Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, the Petitioner was a Career Service employee. On January 13, 1988, while on leave from employment due to a work related injury, the Petitioner met with her new rehabilitation counselor, Irene Brzozowski. During the meeting, the Petitioner informed Ms. Brzozowski that she had an appointment scheduled with her physician at 5:00 p.m. on the following day. The purpose of the visit was to obtain a medical evaluation so that the Petitioner could return to work in a light duty capacity. The Petitioner incorrectly used the word "discharged" for the planned appointment. The counselor asserted that a "discharge" meant that the Petitioner had to return to work on Friday, January 15, 1988. The Petitioner said that her work shift began on Wednesday and that she would rather return to work on that day. The two women had different views over a decision which was a medical decision which neither woman was in a position to make. The discussion resulted from the Petitioner's misuse of a term that was accepted as a fact by the counselor. At the close of this meeting, the counselor said she would call D.H.R.S. to tell them that the Petitioner would be "discharged." The counselor went beyond what she told the Petitioner she was planning to do. On January 14, 1988, even before the medical appointment took place, the counselor misrepresented to Shirley Eaton, the administrative secretary at D.H.R.S., the following matters: That Ms. Brzozowski had seen a doctor's statement that the `Petitioner would be released on January 14, 1988. That Petitioner preferred to return to work on Wednesday, January 20, 1988, but based on the discharge, the counselor had instructed her to return to work on Wednesday, January 15, 1988. Based upon the counselor's misrepresentations, which appeared to Ms. Eaton to be predicated upon a doctor's written discharge and the Petitioner's personal knowledge that she had to return to work January 15, 1988, the Petitioner was placed on the work schedule for the following day. No one informed the Petitioner that she was scheduled for work on January 15, 1988, even before her doctor had rendered his opinion about her ability to return to work. On January 14, 1988, the Petitioner kept her doctor's appointment. During the examination, she told the doctor her work week began on Wednesday. As a result, the doctor told her he would give her a return to work date of January 20, 1988, for light duty activities. The return to work slip was partially prepared by Karen Nalewaik, a licensed practical nurse. She does not recall why she did not complete the note or why she put down the date of January 18, 1988, on the slip. The slip was signed by the doctor after it was completed by his staff and given to the Petitioner. January 15, 16, and 17 passed without the Petitioner's receiving notification that she had been scheduled to work those dates. Sometime after the Petitioner read the doctor's slip and before Monday, January 18, 1988, she noticed the return date was different from the one orally represented to her by her doctor. She did not inform her employer of the mistaken date. Instead, she returned to the doctor's office on Monday, January 18, to obtain a revised slip which accurately reflected his decision. Upon leaving the doctor's office, the Petitioner advised her employer of her return date. She was told she was unable to return because she had abandoned her position when she did not appear for work on January 15, 16 and A copy of her separation letter was given to the Petitioner on this date. The Petitioner did not abandon her employment. She had not been informed that she was to return to work without a medical evaluation. Her actions on January 18, 1988, manifest a clear intent to continue with her work duties for her employer. Her conduct between January 13, 1988, and January 18, 1988, was consistent in all respects with her testimony at hearing and her desire to remain a Career Service employee for the Respondent. The Respondent mistakenly relied on the new rehabilitation counselor who speculated, surmised, and erroneously substituted her own judgment for that of the attending physician who had been treating the Petitioner for related injuries for over three years. The doctor decided his patient could return to light duty work the following work week on January 18 or January 20 because that was when her work week began. His records show that she was not discharged and was still experiencing medical problems on January 14, 1988. Unfortunately, when the Petitioner tried to straighten this out with her employer after she was separated from her position, the counselor continued to be involved. The counselor had a new medical slip manufactured by a member of the doctor's staff on February 3, 1988, and presented it to the Respondent. The slip, which was never signed by the doctor, tended to support her prior misrepresentations that the Petitioner could return to work on January 15, 1988. Interestingly enough, the doctor's notes do not reflect the information placed on this third slip. It is also contrary to every other piece of credible evidence presented at hearing. Even during the statements under oath presented by the Respondent as the physician's deposition, the counselor was present. She interrupted the questioning at different times, educating the doctor on her version of the facts. Her slanting of the situation, as well as the endorsement of her version by Ms. Orser, a D.H.R.S. worker who also spoke during the deposition, make the doctor's deposition of April 22, 1988, unreliable. It is rejected by the Hearing Officer as incompetent and unreliable testimony due to the constant interjections of the two women with presumed facts and misinformation. The major mistake which kept reoccurring in this series of events was that various parties relied on everyone else but the attending physician to timely determine when the Petitioner could return to work. The doctor's first slip which was undated but was signed on January 14, 1988, is given great weight by the Hearing Officer. The second slip, dated only four days later, is given the greatest weight because it is consistent with all of the credible testimony presented as to why the Petitioner would be given a second note. As a result, abandonment could not have taken place on January 15, 16 and 17, 1988.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner abandoned her position in accordance with the terms of Rule 22A-7.010(2) F.A.C.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed as an FSDB groundskeeper. Robert "Curly" Schopmann, the Grounds Supervisor and Petitioner's immediate supervisor, considered her to be "a very good employee" during her two years of employment prior to June 19, 1990. Petitioner's performance ratings confirmed Mr. Schopmann's assessment that Petitioner's quantity and quality of work was excellent during that period of time. Petitioner suffered an on-the-job accident on March 20, 1990 for which the employer and the Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management accepted responsibility under Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Law." In June, 1990, Petitioner requested that the employer provide further medical treatment by an orthopedic physician, which further medical treatment was approved and provided. As a consequence thereof, Petitioner was off work from June 19 to mid-October 1990. Dr. Charles, Petitioner's authorized treating orthopedic physician, prepared a list of "job limitations" dated October 3, 1990 (Heilmann Exhibit 2). There is no evidence Petitioner was provided with a copy of this until after her termination. Sometime between October 1 and October 5, 1990, a rehabilitation consultant/specialist and registered nurse also prepared another, slightly more stringent list of limitations (DOE Exhibit B) which was not "verified" (approved) by Dr. Charles until October 29, 1990. Since Dr. Charles did not sign this second, more restrictive list until October 29, 1990, it must be assumed that neither Risk Management nor FSDB personnel saw it until after that date. Petitioner testified that she did not see it until after her termination. Effective October 13, 1990, Dr. Charles formally released Petitioner to do light work. The day before, Petitioner received notification concerning her release for light work from Risk Management (DOE Exhibit A). In that October 12, 1990 letter, Risk Management notified Petitioner that she was to either return to her old job and do light work while receiving temporary partial disability payments under the workers' compensation law or she was to make a good faith job search among other employers as also contemplated by that law. An abbreviated list of physical limitations based on Dr. Charles' October 3, 1990 list was also given by Risk Management to the Petitioner in its October 12, 1990 letter. By mutual agreement with the FSDB personnel office, Petitioner reported for light duty work at FSDB on Thursday, October 18, 1990. Mr. Schopmann first suggested that Petitioner work at her own speed outside but acceded to Petitioner's rejection of the use of a scooter to get around and do outdoors groundskeeping when she told him the scooter was "too bumpy" for her injured back. Either of Dr. Charles' job restrictions/physical limitations lists would have permitted Petitioner to work with hand-sized garden tools, a scooter, a riding mower, or a rolling seat for 80% of her day outside with only 20% of her day inside, provided she moved around and rested as needed with no lifting over 15 pounds and no squatting, crawling, bending, twisting, rotating, kneeling, or climbing inside or outside. When she said she could not ride the scooter, Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner to pot plants and trim the plants in the pots inside the greenhouse and that when she got tired, she should sit down and answer phones in the office before returning to pot more plants in the greenhouse. This instruction was in accord with the limitations for light work placed on Petitioner by her doctor in his October 3, 1990 list of limitations. It also was within the parameters of the abbreviated list relayed to Petitioner in Risk Management's letter of October 12 and those of the more stringent list the doctor later approved on October 29, 1990. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted that she had understood that the supervisor's instructions included answering phones in the office and that she was otherwise assigned to the greenhouse. On Thursday, October 18 and Friday, October 19 and on October 22-24, she went to the greenhouse and office but did not restrict herself to just the jobs assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Instead, she tried to do all the usual work that is required of full-time, unimpaired greenhouse personnel. This additional work was considerably in excess of the limitations placed on her by her treating physician in either his October 3 or October 29 lists of limitations and was never directly assigned by her supervisor. The Petitioner asserted that she did this additional work because she was relying on the information provided in the October 12 Risk Management letter and in a telephone conversation she had had with Ms. Battle of FSDB's personnel office prior to October 18, and because she personally had never seen either of Dr. Charles' lists of limitations. On Wednesday, October 24, 1990, Petitioner left work at noon saying that she had a doctor's appointment, which she in fact did not have. Instead, she went home to rest. On Thursday, October 25, 1990, she called in sick and, as it turned out, she did not return to work after that date. The Petitioner testified that she did not return to work after October 24 because it was too painful for her to continue the work she had attempted. On October 26, 1990, a letter was sent from FSDB by Ms. Stephanie Battle notifying Petitioner that she was expected to come to work unless she had received a doctor's statement and that she was expected to return to work no later than Tuesday, October 30, 1990. Because October 26, 1990 was a Friday, it was Ms. Battle's intention that Petitioner would receive the letter on Saturday, October 27 or on Monday, October 29, and would then be able to obtain a doctor's certificate before the employer's October 30 deadline, if, in fact, Petitioner were eligible to receive a doctor's certificate at all. The October 26, 1990 letter sent by Ms. Battle provided in pertinent part: You are required to return to your job with the approved restrictions immediately. If you cannot return to work, you must provide this office with a letter from your attending physician saying why you are unable to perform your job, what the inclusive dates are that you cannot work and the approximate date of your return. At the present time you are in an unapproved leave without pay status. I expect to hear from you no later than Tuesday morning, October 30, 1990. On October 29, 1990, petitioner telephoned Stephanie Battle and informed her that she had received Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, that she could not work, but that Dr. Charles would not give her a "no work disability slip." At that time, Ms. Battle told Petitioner that she must return to work and asked if Petitioner had told her supervisor that she could not physically do the work assigned. Petitioner admitted to Ms. Battle that she had not yet discussed the problem with her supervisor. Later on October 29, Petitioner spoke on the telephone with Mr. Schopmann. Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner that she had to come back to work on October 30 or bring a doctor's certificate saying that she could not work at all. At that time, Petitioner indicated to Mr. Schopmann that she was aware that if she did not come back to work or provide some doctor's certificate she would lose her job. Whether Petitioner was consciously aware of the abandonment rule or merely thought she would be fired for not coming to work is not clear from the record. Petitioner asserted that she called Mr. Schopmann a second time on November 1, still seeking to retain her job; Mr. Schopmann denies that such a telephone call ever took place. It does not appear that Petitioner and Mr. Schopmann ever had a meeting of the minds that Petitioner was attempting to do more strenuous work than Mr. Schopmann thought he had assigned her to do, but at no time did Mr. Schopmann urge Petitioner to work harder. In her testimony, Petitioner blamed the employer far not making her fully aware of the limitations placed on her by her doctor. Petitioner also asserted that Ms. Battle had telephoned Dr. Charles on October 24, 1990 to see if the Petitioner's job assignments in the greenhouse and office exceeded his prescribed limitations for Petitioner and, further, that in so doing, Ms. Battle had misrepresented to the doctor the tasks that Petitioner was, in fact, doing and that Petitioner believed that it was due to Ms. Battle's misrepresentations that Dr. Charles would not give Petitioner a certificate of "no work." Ms. Battle confirmed that she had called Dr. Charles at some point and represented to him the type of light work that she understood from Mr. Schopmann that Petitioner was doing in the greenhouse and the office. However, at the time she telephoned Dr. Charles, Ms. Battle also did not know that Petitioner had physically attempted more than she had been assigned to do by Mr. Schopmann. At the time of her phone call, whenever it may have been, Dr. Charles told Ms. Battle [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] that Petitioner could do the light work described by her and assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Petitioner admitted that she did not consult her doctor in his office on October 24-25, that she never spoke personally with Dr. Charles during this period of time or tried to get a "no work certificate" from him personally prior to October 30, 1990, and that she dealt with him solely through his receptionist. However, the doctor's October 29, 1990 list of limitations and Petitioner's recitation of what the receptionist told her [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] supports a finding of fact that at all times material, Dr. Charles felt Petitioner could continue to do the light work actually assigned by Mr. Schopmann, a description of which had been related to him by Ms. Battle, and that the doctor also felt that the Petitioner could do all the light work which the doctor later listed on his October 29, 1990 list. Petitioner never presented a medical certificate to her employer. There was no evidence at formal hearing of whether or not the Petitioner had any accrued annual or sick leave that she could draw on, but it is clear that she never applied for authorized leave. The Petitioner never returned to work. On November 1, 1990, Mr. Schopmann notified the FSDB personnel office that Petitioner had not returned to work for three consecutive days, that he considered her to have abandoned her position, and that he recommended her dismissal on that basis. (DOE Exhibit D) In a letter dated November 2, 1990, Mr. Sam Visconti, FSDB Personnel Director, notified Petitioner that she was deemed to have abandoned her position due to her absence on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1 (sic, see Findings of Fact 12- 13), and that she was dismissed based on Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), F.A.C. That letter reads in pertinent part: You failed to report or call in to work for four (4) consecutive work days on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1, 1990. In accordance with Chapter 22A-7.010(2), of the Florida Administrative Code, State Personnel Rules and Regulations, you have abandoned your position. Abandonment of position is considered and treated as a resignation from your job. Your resignation is effective 12:01 a.m., November 2, 1990. Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave without pay since October 24, 1990. However, due to the terms of Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, the only three days which could be legitimately counted against Petitioner under the abandonment rule were October 30 and 31, and November 1, 1990. Petitioner is angry about the on-the-job accident and how it occurred. She testified that as of the date of formal hearing she continues to see Dr. Charles professionally and that she would not do so if she were not in pain and really injured, but she produced no medical evidence that she was physically unable to report for work at all on October 30 and 31, and on November 1, 1990 or that she was unable on those dates to do the jobs contained in Dr. Charles' October 29, 1990 list of limitations.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner abandoned her position by unreasonable absence on October 30 and 31 and November 1, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1991.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioners were the victims of an unlawful employment practice by being denied promotions allegedly on account of their age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Little was employed by Monsanto, the Respondent, for 34-1/2 years until his retirement on January 1, 1990. Petitioner Akins is currently employed by Monsanto and commenced employment with that firm on December 13, 1955. The Monsanto Company operates a manufacturing facility in the vicinity of Pensacola, Florida, which converts certain chemical feed stocks to synthetic filaments and/or yarns for use in the textile and fiber industries. Petitioner Akins is currently a "Group 12 Maintenance and Instrument Mechanic", an hourly "manufacturing unit" position. Prior to his retirement, Petitioner Little was a "Group 11 Maintenance and Instrument Mechanic", also an hourly manufacturing unit position. Monsanto's Pensacola facility operates with a manufacturing unit employing hourly wage employees and a Technical Center which employs essentially all salaried employees. The two facilities within the plant are separate and distinct units. In December 1989, Monsanto posted two vacancies for a salaried "Operations Technician" position in the Technical Center. The procedure for a promotion or transfer from an hourly job to a salaried Technical Center job is contained in the Nonexempt Selection Procedure Manual, in evidence as Petitioners' Exhibit 1 and Respondent's Exhibit 1. When a vacancy is announced in a salaried position, interested employees submit a "Request for Salaried Job" and "Employee Placement Profile" to the plant employment office. Thereafter, a screening committee comprised of plant personnel determines whether the self- nominated candidates are qualified for the vacancy. That committee selects the qualified candidates and submits the list of those candidates to the Technical Center personnel superintendent. The department with the vacancy thereafter receives notification from the Technical Center personnel department of the candidates to be interviewed. The employees who nominated themselves for the vacant Operations Technician position were Petitioners Little and Akins, Terry Nettles, W. D. Tidwell, and Joni Troutman. All of the candidates who were self-nominated for that Operations Technician position were interviewed by a committee consisting of three technical employees; Charles Livingston, Lawrence Brantley, and Gary Green. All these individuals on the committee were over the age of 40. The committee interviewed each candidate in accordance with the evaluation criteria set forth in the Nonexempt Job Selection Procedure Manual. Some of the factors which the committee considered were the knowledge and skills of each candidate, applicable experience, past job performance, communication skills, attendance records, human-relation skills, and employee initiative. The committee's objective was to select the most qualified candidate for the position based upon the aforementioned factors. Seniority was considered by the committee, but only as one of many factors. Although seniority is a deciding factor in manufacturing unit professions, seniority is not the deciding factor in the selection process in the Technical Center. In accordance with Monsanto's equal employment opportunity policy, age was not a consideration in the selection process. The committee did not ask any candidate any questions about age, nor did the committee ask the candidate when he or she planned to retire from the company. Following the interview, the committee selected Richard T. Nettles, age 47, as the most qualified candidate for the Operations Technician position. Mr. Nettles had been employed by Monsanto from December 1963 until he was terminated by a reduction in force or layoff in June 1985. After leaving Monsanto, Mr. Nettles worked for the James River Corporation at a similar type of plant in an Operations Technician position, the type of position at issue in this proceeding. His job was very similar to the one he held at Monsanto. Mr. Nettles was subsequently rehired by Monsanto in September 1989 as an hourly Manufacturing Unit Employee. During his previous employment with Monsanto, Mr. Nettles had been in an Operations Technician position in the Technical Center for approximately 18 years. During that time, Mr. Nettles' performance evaluations were consistently above average or excellent. Additionally, Mr. Nettles had recently completed college level courses in computers, science and metallurgy, as well as a chemical operator training course at Pensacola Junior College. Mr. Nettles was the only applicant for the Operations Technician job who had ever performed the Operations Technician job in the past. Mr. Nettles was a probationary employee at the time he applied for the Operations Technician position. Monsanto has no policy which prohibits probationary employees from applying for promotions. Rather, the probationary period is simply a period in which a newly hired employee is being evaluated for purposes of retention and during which no job-related benefits accrue. Further, Mr. Nettles was not barred from applying for the Operations Technician position because he was required to spend any length of time in his prior job. Promotions or transfers from hourly to nonexempt salaried positions in the Technical Center are governed by the Nonexempt Selection Procedure Manual. The Nonexempt Selection Procedure Manual contains no restrictions on upward mobility. Monsanto has never followed a policy of restricting the upward mobility of its employees. Ultimately, Mr. Nettles was evaluated by the committee, the appropriate recommendations were made, he was found to be the most qualified candidate for the job and thus was offered the Operations Technician position, which he accepted. Petitioners Little and Akins were dissatisfied with the committee's selection and thereafter pursued the plant's appeal procedure to appeal the decision to hire Mr. Nettles for that position. In the final step in that appeal procedure, the Petitioners met with plant manager Leon Hebert. Mr. Hebert played no part in the selection of Mr. Nettles. Indeed he has no authority over the Technical Center hiring process at all. In their meeting, Mr. Hebert explained to Petitioners why Mr. Nettles was selected over them for their Operations Technician position, most notably, because of his past experience on the job. Mr. Hebert also explained the differences in the selection procedure in the manufacturing unit as compared to the Technical Center. Mr. Hebert made no comments about the Petitioners ages during this meeting, although Mr. Akins maintains he made a comment to the effect that the job in question was not to be a "swinging gate for retirees." Even if Mr. Hebert made such a comment, it is not probative of discrimination or discriminatory intent on the part of the employer for the reasons discussed in the conclusions of law below involving Mr. Hebert playing no part in the decision concerning who to hire for the position in question. Shortly after the vacancy for the Operations Technician position was filed, a similar vacancy was announced for a Spinneret Technician position in the Technical Center. The candidate selected for that position, Mr. Walter Williams, was the oldest candidate who applied for the job.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petitions of Bennie J. Little and Carlton E. Akins in their entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner was employed by the respondent $` percent General Telephone Company in October of 1971. From November of 1980 to February 3, 1982, he was classified as a cable splicer. This position requires strenuous physical duties including climbing telephone poles, lifting and moving heavy equipment, handling compressed gas cylinders that weigh 150 pounds and digging splice pits. Performance of the duties of a cable splicer requires strong hands, arms, back and leg muscles. In November of 1980, petitioner suffered a back injury and was unable to perform the activities of a cable splicer. He was placed on Absent Injury status, thus receiving 80 percent of his salary, and returned to work on or about January 6, 1981. He then took left-over vacation time until January 19, 1981, and about one week later, a light duty assignment was located for him at the Seminole DART Center. Although this assignment required no driving, petitioner complained that the drive to and from the Seminole location aggravated his back condition and was difficult for him due to the medications he was taking for his physical problems. On or about February 17, 1981, petitioner was reassigned to duty as a clerk at the St. Petersburg main building. Due to several absences, complaints by petitioner that he could not sit, stand or bend for long periods of time and that alternating from sitting to standing was painful, petitioner was relieved of all duties on March 30, 1981. He was informed that he would again be placed on Absent Injury status until such time as respondent could verify with the treating physician exactly what petitioner was capable of doing. There is some indication that petitioner may have returned to work in a light duty position in May and June of 1981, though petitioner had no recollection of these dates. In any event, petitioner returned to Absent Injury status on or about June 23, 1981, and was paid Absent Injury benefits until approximately December 15, 1981. He was then advised that his Absent Injury benefits were exhausted, that he would be placed on vacation as of December 16, 1981, and that his benefits with respondent would expire as of December 31, 1981. Petitioner was further advised that he could request a 30-day leave of absence, provide a doctor's statement regarding his present condition and that, during that 30-day leave of absence period he could request an additional 5 month leave of absence. Upon the advice of his Union representative, petitioner did request and was granted a 30-day leave of absence, which expired on January 31, 1982. On January 19, 1982, a meeting was held with petitioner to discuss his medical condition. He was advised that there were no light duty positions available at that time and that his 30-day leave of absence would terminate at the end of January. Petitioner's supervisor suggested that he request further leave of absence without pay in order to protect his employment and continue his benefits. Petitioner became angry at this suggestion, refused to request additional leave without pay, and uttered some statement about a "personal tragedy." His supervisor felt that he had been threatened by Mr. Wiggins and notified the police. Petitioner was terminated on February 3, 1982. The reasons cited for the termination were failure to apply for an additional leave of absence before his last 30-day leave had expired and insubordination at the January 19, 1982, meeting. Petitioner presented no evidence that other light duty assignments were available in January of 1982. He made reference to two other light duty assignments held by other employees. He acknowledged that one such position held by a white employee required extensive driving, and admitted that he was unable to drive for long distances or long periods of time. The other light duty position that petitioner believed he could have filled was awarded to a black employee. Other than these two positions, petitioner was not aware of any light duty assignments which were available between May and December of 1981 and were not afforded to him. Petitioner also admits that he was unable to perform the duties of a cable splicer in 1981 and in January of 1982.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's charge that the respondent committed an unlawful employment practice be DISMISSED. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0606 The undersigned has carefully considered the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the petitioner and the respondent. The proposed findings of fact have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Petitioner: The document filed by the petitioner entitled "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" contains neither factual findings nor legal conclusions. Instead, petitioner complains of the procedural rulings at the final hearing. The undersigned would only note that the final hearing occurred on a Friday and that the parties were advised that if the hearing were not completed on that day, it would be continued to a later date. It was only after the petitioner announced that he had no further witnesses that respondent moved for a directed recommended order and elected not to present any evidence after that motion was granted. Respondent: (NOTE: Any reference to the hearing transcript and Mr. Wiggins' deposition transcript are rejected inasmuch as neither transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings.) 23 and 24. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: E. D. Wiggins 4843 Campenella Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Kathryn M. Lancaster, Esquire 501 First Avenue North Suite 626 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Leslie Reicin Stein, Esquires Post Office Box 110, M.C. 7 Tampa, Florida 33601 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Regina McGriff, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pobst had been employed by Petitioner and had obtained permanent status in the career service as a half-time University Parking Patroller, at the time he transferred to the position of Motor Vehicle Operator (MVO) on Friday, April 18, 1986. At that time, he came under the supervision of Terry Fisher, Store Supervisor of the University's Central Receiving Department. The MVO position was full time, with regular hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and Pobst was on probationary status in that job classification at all times relevant to these proceedings. Prior to being hired in that position he had been counseled by Eugene Weber, Stores Manager (supervisor to Terry Fisher), concerning abuse of leave, but the emphasis was on sick leave abuses. On Monday, April 28, 1986, Pobst reported one hour late due to a weekend holdup, and immediately requested and received authorization from Fisher to take unpaid leave so as to obtain a copy of a report from the Tampa Police Department. Pobst had no annual leave available. When he transferred positions he was already in arrears for time off and already owed money for that time off. Fisher requested that Pobst telephone him later in the day. Respondent completed his business with the Tampa Police Department late in the day and did not need additional time. Nevertheless, he did not call Fisher because the work day was completed when he had the first opportunity to call in. Both Pobst and Fisher understood that Pobst would return to work no later than the beginning of the workday on Tuesday, April 29, 1986. Fisher would have granted additional leave on the same terms (unpaid leave with payroll deduction) had Pobst called in, however, Pobst never called in. Pobst did not report for work on Tuesday, April 29; Wednesday, April 30; Thursday, May 1; or Friday, May 2. From the time Respondent left Fisher on the morning of April 28 until the morning of Sunday, May 4, 1986, Respondent had no contact with his immediate supervisor or with any other individual in his chain of supervision at the University. Late the night of April 28, Pobst was injured in a fight. At 12:30 a.m. on April 29, Pobst was arrested for aggravated assault. The charge was ultimately dismissed by the Hillsborough County Circuit Court. However, he arrived at Hillsborough County Sheriff's Central Booking at 2:20 a.m., was booked at 4:54 a.m., and processed at 6:15 a.m. on April 29. From 2:20 a.m. until 6:15 a.m. on April 29, Pobst was either in a Booking/Releasing Section holding cell without telephones, or on a bench in the Receiving Area with two regular local-only telephones as well as two collect-only telephones that resemble pay telephones. He made one telephone call from a collect call telephone. He made that call to the information operator, in an attempt to get Terry Fisher's home telephone number. The call was refused by the information operator because it "was made from a collect call telephone." Respondent was not allowed to make a second telephone call at that time but was told by the officer in charge of him that he would have an opportunity later to make another call. In any case, Pobst would have been unsuccessful in getting Terry Fisher's home phone number because it was unlisted. He did not again ask to use the telephone for the remainder of April 29, 1986, either during business hours when he might have reached Fisher at work or after business hours. From 6:15 a.m. until approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, Respondent was in a Housing and Support Section holding cell consisting of three rooms: a dayroom with collect-only telephones that resemble pay telephones; a sleeping room without telephones; and a vestibule between the sleeping and dayrooms. This was cell 200C/2, which is one of several individual sleeping rooms opening onto a common dayroom with collect-only telephones operable from 7:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m. Although the sleeping area and dayroom are normally kept locked, confined persons usually have free access to both areas 24 hours a day. However, there are times and circumstances in which the areas are separately locked, and confined persons do not have such free access. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, Respondent was moved to the infirmary for examination and on medical staff instruction was placed in cell 200C/2 "B", a lockdown cell for medical observation. This particular lockdown cell was intended for confined persons who were deemed to need psychiatric observation. In the psychiatric medical lockdown area, incarcerated persons normally are allowed out of their cells for one hour per day to take a shower, watch television, or make telephone calls. However, special circumstances or inappropriate behavior may result in an inmate being denied the opportunity to leave his cell on any given day. Respondent had no access to a telephone during the move, wait, or infirmary/dispensary visit. Although Pobst's testimony emphasized his physical injuries and confused state of mind resulting from the assault by third persons leading up to his arrest in the midnight hours of April 28-29, he also related that while awaiting medical examination on April 29, he engaged in a fight with three police officers who requested that he undress for the physical examination. It appears to be this belligerent attitude which resulted in his being confined in restraints thereafter. Respondent's candor and demeanor and various inconsistencies in his testimony do not render him credible on the issue of inability to contact his employer during the whole of the time prior to his being placed in restraints or the period after he was released therefrom. His testimony that he was so confused at all times that he could not ask for a phone is not believable in light of the police log that he was in "good" condition on May 2, the testimony of Officer Blackwood that even a very "bad" prisoner would get to use the phone or write a letter if he just asked to do so, and that the property inventory showed Pobst had available $.85 for stamps or a local phone call. For these same reasons, Respondent's testimony that he was not permitted to use the phone at any time is not credible. Respondent's father testified to Respondent's disheveled and beat-up appearance on Friday, May 2, but Respondent appears to have been capable of coherent conversation. Respondent did not visit a medical doctor until May 7, 1986, five days after his release, and then did so primarily for the purpose of obtaining a medical excuse in an attempt to be rehired. Pobst was first placed in restraints at some time on Wednesday, April 30, and was in and out of restraints that day and the next, Thursday, May 1. An individual is placed in medically-approved restraints if he is viewed by the staff as a danger to others, or if the medical staff believes that he is at risk to commit suicide. An individual in restraints may not be allowed out of his cell on any given day and in this condition he is not permitted to use the telephone. On Wednesday, April 30, Fisher advised Eugene Weber, Stores Manager, that Pobst had not reported for work or called in since their Monday conversation. On April 30, after telephoning at least four area hospitals, Fisher telephoned Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office Central Booking and was informed that Pobst was in jail for aggravated assault and that all inmates could make as many telephone calls as they wanted. Fisher reported this information to Weber who reported the same to his supervisor, Keith Simmons, Director of Procurement. 1/ On Thursday, May 1, Simmons telephoned Hillsborough County Jail Central to confirm Fisher's report that Pobst had access to a telephone and was told that all an inmate had to do was ask and that inmates are let out for just such purpose each day. In reliance on this information, Simmons contacted Roland Carrington, Director of Labor Management Relations, requested advice regarding the appropriate University response to Respondent's unauthorized absences, and was told it was appropriate to invoke the job abandonment rule. On Friday, May 2, Respondent Pobst was not in restraints at any time during the day, and his condition and attitude were both noted as "good" on the police log completed at 10:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Respondent did not ask to use a telephone on Friday, May 2 until at least 5:00 p.m., at which time he telephoned his mother in Indiana and then waited in the dayroom for release. When Respondent was allowed to use the telephone on May 2, 1986, he instructed his mother to have his father call his employer to notify him of his whereabouts. She in turn telephoned his father, Robert Pobst, in Tampa. Robert Pobst called for his son at 8:25 p.m. and effected release on bond at 9:40 p.m. on Friday, May 2. After being released from jail at 9:40 p.m. on Friday, May 2, 1986, both Respondent Pobst and his father attempted to reach Respondent's superiors at the University of South Florida. Respondent also attempted to reach Terry Fisher at home, but did not have enough information to get in touch with the right person. On Sunday, May 4, Respondent reached Weber at home by telephone. Pobst explained the circumstances of his absence to Mr. Weber, and informed him he desired to report for work the following morning. Weber explained that Respondent's unauthorized absence was deemed as a resignation via job abandonment and that the paper work had already been processed. However, the true chronology is that upon Weber's notification Friday, May 2, that Pobst had again failed to appear or call that day, Simmons instructed his administrative assistant to prepare a letter of notification to Pobst. The letter provided that he was deemed to have resigned via abandonment. However, it was not until Monday, May 5, 1986, that Simmons actually mailed Pobst the notification of acceptance of his resignation via job abandonment by certified mail, return receipt requested. On Monday, May 5, 1986, before receiving the official notification of abandonment, Pobst reported to the University one hour before the beginning of the work day. At that time Pobst's request for reconsideration of his resignation via abandonment was declined by Simmons in reliance on information from the Sheriff's Department which contradicted Respondent's assertion that he was unable to contact the University during the whole of April 29 through May 2 inclusive. Terry Fisher had the authority to grant Pobst leave for the time he was incarcerated in the Hillsborough County Jail, and would have done so had Respondent given him a telephone call requesting such leave. On April 30, 1986, Terry Fisher, Eugene Weber, and Keith Simmons, all had knowledge that Respondent was incarcerated in the Hillsborough County Jail and had not appeared for work because he was physically unable to be present at work. Although each of Respondent's superiors knew that Respondent was incarcerated in the Hillsborough County Jail and was unable to be at work for that reason, none made any attempt to contact Respondent in order to gain direct information on his employment status or intentions. It was not demonstrated that any University supervisor had any animosity toward Pobst, and it appears that it was not Pobst's being in jail but his failure to call in and their belief that he could have called in and did not do so that influenced Pobst's superiors to invoke the resignation via abandonment rule on May 2. Mr. Weber specifically chose to invoke the rule because he had made a negative assessment of Pobst's credibility from previous absence excuses and because he relied on the telephone representations by law enforcement personnel that Pobst could have called at any time. Additionally, Weber, who was Fisher's superior, took into consideration that late April and early May was an especially busy time of year for Central Receiving because it was the end of the fiscal year and all University departments were receiving large orders in an attempt to exhaust their old budgets before claiming new ones. After May 5, Respondent made numerous efforts to regain his employment. He talked with Fisher, Weber, Simmons, and Roland Carrington in the University's Personnel Office. He requested his then-current position, OPS employment, and work he had performed prior to his transfer on April 18, 1986. Following his termination from employment Respondent made an application for Unemployment Compensation. Because the University of South Florida initially contested his eligibility, Respondent was required to appeal the initial denial of unemployment compensation. Thereafter, Respondent and the University of South Florida were parties before an appeals referee, who conducted a de novo evidentiary hearing. The issue before the appeals referee was whether Respondent "voluntarily left employment without good cause." In determining this issue, the appeals referee applied a test of "good cause" associated with "misconduct" as those words of art are defined or contemplated in Chapter 443 Florida Statutes, determined that Respondent had committed no misconduct, and awarded unemployment compensation.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent to have abandoned his position with the University of South Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of April, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1987.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Notice of Specific Charges filed against him, and, if so, whether he should be terminated from his employment with Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by Petitioner in 1982. From 1984 to 1993, he was employed as a head custodian. He was demoted from that position to the position of custodian in 1994. Thereafter, he was employed by Petitioner as a custodian assigned to Lindsey Hopkins Technical Education Center. At all times material hereto, John Leyva was the principal of Lindsey Hopkins. Leyva delegated many of his responsibilities as principal, including his supervision over the custodial staff, to other administrative personnel. Prior to his assignment to Lindsey Hopkins, Respondent was the subject of progressive discipline, consisting of formal and informal conferences, counseling sessions, and reprimands. At the beginning of Respondent's employment at Lindsey Hopkins, Respondent was assigned to the third shift, from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. During the 1994-95 school year, Respondent was frequently absent, and he failed to follow appropriate notification procedures with respect to his absences and his whereabouts during work hours. From July 1994 through July 1995, Respondent was absent a total of 76 days, of which 7 1/2 days were without authorization. From June 2, 1995, through June 6, 1995, Respondent was absent without authorization for three consecutive work days. Respondent's absences had an adverse impact on his work site inasmuch as his absences created a morale problem among staff and resulted in areas within Lindsey Hopkins not being cleaned properly. Eventually, due to Respondent's attendance problems, Respondent was moved from the third shift to the second shift, from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. During this time Respondent was to report to James Parker, the on-site vice-principal. As a custodian, Respondent was also supervised by Dennis Caldwell, Linda Morris, and Lawrence King. Although Caldwell was not present during the major portion of Respondent's second shift, since Caldwell's regular hours ended at 4:00 p.m., there were many times when Caldwell went to the work site in the evening to spot-check his employees and address different problems in the custodial area. On March 23, 1995, Respondent was issued a memorandum that delineated his absences during the school year and which provided numerous directives to Respondent regarding the appropriate procedures he was to follow if he were going to be absent in the future. He was directed to communicate his intent to be absent directly to his supervisors and to provide documentation from a treating physician for his absences due to illness. He was also directed to comply with Petitioner's leave procedures. Respondent was also provided with notice of the adverse impact that his absences had on his work environment. He was offered assistance to achieve regular attendance. He was advised that continued non-compliance with attendance procedures and directives would be considered a violation of his professional responsibilities. On May 17, 1995, Respondent was not in his assigned work area, and he had failed to notify anyone of his whereabouts. Further, he refused to discuss his absence with Caldwell after being directed to speak with Caldwell. On May 26, 1995, Respondent was involved in a physical altercation with a woman on the premises of Lindsey Hopkins during Respondent's working hours. During the course of this incident, King noticed that Respondent was staggering and that he had alcohol permeating from his breath. King concluded that Respondent was under the influence of alcohol and sent Respondent home. On May 30, 1995, Respondent was directed to attend a conference-for-the-record on June 7, 1995, to address his conduct. Respondent failed to attend the conference-for-the- record. On June 8, the conference was re-scheduled for June 14, but Respondent did not attend that conference-for-the-record either. Respondent was administratively referred to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program in an effort to provide him with assistance in eliminating his continuing pattern of unauthorized absences and performance-related problems. On March 19, 1996, despite directives from Caldwell regarding Respondent's work responsibilities, Respondent failed to complete his daily work assignments with respect to the lockers within his assigned area. In a written warning, Respondent was notified that his continued non-performance would result in further disciplinary action. On July 30, 1996, Respondent again failed to carry out his job responsibilities. He failed to empty trash cans and sweep or mop the corridors within his assigned area. In a written warning, Respondent was again directed to complete his daily work assignments. From July 1995 through July 1996, Respondent was absent for 45 days, 7 1/2 of which were without authorization. During the period from July 11, 1995, through July 18, 1995, Respondent was absent without authorization for at least three consecutive work days. On September 18, 1996, Tom Albano saw Respondent sleeping on the floor in the child care room during his work hours. The child care room is not an authorized break area. Further, at the time he was caught sleeping, Respondent was not on an authorized break. Albano told Respondent that his conduct was improper and that there were other things he could be doing rather than sleeping. On October 1, 1996, Parker found Respondent sleeping on the couch in the child care room at a time when Respondent was not on an authorized break. Parker prepared a memorandum addressing the sleeping incidents to give to Respondent. The memorandum documented the appropriate procedures concerning Respondent's work schedule and break areas. It notified Respondent that his actions adversely impacted the effective operation of the work site. It provided directives to Respondent and advised him that non-compliance with the directives would be considered a violation of his employment responsibilities. In order to give Respondent the memorandum, Parker called Respondent into his office to meet with him and Albano on October 2. During that meeting Respondent reacted to Parker in a loud, irate, aggressive, hostile, and threatening manner. He called Parker a racist and a bigot and told Parker that Parker must be on drugs. Parker became concerned for his own safety. Parker and Albano provided written summaries of the meeting to Principal Leyva. Leyva directed Respondent to attend a conference-for- the-record on October 7, 1996. That conference was canceled by Leyva, with the consent of Respondent's union, due to an injury Leyva suffered. The conference-for-the-record was re-scheduled for the following day, but Respondent failed to attend. The conference was re-scheduled for October 15 but was postponed at the request of Respondent's union and re-scheduled for October 22. Respondent failed to appear for the October 22 conference and was absent from his work site October 21-28, 1996. The school administrators subsequently learned that Respondent was incarcerated for domestic violence at the time of the October 22 conference and during the period of October 21-28. It is Petitioner's policy that absences due to incarceration are documented as unauthorized leave without pay. As a result, Respondent's absences from October 21 through October 28 were documented as unauthorized leave without pay. Respondent returned to Lindsey Hopkins on October 30. Parker requested that Respondent come to Parker's office so they could discuss Respondent's unauthorized leave status and so that Parker could direct Respondent to report to the Office of Professional Standards (hereinafter "OPS"). Due to his previous meeting with Respondent and out of concern for his own safety, Parker had two other employees present in his office awaiting Respondent's arrival. When he arrived at Parker's office, Respondent had a strong odor of alcohol permeating from his breath. He also appeared to be stumbling, his eyes were red and bloodshot, and he appeared angry, upset, and agitated. Therefore, Parker directed Respondent to report to OPS for re-admittance to Lindsey Hopkins and had Respondent escorted off the school campus. Respondent failed to follow Parker's directive to report to OPS before returning to Lindsey Hopkins. Instead, Respondent reported to Lindsey Hopkins on the following day, October 31, 1996. When Leyva was advised that Respondent was at Lindsey Hopkins, he directed that Respondent come to Leyva's office. Two other employees were present in Leyva's office. When Respondent came to Leyva's office, those present noticed that Respondent was swaying and mumbling, his speech was slurred, and he smelled of alcohol. Leyva contacted Dr. Thomasina O'Donnell in the OPS for further direction, and she advised him to ask Respondent if he would consent to take a drug/alcohol test based upon reasonable suspicion. Respondent agreed to take the test and was escorted to the testing facility. His breath alcohol test revealed the presence of alcohol in Respondent's system. The following day Leyva administratively referred Respondent to OPS, and OPS thereafter sent Respondent a letter requesting that he contact the office to schedule a conference- for-the-record. OPS convened Respondent's conference-for-the-record on November 5, 1996. Respondent's aggressive and violent behavior at the work site was discussed, as was his October 31 breath alcohol test confirming the presence of alcohol in his system and, thus, his intoxication at the work site. His attendance and future employment status were also discussed. Respondent was directed to provide OPS with official documentation by November 12, 1996, showing his enrollment and participation in an alcohol recovery program. He was also advised of his right to clarify, explain, and/or respond to any information recorded in the conference summary. Respondent was again referred to the Employee Assistance Program and was administratively re-assigned to another work location pending formal notification of any disciplinary action. Respondent never provided any documentation to OPS to clarify, explain, respond to, or refute any of the allegations made against him during the conference held on November 5. Likewise, Respondent never complied with the directive given him during the November 5 conference that he provide OPS with documentation of his enrollment and participation in an alcohol recovery program. From November 1995 through November 1996, Respondent was absent a total of 37 days, 12 of which were without authorization. From July 1996, the commencement of the contractual school year, to February 5, 1997, the date on which Petitioner suspended Respondent and initiated these dismissal proceedings, Respondent had already accrued a total of 24 days of absences, 12 of which were without authorization. From October 21, 1996, through November 5, 1996, Respondent was absent without authorization for at least three consecutive work days.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Notice of Specific Charges filed in this cause and dismissing Respondent from his employment with Petitioner effective February 5, 1997. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Heidi Shulman-Pereira, Esquire Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Donald Appignani, Esquire Phillips, Levy & Rind, P.A. 3001 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 214 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Roger C. Cuevas, Superintendent of Schools Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 403 Miami, Florida 33132-1308
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit: constructively discharging Petitioner on the basis of handicap discrimination without reasonable accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Lake County Sheriff's Office (LCSO), constitutes an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Chris Daniels took office as the elected Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, in January 2005. He had been with Respondent LCSO for 18 years. The sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer for Lake County; operates the Lake County Jail for the Board of County Commissioners; and manages security and bailiffs for the Lake County Courthouse. His responsibilities also include providing final approval for staffing levels at the Lake County Jail. In 2005, Petitioner had been employed as a detention officer at the Lake County Jail for 16 years. He is a certified corrections officer. Corrections/detention officers assigned to the inmate housing/security areas at the jail work 12-hour shifts from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. They are assigned to either "A," "B," "C," or "D" Squads. The squads rotate from day to night, and from night to day, shifts every four months. Officers assigned to inmate security are not normally assigned permanent shifts. Petitioner was such an officer. Working on rotating shifts is an essential function of working in the inmate housing area of the jail, as detailed in the job description for corrections officers as follows: . . . ensures a timely transmission of pertinent information and materials to other correctional personnel assigned to the same and/or the next shift. Petitioner understood at the beginning of his employment with LCSO that he was expected to work rotating shifts, and he did, in fact, work rotating shifts until 1996. Other corrections officers assigned to laundry, the jail kitchen, inmate transportation and other administrative functions permanently work days from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, without shift changes. Such positions with permanent day shifts have become available over the years. However, Petitioner last sought such a position in 1997 or 1998. Petitioner was working as a detention/corrections officer for Respondent when he was diagnosed with diabetes in 1996. Petitioner's diabetes causes tingling in his hands and feet, impotence, floaters in his eyes, dizziness, profuse sweating, frequent urination, a weakening immune system and occasional outbreaks of boils. Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 reveals that he takes multiple oral medications and that each kind of medication ideally should be taken at the same time of day, each day, but there are instructions on how to compensate if a dose is missed. With the exception of working rotating shifts, Petitioner was able at all times to perform the essential functions of a corrections officer for Respondent. The Veterans’ Administration pays Petitioner $218.00 per month because it believes his diabetes was induced by Agent Orange he encountered while in Viet Nam. At Petitioner's request, Respondent allowed Petitioner to work a permanent day shift from 1996 to June 30, 2005, when he retired. Petitioner testified he has worked in the past as a military medic and as a physician's assistant in correction facilities, so he is knowledgeable about the horrific, and sometimes fatal, effects of uncontrolled diabetes. Petitioner expected to live a normal life so long as he controlled his diabetes. Petitioner claims to have explained over the years to all his superiors that he needed to consistently take his medications at the same time of day. However, he did not offer any evidence in the present proceeding to explain why he could not take his medications consistently on a 24-hour clock, e.g. during nights, as opposed to during days. There have been periods when he experienced problems with his diabetes while working a permanent day shift. His medications have been adjusted several times since 1996. All witnesses agreed that Petitioner spent 18 months alone in a permanent day position in the third-floor control room. Petitioner claimed that he was assigned this long period of duty on the third-floor as “punishment” for being allowed to permanently work a day shift. He maintained, without any supporting evidence, that being assigned to a single position for more than a few months this way was unusual. However, although Respondent assigned Petitioner to the third-floor control room alone for a duration of 18 months, Respondent also assigned a non-diabetic employee alone there for about one year. Petitioner speculated, again without any supporting evidence, that the non-diabetic employee was also being punished for something. Both Petitioner and the non-diabetic employee experienced being confined to the control room without a restroom. Having to urinate when no other officer could stand- in for them created a hardship on both men. On one occasion, the non-diabetic employee urinated in a garbage can. At the date of hearing, Gary Borders had been with LCSO for 17 years and served as its Chief Deputy.1/ On the date of hearing, and at all times material, Chief Borders’ duties included responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the Lake County Jail and the Lake County Courthouse and for training. Petitioner claims to have frequently protested to many superiors about not having a restroom on the third-floor and not being allowed to bring food in for his diabetes. He also claimed to have specifically asked Chief Borders to be transferred from service on the third-floor, but Chief Borders did not recall more than one vague conversation concerning Petitioner’s complaint about how long Petitioner had been posted there and that he had told Petitioner he, Borders, had no problem with Petitioner’s being transferred elsewhere in the jail. It is not clear when, precisely, this 18 month-period occurred. Because Petitioner was on a permanent day shift from 1996-1997 to 2005 (eight years), and Petitioner testified his 18-month posting on the third-floor was "over" and was from 2003-2005, his time on the third-floor was not affirmatively shown to have occurred within the 365 days immediately preceding the filing of his Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on December 8, 2005. When Sheriff Daniels took office in January 2005, Chief Borders advised him that because the date for the squads to rotate shifts (see Finding of Fact 4) was due to occur on May 1, 2005, the number of persons assigned to permanent shifts was affecting Chief Borders' ability to make assignments. When corrections officers working in inmate housing of the jail are assigned permanent shifts, staff shortages can occur on other shifts. Chief Borders further advised the new sheriff that he, Borders, was receiving additional requests for permanent shifts. While discussing why there were so many employees assigned permanent shifts, and not subject to the standard four months' rollover of the squads from day-to-night and night-to- day shifts, Sheriff Daniels and Chief Borders concluded that LCSO needed a formal method of differentiating between those employees who genuinely needed a permanent day or night shift and those employees who merely wanted a permanent shift assignment. To determine which employees needed a permanent shift as an accommodation for their specific condition or situation, Sheriff Daniels instructed Chief Borders to send a memorandum to the 12-14 employees assigned to permanent shifts, requiring those employees to provide medical evidence of their need for a permanent shift assignment. On March 25, 2005, Chief Borders sent all employees assigned to permanent shifts the following memorandum: There is a requirement for rotating shift work for Detention Deputies, Auxiliary Detention Deputies and Deputy Sheriffs at the Lake County Sheriff's Office. Please ask your physician to review the Job Description for Detention Deputy (or Auxiliary) and ask if you can perform all the job requirements. If you are cross- sworn, also have your physician review the Deputy Sheriff job description and ask if you can perform all of the job requirements for that position. When your job description(s) have been reviewed, bring your physician's letter and all related supporting material (diagnosis, prognosis, treatment notes, test results and any other documents that would assist the agency in evaluating your request) to me so that our agency physician can review them for possible accommodation. Because shift changes will take place on May 1, 2005, you must have your documents to me no later than 5:00 P.M. on Friday, April 15, 2005. If I do not hear back from you by Friday, April 15, 2005 at 5:00 P.M., I will take it that you are available for rotating shift work assignment. The process envisioned by the Sheriff and Chief was that when an employee, who wanted an accommodation, provided the requested information from his own treating physician, that employee's supervisor would pass the information along to LCSO's physician, and an interactive process would begin. As of the date of hearing, LCSO had employees working in modified jobs, including job sharing, and an accommodation had been made for a person in a wheelchair. In 2005, LCSO also fully intended to accommodate those employees who provided proof from their physicians of their need for other accommodations. Petitioner testified that he did not want to repeatedly roll over from day-to-night shifts every four months because past experience had taught him that each time his shift changed, it took him at least two weeks to properly regulate and space his intake of food, liquids, and medications, in such a way that his diabetes was controlled and he felt alert and capable. In response to receiving the March 25, 2005, memorandum, Petitioner presented Chief Borders with a note from Petitioner's primary physician, Dr. Gelin, written on a prescription pad, stating: brittle diabetic pt needs to work day shift only. Petitioner did not present any other written information in response to Respondent LCSO’s detailed request. Petitioner testified that he discussed Dr. Gelin’s note with Chief Borders to the extent that he told Borders that if anyone on behalf of LCSO phoned Dr. Gelin, Dr. Gelin would discuss or fax further information to that person; Chief Borders does not recall this conversation. Chief Borders is a diabetic himself, but he had never heard the term, "brittle diabetic." It is Petitioner's position that because, in Dr. Gelin's private conversations with Petitioner, Dr. Gelin had told Petitioner that “any doctor” should know the sequelae and effects of "brittle diabetes," all Petitioner’s LCSO superiors needed to do was pass on Dr. Gelin’s prescription note to LCSO’s consulting physician in order for Petitioner to be accommodated. Petitioner believed it was his superiors' duty to make Dr. Gelin submit the written materials they wanted. Sheriff Daniels generally distrusted the information that physicians submitted on prescription pads, because, in his experience, when the employee or physician was pressed for details, there was often no supporting information forthcoming. Therefore, he did not believe the information on Petitioner's prescription slip, as described to him by Chief Borders, was sufficient to begin the interactive process with LCSO’s Human Resources Department or its consulting physician. Neither Sheriff Daniels nor Chief Borders presented Petitioner's prescription slip to them. It was decided between the Sheriff and the Chief, that Chief Borders would try to get more detailed information from Petitioner. Petitioner testified that he tried to get more information from his primary physician, Dr. Gelin, but Dr. Gelin would not provide in writing the detailed information requested by LCSO’s March 25, 2005, memorandum. On April 22, 2005, Chief Borders wrote Petitioner that Dr. Gelin's prescription pad note was insufficient and that Petitioner would not be reassigned to a permanent day shift position, stating: I have reviewed the information provided by your physician and find there is insufficient evidence presented to justify a permanent shift assignment. As such, your request is denied. You will rotate day/nights with your assigned shift during the normal rotation. None of the 12-14 employees assigned to permanent shifts, had submitted the requested information, so all of them, including Petitioner, were assigned to a rotating shift. The Sheriff and Chief received no report of complaints from any employee. However, on April 26, 2005, Petitioner received a memo stating that effective May 4, 2005, he would be assigned to "C" squad. "A" Squad, where Petitioner was then assigned, was scheduled to rotate from day shift to night shift on May 1, 2005, and "C" Squad was due to rotate from the night shift to the day shift on the same date. Accordingly, LCSO’s purpose in transferring Petitioner to “C” Squad was to provide him with four more months (until September 1, 2005) to obtain the required medical opinion and detailed supporting documentation from his treating physician. The "A" to "C" Squad change also would have allowed Petitioner to remain on a day shift, without interruption, and allow him an additional four months in which to gather medical information from any appropriate source to support his request to indefinitely remain on a permanent day shift. In fact, Petitioner was regularly seeing Dr. Flores, at the Veterans’ Administration, as well as Dr. Gelin. Dr. Flores coordinated oversight of Petitioner's medical condition with Dr. Gelin, who is Petitioner's private physician. However, Petitioner did not approach Dr. Flores, and he did not go back to Dr. Gelin, until after Petitioner retired. Petitioner had hoped to work another six years before retiring, but on May 13, 2005, while still assigned to the day shift, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation, hoping that someone in his chain of command would try to talk him out of leaving. He expected his supervisors to "workout" a permanent day shift for him, instead of permitting him to retire.2/ Petitioner's resignation letter stated: Regrettable [sic] I am submitting my letter of resignation effective June 30, 2005. Your recent decision denying me permission to remain on the day shift in spite of my doctor's recommendation to remain on the day shift because of my medical condition (brittle diabetic) has forced me to retire earlier than I had planned to. There is no other way that I can regulate my medication switching from days to nights . . . Respondent never required Petitioner to work the night shift, and he never did work the night shift after 1996-1997. Petitioner gave notice of his retirement in May 2005, rather than work in "C" Squad on the day shift until September 1, 2005, or continue to try to obtain additional medical information that would allow him to indefinitely remain on a permanent day shift. Petitioner elected to retire effective June 30, 2005, because, upon advice of “Retirement” he believed it was more financially beneficial for him to retire in June 2005, rather than wait until January 2006.3/ Since January 1, 2006, Petitioner has been employed managing real property in Florida and Costa Rica. Petitioner testified that when he retired, he could perform all the duties required by his detention/corrections officer job description, and perhaps other duties as well, except for the rotating shifts. He believes, but offered no supporting documentation, that rotating shifts are counter- productive and are on their way out in most jails. He further testified that he could probably even work the rotating shifts required by this employer but he believed that to do so would have put him in a health crisis due to his diabetes and multiple medications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the regional juvenile detention center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and pursuant to Section 215.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between January 7, 1978 and May 20, 1978 Richard Fisher was employed by Acco Mechanical Contractors; Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this time Fisher was paid at the rate of $6.50 per hour for regular time and $9.75 per hour for overtime. The difference between the amount paid the Petitioner for regular time hours worked and the prevailing wage is $3.57 and the difference between the amount paid the Petitioner for overtime and the prevailing wage is $5.35 per hour. The Respondent also controverts the number of hours asserted to have been worked by Fisher. The Respondent asserts in its hearing brief that Fisher worked 459 regular hours and 50 overtime hours. The claim presented by Fisher indicated that he worked 512 regular hours and 50 overtime hours. Exhibit 8 reflects that Fisher worked 459 regular hours and 55 overtime hours. Exhibit 8 further reflects that Fisher received $6.50 per hour for regular time worked and $9.75 per hour for overtime worked. The prevailing wage rate established by the division was $10.07 per hour. The difference between the wage paid Fisher for regular time hours and the prevailing wage was $3.57. The difference paid Fisher between time and a half computed on the prevailing wage and time and a half paid Fisher is $5.35 per hour. The amount Fisher was underpaid is equal to the sum of the regular hours worked (459) times $3.57 end the overtime hours worked (55) times $5.35, or a total of $1,941.13. The Petitioner has complied with the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(a)1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid for said hours. Said affidavit was filed within the time prescribed by statute. Pursuant to Section 215.19(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service is presently withholding $2,322.35 from Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. while awaiting the decision in this administrative proceeding.
Conclusions Petitioner has established that he was hired and worked for Acco, Inc. as a plumber and that he was paid $6.50 per hour rather than the prevailing wage of $10.07 for plumbers on the project in question. Petitioner is entitled to the difference between what he was paid and the prevailing wage for the total number of hours worked by Petitioner at less than the prevailing wage. The Hearing Officer, in his Recommended Order, addressed the difference in pay between the regular time worked and overtime worked. However, Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, is void of any statutory language concerning overtime. The statute only requires that the employee be paid "not less than the prevailing wage." Absent a legislative directive in Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, concerning overtime pay, the employee is only entitled to the difference between what he was paid and what he should have been paid at the prevailing wage for the total number of hours worked at a rate less than the prevailing wage. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to $1,638.63. Respondent's argument that the Division of Labor failed to properly adopt prevailing wage rates has been considered by the First District Court of Appeals of Florida in Vernon Neff et al. vs. Biltmore Construction Company, Inc., 362 So.2d 442, (1st DCA Fla. 1978) and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Labor vs. Matthews Corporation, 358 So.2d 256 (1st DCA Fla. 1978). The Court, in both cases, upheld the process by which the wage rates are adopted. Respondent argues that additional insurance benefits should be included in the wage rates, but such benefits are not "wages". The amount paid by the employer to provide insurance benefits should not be included in Petitioner's wage nor deducted from the amount owed to the Petitioner based upon this claim. It is, therefore, hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the contracting authority, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pay the Petitioner, from the amount it is withholding in this claim, the amount of $1,638.63, and that the remaining amount held by the contracting authority, pursuant to this claim, be paid to Acco, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December, 1978 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEVEN H. CAMPORA, Director Division of Labor Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 200 - Ashley Building 1321 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Telephone No.: (904) 488-7396 COPIES FURNISHED: DEWEY H. VARNER, JR., ESQUIRE Attorney for Petitioner 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 L. BYRD BOOTH, JR., ESQUIRE Attorney for Respondent O'Neal and Booth, P.A. Post Office Drawer 11088 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 LUTHER J. MOORE, Administrator of Prevailing Wage Division of Labor 1321 Executive Center Drive, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 THOMAS A. KOVAL, ESQUIRE Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security 401 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Department of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Division of Labor enter its order directing the contracting authority to pay to the employee the sum of $1,941.13 and the remaining amount held by the contracting authority pursuant to this claim be paid to Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of November 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey H. Varner, Jr., Esquire Culp and Fisher 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 Byrd Booth, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 11089 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION OF LABOR RICHARD E. FISHER, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1283 ACCO, INC., Respondent. / FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER Upon due notice to all parties in the above-styled cause, an administrative hearing was held on September 15, 1978 in West Palm Beach, Florida before Stephen F. Dean, the assigned hearing officer. STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Petitioner, Richard E. Fisher, filed a claim against Respondent, Acco, Inc., alleging that he had been hired by Acco, Inc. in the capacity of a plumber and that Acco, Inc. had failed to pay him the prevailing wage for plumbers as required by Section 215.19, Florida Statutes. The question presented in this case is how many hours the Petitioner, Richard E. Fisher, worked, the wage paid the Petitioner, and what, if any, difference exists between the wage paid the Petitioner and the prevailing wage. FINDINGS OF FACT: Acco, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the Regional Juvenile Detention Center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and, pursuant to Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between January 7, 1978 and May 20, 1978, Richard E. Fisher was employed by Acco, Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this time, Fisher was paid at the rate of $6.50 per hour. The difference between the amount paid Petitioner and the prevailing wage is $3.57. The Petitioner has complied with the prOvisions of se6ion 215.19(3)(a) 1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid for said hours. This affidavit was timely filed. Exhibit No. 8, the Weekly Time Reports for Richard E. Fisher, establish that Fisher corked 459 hours at the rate of $6.50 and 55 hours at the rate of $9.75. The difference between what Petitioner was paid and what he should have been paid at the prevailing wage rate is equal to the sum of hours worked (459) times $3.57 or a total of $1,638.63. Pursuant to the statute, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is withholding $2,322.35 from Acco, Inc. pending the outcome of this claim.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment as a custodian.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for hiring, overseeing, and terminating employees in the school district. Respondent has been employed by Petitioner as a custodian since September 13, 2002. Respondent worked at Dunbar Middle School (Dunbar) until August 6, 2010, when she was involuntarily transferred to Lexington. Respondent worked at Lexington from August 2010 until her suspension on April 2, 2013. Respondent's personnel file documents that throughout her employment as a custodian, she has had problems with displays of disrespect and insubordination to her fellow employees and superiors. Respondent's disrespect and insubordination have been a consistent theme in written warnings and reprimands, incident reports, and conference summary reports. Respondent has been repeatedly advised in writing of the concerns with her behavior, instructed to stop the unacceptable behavior, and advised of disciplinary consequences if the behavior did not stop. The writings in turn refer to verbal communications with Respondent about the same subject addressed in the writings. The writings also reflect a consistent theme of Respondent's problematic behavior arising when a superior would attempt to address a problem with Respondent's job performance. For example, Respondent would be told to clean certain areas, but Respondent would fail to follow the directives, and then Respondent would become agitated and loud when confronted regarding her failure to follow the cleaning directives. The first memorandum, dated January 9, 2004, was issued by Respondent's then-supervisor, Carlos Morales: Despite previous conversations regarding your job responsibilities as a member of the custodial staff at [Dunbar], it has become necessary for me to apprise you in writing of a serious concern regarding your insubordination . . . On Monday, January 5, 2004, you were asked to vacuum all offices, rooms, and hallways of the administrative wing. Upon checking the administrative wing on the morning of January 8th, many areas appeared in need of vacuuming. During my discussion with you regarding this matter, your verbal, agitated response became loud, accusatory and insubordinate . . . It was then noted you were approaching other school personnel regarding the discussion and your accusations. Employees who are insubordinate are subject to disciplinary action. I sincerely want you to be successful at [Dunbar,] but this requires more effort in your assigned duties. The teachers, staff, and students depend on you to do your part in making this a clean and safe learning environment. Respondent's performance evaluation for the 2003-2004 contract year echoed Mr. Morales' concern, by finding that Respondent "inconsistently practiced" effective communications with co-workers and supervisors. The comments informed Respondent that she needed "to work on her communication in times of questions of job requirements." The same inconsistent rating in the same category, with similar comments, appeared in Respondent's evaluation for 2004-2005. Respondent received good performance evaluations for contract years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007. No behavior problems were documented in her personnel file during that time. Respondent's performance evaluation for 2007-2008, completed in March 2008, found that although Respondent's job performance was "adequate," her punctuality and attendance "continue to be" areas needing improvement. Later that same year, in June 2008, an incident report was prepared by the assistant principal to document an incident between Respondent and her then-supervisor, Pete Torres. According to the report, Mr. Torres tried to discuss a concern with Respondent about her chronic tardiness, but Respondent "became very loud and disrespectful towards her supervisor, Mr. Torres." The assistant principal met with Respondent to discuss the incident, and determined that Respondent "was disrespectful towards her supervisor. Disrespect towards any school employee will not be tolerated. Any type of future disrespect will result in [a] documented performance letter." Respondent was advised that a documented incident report would be placed in Respondent's personnel file. Respondent's performance evaluation for 2008-2009 found Respondent's performance inconsistent in the areas of punctuality and communications with co-workers and supervisors. The comments noted inconsistencies with Respondent's "interpersonal skills and attendance issues." Shortly after this performance evaluation, on July 23, 2009, the assistant principal prepared another incident report to document an incident involving Respondent. According to the documentation, at a mandatory meeting and training session for all of the custodians with district zone manager Debbie Greene to review summer cleaning processes and procedures, Respondent "became very loud, disrespectful and belligerent towards her direct supervisor, head custodian Randy McMillan." The assistant principal held another meeting with Respondent to discuss the incident, and he determined that Respondent was disrespectful towards her supervisor. He also reminded Respondent that "this was the second documented incident involving disrespect towards a supervisor in the past two years." Respondent was told again "that this behavior is unacceptable and would not be tolerated." Respondent was advised that this documented incident report would be placed in her personnel file. For the 2009-2010 contract year, Respondent's performance evaluation continued to reflect issues in the communications areas. Respondent was rated as "inconsistent" in the following areas: "responds appropriately to praise and constructive criticism"; and "communicates effectively with coworkers, supervisors, and school-based staff." The comments regarding these ratings were: "Ms. Rice continues to have trouble responding appropriately to constructive criticism. Cooperating with supervisors continues to be an area of focus." The documentation in Respondent's personnel file from her years at Dunbar portrays a pattern of similar behavior by Respondent in her dealings with a number of different supervisors. This documentation put Respondent on notice that her behavior was not acceptable. Nonetheless, Respondent did not take away from her years at Dunbar that her behavior was not acceptable and needed to change. When Respondent was asked if she recalled having problems with her supervisors and other employees at Dunbar, she responded: Of course I've had problems with -- from the other school, but it was only by speaking my opinion because if someone asked me something I'm going to tell them how I feel, but it's not nothing about like cursing them or whatever, just let them -- I'm giving them my answer. And then the way I talk, they say that I be disrespectful to them because I have a hot-pitched tone voice, but I don't mean no harm on nothing I say. I just trying to express my opinion. Even when I talk, I talk with my hands and it don't mean that I'm trying to be rude or nothing, I'm just used to expressing my feelings. Respondent was involuntarily transferred to Lexington shortly after the beginning of the 2010-2011 contract year. The circumstances of this transfer were not established in the record. Respondent began working as a custodian at Lexington on August 9, 2010. She worked during the day over the summer, as did all of the custodial staff. When school was in session, Respondent was assigned to what was variously described as the afternoon, evening, or night shift (hereafter referred to as the "night shift"), working from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. At Lexington, the building supervisor was in charge of the custodial department, and was the direct supervisor of the custodial staff. The work hours for the building supervisor position were from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Therefore, during the school year, the building supervisor's work day overlapped with the night shift by only two and one-half hours. After the building supervisor left for the day, the head custodian served as acting supervisor of the night shift custodians. The head custodian was considered the liaison between the building supervisor and the custodians. The head custodian would receive instructions and directives from the building supervisor in the afternoon, and the head custodian was responsible for giving directives to the night shift custodians and supervising their work to ensure that they carried out the directives. The head custodian position at Lexington was not a managerial position; the head custodian did not have authority to discipline the other custodians. However, by all accounts, the head custodian was vested with authority to give directives to the custodians working the night shift. The head custodian was reasonably expected to act as supervisor of the night shift custodians after the building supervisor left each day. Otherwise, these employees would be left unsupervised for two- thirds of their work day. During Respondent's first year at Lexington, the building supervisor was Jack Duffy and the head custodian was Rosa Valentin. According to Respondent, that year was "okay," in that she did not have any problems at work. However, according to Respondent's performance evaluation, which recorded her absences and tardy days through March 2011, Respondent missed a lot of work. In fact, the evaluation comments refer to a meeting with Respondent in February 2011 to address concerns with her attendance; improvement in Respondent's attendance was noted in the month following that meeting. Respondent had only been working at Lexington for seven months when assistant principal Jason Peters drafted Respondent's performance evaluation for the principal, Linda Caprarotta, to review and sign, in accordance with the standard practice. For this short period of time, during which Respondent frequently was absent and late, Respondent's performance was found inconsistent in the areas of using leave only when necessary and punctuality, but her job performance otherwise was found to be effective. However, the Lexington principal was not satisfied with the overall performance of the custodial department for the 2010- 2011 contract year, because the school was not being cleaned well. Ms. Caprarotta determined that the building supervisor, Mr. Duffy, lacked appropriate management skills. She found him to be too lax with the custodial staff. He was not comfortable supervising, giving directives, or confronting the custodians when their work was unsatisfactory. Therefore, Mr. Duffy was let go at the end of the 2010-2011 contract year. On July 6, 2011, Ms. Caprarotta hired Mack Farmer to replace Mr. Duffy as the Lexington building supervisor. Mr. Farmer had the management experience Ms. Caprarotta was looking for, having run his own cabinet manufacturing company for 25 years. Ms. Caprarotta informed Mr. Farmer of her expectations for better-quality cleaning services for her school, and her expectation that he would exercise stronger supervisory responsibility than the prior building supervisor to ensure that custodians were doing their jobs. The credible evidence supports a finding that before Mack Farmer was hired, the custodial staff at Lexington had a relatively easy time, with little expected or demanded of them by the building supervisor. The night shift workers, including Respondent, essentially had free rein to do things their own way, but their own way was not getting the job done. As Respondent put it, "Really I wasn't sure that they was watching me or anything, but they never told me that I wasn't -- that I needed to do better or anything[.]" Although Respondent's attendance had improved after a meeting was held in February 2011 to address the problem, the improvement was short-lived. In addition, problems had become apparent with Respondent's performance when she was there working. On July 13, 2011, Ms. Caprarotta and Mr. Peters held a meeting with Respondent "to address absenteeism/tardiness and work performance." The meeting was documented in a conference summary performance report and placed in Respondent's personnel file. According to the report, with regard to Respondent's work performance issues, Respondent was reminded that she was "expected to work thoroughly and continue to work/clean during her designated work times." Respondent testified that everything fell apart after Mr. Duffy was replaced with Mr. Farmer. Respondent was not happy with the change, and did not agree with it: Q: You heard Ms. Caprarotta, she wasn't happy with Mr. Duffy, she didn't think that he was requiring satisfactory services from the custodial staff, you heard that, right? A: Yes, I did. Q: And do you agree that it's the principal's choice as to who she wants as the building supervisor? A: Well, I don't agree, but I know that that's what I heard that that's mandatory that the principal have all the say-so on who she wants to be hired in her system. * * * Q: Okay. So whatever reason she had for replacing Mr. Duffy, is that your concern? A: No, it's not my concern, but it come down to my concern whenever she replaces Mr. Duffy and end up -- it's a stress-free environment and then it's very stressful on the people that I'm working under. According to Respondent, Mr. Farmer approached her on his first day of work and told her that he knew who she was and that she had better be careful because they were trying to get rid of her. The more credible testimony was a bit different from Respondent's description. Ms. Caprarotta credibly testified that when Mr. Farmer was first hired, she talked to him about the broader issue of the lack of cleanliness and need for better management of the custodial staff. She briefed Mr. Farmer about all of the staff members whom he would be supervising; Respondent was included, but not singled out. Mr. Farmer credibly testified that he spoke with Respondent not on his first day, but shortly thereafter, to tell her that she needed to change her behavior and improve her performance or she was going to lose her job. He had many conversations with Respondent, trying to get her to do her work, be a team player, and improve her behavior. Respondent acknowledged that she took away from Mr. Farmer's comments to her that she needed to improve: "I figure I better do a good job." In August 2011, shortly after Mr. Farmer began as building supervisor, Respondent was involved in an altercation with Rosa Valentin, then-head custodian. Respondent was called in for a conference with the principal, assistant principal, and Mr. Farmer. A conference summary performance report dated August 10, 2011, documented the incident and the conference, at which Respondent was reminded that one of her job requirements was that she must have the ability to work well with others, and that Respondent was expected to do so. Respondent was informed that her failure to comply will result in further disciplinary actions. The altercation addressed by the August 2011 conference summary performance report was described in somewhat-conflicting terms by several witnesses. The more credible testimony established that Respondent confronted Ms. Valentin, who was weeding the flower beds next to the school building. Another custodian was standing next to Ms. Valentin. Respondent made negative comments critical of Ms. Valentin, questioning why Ms. Valentin was not making the other custodian help with the weeding, and suggesting that Ms. Valentin would have made Respondent help if it were Respondent standing next to her. Respondent and Ms. Valentin argued, and Respondent called Ms. Valentin a "b****." Ms. Valentin went inside to the main office to report the incident to the principal. Respondent followed Ms. Valentin into the main office, where Respondent resumed her verbal assault on Ms. Valentin. Respondent was the instigator and the aggressor, and her behavior was completely inappropriate. Respondent did not deny the essential facts of this altercation. She did not deny having called Ms. Valentin a "b****." This incident stands in marked contrast to Respondent's testimony that she was never disrespectful and was just expressing her opinions. A custodian calling a head custodian a "b****" is no mere expression of opinion. Respondent's friend, Claytrina Griffin, another custodian who was with Respondent during the altercation, testified without a great deal of credibility that she did not see anything wrong with Respondent's comments. However, Ms. Griffin admitted that, unlike Respondent, she did not say anything to Ms. Valentin because whether Ms. Valentin required the other custodian to help her weed or not was none of Ms. Griffin's business. Shortly after this incident, Ms. Valentin requested to be moved to the day shift for personal reasons, even though that would mean she could no longer be the head custodian whose job was to supervise the night shift custodians. Ms. Valentin's request was granted, and her position was downgraded to a regular custodian at a lower pay grade. After advertising and interviewing candidates for the head custodian position, Jeff Hancock, who was a custodian at a different school, was hired as Lexington's new head custodian. Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock had specific ideas about how the cleaning should be done by the custodians. Just as Respondent expressed her dislike for the new, more demanding building supervisor, Respondent also made clear that she did not like the new head custodian. Ms. Griffin echoed Respondent's sentiments, complaining that Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock were demanding. Ms. Griffin complained that Mr. Hancock would spend too much time (which she quantified as five minutes), hanging around to tell Ms. Griffin what to do and how to clean, and repeating the same directive over and over. Both Respondent and Ms. Griffin testified that Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock had their own ideas regarding how they wanted the custodians to clean and neither Mr. Farmer nor Mr. Hancock liked it when Respondent or Ms. Griffin would clean their own way, as they apparently had been able to do when they had enjoyed lax supervision or no supervision at all. The key difference between these two custodians, however, is that Ms. Griffin would keep quiet and would just do her work in the way that Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock wanted it done. As a result, Ms. Griffin was able to finish her assigned cleaning duties by the end of her shift, even when she and the other custodians at work had to absorb extra duties because of absent workers. Respondent did not respond appropriately to being told how to do her work by Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock. Instead, Respondent responded with displays of the same type of behavior for which she had been taken to task when she worked at Dunbar. On December 16, 2011, Ms. Caprarotta issued a letter of reprimand to Respondent for being insubordinate and disrespectful to her supervisor, Mack Farmer, on December 7, 2011. Mr. Hancock was out that day, so Mr. Farmer stayed at work for the night shift. Mr. Farmer gave Respondent specific directions regarding cleaning her assigned rooms, telling her that she was to go into each room and clean it completely before going to the next room. Instead of following directions, Respondent went up and down the hallway, complaining and yelling at Mr. Farmer. Mr. Farmer directed Respondent to stop, but she continued. Respondent yelled at Mr. Farmer from one end of the hallway to the other, and followed him until she was in his face, yelling at him that he gave her too much work. If Respondent had not wasted the time she should have spent cleaning to walk up and down the hallway, loudly "expressing her opinion" to her supervisor, she might have found there was not too much work. That same night, in the middle of her shift, not during a break, Respondent went to Mr. Farmer's office to fill out a vacation request. Mr. Farmer instructed her to stop; he told her that she should not take the time to fill out a vacation request when she had not finished her cleaning assignments. Respondent ignored his directive, and kept filling out her request. As Mr. Farmer aptly described it, "This was [Respondent] doing what she wanted to do instead of doing her job." As a result of Respondent's failure to follow Mr. Farmer's multiple directives on just this one day, Respondent failed to complete her cleaning duties by the end of her shift. In the December 16, 2011, letter of reprimand, Ms. Caprarotta noted that Respondent had engaged in the same kind of insubordinate and disrespectful behavior on January 5, 2004, June 26, 2008, July 23, 2009, and August 8, 2011, and each time, Respondent's outbursts targeted a different supervisor. Ms. Caprarotta gave Respondent the following directives: Effective immediately, you are expected to treat your supervisor with respect. At no time should you be screaming or yelling in the work environment. You are expected to follow directives given to you by your supervisors. You are expected to finish all work assigned. Failure to comply with this directive will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Despite the directives in the December 16, 2011, letter of reprimand, Respondent engaged in the same type of behavior, which was the subject of another conference summary performance report issued on February 16, 2012, and placed in Respondent's personnel file. The subject of this conference was Respondent's disrespect toward Jeff Hancock, the head custodian, described in the summary as Respondent's "Designated Supervisor . . . when the Building Supervisor is not present." When Mr. Hancock had given Respondent directives, she refused to listen to him and was rude and disrespectful. Respondent had to be reminded again that she was required to work well with others and was required to respect her designated supervisor by following directions. In the early spring of 2012, Mr. Peters drafted Respondent's performance evaluation for the 2011-2012 contract year. This evaluation reflected a marked deterioration from the prior partial-year's evaluation, consistent with the documented problems added to Respondent's personnel file. Respondent did not improve in the dependability section, receiving two inconsistent ratings. In the job skills section, Respondent's performance was deemed inconsistent in all five areas measured. Likewise, Respondent's performance was inconsistent in five of the seven areas in the interpersonal skills section; her two effective ratings in this section did not involve communications or interactions with others; instead, Respondent was found effective in dressing in an appropriate manner and being clean and neat in appearance. The evaluation comments reflected that Respondent "had issues with respecting authority," although, as before, she had shown improvement following the most recent meeting. In addition, Respondent was told that she needed "to improve her quality of work and be more efficient." Finally, her problems with tardiness and absences were noted. In May 2012, the Lexington principal made a referral to the DPSE to investigate Respondent for misconduct, including excessive absenteeism, disrespect, and insubordination. The principal testified that she made the decision to make the referral to the district level because all of the school-level meetings, discussions, written reports, and reprimands had been ineffective in bringing about sustained improvement in Respondent's behavior and performance. The details of the 2012 investigation were not established in the record. However, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between Respondent's union, the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (SPALC), and Petitioner (hereafter referred to as the SPALC agreement), the investigation file was provided to Respondent and her union representative, and then a predetermination conference was held. The predetermination conference in July 2012 was attended by Ranice Monroe, director of the DPSE, Respondent, and her union representative, Mr. Rushlow. In the predetermination conference, Respondent and her representative were given the opportunity to respond to the investigation material. The 2012 investigation concluded with a finding of probable cause to take disciplinary action against Respondent. Respondent received a formal letter of reprimand as disciplinary action for excessive absenteeism. In addition to the formal disciplinary action, Petitioner took other action to address Respondent's disrespectful and insubordinate behavior. Mr. Rushlow and Ms. Monroe went to Lexington to work with Respondent for the purpose of retraining, or "coaching," her. They gave Respondent instructions on how to relate to, and communicate better with, people. As Ms. Monroe recently reminded Respondent (in the 2013 predetermination conference that was the precursor to this disciplinary action), the hope was that Respondent would respond to this informal coaching assistance by improving her behavior.2/ Instead of improving her behavior in response to the coaching assistance, Respondent made no effort to change, because she continued to deny that there was any problem with her behavior: Q: Do you remember Mr. Rushlow and others coming out to the school and to try to coach you on how to relate to other people? A: They had to come and coach me simply because they was making false accusations so I had to go to the meeting and attended the meeting. That don't mean that happened. That do not mean that I talk back to them and that don't mean that happened. The ones that say that I talked back, it was just that I was expressing and giving them my point of view. But disrespecting them? That wasn't really no disrespect[.] According to the Lexington principal, after the July 2012 predetermination conference, Respondent had clear instructions to return to work, work hard, and keep her comments to herself; however, Respondent did what she was told for only about two weeks. She then fell into her old pattern of refusing to take instruction from her supervisors, Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock, and talking back to them. As an example, Ms. Caprarotta got involved in an incident in September 2012 when Respondent would not listen to Mr. Hancock's instructions regarding the order in which Respondent was supposed to clean her assigned rooms. On several occasions, the kitchen science teacher had complained that her room was not being cleaned and she had to sweep and mop it herself. Meanwhile, Respondent was not able to regularly finish her cleaning assignments by the end of her shift, but Mr. Hancock would require her to clock out and leave her work unfinished, because overtime pay was not allowed without prior approval. In an attempt to partially address these problems, Mr. Hancock instructed Respondent to clean the kitchen science classroom first, but Respondent responded rudely, yelling at him. Ms. Caprarotta was informed, and spoke with Respondent about the incident. Respondent told the principal that "that man does not have to tell me what I need to do; you should hear what he says to me, he treats me like a slave." When Ms. Caprarotta asked what exactly she meant by that, Respondent replied: "He keeps trying to tell me what to do." Ms. Caprarotta informed Respondent that Mr. Hancock is her supervisor during the night shift and she had to listen to him and comply because her rooms were not getting clean every night. At this point, Ms. Caprarotta instructed Mr. Hancock to keep Mr. Farmer, Mr. Peters, and herself informed regarding Respondent's behavior and job performance. In addition, she and Mr. Peters began following up to inspect areas where cleaning problems were called to their attention, so that they could judge for themselves. While Respondent contends that she was being unfairly targeted for scrutiny, the credible evidence established that Respondent's performance was reasonably subjected to scrutiny, brought on by Respondent's own failure to perform well, and by her inappropriate outbursts directed to her supervisors when they tried to address the problems with her work. On November 20, 2012, Mr. Farmer inspected the school and provided Mr. Hancock with an inspection report that listed items and areas not cleaned sufficiently during the previous evening shift. The boys' and girls' bathrooms on the first floor, which were Respondent's assigned areas, were on the report, with specific items listed that were not cleaned.3/ Mr. Farmer also reported the cleaning deficiency to Mr. Peters, and had Mr. Peters personally inspect the first floor bathrooms. Mr. Peters agreed with Mr. Farmer's report that the bathrooms had not been cleaned properly. Mr. Hancock gave Respondent the list of items that she had failed to clean adequately the previous day. Respondent did not complete the items on the list that day, and Respondent took leave the next day, so Mr. Hancock had to finish the cleaning. Although Respondent first claimed that she was completely unaware that there were any problems with the quality of her cleaning in the fall semester of 2012, she admitted that she remembered Mr. Hancock going over a list of things that had not been cleaned in the bathrooms. Respondent minimized the problems, claiming that they were nothing substantial. Respondent's claim was not credible; Mr. Farmer observed such problems as not emptying and cleaning the feminine sanitary receptacles, and not cleaning dirt and grime on stall doors and door handles that was built up to the point where it was clear that the cleaning had not been done properly in weeks. On one afternoon after school in mid-October 2012, then-assistant principal Lisa Eastridge went to the "time-out room" to return some books. She found the room locked, with the lights off. She unlocked and entered the room, and started walking across to put away the books she was returning, when she was startled to see that Respondent was there, seated at a student desk, with her head down on the desk. At about the same time, Respondent realized that Ms. Eastridge was in the room and jumped up. Ms. Eastridge asked Respondent if she was all right, and Respondent said she was fine. Ms. Eastridge put the books down and left. Thereafter, she checked with Mr. Farmer to find out if Respondent was on her break at the time, and confirmed that it was not Respondent's break time. The next day, after Respondent learned that Ms. Eastridge had spoken to Mr. Farmer about the incident, Respondent sought out Ms. Eastridge to tell her that she had not been sleeping. Ms. Eastridge told Respondent that she did not tell Mr. Farmer that Respondent had been sleeping, but told him that she found Respondent in the time-out room with the door locked and lights off, and Respondent's head down on the desk. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that Ms. Eastridge was lying about this encounter, although Respondent offered no reason why Ms. Eastridge would lie. Respondent claimed that the actual encounter between herself and Ms. Eastridge in the time- out room was over the summer, that there were no desks in the time-out room because they had been removed so the floors could be done, that Respondent was in the bathroom off of the time-out room, and that Ms. Eastridge found her there when she exited the bathroom. While the encounter Respondent described may have also occurred, Ms. Eastridge's description of a different encounter in mid-October 2012 was credible, and not credibly refuted by Respondent. Later in October 2012, Ms. Eastridge was exiting a stairwell when she observed Respondent in a confrontation with Mr. Farmer. They had their backs to her, and so they did not see her. Mr. Farmer was speaking politely and softly, attempting to go over the cleaning procedures with Respondent, explaining that she needed to clean the home science classroom first and then make sure the bathrooms are clean. Respondent responded loudly and disrespectfully, yelling at Mr. Farmer that she knew what she was supposed to be doing, and arguing with him as he was gently trying to explain why she needed to clean the areas in a certain order. Ms. Eastridge stood there for a moment to see if she needed to intervene, but Respondent and Mr. Farmer proceeded down the hallway away from Ms. Eastridge, so she just went on her way. Ms. Eastridge also observed Respondent in similar confrontations with Mr. Hancock. On one occasion during the 2012 fall semester, Ms. Eastridge came upon Respondent and Mr. Hancock in the hallway outside of the custodial office. Mr. Hancock was trying to talk to Respondent about making sure to clean the bathrooms properly. Respondent, however, was being very loud and argumentative, yelling and screaming at Mr. Hancock. Ms. Eastridge stopped to ask Mr. Hancock if she needed to intervene and assist. Respondent attempted to downplay the confrontation, saying that they were just having a conversation. Ms. Eastridge advised Respondent that she needed to conduct her conversations in a peaceful, quiet, respectful tone of voice, not yelling and screaming at Mr. Hancock. Respondent was involved in another confrontation with Mr. Hancock on December 19, 2012. At the beginning of her shift that day, Respondent had cleaned the courtyard adjacent to the cafeteria, wiping down the outdoor tables and removing the trash. She then joined the other custodians to clean the cafeteria. Respondent noticed that teachers were bringing food out to the courtyard, and she learned that they would be meeting with parents for a parent-teacher organization (PTO) meeting. Respondent got angry and started yelling at Mr. Hancock across the cafeteria that she was not going to clean up again after the teachers were done. Respondent admitted that she asked Mr. Hancock "what type of head custodian are you," and told him that it was dumb to send her out to clean the courtyard when the teachers were going out to mess it up again.4/ Respondent did not believe she was disrespectful to Mr. Hancock: "I'm only expressing and all I told him was that was a dumb -- you know, like that was a bad choice that you made[.]" After Respondent "expressed her opinion" that Mr. Hancock was a bad head custodian who made dumb choices, Mr. Hancock just walked away. Respondent followed him to make sure he was not going to report what she had said to the principal. Mr. Hancock testified credibly that Respondent was shouting at him that he had better not report her to the principal. On December 21, 2012, Mr. Farmer inspected the classrooms before the winter break. He found that several classrooms in Respondent's assigned areas had not been dusted, cleaned, or vacuumed for quite some time. Mr. Farmer had Ms. Caprarotta inspect the rooms, and she found them noticeably dirty, with corners full of dust, dirt, and paper scraps, and shelves and counters "filthy with dust." When Mr. Farmer spoke with Respondent about these problems, Respondent blamed the teachers for doing things in the classrooms to make them so dirty. Mr. Farmer ended up cleaning the rooms himself. Mr. Farmer testified credibly that Respondent was repeatedly insubordinate to him by refusing to follow his directives, and by telling him that he was not her boss and could not tell her what to do. When Mr. Farmer tried to tell Respondent to do her job, she would laugh at him and tell him that she was going to bring harassment charges against him. Respondent denied that she ever told Mr. Farmer he was not her boss, but admitted telling him that "he really not no professional on being no building supervisor. He might have supervised where he had his cabinet shop, but you're not doing it right." Respondent also denied laughing at Mr. Farmer, but admitted threatening him with harassment charges when he would tell her to do her job. As evident from the following exchange, Respondent ultimately admitted that she did not accept direction from either Mr. Hancock or Mr. Farmer, even though she acknowledged that Mr. Farmer was her direct supervisor; Respondent then tried to blame the union for her own refusal to follow Mr. Farmer's directions, as if the union somehow had led her to believe she could be insubordinate: Q: Barbara, do you not believe that a supervisor or boss should be able to direct the people that they supervise? A: I believe so. That's why I give Ms. Caprarotta so much respect because she's our boss, but because she acted like a boss, she performed like a boss. But Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock, they didn't perform like they should be telling me nothing, and I should have went to the principal. I didn't never do it. I should have went to the principal with all of this, but I never did it. * * * Q: Doesn't it mean anything to you based on the respect that you have for Ms. Caprarotta that she hired Mr. Farmer and that should mean something? A: Well, as we talking now it means something now. I have respect now. But then I wasn't thinking that way. I wasn't thinking that way. I was only thinking that she's just my boss, no one else, because the union kept throwing in my face that John [sic: Jeff] Hancock, he's not your boss, he can't tell you this, and this all I was going on. You know, you know, like miss -- like Bob Rushlow said, oh, I'm gonna file a grievance I don't even know what all the half of this stuff is. Q: Do you feel like the union misled you? A: That's right. I feel like they did. Maybe I wouldn't be doing the type of acts like I was doing. Ms. Caprarotta credibly testified to the lengths that Lexington personnel went to in their attempts to curb Respondent's misbehavior and improve her work performance, including in the performance conferences detailed above and in informal conferences with Respondent and union representatives. In one of the informal conferences with Respondent and her union representative during the 2012 fall semester, attended by Ms. Eastridge, Respondent got angry and belligerent in response to Ms. Eastridge's description of Respondent's confrontation with Mr. Farmer (addressed in paragraph 50 above). Respondent slammed her hands on the table angrily and yelled at Ms. Eastridge that she was not even there. Ms. Caprarotta personally met with Respondent many times to address the numerous incidents brought to her attention during the 2012-2013 contract year. Ms. Caprarotta tried to coach, counsel, and direct Respondent to control her temper, listen to her superiors, and just do her work. Ms. Caprarotta told Respondent that if she did not heed the warnings she had been given time and time again, she was going to lose her job. Ms. Caprarotta testified that she liked Respondent and tried hard to get her on track. For a brief period after each time they met, Respondent's performance and attitude would improve. However, Respondent would always slide back into the unacceptable pattern of disrespect and insubordination directed to the head custodian and the building supervisor, and not doing a good job cleaning her assigned areas. On January 9, 2013, Ms. Caprarotta gave Respondent a 30-day notice that she would be reassigned to the day shift. The principal made this decision because she believed it was necessary to micromanage Respondent, keeping her under the watchful eyes of the principal, assistant principals, and building supervisor. There was not really a day-shift position for another custodian, and the reassignment would leave the night shift short one custodian. This move was, therefore, not so much of a solution or chance for redemption as it was a gesture of defeat. Before the reassignment went into effect on February 11, 2013, the Lexington principal made a referral to the DPSE, requesting that Respondent be investigated for insubordination and inadequate job performance.5/ As Ms. Caprarotta explained to the DPSE investigator: I have been in an administrative position for the past 16 years. I have spent more time dealing with [Respondent] than I have with any others combined. The situation is continual with little to no progress. . . . [When the shift change goes into effect], I will have to micromanage her all day every day. . . . I do not need her during the day and the night shift will now be a person short, however, I will not tolerate the insubordinate and unprofessional behavior towards my staff any longer. Respondent was under the impression that she was doing well on the day shift. However, the arrangement could not last; Respondent's job position was needed for the night shift, for cleaning empty classrooms and bathrooms when students and teachers were gone for the day. Respondent made clear in her testimony at the hearing that she is unwilling to change her behavior. During the 2012- 2013 contract year, up to the date of her suspension, Respondent was repeatedly confrontational and disrespectful with her direct supervisor, with the head custodian when he was her acting supervisor, and with at least one assistant principal. Respondent repeatedly refused to follow reasonable directives from her direct supervisor. Respondent repeatedly refused to follow reasonable directives from the night-shift acting supervisor. Respondent repeatedly refused to follow reasonable directives from the principal, such as the directive that Respondent must take direction from the head custodian. Respondent attempted to establish at hearing that the 2013 investigation took her by surprise, because she had no idea that anyone had a problem with the quality of her work or with her behavior during the 2012-2013 contract year. This claim was not credible, and was refuted by Respondent's own testimony that was diametrically opposed to the claim of surprise. Respondent testified that she knew that her performance was under scrutiny, because Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock watched everything she did and picked on every little thing. Quite plainly, then, Respondent was aware that her supervisors were not pleased with the quality of her work, but she did not attempt to address their criticisms. Instead, Respondent viewed the criticisms and cleaning directives as provocation for her to respond angrily and disrespectfully. According to Respondent, Mr. Farmer and Mr. Hancock made her be disrespectful and insubordinate to them; they knew that if they gave her directions, she would "snap" and refuse to follow their directions. As Respondent described it: It was always whatever you have to do they would -- while I'm doing it they would steady coming in repeating the same thing over just torturing me when I already done heard them say it. And so that make me -- provoke me to snap and say I done heard that, just get out of my face, I done heard that or something like that. It's just like it was a ongoing, never stop situation on just nagging me, that's all. So it made me felt like . . . I was doing my job, but how can I finish in time if they steady come every other 30 minutes in the room saying speed up or saying the same thing over, I want you to do this or then the next one will say the same thing. Notwithstanding Respondent's perception, a supervisor's directives to a subordinate employee regarding how the supervisor wants the employee to carry out his or her job does not constitute "nagging." Rather than treating such directives as nagging or as provocation that had to be met with a harsh response to "get out of my face," Respondent should have curbed her tongue, accepted the supervision, and followed the directives as part of Respondent's job responsibility. Respondent was not entitled to free rein to work in the manner she saw fit, nor was Respondent entitled to harshly criticize her supervisors when they sought to direct Respondent in the manner in which she was to carry out her job. No credible evidence was presented to establish that the directives given to Respondent by either Mr. Farmer or Mr. Hancock were unreasonable. Instead, Respondent just disagreed with how her supervisors wanted her to perform her assignments, and bristled simply because they would tell her what they wanted her to do. For example, when Respondent was having trouble cleaning all of her assigned rooms by the end of her shift, Respondent was directed to clean her rooms in a certain order so that the most important rooms, or the rooms that had been the subject of complaints (such as the home science classroom), would be done first. Respondent disagreed with this directive, and rather than simply following orders, she argued with the directive, violated the directive, and then argued some more. Respondent told her supervisor, Mr. Farmer, that he was not qualified for his job and had no business telling her how to clean. At the hearing, Respondent stubbornly stuck to the mantra that she was only expressing her opinion when asked, and did not intend any disrespect. Respondent's claim was not believable. Surely, Respondent does not expect anyone to believe that Mr. Farmer asked Respondent for her opinion regarding whether he was qualified to supervise her. Respondent's comments were blatantly disrespectful and grossly insubordinate. Perhaps Respondent was capable of doing a good job cleaning, but with all of the time and energy she spent complaining, criticizing, and talking back to her supervisors, she proved incapable of doing her work in the remaining time. And even though Respondent acknowledged that she had problems finishing her assigned work by the end of her shift, Respondent reacted badly whenever her supervisors would tell her to hurry up, that she needed to pick up the pace in order to finish in time. Respondent reacted to such comments as provocation for another round of angry responses, yelling at her supervisors that she did not need to hear "that junk" and that they should "get out of her face." Respondent attempted to blame her inability to finish her assigned cleaning duties by the end of her shift on the extra cleaning duties she had to absorb when other custodians were absent or tardy. Respondent attempted to prove that the custodial staff at Lexington had an unusually high number of absences and tardy days during the 2012-2013 contract year, and therefore, her inability to finish her cleaning was the fault of administration for not hiring more staff. The credible evidence did not prove Respondent's theory. Attendance data was offered only for the 2012-2013 contract year; no comparative data was submitted for other years. Testimony by school officials was that the custodial staff always took a good number of days off, especially near weekends and holidays, and they were entitled to their leave time; 2012-2013 was not considered to be an unusual year in this regard. Although the attendance data offered by Respondent showed a fair amount of absences in 2012-2013, most of the absences by night shift custodians did not take place until after February 8, 2013, which was Respondent's last day working the night shift. Respondent pointed to one custodian, in particular, who missed many whole and partial days due to an on-the-job injury. However, most of those absences were after February 8, 2013. Therefore, the absences of custodial staff were not shown to be the cause of Respondent's recurring inability to finish her assigned cleaning duties when she was on the night shift through February 8, 2013. Significantly, the only other regular night shift custodian to testify, besides Respondent, said that she has always finished her assigned cleaning duties by the end of her shift, even when she has extra cleaning duties to make up for other custodians who are not working. During the 2012-2013 contract year, up until Respondent's suspension, Respondent repeatedly was told of the shortcomings in the quality of her work, from not cleaning the bathrooms properly, to not vacuuming and mopping the home science classroom floors, to not vacuuming and dusting her assigned classrooms, to not finishing her assigned cleaning duties by the end of her shift. Moreover, Respondent was well aware of the repeated confrontations she had with the head custodian, custodian, with the building supervisor, and with assistant principal Eastridge.6/ Respondent has no one but herself to blame for minimizing or trivializing these incidents, and ignoring the many warnings and chances she was given. Inexplicably, despite all the warnings Respondent had been given that her misbehavior was unacceptable and could result in termination, Respondent decided that she did not have to take the warnings seriously, because she did not think her misbehavior was unacceptable as she had been told repeatedly: I felt like disrespecting wasn't -- if you disrespect somebody, you got to be really cursing somebody out, or this here and that, or if for me to get to get to this far I have to done stole something or demolished the school or something. In terms of process, the evidence established that Petitioner followed the procedural requirements of section 7.10 of the SPALC agreement, by conducting an investigation in early 2013 upon request of the Lexington principal, by providing the investigative file to Respondent and her union representative in advance of the predetermination conference, and by conducting a predetermination conference on March 14, 2013, at which Respondent and her representative had the opportunity to respond to the investigation material. The result of that process was the Petition, and Respondent has had every opportunity in this proceeding to put Petitioner to its burden of proof and to present evidence in defense of the charges against her. As is evident to some extent from the hearing transcript, Respondent's testimony and demeanor at hearing only served to corroborate the testimony of Lexington personnel describing Respondent's chronic misbehavior. Despite numerous instructions by the undersigned and by Respondent's own lawyer, Respondent comported herself as follows: she would not listen to questions; she gave answers that did not match the questions or that went far beyond the questions; she criticized questions directed to her instead of answering; she repeatedly offered comments when there was no pending question; she repeatedly interrupted; she was angry and belligerent at times, and impatient at other times, at one point announcing to her own lawyer in the middle of his questioning: "I want to go home."7/ Respondent's lack of self-control on display at hearing added credence to the testimony of numerous witnesses describing Respondent's chronic misbehavior that was at the heart of the charges against her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Lee County School Board enter a final order terminating the employment of Barbara Rice. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the career service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Betty Pigatt, was employed by the Division of Driver Licenses, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Respondent) from February 22, 1983 until January 21, 1988. Petitioner injured her lower back in an automobile accident on April 17, 1985. She was previously disabled from a work related injury and was awarded prior temporary total disability benefits. She returned to work on June 5, 1987. Her condition became progressively worse and she again ceased work on June 27, 1987. Petitioner complained of pain in her lower back going down her left leg and into her foot. She had limited ability to stand and sit, and complained of pain and limitation of motion in her neck. Petitioner was treated by Dr. Rosabal who discharged her in late July, 1987. She thereafter was treated by Dr. William Bacon, who has treated her since August 17, 1987. By letter dated September 24, 1987, Petitioner was advised by Respondent's Division Director, James H. Cox, (Cox) that her request for leave without pay was granted beginning September 2 thru November 30, 1987. She was further advised that Respondent "requested that she send a Doctor's statement to Mr. Richard Weaver, Bureau Chief of Field Operations, explaining your medical condition and an approximate date of when you will be able to return to work". (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Petitioner was aware that she was to submit a letter of explanation of her medical condition from her physician. Petitioner failed to submit such a letter. Thereafter, Petitioner requested additional leave without pay and Cox advised Petitioner as follows: Your recent letter requesting additional leave without pay cannot be given favorable consideration until you furnish Mr. Richard Weaver, Bureau Chief of Field Operations, with a statement from your Doctor explaining your medical condition and an approximate date of when you will be able to return to work. Respondent, by its Acting Regional Director, Martha A. Castro, advised Petitioner by letter dated January 21, 1988, that her request for an extension of leave without pay had been denied and she was directed to report for duty at her assigned office at 7:00 a.m., on January 13, 1988. Petitioner did not report to work as directed on either January 13, 14, or 15, 1988. Respondent advised Petitioner by letter dated January 21, 1988, of Fred O. Dickinson, III, Deputy Executive Director of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, that as she had not reported to work for 3 consecutive work days, in accordance with Rule 22A-7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, she was considered to have abandoned her position and to have resigned effective immediately. Petitioner had received maximum medical improvement and was requested to return to work as of January 13, 1988. (Respondent's Exhibit 6). Petitioner was familiar with her rights and obligations as an employee and was responsible for knowing the contents of the Driver License Examiner's Manual. On page 240 of the Examiner's Manual which was in use during Petitioner's employment is the requirement that leave without pay must be authorized by the Director of the Division of Driver Licenses. Petitioner did not obtain authorized leave without pay from the Director of the Division of Driver Licenses as required.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from career service, and denying Petitioner's request that she be reinstated to her position of employment. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-1163 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed factual findings: Adopted as modified, paragraph 1, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 9, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 4, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 5, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 6, R.O. Adopted, last sentence paragraph 6, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 7, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 8, R.O. First sentence adopted and the remainder rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne G. Printy, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Betty Pigatt 1262 Northwest 172nd Terrace Miami, Florida 33169 Michael Alderman, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0555 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
