Findings Of Fact Respondent was initially employed by Petitioner on April 13, 1970. He was appointed to the position of Superintendent of Petitioner's West Palm Beach Field Station in 1973, and continued in that position until March 9, 1983, when he was discharged. As Superintendent of the West Palm Beach Field Station, Respondent supervised approximately 80 maintenance operations and administrative employees. The facility is located adjacent to Petitioner's headquarters, and is somewhat larger in terms of employees than Petitioner's other field stations. Respondent was a generally capable and dedicated employee of Petitioner. However, his management style and personality were often irritating to his employees, coworkers and supervisors. The incident which precipitated his discharge involved the retirement of a valued employee who was supervised by Respondent. The employee informed Respondent's supervisor that one of the reasons for retirement was his difficulty in working for Respondent. Specifically, the retiring employee was embarrassed by Respondent's handling of a subordinate's failure to earn promotion. Respondent advised the employee in his subordinate supervisor's presence that he (Barnette) was ready to promote the employee, but that the subordinate supervisor was opposed. The cancellation of the promotion was unnecessarily dramatized by Petitioner dropping the promotion form in the wastebasket in the presence of the subordinate supervisor and the employee. The testimony of witnesses from the West Palm Beach Field Station established that the Respondent has a hot temper, and is subject to frequent temper outbursts. His radio room operator overheard Respondent yelling at people in his office through a closed door once every week to two weeks. Other witnesses also observed the Respondent engaged in loud arguments with his subordinates. Respondent admitted on cross-examination to having a temper, and did not deny that the incidents attested to by Petitioner's witnesses. Respondent's temper outbursts were unacceptable conduct, and Petitioner counseled Respondent regarding this deficiency in 1978 and periodically thereafter. The testimony of Mr. George Dupley, Supervising Professional Engineer, established that on several occasions Respondent refused to comply with design instructions from headquarters, which resulted in additional project cost to the District. His testimony also indicated Respondent had a generally uncooperative attitude, and that he was much less cooperative than other field station superintendents, with whom Mr. Dupley had no problem. Mr. Rob Baskin, Assistant Structure Maintenance Coordinator, was subjected to an incident where Respondent blew up at him in the presence of other employees and told him to leave the job, while he was attempting to carry out assigned duties. Dupley, Baskin and other headquarters staff personnel avoided dealing with Respondent whenever possible because of his hot temper and hostile attitude. Respondent's uncooperative attitude extended to the District's personnel office. Respondent generally disregarded the Petitioner's recruitment policy which required that no external applicant be interviewed or hired for an open position until internal employees had been interviewed. Respondent's refusal to comply with this policy created morale problems and prompted the filing of several employee grievances. Respondent was counseled on this problem in 1981. Respondent's disregard of personnel policy was most flagrant in his hiring of his niece's husband in 1982, after being advised by Petitioner's personnel office that such action would constitute a violation of its anti- nepotism policy. Respondent was disciplined for this infraction under Petitioner's "Corrective Action Policy" (discussed below), and assigned 25 points. This was a "category 2" offense for which the penalty was to remain in effect for six months. This disciplinary action would have expired March 14, 1983, five days after Respondent was discharged. In the nepotism memorandum, dated September 17, 1982, Respondent's supervisor also stated: [I]t has come to my attention from numerous sources that both employees and supervisors avoid discussions with you for fear of temper outbursts. You are attempting to maintain a one man iron rule at the station which is out of step with the District's management philosophy . . . Any future problems may require dismissal. Although Respondent never received an unsatisfactory merit review rating, his April 7, 1978, rating included the following observations: A negative form of reluctance is evident relative to meeting organizational and program objectives. There is too much disregard for certain headquarters expertise. As a superintendent improvement is mandatory. Decision-making on certain occasions appears tainted with prejudice against endeavors of well intentioned key staff members. Respondent's most recent merit review rating, dated October 21, 1982, included the following: The handling of matters which impact on board personnel must improve. Emphasis has been placed upon this issue in several previous evaluations, including the last two. Thus, Respondent had ample notice of his expected performance and the opportunity to correct his deficiencies. In addition to the above notices and meetings, Petitioner's efforts to upgrade Respondent's performance included his attendance at several management training seminars. After concluding that Respondent would have to be replaced, Petitioner considered demoting rather than discharging him. However, no suitable position was available. Petitioner's Corrective Action Policy (Respondent's Exhibit One, in evidence) sets forth expected standards of performance for all District personnel. Respondent is familiar with these standards, both as a supervisor and as an employee of Petitioner.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order discharging Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondent Eastern Florida State College (EFSC) engaged in discriminatory employment practices and retaliation, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), as alleged in the Petition for Relief; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Garrett is a 53-year-old African American woman. EFSC is a public college in Brevard County, Florida. For the time period relevant to this matter, EFSC is, and has been, her employer. On July 9, 2018, Darla Ferguson informed Ms. Garrett that EFSC eliminated her position as e-Learning Coordinator. EFSC did not fill Ms. Garrett’s position in the e-Learning department; rather, the prior job duties were assigned to other members in the e-Learning department. After eliminating the position of e-Learning Coordinator, EFSC offered Ms. Garrett the position of Coordinator of the Office of Undergraduate Research (OUR). The OUR department supports and promotes research opportunities among undergraduate research students through EFSC’s four campuses. Ms. Garrett accepted EFSC’s offer, and Ms. Garrett became EFSC’s first employee to hold the position as Coordinator of OUR. In lieu of offering Ms. Garrett the position of Coordinator of OUR, EFSC could have laid off Ms. Garrett following the elimination of her position as e-Learning Coordinator. However, rather than laying her off, EFSC found a new position for Ms. Garrett. Following her transfer to the position as Coordinator of OUR, Ms. Garrett’s salary and benefits remained unchanged from her prior position as e-Learning Coordinator. On July 10, 2018, Ms. Garrett met with Dr. Sandra Handfield, Scott Herber, and Dr. Ashley Spring to discuss Ms. Garrett’s new position as Coordinator of OUR. At that meeting, Dr. Handfield—who was Ms. Garrett’s new supervisor—informed Ms. Garrett that Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber were the founders of OUR. Prior to Ms. Garrett’s arrival as Coordinator of OUR, Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber, who were full-time faculty members, oversaw the OUR program. Dr. Handfield also informed Ms. Garrett that should she have any questions regarding her position as Coordinator of OUR, she should consult with Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber. As of the date of the final hearing, Ms. Garrett remained employed by EFSC as the Coordinator of OUR, and continues to receive the same salary and benefits that she received when she was the e-Learning Coordinator. Allegations of Adverse Employment Action EFSC originally intended for the Coordinator of OUR to be a Director, and possess a doctorate degree. However, EFSC later changed this position to Coordinator, which did not require a doctorate degree, and which had a lower salary. Ms. Garrett never applied for the Director of OUR position, and she does not have a doctorate degree. Ms. Garrett testified concerning her belief for the reason that EFSC transferred her to the Coordinator of OUR position, stating: I believe they did that because the intent was to put me in a position that was beyond my reach so that when I had issues and problems, they could use that and tie it with this position in order to say that I could not do the job. On April 12, 2019, Ms. Garrett received a six-month performance evaluation covering her first six months in her position as Coordinator of OUR. Dr. Handfield provided the performance evaluation approximately four months after the performance period ended. The performance evaluation indicated that Ms. Garrett was deficient in the areas of teamwork, valuing differences, and communication. Following the performance evaluation, Ms. Garrett did not lose any pay or benefits, and nothing adverse happened to Ms. Garrett as a result of the performance evaluation. Ms. Garrett testified that she believed Dr. Handfield gave her that evaluation “as a form of retaliation[,]” but not on the basis of her race, age, or gender. She further testified as follows: Q. Okay. But just to be clear, not gender, age, or race. You think it’s retaliation, what she did, correct? A. Correct. Q. Okay. And what was she retaliating against you for in your view or what facts do you have that it was for retaliation? A. I believe it was retaliation based on the input from the faculty members, based on the interactions we had during the actual performance review period, which would have been July 9th, 2018, until January 9th, 2019. Q. So based on the interaction you had with Dr. Handfield, Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber for the six months before that; is that what you’re saying? A. Yes In January 2019, Ms. Garrett requested that she use Canvas shell computer software to enable her to build an orientation outline. EFSC denied this request, because it would not generate money. Allegations of Comparator Ms. Garrett identified Justin Looney, a 38-year-old white male, as a comparator in support of her discrimination claim.1 Ms. Garrett’s testimony was that Mr. Looney was an EFSC employee working as an Academic Services Coordinator at EFSC’s Patrick Air Force Base campus; upon the closing of that campus, EFSC eliminated Mr. Looney’s position and, similarly to Ms. Garrett, transferred him to a newly-created position in which he received the same salary and benefits. 1 At the final hearing, Ms. Garrett also mentioned Marian Sheltman as a possible comparator, stating that she was a white female. However, Ms. Garrett failed to introduce any additional facts or evidence concerning Ms. Sheltman’s status or to explain how the undersigned could consider Ms. Sheltman as a valid comparator. The undersigned finds that Ms. Garrett failed to establish Ms. Sheltman as a comparator in this matter. Ms. Garrett contends that EFSC treated Mr. Looney differently, during his transfer, in that EFSC provided Mr. Looney more notice time between the elimination of his prior position and the transfer to his new position. Ms. Garrett also contends that EFSC treated Mr. Looney differently than her because Mr. Looney was Dr. Handfield’s son-in-law. Allegations of Hostile Work Environment Ms. Garrett testified that at the July 10, 2018, meeting, Dr. Spring commented about the uncleanliness of the OUR office, and recommended that Ms. Garrett obtain a broom and dustpan to keep the office clean. Ms. Garrett also testified that she declined to assist Dr. Spring in hanging posters on the wall of the OUR office. Ms. Garrett also testified that Dr. Spring noticed that the OUR signage was covered up on the outside of the building, and asked Ms. Garrett to correct this. Ms. Garrett testified that in subsequent meetings with Dr. Handfield, she “shared [her] concerns regarding the work environment[,]” and stated that she did not feel comfortable with the things Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber asked of her because these things “were in violation of college policy.” Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Spring micromanaged her role as the Coordinator of OUR; for example, Dr. Spring continued to process online student research forms, and coordinated the Fall 2018 OUR board meeting. Ms. Garrett also testified that Dr. Spring opened the OUR online student forms too early, which prevented Ms. Garrett from matching faculty mentors with student applicants.2 Ms. Garrett also testified that Dr. Spring made decisions concerning the OUR without consulting with her. Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Spring would send her e-mails asking if Ms. Garrett had completed the work requested of her. 2 Ms. Garrett also testified that Mr. Herber was not involved in micromanaging her role as the Coordinator of OUR. Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Spring told Ms. Garrett what she should be doing, and would become vocal with her dissatisfaction of Ms. Garrett’s job performance. Ms. Garrett testified that she did not know why Dr. Spring engaged in any of these actions. After a November 2018 meeting with Dr. Spring, Ms. Garrett testified that her work atmosphere became “more tense … in terms of Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber starting to make comments about allegations about my work.” She further testified that after this meeting, Dr. Handfield “started issuing directives[,]” such as requiring Ms. Garrett to first ask Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber for input prior going to other EFSC campuses to host information tables. Ms. Garrett claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment in which “in every meeting that I planned and hosted, Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber would say disparaging comments during the meeting.” For example, “[t]hey would talk across me and I did not reply.” Although Dr. Handfield was Ms. Garrett’s supervisor, Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Handfield openly discussed supervision of the OUR with Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber. Findings of Ultimate Fact Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive action that EFSC’s decisions concerning, or actions affecting, her, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by race-based, sex-based, or age-based discriminatory animus. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful race, sex, or age discrimination. Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive evidence that EFSC’s actions subjected her to harassment based on race, sex, or age. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful race, sex, or age harassment. Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive evidence that EFSC discriminated against her because she opposed an unlawful employment practice, or because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the FCRA. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful retaliation. Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive evidence that EFSC’s actions were sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to create a hostile work environment. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Mary F. Garrett’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Mary F. Garrett Apartment 2508 2741 Caribbean Isle Boulevard Melbourne, Florida 32935 (eServed) Mark E. Levitt, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. Suite 100 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Palafox, LLC (“Palafox”), is entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in its defense of the challenge to its Environmental Resource Permit (“Permit”) as raised in the Amended Petition in the underlying administrative matter, filed by Respondent, Carmen Diaz or her attorney, Jefferson M. Braswell, or both, pursuant to section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Palafox is a Florida limited liability company and was the applicant for the Permit in Case No. 19-5831. Palafox owns Lot 1, Block B, of the Palafox Preserve Subdivision, the six-acre property on which the Project will be developed. Ms. Diaz is the owner of Lot 18, Block A, of the Palafox Preserve Subdivision. Petitioner is a member of the Palafox Preserve Homeowners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). The HOA is not a party to this litigation. The HOA has previously agreed not to challenge any permits sought by Palafox for the development of the project. Mr. Braswell is not a party to this matter. He represented Ms. Diaz through the Final Order issued by the District in Case No. 19-5831. Palafox’s Renewed Motion for Fees sought attorney’s fees and/or sanctions against Mr. Braswell for his role in that case, as allowed under section 120.569(2)(e). Ms. Diaz’s Challenge to the Project The Project consists of a 36-unit multi-family residential development proposed to be built on Lot 1, Block B, of the Palafox Preserve Subdivision. The Project encompasses approximately 2.68 acres of Lot 1, Block B. The Project lies adjacent to, and immediately west of, Martin Hurst Road and adjacent to, and immediately south of, Palafox Lane. The remainder of 2 Mr. Braswell also filed a Proposed Final Order and Amended Proposed Final Order, which were not authorized and have not been considered by the undersigned in preparing this Final Order. Mr. Braswell is not a party to this proceeding and did not become a party thereto by merely appearing at the final hearing to make some argument on his own behalf. He did not move to intervene in this proceeding, or otherwise obtain party status, not even by ore tenus motion at the Final Hearing. Mr. Braswell did not file a notice of appearance and did not attend the Final Hearing as counsel for Ms. Diaz. Furthermore, Mr. Braswell did not request permission to submit a Proposed Final Order. Palafox’s property runs to the west of the Project and south of Palafox Lane, and is located within a perpetual conservation easement. Ms. Diaz’s property is a residential lot located west of, and not adjacent to, Palafox’s property. An approximate nine-acre conservation easement owned by the HOA lies between Ms. Diaz’s property and Palafox’s property. A portion of Petitioner’s back yard is located within the conservation easement. Approximately seven acres within the conservation easement are wetlands. The conservation easement, including the wetlands, straddles the boundary between Block A and Block B, with about two-thirds in Block A, for the most part owned by the HOA, and one-third in Block B, wholly owned by Palafox. Palafox sought an environmental resource permit from the District to construct storm water management facilities (SWMFs) to serve the Project. The SWMFs to be authorized by that Permit are on Palafox’s property. Palafox’s property, the conservation easement and wetlands, and Ms. Diaz’s property, are all located within the same closed basin. This means that storm water within the basin will generally not flow out of the basin in all storm events up to, and including, a 100-year, 24-hour storm. On October 30, 2019, following the District’s notice of intent to issue the Permit, Ms. Diaz filed an Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings Before a Hearing Officer (“Amended Petition”). In the Amended Petition, Ms. Diaz challenged the District’s issuance of the Permit alleging that the Project will (1) have adverse water quantity impacts to adjacent lands; (2) cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site properties; (3) cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and (4) adversely impact the value and function of wetlands and other surface waters. She also alleged that the wetland had not been properly delineated previously, and that an older delineation was no longer valid. Specifically, Ms. Diaz alleged that the “proposed [storm water] system results in a massive change in the amount of storm water being discharged from the applicant’s site directly onto Petitioner’s property which leads to adverse impacts on her property.” On November 19, 2019, the Final Hearing was scheduled for February 19 and 20, 2020. Ms. Diaz was deposed on January 17, 2020, almost three months after filing her Petition, and two months after the Final Hearing date was set. The deposition revealed that Ms. Diaz was not the least bit informed of the Project. Ms. Diaz had not reviewed the Permit, and believed that the Permit authorized Palafox to build the Project, rather than the storm water treatment system. Ms. Diaz had not seen the site plans, had no understanding of what the Project would look like, and admitted she had done nothing to learn about the Project. In fact, Ms. Diaz testified repeatedly at her deposition that she simply does not want the Project built, regardless of whether it would actually impact her property or the wetlands, and regardless of what kind of development it is. She does not want Palafox’s property developed, in any capacity, and wants it to stay “the way it is now.” Ms. Diaz conducted no written discovery nor any depositions, and did not hire an expert until approximately one month before the final hearing. That expert, Mr. Carswell, had never visited the site. Although Mr. Carswell conducted a storm water analysis, Mr. Carswell conceded that Mr. Braswell prepared and sent him a ten-page report and asked him to consider it as Mr. Carswell’s opinion report. In reviewing and adopting that report, Mr. Carswell admitted that he did not do the type of analysis that he would have if he wanted to determine the incremental addition of storm water to a closed basin. Instead, he did a simple water balance equation. Mr. Carswell testified that he had never before used this type of analysis to support permitting for a storm water pond and that if he was going to try to predict the incremental contribution of storm water discharge from a project into a closed basin, he would utilize a model similar to the one submitted by Palafox in support of this Project. The undersigned found Mr. Carswell’s analysis was not a professionally-acceptable method for determining whether the Project met the standards for the Permit. In addition to Mr. Carswell, Petitioner offered the testimony of four other witnesses at the final hearing. None were able to offer any evidence that Palafox failed to provide reasonable assurance that the project: Will not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; Will not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off- site property; Will not cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and Will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife and listed species by wetlands and other surface waters. The testimony of two of those witnesses, Mr. Songer and Mr. Stinson, was in transcript form and was actually given in DOAH case No. 18-2734. In that case, neither witness’ testimony was accepted to defeat Palafox’s site plan approved under the more stringent permitting requirements of Leon County. See Braswell v. Palafox, LLC, Case No. 18-2734 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 31, 2018; Leon Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’s (Sept. 24, 2018)). The remainder of Ms. Diaz’s witnesses’ testimony was equally ineffective. Mark Cooper, the Project engineer, testified that the Project would raise the water level in the wetland by .04 feet in a 100 year, 24-hour storm event, which he classified as a negligible impact. Mr. Cooper’s testimony confirmed that of Palafox’s expert engineer, Mark Thomasson, who classified that increase as “de minimus.” Cheryl Poole, Ms. Diaz’s other witness and an engineer who worked on a prior project on the property, merely testified to conditions that existed a decade prior that are not relevant to the Project. In short, Ms. Diaz presented no credible evidence at all that the Project would negatively impact either the wetlands or her property. After the final hearing, the undersigned administrative law judge issued a Recommended Order, adopted in toto by the District, concluding that Ms. Diaz did not carry her burden to prove that Palafox failed to provide reasonable assurances that the Project will not (a) cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; (b) cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property; (c) cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and (d) adversely impact the value and functions provided to fish and wildlife and listed species by wetlands and other surface waters. Mr. Braswell’s Prior Challenges to the Project Mr. Braswell has been involved in challenges to the Project for over five years. In those challenges, he has represented his parents, the HOA, Ms. Diaz, or some combination of those parties. In 2015, Mr. Braswell filed an administrative challenge on behalf of his parents—Wynona and Robert Braswell (the “Braswells”), who live in the Palafox subdivision and are members of the HOA. See Braswell v. Palafox, LLC (Fla. DOAH Case No. 15-1190). In that administrative challenge, the Braswells challenged Leon County’s approval of the Project site plan.3 The Braswells raised many of the same factual issues regarding the wetlands and storm water impacts that Mr. Braswell later raised again in Ms. Diaz’s challenge to the Permit. The Braswells also raised the issues that 3 Mr. Braswell admitted that when he filed that case, he “didn't know very much about the [P]roject,” “didn't know the rules” for Leon County’s site plan approval, and that he and his parents “didn't realize kind of what [they] were getting [them]selves into.” the Project violated a private covenant in the subdivision’s governing documents, which was beyond the Division’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, Palafox filed a civil suit for declaratory judgement to resolve that claim. In the interim, jurisdiction of Case No. 15-1190 was relinquished to the County without prejudice to refer it again to the Division should the civil suit not dispose of the issues raised in the administrative case. See Braswell v. Palafox, LLC, Case No. 15-1190 (Ord. Rel. Jsd. May 14, 2015). After an initial grant of summary judgment for the Braswells and a reversal by the First District Court of Appeal, the trial court entered a final judgment for Palafox. (Final Judgment, Evergreen Communities, Inc. v. Braswell, No. 2015-CA-000765 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2017)). After the civil suit was resolved, Mr. Braswell renewed his parents’ challenge to the site plan. See Braswell v. Palafox, LLC, Case No. 18-2734 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 31, 2018; Leon Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’s Sept. 25, 2018). As in the underlying Permit challenge, Mr. Braswell argued that the wetlands were not correctly delineated, and that the project would cause the wetland area to overflow and burden the “downstream” storm water facilities owned by the residential homeowners. While the County did not issue a storm water permit for the Project, approval of the site plan required a determination that the Project meets the County’s environmental code requirements. The County’s standard for volume control requires the runoff volume in excess of the pre-development runoff volume to be retained for all storm events up to a 100-year, 24-hour duration storm. That standard is more stringent than the District’s requirement to provide “reasonable assurances” that the Project will not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; will not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property; will not cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife and listed species by wetlands and other surface waters. In the site plan challenge, the administrative law judge found that the Project was consistent with the Code requirements and specifically found as follows: the Project’s proposed storm water system will not significantly impact the conservation easement wetlands and will not cause flooding or other adverse impacts to downstream areas. no statute, ordinance, rule or regulation requires a wetland to be re-delineated after it has been identified and placed in perpetual preservation under a conservation easement and that the argument to the contrary “would lead to the absurd result of re-surveying and re- recording allegedly ‘perpetual’ conservation easements every time a lot was developed” within a plat. Id. at R.O. ¶¶ 37 & 51. In yet another case arising from this dispute, in 2016, Mr. Braswell’s father filed a formal complaint against the Project engineer with the Florida Board of Professional Engineers. Mr. Braswell submitted additional information in support of that proceeding. See In re Mark Cooper, P.E., Case No. 2016052464 (Fla. Bd. of Prof’l. Eng’rs Mar. 14, 2017). The Closing Order in that case found no probable cause of a violation by Palafox’s professional engineer related to the storm water system after the independent reviewer concluded that, based on the materials submitted by Petitioner’s counsel, “there should be no adverse surface water impacts to adjacent property” from the Project. Id. at ¶ 1. After the resolution of the civil suit and prior administrative challenges, Palafox, the HOA, and the Braswells entered into a settlement agreement. Under that agreement, the HOA and the Braswells agreed they would not challenge the Project any further, as long as it complied with the site plan that the County had approved. Mr. Braswell signed that agreement on behalf of his parents as attorney in fact. Palafox, believing that Ms. Diaz was bound by that settlement agreement as a member of the HOA, and that she had breached the agreement by filing the Amended Petition in the Permit challenge, filed a civil suit in Leon County Circuit Court. See Palafox, LLC v. Diaz, Case No. 2019-CA-002758 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.). Mr. Braswell, representing Ms. Diaz in that suit as well, filed a counterclaim, subsequently voluntarily dismissed, in which he again raised the issues of the wetlands delineation and downstream flooding. (Def’s Ans. and Aff. Def. and Countersuit for Dec. Jdmt. at pp. 6-9). At no point between the resolution of the prior litigation regarding this Project and filing the Permit challenge did Mr. Braswell obtain new evidence or expert opinion to suggest that the Project would not meet the District’s more lenient standards for granting an environmental resource permit. Nor did he adduce evidence at hearing that would lead an administrative law judge to reach a different conclusion from Judge Ffolkes—that the project would not cause adverse impacts to downstream owners, that the Project would not adversely impact the wetlands, and that no new wetland delineation was required.
Findings Of Fact In conjunction with the preparation of plans for widening Dale Mabry Highway in Tampa, Florida, DOT in November 1985, filed a map of reservation which includes 6.49 acres owned by Petitioner. The map of reservation was filed and approved by the Hillsborough County Commission in compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations. The property in question is adjacent to the west boundary of Dale Mabry and south of the Waters Avenue intersection. The purpose of the map of reservation is to restrict building on the property for up to five years pending the filing of condemnation proceedings. DOT intends to use the area for storm water management of the runoff from the additional pacing resulting from the widening of Dale Mabry. The parent tract is 8.3 acres in size while the area encompassed within the reservation map is 6.49 acres. The entire tract is undeveloped, but to the north and south of the property along Dale Mabry Highway industrial and commercial development has occurred. The tract was acquired by the Petitioner in 1969 as an investment and has remained essentially in an undeveloped state since that time. During the period between 1969 and the present the value of the property has gradually risen until today it is sufficiently valuable to warrant development and the cost associated therewith. In the distant past most of this area in the vicinity of this property was wetlands. Prior to the acquisition of this tract by the owners, a drainage ditch, channel H, was dug through an area just west of this tract. That has had the effect of draining part of the area and has impacted on the wetlands function performed by this tract. Some dredging was done on this tract before dredge and fill laws were enacted and the area is no longer a pristine wetland. Both Channel H and the earlier demucking have caused some diminution of the property's wetlands effectiveness. No development plans have been submitted to the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) for the development of this property. Preliminary surveys of the property conducted by DER personnel indicate approximately fifty percent of the property is wetlands and can be developed only by obtaining a dredge and fill permit from DER. Until such time as development plans are received DER will not commit itself to what developments will be permitted on land subject to DER jurisdiction. The highest elevation on this tract is adjacent to Dale Mabry highway. This area is clearly upland and can be developed without a permit from DER. The map of reservation excludes the portion of the tract running along the west Dale Mabry boundary 165 feet deep. This tract constitutes 1.81 acres (8.3 - 6.49) abutting Dale Mabry. The undeveloped tract currently performs a wetland function in that storm water runoff from the east side of Dale Mabry highway flows through a culvert under Dale Mabry in the vicinity of this property then across this property to Channel H. Similarly, storm water runoff from the west side of Dale Mabry runs south to this property thence to Channel H. Prior to selecting the Petitioner's property for ultimate condemnation to use in the storm water management program necessary for the construction on Dale Mabry, the consulting engineers on the project surveyed the area looking for appropriate sites. This site, another site at the southwest junction of Dale Mabry and Waters, and two sites east of Dale Mabry were considered. The sites east of Dale Mabry consisted of borrow pits. One was too high and would require extensive piping to transport the water to Channel H and the other already has water quality problems which could preclude water from this pit being pumped into Channel H (and from there to state waters). The property at the southwest intersection of Dale Mabry and Waters was deemed to be more valuable for commercial development and would require more development as a storm water management area than the site owned by Petitioners. Petitioner's property will require little, if any, changes to serve the intended function as a waste water management area. This will reduce the cost to DOT for so using the property. After tentatively selecting this site for storm water management the consulting engineers went to DER to obtain information on sites DER would suggest to use for storm water management purposes. DER suggested Petitioner's property and advised of water quality problems in the borrow pit. Both the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission (EPC) and DER are involved in the development of environmentally sensitive areas. In 1984 the EPC advised Petitioner that one of EPC's water quality managers had stated that 85 percent of this property was developable and invited Petitioner to submit preliminary plans for developing 85 percent of the property (exhibit 2). No development plans have been submitted. Despite EPC's 1984 letter, DER exercises ultimate jurisdiction over dredge and fill permits involving wetlands and no such property can be developed exceeding that approved by DER. Accordingly, the 85 percent developable ratio used by Petitioner's witnesses is given little credence. Some three weeks before DOT filed its map of reservation Petitioner entered into a contract to sell this property for $800,000. The contract is contingent on the buyer being able to obtain the permits necessary to develop the property. Several meetings have been held between the buyer, DOT and DER personnel to discuss how the property may be developed and still serve DOT as a storm water management area. No plans for such joint use have been presented to DER. Petitioner presented one witness who opined the property was worth $1,000,000. Presumably that appraisal did not include the 1.81 acres fronting along Dale Mabry which is not included in the map of reservation. The contract to sell the property for $800,000 cash comprised the part included in the map of reservation and the tract 165 feet deep fronting on Dale Mabry. This contract which was reached in an arms length transaction indicates the price a willing buyer is willing to pay a willing seller and is a much more credible sum than is the $1 million appraisal offered by Petitioner's witness. If this witness intended his $1 million valuation to be applicable to the 8.3 acre tract, in estimating the loss to Petitioner as a result of the restrictions imposed by the map of reservation, this witness neglected to deduct the value of the 1.81 acres fronting Dale Mabry highway in reaching that calculation. This witness attempted to place a value on the loss sustained by Petitioner as a result of the inability to market the property after the filing of the map of reservation. In making this calculation he assumed 85 percent of the property to be developable and a value of $1 million. These figures are unsupported by credible evidence and the value arrived therefrom is not credible. Further, the filing of the map of reservation only restricts the issuance of a permit in connection with this property. Petitioner is free to do with the property exactly what it has done with the property since it was acquired in 1969. Although no evidence was presented that the project involving the widening of Dale Mabry in the vicinity of this property will be accomplished on a date certain, the project is scheduled to be let for bids in December 1987. Prior to commencing any work on the project condemnation proceedings for all property involved must be underway. Although this schedule is subject to change if funding is not timely provided, this is not an event expected to occur. DER requires the storm water runoff from additional paving resulting from the widening of Dale Mabry be treated before this storm water runoff is discharged into State waters. Accordingly, it is essential that DOT show capability for storm water management before this project can be approved. Section 337.241, Florida Statutes (1985), was enacted as s. 140 ch. 84-309 Laws of Florida, 1984, and amended slightly by s. 2, ch. 85-149, Laws of Florida, 1985. Some of these provisions were formerly found in s. 335.02(3) and (4), Florida Statutes. The purpose of the filing of a map of reservation is to preclude development of the property, while road construction plans are being prepared which include the use of the property, before the acquisition of the property by DOT. During construction involving the widening of US 19 in Pinellas and Pasco Counties, numerous instances arose where development of property needed for storm water management as a result of widening of US 19 commenced after plans for use of the property had been made but before condemnation of the property by DOT. This resulted in an increase in the cost of acquiring the property.
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent failed to maintain sewage drains and to prevent the presence of roaches in violation of Food Code Rules 5-402.13 and 6-501.111, and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating restaurants in the state. Respondent is licensed as a restaurant, pursuant to license number 3912699, and is located at 1235 Hillsborough Avenue, Tampa, Florida. A sanitation and safety specialist (Specialist) for Petitioner inspected the restaurant on March 15, 2006. Respondent committed two violations. One violation involved waste water sewage, and the other involved roaches. Waste water sewage backed up into the mop sink in the floor drain in the dishwashing room. Waste water also backed up in the kitchen hand sink drain. Eight roaches were present in a shelf, and 10 roaches were clustered in cracks in a pipe. Another roach crawled out from behind the kitchen stove. The deficiencies were significant violations. Petitioner issued an emergency order closing the restaurant. Respondent corrected the offenses in one day. There is no evidence the violations are continuing. Respondent submitted credible and persuasive evidence of diligent efforts to maintain the restaurant in proper condition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of committing the acts and violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing a fine of $1,000, due and payable to the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1011, within 30 calendar days of the date that the agency serves Respondent with a copy of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Maria B. Vences Los Tucanes 1235 East Hillsborough Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 Jessica Leigh, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 George Luebkemann, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this case are whether penalties should be imposed and investigative costs and expenses assessed against Respondent for water supply system violations; and, if so, the amount of the penalties and assessments.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Premier Construction Group, Inc., owns and operates a water treatment plant and associated piping in a commercial building it owns and leases at 2315 Highway 41 North in Inverness. The water treatment plant consists of a 500- gallon tank that holds groundwater pumped from a well. The water in the tank is treated with chlorine and distributed throughout the building for potable water use. The water system serves 25 or more people daily for at least 60 days a year and serves the same people for over six months a year. Respondent owned and operated the water system for 18 and a half years with no violations. Respondent hired a licensed water treatment plant operator to monitor and ensure compliance with applicable DEP rules. In August 2009, Respondent’s licensed operator increased his price substantially. Rick Suggs, as Respondent’s owner and president, disputed the increase and asked the licensed operator to reconsider. Family obligations then required Mr. Suggs to travel to South Carolina for an extended period of time, and Respondent did not attend to the matter further. By the end of August 2009, Respondent’s licensed operator notified DEP that he would no longer be servicing Respondent’s water system as of the end of the month. On August 24, 2009, DEP mailed Respondent a letter relaying this information and putting Respondent on notice that a new licensed operator would have to be hired for September. Notwithstanding Respondent’s communications with its licensed operator and DEP in August, Respondent did not hire a new licensed operator. Mr. Suggs testified that Respondent did not know its licensed operator actually quit until later in September. When this was brought to Mr. Suggs’ attention, he instructed his office manager to hire a replacement. Respondent thought the matter was resolved, but the supposed replacement did not proceed with the work. While Respondent was without a licensed operator, the residual chlorine in the system dropped to zero when tested by DEP on September 17, 24, and 30 and on October 7 and 13, 2009. As a result, the water system did not comply with disinfection requirements during September and October 2009. Respondent did not notify DEP of its failure to comply with disinfection requirements in September and October 2009. No monthly operation reports were submitted to DEP for Respondent’s water system for September or October 2009. No bacteriological samples were collected from Respondent’s water system for the months of September and October 2009. Respondent did not notify DEP of its failure to collect bacteriological samples in September and October 2009. While without a licensed operator, Respondent did not provide public notification of its failure to collect bacteriological samples in September and October 2009. Well into October 2009, Respondent became aware that the supposed replacement licensed operator was not doing work for Respondent. Mr. Suggs hired a replacement licensed operator named Mike Watson, who began servicing Respondent’s water system on November 17, 2009. Public notification of Respondent’s failure to collect bacteriological samples in September and October 2009 was given on November 25, 2009. On December 11, 2009, Respondent submitted a completed DEP Form 62-555.900(22), Certification of Delivery of Public Notice, as to its failure to notify the public of its failure to collect bacteriological samples in September and October 2009. By not having a licensed operator in September and October 2009, Respondent saved $332. By not having bacteriological samples collected and tested in September and October 2009, Respondent saved $60. There was evidence that DEP spent approximately $678 investigating and enforcing the violations. More may have been spent, but no evidence of any additional costs or expenses was presented. There was no evidence of any other water treatment violations by Respondent after October 2009. Although there was a potential that the violations could have posed a health threat, there was no evidence that the public’s health actually was threatened by Respondent’s violations. The water system was tested on November 18, 2009, and did not have any coliform bacteria. The NOV includes corrective actions (essentially coming into and staying in compliance), which Respondent already has taken. The NOV requests that penalties be paid within 30 days by cashier’s check or money order made payable to the “State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection” and including the notations OGC File No. 09-3847-09-PW and “Ecosystem Management and Restoration Trust Fund” to be mailed to DEP’s Southwest District office at 13051 North Telecom Parkway, Temple Terrace, Florida 33637. Respondent believes the penalties sought by DEP in this case are excessive. Mr. Suggs cited Respondent’s clean record for 18 and a half years, his personal and financial difficulties during the two months when the violations occurred, and his responsiveness in correcting violations beginning in November 2009. Mr. Suggs testified that, during mediation, DEP informed him that the penalties could have totaled $115,000 if an unexplained “matrix” had been used to calculate the penalties. Mr. Suggs thought $115,000 was “ludicrous.” Mr. Suggs also requests that the lesser penalties sought in the NOV be further reduced, especially considering that Respondent paid a lawyer $2,800 for representation earlier in the proceeding, until the lawyer withdrew from the case.
The Issue Whether the Department of Environmental Regulation should grant a dredge and fill permit to James N. and Janice E. Nash authorizing removal of eleven cubic yards of soil, installation of five 24-inch culverts in lieu of two 18- inch culverts, and placement of 19 cubic yards of limerock in and around the bed of an unnamed creek near the point it reaches the Alford Arm of Lake Lafayette in Leon County, Florida?
Findings Of Fact More than a thousand acres in eastern Leon County comprise the drainage basin giving rise to the unnamed stream that intermittently wends its way across the Alvarez property, crosses the 30-foot wide "tongue" of the Nashes' lot, and traverses the Saltiels' land on its way to the Alford Arm of Lake Lafayette (unless it reaches Alford Arm earlier because rain or other conditions have raised the lake, moving the water's edge upland.) Although neighbors allow them ingress and egress by another route, when flooding makes the roadway impassable, Mr. and Mrs. Nash have no legal right of access other than by the private road which crosses the intermittent stream. In addition to wetlands on either side, part of the streambed, 15 feet wide where it meets the roadway, was originally filled in 1968, when the private drive was built. The strip of land, 30 feet wide and 700 feet long that underlies most of the private road, joins the part of the parcel where the Nashes' house stands to Deep Wood Trail, the public thoroughfare which the private road enters. Leaving a car on the Deep Wood Trail side of the stream, wading across to the other side, and hiking to the house pose difficulties for Mr. Nash, who has muscular dystrophy. Under some conditions, the roadbed acts as a dam. When the lake is low, water flowing downstream may be impeded. When the lake is high, backwater moving in the other direction may be impeded. Of the two culverts installed when the private road was constructed, each with a diameter of 18 inches, only one permits water to flow through now, and even it is partially clogged. When Lake Lafayette rises above 45.3 feet NGVD, Alford Arm spills over the terrain between it and the Nashes' road, and reverses the flow in the streambed where it intersects the roadway. The "invert of the stream at the subject crossing [is] 44.3 feet [NGVD]." T.402. The roadbed is submerged in the vicinity of the stream when Alford Arm rises above 46.7 feet NGVD. The Nashes propose to excavate the streambed (about two and a half feet deep in the natural channel on either side of the existing fill) where it crosses (diagonally) the Nashes' private road, remove the existing culverts together with the soil in which they are embedded, install five culverts, each 24 inches in diameter, in their stead, install cement bag riprap at the ends of the culverts, remove 11 cubic yards of dirt from a 205' by 10' wide section of existing road surface and replace with 19 cubic yards of lime rock surface, Nashes' Exhibits Nos. 5 and 6, realigning the roadway slightly (to avoid the existing encroachment on the Saltiels' property) and increasing the roadbed's elevation over a 205-foot stretch by no more than four inches. Five trees are to be removed, but other trees are to be protected "by tree protection barricades." Nashes' Exhibit No. 7A. Filter fences upstream and down would contain turbidity during construction. The plan is to lay sod and plant grass seed afterwards in order to prevent erosion. Larger culverts would permit the flow of a greater volume of water at lower velocity, more closely approximating the natural regime and reducing scour or erosion downstream. Even when water levels exceeded the elevation of the existing roadbed, more water than the existing culverts can accommodate could move through the proposed replacement culverts, and at a slower velocity. At water levels above the existing grade and below the proposed, slightly higher grade, however, the four inches or less of limerock added to the roadbed would act as a (presumably somewhat porous) barrier to flows that could now move over the roadway unimpeded. The proposed improvements would have no discernible effect on water levels whenever Alford Arm overtopped the roadbed. Ted L. Biddy, the professional engineer called as a witness by the Nashes, testified that a 25-year return two-hour storm would raise water immediately upstream of the roadway, when runoff concentrated there, to levels above the existing roadway grade, assuming that the drainage basin was saturated at the time of the rainfall and that all ponds within the basin were full, but that the level of Lake Lafayette was at or below 45.3 feet NGVD. T.489. "Ordinary high water for Alford Arm is 45.7 [feet NGVD.]" T.486. On this record, it can only be a matter of speculation how often (if ever) a 25-year return, two-hour storm might be expected to occur after rainfall has saturated the ground and filled all ponds in the drainage basin without raising the lake above 45.3 feet NGVD. The wet conditions Mr. Biddy assumed already to obtain in the drainage basin at the time of the hypothetical storm seem unlikely to coincide with the low lake level assumed to occur simultaneously. Alford Arm's 100-year flood level is 51 feet NGVD, "50.25 for the 25 year flood or rainfall, and elevation 49.9 for the 10 year storm water event." T.425. In any event, flooding of the Saltiels' property attributable to the proposed raising of the roadway would last only a matter of hours every quarter of a century according to Mr. Biddy, and would represent temporary diversion of water that would otherwise have flooded their property downstream of the roadway. Even then, no house or structure on the Saltiels' property would be affected nor any part of their property not within the 100-year flood plain. At all water levels below the existing roadway grade, the overwhelmingly more frequent condition, larger culverts would prevent or diminish flooding that might otherwise reach the Saltiels' property upstream of the roadway. By impeding flows downstream, the roadway affords some solids suspended in the water an opportunity to precipitate, instead of being borne on into Alford Arm. Under certain conditions, the larger culverts proposed by the Nashes would reduce time for particulate matter to settle upstream of the roadway; the greater volume of flow through larger culverts would reduce the time water was impounded upstream. Uncontroverted expert testimony established, however, that any increase in turbidity in water reaching Alford Arm would not violate applicable standards.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DER issue a dredge and fill permit to Mr. and Mrs. Nash for the project described in their application on the conditions stated in the notice of intent to issue. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioners' proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 1, what knowledge petitioners are charged with is a matter of law. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 31 pertain to subordinate matters. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact Nos. 5, 6 and 32 pertain to immaterial matters as does petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 9. Only the dredge and fill permit DER proposes to grant the Nashes is at issue. With respect to petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 30, the calculations of both Mr. Flatt and Mr. Biddy seem to be flawed. With respect to petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 33, it is not clear that the proposed project would increase the flooding on the Saltiels' property significantly. Temporally de minimis, the change might amount only to relocating the flooding. With respect to petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 34, see finding of fact No. 12. With respect to petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 35, larger culverts will decrease the velocity of the flow through the culverts. Petitioners' proposed finding of fact No. 36 is immaterial because it does not relate to any applicable rule or statutory standard. With respect to the individual respondents' and intervenor's (applicants') proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 and 2, the application does not specify dredge and fill. The applicants' proposed findings of fact Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 32 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the applicants' proposed finding of fact No. 6, backwater flows at levels above 45.3 feet NGVD. With respect to the applicants' proposed finding of fact No. 9, the OHW is 45.7 feet NGVD. With respect to the applicants' proposed finding of fact No. 11, testimony so implied. With respect to the applicants' proposed finding of fact No. 12, Mr. Nash suffers from muscular dystrophy. The applicants' proposed findings of fact Nos. 14 and 15 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to the applicants' proposed finding of fact No. 16, the only testimony regarding flooding concerned the critical 25-year return storm. With respect to DER's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1 and 2, the application does not specify dredge and fill. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 3, backflows begin at 45.3 feet NGVD. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 4, not all fill would be removed. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 5, testimony so implied. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 6, no statute or rule specifies a design storm. DER's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is really a conclusion of law. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 8, less settling may result in more suspended solids under some conditions. DER's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. DER's proposed finding of fact No. 13 is immaterial to the merits. COPIES FURNISHED: John A. Barley P.O. Box 10166 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Donna H. Stinson Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Fitzgerald & Sheehan, P.A. 118 North Gadsden Street Suite 100 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Candi E. Culbreath Patricia Comer 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Carlos Alvarez c/o Hopping, Boyd, Green & Sams 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Frank A. Caluwe, Jr., was employed on a noncontractual basis by Respondent, South Florida Water Management District, during the period from April 8, 1974 through August 4, 1982. From August, 1981 until his termination, Caluwe held the position of water management engineer III. At all times relevant hereto, Richard A. Rogers, director of the Resource Control Department, was overall supervisor or department head. Charles Alan Hall served as his direct, day-to-day supervisor. Petitioner transferred into the Resource Control Department in 1977. He was eventually promoted to a supervising professional engineer I class in 1979 by Rogers and Hall. Caluwe's job evaluations received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 17 reflected outstanding and excellent ratings and included such glowing descriptions of his work performance as "excellent" and "well organized", and as having "a very good handle on all phases of the work". He received an excellent rating from Rogers and Hall as late as November, 1981. Rogers first began experiencing what he described as "difficulties" with Caluwe around 1980 when Caluwe went to lunch with several of his subordinates and did not return to work the rest of the afternoon. He did not take leave for his absence. Although Rogers claimed the employees were on a "drinking spree," this was not confirmed. Caluwe did not receive any disciplinary action for this "incident", although several months later Hall expressed displeasure with his absence. There was no evidence that any of the other employees in the group received any type of oral or written disciplinary action for their absences. Several other "problems" occurred during his employment tenure including unsuccessful attempts in 1980 to utilize law books at the agency's law library for personal use, admonishments for having too many incoming personal calls on his telephone during office hours and discussing nonworking matters with other employees, "negative" comments to two subordinates during a 1981 intra-agency election, and an alleged failure to return a long-distance telephone call to someone seeking information. However, no formal disciplinary action was taken against Petitioner for any of these actions, and his personnel file reflects no written comments. He also sued the agency twice, once in 1977 over an insurance claim, and a second time in 1980 concerning a cash award he claimed was due for making a suggestion. However, this action did not result in any written or oral warnings from his superiors. In May, 1981, Hall, Rogers and Caluwe met to discuss a transfer from a supervisory position (supervisor of water permit section) to a water management engineer III, which was a staff position. Although Caluwe admitted he was "burned out" in his supervisory role, he protested being demoted to a staff position and requested he be given an engineer IV slot. Notwithstanding his request he was demoted to the lower position. On March 17, 1982, an annual agency meeting was held at which time the agency executive director spoke to all employees. Prior to that time an undated memorandum was posted on the agency's bulletin board "urging" all employees to attend. Another memorandum dated March 1, 1982, which rescheduled the meeting to another date, simply advised members of Caluwe's department when the talk was to be held, but made no mention regarding attendance. Caluwe did not attend the meeting because he did not consider it to be mandatory. He based this conclusion upon the fact that the memorandum urged vis a vis required attendance, and because other employees had missed the meeting in prior years. He conceded, however, that it was "implied" from the memorandum that he attend the meeting. Respondent construed the memorandum to mean that attendance was compulsory, and that "everybody (was) expected to attend." Whether this specific meaning was ever conveyed to all employees, including Caluwe, before the meeting was not disclosed. During the annual agency meeting Caluwe remained working in his office. While there, an unidentified member of the public approached a temporary receptionist seeking information concerning a problem. The receptionist in turn went to Caluwe seeking his aid in responding to the inquiry. Caluwe responded, "I don't know. That's not my job. Pat Gleason's group handles that." Out of "curiosity", the receptionist reported his comments to a department head, who in turn told Rogers. Neither the receptionist nor the member of the public were identified, and neither appeared and testified at the final hearing. Whether or not the receptionist suffered "abuse" as a result of this as the agency claims was not confirmed. Rogers, Hall and Caluwe met on March 18 concerning his absence from the annual meeting and the "incident" with the receptionist. On March 22 Caluwe was given a written warning and assigned 25 disciplinary points for being guilty of a Category 2e offense under the agency's Corrective Action-Procedure Index and Corrective Action-Policy. The Index and Policy "defines appropriate corrective actions for resolving performance problems and violations of rules of conduct" by agency employees. In short, it represents the agency's written code of conduct for employees. A 2e offense is defined therein as a "(f)ailure to follow authorized instructions." In conjunction with the written warning, Caluwe was also given a memorandum prepared by Rogers on March 19 which explained in greater detail the conduct that precipitated the disciplinary action. In the memorandum Rogers referred to a number of things which prompted the disciplinary action, including the "incident" with the receptionist, the missed meeting, and Caluwe's apparent use of the telephone for personal use during the meeting as reported by the temporary receptionist. However, since the 25 points were given to Caluwe for failing to follow authorized instructions, it is found that disciplinary action was taken because he failed to attend the annual meeting. On March 29, 1982, Caluwe wrote a fourteen-page letter to Rogers giving his version of what occurred on March 17, and explaining in great detail other "incidents" that had occurred during the preceding eighteen months, Attached to the letter were 23 exhibits. Among other things, Caluwe accused Hall and Rogers of "improper conduct and abuse of authority" in handling the other incidents that had previously arisen. He also criticized their ability to manage and communicate with employees. The letter indicated that copies of the same were being mailed to each member of the agency's governing board, its Executive Director, Deputy Director, and Records Clerk, and an outside attorney. Rogers accepted the letter as merely being a response to his memorandum of March Caluwe was not disciplined for this action. On March 31, 1982 Caluwe wrote a two-page letter to the members of the governing board of the agency and enclosed his March 29 letter and exhibits previously sent to Rogers. In his March 31 letter, Caluwe stated, among other things, that management "occupie(d) a position of trust", that it had "breached this trust", that it "rule(d) by intimidation and fear and not in the spirit of cooperation", and urged the board members to conduct an independent investigation of his "allegations". A copy of this letter was also furnished an outside attorney. On May 13, 1982 Caluwe sent another letter to the members of the governing board in which he inquired as to the status of the investigation he had called for in his letter of March 31. Caluwe also raised allegations concerning the agency's general counsel, and claimed the general counsel had "used sick leave for purposes other than for which it was intended (and) falsified his bi-weekly time reports and received pay and benefits for periods he was absent from work", and that the problem was created because his leave slips had been approved by the agency's deputy executive director. That complaint is now the subject of a Florida Commission on Ethics proceeding. Caluwe had previously brought this subject to Rogers' attention sometime in 1980. There was no evidence his to the reaction, if any, by the members of the governing board to this letter or the one previously sent on March 31. Caluwe did not furnish his supervisors a copy of the letter but did copy the records clerk of the agency. Neither Rogers nor the agency personnel director received copies of the same until late July, 1982. In June, 1982 Caluwe contacted reporter for the Miami Herald to disclose the fact that the chairman of the agency's governing board had been involved in selling insurance to the board. On June 22, 1982 outside counsel for the agency wrote the agency's personnel director telling him, among other things, that it would call the director the next day concerning Caluwe and provide him "with language to be included in a letter of termination." It also referred to a need to review in detail "SFWMD's termination, grievance, and personnel policies to make sure that Caluwe's discharge, and the procedures used to implement the discharge, comport with due process." At this point, then, the agency had decided to terminate Caluwe. On July 21, 1982 Caluwe again wrote a letter to the members of the governing board. The text of the letter is set out below: To members of the Governing Board of the South Florida Water Management District: You are to be congratulated for your unity in not addressing controversial topics. It's an unfortunate situation when special interests are put ahead of the public trust that has been vested in you. The only reasonable conclusion that I can reach is that you condone poor management and theft. Perhaps some of you have committed acts similar to these and that's why you cannot afford to get involved. Well you are involved! It's satisfying to note the courts have held directors personally liable in civil actions and that penalties are not limited to compensatory damages but that punitive damages can be assessed. It's also interesting to note that you may be found culpably negligent in permitting acts like these to occur. Since you have been unwilling to do your own house cleaning, I have decided to help you in this matter. I think it would be an excellent idea if the citizens of South Florida had an opportunity to see how the South Florida Water Management District has acted in favoring special interests. When this happens you will not honestly be able to say, "we didn't know". One member of the Board responded by letter dated July 23, 1982 that she considered it inappropriate for Caluwe to write directly to board members and instructed him to use channels that were provided for handling complaints. She added that Caluwe's letter struck her as being "offensive". The letter made no direct reference to Rogers and Hall, and they were not furnished a copy. However, on July 26 Rogers was given a copy of the letter. On July 30, 1982 Rogers sent Caluwe a memorandum in which he informed Petitioner that his employment was being terminated at 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 1982, and not to report to work after July 30. In brief, the reasons given for Caluwe's termination were (a) his "uncooperativeness shown a co-worker" on March 19, and his "failure to respond to a request for information from a member of the public", which collectively constituted a 2e offense for which he was previously assigned 25 points on March 19, 1982; (b) his letter to Rogers on March 29, 1982 which alleged poor management, illegal activity and unfair treatment to Caluwe, and which "personally attacked and insulted Charles Hall and (Rogers)"; (c) his letter of July 21 to the board which contained "inflammatory, threatening, and abusive language" and which constituted Category 2h and 3a offenses for which he received 75 points in total, and an additional 25 points which was given for the same letter by virtue of Caluwe's "failure to follow promulgated grievance and complaint procedures'; 3/ (d) the accumulation of a total of 125 points since March 19 which was in violation of Section E.1.d. of the Corrective Action Policy; and (e) "actions" which interfered with Rogers' ability to maintain internal discipline", made it impossible to work with (Caluwe)", made it "impossible to transfer (him) to a different Department", which "interfered with (his) performance of assigned duties", and which showed a "tendency on (his) part to make untrue and misleading statements." A Category 2h offense is defined in the Policy-Index as the "(u)se of abusive language to a co-worker" while a Category 3a offense is defined as the "(u)se of abusive or threatening language to the public, or use of threatening language to a co-worker." Category 2e offenses carry the imposition of 25 points for each violation. Fifty points are assigned for a violation of a Category 3 offense. Section E.1.d, of the Policy-Index provides that "(a) total of 100 points in effect may be cause for termination." The Policy-Index requires that "(c)orrective action shall be taken as soon as possible, but not more than five working days from the time the supervisor becomes aware of the incident." The memorandum of July 30, 1982 was followed by a letter to Caluwe on August 5 from Rogers which confirmed that his employment had been terminated. The letter also instructed Caluwe on the time limitations for filing a request for an administrative hearing. Thereafter, a timely request for a hearing was filed. The agency adopted an "Employee grievance Procedure" on July 15, 1977. Its purpose was to allow all employees the opportunity to quickly and fairly resolve a grievance." The Procedure provides a specified procedure for hearing and resolving various types of complaints from employees, including a hearing by an Employee Relations Committee (ERC), a further review by the unit manager or department director, a second hearing by a Grievance Review Board, and a final decision by the agency's executive director. According to the agency's personnel director, the agency has fired employees in one of two ways in the past: (a) when the employe has accumulated more than 100 disciplinary points under the Policy-Index, and (b) when the employee has committed certain acts, irrespective of the Policy-Index. Thus, it contends the agency may, at its discretion, determine whether to terminate an employee by assessing points under the Policy-Index or by merely giving notice to the employee even though he has accumulated no points under its written code of conduct. Even though an employee has accumulated over 100 points, the agency may not necessarily fire an employee. For example, on one occasion an employee accumulated 135 points but was not fired. In the case at bar, the agency considered Caluwe's 125 points to be incidental to his termination, and viewed his supervisor's inability to work with him, his letter writing activities and prior "incidents" to be the major concern and basis for the termination. Whether the District had a policy of terminating an employee whenever his actions made it impossible to transfer him to another department or whenever a supervisor could not work with an employee was not disclosed. It was also not disclosed whether all employees, including Caluwe, were aware of such policies, and the ramification for violating the same. There was no evidence as to the reason for such policies, the types of proscribed conduct within each policy, and the authority for adopting the same. Caluwe blamed his firing primarily on the fact that he had prompted an investigation of the agency's general counsel, who was a long-time District employee. He acknowledged he failed to use the Employee Grievance Procedure when he wrote directly to the members of the governing board, but claimed the ERC was ineffective in dealing with management problems. Caluwe did not dispute that he missed the annual meeting, and wrote the letters in question; however, he contends they do not justify the disciplinary action imposed by the District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against Petitioner be dismissed except for one Category 2e offense for which 25 points should be imposed. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be reinstated in the position of water management engineer III retroactive to August 4, 1982 and that he be given full back pay between that date and the date of reinstatement. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1983.
