented to establish that Respondent failed to adequately monitor the patient's condition during the period in which he provided treatment. (Testimony of Willey, Reines, Stadnitski, Shaneyfelt, Downey, Barr, Abbey, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3-5, 7) Although the medications ordered by Respondent, in conjunction with those ordered by the other physicians in the case had potential nephrotoxic effect, it is found that they were administered as necessary to prevent serious infection in a patient who had advanced cancer. In such a situation, every effort must be made to prevent such infection by the use of antibiotics. In the opinion of an expert in the field of surgery, Dr. Joseph Abbey, the use of such medications in such an instance constitutes a calculated risk which is acceptable if the patient is well hydrated and monitored closely. His opinion conforms with that of Dr. Reines, the internist, who testified that the patient was in a life-threatening situation due to his overall poor physical condition which justified use of the medications in question because all of the patient's organs were threatened and he otherwise would have been subjected to peritonitis. He also felt that if the patient had been taken off diuretics, he probably would have gone into congestive heart failure. Since the patient had acute tracheal bronchitis, he felt that no less toxic antibiotics could have been given to the patient than were used during the course of treatment. (Testimony of Abbey, Reines) Dr. Reines was also of the belief that the patient's renal failure was exclusively caused bye the bradycardia episode that had occurred during surgery. This opinion was disputed by Petitioner's expert pathologist, Dr. Edward Willey, who testified that the kidney failure had been caused by the cumulative effects of toxic drugs and dyes administered to the patient. He was, of the opinion that the period of bradycardia had a relatively insignificant effect on the patient's renal condition. However, the nephrologist who examined Marotta on October 16, 1979, was of the view that renal failure was "probably secondary to possible hypotensive episode intra-operatively and nephrotoxic drugs." (Testimony of Reines, Willey, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) At some undetermined time after Respondent had made original entries in Marotta's medical records, he made additional entries on various pages concerning various laboratory tests that had been made during the course of treatment. No evidence was presented that these late entries were inaccurate or misleading. Additional late entries were made on several pages of the record, including the signed patient consent to surgery form on October 14, 1979. Paragraph 6 of the printed form reflected that the nature and purpose of the operation, possible alternative methods of treatment, the risks involved, and the possibility of complications had been fully explained. At the bottom of the form in handwriting, Respondent had added a handwritten note stating that he had explained in detail the pros and cons of surgery to the patient, and that the mortality and morbidity of the surgery and medical treatment had been discussed. In several other instances, Respondent had added similar notes in handwriting on pages of the record stating that he had discussed with the patient and/or his family the "bad risks involved for surgery and medical management," "the risk of surgery in the face of poor lung function and kidney function," and "Bowel prep with neo and Erythromicin discussed with patient - risk explained." At least one of these late entries had been made sometime in 1981 after the records had been numbered by hospital personnel. One of the other entries reflected the correction of the erroneous date of "10/10/80" to 10/10/79. All of the entries purported to have been made on dates during October 1979. Although it is not unusual for physicians to make late entries to complete the hospital records after a patient is discharged, and to date the delayed entry as the date that treatment was given, normally this is accomplished in a relatively short period of time unless there are multiple physicians involved in the case. It would be rare that an entry was dated over a year after discharge of the patient. Both Michael Marotta and his wife denied that they were ever advised by Respondent that the medications in question were dangerous to or could affect the kidneys. (Testimony of Shaneyfelt, Robinson, Michael Marotta, Marie Marotta, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 6) Respondent has a reputation in the local medical community as a competent and respected surgeon since his arrival in New Port Richey some five or six years ago. (Testimony of Marlow, Lincer, Wright, Stipulated testimony of Abbey)
Recommendation A hearing was held in the above captioned matter, after due notice, at New Port Richey, Florida, on March 13-14, 1984, before Thomas C. Oldham, Hearing Officer.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license shall be disciplined for violations of Section 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes [failure to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of patients as set out in Counts 1-4, 6-9, 11, and 13-14 of the administrative complaint]. Whether Respondent's license shall be disciplined for violations of Section 458.331(1)(cc) 1, 2, and 3, Florida Statutes [prescription of an amphetamine drug for purposes other than specifically stated in those subsections as set out in Counts 5 (Preludin), 10 (Preludin), and 12 (Ritalin) of the administrative complaint]. Whether Respondent's license shall be disciplined for violations of Section 453.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes [by engaging in gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances as set out in Counts 1-15 inclusive, of the administrative complaint].
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Tariq Husam Abdullah, is a licensed medical physician, practicing under license number ME 0021526. He is also known as Henry Nichols. The two are one and the same and there is no dispute over identity. Respondent appears to have been a hard worker, rising from a "bed pan hustler" at the old Fort Walton Hospital to his current level of education, licensure, and community position. Previous to Florida licensure, Respondent received his medical degree from Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee, where he also did his internship in straight medicine. Thereafter, Respondent performed three years of anatomical and experimental pathology at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri, and two years in clinical pathology at the National Institute of Health and the United States Public Health Service in Bethesda, Maryland. Respondent is not board-certified, but is currently board-eligible in both pathology and laboratory medicine. At all times material hereto, Respondent engaged in medical practice in Bay County, Florida. During much of the time in question, Respondent had no assisting staff. His usual fee for each office visit of each of the patients referred to in the fifteen count administrative complaint was approximately $15- 20 maximum. They are a small portion of the approximately 1,000 patients he treated between 1978 and 1982, and in most cases his fees for office visits were $10.00 apiece. Sometimes his fees were paid and sometimes they were not paid. Medicaid and Medicare reimbursed all or a portion of many fees. In the course of his practice Respondent treated the following patients: D.B.; T.B.; Tommy B.; J.C.; L.C.; T.G. a/k/a L.C.; David G.; Dan G.; C.R.; B.W.; and J.M. Petitioner's expert-witness medical doctors were Jabe Armistead Breland and Michael W. Cohen. Dr. Breland was present at the formal hearing and had the advantage of reviewing Respondent's exhibits as well as Petitioner's exhibits in the forming of his opinions. Dr. Breland has been a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida since September 1950. Most of that time he has practiced in the panhandle of north Florida which includes Panama City, Bay County. His office is in Marianna, Florida. He is board- certified in family medicine, licensed by the federal government to prescribe controlled substances, and was stipulated as an expert in the field of medicine. Dr. Michael W. Cohen testified by means of a deposition taken prior to formal hearing and did not have the advantage of review of Respondent's exhibits admitted in evidence at the formal hearing. He is a family physician with an M.D. from the University of Miami School of Medicine (1975), a graduate of Tallahassee Memorial Hospital Regional Medical Center Family Practice Program, and has been a board-certified family physician for six and one-half years. His practice is limited to Tallahassee and he has testified on contract for Petitioner six times previous to this case. He is accepted by the undersigned as an expert medical witness, but because of the unavailability to Dr. Cohen of Respondent's exhibits which were admitted in evidence at the formal hearing held subsequent to his deposition and because some of the materials upon which Dr. Cohen's opinions were predicated were excluded from evidence at the formal hearing, the weight and credibility of his prior deposition testimony is significantly impaired through no fault of Dr. Cohen and without any unfavorable reflection upon him. Dr. Wilson, Respondent's expert medical doctor who testified by after-filed deposition knew nothing of Respondent's records and was unaware of the precise charges against him. In the absence of appropriate predicate as to medical opinion, his testimony has been accepted only as to facts of which he had personal knowledge and as to character. It is his opinion that Respondent is the kind of person who deserves not to have his license suspended or revoked. Dr. Wilson partly financed Respondent's education. The parties by Request for Admission have established that Preludin is an amphetamine; more accurately Preludin is phenmetrazine. Ritalin is methylphenidate. Dioxan is a methylamphetamine. At all times pertinent these were Schedule II controlled substances pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Percodan is also a Schedule II controlled substance. Valium is a Schedule IV controlled substance. Darvon Compound and Tylenol 4 are Schedule III controlled substances. Respondent frequently talked to police, Sheriff's deputies and pharmacists in an effort to avoid his patients becoming addicted to drugs. He never was made aware from any source of any drug addiction or any arrests of any patients concerned in this action. He testified that he performed a physical examination in every case and verified all prior medications in every case, but he also conceded not verifying prior medications with previous doctors or hospitals. It is specifically found that in many instances none of these precautions appear in his records as set out infra. D. B. (Counts I; XV) It is admitted (Requests for Admission) and found that between February 19, 1979, and April 23, 1983, Respondent prescribed at least the following quantities of controlled substances to his patient, D. B.: DATE DRUG STRENGTH QUANTITY 02/19/79 Percodan Approximate 04/30/79 Darvon Compound 03/23/82 Valium 05/13/82 Tylenol #4 06/03/82 Percodan Demi 40 06/16/82 " " 18 07/10/82 " " 07/17/82 " " 36 08/14/82 " " 18 08/28/82 Percodan 08/28/82 Valium 01/15/83 Percodan 03/26/83 " 03/26/83 Valium 04/23/83 Percodan Respondent's treatment of his patient, D.B. with controlled substances was predicated upon his diagnosis of "traumatic arthritis." His records reflect, "hurting ankle, leg, and back" as the chief complaint. In no instance of prescribing scheduled drugs for this patient did Respondent maintain a record of the strength (dosage) and on only a few occasions did he record the quantity prescribed. This particular inadequacy of record-keeping seems also to have applied to additional non- scheduled drugs prescribed by Respondent for this patient. Although Dr. Breland acknowledged that many doctors only record the word "refill," good medical practice dictates that Respondent should have recorded at least the quantity and dosage at the time of the initial prescription. Normal protocol would be to also record the method of taking the medication. On this analysis, in Dr. Breland's professional medical opinion, Respondent's medical records for his patient, D.B. (Composite P-1) were inadequate and did not justify the course of treatment upon the recorded chief complaint. Dr. Cohen concurs. Further record inadequacies as noted by Dr. Breland include failure of the records to indicate which bone was fractured in relating the patient's medical history, recording only blood pressure as a vital sign, and failure to state what condition was being treated on subsequent visits. Dr. Cohen recited the same inadequacies in forming his professional medical opinion that Respondent's records do not justify the treatment received. Dr. Cohen further opined that if the patient had traumatic arthritis, the treatment prescribed was wholly inadequate due to the absence of any recorded plans for therapy. Dr. Breland, on the other hand, felt that a Percodan prescription is consistent with good medical practice for a patient who complains of traumatic arthritis and that Valium, a benzodiazepine drug which is a calmative or tranquilizer, may also be properly used for traumatic arthritis but that Valium would be contraindicated if there were associated patient nervousness and anxiety. Dr. Breland's opinion is that it would not be medical malpractice to prescribe Valium upon the basis of Respondent's records nor would it be medical malpractice based upon the continued prescribing of Percodan unless the patient became addicted. Dr. Breland's experience is that 1-3 months on Percodan would cause individuals to run the risk of addiction but knows of doctors in the Panama City locale who have prescribed Percodan in excess of three months with addiction resulting in some patients and not in others. Respondent conceded that his records for this patient should show greater detail but according to his recollection independent of the medical records, he recalled that on the first visit, he had accepted D.B.'s representation that D.B. had had prior surgery on the left ankle because the pins could be seen through that swollen ankle. Respondent's independent recollection was that D.B. did not ask for Percodan. Respondent testified that he prescribed the Percodan because "after codeine I can't think of another drug with potential for comfort." His failure to record further detail he explained as his belief that writing down prescriptions was a sufficient reference back to the original first visit diagnosis. Respondent admittedly did not record, but expressed independent recollection of also accepting D.B.'s representation of previous unsuccessful medication with codeine from a Dr. Smith and of recommending acupuncture as an alternative pain therapy but admitted he also did not record this latter instruction. The medical records themselves confirm Respondent's testimony in the course of the hearing that Respondent prescribed the scheduled drugs in addition to a number of other medications such as Roboxin and anti-inflammatories which he did record and which Dr. Breland confirmed were appropriate as treatment for traumatic arthritis. A portion of Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 15, court certified records, show one "Donald Richard Bozeman" was charged in two counts of illegally selling Valium in Bay County on September 2 and September 11, 1982. This person was subsequently tried and found guilty of one count and entered a plea of guilty to the other. A Circuit Court Judgment was entered. The date of the commission of this person's offenses are close to the date of a prescription by Respondent to his patient "D.B." but there is absolutely nothing in the court documents to connect them to the D.B. treated by Respondent except a partial similarity of name. Nor does the similarity of name of a co-defendant, Tereza Ann Bozeman (see infra.) prove an inescapable link of "Donald Richard Bozeman" to Respondent's patient, "D.B." who was married to someone of partially similar name. Accordingly, the court documents are probative of nothing in connection with Respondent's records or his patients, including but not limited to Petitioner's assertions that Respondent prescribed to his patient, "D.B." for a non-medical or criminal purpose or that the patient was drug-addicted. Upon all the foregoing information taken together it is clear Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of his patient, D.B. This finding is made despite both of Petitioner's experts' testimony that there is no affirmative professional requirement that dosage and number of tablets be recorded anywhere except on a prescription. That concern is only a portion of the inadequacies of these records. However, in light of Dr. Breland's greater familiarity with all of Respondent's records and the standard of medical practice in the community, and the greater detail provided by his testimony and the explanations provided by Respondent at formal hearing, Dr. Breland's opinion that the course of treatment for this patient, isolated from all others, does not represent malpractice is accepted over Dr. Cohen's opinion that it does. T. B. (Counts II, XV) It is admitted (Requests for Admission) and found that between approximately May 1, 1982, and April 9, 1983, Respondent prescribed at least the following quantities of schedule- controlled substances to his patient, T.B.: DATE DRUG STRENGTH QUANTITY 05/01/82 Valium 05/01/82 Percodan Demi 07/10/82 " " " 30 08/14/82 " " " 08/14/82 " " " 18 08/14/82 Valium 09/11/82 Percodan 09/11/82 Valium 12/12/83 Percocet #5 Although in some respects, Drs. Breland and Cohen emphasized different faults or inadequacies of Respondent's records which they reviewed concerning T.B. (Composite P-2), both experts concur that the records do not justify the course of treatment of this patient. Dr. Cohen bases his opinion on his analysis that the history Respondent recorded for this patient was not sufficiently detailed. Specifically, the initial office visit record is flawed by only writing down patient's vital signs and recording no physical findings. Dr. Cohen stated it is unjustifiable to prescribe a narcotic analgesic on the first office visit and to continue to refill the prescription on subsequent visits without recording how the patient had done on those medications and further without recording physical examination, assessment of how the patient is responding to the medication, a plan outline for prophylactic care, and patient education. Further, both Drs. Breland and Cohen assert that although there is no affirmative professional requirement to record dosage and tablet numbers except on prescriptions, it is the custom of reasonably prudent similar physicians to record amount, dosage quantity of drugs prescribed, and method of taking drugs, and Respondent's records do not do so. Respondent's records for this patient also offend custom and usage of the profession in that they indicate several office visits for which there are no recorded findings or treatments whatsoever. Dr. Breland's opinion that the records do not justify the treatment and that they fall below the customary standard of care are based on his analysis thereof emphasizing that the records of the first office visit do not evidence a physical examination other than taking a blood pressure reading and weighing the patient. There is a brief history of migraine headaches for three months recorded and also recorded is a past diagnosis and treatment with codeine and talwin; the records note no previous surgery, no previous fracture, and no physical findings. Then, Cafergot PB #2, Valium #3 and Percodan-demi were prescribed by Respondent. The records should have specified whether or not previous treatment was successful and if it was successful, Respondent could have subsequently prescribed less addictive drugs. In Dr. Breland's opinion, it is "hard to justify" a Class II drug without trying some other modalities available. Respondent first saw this patient on May 1, 1982, for migraine headaches and prescribed Cafergot PB and Percodan-demi. He selected Percodan- demi because Percodan is habit-forming. In the course of the formal hearing, he testified, "I just didn't know another medication to go to after you pass codeine that would be effective with patients, other than giving them Demerol and the harder narcotic medications" and that when he first began seeing this patient he was less aware of the similar use of the less addictive drug, Inderal, than he is now. On the physical examination portion of his clinical notes, Respondent indicated that the patient had been using Codeine, Talwin, and "Dx" and "Rx". He then and thereafter (8/14/82 and 9/11/82) prescribed analgesics and vasoconstrictors (Cafergot PB and Ergotamine) together with the Valium because Valium, in his opinion, is often ineffective without more because of the significant emotional components of migraine headaches. Respondent also expressed his independent recollection of discussing with this patient the alternative treatment of acupuncture but admitted he did not record this instruction. Respondent's explanation is not sufficient justification for the repeated prescriptions of controlled substances in light of Dr. Breland's more knowledgeable and thorough explanation of the standards of record-keeping necessary to justify continued prescription of the particular controlled substances here at issue. Dr. Breland faults another of Respondent's prescriptions dated 12/4/82 of Cafergot PB#2 (a combination of drugs primarily containing an Ergotamine derivative and caffeine), Percocet, and Valium because Respondent's records do not show how many pills were prescribed nor do they give directions for taking them. For prescriptions on 1/8/83, 8/14/82, 9/11/82, and 2/12/83, Dr. Breland expressed as his chief concern that there was an absence of recorded physical findings, history, and blood pressure plus no recorded amount of dosage listed for most prescription drugs, but Dr. Breland also determined that prescribing Cafergot is consistent with Respondent's diagnosis of vascular headaches and his prescriptions for these dates is an appropriate lesser treatment to be tried before prescribing a Schedule II drug, and, further, that Respondent's records justify prescribing Cafergot. However, the opinion expressed in the prior sentence is not compelling in face of the records having no notations to show the effect, if any, of Cafergot or other drugs or to show why Respondent prescribed stronger medication. Dr. Breland also felt Respondent should have prescribed other less addictive drugs before going to the Schedule II-controlled substances as he did, and that if Respondent's findings were negative, he should have recorded them as negative rather than leaving the record blank, because without such records it cannot be determined if a physical examination was ever made and because in absence of recorded physical findings, no Schedule II drugs should have been prescribed. A portion of Petitioner's Composite 15, court-certified records show one "Tereza Ann Bozeman" was charged in two counts of illegally selling Valium in Bay County on September 2 and September 11, 1982. This person entered a plea of guilty to a lesser-included misdemeanor. The Circuit Court withheld adjudication and placed her on probation. The date of one of the offenses coincides with one of the dates of a prescription by Respondent to his patient, "T.B." but there is absolutely nothing in the Court documents to connect them to the "T.B." treated by Respondent, except a partial similarity of name. The court documents also charge "Donald Richard Bozeman" who has a similar name to that of another of Respondent's patients (see supra.) but the court documents do not indicate the charged individuals are married or provide any other link to Respondent's patient(s). Accordingly, the court documents are probative of nothing in connection with Respondent's records or his patients, including but not limited to Petitioner's assertions that Respondent prescribed to his patient, T.B., for a non-medical or criminal purpose or that the patient was drug-addicted. Tommy B. (Counts III, XV) It is admitted (Request for Admissions) and found that between approximately August 16, 1981, and February 19, 1983, Respondent prescribed at least the following quantities of schedule controlled substances to Tommy B.: DATE DRUG STRENGTH QUANTITY 08/15/81 Valium 08/15/81 Percodan 08/15/81 Dalmane 10/30/81 Tylox 12/05/81 " 12/05/81 Valium 12/06/82 Darvon compound 02/17/82 Percodan 30 04/01/82 " Demi 04/01/82 Percodan 30 05/29/82 Percodan Demi 06/21/82 Tylox 24 07/12/82 Percocet #5 30 02/19/83 Percocet 02/19/83 Valium In the course of the hearing, Respondent independently recalled that this patient presented on 8/15/81 and that Respondent himself personally recorded the notes for that date including a history, diagnosis of L-S syndrome, and treatment. On that date he observed scars on the patient's back from back surgeries which the patient related had been done at Southern Baptist Hospital in New Orleans. Respondent conceded that he failed to record the physical findings of scars and failed to record full details of the related surgeries so that at first glance it might appear to others, in this case Dr. Breland, that Respondent was only filling in a history of surgeries without making his own diagnosis. Respondent stated that he had relied on the Physician's Desk Reference, which he characterized as a "bible of the medical profession", and which recommends Percodan as a pain-killer. The treatise itself was not offered in evidence. Respondent also stated that the Percodan-based drugs he prescribed effectively relieved this patient's pain. There is no contrary evidence on this point of effectiveness but it still was not contemporaneously recorded by Respondent in the patient's record. Both Drs. Cohen and Breland opined that Respondent's records for Tommy B. did not justify the prescribing of these controlled substances, most specifically Percodan. These opinions have not been accepted for the following reasons. In the absence of any supporting evidence, Dr. Cohen's considerable testimony concerning his belief that this must have been a scam or scheme of Respondent to indirectly charge for a controlled substance prescription by requiring frequent office visits is rejected as conscientious but pure conjecture. Dr. Breland expressed concern that Percodan-demi was among the drugs prescribed by Respondent in the presence of a record notation within the physical findings which relates that "patient says he can't take Percodan". Respondent denied he made this notation, and related it is in someone else's handwriting and not true. Respondent's testimony on this score is corroborated by clear observation of the records. Most of Dr. Breland's other complaints concerning Respondent's record of this patient devolve to Dr. Breland's inability to read Respondent's handwriting and his original erroneous belief that the history and exam was chronologically incorrect and taken by someone other than Respondent. Dr. Breland's opinion that the records are deficient because the fracture of the back was not specifically recorded by Respondent's indicating whether there was an old fracture or current pain and by Respondent's not indicating whether there was thoracic or lumbar distress, and because there is no recitation of whether the fracture is pelvical or in any body of the vertebrae, and his objection to failure of Respondent to either record "no x- rays" if none or to record x-rays if there were some instead of leaving a blank space constitute technique over professional custom requirement of record- keeping. Dr. Breland also described the two month fluctuation down to Percodan- demi and then up to the stronger drug of Percocet from 4/1/82 to 2/19/83 as unjustified because no less addictive medicines had been tried and no degree of relief from less addictive drugs was attempted by Respondent, but Dr. Breland described the Percodan- based drugs and the Valium as medically acceptable where based on the degree of relief the patient had received. In such a situation Dr. Breland would use these drugs for pain treatment and consider them medically justified. Like Dr. Cohen, Dr. Breland also found unacceptable the failure of Respondent to record amounts and dosages in his office medical records, but on many occasions throughout their testimony, both of Petitioner's experts observed the requirement of listing amount and dosages is for prescriptions only and not for a doctor's office records. Upon the failure of adequate predicate for Dr. Cohen's conclusion of unjustified prescriptions, the absence of any admissible evidence of any addiction in this patient, and the only positive evidence of the effect of these prescriptions being Respondent's opinion that it was effective, the opinions of both Drs. Cohen and Breland that the medical records do not justify the course of treatment of Tommy B. are rejected. J. C. (COUNTS IV; XV) It is admitted (Requests for Admissions) and found that between January 4, 1982, and February 26, 1983, Respondent prescribed at least the following schedule-controlled substances to J.C.: DATE DRUG STRENGTH QUANTITY 01/04/82 Percodan 24 03/23/82 Tylox 30 04/17/82 Percodan 04/17/82 " " 05/01/82 Tylenol #4 30 05/01/82 Valium 30 05/04/82 Tylox 30 06/12/82 Valium 06/16/82 Tylox 36 07/17/82 " 30 08/14/82 " 30 10/03/82 " 30 10/30/82 Tylenol #4 11/13/82 Percodan 30 01/15/83 Percocet 01/15/83 Valium 28. J.C.'s chief complaint was migraine headaches, "nerves", and back trouble. Respondent prescribed Percodan for pain, Valium for "nerves", and Cafergot-pb for migraines. He diagnosed hypertensive heart disease, anxiety neurosis, migraine headaches, and lumbosacral syndrome. He only used Percodan four times over a year's period due to the severity of the symptoms brought on by the tug and strain on this 200-pound woman's back. Dr. Cohen ranks the relatively minimal fault of writing progress notes in two corners and across the top and side of a page in the same category as overprescribing. Dr. Cohen's concern over the absence of recorded physical findings for this patient was not confirmed by Dr. Breland (see infra.) and his concern because the number and dosage of Cafergot-pb (non-scheduled), Valium (scheduled) and Percodan (scheduled) were frequently not recorded by Respondent is less significant in light of Dr. Breland's testimony that the best custom and practice of the medical profession is to record these matters but such recordation is not required for office records but only for prescriptions. Dr. Cohen also faulted Respondent for prescribing symptomatically with no effort to educate the patient to prevent or "prophylax" against migraines or to prescribe common anti- inflammatory medications usually prescribed for migraines. Dr. Breland noted that Tylenol #4 is a controlled substance but made no specific objection to Respondent's prescription of it for this patient. Cafergot-pb is not a controlled substance and its prescription by Respondent was not faulted by Dr. Breland. All of Dr. Breland's testimony on this patient is couched in vague terms of "it is hard to justify" Respondent's prescription of Percodan and Percocet on just this work-up and Dr. Breland felt Respondent's prescription of Percodan on the first visit was not justified without obtaining a further medical history, but he would have approved eventual (not first visit) use of Percodan for this patient's migraine headaches if it were not for the presence of hypertensive heart disease or her neurosis. Although the records fail to state why Percodan-based drugs were used, Dr. Breland felt these drugs would have been appropriately prescribed for the lumbosacral syndrome. By comparison, J.C's recorded medical history is more extensive than that of most of the patient records involved in this action. The history taken by Respondent lists previous surgery of a hysterectomy, of a previous fracture to the left hip, and of a tonsillectomy. Also given is an elevated blood pressure of 160 over 100, height and weight, state of parity, and diagnoses. The date of her last period and of her hysterectomy are not given. Petitioner's two expert witnesses each would have made separate and different judgment calls on all prescriptions here related, except that each concurs that Respondent's initial prescription of Percodan on this patient's first visit was unjustified without a further recorded history; therefore, Dr. Breland's summation that the records justify overall treatment of this patient is accepted. L. C. (COUNTS V; VI; XV) It is admitted (Requests for Admission) and found that between approximately March 27, 1978, and April 23, 1983, Respondent prescribed at least the following quantities of schedule-controlled substances to L.C.: DATE DRUG STRENGTH QUANTITY 03/27/78 Darvon Compound 07/21/78 Darvon 07/21/78 Darvon Compound 07/21/78 Valium 10/23/79 Percodan 10/31/79 Preludin 11/17/80 Preludin 11/28/81 Darvon Compound 12/28/81 Percodan 24 01/14/82 " " 30 04/02/82 " " 36 06/08/82 " " 36 07/17/82 " " 36 08/28/82 " " 36 09/25/82 " " 24 09/25/82 Darvon Compound 12/03/82 Percodan 30 01/15/83 " " Dr. Cohen's opinion that there had been prescription of an amphetamine drug for an unjustified purpose and that the patient's records did not justify the Respondent's prescribed course of treatment is rejected as partially predicated upon inadmissible and unadmitted exhibits. The opinion of Dr. Breland is accepted that most of these prescriptions as only part of the course of treatment as a whole were acceptable. More particularly, Dr. Breland indicated there are other doctors similarly geographically situated who use Percodan similarly; there was a very adequate history taken, although the date appears out of order on the page; Respondent's early prescribing of Roboxin and Darvon (one of the less addictive controlled substances) would be a good treatment for osteoarthritis which was part of Respondent's diagnosis of this patient; there was not enough Percodan prescription here for Dr. Breland to say it was not justified in this patient's case. Dr. Breland was unsure when Preludin became a scheduled substance and so would not comment on that aspect of the case. This is an issue of law and is discussed under "Conclusions of Law." T. G. (COUNTS VII; XV) Between approximately July 23, 1978, and April 26, 1983, Respondent treated a patient by the name of T.G. During that period, the stipulated records reveal at least the following prescriptions, among others: DATE APPROXIMATE QUANTITY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 7/23/78 30 Percodan 7/23/78 Darvon Compound 9/21/78 Percodan 10/14/78 Percodan 10/14/78 Darvon Compound 11/21/78 24 Percodan 11/21/78 Darvon 12/6/78 30 Percodan 12/6/78 Darvon Compound 12/28/78 Percodan 12/28/78 Darvon 1/23/79 Qualudes 1/29/79 24 Percocet 1/19/82 24 Percocet 3/4/82 Valium 3/4/82 Percodan 4/29/82 Percocet 8/19/82 Percodan 8/19/82 Valium 10 mg 9/25/82 Valium 9/25/82 Percocet 10/14/82 40 Percocet 10/14/82 40 Valium 10 mg 10/14/82 40 Percocet 10/14/82 40 Valium 10/14/82 40 Percocet 10/14/82 40 Valium 10 mg 10/14/82 40 Valium 10/14/82 40 Percocet #5 10/14/82 40 Percocet 10/14/82 40 Valium Additionally, the Respondent occasionally prescribed Tetracycline and Actifed Syrup for colds, and the parties have stipulated these are not controlled substances. Although Dr. Breland tagged Respondent's use of Roboxin 750, Percodan 30, Darvon compound and Prednisone (a Cortisone- like anti-inflammatory) on the first visit as "borderline acceptable," it was his and Dr. Cohen's mutual opinions that in the absence of recorded physical findings, the Respondent's prescribing of controlled substances in these quantities and with this frequency to this patient was not justified by the records Respondent kept. Dr. Breland, in particular, found unacceptable the Respondent's diagnosis of lumbosacral syndrome without detailed physical findings or any x-ray diagnosis, and both experts took exception to the continued and repeated prescriptions of the addictive drugs, Valium and Percodan, in a case where Respondent's records repeatedly indicate a good response. Both further opined against Respondent's delayed attempt to diminish the use of these addictive drugs. The doctors' opinion that the records do not justify the prescriptions are accepted. DAVID G. (Counts VIII; XV) The stipulated records reveal at least the following controlled substances were prescribed by Respondent to his patient, David G., between December 17, 1981, and February 12, 1983. DATE APPROXIMATE CONTROLLED QUANTITY SUBSTANCE 12/17/81 Ativan 12/30/81 Ativan 2/12/82 Valium 3/06/82 Seconal 3/11/82 Valium 4/08/82 Seconal 8/28/82 Seconal 8/28/82 Valium Respondent saw this patient 12 times in approximately 2 years and accepted David G.'s representation that he had been previously prescribed Ativan, a controlled substance of the same chemical family as Valium. Although Respondent claims he verified all prior medications, the verification here is not reflected in his record. The records themselves do not reflect for most occasions why this patient was being treated nor do they set forth an assessment of why Respondent switched from less to more addictive sedative hypnotics. Ativan is a tranquilizer on Schedule III. Seconal is a sedative on Schedule II. In an isolated response, Dr. Breland testified that if the Respondent's initial diagnosis of insomnia and anxiety neurosis had been arrived at after taking a proper history and after a proper physical examination which was not recorded, he would not find Respondent's use of these medications, including Seconal, improper, because there are doctors in the same geographical area who would also use Seconal. However, the ultimate opinion of both of Petitioner's experts is accepted that in the absence of a recorded initial physical examination and a recorded history beyond merely recording height and weight and an unverified former medical treatment, the course of this patient's treatment was not justified by the records kept. DAN G. (Counts IX; XV) The records stipulated in evidence reveal at least the following controlled substances were prescribed by Respondent to his patient, Dan G., Jr., between January 9, 1979, and April 22, 1983. DATE APPROXIMATE CONTROLLED QUANTITY SUBSTANCE 01/09/79 Percodan 02/22/79 Talwin (50 mg) 11/18/81 Percodan 11/30/81 Percodan 01/02/82 Percodan 01/19/82 Percodan 02/05/82 Percodan 03/30/82 Percodan 04/12/82 Percodan 05/01/82 Percodan 05/01/82 Valium 05/18/82 24 Percodan 06/05/82 Valium 06/22/82 Percodan Demi 06/22/82 Darvon Compound 06/22/82 Valium 07/24/82 Percodan 07/24/82 Valium 08/28/82 Percodan Demi 08/28/82 Valium 09/25/82 Percodan 09/25/82 Valium 10/30/82 Valium 10/30/82 Percodan 12/03/82 Percodan 02/19/83 Percocet 03/26/83 Percodan 03/26/83 Valium 04/22/83 Tylox 04/22/83 Valium Respondent's records for this single patient sometimes specify "Jr." and sometimes do not. The initial record indicates a surgical incision along the lateral aspect of both femurs and pain on palpation of both hips, and records a history of total hip arthroplasty (two total hip replacements) in 1979 with the patient evidencing pain secondary to a post-operative procedure to correct aseptic necrosis of both femurs. At formal hearing, Respondent stated that this patient first presented in a wheel chair and returned frequently, due to chronic pain and was already on Demerol when first seen by Respondent. The chronic pain was not always repeatedly recorded in Respondent's records. Both of Petitioner's experts concede that prescriptions of Percodan would be consistent if that were all that were relieving the pain when the patient presented to Respondent, and Dr. Cohen opined that Percodan and Talwin were possibly consistent with aseptic necrosis of a femur. Respondent had admitted (R-1), a hospital summary of subsequent surgery (conversion of left total hip arthoplasty to girdlestone on 8/19/83) at the Veteran's Administration Hospital in Gainesville. This exhibit of subsequent surgery corroborates the previous 1979 history taken by Respondent which indicated that medications on discharge from the VA Hospital included Demerol 50 mg. po q 4h prn for pain. In light of no evidence of patient addiction and no evidence of poor response by this patient to Respondent's prescribing and treatment, the opinions of Dr. Breland and Dr. Cohen that Respondent's prescribing was excessive and necessarily addictive and therefore was unjustified are rejected, however the undersigned accepts their mutual opinions that the Respondent's records by themselves without the subsequent corroboration of the VA Hospital report do not justify the treatment Respondent administered to Dan G. Respondent admits R-1 was not relied on in treating this patient. C. R. (Counts X; XI; XV) The records stipulated in evidence reveal at least the following controlled substances were prescribed by Respondent to his patient, C.R., between July 3, 1978, and April 22, 1983: 2/ DATE APPROXIMATE CONTROLLED QUANTITY SUBSTANCES 07/03/78 Percodan 07/03/78 Percodan Compound 07/20/78 30 Percodan 08/14/78 30 Percodan 11/01/78 30 Percodan 12/05/79 Desoxyn 12/05/79 Percodan 01/02/79 Desoxyn 02/05/79 Percodan 02/12/79 18 Percodan 03/28/79 Percodan 04/16/79 Percodan 05/03/79 Percodan 05/17/79 Percodan 05/17/79 Darvon Compound 05/17/79 Percodan 05/17/79 Darvon Compound 06/14/79 6 Percodan 06/14/79 24 Desoxyn 09/18/79 Desoxyn 10/04/79 Percodan 11/10/79 Preludin 01/28/80 P 06/12/80 Preludin (75 mg.) 09/18/80 Preludin (75 mg.) 11/17/80 Percodan 01/27/81 Darvon Compound 04/27/81 Percodan 07/28/81 Percodan 08/31/81 24 Percodan 09/21/81 24 Percodan 12/16/81 Percodan 01/06/82 Percodan 01/29/82 Percodan 03/02/82 Percodan Demi 03/02/82 03/28/82 Percodan 04/20/82 Percodan 05/13/82 06/04/82 Percodan Demi 07/03/82 Percodan Demi 08/03/82 36 Percodan Demi 08/28/82 Percodan 08/28/82 Valium 12/20/82 24 Percocet 5 12/20/82 30 Valium (10mg) 01/15/83 6 Tylenol #6 01/22/83 Percodan Preludin and Desoxyn are amphetamine drugs. Desoxyn was legitimately prescribed for weight control in 1978. Respondent's prescription of both drugs was ostensibly to modify the amount of weight supported by the patient's leg bones. Dr. Breland is not sure whether both drugs were reclassified for control in 1979 or not but this is an issue of law resolved in "Conclusions of Law" supra. Despite Dr. Breland's testimony that if he did not have to base his opinion on the Respondent's inadequate recorded history and findings, he would term the prescribing of Percodan and Roboxin as recorded to be borderline acceptable, the undersigned accepts his and Dr. Cohen's mutual opinion that the frequent prescriptions of Percodan, Percodan- demi or Percocet (narcotic analgesics) for the Respondent's recorded diagnosis of arthritis and right leg pain resulting from previous right thigh surgery are unjustified by the records. Their respective opinions that this pattern of prescribing was excessive and unjustified in light of the potentially addictive nature of these drugs is also accepted. B. W. (Counts XII; XIII; IV) The records stipulated in evidence reveal at least the following controlled substances were prescribed by Respondent to his patient, B.W. between June 7, 1979, and January 29, 1983. 3/ DATE APPROXIMATE QUANTITY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 10/01/79 Valium 10/15/79 Tylenol #3 06/19/80 Tylenol #3 06/08/81 Ritalin (20mg) 08/11/81 Valium 08/15/81 Valium 09/15/81 Talwin 11/14/81 Talwin 12/07/81 24 Ritalin (20 mg) 12/20/81 Talwin 01/23/82 Talwin 02/12/82 Percodan Demi 02/27/82 Tylenol #4 03/04/82 Ritalin 03/18/82 Percodan Demi 04/02/82 30 Talwin 07/03/82 24 Ritalin 08/28/82 30 Ritalin 09/22/82 24 Percodan 10/14/82 Talwin (50mg) 12/21/82 24 Percodan 01/29/83 Tylox Ritalin is a sympathomimetric amine drug, which may only be properly prescribed in certain types of cases more specifically set out in the following "Conclusions of Law." Respondent's diagnosis, that this patient had chronic anxiety and back pain, is reflected in his written records. This is essentially the only recorded history on this patient. Respondent did not record a diagnosis of narcolepsy. Respondent did, however, introduce R-2, a consultation report to a Dr. Yankovich dated 1/5/82 from a Dr. Elzawahry which states the impression: "narcolepsy; low back syndrome. . . maintain on Ritalin 10 mg. po tid." Respondent testified that he had received similar information concerning the narcolepsy and psychiatric disturbance earlier than 1/5/82 first by telephone and then by written reports thereon from consulting neurologists, surgeons, and psychiatrists, and that through inadvertence this document was not turned over to Petitioner's investigator. However, Respondent did not explain why his files did not contain these other consultants' reports or why he did not write-up their contents or the dates they were received by him or why his prescriptions of 20 mg were so much greater than those recommended by Dr. Elzawahry. Dr. Breland felt that if Respondent were aware when he first prescribed Ritalin to this patient that the consultant had recommended it because of a good response, then Respondent's Ritalin prescriptions would be justified. It was also noted by Dr. Breland that Ritalin once was believed by the medical profession to be appropriately prescribed in the treatment of depression but that method had ceased and was statutorily proscribed by the time periods in question. Dr. Breland's expert opinion on prior belief of the medical profession is accepted. His conclusions of law invade the province of the hearing officer and are rejected in part and accepted in part as set out in the "Conclusions of Law." Dr. Breland did not feel under the circumstances that the Ritalin was contraindicated. Accordingly, Dr. Cohen's testimony that Ritalin is very dangerous if prescribed for chronic anxiety and depression is hereby discounted in that unlike Dr. Breland, he did not have the benefit of R-2 when testifying by earlier deposition. Dr. Cohen felt Valium was useful for chronic anxiety and that Tylenol #3 and Talwin were useful for pain but that there were excessive prescriptions of these drugs with few or no notations indicating any pain. In most instances all that is noted in Respondent's records on this patient is a prescription listed beside the date. Dr. Breland remarked that even the forms used by Respondent did not include a space for physical findings. J. M. (Counts XIV; XV) The records stipulated in evidence reveal at least the following controlled substances were prescribed by Respondent to his patient, J. M., between October 25, 1980, and March 9, 1982: 4/ DATE APPROXIMATE QUANTITY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 10/25/80 Percodan 01/05/81 Percodan 05/19/81 Emprin #4 06/03/81 Emprin #4 07/29/81 18 Percodan 09/25/81 12 Percodan 09/25/81 18 Tylenol #3 11/07/81 24 Tylox 11/21/81 Percodan 12/17/81 Percodan 01/02/82 Percodan 02/22/82 Percodan 03/09/82 Percodan The records of history and findings on this patient are reasonably complete and were faulted by Dr. Breland mostly because without appropriate dates one cannot tell if the history was taken on the initial visit as it should have been or later, and because the dates given are frequently out of order. In Dr. Breland's opinion, some of the modes of therapy utilized by Respondent were not of his choice but Dr. Breland only seriously objected to Respondent's continued and excessive use of Percodan as unsafe. Dr. Cohen's opinion was that the Respondent's conduct constituted mal- prescribing over malpractice. Dr. Breland's opinion was that Respondent's overall conduct with regard to these eleven patients constituted malpractice in that it was the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment of a reasonably prudent similar physician, under similar circumstances. Dr. Breland has had the benefit of reviewing all of Respondent's exhibits and he practices in the same geographical locale as Respondent. His opinion in this regard is accepted as to the overall pattern of practice with these eleven patients, despite his previous opinions that specific cases might not evidence malpractice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0019670. Respondent is a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist. On March 20, 1989, at approximately 1:04 a.m., Patient #1 (Derrick Prince) was presented to the emergency room at Weems Memorial Hospital in Apalachicola, Florida. Prince was a twenty-year-old male suffering from a stab wound to his left thigh that was inflicted by a butcher knife. Prince was actively bleeding and had lost a large amount of blood, as evidenced by the condition of his clothing, the amount of blood on the walls and floor of the hospital, and blood on his companions. Prince was placed on a table in the trauma room. When his blood-soaked pants were removed, blood spurted from the wound on his left thigh to a height of one to two and one-half inches. The emergency room R.N., Ms. Page, controlled the bleeding by direct pressure, first with her hand and then with a towel. Prince was semiconscious, muttering, "I can't breathe," and was randomly combative. Emergency room personnel had to forcibly restrain him on the table. Respondent, working as the emergency room physician, was summoned to the trauma room by the nurse. Hospital personnel attempted to establish Prince's blood pressure and pulse. Ms. Simpson, the L.P.N., could detect no blood pressure or pulse on Prince. Ms. Page, the R.N., could detect no blood pressure or pulse although she checked radial, cubital, and popliteal areas. Mrs. Estes, a paramedic who came in to help, could detect no pulse. Respondent was advised repeatedly that no blood pressure or pulse could be detected. Respondent instructed Ms. Simon to call respiratory and laboratory personnel and the Sheriff's Department, which she did. The laboratory director, Tracy Pierce, was called at his home in St. Joe Beach. When pressure was removed from the wound area, there was little blood on the towel and the wound was not bleeding. Respondent commented to the nurse that she did a good job stopping the bleeding. The nurse and paramedics attempted to begin intravenous infusion but were unable to establish any IV lines because all veins were concave (collapsed). The nurse and paramedic interpreted this peripheral vascular collapse as meaning there was no blood volume to keep the veins open. Respondent was advised that no IV could be started because the veins were concave. Respondent had ordered a suture tray. He explored the wound with his finger and commented that the wound went all the way to the bone. Respondent commented that the boy would be all right, that he wasn't hurt that bad. Respondent proceeded to treat Prince by suturing the wound in three layers. He stated he tied off some minor arterial branches during this suturing. After suturing the wound, Respondent again commented that the boy would be all right because he wasn't hurt that bad. After suturing the wound and noting no jugular access, Respondent began a cutdown in order to establish an intravenous line. Ms. Estes, the paramedic, suggested using MAST trousers to help venous pressure, and Respondent agreed. MAST trousers also can act as a tourniquet to control bleeding. The pants were applied and Prince's legs were elevated in an effort to establish a positive venous pressure. At 1:30 a.m., while Respondent was setting up for a cutdown, Prince had a seizure and respiratory arrest. He was intubated by Respondent. He vomited, was suctioned, and breathed by AMBU bag. Respondent then inquired, for the first time, about the availability of blood. He was told there was none in the hospital. Sufficient blood was available and could have been obtained from Gulf Pines South Hospital in St. Joe within 30 minutes had a request been made for Mr. Pierce to bring it with him. Mr. Pierce arrived during the cutdown procedure. Mr. Pierce was the laboratory director for both hospitals. An intravenous fluid line was finally established via the cutdown and some fluid begun. The Life-Flight helicopter was ordered at approximately 1:40 a.m. At approximately 1:55 a.m. Prince suffered a cardiac arrest. When Life-Flight arrived at 2:40 a.m., it was impossible to transport Prince in his moribund condition. Resuscitative efforts were employed until approximately 3:00 a.m., when Respondent pronounced Prince dead. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Thomas Wood, the Medical Examiner, on March 21, 1989, revealed that the stab wound to the left thigh was located six inches above the knee, was seven inches deep, passed by the bone, and completely severed both the femoral artery and vein. The autopsy also revealed 3 layers of sutures: the first closing the skin and two other layers within the subcutaneous fatty tissue, not more than three-fourths of an inch below the surface. There was no evidence of any arterial or venous repair. The cause of death of Derrick Prince was exsanguination from the severed femoral vessels. After an investigation was initiated, Respondent was interviewed by Investigator Reese. Respondent stated that peripheral pulses were obtained and the patient's pulse rate was 120 from admission until the time of his respiratory arrest. Respondent stated to Investigator Reese that two IVs were started but that the patient pulled them out. Statements of Ms. Page and Ms. Estes written immediately after the incident indicate that no IVs were started, not because the patient pulled them out, but because all veins were collapsed. Respondent stated to Investigator Reese that he had to leave the patient after suturing the wound to examine a family member across the hall. At no time did Respondent leave the emergency room. Respondent stated to Investigator Reese that there was no indication that the femoral vessels had been cut, as he had checked the wound and that is not the direction the femoral artery runs. Respondent believed the wound was not life-threatening, that after the bleeding was stopped and the wound sutured the patient was in pretty good shape and was going to be fine. Respondent was not aware the femoral vessels had been severed until informed at the circuit court hearing of June 6, 1989. Respondent reported in his medical record the patient "became shocky" at approximately 1:30 a.m., after the suturing. The massive blood loss, disorientation and combativeness, peripheral vascular collapse, and lack of vital signs all indicate Prince was in shock when admitted and Respondent did not recognize this fact. Respondent instead believed Prince to be a combative drunk and his course of treatment indicates this perception. The emergency room physician should prioritize his actions in such a way that the most critical factor is treated promptly and other, less dangerous factors are given lesser priority. The correct treatment of this patient would have been for Respondent to direct all efforts of the E.R. team toward immediately reestablishing Prince's blood volume, then blood replacement. The wound itself could have been easily controlled by pressure, tourniqueted by the MAST pants, or even left for later care. Rather than misdirecting his attention to suturing the wound, Respondent should have performed the cutdown or placed a CVP catheter to start IV fluids as soon as it was evident that the nurses could not start the IVs and Respondent should have ensured that blood was being obtained as soon as possible. Respondent's suturing of the wound was ineffective in any case, as only superficial layers were stitched, and the wound remained unexplored. Respondent did not practice with the acceptable level of care, skill and treatment of a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances in that Respondent did not correctly assess Prince's physical condition and therefore misdirected his attention to suturing the wound instead of establishing intravenous access for immediate fluid replacement. Respondent's entire written medical record consists of his "Emergency Room Note." Respondent has documented no detailed history or physical examination: there is no documentation of the amount of blood loss, of the spurting blood, of the initial assessment of the patient's shock, or of consideration that the massive bleeding could have been from the great vessels and life threatening; there is no record that Respondent ever felt for pulses or obtained a pulse, no record of any neurological assessment or vascular status of the left leg distal to the wound, no conjunctival color noted, and no justification for giving his attention to the wound rather than immediately attempting to replace the lost blood volume; there is no note of a request for blood, how it could be or why it was not obtained. In short, prior to the cardiac arrest, there are no medical records written by Respondent which justify the course of treatment he followed with Prince.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order and therein REVOKE the medical license of Elliott F. Monroe. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-0377 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-13(1-9) and 14-53( 11-50). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Elliott Monroe Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Radkins, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Alfred O. Shuler Attorney at Law Post Office Box 850 Apalachicola, FL 32320 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
