The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Scott Rhodes, should be terminated from employment with Petitioner, City of Clearwater (City), for violating City policies as alleged in the City's Termination and Dismissal Notice dated February 16, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction The City is a government employer governed by a City Council. A City Manager oversees the City’s operations. Pursuant to the Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater (City Code), the Clearwater Civil Service Board has adopted policies and rules regulating all aspects of the civil service employee positions within the City.1/ Mr. Rhodes began his employment with the City as a Solid Waste worker on September 6, 2004. He worked in the same position until his termination effective February 20, 2018. Approximately 85 percent of the current Solid Waste staff is African-American. Mr. Rhodes describes himself as “white” and “not black.” At all times relevant, Mr. Rhodes’ supervisor was Joseph Farrar, who is Caucasian. Mr. Farrar’s ultimate supervisor is Earl Gloster, an African-American. Mr. Gloster is the department head of Solid Waste and reports directly to the City Manager. Mr. Rhodes’ Disciplinary History Prior to his termination, Mr. Rhodes had been involved in a number of incidents with co-workers requiring counseling or discipline. In late November 2011 and early 2012, Mr. Rhodes reported he was being harassed by a co-worker in Solid Waste, Feth Benbelgacem. His complaint was investigated by the City’s HR Department and a report was issued. Although the City found Mr. Benbelgacem had violated the City’s Workplace Violence Policy, the report concluded: No one was able to corroborate the specific claim that Mr. Rhodes made that Mr. Benbelgacem [threatened him]. A number of those interviewed feel that Mr. Rhodes has animosity because Mr. Benbelgacem is permitted to operate the equipment which causes Mr. Rhodes to “nitpick” Mr. Benbelgacem’s work performance, thereby instigating their interaction. This behavior on the part of Mr. Rhodes has been reported to the supervisors and although Mr. Rhodes has been directed to cease the behavior and worry about himself, the behavior allegedly continues. * * * Although Mr. Rhodes has been instructed by his supervisors to stop delegating and criticizing tasks relating to Mr. Benbelgacem, the behavior seems to continue and should it not stop, the supervisor should address it through the Performance and Behavior Process. In November 2016, Mr. Farrar issued Respondent a coaching and counseling form for “violence in the workplace” based on a verbal altercation Mr. Rhodes had with an African-American co-worker. The form signed by Mr. Rhodes states: Outcome of Meeting: Mr. Rhodes understands that verbal misconduct is as serious as physical conduct. Verbal attacks can lead to physical confrontations just as this situation did. In the future, verbal attacks on a co-worker’s family or loved ones will not be tolerated. At some point after the November 2016 counseling, when someone did something he did not like, Mr. Rhodes would either tell that person that he was going to give that person a specific number of lashes or he would direct a co-worker to distribute a specific number of lashes to that person. Mr. Rhodes also told his co-workers to “kiss the ring,” implying they were subservient to him. Mr. Rhodes would talk about certain co-workers being on his “hit list.” When asked who was on his “hit list,” Mr. Rhodes named the same African-American co-worker involved in the November 2016 incident. In early 2017, Mr. Farrar overheard Mr. Rhodes saying he would give certain co-workers lashes. Mr. Farrar believed these comments were inappropriate and could have been interpreted as racially offensive. He also overheard Mr. Rhodes talking about his “list.” As a result, Mr. Farrar met with Mr. Rhodes and instructed him to stop making such remarks. Although Mr. Farrar did not specifically tell Mr. Rhodes these comments violated any specific policy, he did tell Mr. Rhodes “that he needed to watch what he was saying around newer people because they might not know how to take it the way people that had been around him do.” At the final hearing, Mr. Rhodes admitted he told other employees he would give them lashes, they were on his hit list, and they should kiss the ring, but claimed he was joking. In April 2017, Mr. Farrar placed Mr. Rhodes on a “Development Plan” after repeatedly being warned by Mr. Farrar about failing to properly clock in and out, and accruing unauthorized overtime. The Development Plan was to remain in effect from April 28 to October 28, 2017, and required Mr. Rhodes to meet personally with Mr. Farrar on “Payday” Fridays and comply with the City’s timeclock regulations. Mr. Rhodes defied orders to meet with Mr. Farrar and otherwise failed to adhere to the Development Plan. As a result, Mr. Rhodes received a one-day suspension (referred to as a “decision-making leave day”) and was referred to the Employee Assistance Program. The Development Plan was also revised and extended to remain in effect until March 2018. Meanwhile, Mr. Rhodes continued to make the same type of inappropriate remarks referring to “lashes” and the “hit list.” In October or November 2017, Mr. Farrar had a second meeting with Mr. Rhodes and again instructed him to stop making these types of remarks. The Terminating Incident On January 17, 2018, Mr. Farrar received a complaint from Allan Craig, an African-American Solid Waste worker, that Mr. Rhodes claimed he was the “emperor of all black people.” According to Mr. Farrar, Mr. Craig reported the incident just after it was made and was visibly shocked. Mr. Farrar referred the incident to the City’s Office of Diversity and Equity Services (“ODES”), a division within the HR department tasked with handling and investigating complaints of the City’s anti-discrimination policies, as well as potential employee violations of state and federal employment laws. Mr. Craig testified that on the day in question, Mr. Rhodes did not like something an African-American co-worker said. In turn, Mr. Rhodes told Mr. Craig to give this co-worker “50 lashes,” which Mr. Craig understood to be a whipping. Mr. Craig, said, “no, we [have] to stick together.” It is unclear to whom Mr. Craig is referring when he said “we”--“Solid Waste workers” or “African-Americans.” Regardless, in response, Mr. Rhodes made the statement, “I’m the emperor of black people.” Mr. Craig did not respond, but instead immediately left the worksite to report the comment to Mr. Farrar. Although Mr. Rhodes corroborates Mr. Craig’s version of events, he disputes saying “I’m the emperor of black people.” Instead he claims he told Mr. Craig “I am the emperor of Solid Waste”; and after Mr. Craig said, “no, we [have] to stick together,” Mr. Rhodes replied, “Allan, even black people have to answer to somebody.” Mr. Rhodes saying, “I’m the emperor of black people” is more believable than him saying “Allan, even black people have to answer to somebody.” The undersigned rejects Mr. Rhodes’ version of events for a number of reasons.2/ First, Mr. Rhodes statements do not seem to flow naturally. Second, Mr. Craig’s demeanor was more credible, and his version of the facts leading up to the “emperor” statement was consistent with the testimony of the other witnesses. Moreover, Mr. Deris, the ODES investigator, testified that Mr. Rhodes admitted to making the statement, “I am the emperor of black people” when questioned during the investigation. Mr. Gloster testified that during the pre-termination meeting he had with Mr. Rhodes, “I asked him specifically as to the comment that was made . . . that he was the emperor over all black people, and he said, yes, that he said it.” Even assuming Mr. Rhodes’ version is correct, it is equally offensive; it still implies African-Americans at Solid Waste need to answer to him. Based on the competent and credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Rhodes made the statement, “I am the emperor of black people,” and this statement was reasonably offensive to Mr. Craig. Grounds for Dismissal Based on the ODES investigation and after meeting with Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Gloster made the decision to terminate Petitioner. Thereafter, the City issued the Dismissal Notice citing numerous violations of City policy and regulations: City Policy 3201.2, Equal Employment Opportunity Policies (EEO); City Policy 3704.1, Workplace Violence Prevention Policy; and Relevant portions of the City’s Performance and Behavior Management Program Manual (PBMP), which set standards for City workers in the areas of personal responsibility, excellence, and integrity. Chapter 13, section 3, of the Civil Service Board Rules and Regulations outlines the grounds for discipline, including terminations. That section provides in pertinent part: Reasons for Suspension, Demotion, and Dismissal--Whenever practical, employees will be given reasonable opportunity to bring their performance and/or behavior up to acceptable standards pursuant to the procedures and rules of the City’s performance and behavior management programs. However, employees may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate dismissal for the following acts, including but not limited to specifically cited examples: * * * (e) Commitment of a flagrant offense, including harassment or discrimination or abusive conduct or language toward coworkers, City officers, or the public. * * * (l) Failure to conform to the dictates of corrective action, including but not limited to failure or inability to comply with an agreed-upon “development plan,” or when the City believes that an employee is willful in refusing to adhere to establish rules, regulations, or guidelines. (emphasis added). Violation of EEO Policy The City’s EEO policy states in relevant part: It is the policy of the City of Clearwater that no person shall be unlawfully discriminated against with regard to recruitment, selection, appointment, training, promotion, retention, discipline or other aspects of employment because of any consideration of race, color, religion, national origin, age, disability, marital status, or gender (including conditions of pregnancy and sexual harassment), or genetic or family medical history information as defined by the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. Mr. Rhodes’ “lashes” comments could reasonably be interpreted as a reference to slavery, and be racially offensive to African-American (and other) employees. As such, Mr. Rhodes continued references to “lashes,” even after being warned, violated the City’s EEO policy. Mr. Rhodes statement that he, a white person, was the “emperor of black people” clearly violates the City’s EEO policy. Violation of the City’s Workplace Violence Prevention Policy The City’s Workplace Violence Prevention Policy states in relevant part: Policy: The City of Clearwater will not tolerate violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, and other disruptive behavior in our workplace [.] All reports of incidents will be taken seriously and will be dealt with appropriately. Individuals who commit such acts may be removed from the premises and may be subject to disciplinary action, criminal penalties, or both. Definitions: Workplace violence is any physical assault, threatening behavior, or verbal abuse occurring in the workplace. Such behavior can include oral or written statements, gestures, or expressions that communicate a direct or indirect threat of physical harm. Although there was no evidence anyone believed Mr. Rhodes’ “lashes” or “hit-list” statements were real threats of violence, these statements could be considered a form of intimidation, disruptive behavior, and verbal abuse under the policy. These comments, however, when taken in the context of Respondent’s history of verbal altercations with co-workers, and coupled with the fact he was told that these statements may be misinterpreted, constitute violations of the City’s Workplace Violence Prevention Policy. Violation of the City’s Employee Standards The PBMP contains the following relevant standards and instructions: INTEGRITY STANDARDS The following standards represent Integrity issues of such a serious nature that immediate formal discipline, up to and including termination, may be recommended. Violation of the City Workplace Violence Policy. Violation of the City Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Policy. * * * EXCELLENCE STANDARDS We will present a professional image through actions, dress, speech and behavior. We will strive for excellence and continuously learn and make improvements. We will learn from mistakes, modify behavior and recommend procedural changes to improve operations and processes. Again, Mr. Rhodes’ statements described above when considered cumulatively and in context clearly violate the standards for employee integrity. Mr. Rhodes’ continued use of these comments, even after being repeatedly counseled, violates the standards for professional image through actions and speech; continuously learning and improving; and modifying behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board make a determination that the charges in the Dismissal Notice are sustained, and that Respondent be terminated as a City employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 2018.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondents are entitled to a renewed license for their facility. HRS' position is that the renewal should be denied because the sleeping room windows do not comply with the 1981 Life Safety Code. The Brevigs argue that HRS's interpretation of the code is too rigid, that the 1985 code is the applicable edition, and that they are entitled to an exception contained within the later code.
Findings Of Fact Tom and Jeannie Brevig own Florida Haven Retirement Home #1, located in Maitland, Florida. They purchased the facility in 1981. Prior to 1984, Florida Haven was licensed as an adult congregate living facility (ACLF) by the HRS District Office and fire safety inspections were conducted by Seminole County inspectors. In 1984, the HRS Office of Licensure and Certification acquired jurisdiction and a fire inspector from that office conducted an inspection in July 1984. At that time a citation was issued for deficiencies in the sleeping room windows. In October 1984, the Brevigs sold the facility. Ray Heyser is an inspector certified by the State Fire Marshal. He is employed by HRS' Office of Licensure and Certification and conducts inspections of ACLFs in accordance with Chapter 22 of the Life Safety Code. On July 2, 1985, he inspected Florida Haven and personally measured the windows. He found the following: The front north bedroom window had a clear opening of 16 inches high, by 48 inches wide, and the sill was 42 inches from the floor. The rear south bedroom window was 16 inches high, by 32 inches wide, and the sill was 42 inches from the floor. The side south bedroom window was 10 inches high, by 48 inches wide, with a 54 inch sill. The front south bedroom was 16 inches high, by 48 inches wide, with a 34 inch sill. The remaining front bedroom window was also 16 inches high, by 48 inches wide, with a 34 inch sill. Each of these bedrooms was used as a sleeping room. None of the rooms has exterior doors. The Life Safety Code requires that an outside window in a sleeping room have a clear opening of not less than 24 inches in height, 20 inches in width, and 5.7 square feet in area. The bottom of the opening must be no more than 44 inches from the floor. "Clear opening" means the unobstructed passage when the window is opened. The reasons for the requirement are to allow emergency egress and to permit access by fire service personnel who may be equipped with large cylinder breathing apparatus. None of the sleeping room windows at the facility met the height requirement for clear opening and one window was out of compliance as to the height from the floor. In January 1986, the Brevigs regained ownership of the facility and were granted a transfer license. In August 1986 the home was again cited for deficiencies in the windows. This was noted as a "Class III" deficiency and the recommendation was a "conditional license pending correction". (Petitioner's Exhibit #1) At a re-investigation in February 1987, the window deficiencies still existed. By a letter dated July 7, 1987, Tom Brevig was informed that his license for Florida Haven Retirement Home #1 expired on June 30, 1987. Since he had not corrected the deficiencies noted in his conditional license, he was told to relocate the residents. HRS adopted the 1985 Life Safety Code in April 1987. Both that code and the prior edition provide for exceptions or variances to the window requirements in certain circumstances. HRS' policy is that exceptions are only rarely granted, and then only when the applicant affirmatively presents its basis for an exception. Tom Brevig discussed the possibility of an exception with HRS's architect but did not make a specific proposal. Tom Brevig claims that he was given an exception by a prior HRS inspector, but the HRS Office of Licensure and Certification has nothing in writing that would indicate that an exception was granted. The ACLF Director for that HRS office has no knowledge that HRS ever approved the windows as a pre-existing means of escape or entry.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a renewal license be withheld from Florida Haven Retirement Home #1, until the deficiencies are corrected or the owner provides an alternative proposal consistent with the standards in the Life Safety Code, 1985 Edition and Rule 4A- 40.004, F.A.C. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitute rulings on the findings of fact proposed by counsel for the Brevigs: Adopted in paragraph #1. Adopted in paragraph #2. Rejected as unsupported by competent evidence. Mr. Brevig's argument is a conclusion based on the fact of his obtaining a license. He did not establish that the windows were approved or that their size was at issue when the Seminole County inspections were made. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3, although it was not clearly established that this was the first citation by HRS. It was the first citation by the OLC. Adopted in paragraph 4. Rejected as uncorroborated hearsay. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary and a mischaracterization of the discussion as evidenced in the cited portions of the transcript. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as irrelevant and hearsay. Adopted in part in paragraph 6. Access from the outside is not the sole reason for the requirement, in spite of the testimony from witness Mauger. The plain language of the section of the Code and the Handbook explanation establish the requirement as relating to a means of escape from the inside. Rejected as hearsay and inconsistent with the history of Rule 4A-40.005, F.A.C. Adoption was in 1987, not 1986, according to the F.A.C. Addressed in paragraph 2, Conclusions of Law. Rejected as unnecessary. This fact is not in issue. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service 400 West Robinson Street Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas C. Brevig 1680 Maitland Avenue Maitland, Florida 32751 Michael J. Bittman, Esquire DEMPSEY AND GOLDSMITH, P.A Suite 500, Day Building 605 E. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1980 Orlando, Florida 32802 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on Petitioner's race.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Bagley, an African-American, was employed by the City from 1987 until her termination on July 9, 2004. At the time of her termination, she was employed as a Code Enforcement Officer II. On Monday, March 15, 2004,1 Ms. Bagley called her supervisor, Larry Canelejo (Mr. Canelejo), and advised him that she would be late to work because she had to assist her mother. Mr. Canelejo approved her absence. Ms. Bagley's normal work hours on March 15, 2004, were 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday. On March 15, 2004, she arrived to work at 11 a.m. She did not work through her lunch on that day or stay later to make up the time that she was late. On Thursday, March 18, 2004, Ms. Bagley turned in a time and attendance sheet showing that she had worked from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. on March 15, 2004. Mr. Canelejo verbally asked Ms. Bagley to turn in a leave slip for the time that she was absent on March 15, 2004. Ms. Bagley did not turn in a leave slip, and Mr. Canelejo sent an e-mail to Ms. Bagley on March 18, 2004, requesting that she do so and indicating that disciplinary action would result for her failure to do so. Instead of turning in a leave slip for her three-hour absence, Ms. Bagley wrote a memorandum to Darrell Smith, Chief of Staff, complaining that she had been requested to submit a leave request for time she was absent from work when other workers who were absent were not required to submit a leave request for their absence. On the morning of Friday, March 19, 2004, Mr. Canelejo sent another e-mail to Ms. Bagley requesting that she submit her time card and leave slip by 11:30 a.m. Ms. Bagley retrieved the time card that she had previously submitted and covered her signature with white-out. She did not submit a leave slip as requested by her supervisor. Mr. Canelejo marked on Ms. Bagley's time sheet that she was absent without leave for three hours on March 15, 2004, and submitted a leave slip for Ms. Bagley showing that she was absent without leave for that time. The time card and leave slip was later changed by the City's personnel office to sick leave for others. On March 17, 2004, Mr. Canelejo received a complaint from the general manager of Wendy's Restaurant located on North 15th Street in Tampa, Florida. The general manager advised Mr. Canelejo that Ms. Bagley had come into the restaurant on three separate occasions demanding that she be given free food for food that she had purchased which she felt was bad. Ms. Bagley did not have receipts for the previously-purchased food, and indicated that other managers in the store had told her that she could get free replacements for the bad food. The general manager advised Mr. Canelejo that other managers at Wendy had not given authorization for Ms. Bagley to receive free food. A co-manager at Wendy's also wrote to the City confirming Ms. Bagley's actions in getting free food. The City's Department of Code Enforcement received a letter dated March 31, 2004, from Hazel Hill, who was the sales floor supervisor at Martin's Uniforms Retail Store (Martin's Uniforms). The City had a contract with Martin's Uniforms to supply uniforms and related items to City employees, including code enforcement employees. Ms. Hill related an incident involving Ms. Bagley on March 12, 2004. Ms. Bagley came to the store, requesting to return some shirts and pants, which she claimed to have received from Martin's Uniforms as part of the 2004 uniform allotment. Ms. Hill inspected the garments and determined that the uniforms could not have been received as part of the 2004 order because the shirts were not the same style as those that had been sent. The 2004 shirts were made of gabardine with two new-style patches, one on each arm. The shirts that Ms. Bagley was attempting to return were made of poplin with only one patch, which had been discontinued. The shirts also appeared to have a yellow tint, which could be attributed to age. The pants which Ms. Bagley was attempting to return had been altered in the waist. The pants which had been sent with Ms. Bagley's 2004 uniform order were not altered in the waist. Ms. Hill also advised that the incident concerning the 2004 uniform order was not the first time that Ms. Bagley had attempted to exchange old merchandise. About four months earlier, Ms. Bagley had tried to return an old jacket for a new one, but Ms. Hill refused to make the exchange. The previous year, Ms. Bagley came to exchange a pair of shoes for which she had no receipt and for which no record of the purchase could be found at the store. On July 9, 2004, the City dismissed Ms. Bagley from her employment. The final decision to terminate Ms. Bagley's employment was made by the Director of Code Enforcement, Curtis Lane, who is an African-American. Mr. Lane based his decision on Ms. Bagley's failure to submit a leave request for the three hours that she was absent on March 15, 2004; submission of a time sheet showing that she worked eight hours on March 15, 2004; the complaints from the employees at a Wendy's restaurant that Ms. Bagley had requested free food while she was in a City code enforcement uniform; and the complaint from Martin's Uniforms that Ms. Bagley tried to get new uniforms by falsely claiming that she was not sent the correct uniforms in her 2004 uniform order. The allegations against Ms. Bagley were investigated by City staff, and, based on the results of the investigations, Mr. Lane believed the allegations against Ms. Bagley and felt that Ms. Bagley's actions demonstrated a lack of honesty and integrity, two traits which are essential for a code enforcement officer. At the time of her termination, Ms. Bagley's employment with the City was subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the City and Amalgamated Transit Union. The collective bargaining agreement provided a grievance and arbitration procedure. Ms. Bagley filed a grievance contesting her termination, which she submitted to final arbitration. On February 15, 2005, an evidentiary hearing was held on Ms. Bagley's grievance before arbitrator Genellen Kelly Pike. On June 15, 2005, Ms. Pike denied Ms. Bagley's grievance. On July 26, 2005, Ms. Bagley filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission, claiming that she was terminated from her employment with the City on account of her race. Ms. Bagley claims that she was discriminated against based on her race because other employees of the Code Enforcement Department were allowed to come in late and either to make up the time on their lunch hours or after work or to not have to make up the time at all. Mr. Canelejo did have a practice of allowing employees to make up their time if they were 15 to 30 minutes late for work. The time could be made up during the employee's lunch hour or at the end of the employee's regularly scheduled work day. There was no practice or policy allowing employees to make up absences as long as three hours rather than requiring them to submit leave slips for the missed time. Ms. Bagley claims that both African-American and Caucasian employees were allowed to make up missed work. Not all employees in the Code Enforcement Department had the same work schedule. Some employees worked ten-hour shifts, Sunday through Wednesday; some employees worked 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday; and some employees worked 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday. Some employees were required to attend neighborhood meetings at night after their regularly scheduled hours, and were allowed to adjust their work schedule to avoid overtime as a result of the meetings at night. The code inspectors used City-owned vehicles in making their inspections. The vehicles were parked in a central location, and the employees picked up the City vehicles each day. Sometimes an inspector would schedule an inspection at the beginning of the inspector's shift. The inspector was not required to report into the office prior to making the inspection, but could pick up the City vehicle and leave from the parking lot. Ms. Bagley took it upon herself to begin keeping notes on when the inspectors would arrive at the office. She noted that some of the inspectors, both African-American and Caucasian, did not arrive at the office at the beginning of their regularly scheduled shift. However, Ms. Bagley had no knowledge if these inspectors had attended a night meeting during that week, if the inspectors had gone to an inspection prior to coming to the office, or if the inspectors had made up their tardiness by either working during their lunch hours or after the end of their regularly scheduled shift. Ms. Bagley just assumed that these employees were not putting in 40 hours per week. She produced no evidence at the final hearing that there were other employees who claimed they worked 40 hours per week, when they did not and were allowed to do so without taking leave. She presented no evidence at the final hearing that African-American employees were treated differently than Caucasian employees. In fact, she claims that both African- American and Caucasian employees were allowed to come in late without having to submit a leave slip for the missed time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the petition because the charge of discrimination was not filed timely and because Ms. Bagley failed to establish that the City discriminated against her based on her race. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2006.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Terry John Conley, d/b/a Terry's for Men's/Women's Hair, should be disciplined for violating Section 477.029(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1985)?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding the Respondent, Terry John Conley, was licensed to practice cosmetology and to operate a cosmetology salon in the State of Florida. Mr. Conley's license numbers are CL 0095556 and CE 0028208. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Conley was the owner of a cosmetology salon known as Terry's for Men's/Women's Hair (hereinafter referred to as "Terry's"). Terry's is located at 272 Palm Coast Parkway, Palm Coast, Florida 32026. On December 3, 1987, an employee of the Petitioner inspected Terry's. More than one of the drawers where employees of Terry's stored sanitized brushes and combs contained hair, coins, cards and medicine. Mr. Conley admitted that there may have been coins in the drawers and a little hair on brushes. Two additional alleged violations were cited as a result of the December 3, 1987, inspection. These alleged violations were corrected as of the date of the next inspection of Terry's by the Petitioner. On September 21, 1988, the same employee of the Petitioner that inspected Terry's on December 3, 1987, inspected Terry's again. During this inspection the inspector determined that the drawers where sanitized brushes and combs were stored were in a condition similar to their condition on December 3, 1987. Additionally, the following additional conditions were discovered during the September 21, 1988, inspection: Hair rollers, and the trays where hair rollers were kept, contained an excessive amount of hair and dirt; The Petitioner's sanitation rules were not displayed for public viewing in a conspicuous place; and More than one of the five sanitizer jars for combs were not filled sufficiently-to cover all of the teeth of the combs. Mr. Conley admitted that the jars are refilled "every day or two." The inspector also cited Terry's because one of the persons working at the shop had allegedly used clippers and scissors without sanitizing them. This alleged violation was not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Conley has been operating Terry's for eleven years. The cited violations of December 3, 1987, and September 21, 1988, are the first violations cited against Mr. Conley or Terry's.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Terrance John Conley, d/b/a Terry's for Men's/Women's Hair be found to have violated Rules 21F-20.002 and 21F-20.004, Florida Administrative Code, in violation of Section 477.029(1)(i), Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that Terrance John Conley, d/b/a Terry's for Men's/Women's Hair be required to pay an administrative fine of $150.00. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Tunnicliff Senior Attorney Tobi C. Pam Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Terry John Conley d/b/a Terry's for Men's/Women's Hair 272 Palm Coast Parkway Palm Coast, Florida 32307 Myrtle Aase Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Respondents' Division of Hotel and Restaurants' license should be suspended or revoked, or a civil penalty assessed for alleged violation of Division Rule 7C-4.01(5)(c) and Florida Statute s. 509.221, as set forth in Notice to Show Cause issued by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact On April 19, 1977, Johnny Bell, inspector for petitioner's Division of Hotels and Restaurants, received notification from the Health Department of Sarasota County that respondents' place of business, Port-of-Call, resort apartments located at Longboat Key, Florida, was not connected to the sewerage system of Longboat Key. Bell inspected respondents' premises and discovered that a septic tank system was in use at the Port-of-Call. He informed respondents that they must connect to an "approved" sewerage system within sixty (60) days. On June 20, 1977, Bell returned to the premises and found that no action had been taken to connect to the Longboat Key system. Respondent Edward W. Henderson informed him that he should not have to go on such a system because his septic tanks were adequate and functioning properly. Bell did not examine the septic tanks or ascertain if they were, in fact, in proper condition and operating satisfactorily. He proceeded to issue a Notice to Show Cause as to why respondents' license No. 68-606H should not have a civil penalty assessed against it or be suspended or revoked. The stated cause for such intended action was as follows: "Division Rule 7C-4.01(5)(c) ; Florida Statutes 509.221 -- Failure to have sewage system hooked into public sewerage system." The Notice to Show Cause also informed respondents of their right to an Administrative Hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondents thereafter requested such a hearing. There is no food operation at the Port-of- Call. (Testimony of Bell, Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That the charges against respondents be dismissed. Done and Entered this 10th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence C. Winson, Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building, Suite 210 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John W. Meshad, Esquire 100 South Washington Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 33577
The Issue Petitioner is charged pursuant to a Citation for Violation, Onsite Sewage Program/Sanitary Nuisance with a violation of Section 386.04(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1997), which describes conditions that are prima facie evidence of a sanitary nuisance injurious to health.
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Petitioner, Ann B. Harvey, through her company Harvey Enterprises and Company, Inc., owns the home at 102 Williams Street, Palatka, Florida. At all times relevant to the alleged violation, the home was occupied by tenants. The tenants vacated the house on or about October 13, 1998. Kenneth F. Burnett, Environmental Specialist I, with the Putnam County Health Department, first investigated a complaint regarding the property at 102 Williams Street, Palatka, Florida, on August 5, 1998. He witnessed faulty plumbing in the home and ponded wastewater at the back of the home. On August 11, 1998, Mr. Burnett drafted and mailed a Notice to Abate. The notice was mailed by certified mail return receipt requested and received by Ann B. Harvey on August 25, 1998. Ann B. Harvey signed the return receipt for the Notice to Abate on August 25, 1998. Mr. Burnett again inspected the property on September 2, 1998, and found no change in the status of the faulty plumbing and ponded wastewater. On September 9, 1998, Mr. Burnett again inspected the property and determined there had been no changes. David Flowers, Environmental Specialist II, became involved in the case on September 18, 1998, when he inspected the property. Mr. Flowers observed that wastewater ponded on the ground at the back of the home, and that the plumbing inside the home was in disrepair. Ms. Laurey Gauch, Environmental Health Director for Putnam County Health Department testified. She inspected the property in question on September 18, 25, and 28, 1998. Ms. Gauch observed ponded wastewater in the backyard and plumbing in disrepair inside the home on each visit. Ms. Gauch opined that the condition of the property was a sanitary nuisance in violation of Section 386.041(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1997), because the ponded wastewater would breed disease (bacteria, viruses, etc.) and contamination. A Citation for Violation was received and signed for by Ronald Harvey on September 25, 1998, pursuant to statutory authority at Section 381.0065, Florida Statutes (1997). The citation cites the Petitioner for violation of Section 386.041(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1997). On September 25, 1998, Mr. Flowers again inspected the property, and observed that the sewage remained on the ground at the rear of the home. Mr. Flowers flushed dye in the toilet to determine if the standing water was coming from the toilet inside the home. The dye would run out onto the ground if the ponded water was from the toilet. Mr. Flowers inspected the problem on September 28, 1998. Sewage remained ponded on the ground at the rear of the home and the water bubbled when the toilet was flushed. Mr. Flowers re-inspected the property on September 29, 1998, and flushed dye in the toilet. He documented that the dye came to the ground surface. During the visit, Mr. Flowers was accompanied by a County Codes Enforcement Officer who condemned the home. On October 6, 1998, Mr. Flowers returned to the property with his supervisor, Geoff Batteiger. The tenants were still living in the home, but were reported to be leaving. The plumbing in the home remained unrepaired. When the toilet was flushed, water bubbled onto the ground surface. The problem had neither been abated, nor were there any signs that the problem was being corrected. No repairs were made to the premises between August 25, 1998, and October 6, 1998, a period of one and one-half months during which tenants lived in the home. On November 17, 1998, the property was reinspected by Mr. Burnett and Mr. Batteiger. They observed that the sanitary nuisance had been remedied. Ms. Lucille Harvey, property manager and sister-in-law to the Petitioner, testified for Petitioner. She collects rents and arranges for repairs. She had contacted one handyman who came to the home, but refused to do the work because of foul odor in the yard and fleas. Ms. Lucille Harvey did not contact anyone else for repairs until after the tenants had vacated the premises. The tenants kept dogs in the backyard where the problem was, and were uncooperative with the landlord. Ms. Lucille Harvey testified that she notified the Petitioner of the sanitary nuisance at the end of August 1998, and the problems she was having making repairs. Petitioner, Ann Harvey, testified she commenced eviction proceedings for the tenant at 102 Williams Street on or about July 12, 1998. The proceedings were on-going due to various legal exigencies until the tenants vacated the premises on or about October 13, 1998. Ms. Harvey was out-of-town from approximately July 22, 1998, through August 15, 1998, during which time a judge dismissed the eviction action. The action was recommenced. The tenant made a partial payment of one month, which Petitioner accepted. The judge again dismissed the eviction action. The sanitary nuisance at the property in question was not remedied until the Petitioner evicted the tenants and gained access to the premises. Mr. Thomas Harvey, handyman and brother Ron Harvey, testified that he began working on the repairs at the home at 102 Williams Street, on November 2, 1998. He testified that he replaced broken lines, cleaned a grease trap, and snaked the kitchen and bathroom. These repairs concluded on or about November 12, 1998.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health enter a final order waiving the fine and payment as stated in the Citation for Violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Harvey Route 2, Box 1650 Palatka, Florida 32177 Ann B. Harvey 102 Williams Street Palatka, Florida 32177 Susan E. Lindgard, Esquire Department of Health 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Box 19 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Petitioner has alleged that Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and its predecessor statute by discriminating against him based on his age and national origin in the following: denial of promotion to liftstation mechanic; disparate treatment with regard to training opportunities, transfers, overtime opportunities and disciplinary actions; ridicule and other demeaning actions, such as being escorted to the restroom; and other harassment in retaliation for his complaints. Both parties have requested attorney's fees and costs and it is necessary to determine if such award is appropriate. The primary issue for disposition is whether the alleged violations occurred, and, if so, what relief is appropriate. Although other actions, including termination, have occurred since the complaint was filed, the parties have concurred that those actions are not the subject of this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Emiliano Santos was born in Puerto Rico in 1944 and came to the United States in 1964. Spanish is his first language, and, in his words, he has been struggling with English since 1964. Mr. Santos was employed by the City of Melbourne on January 8, 1990. His first job was as a custodian helper in the auditorium. Approximately six months later he applied for positions as Maintenance Worker I and Maintenance II in the city sewer department; he was given the Maintenance II position, the higher level, because of his employment with the city. Robert Klaproth is the Melbourne water and sewer administrator in charge of the day-to-day operations of the water and sewer division. Tom Hogeland is the water and sewer operations superintendent for the City of Melbourne and has been in that position for approximately five years. Under his supervision is Greg Williams, supervisor of the sewer collection division, who in turn directly supervises Doug Hammond, the liftstation maintenance foreman, and Bob Lyons, the maintenance and construction crewleader. Under those two latter individuals are technical workers such as liftstation mechanics, the liftstation electrician, equipment operators, and other crew leaders. At the entry-level or laborer level are the maintenance workers I and II and utility system service workers. As of January 1992, that entry level in the sewer collection division included, among others, Mr. Santos, William Spann, Joseph Concepcion, and Martin Koehler. The Liftstation Mechanic Promotion Some time in the summer of 1992, an opening came up in a liftstation mechanic position; and Tom Hogeland was directly involved in the recruitment and hiring process. Five applicants sought the position: Mr. Santos, William Spann, Elmer Cross, Oscar Vega and Cecil Smith. The position was advertised in-house as a promotional opportunity. It called for five years mechanical experience in the repair and maintenance of pumps, motors and other associated mechanical equipment. Each applicant was given a copy of the job description in advance of the interview. At the individual interviews Tom Hogeland described the physical condition of the job and asked the individual whether he was familiar with the position description. He also asked four questions to determine the applicant's basic familiarity with pumps and equipment used in liftstations, and he asked each about his background and experience. Of the five applicants, Tom Hogeland found only two had the minimum five years' experience: William Spann and Elmer Cross. Hogeland verified the experience of each applicant. William Spann had claimed experience in the Marine Corps and Hogeland called and spoke with someone in the Corps who was familiar with Spann's experience. Hogeland verified Elmer Cross' experience with his city supervisor, as Cross was working in the Melbourne wastewater treatment plant. Emeliano Santos claimed on his application that he had the requisite experience in a prior job with the John Deere company. When Hogeland called the company he was told that Mr. Santos had not worked as a mechanic, but was a machinist, assembling and operating machines. He had no pump mechanic experience at John Deere. Because of his seniority with the city, Hogeland recommended Elmer Cross for the opening. However, it was not a promotion for Cross and he told Hogeland that he decided to turn down the transfer. The position was then offered to William Spann, who accepted it. At hearing, Mr. Santos admitted that he did not have the requisite five years' experience. He claimed, however, that William Spann did not have the experience either. William Spann is a white male in his 20's who was hired as a maintenance worker I in 1990 in the sewer division. His prior experience was as a maintenance sergeant at Camp LeJeune, including the responsibility for maintaining and servicing the wells and pumps at the facility. This military experience and his experience with the city, when he was assigned to assist the liftstation mechanic, combined to provide him the requisite minimum five years. Contrary to Mr. Santo's claim that he was the only one who was quizzed on his knowledge, both William Spann and Oscar Vega (an Hispanic) testified that their interviews included the questions described by Tom Hogeland. Training Opportunities The city sponsors or pays for its employees' attendance at various training sessions and tries to insure that everyone has an opportunity for such training each year. Tom Hogeland generally makes the final decisions where there is a dispute about who can participate. As required by union contract, the educational opportunities are posted on the bulletin board, and commonly there is no dispute because selections for attendees are made on the basis of seniority and rotation. Selections are also made based on whether the opportunity relates to an individual's job. Mr. Santos alleges that he and other minorities were passed over in favor of white employees who were given training opportunities. He was selected, and attended, a pump school in Orlando, but he contends that the city denied any employee's attendance at another pump school when a number of minorities signed up for the school. Robert Klaproth has cancelled training opportunities twice, both in the wastewater treatment division. On one occasion the opportunity was posted and employees applied, but the school could not be approved because there was no money for it in the budget. On another occasion twenty people signed up, and when the union could not resolve who should go, the opportunity was cancelled. In neither case was race or ethnicity of the employees an issue. There is no evidence that race, age or ethnicity has been an issue in any decision by the city in providing training opportunities. Over-time Opportunities There are three types of overtime for employees in the sewer division. The first is a voluntary on-call overtime for which employees sign up and take one week at a time. During that week the employee forfeits his free time and must be available for emergency response. The second type of overtime is the scheduled emergency overtime which occurs when repairs need to be scheduled after hours when there is reduced demand on the system, or when an emergency occurs which cannot be handled by the on-call person, alone. The third type of overtime occurs when a job is not finished by quitting time and the crew needs to stay over to get the system back together. Generally the crew who starts the job has the opportunity to stay and finish it. Overtime is voluntary and is granted on rotation. The list is posted, by seniority, and when the individual's name comes up, the opportunity is offered, and if it is declined, the individual's name goes back to the bottom of the list. Overtime is compensated at time and a half, either in pay or compensatory time off, at the employee's option. There was a period during 1991 or 1992 when Mr. Santos declined overtime. He claims he declined because it was not being handled fairly, that the rotation was not being followed and that he was being passed over. Aside from some evidence that the overtime postings were removed from the employees' bulletin board for a brief period by some unknown person, there is no evidence that the union-prescribed rotation system was not followed. The 1992 records maintained by Greg Williams reflect a substantial amount of overtime available to Mr. Santos and no evidence that he or the other minorities in the division were being passed over. In 1993, Mr. Santos was provided more than the average amount of overtime hours provided to other employees in the sewer division. Disciplinary Incidents Mr. Santos has been disciplined on several occasions. On one occasion, he, Joseph Concepcion (an Hispanic) and Perry McThenney (Black) were disciplined for leaving the city limits in the city truck to buy some work shoes for Mr. Concepcion. Neither Mr. Concepcion nor Mr. McThenney considered the discipline unwarranted; they understood they violated city policy and did not consider the discipline as discriminatory. On another occasion, incentive points which were used to obtain a raise in pay were removed by the city after it learned that Mr. Santos forged the signatures of his supervisor and other employees on documents related to those incentive points. Mr. Santos freely admits the forgery but dismisses its significance, as he claims he was attending the classes on his own time, and received academic credit for the classes. These were classes taken in coordination with an on-job training program which required the periodic certification by the city that Mr. Santos was working as an electrical apprentice. In October 1992, Mr. Santos was given a written reprimand and leave without pay for taking a full day off for a medical appointment that was approved for a half-day. That discipline was rescinded after Mr. Santos explained to Robert Klaproth that he needed the day to go to the doctor, go to the bank to get money for his prescription and to buy the prescription. Other Hispanic employees have been disciplined from time to time. There is a union grievance procedure in place and it has been used by Mr. Santos and others. In some instances the grievance has been upheld and the discipline rescinded; in other cases the discipline has been upheld. No evidence was presented that the disciplinary process or grievance process have been used by the city to discriminate against Hispanics or other minorities; that is, no competent evidence was presented that white employees received less or no discipline for similar infractions. Ridicule, Harassment or Retaliation Claims Sewer collection division supervisor, Greg Williams, received complaints from other workers, including Joseph Concepcion, that Mr. Santos was taking the truck to make telephone calls or to go to the bathroom and the crew was left at the field site without a vehicle or tools. He also heard complaints that Mr. Santos was leaving to go to the bathroom right after the crew left the breakroom. Greg Williams spoke with crew leader, Bobby Lyons, about telling everyone, and not just Mr. Santos, that the crew members should check with the others before leaving to see if anyone else needed to go; and to be sure that tools and equipment were left at the job site. Greg Williams did not instruct Bobby Lyons to "escort" Mr. Santos to the bathroom. Bobby Lyons did go with Mr. Santos to the bathroom on two occasions after that. The record does not reflect whether Mr. Lyons also went to the bathroom or had other errands to run at the same time. The crews in the city water and sewer division are a diverse group, comprised of whites, blacks and Hispanics. The work can be rough and difficult, and there is ample opportunity for banter and joking to get out of hand. Mr. Santos was involved on several occasions in such verbal spats and was orally chastised, along with the other employee. In the course of one verbal exchange, he called Martin Koehler a "prick" and Koehler called him an "asshole." These are not racial or ethnic epithets. Mr. Santos also complained that Joseph Concepcion was calling him names. Mr. Concepcion, a Hispanic, was not harassing Mr. Santos because of his ethnicity. Two employees in particular in the water and sewer division were commonly heard to say "nigger," or to call Mr. Santos "Puerto Rican": Mike Carouso and Martin Koehler. When this language was brought to the attention of the supervisors, the men were reprimanded, either in writing (in Carouso's case) or verbally. When the union steward, Robert Bray, complained to Robert Klaproth that ethnic remarks were being made, Mr. Klaproth immediately convened a general meeting of the employees in the division and made it clear that such language would not be tolerated. Although it is obvious that the meeting did not cure the problem entirely, the name-calling and epithets did not take place in front of the supervisors. The city's policy is to discipline employees who engage in language that is derogatory to minorities and the city has taken severe action against two high-ranking employees, a police sergeant and a fire battalion chief, for single incidents of such language. Mr. Santos' claims of retaliation are not substantiated. The incidents of disciplinary action which he described were justified, or in the case of the medical leave, was properly rescinded after he explained the circumstances to his supervisors. None of the grievance proceedings described in Mr. Santos' testimony and in copious documents received in evidence, including transcripts of the proceedings, support his claims of retaliation or harassment. The Experience Of Other Minorities Carlos Colon is a sixty-two year old Hispanic employee in the city's park department. He was hired nine years ago, when he was fifty-three. He was disciplined once for accidently damaging a city tractor that he was driving, and he failed to receive a promotion for which he considered himself qualified, but he does not believe that the city or his supervisor discriminated against him. The top manager in the parks department is Felix Rodriquez, a Puerto Rican. Joseph Concepcion, also Puerto Rican, considers his ethnic background an asset because of his bi-lingual ability. He has been regularly promoted in his seven years with the city. He has not observed discrimination in the choice of employees for training, for promotions or for overtime. He has heard Martin Koehler use derogatory language regarding blacks and Hispanics, but not directly toward Mr. Santos and not when any supervisors were around. When he heard Mr. Koehler, a co-worker talking like that, Mr. Concepcion walked into the breakroom at lunch and invited anyone who did not like Puerto Ricans and blacks to come outside and "talk" to him. No one came out; and as far as he was concerned, that was the end of the issue. Perry McThenney is a black employee who has worked for the city for eight years and has been promoted three times. He has not experienced nor observed discrimination in promotions, overtime and training opportunities. Robert Bray, the union steward, is a black city employee. Mr. Santos complained frequently to him about racial slurs against his Hispanic origin but never complained about age discrimination. The one time that Mr. Bray went to Mr. Klaproth with the racial slur complaint, a meeting was held the next day to inform the entire division staff that such language would not be tolerated. Mr. Bray believes that the city should come up with some kind of sensitivity program, but he has not actually suggested that remedy to anyone yet. The employees whom Mr. Brag was aware had used derogatory language were the same two mentioned by Mr. Santos and others: Martin Koehler and Michael Carouso. Pedro Diaz, an Hispanic, was passed over for promotion in favor of a sixty year old white employee. At the time, Mr. Diaz felt he should have gotten the promotion because of his longer seniority with the city; however, he conceded that the successful employee could have had better experience. Mr. Diaz has been promoted by the city since then. Mr. Diaz encountered a series of problems with a supervisor who is no longer employed by the city. Since that supervisor left, no other management employee has given him a hard time or discriminated against him because of his ethnic background. Oscar Vega was born in Cuba and has worked for the city approximately 6-1/2 years. He has been promoted during that period. He has also applied for positions which he did not get; in one case, he was not qualified and agrees that the best person got the job; in another case, he filed a grievance with the help of Robert Bray and received the job. He feels the city has treated him fairly and has not discriminated against him based on his Hispanic origin. Summary of Findings The City of Melbourne has not discriminated against Emiliano Santos based on his age or ethnic origin. The demeanor and credibility of the witness have, in part, contributed to this finding. Specifically, the hearing officer has considered, and rejected, the suggestion that the presence of Robert Klaproth, as Respondent's representative, throughout the proceeding, influenced the testimony of the several black and Hispanic employees called as witnesses by Mr. Santos. There is no doubt that Mr. Santos is bitter and frustrated with his employment experience with the city. He has been subjected to other discipline or personnel action which, by stipulation, was not at issue in this proceeding. He has engaged in crude and disruptive verbal exchanges with co-workers. Whether he was the instigator of those exchanges or not, there is no evidence that they were racially or ethnically motivated. He has been disciplined for good cause, or when he explained the circumstances (as with the medical leave), the discipline was rescinded. He was passed over for a promotion, but did not have the requisite experience, and, as best as the city could determine, the successful applicant did have the experience. There was uncontroverted evidence that at least two non-supervisory employees have used racially derogatory or abusive language in the work place. They were disciplined, and the supervisors attempted to address the problem with a general meeting. Although the language continued, it was not because such was tolerated by the supervisors, and it was not so pervasive as to create an abusive or offensive work environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief dated February 28, 1994, be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: James L. Reinman, Esquire 1825 S. Riverview Drive Melbourne, FL 32901 Susan K. W. Erlenbach, Esquire ERLENBACH AND ERLENBACH, P.A. 400 Julia Street Titusville, Florida 32796 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations involved herein, Respondent, Ezekiel Taylor was employed as a tree trimmer by the Department of Parks and Recreation, City of Clearwater. By Stipulation, Respondent agreed, and it is so found, that on March 7, 1988, contra to the provisions of a policy letter dated January 11, 1985, from Ream Wilson, Director of Parks and Recreation for the City of Clearwater, dealing with the use of city vehicles, Respondent, while operating a City owned vehicle with his tree trimming crew, made an unauthorized stop at the Charter Food Store located at Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard and Duncan, at approximately 8:00 a.m. According to the terms of the policy letter, with which Respondent was familiar, "1) Operators of City Vehicles shall not stop at convenience stores, donut shops, restaurants, etc., for food or drink while in [sic] route to their sites at the beginning of their work shift." The terms of this policy letter have been made a part of Rule 14(c), Civil Service Rules and Regulation of the City of Clearwater, the violation of which subjects an offender to disciplinary action. Respondent admittedly stopped at a convenience store on the morning in question, as alleged, to get a cup of coffee to take with him. He was in the store a very short time. Nonetheless, his actions constituted a violation. Disciplinary guidelines for the City are set out in Guidelines For Disciplinary Action, for the City, (Revisions effective 05/23/86) and are broken down into four categories, Level 1 through Level 5 in ascending order of severity . The guidelines provide that: "In each level and for each infraction con- sideration will be given to the severity of the offense, the actual potential cost or damage involved, time interval between infractions, the length and quality of service records and any other pertinent matters." The infraction in question was classified as a Level 3 offense. Under the terms of the Guidelines, Level 3 offenses (here item 16) calls for a "One to Two Day Suspension" for a first offense, a "Three to Five Day Suspension" for a second offense, and "Discharge" for a third offense. The infraction was reported up to Mr. Wilson who evaluated the matter in light of Respondent's work record and prior disciplinary record, and who concluded a one day suspension without pay was appropriate. Mr. Wilson considered the fact that Respondent had worked for the city for 15 years and was a good worker. He also considered Respondent's four prior written disciplinary actions including: 12/30/87 - a written counselling for allowing a city-owned chain saw in his custody to be stolen, 7/10/87 - a written reprimand for sitting in a city truck, while not on break or lunch, 6/11/87 - a written reprimand for care- lessly damaging city property, and 8/21/86 - a written reprimand for care- lessly damaging city property. The above personnel actions were taken from the records of the Division of Parks and Recreation, not the Respondent's official personnel records with the City. Consequently, it cannot be determined if the prior actions were finalized properly and made a part of Respondent's official record. Mr. Ream did not consider the several complimentary notes of appreciation forwarded to Respondent by his supervisor indicating calls by citizens of the city who were pleased with Respondent's work. Again, there was no indication that these notes, admitted by Respondent without objection by the City Attorney, were in Respondent's files or that Mr. Wilson had notice of them. Respondent's immediate supervisor, Mr. Gill, however, indicated Respondent is one of his best employees when it comes to doing his work. He has always been honest and his decisions are usually good. He requires no more supervision than the rest of the workers. Mr. Ream's rationale for imposing the punishment he chose was that Respondent was a group leader who was expected to set the proper example for his crew, and who would have been expected to report any violations he observed. He considered Respondent's 15 years with the city and the fact he had been notified four times previously of substandard behavior. Though no suspension had ever been imposed before, if one had been imposed, this time the action would have been more severe. Respondent was not treated any more drastically than any other city employee guilty of a Level 3 offense. The city looks at this as an unauthorized additional break which, as a matter of community relations, must be curtailed. Though Respondent raised some inference of lesser action being the rule in other city departments, no evidence of such was forthcoming and in any case, so long as the action taken in this case was within the limits authorized, was justified, and was not an abuse of agency action, evidence of other actions in other departments would be irrelevant. The guidelines described above are not mandatory actions but merely suggested actions, and the city officials have consistently tried to stick with them to avoid the unfair application of punishment. That they have been successful is established by the testimony of Mr. George, who, in his many years with the city, cannot recall anyone ever receiving less punishment for the offense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: Recommended that The one day suspension without pay imposed by the City of Clearwater on Respondent Ezekiel, be sustained. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 5th day of July, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Ezekiel Taylor 1466 Lemon Street Clearwater, Florida 34616
