The Issue Whether Choice Plus, LLC is entitled to Unclaimed Property Account Number 103851316.
Findings Of Fact On January 25, 1999, Donald C. Rogers died. On August 19, 1999, the Estate of Donald C. Rogers, (“decedent”) was submitted for probate. The Department received the following described unclaimed property: Account Number: 103851316 Reported Amount: $28,007.01 Reported Name: Rogers, Donald C. Sr. Reported Address: Hillsborough SSN#: None Holder: Clerk of Court Property Type: Cash On March 22, 2005, the probate court entered an Order Granting Petitioner to Distribute Funds and to Distribute Surplus Funds into Registry of Court. The Personal Representative for the Estate had been unable to locate Sean Henry Casner (“Casner”), the decedent’s grandson. Casner’s share of the Estate was $23,689.95. The Order for Discharge was rendered June 24, 2005. On November 3, 2012, Casner executed a Limited Power of Attorney (“LPOA”) authorizing Choice Plus to act on his behalf as Claimant’s Representative. The LPOA disclosed that Choice Plus’ fee was 25 percent of the funds recovered. The 25 percent equaled $5,922.49; the net amount to Casner was $17,767.46. On April 29, 2013, the Department received a completed claim form filed by Choice Plus on behalf of Casner. On August 12, 2013, Choice Plus withdrew its claim on behalf of Casner by email. On August 17, 2013, Casner sold his interest in the property related to the above-referenced account (“account”) to Choice Plus by means of a purchase agreement. On or about August 19, 2013, Casner cashed the $13,029.47 check from Choice Plus for the purchase agreement. On September 3, 2013, the Department received a claim from Choice Plus on behalf of Casner, as the purchaser of the account. The Purchase Agreement disclosed the following: $23,689.95=Approximate Dollar Value of the Property $23,689.95=Amount to be Paid to Buyer $13,029.47=Net Amount to be Paid to Seller Property Account Number(s): 103851316 The Department issued a Notice of Intent to enter a final order denying the claim filed by Choice Plus as the purchaser for the unclaimed property relating to Account Number 103851316. The Department determined Choice Plus failed to comply with section 717.1351, Florida Statutes, by deleting the percentage line in the Purchase Agreement without a flat fee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is REOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Choice Plus claim to the unclaimed property Account Number 103851316. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer and Dobbs, LLP Suite 750 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Josephine Schultz, Esquire Department of Financial Services Legal Services, Room 601 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, William D. Manser (Respondent) was licensed in Florida as a real estate broker, having been issued license number BK 0427410. Respondent was a broker/officer of United Equity Marketing, Inc., located at 6635 West Commercial Boulevard, Tamarac, Florida. Since October 1, 1995, his broker's license has not been on an active status due to non-renewal of the corporate registration. By warranty deed dated February 14, 1992, James and Angela Cunduff became owners of property located at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. By Articles of Agreement for Deed dated February 25, 1992, James and Angela Cunduff agreed to convey the property to Respondent's corporation, United Capital Networks, Inc., if certain conditions were complied with. The conditions included Respondent's corporation making all the mortgage payments and paying the taxes on the property, and keeping the buildings on the property properly insured. In return, James and Angela Cunduff agreed, among other things, to execute a warranty deed to Respondent's corporation and to place the warranty deed in escrow. Respondent and the Cunduffs agreed that the Articles of Agreement for Deed would not be recorded. Respondent looked upon himself and conducted his actions as the owner of the property at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On October 31, 1995, Mary J. Augustine signed a lease agreement for the rental of a portion of the home, the rear of the home, located at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The rear area of the home had its own entrance. The rental was for one year, beginning November 15, 1995, and ending October 30, 1996. Respondent used part of the home as a storage area. At the front of the home, there were two separate entrances. One of the separate entrances was for the storage area. The other separate entrance was for another area of the home. The lease agreement indicated United Equity Markets, Inc., as the managing agent of the property. The lease agreement required signatures of the "Tenant" and the "Lessor." Ms. Augustine signed the lease as "Tenant," and Respondent signed as "Lessor," adding the word "Agent" next to his signature. United Equity Markets, Inc., is Respondent's corporation. Prior to the signing of the lease, Respondent had met with Ms. Augustine at the house at least twice before she signed the lease agreement. Respondent represented himself as the manager of the property. The home was listed as a single-family residence. Ms. Augustine believed that the home would be occupied by Respondent, another tenant, and herself. The evidence is insufficient to show and make a finding that three families would live or had lived at the home. In accordance with the lease agreement, Ms. Augustine gave Respondent $1,290, as a security deposit. Ms. Augustine had also given Respondent, prior to the security deposit, $645 for the first month's rent. Ms. Augustine wanted to move into the rear portion of the home approximately two weeks prior to the beginning of the rental period. Respondent agreed that Ms. Augustine could have access to the home and clean the rear area where she was going to reside. Ms. Augustine had problems with, such things as, the refrigerator, oven, and swimming pool. She decided not to rent the home. Ms. Augustine demanded her deposit and first month's rent from Respondent. However, he refused to return the monies. The lease agreement contained a default provision, providing for the recovery of damages by the lessor if the tenant defaulted. The lease agreement also contained a security provision, providing for the non-refundable nature of the security deposit under certain conditions, including termination of the lease prior to its expiration. Ms. Augustine attempted but could not contact Respondent at his office because he had closed his office prior to October 1995. Ms. Augustine attempted also to contact Respondent at the telephone number that he had provided her, which was his home number. She was again unsuccessful due to Respondent having his telephone disconnected because he had gone to New York to care for his ill sister. Respondent did not provide Ms. Augustine with an accounting of the monies. Respondent was conducting his own personal real estate transaction with Ms. Augustine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against William D. Manser. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated March 22, 1982. This proceeding commenced with the filing of an Administrative Complaint by Petitioner alleging that Respondent had acted as a broker in three separate real estate transactions in 1981 at a time when his real estate license had lapsed, and that he also had failed to place and maintain earnest money deposits in a trust account with reference to the same transactions. Respondent requested an administrative hearing under Section 120.57(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and the case was thereafter referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for appointment of a Hearing Officer. Petitioner appeared at the hearing unaccompanied by legal counsel. He was thereupon advised by the Hearing Officer as to his right to counsel and as to his rights in an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondent indicated that he understood his rights and elected to represent himself. At the hearing, the parties submitted a Prehearing Stipulation of facts and exhibits. (Exhibit 1) In addition, the deposition of Respondent was received in evidence (Exhibit 2), and Respondent testified in his own behalf. Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order has been fully considered and those portions not adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary or irrelevant, or unwarranted in fact or law.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are contained in the Prehearing Stipulation: The Respondent, WILLIAM McCOY, was a real estate broker licensed by the Florida Board of Real Estate prior to October 1, 1980. On or about October 1 1980, the Respondent's real estate license lapsed due to the fact that Respondent failed to apply for a renewal of such license. The Respondent did not renew such license until November 9, 1981. The Respondent acted as a real estate broker on behalf of Clinton and Elizabeth Johnson in their efforts to purchase the property located at 3015 East Fern, Tampa, Florida. Such efforts led to the Johnsons' purchasing the property of [sic] July 29, 1981. A true and correct copy of the contract for sale which was executed by the parties to the sale is attached hereto and identified as Exhibit A. The signature which appears to be the signature of the Respondent is, in fact, the Respondent's signature. The Respondent received payment of a commission for brokerage services on the sale of the East Fern Street property in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) at closing on July 21, 1981. The Respondent acted as broker on behalf of George B. Wilds and Jetie B. Wilds in their efforts to purchase a residence located on West Palm Street in Hillsborough County, Florida. A true and correct copy of the contract for sale executed by the parties to the Palm Street transaction is attached hereto and identified as Exhibit B. The signature which appears to be the Respondent's signature is in fact the Respondent's. The Respondent received a commission for his efforts on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Wilds in the above referenced real estate transaction at the closing which occurred on November 6, 1981. The Respondent received an earnest money deposit check on the Palm Street property from the Wilds, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and identified as Exhibit C. The copies of checks and checking account statements which are attached and identified as Exhibit D are true and correct copies of such records. The trust account from which the records which constitute Exhibit D were the Respondent's only trust account during the relevant period. The following additional facts are found from the evidence presented at the hearing: Respondent maintained both personal and escrow accounts at the Seminole Bank of Tampa. He admitted at the hearing that checks for personal purposes were drawn on his escrow account at various times, although the money expended was money belonging to him after the closing of real estate transactions. (Testimony of Respondent, Exhibits 1-2) In the Wilds transaction, Respondent received a $100.00 binder which he placed in his escrow account. (Testimony of Respondent) On September 28, 1981, Respondent executed an exclusive listing contract with Herbert H. Holley. However, he did not perform services under this agreement, or consider it binding because Holley did not obtain his wife's signature on the contract as had been requested by the Respondent. (Testimony of Respondent, Exhibit 2) Respondent maintained at the hearing that he was unaware of the fact that his broker's license had lapsed because he had been in the process of obtaining a divorce from his wife and that she had taken his credentials at the time they had separated. He had not received a notice from Petitioner to renew his license because his wife was living at home at the time and there was a lot of mail that he had never received prior to their separation. He was aware of the need for periodic renewal of his license, but had not been aware that it had lapsed in 1980. (Testimony of Respondent, Exhibit 2)
Recommendation That Petitioner impose an administrative fine of $250 on Respondent, William McCoy, pursuant to subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, for violation of subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 14 day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: David P. Rankin, Esquire Freeman & Lopez, P.A. 4600 West Cypress (Suite 410) Tampa, Florida 33607 William McCoy 5725 North 40th Street Tampa, Florida 33610 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Legal Services 400 W. Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for nonconforming status on his property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of facts filed by the parties, the following findings of fact are determined: Mr. Mayhew resides in Hawthorne, which is located in the southeastern portion of Alachua County (County). (Some papers filed in this case identify his residence as being in Cross Creek, rather than Hawthorne, but with the same street address.) Since November 1998, he has owned property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida. More specifically, the property is in an older, single-family residential neighborhood known as Florida Park which is located several blocks west of U.S. Highway 441, which runs in a north-south direction through the City, and approximately one-quarter mile north of Northwest 8th Avenue. In broader geographical terms, the property is located around one mile north of the University of Florida campus. There are two structures (or units) on Petitioner's property. One is a three-bedroom, two-bath dwelling constructed by the original owner (Mr. Gainous) in 1949, who occupied that dwelling with his wife. That unit's address is listed on the County Property Appraiser's records as 1607 Northwest 12th Road. The second structure, a two-bedroom, one-bath dwelling (also referred to as a "cottage"), was built by Mr. Gainous in 1957, and was apparently used primarily as rental property by the owner. The address of the second unit on the Property Appraiser's records is 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road. Separate gas meters and a single water line and electric meter serve the two units. (Although the two units are given separate street addresses by the Property Appraiser, only one tax bill is issued by the County Tax Collector.) When these structures were built, the County did not issue building permits. The property was in the unincorporated area of the County until 1961, when the City annexed the property. In 1964, the City adopted its first zoning plan and placed the property in what was then known as the Single-Family Residential (R-1a) zoning district. This category was used since the property was "closely consistent" with that zoning classification. A few years later, the property was rezoned to the Residential Single-Family zoning district (RSF-1), which apparently replaced the R-1a zoning district, and it still remains in that zoning classification. Under current zoning regulations, unless a property has "legal" nonconforming status, two family dwellings are not permitted in the RSF-1 zoning district. However, if a structure and use of land was in existence before the City annexed the property and adopted its zoning code, and was not otherwise shown to have lost that status, the nonconforming use is grandfathered and allowed "to continue until [it is] removed" or otherwise conflicts with conditions pertaining to nonconforming lots, uses, or structures. See § 30-346, Code of Ordinances. (Nonconforming status allows the owner to rent each unit on the parcel to no more than three unrelated persons. Thus, six unrelated persons could legally occupy Mr. Mayhew's two units. However, Mr. Mayhew has always rented to smaller numbers of tenants, and then only to graduate students or "professionals.") One way a property can lose its status is for the owner to not use the property in a nonconforming status for nine consecutive months. In the case of a rental property, this means that the owner has not rented the property for at least nine consecutive months. If this occurs, the owner is presumed to have abandoned the nonconforming status. See § 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances. The precise date on which the City began using the nine-month time period is unknown. According to Mr. Calderon, this time period has been in the Code of Ordinances for "awhile," it was in the Code of Ordinances when "Citywide zoning" was first used in 1982, and he implied that it was in the first zoning code adopted in the 1960s. The City has no formal process by which it monitors properties to ensure that they continue to meet the requirements for legal nonconforming status. Generally, the issue arises after a complaint is filed by a third party or an inspection is made by City officials, who then require that the owner confirm (or prove) that the property still qualifies for that status. In this case, in October 2006, the tenant who occupied the cottage filed a complaint with the City concerning the installation of a new gas stove and other possible code violations. Prior to that time, no other complaints had been lodged against Mr. Mayhew's property. In response to that complaint, a code enforcement officer, Michael Wohl, inspected the property. During the course of that inspection, Mr. Wohl noticed that there were two rental units on one parcel of land. As a routine part of the inspection process, Mr. Wohl made an inquiry to determine if Mr. Mayhew had a landlord permit for each unit. Under the Code of Ordinances, a landlord permit is required for each rental unit. (The specific provision in the Code of Ordinances which imposes this requirement was not given.) According to Mr. Calderon, this requirement has been in the Code of Ordinances since 1989. Mr. Wohl learned that Mr. Mayhew had purchased one landlord permit for the parcel in the year 2000 (and had renewed that permit each year) but did not have a second permit. (When he purchased the property in late 1998, Mr. Mayhew did not know that such permits were even required. He obtained one as soon as this was brought to his attention.) After Mr. Mayhew advised Mr. Wohl that he was unaware that a permit was needed for each unit on his property, Mr. Wohl spoke with Mr. Calderon, who instructed Mr. Wohl to verify if the property was a legal nonconforming use (and therefore could qualify for two landlord permits) since it was located in a single-family zoning classification. Shortly thereafter, a citation was issued to Petitioner. The specific nature of the citation was not disclosed. In any event, by letter dated September 25, 2006, Mr. Calderon requested that Mr. Mayhew provide documentation to support the nonconforming use of the cottage at 1607 1/2 NW 12th Road as an accessory dwelling unit. In response to Mr. Calderon's request, on October 2, 2006, Mr. Mayhew submitted a lengthy letter with supporting documentation, including photographs of the units; copies of rental agreements of tenants who had rented the cottage since he had purchased the property in November 1998; information regarding the date of construction of the two units; and Property Appraiser records showing two units on the parcel. On December 7, 2006, the Department advised Mr. Mayhew by letter that "[b]ased on the physical evidence, property appraiser records and documents provided by you, the property is therefore classified as an existing non-conforming two-family development and is subject to regulations governing non-conforming uses." However, because the City apparently has a policy of notifying residents who live within 300 feet of the subject property of this type of decision, the City also issued on the same date a Notice of Decision to Issue Non-Conforming Status to Petitioner's Property (Notice)." (The record is unclear whether this notice was given pursuant to a policy or a specific Code provision. Other provisions within the Code of Ordinances provide for such notice when the Board conducts hearings on variances, appeals alleging error by an administrative official, and requests for special zoning exceptions. See § 30-354(h)(6)(i)-(k), Code of Ordinances.) In response to the Notice, affidavits were filed by a number of residents who lived adjacent to, or near, the subject property. After reviewing those affidavits, on December 20, 2006, the Department advised Petitioner by letter that based on "new information . . . submitted by affected persons within 300 feet of your property . . . [the] staff [is going to] reconsider the nonconforming status of your property." On January 25, 2007, Mr. Calderon issued a letter denying Mr. Mayhew's request for the following reasons: I have reviewed the information you submitted and those submitted by surrounding property owners. Based on the information and affidavits, there appears to be no consensus or conclusive data establishing emphatically that the subject property has been used consistently as a two-family development since annexation into the city. Evidence from the property owner would suggest that since 1998, the subject property has been used as a two- family dwelling and that no nine-month period has elapsed where the property was not used as a two-family dwelling. However, due to uncertainty for the period around and prior to 1998, staff cannot make a determination about the status of the development around and prior to 1998. Staff cannot determine whether the subject property was illegal, legal non-conforming or lost its non-conforming status at the time of ownership change in 1998. Since the current zoning of the subject property is RSF-1 (Single-family residential, 3.5 dwelling units per acre), the current use as a two-family dwelling is not permitted. Staff is therefore denying the request on the basis that available information cannot demonstrate continued use of the property as a two-family development, since annexation into the [C]ity of Gainesville. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Mayhew filed his appeal of that decision. Because Mr. Mayhew alleged that there were disputed issues of material fact, the appeal was forwarded to DOAH, rather than the Board. In his appeal, Mr. Mayhew alleged that the City had improperly relied on affidavits from neighbors to reconsider its decision, that there was no new evidence submitted to support a change in the City's initial decision, and that he could not get a fair hearing from the Board because several members of the Board live in the affected neighborhood or are members of a neighborhood association that includes the Florida Park area. Section 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances, as amended in November 2006, provides the following restrictions on nonconforming uses: Whenever a nonconforming use of land or a building or other structure or any portion thereof is abandoned or the use is discontinued for a continuous period of nine months or more, such abandonment or discontinuance shall be presumed to constitute an intention to abandon or discontinue such use, and such use shall no longer be permitted. Any subsequent use of such building or structure or land shall be in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. Although this section was amended in November 2006, the amendment did not affect (or otherwise change) the nine- month time period for losing a nonconforming use. Prior to the amendment, the section provided that if a nonconforming use was lost due to abandonment or discontinuation, the reestablishment of the use could be authorized by the Board, after hearing, if the Board found the design, construction, and character of the building not suitable for the uses in the district in which the nonconforming use is situated. Under the new amendment, that option no longer exists. The history note to this provision indicates that the original ordinance (No. 3777) was adopted on June 10, 1992, and was later amended on July 25, 1994.1 (However, Mr. Calderon indicated that the nine-month period dates back many years before the adoption of this particular Ordinance. See Finding of Fact 5, supra.) When an owner is required to demonstrate that his rental property has continuously retained its nonconforming status, he must show that the property has been continuously rented (with no nine-month breaks) not only for the period of time that he has owned the property, but also for the entire time the property has enjoyed nonconforming status, or in this case since the property was annexed by the City. Thus, Mr. Mayhew was obligated to show that the original owners (Mr. and Mrs. Gainous) rented the property continuously from the time the property was annexed in 1961 until it was sold to Mr. Mayhew in late 1998. The City's practice is to determine nonconforming status on a case by case basis but the burden is on the owner to prove that status through records such as building permits, landlord permits, zoning compliance permits, and occupational licenses, and "records from reputable sources." The parties agree that both units were continuously rented by Mr. Mayhew since the time he purchased the property in November 1998. The dispute here is whether the nonconforming use was abandoned for any nine-month period prior to Mr. Mayhew's purchase of the property. The City contends that Mr. Mayhew has presented no evidence to show that the cottage was rented by the prior owner from 1996 until the property was sold in late 1998. Although Mr. Mayhew clearly established (and the City agrees) that the property has been continuously rented since he purchased the parcel in late 1998, he conceded that the cottage was vacant when he purchased the property, that he had made no inquiry to the seller as to how long the cottage had been vacant, and that he had no personal knowledge regarding the rental history of the property during the three years preceding the purchase. He contended, however, that there are always periods of time when a unit remains vacant while the owner is actively seeking a new tenant or when necessary renovations must be made. While this is true, there is no evidence that this occurred during the years 1996, 1997, or 1998. (It is unknown where Mrs. Gainous presently resides, or even if she is still alive. When the property was sold in late 1998, Mrs. Gainous was described as being elderly and in poor health.) Significantly, City records show that Mrs. Gainous had secured landlord permits to rent the cottage from 1989 (when permits were first required) through 1995, but she had failed to obtain any permits for the years 1996, 1997, or 1998, at which time she sold the property to Mr. Mayhew. This raises a logical inference, not overcome by Mr. Mayhew, that she did not rent the cottage during those years. In addition, Dr. Kosch, who has lived across the street from the subject property for the last twenty years, testified that he personally observed several periods of time before the property was sold to Mr. Mayhew when there were no tenants in the cottage. Although Dr. Kosch could not specifically identify the exact time periods when this occurred (due to the passage of time), his testimony adds further support to a finding that there is insufficient evidence that the cottage was rented continuously (without any nine-month breaks) during the years 1996-1998. Mr. Mayhew purchased the property with the understanding that he could legally rent both units. While it may seem unfair for him to now have to prove that the property has been continuously rented (with no breaks exceeding nine consecutive months) since the 1960s, this interpretation of the Code of Ordinances has always been followed by the City without exception. According to Mr. Wohl, this situation has occurred at least 8 or 9 times in the last few years alone, and in each case, the property owner was required to prove a continued nonconforming use since the property was annexed by the City or placed in a more restrictive zoning classification.
Findings Of Fact At all times here relevant, Respondents Arthur C. Enger and William L. Baldwin were registered real estate salesmen and T. Maurice Rouede and Rouede Realty, Inc. were registered real estate brokers. In 1969 the cities of Eau Gallie and Melbourne were merged into the City of Melbourne. A comprehensive zoning plan for the new City of Melbourne was embarked upon and by Melbourne Ordinance No. 72-4, a comprehensive zoning plan was adopted. Because of the large area affected by the plan individual property owners were not advised of any changes in zoning of adjacent property. Southgate sub-division was sub-divided into lots and platted in 1964 by Disc Corporation, the owners of this property. Between this date and 1972 several of these lots had been sold to individuals who had erected houses on these lots. In 1972 some 38 lots in this sub-division remaining in the ownership of Disc Corporation were purchased by Rouede Builders, Inc. for the purpose of erecting homes thereon for sale. A model home was erected and used as the on-site sales office while the remainder of the property was sold. Since numerous lots in Southgate had already been sold by Disc when the remaining lots were bought by Rouede, a map showing the two platted units in Southgate were obtained from Disc by Rouede and placed on the wall in the on- site sales office with those lots already sold so indicated in red. Although there was some discrepancy in the testimony regarding which particular map was exhibited on the wall of the on-site sales office, each of these maps (which were introduced into evidence as Exhibits 11, 13, and 15) contained the entire plat of the Southgate lots and showed 11 lots number 7 - 17 adjacent to and immediately south of the lots which Rouede was offering for sale. Since all of these maps showed lots 7 - 17 south of the Rouede property and they differed only in the manner in which previously sold lots were indicated, it is immaterial to the issues herein which map was actually exhibited on the wall of the sales office. While the testimony on how the Rouede lots were sold was not clear, it appears that these lots were sold only to individuals who also contracted with Rouede for the construction of a residence, or were sold only with the residence. The property immediately south of the Rouede property was zoned R-1 prior to 1972, and it appears that lots 7 - 17 were shown on the map used by the Tax Assessor prior to 1975. The Comprehensive Zoning Plan enacted in 1972 zoned this property R-3 for multiple family dwellings. The current parcel map (Exhibit 10) indicates that in May, 1975 the parcel map was corrected by the addition of Village Green. Village Green occupies the same geographical area as lots 7 - 17 shown on Exhibits 11, 13, and 15 without any lot lines separation. On May 29, 1973 Rouede Builders, Inc. entered into a contract, (Exhibit 12) with William E. and Irene Cook to erect a residence thereon and deed lot number 27 in Southgate Section 2, Unit 1 to the Cooks. The construction was delayed for several weeks to obtain a variance for the purchasers. The construction was completed, and by warranty deed dated January 28, 1974 (Exhibit 8) Rouede Builders, Inc. conveyed the property to the Cooks. Following the occupancy of the residence by the Cooks the owners of the property immediately south of the Cook's property, designated as Village Green on Exhibit 10, commenced the construction of townhouses. These are two story units with each unit comprising a ground floor and second floor, and with walls common to an adjacent unit on either side. These units are constructed 25 feet from the property line as required by the setback restrictions, and by virtue of the two-foot variance obtained for the Cook's residence they are located 48 feet from the Cook's house. Mrs. Cook testified that prior to entering into a contract for the purchase of Lot 27, the salesman with whom she was dealing, Arthur C. Enger, in response to her question, advised her that the property immediately south of Southgate (lots 7 - 17 on the wall plat) was zoned for single family residences the same as lot 27. Subsequent to the commencement of the construction of her house she testified that William C. Baldwin, in a telephone conversation also indicated that the property immediately south of Lot 27 was zoned R-1. She talked to Mr. Rouede once or twice by phone regarding construction of her home, but never discussed zoning with him. Other witnesses who contracted for the erection of a home in Southgate from Rouede recalled no discussion with any salesman regarding the zoning of the area to the south. One of these witnesses took it upon himself to ascertain this fact prior to having his house built and learned from the zoning authorities that the property was zoned R-3. All Respondents denied that they ever knew what the zoning of the area immediately south of the Rouede property was while they were building and selling houses in Southgate or that they ever discussed such zoning with prospective purchasers or among themselves. None of the Respondents knew who the owners of the property were at the time Rouede was building homes in Southgate; only that it was not included in their sales package. At the initial sales meeting, where the salesmen were advised how the lots would be sold as well as at subsequent monthly sales meetings, no mention was ever made regarding the zoning of the property later known as Village Green. At this time the property was undeveloped and what is shown as Berkley Avenue on Exhibits 11, 13, and 15, was not in existence. The map on the wall was reproduced to an 8 1/2 x 14 size (Exhibit 14) and copies of this smaller map were given to all salesmen. These maps were used only as visual sales tools and to keep the salesmen current on which lots were available for sale.
Findings Of Fact Mini-Warehouses at Kendall, Ltd. d/b/a A+ Mini-Storage (KENDALL) is a Florida partnership maintaining its principal place of business at 12345 S.W. 117th Court, Miami, Florida. DOT is a decentralized state agency. It has established several districts of which District 6, Dade County, is one. DOT's central office is located in Tallahassee, Florida. At all times material hereto, KENDALL held title to all privately owned real property, hereinafter abutting parcel, located adjacent to real property owned by the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT), hereinafter surplus property, situated in Dade County, Florida. Surplus properties are oddly-shaped strips of land left over from parcels acquired by the State of Florida. The subject surplus property is of no use to the State and can only be used for a few economic purposes. It has utility value for the abutting property. KENDALL's abutting parcel is fully developed with buildings divided into mini-storage units being rented to the public and is zoned IU-C, Industrial/Conditional - Manufacturing. The east side of KENDALL's property abuts the surplus property. The surplus property and the abutting property are located in DOT's District 6. DOT identifies the surplus property as parcel no. 0739 which is a long, narrow right-of-way, consisting of .927 acres. It is 29 to 67 feet wide and approximately 950 feet long. The surplus property is zoned EU-M, Residential. On June 28, 1985, DOT and KENDALL entered into a written surplus property lease (original lease) for the subject surplus property. The original lease was automatically renewable and could be cancelled by either party with 30 days prior notice. Leasing the surplus property allowed KENDALL to reduce the amount of damage that the state's storm water runoff would otherwise cause to its abutting property. KENDALL was required by the original lease to pay DOT $2,400 annually, plus sales tax, for the use of the surplus property. KENDALL made the payments from 1985 to 1991. By letter dated May 3, 1991, DOT's District 6 office informed KENDALL that: (a) the original lease was unilaterally terminated; (b) KENDALL would be required to execute a renewal lease for 5 years with an option to renew for 5 more years, at an annual rate to be determined; (c) KENDALL might want to hire an independent appraiser from DOT's approved list of independent fee appraisers; and (d) KENDALL would have to negotiate a fee with the appraiser. Wanting to continue to lease the surplus property, KENDALL chose an appraiser from DOT's approved list of independent fee appraisers and hired him to appraise the surplus property. Per DOT's instructions, the independent appraiser contacted District 6's chief review appraiser for further instructions regarding the appraisal. The appraiser hired by KENDALL had a long working relationship with DOT. Throughout the 1980's to 1991, DOT and District 6 had accepted surplus property appraisals, without exception, from the appraiser that: (a) used only the contributory value method as a starting point in the appraisal process for fair market rent; (b) determined the fair market value that the surplus property would bring in a sale open to the public; and (c) made necessary market-based adjustments to arrive at a final figure, which was somewhere between the figure obtained in (a) and the figure obtained in (b), which represented the fair market rent for the surplus property. However, involving the surplus property at KENDALL, District 6's chief review appraiser informed the independent appraiser that only the unmodified across the fence or contributory value method would be acceptable when estimating rent that DOT should seek for the surplus property. Moreover, the chief review appraiser informed him that any other method would result in his appraisal being rejected. The chief review appraiser informed the independent appraiser that the factors to be used and considered were: (a) the surplus property's contributing value to KENDALL, as if the abutting property was vacant; and (b) a market rate of return based on the contributing value to KENDALL for fee simple ownership in perpetuity even though the renewal lease only conveyed surface rights, subject to a 30-day cancellation clause. In other words, District 6's chief review appraiser was instructing KENDALL's appraiser to use the across the fence appraisal method. This appraisal technique involves the following actions: Estimate the market value of the surplus property and the abutting property, as assembled. Estimate the market value of the abutting property, as it exists (without the surplus property added). Subtract the estimated market value of the abutting property, as it exists, from the estimated market value of the assembled abutting and surplus properties. The difference between the two value estimates should yield a supportable indication of market value for the surplus property. KENDALL's independent appraiser followed the instructions of the chief review appraiser for DOT's District 6. Because of the very limited market data for surplus property leases, KENDALL's appraiser requested DOT's surplus property lease data for Dade County from the chief review appraiser; however, he received no response to his request. Without the requested data, KENDALL's appraiser was unable to use a lease data comparison. In his appraisal, he relied upon market data of the sales of commercial land, exclusively, and determined that the surplus property's highest and best use is to serve as a storage yard for parking trailers and boats, assuming the surplus property could be rezoned or a variance obtained to permit that use. Based upon the assumption of vacant or undeveloped commercial property and rezoned or variance surplus property for commercial use as a storage yard, the independent appraiser determined that the market value of the surplus property in fee simple was $128,000. He further ascertained that an investor would be satisfied with a 10 percent yield and determined that the across the fence value is an annual rent of $12,800 for a 50 to 100 year lease term, which is the prevailing market rent for the surplus property. The appraisal was accepted by DOT. Not agreeing with the across the fence method, KENDALL obtained approval from DOT for the submission of a second appraisal for the surplus property. DOT agreed but on the condition that the second appraisal had to be submitted by December 31, 1991. For the second appraisal, KENDALL'S independent appraiser used the method which he used previously and which was historically accepted by DOT. Again, he determined that the highest and best use of the surplus property was a storage yard, assuming that it could be rezoned or a variance obtained to permit such use. He then determined, as before, that the contributory value (across the fence) value of the surplus property in fee simple was $128,000. Subsequently, the appraiser determined that the fair market value of the surplus property was $32,000 if rezoned and sold in fee simple to the public, including KENDALL. Finally, contrary to the first appraisal, the appraiser determined that the fair market rent for the surplus property was $3,000 a year if the entire parcel could be used as a storage yard and that the surplus property would only produce a nominal rent of $100 a year if leased to the general public. The second appraisal was submitted by DOT's imposed deadline. By letter dated October 9, 1991, the chief review appraiser for DOT's District 6 notified all approved appraisers on its list, including KENDALL's independent appraiser, of the surplus property appraisal policy that would be used. It states in pertinent part: SUBJECT: A STATEMENT OF DISTRICT APPRAISAL POLICY SURPLUS PROPERTY APPRAISALS - THE VALUATION PROCEDURE [I]t is inequitable to examine surplus properties without some evaluation of the abutting property. To be consistent in the appraisals for acquisition and those for sale by the Florida Department of Transportation, subjects should be estimated at their "ATF" or "Across The Fence" value. The surplus property appraisals should be addressed in the same way a "before and after" appraisal is conducted. The current Right of Way Appraisal Standards would be applicable in this assignment. The recommended appraisal procedure for surplus properties will be: Estimate the market value of the surplus property and the abutting property, as assembled. Estimate the market value of the abutting property, as it exists (without the surplus property added). Subtract the estimated market value of the abutting property, as it exists, from the estimated market value of the assembled abutting and surplus properties. The difference between the two value estimates should yield a supportable indication of market value for the surplus property. This process is logical and it appears to be reflective of the market. The appraisal problem is complicated by this procedure, but the result should be a more accurate and consistent estimate of market value of surplus property. In late 1991 or early 1992, KENDALL started the process to obtain a variance from Dade County. In accordance with DOT's requirement, KENDALL absorbed the costs associated with obtaining the variance. As of the date of hearing, KENDALL had expended between $10,000 and $15,000. Generally, the landowner is responsible for obtaining the variance or rezoning necessary for a lessee to use a leased parcel for its highest and best use. However, if the landowner is not obtaining the variance or rezoning, generally, the lessee receives a reduced rental rate. In July 1992, the chief review appraiser for DOT's District 6 notified KENDALL that the second appraisal was rejected. He rejected the appraisal without reviewing it. Based on the accepted appraisal, DOT determined that the prevailing market rent for the surplus property was $12,800, plus tax, annually and assessed KENDALL accordingly. Wanting to continue to use the surplus property, KENDALL paid DOT $2,544 as partial payment of the annual rent, plus tax, for the initial year of renewal beginning June 28, 1991 and paid $24,617 for outstanding rent, plus tax, for the period June 28, 1991 through June 27, 1993. KENDALL has continuously paid the annual rent required by DOT. In May 1994, Dade County issued KENDALL a conditional variance. Assuming KENDALL satisfies numerous local concurrency and planning requirements, the final variance will permit it to use no more than 60 percent of the surplus property for storage purposes. Until rezoning or a variance is obtained, the market rent of the surplus property is $100 to $500 annually according to KENDALL's appraisers. A real property appraisal is expected to use an appraisal technique which reveals the maximum market value at a given time for the property being appraised. Several appraisal techniques are recognized and accepted by the appraisal profession, including across the fence method or technique. The appraiser initially determines the highest and best use of the parcel being appraised. Then, the sale value of the parcel is determined. The appraised market value is the base for establishing a market rental value for the property. The appraisal technique or method for surplus property can vary from parcel to parcel. Appraisal methods or techniques other than the across the fence method have been used by other DOT approved appraisers when appraising the fair market value for surplus property and have been accepted by DOT. Usually, surplus properties have a higher value when a contributing value appraisal technique (across the fence technique) is used because such properties are generally small in size and irregular in shape. The prospective buyer for surplus property is generally limited to the abutting parcel user or its competitors. District 6's chief review appraiser erroneously refused to consider any other appraisal value method, other than the across the fence method, to value the surplus property. DOT admits that its chief review appraiser in District 6 should not have required KENDALL's independent appraiser to use only the across the fence method to determine fair market rent for the surplus property. For the subject surplus property the market data for leases of DOT's surplus properties in Dade County would have been appropriate data to use in the appraisal. Even though DOT failed to provide KENDALL's appraiser with the market data, DOT did have such data for four leases executed between October 1989 and January 1991. These leases, as is KENDALL's lease, were only for surface use, subject to a 30-day cancellation clause. The data showed that the cancellation clause significantly reduced the market rental rate when leasing surplus property and that the market rental rate of return was between 1.89 percent and 2.62 percent per year to the respective owners. The data from DOT's surplus property leases would have been used by KENDALL's appraiser if it had been provided to him. Based upon the data of the surplus property leases, KENDALL's appraiser determined that the owner of the surplus property would receive annual rent equalling between 1.89 percent and 2.62 percent of the amount that the surplus property would produce if it was fully developed as commercial property and sold in fee simple. In February 1994, KENDALL obtained the services of another appraiser from DOT's approved list of independent appraisers to perform an independent appraisal for the fair market value of the surplus property for the period beginning July 1, 1991. Prior to obtaining his services, KENDALL did not request DOT to accept another appraisal. First, the appraiser determined that comparably-sized commercial property in Dade County, providing maximum utility, had a fair market value of $140,000 in a fee simple sale. Next, he determined that the highest and best use of the surplus property was for storage purposes, which reduced the value of the surplus property in fee simple by 57 percent. Even though the appraiser determined that KENDALL was the logical purchaser of the surplus property, he also determined that, due to KENDALL having fully developed its abutting property and not being able to economically build on the surplus property, the surplus property would not provide a maximum utility to KENDALL's abutting property. Based upon such market factors, the appraiser determined that the surplus property had a fair market value of $35,000 if sold in fee simple for storage purposes. Therefore, assuming a variance or rezoning could be obtained by KENDALL to use the surplus property for storage purposes, the appraiser determined that the fair market rent for the surplus property was $3,500 as of July 1, 1991. DOT never performed an appraisal of the surplus property.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that DOT enter a final order that the market rental value assessed to the surplus property leased to and paid by KENDALL is invalid, as exceeding prevailing market rent, that the prevailing market rent for the surplus property is $3,000 annually and that DOT refund to KENDALL the difference between a market rent of $12,800 annually and $3,000 annually, beginning in November 1993. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of March 1995. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March 1995
The Issue Whether the decision to award the bid for Parcel No. 93S101, State Road 84 Spur, was in accordance with the governing rules and statutes or was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact In October of 1993 the Respondent declared that a spur property located at State Road 84 (the subject matter of these proceedings) was a surplus parcel. Such property is comprised of two identifiable tracts identified in this record as parcel 101-A and parcel 101-B. The Respondent utilizes a manual entitled "Disposal of Surplus Real Property" as its guide for the procedures used to comply with statutory and rule provisions regarding the disposal of surplus parcels. Since 1993 the Department has made several attempts to market the spur property. Such attempts included offering parcel 101-A to the Petitioner for no consideration. As recently as October of 2000 the Department offered the spur property to the Petitioner at no cost. The offer did include some conditions but same did not materially affect whether or not Davie would or could accept the transfer. For whatever reasons, the Petitioner did not accept the offer. Subsequently, the Respondent withdrew the offer in writing. Additionally, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it intended to make the spur property (both parcels) available to the public through the competitive bid process. It was contemplated that the bid process would allow any person from the public to competitively place bids for the subject property. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was advised that it would be given an opportunity to acquire the property. A letter of February 7, 2001, from the Department to the Petitioner advised the town of its right to acquire the property but did not in any manner prohibit or prevent the Town of Davie from bidding on the spur property. In fact, the Petitioner did not bid on the subject property. Further, the Petitioner did not and does not intend to purchase the subject property. The only way the Intervenor seeks to acquire the property is without cost. The Petitioner had actual knowledge of the Department's intention of making the property available through competitive bid. The Town of Davie did nothing to oppose the bid process. On May 30, 2001, the spur properties were advertised for competitive bidding with sealed bids to be opened by the Department on June 14, 2001. On June 21, 2001, the Town of Davie by and through its town administrator contacted the Department in order to exercise the town's right of refusal on the property. Accordingly, on June 25, 2001, the Respondent posted a notice stating it would reject all bids. On July 12, 2001, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it had ten days to exercise its right to purchase the property. In connection with the proposed sale the Department offered the property to the Town of Davie at the approved appraised value of $1.9 million. The Petitioner made no counter-offer. Instead, on July 27, 2001, the Town of Davie responded to the offer stating it would accept the parcel for a public purpose for no consideration. Thereafter, the Respondent posted a "Revised Bid Tabulation" indicating it would award the spur property to the highest responsive bidder, the Intervenor. The Petitioner has not proposed to pay for the spur property. The Petitioner did not have an appraisal of the spur property prepared. The Petitioner did not bid on the spur property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order confirming the award of the spur property to the Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael T. Burke, Esquire Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke & George, P.A. 790 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 400 Post Office Box 030220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33303-0220 Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 350 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
