The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated September 26, 2006, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for inspecting and regulating public food service establishments in Florida. Respondent is a food service establishment licensed and regulated by the Department holding License No. 5811184. On September 21, 2006, Alex Chu inspected the premises of Respondent. Mr. Chu prepared a Food Service Inspection Report which noted, 35A-04-01-1; Observed rodent activity as evidenced by rodent droppings found. OBSERVED HUNDREDS OF FRESH AND OLD RODENT DROPPINGS ON 3 DIFFERENT SHELVES WITH FOOD ITEMS AND SINGLE-USE ITEMS IN DRY STORAGE AREA. THE DRY STORAGE AREA IS OPEN AND PART OF THE KITCHEN. ESTABLISHMENT IS OPEN/OPERATING AND SERVING FOOD TO THE PUBLIC DURING INSPECTION. Mr. Chu determined that the presence of rodent droppings constituted a "critical violation" that warranted immediate closure of the restaurant. A critical violation is one that if not corrected, is more likely than other violations to cause an imminent food-borne illness, contamination, or environmental hazard. Respondent, through its co-owner, was immediately made aware of the presence of rodent droppings and the "critical" nature of this violation. On September 19, 2006, Massey Services had performed pest control services on the restaurant premises at the owner's request due to the presence of rodent droppings. There is an established protocol regarding critical violations and immediate closure of the restaurant establishment. This process involves an expedited decision made in Tallahassee based on the local report of a critical violation. Typically, it takes about two hours, as it did in this case. The inspector then returns to the violating licensee, posts a "closed" sign on the premises, and explains the licensee's opportunity for remediation. A "call-back" inspection is conducted within 24 hours after closure. On September 22, 2006, Mr. Chu re-inspected Respondent's premises. It was determined that the premises had been extensively cleaned during the previous night, that rodent droppings were found during the cleaning (although not "hundreds of rodent droppings"), and the restaurant was re-opened.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Brothers and Sisters Barbeque, Inc., violated Rule 6-501.111, Food Code; that a fine in the total amount of $250.00 be imposed for this violation; and that the owner(s) of Respondent be required to attend, at personal expense, an educational program sponsored by the Hospitality Education Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Harrison’s is licensed by the Division as a permanent food service establishment. Harrison’s license number is 6213138. Laura Kennedy, a sanitation and safety inspector for the Division, conducted a routine inspection of Harrison’s on March 16, 2005. Based upon her inspection, Ms. Kennedy documented 28 areas in which Harrison’s was in violation of the statutes and rules governing restaurant operations. One of the violations, No. 35A-01, was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation of ten dead roaches in Harrison’s dry storage area. She required Harrison’s to correct that violation within 24 hours. Ms. Kennedy conducted a “call-back” inspection of Harrison’s on March 17, 2005, to determine whether the roaches had been cleaned up, which they had been. Ms. Kennedy gave Harrison’s 30 days to correct the remainder of the violations that she documented during her inspection on March 16, 2005. Ms. Kennedy conducted a “call-back” inspection of Harrison’s on April 19, 2005, to determine whether the other violations had been corrected. During the inspection, Ms. Kennedy noted that some of the violations had been corrected, but that others had not been corrected. Five of the uncorrected violations were “critical” violations because, according to Ms. Kennedy, they posed an immediate threat to the public health. Three of the uncorrected violations were “non-critical” because, according to Ms. Kennedy, they posed a risk to the public health but not an immediate threat. The critical violations that had not been corrected at the time of Ms. Kennedy’s “call-back” inspection on April 19, 2005, were Nos. 45-17, 45-10, 45-30, 46-11, and 8A-04. Violation No. 45-17 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation that the tag on the fire suppression system on the hood over the cooking area was out of date. The tag is supposed to be updated every six months, but the tag observed by Ms. Kennedy at Harrison’s was dated July 2003. Violation No. 45-10 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation that the portable fire extinguishers were out of date. Fire extinguisher tags are supposed to be updated every year, but the tags on the extinguishers at Harrison’s reflected that two of them had not been inspected since December 2002 and another had not been inspected since July 2003. Violation No. 45-30 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation that Harrison’s did not have the required inspection report for the fire suppression system for the hood over the cooking area. The purpose of requiring a current tag and inspection report on the hood fire suppression system and current tags on the portable fire extinguishers is to ensure that those devices are in good working order in the event of a fire. As a result, the out-of-date tags are considered to be critical violations. Violation No. 46-11 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation that the emergency exit signs over Harrison’s side doors and the back door were not illuminated. This is a critical violation because the purpose of the illuminated signs is to guide restaurant patrons to an exit in the event of an emergency. Violation No. 8A-04 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation of uncovered food in the walk-in cooler. This is a critical violation because uncovered food is subject to contamination. The non-critical violations that had not been corrected at the time of Ms. Kennedy’s “call-back” inspection on April 19, 2005, were Nos. 32-14, 22-02, and 23-01. Violation No. 32-14 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation that there was no hand-washing soap at a sink in the kitchen. The absence of soap did not pose an immediate threat to the public health, but it is required so that employees involved in the preparation of food can wash their hands for their own hygiene and for the protection of the restaurant’s patrons. Violation No. 22-02 was based upon Ms. Kennedy’s observation of built-up of grease in the oven. Violation No. 23-01 was based on Ms. Kennedy's observation of built-up of grease on the sides of equipment in the cooking area. The built-up grease did not pose an immediate threat to the public safety, but cleanliness in the cooking area is important so as not to attract vermin and to prevent contamination of the food being cooked. Ms. Kennedy documented the violations described above on the Food Service Inspection Reports that she prepared at the time of her inspections. Copies of the reports were provided to Harrison’s at the end of each inspection, as reflected by the signature of Rafma Balla on each report. Mr. Balla is identified on the reports as Harrison’s manager/owner. The record does not reflect whether the violations described above have been corrected by Harrison’s since Ms. Kennedy’s last inspection on April 19, 2005. Harrison’s was provided due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing, but no appearance was made on its behalf at the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order that: Imposes an administrative fine of $2,600 on Harrison’s for Violation Nos. 45-17, 45-10, 45-30, 46-11, 8A-04, and 32-14, payable on terms prescribed by the Division in the final order; and Requires Harrison’s to correct the critical violations related to the portable fire extinguishers, hood fire suppression system, and exit signs within 15 days of the date of the final order, and to provide proof thereof to the Division; and Requires Harrison's owner and/or manager to attend an educational program sponsored by the Hospitality Education Program within 60 days of the date of the final order, and to provide proof thereof to the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2005.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are stated in the counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint for each case: Whether Falcon Catering Service No. 7 (hereinafter "Falcon 7") and Falcon Catering Service No. 8 (hereinafter "Falcon 8") failed to maintain the proper protection and temperature requirements for food sold from their mobile site in violation of the federal Food and Drug Administration Food Code ("Food Code"). In the Prehearing Stipulation filed in this matter, each Respondent generally admitted to the violations in the Administrative Complaints, but suggested that mitigating factors should absolve them of the charges or greatly reduce any administrative fine imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Division is responsible for monitoring all licensed food establishments in the state. It is the Division's duty to ensure that all such establishments comply with the standards set forth in relevant statutes and rules. Respondents Falcon 7 and Falcon 8 are licensed mobile food dispensing vehicles. Falcon 7 has license No. MFD5852560, which was initially issued on April 23, 2005; Falcon 8 has license No. MFD5852642, which was issued on October 19, 2005. Each of the Respondents serves meals and snacks to, inter alia, laborers at construction sites. On or about March 13, 2009, the Division conducted a food service inspection on Falcon 7. At that time, the food truck was located at 4880 Distribution Court, Orlando, Florida. One of the Food Code violations found by the inspector was Item 53b. That citation meant there was no validation of employee training on the truck. A follow-up inspection was deemed to be required. On April 10, 2009, a follow-up inspection was conducted by the Division. At that time, Item 53b was cited as a repeat offense. Also, Item 8a was cited. Item 8a refers to protection of food from contaminants and keeping food at an acceptable temperature. Notes by the inspector indicate that a further violation of Item 8a occurred because customers were allowed to serve themselves directly from food containers, and there was no fan in operation during the serving of food. On May 28, 2009, another inspection of Falcon 7 was conducted. At that time, the food truck was located at 12720 South Orange Blossom Trail, Orlando, Florida. Item 8a was again cited as a deficiency. The inspector's notes indicate that food was not properly protected from contamination and that customers were being served "buffet style" from the back of the truck. The inspector noted that this was a repeat violation. A follow-up or "call-back" inspection was conducted on December 3, 2009, at which time the temperature in Orlando was unusually cold. The food truck was at the same address on Orange Blossom Trail as noted in the prior inspection. Falcon 7 was again found to have been serving food buffet style from the back of the food truck. An Item 8a violation was again noted by the inspector. Another inspection of Falcon 7 was conducted on January 19, 2010, another very cold day in Orlando. At that time, the food truck was located at the same site as the last two inspections. The inspector cited the food truck for an Item 8a violation again, stating that the food was not being protected from contaminants. Dust was flying up on the back of the truck to exposed food items. An inspection of Falcon 8 was conducted on August 25, 2009, while the truck was located at 4880 Distribution Court, Orlando, Florida. An Item 8a violation was noted by the inspector, who found that displayed food was not properly protected from contaminants. The food truck was located under an Interstate 4 overpass and was open to flying debris. The inspector noted that customers were being served buffet style and that there was no protection of food from contamination by the customers. A follow-up inspection for Falcon 8 was conducted on August 27, 2009, at 9:12 a.m., while the food truck was located at the same site. Another Item 8a violation was cited at that time. The violation notes indicate essentially the same situation that had been cited in the initial inspection two days earlier. Less than one hour after the follow-up inspection, another inspection was conducted on Falcon 8 at the same location as the prior two inspections. There were no Item 8a citations issued during this inspection, but the food truck was found to have no water available for hand washing. The food truck employee was using a hand sanitizer to clean her hands. Respondents do not dispute the facts set forth above. However, Respondents provided mitigating facts for consideration in the assessment of any penalty that might be imposed. Those mitigating factors are as follows: The food trucks were serving an inordinately large number of workers during the dates of the inspections. The City of Orlando was constructing its new basketball arena, and there were numerous laborers involved in the project. In order to serve the workers, it was necessary for the food trucks to put their food out on tables, rather than ladle the food directly from the food warmers in the food truck. In fact, the shelves in the food trucks are so narrow that dipping food out of the warmers would be impossible. Due to the cold weather in Orlando during this time, it was impossible to keep the food at acceptable temperature levels for very long. The large number of workers washing their hands at the food trucks caused the trucks to run out of water much more quickly than normal. When the water ran out, the employees took care to sanitize their hands as well as possible. Ms. Falcon testified that the inspector's testimony concerning use of tables to serve food was erroneous. However, Sabrina Falcon was not present during the inspections, and her contradictory testimony is not reliable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, imposing a fine of $500.00 against Falcon Catering Service, No. 7, in DOAH Case No. 10-10925; and a fine of $750.00 against Falcon Catering Service, No. 8, in DOAH Case No. 10-10930. All fines should be paid within 30 days of the entry of the Final Order by the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William L. Veach, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Sabrina Falcon Falcon Catering Service 642 Mendoza Drive Orlando, Florida 32825 Megan Demartini, Qualified Representative Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's applications to renew her Licenses to Possess Class II and III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is the state agency that has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the possession, sale, and display of captive wildlife in Florida. Before moving to her current residence in Kissimmee, Petitioner resided in Tampa, where she possessed a bobcat kitten and a kinkajou, a small rain forest creature. In May 2012, she advised the Commission by email that she intended to move to Central Florida. She requested that the Commission provide her with copies of rules that would apply if she kept a bobcat inside her new residence. In response to that request, the Commission provided her with copies of all applicable rules. She was also told that, in order to secure the bobcat, she would have to install chain link on her windows and a secondary safety entrance to the home. These features are necessary in order to ensure public safety. On an undisclosed date, Petitioner moved to a 2,000 square-foot home located at 8520 Sioux Trail, Kissimmee, where she established a captive wildlife facility. Later, she acquired two more bobcats, which she intended to use for presentations and educational shows in the Central Florida area. For that purpose, she formed Florida's C.L.A.W.S., an unincorporated organization that exhibits and sells wildlife at local events in Central Florida to educate the public about, and raise money for, the care of her animals. Her full-time vocation, however, is a tattoo artist, which requires that she work around 60 hours per week, often late into the night and during the early morning hours. "Captive wildlife" species are listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 68A-6.002. The rule establishes three classes of captive wildlife: I, II, and III. Each requires a license issued by the Commission. Until it expired on March 5, 2015, Petitioner possessed a Class II license, issued on March 14, 2014, which allowed the exhibition and sale of Felidae (the family of cats). Until it expired on June 10, 2015, she also possessed a Class III license, first issued on June 3, 2011, which allowed the exhibition and sale of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and conditional species. By holding these licenses, she was responsible for the care of the captive wildlife at her facility. The instant case involves her applications to renew the two licenses. After her licenses expired and the two applications for renewal denied, on July 1, 2015, a Notice to Relinquish Wildlife was issued by the Commission. In response to that order, Petitioner moved her Class II and III captive wildlife to a friend's facility, where they remain pending the outcome of this proceeding. Currently, she keeps only dogs and cats at her home. When the Kissimmee facility was fully operational, Petitioner had more than 30 animals/reptiles, including foxes, bobcats, skunks, snakes (non-venomous), tegu lizards, and a kinkajou. All of these species are listed as captive wildlife in rule 68A-6.002. On February 25, 2014, an announced, routine inspection of Petitioner's facility was conducted by Captive Wildlife Investigator Damon Saunders. This type of inspection is required when a new facility is established. During the inspection, Investigator Saunders observed seven rule infractions, which are noted in his report and depicted in photographs taken that day. See Resp. Ex. C and D. Overall, he found the condition of the facility to be "substandard." The documented violations on February 25, 2014, are as follows: There was no safety entrance for the bobcat enclosure, as required by rule 68A- 6.003(1)(a); There was rusting that affected the structural integrity of the bobcat enclosure, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(e); Weld spots on the east side of the bobcat enclosure were coming undone due to corrosion in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(2)(b), which requires caging or enclosures to be sufficiently strong to prevent escape and to protect the caged animal from injury; The kinkajou was housed in a bird cage, in violation of rule 68A-6.004, which requires a cage size of six feet by eight feet, and six feet high; There was no record for the source of acquisition for her reticulated python, which is required by rule 68A-6.0023(6); A microchip passive integrated transponder (PIT) tag was not detected for the reticulated python; a PIT tag is required by rule 68-5.001(3)(e)2.; and The fox and various reptile enclosures had dirty water bowls, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(b), which requires water containers being used to be clean. At the end of the inspection, Investigator Saunders met with Petitioner and identified each infraction he observed; he explained how each should be corrected; and he told her that she had 30 days, or until March 27, 2014, to correct the violations. She was also given a copy of the Commission's captive wildlife rules, with the violated rules highlighted. Although Investigator Saunders observed several other violations that day, they were not noted on his inspection report because he knew the facility had just been established, and he wished to give Petitioner additional time in which to get her facility operating in accordance with all rules. On July 28, 2014, or approximately five months later, an unannounced, follow-up inspection was conducted by Captive Wildlife Investigators Steven McDaniel and Rick Brown. The purpose of the inspection was to determine if the violations observed on February 25, 2014, had been corrected. The inspection was purposely delayed until July, rather than 30 days after the first inspection, so that Petitioner would have adequate time to take corrective action. Petitioner complained that the inspection occurred when she just awoke around 10:20 a.m., after a long night at work and before she had time to clean the facility. For obvious reasons, however, the Commission does not give licensees advance warning of follow-up inspections. During the inspection, the investigators noted that Petitioner had six foxes, three bobcats, two skunks, a kinkajou, a reticulated python, and several nonvenomous snakes. With the exception of the safety entrance for the exterior bobcat cage, Petitioner acknowledged that none of the violations observed during the first inspection had been corrected. The investigators found some wildlife living in outdoor cages or other enclosures, while others, including two skunks, a bobcat, a kinkajou, a reticulated python, and several reptiles, were living in her home. Investigator McDaniel testified that "it looked as if very little had been done" and characterized the condition of the wildlife as "mediocre to poor." Investigator Brown noted that there was an "extreme" lack of care of the wildlife, the violations were "serious," and they were having an adverse impact on the health and well-being of the wildlife. The investigators observed a number of rule violations, which are listed in their Inspection Report and depicted in photographs taken that day. See Resp. Ex. E and F. The rule violations are summarized below: The outer safety door for the cage containing two bobcats was unsecured, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(2)(b), which requires the cage to be sufficiently strong to prevent escape; There was standing, stagnant water in the bobcat shelter, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(1), which requires wildlife to be maintained in sanitary conditions; Both the bobcats' water container and water in the container were dirty, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(b), which requires water containers being used to be clean and requires clean drinking water to be provided daily; There were large amounts of old and fresh fecal matter throughout the bobcat cage, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(d), which requires fecal waste to be removed daily from inside, under, and around cages and stored or disposed of in a manner which prevents noxious odors or pests; and carrion flies were evident on the fecal matter; The bobcat cage floor had not been raked every three days, as required by rule 68A- 6.0023(5)(e); The rust in the bobcat cage that was observed during the February 25 inspection was still evident and excessive, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(e), which requires any surface of a cage or enclosure that may come into contact with animals to be free of excessive rust that prevents the required cleaning or that affects the structural strength; The broken welds on parts of the cage panel walls on the bobcat cage observed during the February 25 inspection had not been repaired, in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(2)(b), which requires caging or enclosures to be sufficiently strong to prevent escape and to protect the caged animal from injury; The cage for the two foxes measured ten feet by five feet, two inches by six feet, and did not meet the caging requirements of eight feet by six feet by six feet specified in rule 68A-6.004(4)(h)2.a.; A fox was found in a small kennel cage inside Petitioner's home under veterinary care for an injured foot in violation of rule 68A-6.0041(2), which requires animals being temporarily housed in smaller cages for veterinary care to be in cages no smaller than that required for the caged animal to stand up, lie down, and turn around without touching the sides of the enclosure or another animal; Digging was observed between outdoor fox cages exposing the bottom apron in violation of rule 68A-6.003(1)(b)1., which requires the bottom apron to be buried to prevent injury to the captive wildlife in the enclosure; Two snakes in the bull/gopher snake family were observed in their own cages without water and a ball python was observed in a glass cage without water in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(b), which requires that clean drinking water be provided daily; The ball python was in a glass cage with shed skin and old fecal matter; there were two Machlot's pythons in a large cage that was littered with excessive old fecal matter and old shed skins; a boa constrictor cage had old fecal matter in it; the reticulated python cage had old fecal matter and shed skins throughout the cage; the tegu lizard cage had old feces; all in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(d), which requires fecal material to be removed daily, and rule 68A-6.0023(5)(e), which requires hard floors within cages or enclosures to be cleaned a minimum of once weekly; The kinkajou was still housed in the bird cage, which was too small; there was no water or food present; the floor of the cage was covered in old fecal matter; and Petitioner admitted that the cage had not been cleaned in four days. These conditions violated rule 68A-6.0023(5)(b) and (c), which requires the animals to be provided clean drinking water and food; The third bobcat was being housed inside Petitioner's house in a spare bedroom lacking a safety entrance as required by rule 68A-6.003(1)(a); the two doors leading into the room were hollow-core doors and not of sufficient strength, and there was no required wire or grating covering the windows, in violation of rule 68A- 6.003(3)(e), which requires potential escape routes to be equipped with wire or grating of not less than 11.5-gauge chain link or equivalent; Two skunks were housed in a spare bedroom that adjoined the bobcat cage room; the floor was covered in mainly old, but some new, smeared fecal matter; there were no water bowls; the bathroom window was open and only covered by the typical bug screen associated with household windows; all in violation of rule 68A-6.0023(5)(d), which requires cages and enclosures to be ventilated to prevent noxious odors, and rule 68A-6.003(3)(h), which requires the room to be constructed of materials of not less than 14-gauge wire or strength equivalent and the escape routes to be secured; Petitioner was unable to provide records of acquisition of any animals in her possession, as required by rules 68A-6.0023(6) and 68-5.001(3)(e).6.; and Petitioner's Critical Incident Disaster Plan was only partially completed, in violation of rules 68A-6.0022(7) and 68-5.001(3)(e)5. Each of these violations is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. At the conclusion of the inspection, Petitioner was given another copy of the Commission's rules, with the violated rules highlighted; she was told how each infraction should be corrected; she was asked if she had any questions regarding the violations; and she was given another copy of the first inspection report. A new 30-day deadline was established for correcting all violations except the source of acquisition and critical incident plan, for which she was given 60 days to take corrective action. However, no follow-up inspections were made. Petitioner contends that if the follow-up inspection on July 28, 2014, was made later than 10:30 a.m., she would have had time to feed and water the wildlife and clean their cages. However, the amount and appearance of the feces, the presence of snake skins, and the appearance of dirty water bowls in the enclosures indicates that the enclosures had not been cleaned for an extended period of time. During the first inspection, Petitioner identified the source of acquisition of all wildlife, except the reticulated python. After the first inspection, Petitioner acquired a boa constrictor, two Macklot's pythons, four tegus, two carpet pythons, one gopher snake, one bull snake, four sulcatta tortoises, one blue tongue skink (lizard), and one Central American wood turtle. However, she was unable to produce acquisition paperwork for any captive wildlife. She blamed this on the fact that many of her wildlife were donated to her or purchased at exhibitions, apparently meaning that the names of the donors or sellers were unknown. Acquisition information is essential, as the Commission uses these records to combat the illegal trafficking of wildlife. Petitioner blamed many of the facility violations on a lack of financial resources and personal issues in her life that arose in 2014, leaving her with little time or resources to comply with Commission rules. She pointed out that an injury to one of the foxes required an expenditure of almost $2,000.00 in one month alone, which drained her resources; her father was diagnosed with a terminal illness and passed away a short time later; and her fiancée required two surgeries, which prevented him from assisting her in caring for the wildlife. She also testified that she was working 60-hour weeks as a tattoo artist to support herself, which left very little time to care for the wildlife. Given these time constraints, it is surprising that she continued to acquire even more wildlife after the first inspection was made. While Petitioner maintains that the exhibition and sale of animals is intended to support her facility, it is apparent that whatever money was generated by that activity is insufficient to adequately care for the wildlife. In sum, Petitioner contends that many of the violations are unwarranted or simply technical violations of the rules, or other circumstances prevented her from taking corrective action and maintaining the facility in accordance with Commission rules. The evidence belies this contention. Although the Commission presented evidence of alleged violations of United States Department of Agriculture rules observed during an inspection by that agency on June 30, 2015, for which warnings were issued, these violations were not cited in the Notice of Denial as a basis for denying the applications and have been disregarded by the undersigned. See, e.g., Chrysler v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 627 So. 2d 31, 34 (Fla. DCA 1993)(matters not charged in an administrative action cannot be considered as violations). Likewise, Petitioner's contention that the Commission failed to act on her applications within 90 days, raised for the first time during her testimony, has been disregarded as being untimely. See also § 120.60(1), Fla. Stat. Although each infraction noted during the second inspection constituted a violation of state law, a criminal citation for only three violations was issued and reported to the local State Attorney's Office. These included a failure to correct the violations noted during the February inspection; maintaining captive wildlife in unsanitary conditions; and improper caging for Class II wildlife. However, the State Attorney decided to prosecute Petitioner for all violations. On July 28, 2014, criminal charges were filed in County Court. On advice of her counsel, on April 24, 2015, Petitioner pled guilty to all charges and was adjudicated guilty of maintaining captive wildlife in unsanitary conditions in violation of section 379.401(7). Besides having a fine imposed, Petitioner was placed on probation for six months and required to perform community service. Under the terms of her probation, she was ineligible to possess Class I or II wildlife for the duration of her six-month probation period. Just before her criminal case was concluded, Petitioner filed applications to renew her licenses. A major impediment to approving them is a Commission rule that requires denial of an application if the applicant has been adjudicated guilty of a violation of any provision of chapter 379. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68-1.010(2). The same rule provides, however, that denial is not automatic, as the Commission is required to consider nine factors when determining whether to approve or deny an application. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68-1.010(5)(a)- (i). After considering each relevant factor, the Commission issued its Notice of Denial on June 11, 2015. Petitioner then requested a hearing. Petitioner unquestionably cares for wildlife and would never intentionally harm them through inattention or lack of care. However, due to personal and financial issues, and full- time employment outside her home that consumes much of her time, she is unable to comply with Commission rules for operating a captive wildlife facility. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the Commission's denial of the applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife and Conservation Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner's applications for Class II and III Wildlife licenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugene Nichols "Nick" Wiley, II, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Rachel Arnott 8520 Sioux Trail Kissimmee, Florida 34747-1531 (eServed) Ryan Smith Osborne, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Harold G. "Bud" Vielhauer, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Petitioner, Kimberly Wysong, is entitled to approval of her application to add authorization for the family giraffidae to her license to possess Class I and/or Class II wildlife for exhibition or public sale.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner currently holds a license to handle certain Class I and/or Class II animals, e.g., Class I baboons and Class II primates. She is currently employed by Jerry Holly, and along with other full-time and part-time employees, takes care of a number of exotic animals. The Agency is responsible for determining if applicants meet the criteria for issuance of a license, permit or other authorization to possess giraffidae under Florida Administrative Code Rules 68A-6.002(3), 68A-6.0011 and 68A-6.022. The Application On January 25, 2017, the Petitioner wrote to the Agency requesting to add giraffidae to her license. The application included two letters of recommendation and a spreadsheet detailing 1,003 hours spent working with a giraffe owned by Rhudy Holly. The information that the Petitioner sent to the Agency is the type of information she and others in her industry typically submit when requesting authorization to handle other animals. In response to a request for additional information, the Petitioner provided clarification of her hours and a copy of her current license. The spreadsheet documented hours spent with the giraffe between October 19, 2015, and January 23, 2017. The documented time averaged six hours per day and showed that the time was spent doing a combination of enrichment, cleaning, husbandry/handling, and feeding. The Petitioner testified that she noted her hours on a daily basis and then entered the hours into an Excel spreadsheet at the end of each week. For the first two weeks, the Petitioner started working with the giraffe under the supervision of its owner, Rhudy Holly. Mr. Holly has had his license to handle giraffes for at least five years and started working with them around 2007. Mr. Holly taught the Petitioner how to take care of the giraffe. He went over the basics until he was comfortable that she understood the giraffe’s behavior and mannerisms and she could safely handle the giraffe. He checked on her progress periodically. He also has an employee who works with the giraffe who was also available to the Petitioner for any questions or help with the giraffe. The Petitioner described a typical day working with the giraffe. In the mornings, she spent about two and a half hours cleaning the feed area, then gathering and loading fresh feed. Cleaning the feed area requires shifting the giraffe out of the barn to his outdoor enclosure. Coaxing the giraffe to leave the barn and go outside can take up to 45 minutes because the giraffe is a shy and skittish animal and cannot be rushed. Once the giraffe is outside, the Petitioner cleans the feed area including his troth and buckets and then refills them. She then coaxes the giraffe to come back into the barn using cut branches (“browses”), romaine lettuce or various fruits. Mr. Holly testified that two and a half hours was typical for these activities when you are learning how to handle and take care of the giraffe. At midday, the Petitioner returned for about two hours to clean the feed area of the barn again and also to pressure wash the barn. Mr. Holly testified that the barn is large and two hours was not an unusual amount of time to spend on these activities. In the afternoon, the Petitioner returned for about one and a half hours to clean and shift the giraffe back into the barn. Each visit included enrichment. Enrichment consisted of spending time interacting with the giraffe, which can include stimulation and entertainment using branches, treats, and even spoons hung on the fence for play. The Petitioner was able to devote an average of six hours per day to taking care of the giraffe because she has a full-time employee who helps take care of the primates and a part-time employee who helps with cage repairs and maintenance. The Denial On May 26, 2017, the Agency issued its Notice of Denial. It stated that because the Petitioner’s current job is full-time, “it does not appear that [she] had time to obtain the required experience hours for giraffidae.” The denial went on to state that the Agency “has reason to believe that six hours per day is an unreasonable amount of time to spend caring for one giraffe and therefore, that these hours have been falsified.” Furthermore, the denial stated that the Petitioner “in a conversation with FWC Investigator Steven McDaniel . . . stated [she] spent about half of the documented experience hours sitting and observing the giraffe.” The denial states that “observation time” cannot be claimed to meet the experience requirements of the rule. The Petitioner and Mr. Holly testified that there were no chairs at the giraffe’s barn and enclosure for “sitting.” In addition, Mr. Holly testified that references to observation was time spent using branches and other treats for enrichment, to learn and understand the giraffe’s “body language and behavior,” and “was also a way for them to sort of build a bond.” In his opinion these activities were part of husbandry, i.e., “everything that goes into taking care of that giraffe.” The Agency did not offer any contrary factual or expert testimony regarding husbandry of giraffes. The Petitioner testified persuasively that she expended the time required to obtain her experience hours, that she did not falsify the hours submitted in her application, and that she did not spend half of her hours just sitting and observing the giraffe. Investigator McDaniels’ testimony showed that the Agency only made a cursory attempt to verify the Petitioner’s hours. The Agency did not contact Mr. Holly, although he wrote a letter of recommendation as part of the Petitioner’s application; and Investigator McDaniel did not actually observe the Petitioner’s interactions with the giraffe.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that FWC enter a final order granting the Petitioner’s request to add giraffidae to her license to possess Class I and/or Class II wildlife for exhibition or public sale. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRANCINE M. FFOLKES Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: William John Cook, Esquire Barker and Cook, P.A. Suite 1040 501 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Tyler N. Parks, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Bridget Kelly McDonnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Eugene Nichols "Nick" Wiley II, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Harold G. "Bud" Vielhauer, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed)
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of employment discrimination, based on age or marital status, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and, if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was born in 1940 or 1941. He has a high school education, and he has obtained some credits toward an associate’s degree in computer science/business management. Petitioner is married, but his children are grown and no longer living at home. Petitioner worked for 30 years with a large manufacturer, which reduced its workforce and terminated him. Shortly prior to moving to Florida in 1993, Petitioner worked for two and one-half years with the fish and game division of the Enfield, Connecticut, police department, enforcing fishing and hunting laws and dealing with animals. In April 1994, Petitioner applied with Respondent for the position of animal control officer. In May 1994, Keith Larson, Director of Animal Control, telephoned Petitioner and scheduled an interview for the following week. During this telephone call, Mr. Larson and Petitioner briefly discussed his animal control experience with the Enfield police department. Mr. Larson said that Petitioner sounded like a good candidate, and Petitioner felt that he had a good chance to get the job. During the interview, which took place on May 27, 1994, Mr. Larson asked Petitioner, “Do you really think you can get through the animal control course at this time of your life?” Petitioner replied in the affirmative. Mr. Larson also asked Respondent if he were married and if his wife would mind him working the “crazy hours” required of an animal control officer because wives sometimes caused problems. Petitioner assured him that his wife would present no problems. At the time, Petitioner has been working as a Wells Fargo security officer at the courthouse. A few days after his interview, he learned from a deputy that Mr. Larson had hired someone else for the animal control position. Shortly after learning that Mr. Larson had not chosen him for the job, Petitioner complained to Ms. Linda Skelton, presently Respondent’s Human Resources Manager and then one of Respondent’s Employee Relations Supervisors. Petitioner complained about the questions that Mr. Larson had asked during the interview. Ms. Skelton conducted an investigation, which consisted entirely of talking to Mr. Larson, who denied making any of the statements. Ms. Skelton then informed Petitioner that she had found no evidence of discrimination, but referred him to the Florida Commission on Human Relations and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, if he wished to pursue the matter further. She encouraged Petitioner to reapply for an animal control position and promised a fair interview if he did. Choosing not to pursue legal relief, Petitioner reapplied for an animal control position four more times in the year following the unsuccessful initial application. On the first three reapplications, Mr. Larson declined to offer Petitioner an interview. On the fourth reapplication, Mr. Larson granted Petitioner another interview. On Petitioner’s fourth reapplication, Mr. Larson, in consultation with Ms. Skelton, arranged for a panel of County employees to interview candidates. The panel consisted of two firefighters, who were not familiar with the duties of animal control officers, and an animal control officer. Mr. Larson did not speak to any of the three panelists about their deliberations, so as to isolate himself from the selection process. However, the panelists knew Mr. Larson had formed the panel due to Petitioner’s earlier complaint about age and marital discrimination. The panel conducted its interviews in May 1995. The panelists were not particularly well-prepared to conduct interviews. The most prominent shortcoming emerged when one of the firefighters asked Petitioner’s brother, who was also interviewing for the animal control position, who was older-- Petitioner or his brother. The panelists did not take notes during the interviews. They administered a short written test to each applicant; during Petitioner’s test, one panelist continued to talk to him. Petitioner took offense at this distraction, as well as the waste of time spent on a discussion of Petitioner’s martial arts background. Given the simplicity of the test, the distraction was harmless, as was the discussion of martial arts. The deficiencies of the panel are attributable to the unsuitability of the panelists for their task; this was the first time that the panelists had interviewed applicants for an animal control position. After considering all of the applicants, the panelists recommended that Mr. Larson not hire any of the applicants, but instead try to obtain new applicants for the opening. Mr. Larson accepted this recommendation and readvertised the position. Petitioner did not apply for this or any subsequent animal control opening. After conducting another round of interviews, the panelists recommended that Mr. Larson hire Catherine Katzman. Mr. Larson did so. This was the last time that Mr. Larson used the panel to interview applicants for an animal control position. Petitioner’s career and education have had almost nothing to do with animal control. Although the record is not particularly well-developed on these points, it does not appear that much of the animal control officer’s duties in Charlotte County involve undomesticated animals, and it does not appear that much of Petitioner’s duties in the fish and game division of the Enfield police department involved domesticated animals. The job description for the animal control position calls for someone to apprehend animals and enforce the County’s animal control ordinances. The educational and physical demands are modest: graduation from a high school or vocational school with “some animal contact work experience” and “moderate physical activity.” The job description notes that the position requires knowledge of animal control procedures, relevant local law, and the geography of Charlotte County, as well as an ability to work with the public. Petitioner is qualified for each animal control position that Mr. Larson sought to fill. However, Petitioner’s qualifications are minimal and easily bettered by other applicants. Following the May 1994 interview, Mr. Larson hired William Pahl, who was in his 20s, married, and the father of at least two young children. Mr. Pahl had already earned his animal control certificate and had worked for two years as an animal control officer in Lee County. Mr. Pahl was considerably more qualified than Petitioner. The next person whom Mr. Larson hired, instead of Petitioner, was Charles Owensby, who had a high school degree and was in his 40s. Mr. Owensby had already earned his animal control certificate and had worked for three years as an animal control officer in Lee County, ten months as a veterinary technician, and 15 years as a dog trainer. Mr. Owensby was considerably more qualified than Petitioner. The next person whom Mr. Larson hired, instead of Petitioner, was James Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox had no prior experience in animal control. He was in his mid 20s. Mr. Larson based his decision to hire Mr. Wilcox on his ability to mold him into an ideal animal control officer. The record does not reveal if a factor other than youth contributed to Mr. Larson’s determination that Mr. Wilcox could be molded into the ideal animal control officer. Mr. Wilcox had only a high school education and his work experience was unimpressive, consisting of grocery store clerk (five months), outdoor furniture assembler (11 months), short-order cook and handyman at restaurant (five months), lawn maintenance (seven months), and--most recently--handyman at a resort (10 months). Again, the record is not particularly well- developed, but Mr. Larson promoted Mr. Wilcox to Animal Control Supervisor at some point, presumably due to Mr. Wilcox’s good work. Mr. Wilcox left the Animal Control Department after two or three years to join the Charlotte County Fire Department. Mr. Wilcox was not as qualified as Petitioner for the animal control position. Petitioner had some tangentially relevant experience; Mr. Wilcox had none. Petitioner had an impressive employment history; Mr. Wilcox did not. The next person whom Mr. Larson hired, rather than Petitioner, was Cheryl Vanande. She had earned a college degree, but had no relevant experience. Ms. Vanande had worked as an energy conservation specialist for a power company (four and one- half years), yellow pages salesperson (nearly two years), and automobile sales and leasing representative (one and one-half years). While serving in the naval reserves, Ms. Vanande had supervised up to 68 persons. Also, her annual earnings had consistently been about $24,000. Ms. Vanande was married and in her 30s. Despite the lack of direct animal control experience, Ms. Vanande was probably more qualified than Petitioner. The last person whom Mr. Larson hired, instead of Petitioner, was Catherine Katzman, whom he hired after the second round of interviews in June 1995. Ms. Katzman had worked for two years at an animal shelter in Charlotte County, where her responsibilities included care for fractious animals. She had also worked for a couple of months as a veterinary technician. Ms. Katzman had earned an associate arts degree and credits in a veterinary medicine major. Ms. Katzman was in her mid 20s and married. She was considerably more qualified than Petitioner. Except for the hiring of Mr. Wilcox, the decisions to employ persons other than Petitioner were entirely justified, based upon qualifications. Ms. Vanande is a closer case, but her college degree and supervisory experience probably rendered her a superior applicant over Petitioner. In each of these cases, then, Mr. Larson’s testimony that his employment decisions were not motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent is supported by the fact that he hired persons more qualified than Petitioner. The decision to employ Mr. Wilcox, rather than Petitioner, cannot be justified based on superior qualifications. On paper, Petitioner was more qualified than Mr. Wilcox for the animal control position. If Mr. Larson had reasons, besides relative youth, to hire Mr. Wilcox, he did not articulate them at the hearing. Mr. Larson’s initial interview with Petitioner is crucial in this case. Displaying an interest in Petitioner’s age and marital status, Mr. Larson revealed the role of these criteria in his hiring decisions. This does not mean that his preferences concerning age and marital status necessarily influenced subsequent decisions. In fact, the record does not establish that any of Mr. Larson’s employment decisions in this case were influenced by marital status. As for age, the superior qualifications of all the other applicants, besides Mr. Wilcox, signifies that it was unnecessary for Mr. Larson, in hiring these four applicants, to reach the issue of age. Each of these four applicants was better qualified than Petitioner to fill the animal control position, so Mr. Larson presumably ended his considerations at this point. But Mr. Wilcox was not as qualified as Petitioner to fill the animal control position. The reasonable inference is that, in hiring Mr. Wilcox over Petitioner, Mr. Larson gave effect to the discriminatory concerns, earlier expressed during the initial interview, concerning Petitioner’s age. Specifically, solely on the basis of age, Mr. Larson doubted that Petitioner was sufficiently adaptable to acquire the skills needed for the animal control position; solely on the basis of age, Mr. Larson expected that Mr. Wilcox was sufficiently adaptable--moldable--to acquire the skills for the animal control position. Mr. Wilcox’s application bears a date of receipt of February 16, 1995. It is safe to assume that Respondent received Mr. Wilcox’s application prior to the date on which Mr. Larson hired Mr. Wilcox. Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination on November 21, 1995. Clearly, then, Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination within one year of the sole act of discrimination proved in this case. Although Petitioner relies upon evidence dating from earlier than November 21, 1994, to establish an act of age discrimination, the act of age discrimination did not take place until early 1995. Petitioner’s proof of emotional suffering is too vague and uncertain to permit an award. This claim is rejected. Petitioner’s proof of lost earnings and associated benefits is more definite, but somewhat unclear. Petitioner would have initially earned $8.12 hourly as an animal control officer, which required 40 hours weekly. Six years have elapsed since the approximate date of hire of Mr. Wilcox. The record suggests that Petitioner would have retired in 2002. It is not entirely clear when Petitioner has held various jobs since March 1, 1995. At one point, Petitioner worked for Wells Fargo at $5.15 hourly. Then, he worked at the Charlotte County courthouse at $5.75 hourly and later earned $7.00 hourly. At some point, Petitioner worked at the clerk’s office at the courthouse and earned $6.50 hourly, but was employed only 30 hours weekly. The parties should try to settle upon a specific amount representing the value of lost earnings and associated benefits, when comparing the animal control job to Petitioner’s actual employment, from March 1, 1995 (or, if available, the date of hire of Mr. Wilcox) through his age of retirement, as noted in Petitioner’s proposed recommended order, in 2002. Likewise, the parties should try to settle upon attorneys’ fees and costs. If unable to reach a settlement, the parties should request the Florida Commission on Human Relations to remand the case again to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the precise relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations: Enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief on the ground that it is time-barred. If the Commission elects not to dismiss the Petition for Relief, enter a final order determining that Petitioner has proved that Respondent committed a single act of age discrimination in the decision to hire Mr. Wilcox on or about March 1, 1995, as an animal control officer. If the Commission enters a final order determining that Respondent has committed the act of discrimination described in the preceding paragraph, enter a final order giving the parties a reasonable period of time to settle Petitioner’s claims, other than emotional suffering, and, if they fail to do so, enter an order remanding the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct an evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M. Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Amy L. Sergent Lancaster & Eure, P.A. 711 North Washington Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34236 Brendan Bradley Deputy County Attorney Charlotte County Administration Center 18500 Murdock Circle Port Charlotte, Florida 33948-1094
