The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was subject to discrimination in employment for the reasons alleged in the Petition.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was terminated from his position as Laborer, position number 51343, within the Facilities Operation and Maintenance Department of Florida State University (FSU) on October 7, 1999, for violation of a Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner had been employed by FSU for 24 years. Petitioner's Disciplinary Violations Leading to Termination Attendance is a critical element of the Laborer's job because departmental productivity depends on the reliable availability of employees. The Petitioner received a copy of Rule 6C2-4.070, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action, Rules of the Florida State University Administrative Code on January 29, 1988, which provided notice to the Petitioner of FSU's standard of conduct and the associated penalties for violation. The Petitioner was cited for numerous disciplinary infractions prior to his dismissal. The Petitioner's work history documents a consistent trend of absences which grew progressively worse over time. A list of documentation in evidence, exhibiting disciplinary action taken by FSU against the Petitioner includes: A three day suspension for Absence Without Authorized Leave (AWOL) and Excessive Absences, dated January 3, 1997. A written reprimand for Excessive Absences and AWOL, dated August 6, 1996. An oral reprimand for excessive absences, dated April 26, 1996. 1996. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated February 29, A written reprimand for AWOL, dated August 14, 1991. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated June 5, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated February 22, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated July 8, 1988. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated May 25, 1988. The Petitioner was cited for excessive tardiness in an official written reprimand dated July 8, 1988, and the Petitioner was again reminded that his performance hindered the department's ability to perform its function. An oral reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated January 28, 1988. An oral reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment, dated July 11, 1985. A written reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment dated March 21, 1984. A written reprimand for excessive absences, dated February 7, 1984. A written reprimand for AWOL and misuse of state property and equipment dated, January 25, 1983. A three day suspension for AWOL, dated July 27, 1981. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated July 13, 1981. The Petitioner was directed in an August 14, 1991, written reprimand to phone his supervisor as close to 8:00 a.m. as possible on days he would be unable to report to work. The Petitioner was reminded in the February 29, 1996, written reprimand of the policy requiring employees to provide supervisors with advanced notice or documentation for leave to be authorized. The Petitioner was informed on April 26, 1996, that his absences, both excused and unexcused, exceeded established attendance and leave standards. Specifically, from January through April, the Petitioner used 33 hours of annual leave, 31 hours of sick leave, and 29 hours of leave without pay. FSU notified the Petitioner that his absences and sick leave totaling 33 hours during the period from April 26, 1996 to August 6, 1996, were deemed excessive and in contravention of departmental standards. The Petitioner was also cited for six hours of being absent without authorized leave. The Petitioner's chronic absenteeism did not improve. The period from August 6, 1996 through January 3, 1997, witnessed 46 hours of sick leave or unauthorized leave on the Petitioner's part. An inventory of the Petitioner's absences following his suspension from January 7-9, 1997 until August 22, 1997, catalogued 56 hours of sick leave, 16 hours of leave without pay and two hours of absence without authorized leave. This amount of leave was "considered to be excessive and completely unacceptable." [Id.] Further, the university did not receive any medical excuses for the Petitioner's use of sick leave during this period. [Id.] Counseling was provided to the Petitioner by FSU regarding the use of sick leave on August 17, 1998. An examination of the Petitioner's attendance revealed that he used 63 hours of sick leave from February 20, 1998 through August 6, 1998. [Id.] The university's standard for the same period of time was 33 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The Petitioner was further advised by FSU that he would not be compensated for three consecutive absences or three absences within a 30-day period without proper medical documentation. FSU assessed the Petitioner's attendance from January 8, 1998 through August 6, 1998, by comparing the standard allocated for sick leave to the Petitioner's actual use of sick leave. The sick leave standard for employees for the period under review was 44.16 hours whereas the Petitioner expended 67 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The record establishes that the Petitioner was warned 17 times in writing through reprimands, memorandums, and counseling notices dating back to 1981 that absenteeism was punishable under university employee disciplinary standards. Tardiness and absenteeism are, in fact, grounds for dismissal under the FSU Handbook for Employees. The Petitioner was warned twice in writing that failure to rectify his recurring absenteeism could result in his dismissal. Petitioner's Termination The FSU's Guidelines for Disciplinary Action are based on the concepts of progressive and cumulative discipline. The Disciplinary Guidelines outline standards to apply for punishable offenses to ensure similar treatment. Ms. Susannah Miller, Manager of Employees Relations at FSU, testified that the Petitioner's personnel file revealed the worst case of absenteeism she has seen at FSU. Excessive absences is defined in the Guideline for Disciplinary Action as "an attendance record of recurring absences, even though all or a majority of the absences were necessary and excused." Dismissal is allowed as proper punishment for an employee's fourth violation of the excessive absence rule. FSU notified the Petitioner of its intention to terminate him for excessive absences, effective on or shortly after October 12, 1998. In lieu of firing the Petitioner, FSU elected to allow the Petitioner to enter into a "Last Chance Agreement" (LCA) with FSU to avoid dismissal. Ms. Miller stated that Last Chance Agreements allow a final opportunity for employees to improve their performance. Ms. Miller further testified that to her knowledge FSU has never retained any employee that violated a Last Chance Agreement. The Last Chance Agreement required the Petitioner to (1) obtain prior written approval of requests for annual leave or leave without pay; (2) follow departmental policy and call-in between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. and speak personally with his supervisor or proper designee if he was sick and unable to report to work; and (3) agree that violation of any LCA provision would result in immediate termination for cause. The Petitioner violated the Last Chance Agreement when he did not report for work on August 27, 1999, because he neither obtained prior approval for the absence nor followed the call-in procedure. The Petitioner also failed to provide any documentation justifying his absence. The Petitioner was in violation of the Last Chance Agreement on August 31, 1999, when he was tardy without permission and failed to follow the call-in procedure. The Petitioner's breach of the Last Chance Agreement is even more egregious because he collected his paycheck prior to work and could have easily informed his supervisor or the designee that he needed leave that day. In addition to violating the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, the Petitioner was also AWOL on August 27 and August 31, 1999. AWOL is "failure to obtain approval prior to any absence from work" and is punishable by dismissal for the third occurrence. The Petitioner admitted that he violated the Last Chance Agreement. On September 15, 1999, FSU informed the Petitioner of its decision to terminate him for violating the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner was dismissed on October 7, 1999. Petitioner's Step One Grievance was denied on December 13, 1999. FSU's decision to terminate the Petitioner for violation of the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave was upheld by the State University System of Florida in its Step Two Grievance decision. Petitioner's Injury The Petitioner's Position Description reveals that lifting is an integral part of a laborer's duties. The Petitioner's 1995 Position Description allocates 85 percent of the job's essential function to lifting, moving and arranging university property and requires that the laborer be able to lift 30 pounds. The Petitioner sustained a back injury at work on September 4, 1997. The Petitioner's job duties changed as a result of the injury and he was tasked with inspecting fire extinguishers from September 10 through November 12, 1997. A physical capacity assessment performed on the Petitioner indicated that he was capable of performing at a medium demand level. The Department of Labor defined medium demand as capable of lifting 50 pounds and pushing and pulling 50 pounds. The Petitioner was temporarily re-assigned to the Grounds Section of the Facilities, Operations and Maintenance Department on December 23, 1997. The Petitioner testified that his job function involved re-cycling. The Petitioner's assignment in the Grounds Section was light duty and he was informed that his job duties could be modified after his physician reviewed the physical capacity assessment. Dr. Alexander, the Petitioner's physician, declared the Petitioner fit for medium demand duty with a 35-pound lifting limit on March 24, 1998. Robert Pullen, American Disabilities Act Coordinator at FSU, was directed by Carolyn Shackleford, under the University's Reasonable Accommodation Policy, to ensure that the Petitioner's job activities with the Grounds Section did not exceed the 35p-pound lifting threshold. The Petitioner never contacted Mr. Pullen's office regarding reasonable accommodation. Mr. Pullen determined that the Petitioner's duties did not violate the lifting restriction and were in full compliance with the accommodation policy. The Petitioner testified that he could lift 35 pounds repetitively. The record reflects no evidence of age discrimination committed by the Respondent against the Petitioner. The record indicates no evidence that the Petitioner was terminated due to his race. The Petitioner presented no evidence or testimony regarding retaliation by FSU.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, when Petitioner was an employee of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact From 1991 until she resigned in November 2005, Petitioner Gloria J. Bias-Gibbs ("Bias-Gibbs") worked for Respondent Jupiter Medical Center ("JMC") in several different positions, which were mostly clerical in nature. Starting in 2001, and continuing throughout the time period relevant to this case, Bias-Gibbs' job was to perform "chart prep" in the Same Day Surgery unit, which is within JMC's Surgical Services Department. As a chart prep employee, Bias-Gibbs' task was to assemble patients' charts for the medical personnel. During the time she held the chart prep position, Bias-Gibbs was the only person who occupied it. Volunteers had performed the chart prep duties before Bias-Gibbs assumed them, and, after she resigned, volunteers once again were given the chart prep duties to perform. Bias-Gibbs' immediate supervisor in Same Day Surgery was Janet Sparks, the Clinical Manager. Ms. Sparks, in turn, reported to Beth Suriano, the Director of Surgical Services. Ms. Sparks and Ms. Suriano are white women; Bias-Gibbs is a black woman. Not long after she began her tenure as a chart prep, Bias-Gibbs began to believe that she was a victim of racial discrimination at work. In particular, she felt that Ms. Sparks was a racist who repeatedly took adverse action against her solely because she is black. The many allegedly discriminatory acts about which Bias-Gibbs presently complains can be divided into three main categories: (a) denials of her requests for promotion or transfer to another position; (b) Ms. Sparks' conduct; and (c) refusals to provide training, most notably in relation to a computer program known as "Fast Forms," about which Bias-Gibbs alleges she received inadequate instruction. The Requests for Transfer. Between April 16, 2001, and February 22, 2005, Bias-Gibbs submitted sixteen job transfer applications, seeking positions at JMC that she believed were more in keeping with her qualifications than chart prep. None of these applications was approved. Bias-Gibbs does not know the identities, racial characteristics, or qualifications of any of the persons whom JMC hired for the sixteen positions Bias-Gibbs sought. Because she applied for these positions and did not get them, however, Bias-Gibbs feels that she was discriminated against. In addition, Bias-Gibbs once sought to transfer to another position in the Surgical Services Department. The job of Patient Access Specialist was given, however, to another employee of JMC, Joyce Stokes, who assumed the position some time in 2004. Unlike Bias-Gibbs, Ms. Stokes (who happens to be white) had taken a medical terminology course and examination. Because proficiency in medical and surgical terminology is desirable for the position in question, Ms. Stokes was more qualified than Bias-Gibbs to be a Patient Access Specialist. Ms. Sparks' Conduct. Bias-Gibbs' complaints about Janet Sparks, whom she calls a "racist," revolve around allegations that Ms. Sparks forced Bias-Gibbs to sit in a back room while on the job; made racially insensitive remarks concerning Bias-Gibbs' appearance (specifically, her hair); refused to transfer Bias-Gibbs to a different position in the Surgical Services Department (the incident discussed above); kept an overly watchful eye on Bias- Gibbs while she was working; and generally declined to give Bias-Gibbs more challenging assignments in addition to chart prep. Work Station. Bias-Gibbs worked in a room apart from the secretaries in the unit. Her work area was neither "on the floor" nor in public view. While she believes that this "back room" placement was discriminatory, Bias-Gibbs' job as a chart prep employee did not require her to sit "out front." There is no evidence that Bias-Gibbs was singled-out for different treatment regarding her work station. To the contrary, after Bias-Gibbs resigned, the chart prep work continued to be done in the same room where Bias-Gibbs had labored, with the same supplies that were available to Bias- Gibbs while she was employed. Insensitive Remarks. Bias-Gibbs does not believe that she was harassed because of her race. She does complain, however, about derogatory remarks she attributes to Ms. Sparks. According to Bias-Gibbs, when Bias-Gibbs wore her hair in braids to work, Ms. Sparks made comments to the effect that she (Bias- Gibbs) looked like Whoopi Goldberg. In addition, Ms. Sparks once told Bias-Gibbs that she wished she (Ms. Sparks) were black because, if she were black, then it would be easier to take care of her hair. The undersigned takes Bias-Gibbs at her word that these quips were offensive and hurtful to her (although she never told Ms. Sparks that the comments at issue made her uncomfortable). To infer, however, that racial animus motivated these comments (there being no direct evidence of discriminatory intent) would require that the words be given a very mean connotation (and the speaker absolutely no benefit of the doubt) because, viewed objectively, the statements appear to be, at worst, inconsiderate, unkind, or rude. Ultimately, there is insufficient evidence upon which to base a finding (or to infer) that these remarks were anything but workplace banter of the sort that anti-discrimination laws are not designed to reach. "Excessive" Supervision. Bias-Gibbs believes that Ms. Sparks was hypervigilant about watching her work, which made Bias-Gibbs nervous or uncomfortable. Although she attributes this watchfulness to racism, Bias-Gibbs conceded, when pressed, that it was not discriminatory for her supervisor to keep an eye on her at work. There is no evidence, in any event, that Ms. Sparks subjected Bias-Gibbs to closer scrutiny than other employees, much less that she treated Bias-Gibbs differently in this regard based on her race. Underutilization. As an overarching complaint about Ms. Sparks, Bias-Gibbs believes that her supervisor generally refused to allow Bias-Gibbs to perform the kind of work that would make full use of her skills. At most, however, the evidence shows that Ms. Sparks and Bias-Gibbs had different opinions about Bias-Gibbs' potential for taking on other responsibilities. There is no evidence that Ms. Sparks' opinion, which was that Bias-Gibbs should continue working in chart prep, was racially based. Inadequate Training. Bias-Gibbs felt that she was discriminated against because other individuals were given more training than she was on using the Fast Forms computer program. Bias-Gibbs did receive instructions on using Fast Forms, however, which were sufficient to enable her to look up patients' names in the database——the only function of the program that was relevant to, and helpful in the performance of, her duties. The secretaries who used Fast Forms were provided more training in the use of the program, it is true, but their duties were different than Bias- Gibbs's duties, and hence they used Fast Forms for reasons in addition to retrieving names. The secretaries, in short, were provided more training than Bias-Gibbs, not because the latter is black, but because, as secretaries, they needed more training than Bias-Gibbs. The bottom line: there is no persuasive evidence that Bias-Gibbs was given inadequate training——period. At all times during Bias-Gibbs' tenure as an employee of JMC, the hospital had an anti-discrimination policy, an anti- harassment policy, an equal employment policy, and a grievance policy, which were available to all employees. Bias-Gibbs was aware of these policies, yet she never made any allegations of racial discrimination or harassment, disparate racial treatment, or racial comments to Ms. Sparks, Ms. Suriano, or anyone else. Similarly, she never used the grievance procedure to complain that she had been denied a promotion or transfer because of her race. Bias-Gibbs resigned her position at JMC in November of 2005. Although she now maintains that she felt compelled to resign her position because she was denied opportunities to advance at the hospital (and because she needed a job that paid more money), at the time Bias-Gibbs informed others that she was leaving her position in Same Day Surgery because she had gotten a better-paying job at the post office. Bias-Gibbs filed a Charge of Discrimination against JMC at some point on or after July 19, 2006. (She signed the charging document on September 22, 2006, but there is an inscription on the instrument indicating that it was filed on July 19, 2006. There is no evidence explaining this discrepancy.) Ultimate Factual Determinations Taken as a whole, the evidence in this case is either insufficient to establish that JMC discriminated unlawfully against Bias-Gibbs on the basis of her race; or it proves, affirmatively, that JMC did not, in all likelihood, unlawfully discriminate against her. Either way, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that JMC did not violate the civil rights laws in its treatment of Bias-Gibbs while she was an employee of JMC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Bias-Gibbs' Petition for Relief as partially time- barred, and alternatively (and additionally) finding JMC not liable on the merits for racial discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 2008.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner was discriminatorily dismissed from her employment by the Respondent on the basis of race and whether she was retaliated against by the Respondent for filing a complaint of discrimination with the City of Jacksonville.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, the University of Florida, is a state university located in Gainesville, Florida. The Respondent, through its Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, operates a Cooperative Extension Service, which maintains a county extension office in each of the 67 counties in the State of Florida. Each of these offices is headed by a county extension director. On September 13, 1991, the Petitioner, Pamela R. Dallis, was hired by the University of Florida as a part-time secretary for the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) in the Duval County Extension Office located in Jacksonville, Florida, which is headed by Mr. Thomas Braddock. The Petitioner was hired in a temporary position known as Other Personal Services (OPS). The Petitioner was initially interviewed for a permanent position, but she did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position because she did not achieve the required score (35 c.w.p.m.) on the typing test. The Respondent changed the classification of the position from permanent to temporary in order to be able to hire the Petitioner despite her typing deficiency. As an OPS employee, she did not have permanent status in the position and was not subject to a probationary period or to periodic written evaluations concerning her performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. Deborah Patterson, provided the Petitioner training as to the policies and procedures applicable to her position. Specifically, the Petitioner received training concerning data entry, reimbursement of expenses incurred for EFNEP and travel reimbursement vouchers. The Petitioner was also provided assistance concerning computer data entry from another employee in EFNEP. The Petitioner was provided oral counseling concerning deficiencies in her performance on several occasions beginning on January 7, 1992. By June 22, 1992, Respondent considered dismissing the Petitioner from her employment because of her performance deficiencies. Due to budgetary constraints, the decision was made to work more closely with the Petitioner because if she were dismissed, there was no assurance that her position could be filled by another individual. On July 6, 1992, in order to provide closer supervision to the Petitioner, the Respondent moved the Petitioner's work station to a location close to her supervisor's office. Prior to this time, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor had requested to Mr. Braddock that this move be made. Mr. Braddock did not approve the request and recommended that the Petitioner be counseled concerning her work performance. In July, 1992, Mr. Braddock agreed to the move because the Petitioner's performance had not improved despite the performance counseling provided. On July 24, 1993, a few weeks after the Petitioner's work station was moved, she reported to Mr. Braddock an incident that had occurred with a white co-worker, Rachel Fleming. Mr. Braddock spoke separately with each employee and asked for their written description of the incident. There were no other witnesses to the incident. Mr. Braddock received conflicting reports from the Petitioner and Ms. Fleming. The Petitioner stated that on July 24, 1992, after informing Ms. Fleming of her dislike for "chain letters" while talking in the printing room, Ms. Fleming placed a chain letter on the Petitioner's desk with her name on it. The Petitioner scratched her name, placed Ms. Fleming's name on the letter and taped it on Ms. Fleming's desk drawer. The Petitioner stated that she later went to the restroom, and as she was exiting, Ms. Fleming came in, blocked her exit, pushed and grabbed her, and said, "I don't like you no more than you like me, bitch!" Ms. Fleming then allowed her to exit. Ms. Fleming acknowledged in her statement that she had an exchange of words with the Petitioner concerning a chain letter that she had given the Petitioner. Ms. Fleming stated that the Petitioner told her, "This is stupid and so are you." Ms. Fleming also stated that about 15 minutes later, she saw the Petitioner as she was leaving the restroom, asked to speak with her, but the Petitioner "brushed past her" saying nothing. Ms. Fleming grabbed the Petitioner, turned to face her and told her that they did not like each other and to "leave me the hell alone". Ms. Fleming denied pushing the Petitioner or calling her a "bitch". She said she called the Petitioner "a biddy". Based upon the unsubstantiated conflicting reports given by each employee, Mr. Braddock determined that no disciplinary action was warranted and counseled each employee. A few weeks after the incident with Ms. Fleming, the Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the City of Jacksonville on the basis that Ms. Fleming had not been disciplined. After having learned of the complaint, the Petitioner's second level supervisor, Ms. Halusky, advised the Petitioner that the proper avenue for her to file a complaint was through the University's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, not the City of Jacksonville. The City of Jacksonville did not proceed with the Petitioner's complaint because she was not an employee of the City of Jacksonville. The Petitioner never filed a complaint with the University of Florida. Despite the performance counseling and assistance provided to the Petitioner, her performance did not improve. The deficiencies concerning the Petitioner's data entry skills continued. Two reports that were due in September, 1992 at the main EFNEP office in Gainesville were late because the work done by the Petitioner had to be redone. The Petitioner's supervisor decided that the Petitioner's continuing performance deficiencies were causing additional work for the EFNEP staff and, even without the assurance of a replacement, it was better to have the position vacant rather than having to redo the Petitioner's work to correct the mistakes. By letter dated September 10, 1992, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor advised her of her termination effective at the close of business that day. The reason given for her dismissal was that she had not developed in her job as expected and because of performance deficiencies. Sixty-six percent of the employees in EFNEP in the Duval County Office are African American. They serve a clientele that is 75 percent African American. Thus, EFNEP is interested in hiring and retaining African American employees for the program. Three of the individuals who testified at the Petitioner's request are African Americans who work at the Duval County Extension Office. They testified that they had not experienced discrimination in their employment at the Duval County Extension Office. Two of those three employees are in EFNEP. One has been an employee in the office for 23 years, and the other has been an employee for 14 years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are all accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Pamela R. Dallis 8050 Arlington Expressway #C-401 Jacksonville, FL 32211 Isis Carbajal de Garcia, Esq. Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, FL 32611
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on December 8, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has a corporate policy that prohibits its employees from engaging in acts of discrimination, harassment and retaliation. The policy provides, in part, as follows: Discrimination Resort Travel & XChange prohibits discrimination against its employees, applicants for employment, and customers on the basis of a person’s gender, ethnicity, race, color, creed, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, military service or veteran status or any other classification protected by applicable law. Specifically with regard to its employees and job applicants, Resort Travel & XChange does not tolerate discrimination on the basis of the foregoing characteristics with respect to the terms and conditions of employment. Retaliation Resort Travel & XChange does not tolerate any form of retaliation taken against an employee who, in good faith, makes a complaint of discrimination or harassment under this policy, opposes such discrimination or harassment, or participates in an investigation of alleged discrimination or harassment. Anyone who engages in such retaliatory behavior will be subject to appropriate discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner was hired by Respondent in March 2014 to work as an “Instructional Design & Delivery Trainer.” The written position description includes the following summary statement: [An] Instructional Design & Delivery Trainer plays an important role in making their companies more competitive by developing the skills of the workforce. They help to accelerate organizational change by developing the skills a company requires if it plans to enter new markets or needs to transform its business performance. Companies with a reputation for developing people also find it easier to recruit and retain high-caliber employees. Among the key competencies are the ability to design and deliver training, manage the learning function, measure and evaluate the results of training, and manage organizational knowledge. According to Pamela Price, Petitioner’s immediate supervisor during his term of employment with Respondent, Petitioner’s “responsibilities would have been to create, design, develop step-by-step institutional training manuals and modules, and perform classroom training of that content to new hires, as well as continuing education courses, [and] [t]o perform analytical assessments of training class participants to see at what level they were learning.” The cornerstone of Petitioner’s gender discrimination claim is his allegation that Ms. Price, on multiple occasions, made statements to Petitioner about a female worker from one of her previous jobs that performed better than Petitioner when assigned similar tasks. Petitioner offered no evidence, other than cryptic self-serving statements and conclusory allegations, which supports his allegation that Ms. Price treated him differently because of his gender. On or about September 19, 2014, Petitioner received from Ms. Price his initial six-month performance evaluation. Respondent’s employee performance evaluation rating scale ranges from “marginal” to “outstanding.” On the initial review, Petitioner received an overall rating of “marginal.” There is no evidence of record that Petitioner suffered a decrease in pay, benefits, or the loss of job-related opportunities as a consequence of having received the marginal performance rating. On or about September 22, 2014, Petitioner sent to Laura Lampkin, Respondent’s director of human resources, his response to the performance evaluation prepared by Ms. Price. In his response, Petitioner states, with respect to Ms. Price, the following: The continued push towards unrealistic deadlines and the refusal to listen or effectively address the needs and concerns expressed creates an unnecessary feeling of duress. Duress is not the inability to handle a fast paced or chaotic environment, as those are environments I thrive within. Duress, as it pertains to this example, is in the feeling to produce regardless of tangible concerns. It is, by nature, the creation of a hostile work environment which should not exist within a professional workplace. Because Petitioner expressed concern about Ms. Price’s behavior creating a “hostile work environment,” Ms. Lampkin, within a day or so of receiving Petitioner’s response, initiated an investigation to determine whether Ms. Price was in violation of Respondent’s anti-discrimination, harassment and retaliation policy. At no time prior to receiving his performance evaluation did Petitioner complain about Ms. Price creating a work environment charged with discriminatory animus. Pursuant to Ms. Lampkin’s investigation, Petitioner, in support of his allegation of the existence of a hostile work environment, informed Ms. Lampkin on September 30, 2014, of the following with respect to Ms. Price: There are a good number of situations which lend themselves to an environment that promotes an air of uncertainty, insecurity – as well as the feeling of being bullied. There is [sic] also interactions and conversations, for example when Pam refers to her co-workers or friends at United Healthcare and how they would be able to perform a function that I push back against or when she fails to consider my professional assessments for training and development, which create concerns of inequality or discriminatory undertones. I have often felt, since July, that there is a determination to replace me with a personal contact from United Healthcare – as it has been referenced repeatedly about this ‘trainer’ and what she is ‘capable of.’ To the degree, where at times, I’m given the impression that I should be as capable as this mysterious person. Perhaps, in Pam’s mind I am too young to be an experienced training professional or maybe she would prefer her previous, female, co-worker. Petitioner failed to offer any evidence, credible or otherwise, that in any way supports his allegation that Ms. Price harbored gender-based discriminatory animus towards Petitioner. At the final hearing, Petitioner cross-examined Ms. Price about myriad subjects, none of which involved issues related to gender bias. Furthermore, in his direct testimony, Petitioner stated, in conclusory terms, that Ms. Price “was discriminatory on the basis of gender because she constantly made references to me about how her other trainer at her other job could do it so much easier and I was making things more complicated than they should be.” Petitioner obviously took offense to Ms. Price’s statements, but contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, these alleged statements attributed to Ms. Price do not demonstrate discriminatory animus, but instead indicate a desire by Ms. Price for Petitioner to improve his level of performance. Petitioner alleges that on October 3, 2014, Ms. Lampkin advised him that she had informed Ms. Price of Petitioner’s claim of discrimination. According to Petitioner, Ms. Price, after learning of Petitioner’s claim, retaliated against him as follows: On October 3, 2014, after I was informed by Laura Lampkin that she had spoken to Pam Price about my claims of discrimination, I received a schedule from Pam Price which included radical changes to my standard operating schedule. I was hired as a salaried employee with a 9am-5:30 p.m. schedule with flexibility in my time and freedom to take breaks and lunch as chosen. In the schedule I received from Pam Price, I was now put into an “agents” schedule, each week working a different shift (morning, afternoon and evening) along with scheduled lunch and break times. In addition, they also moved my office onto the call center floor and set me up in a cubicle with the call center agents. When I complained that the schedule change and relocation of my office to the call center floor was a retaliatory action, the schedule was immediately retracted and I was told to revert back to my standard schedule. However, they kept me on the call center floor which was an uncomfortable position and a distraction to the other agents. I also noticed that the contact I had with other employees both in the Asheville and Orlando office changed during that time. I was no longer treated as a member of management, but now I was being treated as if I was a call center agent. When I expressed this concern to another member of our management team . . . , I was informed that there was an unwritten memo going around the Asheville and Orlando office[s] that I was to be treated as if I was an agent. According to Ms. Price, during Petitioner’s first few months of employment with Respondent, his primary responsibility was “learning” about the company. Petitioner was expected to learn about company “[p]rograms, corporate compliance, policies and procedures, introduction to his teammates, understanding their positions and their roles . . . reading materials [and] having conversations.” Ms. Price, in Petitioner’s performance evaluation, was particularly disapproving of Petitioner as it relates to him failing to take advantage of a critical learning opportunity from a member of Respondent’s staff who was sent to Petitioner’s work-site to conduct a five-week training session. According to Ms. Price, Petitioner spent as little as one to two hours a day attending the training sessions when, in her opinion, more of his time should have been allocated to attending the sessions, especially since he was new to the company. In his September 19 and 22, 2014, responses to his performance evaluation, Petitioner complained that he had “not been afforded reasonable time to learn the processes and workflows contained within the products offered,” and that in order “[t]o be a subject matter expert, which is at the core of my position, I must have the complete and full immersion into the workflows and processes that make up the related products to be able to effectively and authoritatively create training documentation and train[ing] processes.” Respondent granted Petitioner’s request for “complete and full immersion.” On October 3, 2014, Respondent implemented Petitioner’s request for complete and full immersion, which resulted, among other things, in Petitioner being assigned work hours consistent with those assigned to agents in the Orlando call center. Literally within minutes2/ of being fully and completely immersed into Respondent’s workflows and processes, Petitioner, at 2:47 p.m. on October 3, 2014, was already complaining about the immersion program, as reflected in the following e-mail exchanges between Petitioner and Laura Lampkin. Petitioner to Laura Lampkin – October 3, 2014, 2:47 p.m. Laura: While I appreciate the attention to detail given to this project for immersion into the RTX Workflow and while I have explicitly stated ‘agent like immersion’ into those workflows, this is a bit above and beyond that expectation. “In order for you to get the full spectrum of calls and types of calls, I have rotated your schedule from the AM shift, Mid-Shift and Late-shift throughout the two month period of time. In addition to your shift start/stop times, you have regularly scheduled breaks and lunch, based on the particular shift you will work for that week. As an example, for the AM shift, first break is generally at 10:00 am, lunch at 12 noon and then second break at 2:00 and so on for each of the shifts. You will have Monday’s off work on the weeks that you are scheduled to work Saturdays to assist with floor coverage due to the upcoming maintenance fee season. I appreciate your assistance with floor coverage during this busy season.” [from Pamela Price to Petitioner]. There is no reasonable, acceptable, logic to Pam’s statement. The type of calls able to be handled by an RTX Exchange Agent do[es] not change throughout the course of a day or shift. There are only so many call types available and those happen, randomly, with every inbound call – regardless of time of day. Pam did mention scheduling me into the workflows, however, that was not the interpretation I expected. I would like to get this project underway without unnecessary complications. I find the radical change to my schedule a retaliatory maneuver. As the Instructional Design and Delivery Manager, my need to be exposed to the call queue and to gain the practical knowledge to speak to the agent experience does not require the coverage of three shifts, nor does it require a deviation from my normal schedule to accommodate an eight hour workday. Even though I will be using this opportunity as a ‘live learning environment,’ and will hold myself to the highest standards in customer care, while being mindful of queue wait times – I again find it a bit overboard to dictate call per hour and follow up to the level of actual agent performance. I am not transitioning into an agent position, I am simply utilizing the live call queue as the only available method for active learning and methodology. Could you kindly level set the Pam? At this time and until the current investigation is complete, I feel it may behoove all parties involved to have monitored contact. Thank you much. Laura Lampkin to Petitioner – October 3, 2014, 3:28 p.m. Jason, There actually is a logic to your schedule arrangement, and there is a difference in callers in the AM versus the PM. The AM callers do not contain as many sales opportunities, those are more likely to be basic reservations calls. Call volume is higher in the evening, and opportunities for sales are higher in the evening. The logic behind your rotating schedule arrangement is to give you the fullest exposure possible. Given the criticality of immersion in becoming a Subject Matter Expert, the goal is [to] provide you with the best possible opportunities for exposure. This will help in role playing scenarios and variation, which you expressed were much more difficult to train on without full immersion. If the new schedule is a point of contention, we can rework it. I do want you to understand that there was a great deal of thought put into your immersion plan, all centered around what is most beneficial to you and what bests [sic] affords you the chance to become a Subject Matter Expert. With regards to your statement ‘I am not transitioning into an agent position, I am simply utilizing the live call queue as the only available method for active learning and methodology[,] this is technically correct. However, again in the name of immersion and the need to become a Subject Matter Expert, we are arranging temporarily for your work tasks, work environment and product exposure to basically mimic that of an agent for your benefit. Additionally, specific to your statement ‘I again find it a bit overboard to dictate call per hour and follow up to the level of actual agent performance[,]’ I should clarify that aligning your performance standards with that of an agent is not a main focus. Of course we want you to handle calls properly – and I have no doubt you will – but I do not anticipate any detailed comparison to agents in terms of how the calls are handled. I do believe there will be periodic confirmation of phone time, again not in comparison to agents, but to ensure that the exposure and immersion are occurring. If there are confirmations of phone time, those may be used to determine whether we have fully satisfied our goal of immersion, in terms of exposing you to the phone roles and giving you the needed active time on the phones. I feel I must stress that this immersion plan is driven significantly by your continued emphasis on its importance. I wholeheartedly agree that significant exposure (as you’ve indicated, 4-6 months dedicated time, minimum) to the product and the role is necessary to create training programs and train effectively on most possible scenarios. Because we have yet to arrange dedicated time to immersion for you, and because you’ve indicated it’s critical, we are doing it now. Once the immersion plan is completed, my understanding is that you will be a Subject Matter Expert and capable of training as one. Keeping in mind that maximum exposure has been the goal for your immersion plan and your schedule, I welcome your suggested schedule changes. Thanks. Petitioner to Laura Lampkin – October 3, 2014, 5:07 p.m. Laura: I do appreciate the thoughtfulness put into the plan that I’ve requested. I must say, that from my exposure, I find the majority of inbound calls to contain a sales opportunity and while sales is an important part of our member services and revenue generation, it is not the core of the educational process or training programs expected curriculum. It is certainly necessary to have agent exposure to speak to the experiences and topics that new hires will encounter in production. More so, it is a necessity to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of processes and/or procedures that are expected of an agent. I feel very comfortable in what I have expressed to both Pam and yourself as the requirements for effectively and efficiently learning and understanding the RTX Workflow to a level which is agreeable with the creation of curriculum and the training of such curriculum. The activity of taking live calls, which unfortunately was not available sooner, without interruption, is a requirement. Subject matter expertise is built upon that foundation and will continue to fluctuate until a time comes when the systems and processes used do not change on a consistent basis. As for being held to the same standards as the agent’s in production, I can only speak to what was written and manner in which it was relayed. I stand behind my statements that effective training is necessary before the ability to create, direct or lead a training class or materials. I also stand behind my statements that the schedule change is radical, causes personal conflicts and is not a necessary requirement to achieve the level of immersion and learning that has been requested. For the sake of curiosity, was there a logic to creating a structured ‘agent’ schedule which includes my start, break, lunch and end times? As a salaried employee, I was already under my own direction, likely going to extend my hours and/or utilize unscheduled Saturday’s to afford additional learning time – as I found necessary – due to the estimated time frame I had given to both Pam and yourself by request. This package is wrapped very nicely as a thoughtful contribution to my success, but as a training professional who has interacted with the agent’s and call queue – albeit limited, and with the direct knowledge of what has been lacking in my ability to be fully developed as an employee of RTX, the delivered structure places a burden on my personal needs – which are based around my expected schedule. In addition, a rotation does not deliver nor guarantee delivery of experiences that can’t be extracted from a call within my standard scheduled hours. It would be a great assistance, if we could kindly not alter my schedule and allow me the opportunity I have needed within the confines of what has been established as my schedule expectations for the last six months. Should I find that a knowledge gap exists, I will actively adjust to correct and close such gap. Ms. Price testified as to the accuracy of the matters discussed by Ms. Lampkin in her e-mail reply to Petitioner. Additionally, the undisputed evidence is that Petitioner unilaterally withdrew from the immersion program after having been a part of the same for only two weeks. The evidence is also undisputed that Respondent did not change Petitioner’s pay, benefits, or job-related opportunities as a consequence of Petitioner entering and subsequently leaving the full immersion program. The e-mail exchange between Petitioner and Ms. Lampkin show a number of things, none of which support Petitioner’s claim of retaliation. As an initial matter, Ms. Lampkin’s e-mail to Petitioner, and the related testimony from Ms. Price, clearly establishes that Respondent knows its business operations better than Petitioner. Next, Ms. Lampkin’s e-mail to Petitioner, and the related testimony from Ms. Price, establishes that Petitioner’s immersion into Respondent’s operations was a temporary assignment scheduled to last about two months and that the planned immersion was in furtherance of Respondent’s legitimate business interests of having Petitioner to perform his job at a competence level higher than “marginal.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s correspondence of September 19, 2014, wherein he specifically requests “complete and full immersion,” when compared to his correspondence of October 3, 2014, wherein he retreats to a preferred experience of ‘agent like immersion,’ shows that Petitioner was simply trying to the game the system in an attempt to avoid “plac[ing] a burden on [his] personal needs” as repeatedly referenced in his correspondence of October 3, 2014. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Respondent’s decision to fully immerse him, on a temporary basis, in its call center operations was done for reasons other than those related to improving Petitioner’s job performance, and concomitantly Respondent’s business operations. In other words, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent’s decision to fully immerse him in its call center operations was done in retaliation for his having alleged that Ms. Price discriminated against him on the basis of his gender. In the Employment Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner alleges, in part, the following: I suffer from three chronic disabilities as explained to my employer when requesting reasonable accommodation to work from home, when not tasked with a training class, the call center floor and office space triggers disability-related episodes and limits my ability to concentrate and effectively focus. Respondent continues to make the process of providing me reasonable accommodations difficult and shows no desire to work with me, or my physician’s requirements, to allow me to quickly return to work and perform my job functions. The fact that Petitioner suffers from recognized disabilities is not in dispute. On or about October 30, 2014, Petitioner informed Ms. Lampkin during a telephone conference that he believed that he had one or more physical impairments that might warrant an accommodation. Specifically, Petitioner reported that the workplace lighting was bothersome and that he would work better with incandescent or natural lighting. Ms. Lampkin asked Petitioner to provide additional information about his lighting concerns so that Respondent could determine whether workplace modifications were necessary. Petitioner also informed Ms. Lampkin that he was not sure whether his lighting concerns were temporary or would be on-going. On November 3, 2014, Petitioner e-mailed Ms. Lampkin stating, in part, the following: I am unable to go into the call center and back office areas as it directly impacts my sense of well-being and heightens my medical concerns. Therefore I am unable to report to the office to conduct my required function of creating training curriculums and educational products. My physicians are preparing documentation for you as requested. Due to the nature of my core job functions, I am requesting that work from home be authorized as a reasonable accommodation. As of November 3, 2014, the only specific medical concern mentioned by Petitioner was his sensitivity to lighting. On or about November 11, 2014, Petitioner gave Ms. Lampkin a letter from his physician. The physician’s letter states, in part, that Petitioner should be allowed “to work from home when [he] is not tasked with conducting training classes” because Petitioner “will be better able to perform the essential functions of his position by working from home.” The letter goes on to state that “the work environment triggers severe panic attacks” and that Petitioner “has become increasingly sensitive to and made ill by various fragrances and fluorescent lighting, all of which would be eliminated by working from home.” The physician also notes that “[f]urther support of this request is the fact that [Petitioner’s] primary job functions can effectively be performed remotely, with the need for being present in the office relegated to those times when he must attend meetings for which teleconference is not available or to perform the training that he conducts.” The physician's letter did not indicate that Petitioner was unable to perform the essential functions of his job without a reasonable accommodation. Rather the letter stated that Petitioner would be “better able to perform the essential function of this position by working from home.” Based on the rather cryptic information contained in the physician's letter, Respondent was unable to grant Petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation. In response to the physician’s letter, Respondent, on November 13, 2014, informed Petitioner that “[a]dditional information is necessary in order to make a determination regarding [the] request for reasonable accommodation.” The additional information requested from Petitioner’s physician is as follows: What are the environmental factors which trigger the panic attacks? When is the condition(s) expected to resolve and a return to work to occur? What about the conditions(s) prevents performing daily work tasks in the workplace, but permits conduction of classroom training in the workplace? Are there other alternatives which can be offered, outside of working from home, which allow the essential job functions to be performed? If so, what are those alternatives? The previous letter states that the primary job functions can be performed from home. What are those primary job functions which were referenced in that statement? The previous letter reference enclosures, but none were provided with the letter. Please provide any relevant enclosures for review. Each question asked by Respondent was reasonably tailored so as elicit responses that would better enable Respondent to analyze Petitioner’s request for accommodation and to explore the availability of other possible accommodations. On November 19, 2014, Petitioner wrote a lengthy message to Ms. Lampkin contesting Respondent's need for the additional information. In response to this missive, Ms. Lampkin, on November 20, 2014, informed Petitioner that his “request for accommodation has been conditionally denied pending the receipt of the required information.” On November 21, 2014, Petitioner sent another missive to Ms. Lampkin and argued therein that Respondent's request for additional information was overbroad and that in his opinion he had provided sufficient information so as to allow Respondent to grant his request for accommodation. In response to the concerns expressed by Petitioner, Ms. Lampkin provided a detailed explanation to Petitioner of why additional information was needed to evaluate his request for accommodation and encouraged Petitioner to provide the information “as expeditiously as possible so that we can move forward with granting you an accommodation.” His protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, Petitioner had not, as of November 21, 2014, provided Respondent with sufficient information to allow Respondent to determine what reasonable accommodations were necessary and available in order to address Petitioner’s mental and physical impairments. On November 24, 2014, Petitioner supplied Respondent with what is described as “supplemental documentation” from his physician. This documentation was not, however, information entirely responsive to the six points of inquiry mentioned in Respondent’s November 13, 2014, correspondence to Petitioner. Based on the supplemental information, Respondent informed Petitioner that it would modify the workplace to accommodate Petitioner’s sensitivity to light and scents. Petitioner was directed to report to work on December 1, 2014. Petitioner did not return to work on December 1, 2014, as instructed. Petitioner e-mailed Respondent on December 3, 2014, to state that he had not received the e-mail instructing him to return to work on December 1, 2014. He also indicated that he did not believe that all of his workplace concerns had been addressed. Ms. Lampkin responded on December 5, 2014, indicating that Respondent had addressed all known workplace issues and also informed Petitioner that additional information would be considered, if supplied. Specifically, Ms. Lampkin stated to Petitioner: I, too, am willing to continue to engage in this interactive process with you. The next steps in the process, should your position remain that your condition(s) warrant further accommodation including working from home, involve your supplying me with specific responses to the informational requests I have previously made. The informational requests that I made were not entirely answered by the response I received from you dated 11/21/14. I am happy to re-send you the form so that you can provide the remaining information. Please advise. On December 9, 2014, Ms. Lampkin provided Petitioner with another copy of the form setting forth the information requested on November 13, 2014. In her correspondence of December 9, 2014, Ms. Lampkin explained that “[t]he information contained in the form that you returned to me was insufficient to enable RTX to approve your request to telecommute indefinitely or to allow RTX to evaluate what reasonable accommodations other than what RTX has already offered may be available.” On December 11, 2014, Ms. Lampkin again requested that Petitioner provide her information responsive to those items enumerated in her correspondence of November 13, 2014. On December 15, 2014, Petitioner advised Ms. Lampkin that he was expecting to receive from his physician information responsive to her requests and that he would forward the same to her as soon as possible. On or about December 18, 2014, Petitioner sent Respondent a second letter from his physician. In the letter, Petitioner’s physician stated definitively that “I do not find any other accommodations available other than for the patient to be afforded the ability to work remotely when not tasked with conducting training classes which require physical presence.” Based on that statement by Petitioner's physician, Respondent agreed to grant Petitioner a reasonable accommodation and to permit him to work from home when not tasked with conducting classroom training. Petitioner was advised that January 2, 2015, would be his official return-to-work date. Respondent acted reasonably, and communicated with Petitioner appropriately, when seeking information related to Petitioner’s desire to work from home. The evidence does not support Petitioner’s contention that Respondent unreasonably delayed granting Petitioner’s request to work from home. On or about January 5, 2015, Petitioner, via videoconference, met with Ms. Price to discuss the new hire training class that Petitioner was to conduct on January 12, 2015. The following day, on January 6, 2015, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Ms. Price and Ms. Lampkin and complained therein of not having enough time to prepare for the January 12, 2015, new hire training session. Petitioner, nevertheless, assured Respondent that “it will get done” and any questions that he could not answer during the training session “will go to the parking lot while [he] obtains an answer for the students.” On Monday, January 12, 2015, the day of the new hire training session, Petitioner, at 9:52 a.m., sent the following e-mail message to Ms. Price and Ms. Lampkin: I have spent 10.5 hours within the ER on Sandlake Road and awake for over 22 hours, so I will not be in today to begin your impromptu FAC training class. I will either be in tomorrow or we can consider this my constructive discharge/resignation and I will simply limit my interaction with RTX through the ongoing investigations. The choice is yours, of course, but kindly let me know so I can plan my Tuesday accordingly. I need to rest, now. Thank you. At 6:28 p.m., on January 12, 2015, Ms. Lampkin, in response to Petitioner’s e-mail, informed Petitioner of the following: Your absence today is unexcused. You are being given the opportunity to convert today’s absence to an excused absence by presenting a doctor’s note. If today’s absence remains an unexcused absence, you are subject to discipline. We are expecting you to be present to teach the class tomorrow, and to be ready to teach at 8:00 a.m. You were to have printed the materials earlier, and we expect that you will be ready to teach at 8:00 a.m. Petitioner did not report to work on January 13, 2015, to conduct the training session. Instead, Petitioner, at 9:41 a.m. on January 13, 2015, informed Ms. Lampkin that “the curt and underhanded behavior of RTX increases my anxieties . . . [and] it has been determined by myself and my health care providers that it is to my benefit to continue with a constructive resignation.” Respondent deemed Petitioner as having voluntarily resigned his employment with the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Resort Travel and Xchange, did not commit unlawful employment practices as alleged by Petitioner, Jason L. Van Horne, and denying Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36-151 ("IHOP"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011),1/ by discharging Petitioner from her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding racial and religious discrimination in the workplace.
Findings Of Fact IHOP is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. IHOP is a restaurant in Leesburg. IHOP is owned by Pritesh Patel, who owns and operates a total of four International House of Pancakes stores in the Leesburg area through his corporation, Pritesh, Inc. Petitioner is a black female who is an observant Jew. Because of her religious beliefs, Petitioner does not work on the Sabbath, from sundown on Friday until sunset on Saturday. Petitioner was hired to work as a server at IHOP on March 19, 2012. She made it clear that she did not work on the Sabbath, and IHOP agreed to respect her religious beliefs. There was some difference in recollection as to the notice Petitioner gave to IHOP. Petitioner testified that she made it clear she could not work until sundown on Saturdays. The store manager, Brian Jackson, also recalled that Petitioner stated she could only work Saturday evenings. Mr. Patel testified that Petitioner said that she could work on Saturday "afternoon." Petitioner's version is credited as being more consistent with her stated beliefs, though there is no doubt that Mr. Patel was testifying honestly as to his recollection. Petitioner was the only black server working at IHOP at this time. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson credibly testified that IHOP has had many black servers through the years. Mr. Jackson noted that Petitioner only worked for IHOP for a period of two weeks and therefore was in no position to judge IHOP's minority hiring practices. Petitioner testified that assistant manager Hemanshu "Shu" Patel, a relative of the owner, created a hostile working environment for her from the time she started on March 19. She complained that Shu would alter the seating chart so that she would have fewer tables to cover, meaning a reduction in her tips. Petitioner also stated that Shu was disrespectful and rude, in a manner that caused her to believe there was a racial motivation behind his actions. Despite the fact that Shu was subordinate to Mr. Jackson, Petitioner believed that Shu was really in charge because he was a relative of Mr. Patel and therefore "untouchable" as an employee of IHOP. Petitioner's main complaint was that Shu, who was in charge of work schedules for the restaurant, scheduled her to work on Saturdays. Petitioner testified that on the first Saturday of her employment, March 24, Shu called her to come into work at noon. She replied that she could not come in until after sundown. This problem was apparently worked out to Petitioner's satisfaction, and she was not required to report to work on Saturday afternoon. However, when Shu posted the next week's schedule on the following Tuesday, Petitioner saw that she had been scheduled to work on the morning of Saturday, March 31. Petitioner complained. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson testified that Shu had merely made an error in scheduling that was rectified as soon as Petitioner notified them of the problem. Petitioner did not deny that the problem was resolved mid-week, well before any Sabbath conflict could arise. Mr. Patel testified that he wanted Petitioner to work from 4 p.m. until midnight on Saturday, March 31, so that she would not lose a day's work due to the scheduling error. Shu phoned Petitioner early on Saturday afternoon and asked her to come in. Petitioner told Shu that she could not come in until 8 p.m. Mr. Patel testified that he did not need someone to work a four-hour shift, and that Petitioner was told not to come in. As a further reason for declining to work on Saturday evening, Petitioner testified that she had only been trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson testified that the only distinction between the dayshift and the nightshift is that the latter is less busy. All servers are trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson stated that, once trained for the morning shift, a server would find the night shift "a piece of cake." Petitioner's reason for not working in the evening was not credible in this respect. Mr. Patel testified that he had no problem with Petitioner's not working on that Saturday, provided that she understood she was going lose a day. Mr. Patel stated that from his point of view the problems began when Petitioner insisted that he give her weekday hours to make up for the lost Saturday hours. Mr. Patel declined to cut another employee's hours for Petitioner. Petitioner came in to work on the morning of Sunday, April 1. Sunday morning is a busy time for IHOP. According to head server Bernadine Hengst, Petitioner stood near her at the register and voiced her complaints about Shu, who was working in the kitchen. Shu heard Petitioner and stepped into the dining room, asking her, "You got something to say to me?" Petitioner and Shu became loud, and their argument was moved outside for fear of disturbing a restaurant full of people. Petitioner finished her shift then went home and composed a letter to Mr. Patel. She made copies of the letter for every employee at IHOP. Ms. Hengst was the first to see the letter. She phoned Mr. Jackson at home to tell him about it, and Mr. Jackson phoned Mr. Patel. The letter read as follows: On March 19, 2012, I was hired to work as a server. I am a professional, pleasant, respectful, prompt and dutiful individual. As the only African-American server, it is imperative that you know since I have arrived at IHOP, I have faced fierce blatant hostility from a manager ("Shu") and co- workers ("C.C., Misti and Cherish"). I feel Shu has deliberately created a divisive and hostile working environment. It is my understanding Shu is a family member yet his behavior is definitely bad for business. On two separate occasions, Shu altered the seating chart that Brian originally created and took two tables from me. He lacks proficient management skills and is totally unprofessional, disrespectful and rude. On Sunday, April 1, 2012, Shu spoke to me in a loud, impolite manner in front of staff and customers. Shu communicated in a very bellicose fashion and for a moment, it felt as though he would physically attack me. You must take it serious that Shu's conduct is detrimental to your business. When Shu hired me I made it clear that I am Jewish and do not work on the Sabbath ("Saturday"). Nevertheless, Shu called me to come into work on Saturday about noon; I told him I would come in after the Sabbath at 7:00 p.m. The following week I was scheduled to work a Saturday, which in turn caused me to lose a day of work. Also on April 1, 2012, Shu assigned me only two booths for the whole day; when I spoke up about it he threatened to take another booth from me. This type of attitude and his unfair behavior cannot be tolerated in the United States of America in 2012. Shu is outwardly mean, discriminative, and racist towards me. He acts like a tyrant, a bully and he feels he is untouchable. On Sunday, April 1, I was only assigned two booths while my co-workers had four to six tables. This was unfair seating arrangements. At the end of the day, Bernie [Hengst] told all the servers to tip out the busboy, yet I did not because I was unjustly treated by only being assigned two tables. This was one-sided and insulting. I am an exceptional waitress and I depend on this job to pay my bills. During my first week, I was scheduled to work 36.10 hours and this week I was only given approximately 23.0 hours. Everyone should be treated fairly and equally. I ask that you continue to give me a full schedule each week. This letter officially informs you of the battles I have dealt with in your establishment and I have not worked here for one whole month. All Americans have the right to work without being harassed. I urge you to intervene and equitably resolve this issue. Ms. Hengst testified that Shu is a loud person who "talks with his hands," but she saw nothing that gave her the impression that Shu would "physically attack" Petitioner. She did not detect that Shu treated Petitioner any differently than he treated other servers. Ms. Hengst saw Petitioner as an equal participant in the April 1 confrontation. As to Petitioner's complaint about the number of tables to which she was assigned, Mr. Jackson testified that servers are always trained on two booths and then moved to four booths after training is completed. He stated that Petitioner was doing a "terrible" job working four booths, which caused Shu to move her down to two. Mr. Jackson stated that it is counterproductive to overwhelm a new server, and that the server must demonstrate the ability to perform the basics before taking on more tables. On the morning of April 2, after reading Petitioner's letter, Mr. Patel went to the IHOP and sat down for a meeting with Petitioner in hopes of addressing her complaints. Mr. Patel testified that the first thing Petitioner asked him was, "Do you know how many black employees you have?" Though he had been willing to discuss Petitioner's grievances concerning scheduling, Mr. Patel decided to fire Petitioner when she started "threatening us" based on claims of "black and white discriminating." He decided to fire Petitioner for the future of his business, because he did not want the problems associated with allegations of discrimination. Mr. Jackson was also at the April 2 meeting, and testified that Petitioner claimed she was being singled out because of her race. Based on all the testimony, it is found that Petitioner had little basis for claiming that IHOP was discriminating against her based on her race or religion during the actual course of her job. She was mistakenly scheduled to work on Saturday, but was not required to come in to the store once she made management aware of the error. She did lose one shift's worth of work for March 31, but that was partly due to her declining to work the evening shift. The evidence established that Shu Patel was loud, somewhat hotheaded, and perhaps not the ideal choice for managing a busy restaurant, but did not establish that he singled out Petitioner for particular abuse because of her race or religion. The evidence established that Petitioner's poor job performance was the cause of at least some of the friction between her and IHOP management. However, Mr. Patel's own testimony established that he dismissed Petitioner in direct retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory employment practices. IHOP offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Petitioner's dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36- 151 committed an act of unlawful retaliation against Petitioner. It is further recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary proceeding to establish the amount of back pay/lost wages owed to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, race, and/or national origin.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's race is black and her nation of origin is Jamaica. She was born on January 12, 1933. Petitioner completed a State of Florida employment application on August 7, 2002, for the position of Human Services Worker II at the Department's Gulf Coast Center in Fort Myers. The state employment application does not require an applicant to list her age or date of birth. All applicants for the Human Services Worker II position were required to sign a "willingness survey" indicating the applicant's willingness to work beyond the hours of a normal shift and/or willingness to work on an assigned day off, if such was required, in order for the facility to meet its minimum staffing requirements. Petitioner read and signed the willingness survey. The Department hired Petitioner for the Human Services Worker II position on September 13, 2002. Her letter of appointment informed Petitioner that she was required to complete a 12-month probationary period before attaining permanent status. Petitioner is a certified nursing assistant ("CNA"), and the job for which she was hired involved the provision of direct care, supervision, and assistance to residents of the Gulf Coast Center. Gulf Coast Center is a 24-hour licensed intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled, primarily the mentally retarded. Gulf Coast Center's license requires that a minimum number of direct care staff be present and on duty 24 hours per-day, every day of the year, for each residential unit. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.430(d)(3). Petitioner was assigned to the second shift (2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), with Mondays and Tuesdays as her days off. She worked in the Madison Cottage, which houses 16 profoundly retarded adult females exhibiting a variety of extreme behaviors, including self-injury and aggression towards facility staff. The third shift in Madison Cottage began at 10:45 p.m. and ended at 6:45 a.m. The minimum staff required for the second shift was six persons. The minimum staff required for the third shift was three persons. To ensure that the minimum staff requirements were met, Gulf Coast Center promulgated a "holdover policy," which was in effect at the time Petitioner was hired and throughout her employment. The policy provided that staff persons on one shift could not leave the facility until the next shift met the minimum staffing requirement. In practice, the holdover policy was most commonly invoked when an employee from an incoming shift called in sick. The supervisor of the outgoing shift would first invoke the "pull policy," contacting other cottages in Gulf Coast Center to ascertain whether they could pull an employee from their incoming shifts to fill the slot of the absent employee. If no one was available from another unit, the supervisor would then seek a volunteer from her own cottage to work the incoming shift. If no one volunteered, the supervisor was then required to "hold over" an employee from the current shift. Having signed the "willingness survey," this employee was required to work the extra shift, later receiving compensatory leave to ensure that she did not work more than 40 hours in a given week. Employees were given the opportunity to choose which day of the week they would be available for holdover. If the employee failed to choose a day, then her supervisor would assign a day. Petitioner failed to choose a day and was assigned Wednesday as her holdover day. Prior to May 21, 2003, Petitioner had worked at least one holdover shift without incident. On Wednesday, May 21, 2003, Laurie Whidden was the acting supervisor of Madison Cottage for the second shift. She was informed that a third-shift employee had called in sick. Ms. Whidden attempted to pull an employee from another cottage to cover the shortage, but no one was available. She asked for volunteers to work the third shift, but received no response. Ms. Whidden then informed Petitioner that she would be required to hold over and work the third shift. Petitioner responded that she could not work the third shift, because she could not leave her sick husband at home alone for 16 hours. Petitioner's husband suffered from heart disease, and at that time, his condition was precarious. Petitioner testified that she frequently had to take her husband to the emergency room. However, Petitioner gave Gulf Coast Center no prior notice that she could no longer work a holdover shift, nor did she make any arrangements for the care of her husband on Wednesday, which she knew was her potential holdover day. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner made no effort to ask a fellow second-shift employee to cover for her that night. Petitioner simply went home at the end of the second shift. There was some dispute as to whether Petitioner answered, "Hell, no," when Ms. Whidden asked her to hold over for the third shift. The weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's assertion that her statement was directed at another employee's remark that Petitioner could sue the state if she came home after working the third shift and found her husband dead on the floor. Petitioner was indicating to the other employee that she wanted her husband alive, not money from the state. Petitioner and Beverly Morgan, another second-shift employee, testified that another employee was sent over from another cottage to work the third shift on May 21, 2003, meaning that Petitioner's refusal to stay had no real impact on the staffing of Madison Cottage. Ms. Whidden testified that no one came from another cottage to cover the shortage and that Ms. Whidden herself stayed to work the third shift. Ms. Whidden's testimony is credited on this point. Ms. Whidden informed Colette Fritts, the residential services supervisor of Madison Cottage, that Petitioner refused to hold over for the third shift on May 21, 2003. Ms. Fritts forwarded the report to Gulf Coast Center's human resources division with a recommendation for disciplinary action against Petitioner. The superintendent of Gulf Coast Center terminated Petitioner's employment. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her age was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. Ms. Morgan claimed that one night she overheard Ms. Whidden and Leoncia Trevino, another Human Services Worker II in Madison Cottage, discussing Petitioner's age, saying that if she was too old to hold over, she should quit. Given that Petitioner only once refused to hold over, on the night of May 21, 2003, this testimony is not credible. Further, the evidence established that in March and June 2003, probationary employees in their twenties were terminated for refusing to hold over at the end of their shifts. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her national origin played a role in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner, Ms. Morgan, and Carmel Henry, another Madison Cottage employee, all testified that Ms. Whidden, the acting supervisor, wanted to "get rid" of the Jamaican employees in Madison Cottage before the regular supervisor, Monica Franks, herself a Jamaican, returned from sick leave. However, none of them could point to any action by Ms. Whidden to put such a plan into effect or even any statement by Ms. Whidden that would indicate an animus toward Jamaicans. Ms. Whidden testified that at the time of the events at issue, she knew Petitioner was from an island, but didn't know which one. The source of the rumors regarding Ms. Whidden's intention to get rid of the Jamaicans appears to have been Leoncia Trevino. The other workers in Madison Cottage believed that Ms. Trevino had the ear of management. Ms. Whidden credibly testified that she had no special friendship with Ms. Trevino, who was moved out of Madison Cottage on June 24, 2003, after a confrontation with Ms. Henry, and then resigned her employment at Gulf Coast Center the next day. Petitioner produced no evidence that her race played any part in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of her dismissal, meaning that she could be dismissed "at will." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3). At the time of her hiring, Petitioner received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook, which informed her that she could be dismissed at will as a probationary employee. Petitioner was aware of the holdover policy and consented to abide by that policy at the time of her employment. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner refused the lawful order of her duly-delegated supervisor to hold over. This refusal constituted insubordination, which would provide cause for dismissal even for a permanent career service employee. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3)(d). The evidence produced at hearing demonstrated that the sole reason for Petitioner's termination was her direct refusal to follow the lawful order of her supervisor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Department of Children and Family Services did not commit any unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on December 27, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who at all times material to this case was employed with Respondent as a production worker. Respondent, Hamilton Products, Inc., manufactures various animal related products such as horse tack and pet collars and is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Allegations of Race Discrimination Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination alleged discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation and reads in pertinent part: I believe that I have been discriminated against based on race, Black, which has resulted in discipline, unfair terms and conditions, and denial of promotion. Since 2003, I have noticed disparate treatment between White and Black employees. One example of this is that Black employees are rarely if ever promoted to management positions. Another example of this is that a Black coworker of mine, Deloise, would often harass me and when I complained to my supervisor Mrs. Robinson, she took the matter to Mrs. Lake. Mrs. Lake merely asked the woman to not do that again. This harassment continued and I repeatedly complained about it so that finally, I was moved to a different location. A similarly situated White female, Elaine, experienced similar treatment from Deloise but when she complained Deloise was stopped from repeating the behavior almost immediately. I was very upset about this obvious disparity that I contacted Mrs. Benfel and explained to her what was transpiring. She asked me to gather together my complaints and those of others which I did and submitted it to her in a letter. Almost immediately after I began to receive retaliation for my complaint. I was disciplined, verbally harassed and moved away from the other employees. Martha Robinson is a supervisor employed by Respondent for over 16 years. She was Petitioner's direct supervisor for some of the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. Ms. Robinson is a white female. A coworker, Delores,1/ who sat near Petitioner would tap her foot on a wooden box while working. Petitioner found this annoying and complained to Ms. Robinson. Ms. Robinson asked Delores to stop tapping her foot and had fleece put on the box. However, Delores continued to tap her foot. After three or four employees complained about Delores' foot tapping, Ms. Robinson took the box away from Delores and put it in Ms. Lake's office. Karen Benfield is the office manager for Respondent, where she has been employed for 19 years. Petitioner went to Ms. Benfield's office to complain about working conditions. Ms. Benfield described the complaints made by Petitioner as vague and broad-based, consisting of general assertions that employees were unhappy at work. Petitioner's complaints to Ms. Benfield did not include any allegation of racial discrimination about her or anyone else. Ms. Benfield asked Petitioner for specifics, to put her complaints on paper and she would make sure management saw it. She did not ask Petitioner to solicit comments from other employees and told Petitioner she could only speak for herself. Petitioner collected written complaints from her co- workers and delivered them to Ms. Benfield. Petitioner received a Warning Notice dated October 26, 2004, for disruptive influence on the workforce. It read as follows: The purpose of this warning is to make sure that you understand the structure of Hamilton Products and the parameters of acceptable behavior at work. Lately, you have brought a number of suggestions and grievances to the management of Hamilton Products on behalf of yourself and others. There is no single employee representative to management at Hamilton Products. You do not and may not speak on behalf of other employees. Every employee at Hamilton Products, including yourself, enjoys the right to share ideas, suggestions or grievances with management. Such communication is encouraged as long as it is made properly. There is a clear chain of command at Hamilton Products, and you must follow that chain of command when communicating with management. You must speak to your immediate supervisor or place a suggestion in the box provided for suggestions at the north end of the nylon department. It is not acceptable to go around the chain of command to a higher supervisor, as this disrupts the operations of Hamilton Products. In the future, you must follow the chain of command or use the suggestion box, and speak only for yourself. Failure to follow the procedure outlined herein will result in further disciplinary actions up to and including discharge. After the hurricanes of 2004, Petitioner's entire department was reprimanded by the plant manager for missing work. This was upsetting to Petitioner because Ms. Robinson had told these employees not to call in. She felt that Ms. Robinson should not have let him "talk trash" to the employees. There is no evidence that Petitioner or anyone else was singled out in any way by the plant manager regarding this incident. Petitioner believes that white employees were given opportunities for promotion and resulting raises. However, no employees on the production floor were promoted during the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. There is no competent evidence in the record to support Petitioner's claim that white employees received promotions and black employees did not. At some point, Petitioner was moved when the production department was reorganized. Petitioner was placed in the center of the plant, facing the rest of her department. She had no one on either side of her which resulted in her not being able to talk to coworkers while working.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mr. Joseph Hatfield, owns and manages an rental complex at 1839 Portland Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida 32303, also known as Astoria Hills Town Houses. The complex consist of two (2) buildings, each of which contains four (4) town house apartments. The Respondent occupies one of these apartments. Astoria Hills Town Houses are located within the city limits of the City of Tallahassee in the area of the city commonly known as Astoria Hills. The Petitioner, Craig Fletcher, leased on June 29, 1991 from the Respondent one of the town house apartments located in the building opposite from the building occupied by the Respondent. The lease was until June 30, 1992. The rent was due on the fifth day of each month, and the Petitioner occupied the leasehold on July 5, 1991. The Petitioner lived in the leasehold until May, 1994, during which time he and his wife maintained a social relationship with the Respondent, as well as a landlord/tenant relationship. They were guests in his apartment, and he was a guest in their apartment. The Petitioner was in the Respondent's apartment when calls came in on the Respondent's telephone answering machine. The Respondent listened to the calls and stated to the Petitioner that he used the machine to screen calls, and he did not call Blacks back because he did not desire to rent to them. The Respondent is over 70 years old, suffers from physical/medical problems as the result of an automobile accident, to include chronic pain as a result of the accident. The Respondent is known by the tenants to be irascible and to hold views on racial matters which are repugnant to most people. The Respondent has declared to the Petitioner and others that his automobile was struck by an uninsured vehicle driven by "niggers." As a result of the accident, the Respondent's attitude towards Blacks is, at best, uncharitable. The Petitioner testified that the Respondent told him that he hated Blacks because of the injuries he suffered in the automobile accident. When angry, the Respondent made statements and comments about Blacks which were racially offensive. The Respondent stated that he did not want Blacks on his property and did not desire to rent to Blacks. The Respondent screened telephonic inquiries about his apartment rentals and would not contact callers who he identified as black. On December 5, 1991, the Petitioner anonymously contacted the City of Tallahassee Fair Housing Office and complained about the Respondent's alleged discrimination in refusing to rent to Blacks; however, he would not initiate a formal complaint. The Respondent inquired of the Petitioner on several occasions whether he had seen Blacks in the vicinity of the complex or entering apartments at the complex. The Respondent indicated, during these exchanges, that he did not like Blacks even visiting the complex. After the first such exchange, the Petitioner, who had previous entered his apartment through the back door with his black guest, entered with them through his front door. In January, 1992, upon learning from the Petitioner that he had had Blacks over, the Respondent commented, "I try to keep a nice, clean place around here and now you are doing this. I just don't know what I am going to do." The last such conversation between the Petitioner and the Respondent was in April, 1992. In January, 1992, the Petitioner again contacted the City of Tallahassee Fair Housing Office regarding allegations of racial discrimination by the Respondent. As with the previous contact, the Petitioner did not make a formal complaint. On May 8, 1992, the Respondent went to the Petitioner's apartment and demanded the rent that he had not received for May. The Petitioner explained that he was without funds; however, he expected a tax refund check which was over due and would soon be able to pay the rent. In the ensuing discussion, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that he would not be renewing his lease at the end of the term because of the differences he had with the Respondent about Blacks. The Petitioner testified that the Respondent accepted the Petitioner's proposal to use his rental deposit as partial payment of the rent, plus a check for $25, and $10 in cash for the late fee. On May 18, 1992, the Respondent delivered to the Petitioner a letter which referenced the terms of the lease requiring payment by the fifth of each month, rejected the tender of the rental deposit as payment of the rent due, and made demand for payment of the rent then due. The Respondent was accompanied by his maintenance man, Mr. Frisbee, and requested access to the Petitioner's apartment for purposes of inspecting it. The Respondent wanted to know when the Petitioner would be leaving and threatened to take the Petitioner to court for the rent then due. The Petitioner pointed out that the Respondent had agreed to accept the deposit as partial payment of May's rent previously, and he denied this. Mr. Frisbee, who had been there on May 8th, reminded the Respondent that he had agreed to accept the deposit. At this point, the Respondent became angry; and the Petitioner angered him further by reminding him of their discussion of their differences regarding racial issues. The Respondent became livid and said that he wanted the Petitioner out. Mr. Frisbee had to encourage the Respondent to leave because he was so upset. Mr. Frisbee could not confirm the Petitioner's testimony that the Respondent told the Petitioner that he would not rent to Blacks and that the Respondent would have to move out. Not even the Petitioner reported that the Respondent had told him he had to move out because of his black guests. On May 19, 1992, the Petitioner contacted the City of Tallahassee Fair Housing Office a third time and was advised how to write a letter to the Respondent advising him that the Petitioner was leaving. The Petitioner followed up his letter to the Respondent, dated May 21, 1992, filing a formal complaint on May 26, 1992 with the Fair Housing Office. On June 5, 1992, the Petitioner paid the Respondent one month's rent. The Petitioner asserts that this was payment for the month of June. On June 9, 1992, the Petitioner vacated the leasehold and returned the keys to the Respondent on June 17, 1992. A copy of the lease and lease application was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 11. No evidence was introduced that the Respondent confronting the Petitioner over his overdue rent was unusual. To the contrary, that conduct by the Respondent was consistent with the picture painted of him by the tenants. A statement of the Petitioner's expenses was submitted with his post- hearing filing. These are considered as part of the evidentiary record. The costs involved in this litigation are as follows: Photocopies (300x$.05) $ 15.00 Photocopies-FCHR 3.60 Notary costs (5x$5.00) 25.00 Subpoenas 123.20 Postage 13.22 Mileage 77.80 Paper, envelopes, etc. 2.00 $259.82
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered enjoining the Respondent from screening potential tenants; and That the Petitioner be awarded costs in the amount of $259.82. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 93-5540 The parties submitted proposed findings of fact, which were read and considered. The following states which facts were adopted and which were rejected, and why: Petitioner's Findings Recommended Order Paragraph 1,2 Paragraph 1,2 Paragraph 3-9 Irrelevant Paragraph 10 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 11 Subsumed in 6,7 Paragraph 12,13 Paragraph 6,7 Paragraph 14 Paragraph 8,10,16 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 6,7 Paragraph 16 Subsumed in 6,7 Paragraph 17 Irrelevant Paragraph 18,19 Paragraph 11,12 Paragraph 20 Paragraph 13 Paragraph 21 Rejected as argument Paragraph 22,23 Irrelevant Paragraph 24 Subsumed in 15 Paragraph 25,26 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 27 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 28,29,30 Irrelevant Respondent's Findings Recommended Order Paragraph 1,2 Paragraph 1,3 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 11 Paragraph 6 Subsumed in Paragraph 12 Paragraph 7-12 Rejected as Argument Paragraph 13,14 Subsumed by Paragraph 5,6,7 Paragraph 15 Irrelevant Paragraph 16 Paragraph 5 Paragraph 17-19 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence Paragraph 20-24 Rejected as Argument Paragraph 25,26 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 27 Rejected as Argument Paragraph 28 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 29-32 Rejected as Argument COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Craig Fletcher HC2, Box 7281 Tallahassee, FL 32310 Barrett G. Johnson, Esq. Johnson & Associates P.O. Box 1308 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue Mary Harrison's charge of discrimination dated August 4, 1995, alleges that Jodan, Inc., doing business as Manpower (Jodan), discriminated on the basis of her race and for retaliation by constructively discharging her, giving her verbal and written reprimands and a poor performance rating, by denying her training and by intimidating her. The issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether the alleged discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Jodan, Inc., is a family owned franchise of Manpower Temporary Services. Jodan provides temporary staff to its clients. It has six offices in Central Florida: two in north Orlando; one in south Orlando; and one each in Deland, Daytona, and Melbourne. Dan Gavin, president, is responsible for the day to day operations; John Gavin, his brother, is a co-owner. In March 1994, Margaret Jones was Jodan's district manager for the north Orlando (Maitland) and south Orlando (Sand Lake Road) offices. She recruited and hired Ms. Harrison to work as a service representative in the Maitland office. Shortly before that time John Gavin had asked her to recruit specifically for a minority employee as it would be helpful for the office to have a more diverse staff to serve its clients. Ms. Harrison is an African-American woman. At the time that she was hired by Ms. Jones in March 1994, her substantial work experience was in real estate and property management. Service representatives at Jodan perform the intake process with temporary employees (application, interview and testing); they take orders from clients and place temporary employees with those clients. Jodan provides a detailed training program for its employees, including its service representatives. Upon the commencement of her employment with Jodan, Ms. Harrison began a training program known as Professional Service 1 (PS-1) under the supervision of Margaret Jones. PS-1 is a self study course where the employee learns the policies and procedures of a Manpower franchise through tapes and other training materials. It is the responsibility of the employee to keep track of and complete PS-1. Normally it takes between three and six months for an employee to complete PS-1; however, it can take longer, depending on the employee's office work load at the time. Disgruntled and upset by what she perceived as criticism of her management and hiring decisions, Ms. Jones left the employ of Jodan on or about August 1, 1994. Prior to that time, Ms. Harrison had completed all but three or four minor details in the PS-1 training. Ms. Harrison was satisfied by her training under Ms. Jones and she admits that no one at Jodan attempted to prevent her from completing PS-1. In September 1994, Ms. Harrison reported to Dan Gavin that her PS-1 materials were lost. He was surprised that one of his employees would lose her training materials and he assisted Ms. Harrison in looking for the materials by, among other things, looking in an off-site storage facility for them. Ms. Harrison's materials were never found and she includes the disappearance of her training materials as one of the basis for her charge of discrimination. There is no evidence that anyone took the materials but neither is there any explanation for their disappearance. Normally, when an employee completes PS-1, a checklist is sent to Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, indicating the employee has completed the training. On the checklist, the employee is required to record the dates that she completed each aspect of PS-1. Mr. Gavin contacted Manpower headquarters and obtained a new checklist. He also set up a schedule to meet with Ms. Harrison to go over the items on the checklist and verify that all of PS-1 had been completed. At their first meeting, Ms. Harrison assured Mr. Gavin that she had completed all of PS-1. Based on their conversation, he called Manpower headquarters and verbally confirmed that Ms. Harrison had completed PS-1. Manpower records indicate that she officially completed PS-1 as of December 1, 1994. Ms. Harrison's testimony at hearing with regard to whether she actually had an opportunity to finish the training was confused and unclear as she seemed to contend that there were materials that she was supposed to send to the home office, but could not, due to the lapse of time and loss of her training package. After an employee completes PS-1, the next step is to attend PS-2, which is a week-long training seminar at Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee. PS-2 reinforces what is learned in PS-1 and teaches additional marketing skills. Employees are given a list of dates during which PS-2 will be offered and, because the training requires them to be away from home for a week, they can schedule it at their convenience. Employees can schedule PS-2 before actually completing PS-1 but must have completed PS-1 before they actually attend PS-2. Ms. Harrison could have attended PS-2 any time after December 1, 1994. In January 1995, Mr. Gavin directed the area manager, Kathy Stanford, to ensure that all eligible employees, including Ms. Harrison, sign up for and attend PS-2. The PS-2 classes fill up quickly and it was a priority for Mr. Gavin to have his employees enroll. On more than one occasion, Ms. Stanford gave Ms. Harrison a list of available classes and the opportunity to attend PS-2. However, Ms. Harrison failed to sign up for PS-2. Jodan evaluates employees' performance and salaries on an annual basis. On January 30, 1995, Ms. Harrison was given her annual evaluation. Although the "Appraisal Period" on her evaluation is listed as March 21, 1994, to September 1994, the uncontradicted evidence was that this was a scrivener's error and the appraisal period was March 21, 1994, (Harrison's date of hire) through December 31, 1994. Her review was performed by Mr. Gavin, who was familiar with her performance, with input from Ms. Harrison's immediate supervisor, Gloria Michael. Ms. Stanford sat in on all evaluations done at that time, including Ms. Harrison's, because she was the new area manager and sitting in on the reviews was one way for her to become familiar with the staff and their performances. Ms. Harrison's overall score on the evaluation was a 2.66 on a scale of 1 to 5. A score of 2 means "Below Expectations" and a score of 3 means "Consistently Meets Expectations." A service representative learns all performance areas covered by the evaluation through PS-1. Although she claims that she was evaluated in areas in which she was not trained, Ms. Harrison did not raise this issue with Mr. Gavin and she did not write in any comments on the evaluation in the space provided for employee comments. Further, the uncontradicted testimony, including that of Margaret Jones, established that Ms. Harrison did receive training in all areas of her job in which she was evaluated. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any job detriment as the result of this evaluation or the unusual circumstances surrounding her PS-1 training. She received a pay increase following the evaluation and was then the highest paid service representative. On March 29, 1995, Ms. Harrison was presented with a memorandum by Ms. Michael that addressed concerns she had with Ms. Harrison's job performance. Specifically, the memorandum addressed the following areas: Failure to be responsive to customer needs; The high number of personal calls Ms. Harrison was receiving at the office; Failure to properly match an employee's skills with a client's needs; Failure to consistently enter and update employee information in the computer system each time she spoke with an employee; Failure to open the office on time in the morning; Failure to set up computer training for applicants when she opened the office in the morning. Neither Mr. Gavin nor Ms. Stanford played any role in the preparation or presentation of this memorandum. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any adverse employment action as the result of the March 29, 1995, memorandum. Ms. Michael followed up the March 29, 1995, memorandum with a memorandum on May 3, 1995, detailing Ms. Harrison's improvement in all of the areas discussed in the March 29, 1995, memorandum. On May 15-16, 1995, Ms. Harrison and Ms. Michael (who is white) failed to provide an important client with prompt and appropriate service. As a result, Ms. Stanford counseled both women and placed them both on 90 days probation. Ms. Harrison does not contend that this action was discriminatory. On July 17, 1995, Ms. Harrison submitted a letter of resignation. In the letter she stated that she enjoyed her position as service representative. She also stated that she felt she had been subjected to discriminatory treatment. Ms. Harrison's resignation and the allegations of discriminatory treatment came as a surprise to Ms. Stanford and Mr. Gavin as Ms. Harrison had never before told them she was unhappy or felt discriminated against. In her letter of resignation, Ms. Harrison offered to meet with Mr. Gavin and Ms. Stanford to discuss her resignation, but during her exit interview she refused to discuss her allegations. Although many of Jodan's temporary employees were minorities, Ms. Harrison was the only African-American service representative. There were, however, other minorities, including Hispanic-Americans. Ms. Harrison presented her case in an articulate organized professional manner. It is clear that she felt the work environment was stressful and uncomfortable. However, she did not prove that she was discriminated against or was the object of hostile or adverse employment actions. The temporary employment agency business is highly competitive. Jodan had several large corporate clients and it had to work hard to meet the needs of those clients, sometimes on short notice. This created pressure on Jordan's regular staff that was experienced by white or non-minority employees as well as Ms. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the above, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Ms. Harrison's charge of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary A. Harrison 2356 Carborn Street Orlando, Florida 32839 Kelly T. Blystone, Esquire Moran & Shams, P.A. Post Office Box 472 Orlando, Florida 32802-0472 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age for the reasons stated in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was born in 1953. At the time of the events which form the basis for his claim, he was more than forty years old. The Petitioner was born in Cuba and spent most of his life in Cuba. The Petitioner came to the United States of America approximately two years before the events which form the basis for his claim. The Petitioner speaks fluent Spanish, but does not speak English. In October of 1999, the Petitioner was hired by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner is still employed by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner's pay rate has never been changed during his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens. During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never held either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never been demoted from either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor of the City of Hialeah Gardens has the sole authority and responsibility to make employment decisions. The Mayor appointed Nivaldo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to the position of Assistant Parks Director. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was in his late twenties. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez spoke fluent English and Spanish. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was a friend of the Mayor and the Mayor was aware of his qualifications for the position. The Mayor appointed Rodriguez to the position of "Assistant Parks Director" because he thought he was qualified for the position. The Mayor also thought that the Petitioner was not qualified for the position because, among other things, the Petitioner did not speak English. It is necessary to be able to speak English in order to fulfill all of the duties of the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor had credible non-discriminatory reasons to appoint Rodriguez as "Assistant Park Director," and not to appoint the Petitioner to that position. There is no credible evidence that the Mayor's reasons for appointing Rodriguez were pretextual. Age was not a factor in the decision to appoint Rodriguez rather than the Petitioner. The evidence regarding the Respondent's hiring and termination practices does not establish any pattern of age based discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the petition in this case and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2002.