Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. During times material herein, Petitioner was employed as a Unit Treatment Shift (UTR) Supervisor at South Florida State Hospital, Hollywood, Florida. Her duties included setting up medications; dispensing and administering medications, charting medications and taking patients from the ward for meals. Petitioner also performed related duties such as writing medical reports and keeping the ward areas clean. On October 3, 1980, Petitioner was injured while on duty at South Florida State Hospital. Petitioner suffered a back injury which required two back operations during 1981 and 1982 (laminectomies). Petitioner suffered a previous back injury during 1976, a herniated disc and, as a result thereof, had two disc operations wherein discs were removed. Petitioner remained under the treatment and care of Dr. George Crane until December 6, 1983. Dr. Crane determined that Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement on August 11, 1983 and confirmed that Petitioner was employable as of approximately March, 1983. That release was confirmed by letter dated October 20, 1983 from Dr. George Crane, M.D. Prior to that time, Petitioner had been determined unable to sit, stand, lift, push or carry objects without severe pain. Also, during the period 1980 when she was injured through the time of her release by Dr. Crane, Petitioner had endured substantial pain requiring that she spend a great deal of her time in bed. She had, on occasion, left groceries in the store due to excruciating pain. (Testimony of Petitioner) Although Dr. Crane considered that Petitioner was employable as early as March of 1983, he suggested during August of 1983 that Petitioner attend a one week's visit to the Pain Center in Miami, Florida. Evidence reveals that while Dr. Crane suggested that Petitioner visit the Pain Center, he did not consider that her condition rendered her unemployable. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) Bradford Drake, 1/ a Benefits Coordinator employed by Respondent as a Personnel Technician I, contacted Dr. Crane's office and confirmed his release of Petitioner to return to work. Armed with that confirmation, Mr. Drake contacted Petitioner and advised her of Dr. Crane's release of her to return to work. By letter dated December 7, 1983, Petitioner was advised by Barbara Nickels, Personnel Officer, that "This will serve to officially inform you that you are to return to your UTR Shift Supervisor position, Dade/Collier Ward, on Monday, December 12, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. Failure to report to your position after three days from December 12, 1983 will be considered abandonment of position and resignation from the State of Florida career service at South Florida State Hospital. This action is pursuant to the State of Florida rules and regulations, Section 22A-7.10(2)." (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Additionally, by letter dated December 19, 1983, Petitioner was advised by Robert A. Burton, hospital Administrator, that effective the close of business December 19, 1983, Petitioner was considered to have abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida career service at South Florida State Hospital. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent's Employee Handbook including the Employee Standards of Conduct and had received a copy of HRS Pamphlet 60-1 on May 18, 1979. Contained in that pamphlet is an employee policy concerning absences. An employee absent for three consecutive days without authorization may be considered to have abandoned that position and resigned. Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 and Section 22A-7.10(2), Florida Administrative Code. During January of 1984, Petitioner was under the care and treatment of Dr. Paul Wand, a neurologist. Respondent, through employees of the personnel office, was not familiar with the treatment procedures to Petitioner by Dr. Paul Wand. To allow the Petitioner the benefit of doubt, Mr. Drake arranged for Dr. Crane to see the Petitioner during December of 1983 and Dr. Crane noted no change in the Petitioner's maximum medical improvement and considered her employable at that time. (Testimony of Bradford Drake and report of Petitioner's office visit to Dr. Crane dated December 6, 1983, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) In an instance where an employee, as Petitioner, tenders documentation that she is being treated by another physician, such a physician is called and the treatment is verified by staff and the personnel office of Respondent. In such instances, latitude is given that employee to tender documentation which would be considered in determining whether or not an employee is employable based on the opinion of the "other" physician. However, as noted earlier herein, Petitioner was primarily treated by Dr. Crane.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that, based on Petitioner's failure to report to her position as UTR Shift Supervisor after three days from December 12, 1983, Petitioner abandoned her position of employment and resigned from the State of Florida career service at South Florida State Hospital. 2/ RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1984.
Findings Of Fact In April, 1987, DOA submitted recommendations to the Florida Legislature which included proposed changes in the state employees' group insurance program. Among the recommendations was a proposal that would require the Department to competitively bid HMO contracts in the state health program on the basis of cost, service area, plan benefits, and accessibility. The stated objective of the recommendation was to: encourage HMOs in a geographic location to structure their premiums to reflect actual cost experience and to provide the lowest possible cost for the state and state employees, while at the same time changing the current concept of the state's contributions to HMOs..." At the time of the DOA legislative recommendation, existing state law provided that persons eligible to participate in the state group health insurance program had the option to elect membership in any qualified HMO engaged in providing basic health services in the HMO service area where the employee resided in lieu of participating in the state self-insurance plan. Section 110.123(3)(d), Florida Statutes, Rule 22K-1.1003(21), F.A.C. A "qualified" HMO was defined as an entity qualified under the federal Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 300e-9, or certified under Part II of Chapter 641, Florida Statutes, which had entered into a contract with the State, and had achieved a designated level of participation by state employees. Rule 22K- 1.1003(21), F.A.C. Effective October 1, 1987, Chapter 87-156, Laws of Florida (now codified as Section 110.123(3)(d), Fla. Stat.) was amended to add the following: (3) STATE GROUP INSURANCE PROGRAM. -- * * * (d) * * * 2. Effective January 1, 1988, the Department of Administration shall, by rule, contract with health maintenance organizations to participate in the state group health insurance plan through the competitive bid process based on cost, service area, plan benefits, and accessibility. Effective January 1, 1988, all employees participating in the state group health insurance plan, irrespective of whether or not the member participates in a health maintenance organization, shall be subject to the same total premium, regardless of the state or employee's share. THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS Dennis Nye, then the DOA Director of the Office of State Employees Insurance and administrator of the state health insurance program, was directly responsible for implementing the new legislation regarding the HMO contracts. He initially determined that procurement of HMO contractual services was governed by Section 287.057, Florida Statutes. The Request For Proposals For Health Maintenance Organization Coverage was issued on July 31, 1987, as "Bid No. 88-05." It scheduled a presubmission conference on August 12, 1987, and established the deadline for receipt of proposals of August 28, 1987, with a contemplated date of award of contract on September 14, 1987, and an effective contract date of January 1, 1988. The Department clearly set forth the general purpose of the RFP in Section II as requiring each proposal to meet the benefit objectives and to provide high quality benefits and services to state employees. More specific objectives were as follows: A proactive approach to cost containment, including an emphasis on aggressive claims management, utilization review and superior statistical reporting Quality medical care which encourages health promotion, disease prevention, early diagnosis and treatment. Stability in the financial structure of offered health plans. Professional, high quality service in all administrative areas including claims processing, enrollment, membership services, grievances, and communications. Competitive premium rates which take into account the demographics and, if appropriate, the claims experience of State employees. DOA stated other objectives to be as follows: Have each county or contiguous group of counties be considered one service area. Award no more than two contracts per service area; however, the awards will be based on the HMO's ability to respond to the needs of employees and on accessibility by employees. Have reciprocal agreements between locations, if an HMO has multiple service areas. For example, an employee covered in Miami with a covered dependent living in Gainesville, should be provided similar services. Enter into a two year, non-experience rated contract. A provision will be included tying renewal action at each of the two renewals to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Medical Care Services. This will become part of the contract. Section III of the RFP stated that to be considered as a "qualified" HMO, the proposer must be licensed by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Part II of Chapter 641, Florida Statutes. Each proposer was required to submit the following: Form PUR 7033, properly completed and signed. The completed Questionnaires Requirements Section (Please answer questions in the same order as they appear in that Section; do not reformat). The completed Cost Proposal forms (Please use the enclosed form on page 43 and 44; do not reformat). The completed Statement of Compliance on page 47. Documentation in support of the above. Section III further provided in part as follows: Proposals are to be submitted only on the forms and formats provided in this RFP. All exhibits requested must be submitted with your proposal along with answers to all questions contained in this RFP. Section IV of the RFP provided that each contract would be for a 24 month term, beginning January 1, 1988. The Department reserved the right to renew the contracts on the same terms and conditions of the initial contract for two additional one-year periods. Section VI of the RFP, concerning "Required Benefits and Services," listed the minimum benefits that must be provided, and also required that a complete list of all other intended services for each service area be provided. Section IX specified the following criteria for evacuation of the proposals: Premium Cost Extensiveness of Service Areas by County and/or contiguous Counties. Note: The State's objective is to award no more than two contracts per services (sic) area; however, the awards will be based on the HMO's ability to respond to the needs of employees and on accessibility by employees. Plan Benefits as follows: Covered services Limitations and exclusions Co-payments, deductibles and co-insurance features Range of providers including specialists and number of hospitals Out of service area coverage Grievance procedures Acessibility as follows: Reciprocal agreements Provider locations Number of primary care physicians and specialists, in relation to membership Completeness of proposals The RFP did not provide information on DOA's evaluation of the legislatively required criteria concerning the importance of price and other evaluation criteria. The Department weighed cost equal to benefits plus accessibility and determined accessibility was a part of the plan benefits. Section X was a questionnaire with forty-nine questions for the proposers to answer including questions regarding the proposer's license status, corporate structure, reserving practices, reinsurance contracts, service area, employee membership and staff, hospitals and other care facilities, participating physicians, utilization review, and other information regarding the proposer's case management, control mechanisms, statistical reporting, and the like. Each proposer was directed to submit audited financial statements for the last two fiscal years, together with financial statements for the first quarter of 1987. Section XI dealt with cost proposals and provided a form for completion as to proposed premium rates. In an undated addendum to the RFP, the Department added Question 50 to the RFP to provide information for use in a brochure which would allow state employees to compare the benefits offered by the various HMOs. In the pre-submission conference held on August 12, 1987, and attended by representatives of the HMOs, the participants were informed by Mr. Nye that the two criteria of cost and benefits would be weighted on an equal basis. He also advised that the State would enter into a two year, non-experience rated contract, subject to renewal which would tie rate increases to the Consumer Price Index for Medical Care Services. Proposers were told to quote a specific rate for the first year of the contract, and a percentage increase or decrease for each of the following three years. However, he noted that the State would evaluate cost solely on the basis of the premium for the first year. He indicated that two HMOs per service area would be awarded contracts based on the highest number of points received in the bid evaluation process, and not based upon the type of HMO, such as an individual practice association (IPA) or staff model. Then asked whether some factors would be weighted higher than others, Mr. Nye responded that benefits and cost would be weighted higher. THE PROPOSERS 15. Twelve HMOs submitted proposals to the Department for the South Florida area (Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties) in response to the RFP by the deadline, and several of those submitted more than one proposal. There was, however, no prohibition on submitting multiple proposals, and prospective bidders were told that they had that option. In this proceeding, proposals were received from Health Options, Heritage, and Humana to serve Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, and a proposal from Gulfstream to serve Palm Beach County. Health Options is a for profit subsidiary of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, and is an individual practice association (IPA) model HMO. Health Options offers HMO services in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. It has a total membership of 23,074 members, of which 517 are state employees and dependents. Heritage is a subsidiary of Heritage Health System, Inc., for profit Delaware Corporation, and is an IPA model HMO. Heritage offers HMO services in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, and has a total membership of 12,500 members, including 10 state employees and dependents. Humana is a for profit subsidiary of Humana, Inc., and is a combination staff/IPA model HMO. Humana offers HMO services in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, and has a total membership of 91,217 members, including 3,273 state employees and dependents. Gulfstream, at the time its proposal was filed, was a limited partnership whose general partner was Equicor Holding Company and whose limited partner was H.C.A. Care of Florida, Inc. The limited and general partners were wholly owned subsidiaries of Equicor, Equitable H.C.A. Corporation, which is owned by Hospital Corporation of America and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. On January 1, 1988, Gulfstream converted to corporate form, and is now known as Equicor Health Plan of Florida. Gulfstream offers services in Palm Beach County and has a total membership of 12,335 members, including 933 state employees and dependents. THE EVALUATION PROCESS The evaluation of the proposals submitted by HMOs throughout the state for the seven service areas was initially accomplished by employee evaluation teams made up of employees in Dennis Nye's office. He was assisted in his selection by Marie Walker, a benefits analyst in his office. Dennis Nye and Ms. Walker decided which employees could best evaluate the proposals based on the criteria established in the law, including familiarity with benefits and the request for proposal process. The employees selected for these duties had varying degrees of knowledge concerning health plan benefits, HMOs, and bid evaluations. After the initial evaluation was completed, the Department determined that inconsistent methods had been used to score the proposals and further directed Dennis Nye to continue the evaluation process based upon an objective scoring system which limited subjectivity to the maximum extent possible. As Secretary, I was concerned with the financial soundness of each bidder and instructed Dennis Nye to keep that aspect in mind when making his final recommendation. The second or "final evaluation" of the proposals was solely based on the five criteria contained in the RFP, i.e., premium cost, extensiveness of service area, plan benefits, accessibility, and completeness of proposals. In his memorandum of October 6, 1987, Mr. Nye initially recommended that contracts be awarded in the Jacksonville, Pensacola, and Gainesville Service Areas to the two HMOs in each area that had received the top rankings. 1/ However, in the South Florida Service Area, he recommended awarding four contracts based on the need to provide one staff model and one IPA model HMO in each county in the service area. It was Mr. Nye's belief that federal law required that one HMO of each type be offered in each service area, if available. I was concerned about this issue and asked DOA's General Counsel, Augustus Aikens, to review it. He informed me that the federal requirement was not applicable because a state was not included within the definition of "employer" under the applicable federal law. On the bass of this legal advice, directed Mr. Nye to review his previous recommendations as they related to the need to retain one IPA model and one staff model HMO in each service area. In his memorandum of October 26, 1987, Mr. Nye recommended that contracts be awarded to Health Options and to Heritage on the bases that they were "the lowest, best bids for (the) service area." In his memorandum of October 30, 1987, he again recommended that contracts be awarded to Health Options and Heritage. Throughout the entire bidding process, it was my desire to avoid awarding a contract to an HMO which was not in compliance with state law or the rules of the Department of Insurance. I had written to the Department of Insurance seeking its assistance to determine the ability of each bidder to comply with the state law and to meet the needs of the state employees. By letter of October 23, 1987, the Department of Insurance informed DOA that it had approved the rates of Health Options and Heritage. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS Premium Costs The Department specifically designed the RFP to require each proposer to list separate costs in categories of "employee only" and "family" for active employees and retired employees under sixty-five. Required rates for Medicare recipients were to be shown separately listing rates for retirees, retiree and spouse (both on Medicare), and retiree and spouse (one with Medicare, with or without other eligible dependents). A fixed premium cost was required for calendar year 1988 and a percentage of that rate was to be shown for the successive three years. Rates for those last three years were to be "established as a percentage of the first year's premiums" with the maximum increase "limited to the increase, if any, in the overall medical portion of the Consumer Price index." (RFP, Section XI) The rates bid by each HMO were as follows: 2/ A. Heritage (low bid): Employee Only Family Dade, Broward, 66.46 166.15 and Palm Beach B. Health Options (low bid) Dade and Broward: 78.00 195.00 Palm Beach: 75.00 185.00 C. Humana, Dade: 85.02 206.01 Broward: 83.01 199.22 Palm Beach: 77.44 185.86 D. Gulfstream, Palm Beach: 78.92 197.28 (The instructions provided that the total cost of the "family plan" shall not be greater than 2.5 times the total cost of the "employee only" plan.) DOA evaluators computed a "mean" premium cost by adding the premiums for all bidders, dividing by three, and comparing each premium to the "mean," which was then given five points. A premium above the mean gave a bidder less than five points while a premium below the mean gave the bidder more than five points. The same method was used for the "employee only" plan, the "family" plan and the three Medicare retiree groups. Based on the Department's estimate that active employees constituted 90 percent and retirees 10 percent of an HMO membership, the final point calculations were: A. Heritage (low bid): Combined (Dade, Broward and Palm Beach) 9.35 B. Health Options (low bid) Dade and Broward: 7.75 Palm Beach: 9.1 Combined (Dade, Broward and Palm Beach) 8.17 C. Humana Dade: 5.72 Broward: 6.26 Palm Beach: 8.65 Combined: 6.57 D. Gulfstream Palm Beach: 6.61 The Hearing Officer evaluated the above process and found that the Department's action was reasonable even though "the cost proposals were evaluated solely on the basis of premium for 1988." He based his conclusion on: First, Nye announced at the pre-bid conference that proposals would be evaluated solely on that basis. Second, premium costs in succeeding years were limited to the lower of the cost proposed or the future and presently unknown Consumer Price index for Medical Care Services. Accordingly, no meaningful evaluation could have resulted from a consideration of premium costs for succeeding years. (R.O., page 17) Extensiveness of Service Area At the pre-submission conference, proposers were told that they should designate their service areas and that bids would be awarded on the basis of the entire service area. DOA's evaluators awarded two points for each full county and one-half point for each partial county and proposers received 2, 4, or 6 base points depending on whether their proposal was being evaluated on one, two, or three county service area. Heritage submitted one proposal, and designated its service area as Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Its proposal was evaluated on a composite or combined basis. Health Options submitted one proposal and designated its service area as Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Its proposal contained two separate premium costs: one for Dade and Broward Counties, and one for Palm Beach County. The Department evaluated Health Options' proposal as it related to the individual counties of Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach County, and on a combined basis (Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties). Humana submitted three separate proposals, which designated three separate service areas: Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. The Department evaluated Humana's proposal for each county and on a combined basis. Gulfstream submitted one proposal, and designated its service area as Palm Beach County. The Department evaluated Gulfstream's proposal for Palm Beach County. The Hearing Officer found that the above evaluation procedure "was reasonable and a valid exercise of the agency's discretion." (R.O., page 35) ACCESSIBILITY The Department evaluated accessibility criterion on the basis of ten points each for reciprocal agreements provided statewide and national services, ten points for each county of the service area in which a hospital was located, two points for each specialty provider in each county, and one point for each provider physician and specialist. These raw scores were then evaluated further to obtain a "mean" score for each proposer as follows A. Heritage (low bid), Combined: 5.8 B. Health Options (low bid), Dade and Broward: 8.71 Palm Beach: 1.1 Combined: 9.51 C. Humana, Dade: 4.16 Broward: 3.32 Palm Beach: 1.31 Combined: 8.79 D. Gulfstream Palm Beach: 1.18 The Hearing Officer found that the above evaluation procedure "was reasonable and a valid exercise of the agency's discretion." (R.O., page 36) COMPLETENESS OF PROPOSALS The original statutory criteria contained in Chapter 87-156, Laws of Florida, included the areas of "cost, service area, plan benefits, and accessibility." To these criteria, DOA added the fifth criterion of completeness of proposals." The Hearing Officer ruled that "(t)he Department's inclusion of this criterion was reasonable." (R.O., page 22) TOTAL POINTS Total points were calculated by adding the base points to a weighted score. In deriving the weighted score, the criteria were weighted as follows: premium costs at 3.5 times, plan benefits at 2.5 times, accessibility at 1 time, extensiveness of service area at 1 time, and completeness of proposal at 1 time. In evaluating the proposals, the Department first evaluated bids solely against other bids for the same service area. For example, Gulfstream's bid was first evaluated against only those other bids that proposed to provide services in that county. In this manner, Gulfstream ranked fourth out of the five bidders in Palm Beach County, and thirteenth overall. The points and ranking assigned by the Department to the top six proposers and to Gulfstream were as follows: HMO Base Points Weights Total Points Rank Heritage (low bid): 35.34 34.15 70.5 1 Health Options Combined (low bid) 38.59 30.79 59.48 2 Av Med 38.95 24.875 63.825 3 Health Options Dade & Broward (low bid) 34.03 27.73 51.76 4 Heritage (high bid) 34.17 25.925 60.095 5 Humana Combined: 35.05 23.46 58.51 6 Gulfstream Palm Beach: 22.46 22.03 44.49 13 A review of this table shows that the weights altered the relative positions of each of the top six proposers. Mr. Nye testified that the weighting utilized did not affect the ranking of the bids of the proposers and only affected the ranking of one bidder, AV-Med. As the Hearing Officer concluded, the proof was contrary to Mr. Nye's testimony. His finding on this point is supported by competent substantial evidence and is hereby adopted. Based on the results of its evaluation the Department proposed to award the contracts to Heritage (low) and to Health Options (combined-low). HUMANA'S COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS Humana introduced expert testimony to demonstrate that, benefits and cost were weighted equally, its cost-to-benefits ratio would be comparable to or better than the successful proposers. Two analyses were presented. One actuarial expert adjusted the different benefit patterns of Heritage and Health Options up to the Human a benefit level and adjusted their price according to actuarial information filed with the Department of Insurance. The testimony sought to place the proposers on the same co-payment/benefit level to compare premium costs. The result was that Humana's premium cost was the second lowest for the South Florida Service Area. The second analysis adjusted Humana's benefit pattern down to the benefit/co-payment levels of Heritage and Health Options, and adjusted Humana's premium cost down accordingly based on Humana's filed actuarials. This testimony sought to place the proposers on the same co- payment/benefit level to compare premium costs, and Humana' premium cost was comparable to or lower than the second lowest bidder. The Hearing Officer found that the analyses by the expert witness were not persuasive in demonstrating that Humana was the second lowest proposer in this case, or that its cost/benefits were the second lowest. (R.O., page 26) For example, the fitness did not evaluate the bids based on the five criteria contained in the RFP, nor did he include in the cost/benefit analysis all of the criteria utilized by the Department to evaluate benefits. The findings of the Hearing Officer on this point are supported by competent substantial evidence and are therefore adopted. Plan Benefits The criteria for the evaluation of all proposals was set out in Section IX of the RFP as follows: Covered services; Limitations and exclusions; Co-payments, deductibles and co-insurance features; Range of providers including specialists and number of hospitals Out of service area coverage Grievance procedures Three sections in the RFP requested information which was relevant to the plan benefits. Section VI listed the required minimum benefits and requested a complete list of all other services. Each provider was directed to specify co-insurance, deductible, co-payment and other features for all benefits and services for each service area, and to list all limitations and exclusions for all benefits and services for each service area. Section X was a questionnaire which required each propose to list information concerning hospital, ambulatory care facilities services, available physician specialties, programs for health status evaluation, screening and health promotion, limitations or restrictions relative to organ transplants, range of providers and number of hospitals, availability of skilled nursing benefits, a list of the proposer's physician panel, and out-of-service area coverage. Under the Department's Scoring system, each propose received the following scores: A. Heritage 398 B. Health Options Dade & Broward 308 Palm Beach 165 C. Humana Dade 210.5 Broward 161.5 Palm Beach 184.5 D. Gulfstream Palm Beach 203 Using a similar method to calculate a "mean" score as was needed in the premium cost criteria, the base points were as follows: A. Heritage (low bid), Combined: 7.19 B. Health Options (low), Dade and Broward: 5.57 Palm Beach: 2.28 Combined: 5.91 C. Humana, Dade: 3.38 Broward: 2.92 Palm Beach: 3.34 Combined: 4.59 D. Gulfstream, Palm Beach: 3.57 Limitation to Two Successful Bidders Humana and Gulfstream argued that they should not be excluded from being awarded a contract because there was no foundation which required the limitation of the contracts to two or to any number of HMOs. The Department had considered awarding contracts to more than two proposers but rejected doing so because such action best effectuated the general objectives of the RFP, including that of promoting competitive rates. The Hearing Officer agreed with the Department and correctly found that "there was no showing that the selected HMOs could not adequately satisfy the needs of the state employees." (R.O., page 35). He concluded: "While the statute did not specify a number, it did specify that the Department contract through the competitive bid process. If the contracts are not limited in number, there is no competitive bidding process. Accordingly, it is concluded the Department acted reasonably in limiting the award to two HMOs." (R.O., page 35) Employee Evaluation Teams Yet another contention of the Petitioners was that the DOA employee evaluation teams lacked the experience and knowledge in the health care services field and should have been disqualified as not meeting the requirements of Section 287.057(16), Fla. Stat., which states as follows "A selection team of at least three employees who have experience and knowledge in the program areas and service requirements for which contractual serviced are sought shall be appointed by the agency head to aid in the selection of contractors for contracts of more than the threshold amount provided in s. 287.017 for CATEGORY FOUR." After full consideration of the above provision, the Hearing Officer agreed with the Department and found that the employees met the minimum statutory criteria (R.O., page 35) and had sufficient experience and knowledge in the area to properly evaluate the proposals (R.O., pages 13, 14). Departure From RFP At the pre-submission conference, Mr. Nye announced that cost and benefits would be weighted equally. In its final evaluation, the Department weighted cost at 3.5 and benefits at 2.5. The remaining criteria, accessibility, extensiveness of service area, and completeness of proposal , were weighted at I each. The Hearing Officer found that the Department's final evaluation failed to conform to the weighting factors announced at the pre- submission conference. 45. He further stated that: 43. The Department's failure to accord equal weight to cost and benefits was arbitrary and capricious. Such failure was a material departure from the RFP, as supplemented by the pre-bid conference, and adversely impacted the bid procurement process. ... Plan benefits and accessibility under Section 110.123(3)(d), Florida Statutes, and the RFP were distinct criteria upon which proposers formulated their responses. They were also distinct criteria when the Department told proposers that cost and benefits would be weighted equally, were distinct criteria when evaluated by the Departmen, and had a distinct impact upon the ranking of proposers. Under the circumstances, the Department's failure to accord them equal weight was arbitrary and capricious. Rather than acknowledge the disparity that existed between cost and benefits, the Department contended at hearing that accessibility was a part of benefits, and therefore cost and benefits were weighted equally. The Department's contention, and proof, was not persuasive and is rejected as not credible. (R.O., pages 24, 25) The Department finds that the above findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence and adopts them in this final order. INTERVENORS' EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Exceptions of Heritage Heritage filed six exceptions to the Recommended Order and each exception will be considered separately. Exception Number 1: Heritage argued that the Hearing Officer erred when he found that the Department's failure to accord equal weight to cost and benefits was arbitrary and capricious. While the Department agrees with the cases cited by Heritage which hold that administrative agencies have broad discretion in evaluating contracts for personal services such as health services, the Department is aware of its statutory responsibility to adhere to the bidding requirements of Section 287.057, Fla. Stat., and does not believe that it has the discretion to enter into contracts absent the competitive process. As to the testimony of Mr. Burbank, the Hearing Officer, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to assess his credibility and determine the weight to be accorded to his testimony. Koltay vs. Department of General Services, 374 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979). The Department is unable to reject the Hearing Officer's findings in an area clearly within his responsibility. Exception Number 1 is rejected. Exception Number 2: Heritage next argues that the Hearing Officer erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the Department's actions relating to the weights given to various factors. The evidence shows that at the presubmission conference, Mr. Nye informed all proposers that the weights to be assigned to premium costs and to plan benefits would be equal. That information was clearly erroneous because, in the actual evaluations, the evaluators used a different weighting system, one that gave premium costs 40 percent greater weight than plan benefits. It is not the weights given to each category that makes the Department's actions arbitrary and capricious but its failure to adhere to and apply its announced weighting factors. On this basis, Exception Number 2 is rejected. Exception Number 3: Heritage urges that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department's failure to comply with the provisions of Section 287.012(11), Fla. Stat., was fundamental error. The above statute by its terms provides that "(r)equests for proposals shall state the relative importance of price and any other evaluation criteria." (emphasis added). According to the common usage of the term "shall", this language is mandatory (Fla. Tallow Corporation vs. Bryan, 237 So.2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); S.R. vs. State, 345 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977) and requires that the weight of the criteria must be included in the RFP. Therefore, Exception Number 3 is rejected. Exception Number 4: Heritage argues that the Hearing Officer erred in granting standing to Gulfstream. In Preston Carroll vs. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Authority, 400 So.2d 524 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), an unsuccessful bidder who was third low bidder, attempted to overturn the award of the contract to the low bidder. The district court held that while a second low bidder to the award of a contract had the necessary "substantial interest" to contest the award. However, a third low bidder was unable to demonstrate that it was "substantially affected" and therefore lacked standing to protest the award of the contract to another bidder. Under the holding in this case, the Department concludes that Gulfstream did not have standing in this case since it ranked 13th in the ranking of low bidders. According, Exception Number 4 is accepted and included in the Conclusions of Law of this Order. Exception Number 5: Heritage argues that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that Humana had standing to protest the Department's failure to state the relative importance of price and any other evaluation criteria in the RFP because Humana did not raise this point as an issue in its formal protest. If Humana did not have standing, then it was improperly permitted to protest the award of one of the contracts to Heritage. A review of Humana's protest shows that in Item 9, it argued that: "That the rejection of Humana's response to RFP #88-05, HMO coverage for State employees in Clay, Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties was not in accordance with all applicable rules, regulations, procedures, precedents and bid criteria." The rules of the Division of Administrative Hearings (Rule 22I-6.004(3), F.A.C.) provide for the minimum filing requirements in initial pleadings and state as follows: "(3) All petitions should contain: The name and address of each agency affected and each agency's file or identification number, if known; The name and address of the petitioner or petitioners, and an explanation of how his/her substantial interests will be affected by the agency determinations; A statement of when and how petitioner received notice of the agency decision or intent to render a decision; A statement of all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, as well as the rules and statutes which entitle the petitioner to relief; A demand for relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled; and Other information which the petitioner contends is material." (emphasis added) The requirements of this rule are directory only and not mandatory and are not designed to deny petitioners a hearing in which their "substantial interests" are affected. Section 120.57, Fla. Stat., see Seminole County Board of County Commissioners vs. Long, 422 So.2d 938, 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). The initial protest of Humana complied with the minimum filing requirements of Rule 22I-6.004(3), F.A.C., above, and was sufficient to place Heritage on notice of deficiencies alleged to be in the RFP. Exception Number 5 is rejected. Exception Number 6: Heritage argues that "(t)he Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department should invoke its right to reject all proposals." Contrary to Heritage's argument, the Department did not communicate how the criteria would be weighed in accordance with Section 287.012(11), Fla. Stat. It is not possible to cure the deficiency in the RFP by recalculating the proposals. The deficiency can be corrected by re-bidding for proposals for HMO medical services. On this basis, Exception Number 6 is rejected. HEALTH OPTIONS' EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Health Options as one of the successful bidders filed an exception to the Hearing Officer's finding which stated that DOA had failed to state the relative importance of price and other criteria in the RFP. It argued that this issue was not presented by Humana or Gulfstream in the formal protests and thus could not be considered in the Recommended Order. Therefore, Health Options urged that the Department's award of the two HMO contracts was proper and should be upheld. As previously stated, Humana's protest argued that the rejection of its bid "was not in accordance with all applicable rules, regulations, procedures, precedents, and bid criteria." (Item 9 of Protest). Humana's protest complied with the minimum filing requirements of the Department of Administrative Hearings (Rule 22I-6.004(3), F.A.C.) which provide that petitions should contain: A statement of all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, as well as the rules and statutes which entitle the petitioner to relief; A demand for relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled; While Gulfstream's formal protest did not state that its protest was founded on the Department's failure to state the relative importance of price and other evaluation criteria in the RFP, all that was necessary for the Hearing Officer to rule on this issue was for one of the petitioner's to raise the issue in its initial protest. Since the issue was raised by Humana, the Exception of Health Options is rejected. DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Department also filed timely exceptions to the Recommended Order. After reviewing those exceptions, I find that to the extent they are not adopted and accepted herein, they are inappropriate findings of fact and have not been considered further in this Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order rejecting all proposals submitted for the South Florida service area. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1988.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Raymond A. Baker, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a supervisor in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on September 2, 1997, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on September 19, 1993. On that date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of committing a "battery upon his live-in girlfriend," a misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). Since the victim in that case was a person with whom Petitioner was then residing, the offense constituted domestic violence as it subsequently became defined in 1994 by Section 741.28, Florida Statutes. Petitioner entered a plea of No Contest to the charge of "[b]attery-domestic" on October 12, 1993. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, he was fined $150.00, and he was placed on twelve months probation. In addition, he was required to complete "New Hope & Alcohol Counseling," and he was ordered to have no contact with the victim. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation, including counseling courses in both spousal abuse and substance abuse. In October 1993, Petitioner began working at FSH in an Other Personnel Services position. Eventually, he attained the position of unit treatment rehabilitation senior supervisor I in Unit 4, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Due to a change in the law, in 1996, he was required to undergo a background screening. That screening uncovered his 1993 offense, and on July 18, 1997, he was disqualified from working in a position of special trust with developmentally disabled adults. Petitioner then accepted a position of fiscal assistant in the financial services section of FSH, a position having no contact with residents. He has continued working in that position pending the outcome of this case. Because of his desire to return to his former position, he has applied for an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner is a graduate of Florida State University with a degree in government and criminology. He also holds a Doctor of Jurisprudence from Howard University School of Law. He eventually plans to take the Florida Bar examination, and if he passes the examination, the Florida Bar will accept him for membership, notwithstanding his 1993 misdemeanor conviction. This assertion was not contradicted. In interpreting the statutory criteria which govern the granting of exemptions, the DCFS considers the following factors, among others, to be important. First, the applicant should not minimize the seriousness of the offense; he must express some remorse; and he must have insight into the seriousness of the incident and the risks involved. A three-person committee preliminarily denied the request in early September 1997 because at that time it believed that Petitioner minimized the incident, that he expressed little or no remorse, and that he had no insight into the seriousness of his offense. More than four years have elapsed since the criminal incident, a sufficient time for rehabilitation. Since that time, there have been no other blemishes on Petitioner's record. Except for a "bleeding toe," which was caused when the victim either cut it on broken glass or accidentally jammed it against the door, there was no injury to the victim. Petitioner has worked continuously at FSH since the incident, and he was described by former colleagues in Unit 4 as having a good rapport with patients and staff. According to co-workers, he also handled crises in the unit "in the right way." During the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, he received satisfactory evaluations from his supervisor. There is no evidence that Petitioner would present a danger to the residents if the exemption is granted. Petitioner's description of the circumstances surrounding the incident was not altogether accurate. This finding is made after considering the testimony of the victim who reluctantly testified on behalf of DCFS. For example, Petitioner recalled that the altercation ensued after the two had an argument over finances. However, it was established that it was caused when the victim attempted to break off the relationship and to leave the premises. In an effort to keep her from leaving, Petitioner tried to disrobe her. Also, he was extremely argumentative when speaking with the investigating law enforcement officer, and he refused to leave the premises when requested. According to the victim, Petitioner's verbally abusive behavior and his refusal to leave, rather than the altercation itself, ultimately led to his arrest that evening. While Petitioner was somewhat evasive and had no recollection about some of the facts surrounding the incident, this is probably attributable, at least in part, to his being highly intoxicated when the incident occurred. Petitioner expressed regret for his actions on the evening of September 19, 1993. His assertion that he has had no problems with alcohol since that night was not contradicted. Given the lapse of time since the incident, a record of continuous employment with the FSH with good evaluations, the completion of two counseling courses, and an expression of regret, the request for an exemption should be granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Bobby Jones, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on June 4, 1989. On that date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of "battery- domestic," a misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). According to Petitioner, the victim in the incident was his former wife. Thus, the offense constituted domestic violence as it subsequently became defined in 1994 by Section 741.28, Florida Statutes. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of "battery" on August 10, 1989. He was fined $75.00, and he was placed on probation for a period of "up to 9 months." In addition, the court retained jurisdiction "to [o]rder rest[itution]," and Petitioner was required to complete a mental health counseling program. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation, including the counseling course which lasted around "six to nine months." In October 1989, Petitioner began working at FSH as a human services worker in a unit for developmentally disabled adults. Eventually, he attained the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Due to a change in the law, in 1996, he was required to undergo a background screening. That screening uncovered his 1989 offense, and on July 14, 1997, he was disqualified from working in a position of special trust with developmentally disabled adults. Petitioner was then offered a temporary assignment effective July 24, 1997, without any "direct care duties." Most recently, however, he has been employed at a Wal-Mart store in Tallahassee, Florida. Because of his desire to return to his former position, he has applied for an exemption from disqualification. Since the disqualifying incident in 1989, Petitioner worked continuously at FSH for almost eight years. Since leaving FSH, he has been steadily employed by Wal-Mart. Petitioner was described by a former supervisor at FSH as being "dependable," "very good" with residents, and someone who got along well with other staff. Three former co-workers echoed these comments. A present co-worker at Wal-Mart also described Petitioner as friendly, helpful, and courteous with customers. Except for the fact that a former wife was the victim, the circumstances surrounding the incident for which the exemption is sought are not of record, and the "harm [if any] caused to the victim" is unknown. Despite the glowing comments of other workers, the adverse testimony of a former supervisor at FSH must be taken into account. In December 1995, she found Petitioner engaged in a verbal confrontation with another worker. She then directed that Petitioner report to her office. On the way to the office, he told her that the other employee was "going to make [Petitioner] put a board on his ass." At the ensuing meeting, Petitioner became extremely upset and told the supervisor that he wished she were dead, that she would get killed in a traffic accident on the way home, and that he would "spit on her grave." Petitioner subsequently received a written reprimand for using "Threatening and/or Abusive Language" towards his supervisor. In another incident that occurred on May 22, 1997, Petitioner was observed by the supervisor "horseplaying with another employee" in the dining room. When told by the supervisor that such conduct was inappropriate for the workplace, Petitioner stated in a loud, hostile manner, in the presence of both co-workers and clients, that he "would choke the motherfucker out." For this conduct, he received another written reprimand for "Threatening and/or Abusive Language," and he was suspended from work for three days. According to the same supervisor, Petitioner has an "explosive" temper, and she would not want him returning to her unit. Given this testimony, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he will not present a danger if continued employment is allowed. Besides the disqualifying offense, Petitioner has a long string of misdemeanor convictions beginning in 1979 and continuing through 1992. The specific crimes are described in Respondent's Exhibits 1-7 and 9-31 received in evidence. Petitioner himself acknowledged that he has been convicted of passing worthless bank checks approximately thirty times. Most recently, he was convicted for the offense of disorderly conduct in November 1992. In addition, he was convicted for the offense of simple battery on a former wife in October 1990. These convictions, by themselves, are not disqualifying offenses, and many are so old as to be arguably remote and irrelevant. They do, however, establish a continuing pattern of misconduct, especially since Petitioner has at least eight convictions for various misdemeanors since the disqualifying offense in 1989. Given these circumstances, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of rehabilitation since the disqualifying event. This being so, his request for an exemption should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner may be presumed, pursuant to Rules 22A- 7.0l0(2)(a) and 22A-8.002(5)(a)3 F.A.C. to have abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner started working for Florida State Hospital, a residential facility owned and operated by HRS, on August 8, 1986. On June 22, 1987, Petitioner was assigned to Unit 14, at Florida State Hospital, a unit which treated geriatric mentally ill patients. In that assignment, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Senior Registered Nurse Supervisor Shirley Greggly. It is an established policy at the HRS facility in question for employees who will be absent to notify their supervisors as soon as possible when they know they will be absent. During her employment, Petitioner had received printed copies of this general policy and of the State rules governing the presumption of abandonment of position in cases where an employee is on unexcused leave for three consecutive workdays. During her employment, Petitioner had been a less-than-exemplary employee with regard to absenteeism, tardiness and timely notification and had been counselled prior to April 1989 that she should make contact with the Hospital within seven minutes of the time she was due on shift if an absence was necessary. Only after review of such contact initiated by an employee can a superior determine to approve or disapprove the requested leave. If no contact were initiated by the employee, it was Ms. Greggly's standard procedure to attempt to initiate contact herself with the missing employee. Failure of an employee to notify Ms. Greggly or delayed notification of Ms. Greggly by an employee creates great hardship for the patients who may receive delayed care as a result, and also it creates considerable administrative turmoil for Ms. Greggly in rounding up a substitute employee. Petitioner had been disciplined with a ten-day suspension in September 1988 for failure to notify. She had received a prior written reprimand for absence without authorized leave in June 1988 and an oral reprimand for excessive absenteeism in December 1987. Petitioner had been frequently counselled in regard to these shortcomings. During the first few months of 1989, Petitioner was absent from work due to a work-related injury and, if not already filed, a workers' compensation claim pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. was at least imminent. Petitioner's primary treating physician was Daniel Bontrager, D.C. By April 1989, Dr. Bontrager had determined that Petitioner could return to light duty work. On April 7, 1989 and again on April 13, 1989, Dr. Bontrager orally informed Petitioner that she could return to light duty work as of April 17, 1989. On April 13, 1989, Ms. Hobbs stated that she would not return to work. Dr. Bontrager communicated his advice to the Hospital. The best diagnostic evidence obtainable by Dr. Bontrager indicated that there was no valid medical reason why Petitioner could not return to work. Ms. Greggly expected Petitioner back at work on April 17, 1989. From that date until April 28, 1989, when Petitioner was deemed to have abandoned her position, Petitioner initiated no contact with her employer or Ms. Greggly, and therefore no leave was authorized for her. On the dates between April 17, 1989 and April 28, 1989, inclusive, Petitioner neither appeared at work nor informed the hospital that she was going to be absent. This period constitutes in excess of three consecutive workdays of absence without approved leave.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order ratifying its previous presumption that Petitioner has abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of January, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: None filed. Respondent' PFOF: 1-3, 8, 10, 12-14 Accepted. 4-5 Immaterial. 6-7, 9 Accepted as modified; unnecessary argument and detail is rejected as such. 11 Modified to reflect the record; rejected where it is not true to the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration Office of the General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ms. Clara Hobbs Route l, Box 186B Sneads, Florida 32460 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Suite 200-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4082 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing, under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Sections 760.11(8) and 760.11(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 57-year-old male and a former employee of the Respondent. Respondent is an executive agency of the State of Florida with more than 15 full-time employees and is, therefore, an employer under Sections 760.02(6) and (7), Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1995, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He charged his former employer, Respondent, with gender and age discrimination for failure to promote him. The Florida Commission on Human Relations conducted an investigation of the charges. It did not issue a Notice of Determination. The staff of the Commission misled or lulled Respondent into inaction, for a period of time, as follows: Day 0000 - 19 May 1995: Charge of Discrimination submitted to Commission. Day 0061 - 19 July 1995: FCHR Notice of Receipt, Docketing and Dual Filing with EEOC. Day 0110 - 6 September 1995: Respondent submitted response to Commission request for information. Day 0255 - 29 January 1996: Petitioner drove from Orlando to FCHR in Tallahassee and met with Iliana Haddock, who advised him that she had just been assigned to investigate the Discrimination Complaint. Haddock took the opportunity to interview the Respondent relative to the complaint. Day 0312 - 26 March 1996: Telephone conversation between Haddock and Petitioner. Haddock stated that she had reviewed all the applications submitted for the Environmental Manager position and had found evidence of age discrimination. Day 0340 - 23 April 1996: Telephone conversation between Haddock and Petitioner. Haddock stated the investigation was almost complete, but they were waiting for Respondent to submit criteria used for determining who would be interviewed for the Environmental Manager position. Day 0431 - 23 July 1996: Petitioner drove from Orlando to FCHR headquarters in Tallahassee and met with Haddock and her supervisor, Harry Lamb. They told Petitioner that Haddock's investigation was completed and that her report would be submitted to Lamb in 30 to 45 days and from there Lamb would submit it to the FCHR legal staff and then it would go to the Executive Director for his approval and determination. Day 0494 - 24 September 1996: Assistant Enforcement Director Singleton sent Petitioner a letter stating that the Commission had not been able to complete the investigation in this case and stated four options of proceeding, (1) file a civil action in civil court; (2) file petition to have case heard by ALJ in DOAH; (3) request a right to sue so I could bring an action in Federal Court; or (4) allow the commission to continue with the processing, investigation and final action in this matter. Day 0509 - 9 October 1996: Petitioner responded to Singleton's letter by pointing out the contradictions between her letter and what Petitioner had been told at the meeting with Haddock and Lamb on 7/23/96. Petitioner requested more information in order to make a decision concerning the future course of this case. Petitioner submitted 11 questions to Singleton. Day 0521 - 21 October 1996: Commission Investigator Iliana Haddock submitted her report to the FCHR Office of General Counsel. Day 0573 - 12 December 1996: Petitioner sent follow-up letter to FCHR Executive Director advising him that he had not received a reply to the 10/9/96 letter to Singleton. Day 0644 - 21 February 1997: Mathis sent Petitioner a letter about the status of the original complaint of discrimination. Mathis stated that Haddock had submitted her report of investigation, with a recommendation for a cause finding to Harry Lamb; that Haddock was no longer with the Commission; that Lamb was no longer with the Commission but had not forwarded the investigation report before he left; and that the report was now in the hands of Otis Mallory. Day 0795 - 22 July 1997: Mathis sent Petitioner a letter advising that the "initial charge is still located in Mr. Mallory's office and will be reviewed." Day 0805 - 1 August 1997: Assistant Director Snell sent Petitioner a letter stating: "The investigation of your first case has been completed and is in the Employment Enforcement Manger's office for review". Day 0809 - 5 August 1997: The EEOC State and Local Coordinator advised Petitioner by letter that the cases were still being processed by the FCHR. Day 0852 - 27 September 1997: Petitioner sent letter to FCHR Executive Director advising him that Otis Mallory had Discrimination Report for almost a year; that Mallory also had received the Retaliation Report in August 1997; and since Mallory now had both reports, he ought to be able to complete his review and move this matter forward. Day 0986 - 29 January 1998: Petitioner sent letter to FCHR Executive Director attempting to get Investigators' Reports through the internal FCHR review system. Day 1076 - 29 April 1998: Commission issued Notice of Determination on Retaliation Complaint. No action on original discrimination complaint. Day 1252 - 22 October 1998: Petitioner mailed Petition for Relief and Administrative Hearing concerning Discrimination Complaint to FCHR. After filing the Complaint of Discrimination with the FCHR, Petitioner actively pursued the progress and status of the Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. In response to his pursuit, the staff of the Commission told the Petitioner throughout the above time-line, that his Complaint was being investigated; the investigation was completed; the report would be submitted; the report was submitted; the report was in for review; and the report would be reviewed. Thus, the Petitioner was misled or lulled into believing by the staff of FCHR not only that the Complaint was going to result in a Determination, but also that the Determination was going to be a cause-finding. On September 24, 1996, a year and four months after filing the Complaint, the Commission advised Petitioner that he had four options relating to the charges, including having the Commission continue with the processing, investigation, and final action in this matter. When Petitioner requested further information so he could make an informed choice, the staff of the Commission failed to respond to his letter. In addition, other staff took no further action on his case. However, Petitioner waited more than two years from issuance of the letter of September 24, 1996, to the filing of his Petition for Relief, dated October 22, 1998. Although Petitioner was misled or lulled into inaction for a period of time by the staff of the FCHR, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate equitable estoppel or excusable neglect in his failure to file the Petition within a reasonable period of time after the statutorily mandated time limit.
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction on the parties and the subject matter pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1) and 760.11, Florida Statutes. The Florida Commission on Human Relations has the authority to investigate a charge of discrimination with alleges that an employee has committed an unlawful employment practice by its failure to promote Petitioner based on his sex and/or age. Section 760.10(1) and 760.11, Florida Statutes. When a complaint has been filed with the Commission, it has the duty to investigate the allegations in the complaint and make a determination within 180 days of the filing of the Complaint, if there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. After a determination is made, the Commission is charged with the duty to notify the aggrieved person and the Respondent of the determination, the date of such determination, and the options available under the law. Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes. In this case, the Commission failed to make a reasonable cause determination; and three and one-half years after first filing his Complaint, Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, Sections 760.11(8), (4) and (6), Florida Statutes, applied to this case. These sections read, in pertinent part: In the event that the commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under ss 120.569 and 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing a civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. * * * (6) Any administrative hearing brought pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) shall be conducted under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. . . . An administrative hearing pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) must be requested no later than 35 days after the date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission. . . . * * * (8) In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause. Although it appears unjust that Petitioner's case should be dismissed because of the failure of a state agency to complete its statutory duty to make a reasonable cause determination, nevertheless, the court in Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 at 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) held that the 35-day limitation on requesting an administrative hearing begins to run at the expiration of the 180-day period in which the Commission was to make a reasonable cause determination. Therefore, the Petition for Relief is untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the presumed date of determination of cause by the Commission. See Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes (1997); Wright v. HCA Central Florida Regional Hospital, Inc., 18 FALR 1160 (1995); Pusey v. George Knupp, Lake County Sheriff's Office, 20 FALR 791 (1997); cf. St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) and Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). This procedure has been determined to be constitutional, under Florida law. McElhath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The record does establish some evidence of excusable neglect, which might, under certain circumstances, excuse delinquent filing. See, for example, Machules v. Department of Administration 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988). In Machules, the Florida Supreme Court described the parameters of the "equitable tolling" doctrine as follows: Generally, the tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. 523 So. 2d at 1134. Petitioner asserts that the staff of the Commission lulled him into inaction. That assertion is accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion for Summary Recommended Order. However, Petitioner is claiming he was lulled into inaction for two additional years after he was advised of his options under the statute. The District Court of Appeal has held that Petitioner may not enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory limitation meaningless. It held that a Petitioner should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute. Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., supra, at 1095. Although this result is harsh, two other district courts have followed this precedent and it is, therefore, binding on this tribunal. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, So. 2d , 1999 WL 71523 (Fla. 1st DCA, February 17, 1999) and Adams v. Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc., So. 2d , (Fla. 4th DCA, March 17, 1999).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the petition of Donald A. Garrepy in DOAH Case No. 98-5090; FCHR Case No. 95-5752. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary C. Smallridge, Senior Attorney Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Donald A. Garrepy Post Office Box 276 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail, is guilty of unprofessional conduct and of being convicted or found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of nursing or the ability to practice nursing.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact: At times material hereto, Respondent, Cecelia Faye Norwood, was licensed as a practical nurse by petitioner and has been issued license number 0533451 by the Florida Hoard of Nursing. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit A) During times material herein, Respondent was employed as a licensed practical nurse at South Florida State Hospital, Hollywood, Florida and was assigned to a ward where she administered treatment to psychiatric patients. During the afternoon of October 21, 1983, while employed at South Florida State Hospital, Respondent administered an injection to a fifteen (15) year old patient. Thereafter, Respondent assisted other hospital employees in restraining the patient. The patient had been placed in a "four-point restraint" (with both arms and legs restrained) however she managed to pull her left arm from the restraint. While Respondent was attempting to restrain patient D'Antuono's left arm, the patient grabbed Respondent's hair, pulling her head towards the bed frame at which time Respondent struck the patient in the face. During the afternoon, Respondent was assisted by employees Patricia Calcagino, an LPN, and Mrs. Fico. Those two employees released the patient's fingers from Respondent's hair and while Ms. Calcagino was attempting to refasten the restraint straps to the bed frame, Respondent struck the patient in the face. (Tr. 19 and 37) This incident was reported to the hospital and an internal investigation was conducted by Ben Drazen, Director of Internal Affairs for South Florida State Hospital. Later, a joint investigation of the incident was conducted by South Florida State Hospital, the Office of Children, Youth and Family Services, and the Broward County Sheriff's Department. Respondent was criminally charged based on the investigation by the Broward County Sheriff's Department and, on October 17, 1984, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of knowingly or by culpable negligence, permitting the physical or mental injury to a child by striking said child about her face with her hand, in violation of Section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes. The patient involved in the aforesaid incident was a stocky patient who had been diagnosed as psychotic and slightly retarded. The patient had a history of combative, assaultive behavior. Ms. Rotton, an RN who was called upon to offer her opinion as to whether or not Respondent's conduct was unprofessional, considered that such conduct was inappropriate or unprofessional. She understood that Respondent was provoked to the point where she struck the patient and "she could understand how such an incident might happen." The patient is a patient with a "very well-documented history of extremely assaultive behavior, very, very agitated. She has injured many employees in the past." (Testimony of Drazen, Tr. 34 and 35) Nurse Rotten also acknowledged that the patient involved had given the staff quite a few problems. The patient bit, kicked, scratched, clawed and spit in the face of other employees. (Testimony of Rotton, Tr. 28 and 29) Nurse Rotten had observed Respondent work with patients for a long time. Nurse Rotten has "seen [Respondent] deal with some pretty difficult patients. I've seen her, you know, assaulted, by patients; nothing like this has ever happened. . . ." (Tr. 30) Respondent has never been disciplined by either her then employer, South Florida State Hospital, 2/ or Petitioner, Board of Nursing. (Tr. 30)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent, Cecelia Faye Norwood, be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year subject to appropriate terms of probation as deemed indicated by her conduct, found hereinabove, by Petitioner. 3/ RECOMMENDED this 21st day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1985.
