The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Department of Juvenile Justice (the "Department") assessed Petitioners and Intervenor counties for secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008-2009 in a manner consistent with the provisions of section 985.686, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.001 through 63G-1.009.1/
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the cost-sharing requirements of section 985.686, Florida Statutes, regarding secure detention care provided for juveniles. With the exception of Intervenor Florida Association of Counties, Inc., the Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively referenced herein as the "Counties") are political subdivisions of the State of Florida. The specific counties that have petitioned or intervened in these proceedings are not "fiscally constrained" as that term is defined in section 985.686(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Each county is required by section 985.686 to contribute its actual costs for predisposition secure detention services for juveniles within its jurisdiction. The Counties are substantially affected by the Department's determinations of the number of secure detention days that are predisposition, and by the Department's allocation of those days among the Counties, an allocation that further determines each county's share of the cost for pre-disposition secure detention. The Counties are further substantially affected by the allocation method itself, which they assert is not authorized by section 985.686. Statutory and rule framework Section 985.686(1), Florida Statutes, provides that the "state and counties have a joint obligation, as provided in this section, to contribute to the financial support of the detention care provided for juveniles." Section 985.686(2)(a), defines "detention care," for purposes of this section, to mean "secure detention."2/ Section 985.03(18)(a), defines "secure detention" to mean "temporary custody of the child while the child is under the physical restriction of a detention center or facility pending adjudication, disposition, or placement." Section 985.686(3), provides in relevant part that each county "shall pay the costs of providing detention care . . . for juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition. The department shall develop an accounts payable system to allocate costs that are payable by the counties." In summary, section 985.686 requires each non-fiscally restrained county to pay the costs associated with secure detention during predisposition care, and the Department to pay the costs of secure detention during post-disposition care.3/ The Department is charged with developing an accounts payable system to allocate costs payable by the counties. Section 985.686(5), sets forth the general mechanism for this allocation process: Each county shall incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds to pay its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition. This amount shall be based upon the prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are residents of that county, as calculated by the department. Each county shall pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. Any difference between the estimated costs and actual costs4/ shall be reconciled at the end of the state fiscal year. Section 985.686(10), provides that the Department "may adopt rules to administer this section." Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Department promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.001 through 63G-1.009, effective July 16, 2006. Rule 63G-1.004 provides the detailed method by which the Department is to calculate the counties' estimated costs: Each county's share of predisposition detention costs is based upon usage during the previous fiscal year, with the first year's estimates based upon usage during fiscal year 2004-05. Estimates will be calculated as follows: All youth served in secure detention during the relevant fiscal year as reflected in the Juvenile Justice Information System will be identified; Each placement record will be matched to the appropriate referral based upon the referral identification code. Placements associated with administrative handling, such as pick-up orders and violations of probation, will be matched to a disposition date for their corresponding statutory charge; The number of service days in secure detention is computed by including all days up to and including the date of final disposition for the subject referral. Each county will receive a percentage computed by dividing the number of days used during the previous year by the total number of days used by all counties. The resulting percentage, when multiplied by the cost of detention care as fixed by the legislature, constitutes the county's estimated annual cost. The estimated cost will be billed to the counties in monthly installments. Invoices are to be mailed on the first day of the month prior to the service period, so that an invoice for the August service period will be mailed on July 1. Rule 63G-1.008 provides the method by which the Department is to reconcile the estimated payments with the actual costs of predisposition secure detention: On or before January 31 of each year, the Department shall provide a reconciliation statement to each paying county. The statement shall reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period. If a county's actual usage is found to have exceeded the amount paid during the fiscal year, the county will be invoiced for the excess usage. The invoice will accompany the reconciliation statement, and shall be payable on or before April 1. If a county's actual usage was less than the estimated amounts paid during the fiscal year, the county will be credited for its excess payments. Credit will be reflected in the April billing, which is mailed on March 1, and will carry forward as necessary. Under the quoted rules, the Department determines an estimate for each county's share of predisposition secure detention costs. This estimate is provided to the counties prior to the start of the fiscal year in order to allow each county to "incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds" to pay for the costs of predisposition secure detention care for juveniles who reside in that county. To prepare this estimate, the Department utilizes the county's actual usage of secure detention facilities for the most recently completed fiscal year.5/ The amount of this usage is shown as that county's percentage of the total usage of predisposition secure detention care by all counties. The resulting percentage for each county is then multiplied by the "cost of detention care as fixed by the legislature" to arrive at the estimated amount due for each county. Rule 63G-1.002(1) defines "cost of detention care" as "the cost of providing detention care as determined by the General Appropriations Act." The term "cost of detention care" is used in rule 63G- 1.004, which sets forth the method of calculating estimnated costs. The term is not used in rule 63G-1.008, which addresses the annual reconcilation by which the Department purports to arrive at the "actual cost of the county's usage" for the fiscal year. The definition of "cost of detention care" references the Legislature's annual General Appropriations Act, which appropriates revenues for the operation of various state functions. An "appropriation" is "a legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized by law." § 216.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat. The General Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008-2009 was House Bill 5001, codified as chapter 2008-152, Laws of Florida. Within chapter 2008-152, Specific Appropriations 1073 through 1083 set forth the appropriations for the juvenile detention program. These items included the cost of operating the secure detention centers and identified specific funding sources for the program. These funding sources were the General Revenue Fund ("General Revenue"), the Federal Grants Trust Fund, the Grants and Donations Trust Fund, and an amount identified under the Shared County/State Juvenile Detention Trust Fund ("Shared Trust Fund"). Section 985.6015(2), states that the Shared Trust Fund "is established for use as a depository for funds to be used for the costs of predisposition juvenile detention. Moneys credited to the trust fund shall consist of funds from the counties' share of the costs for predisposition juvenile detention." A total of $30,310,534 was appropriated from General Revenue to the Department for the operation of secure detention centers. This amount was intended to cover the Department's costs in providing post-disposition secure detention services, including the state's payment of the costs for detention care in fiscally constrained counties. See § 985.686(2)(b) & (4), Fla. Stat. A total of $99,583,854 was set forth as the appropriation for the Shared Trust Fund. This amount was not an "appropriation" as that term is defined by statute because it did not authorize a state agency to make expenditures for specific purposes. Rather, this number constituted the amount to be used in the preparation of the preliminary estimates that the Department provides to the counties for the purpose of budgeting their anticipated contributions toward the secure detention costs for the upcoming fiscal year. As will be discussed at length below, a refined version of this number was also improperly used by the Department as a substitute for calculating the counties' actual cost at the time of the annual reconciliation described in rule 63G-1.008. As set forth in rule 63G-1.004, the Department determines the estimate, then it notifies the counties of the estimated amount. The counties make their payments in monthly installments. Rule 63G-1.007 requires the Department to prepare a quarterly report for each county setting forth the extent of each county's actual usage. The counties receive their reports 45 days after the end of each quarter. Subsection (1) of the rule provides that the quarterly report "is to assist counties in fiscal planning and budgeting, and is not a substitute for the annual reconciliation or grounds for adjusting or withholding payment." At the end of the fiscal year, and no later than January 31, the Department must prepare an annual reconciliation statement for each county, to reconcile the difference, if any, between the estimated costs paid monthly by the county and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period. If the county's actual cost is more or less than the estimated payments made during the fiscal year, the county will be credited or debited for the difference. Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.008. Because a county is billed prior to the start of the fiscal year, the Department's initial estimate obviously cannot be based on actual costs for that fiscal year. However, the amount ultimately owed by each county following the annual reconciliation should assess the county's actual costs for predisposition secure detention care during that year, in accordance with section 985.686(5). Prior DOAH litigation The Department's manner of assessing the counties for predisposition secured detention services has been the subject of five prior DOAH cases, all of them involving Hillsborough County. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 07- 4398 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 7, 2008; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. June 4, 2008)("Hillsborough I") dealt with the methodology used by the Department to determine the amount that Hillsborough County owed for predisposition secure detention services for fiscal year 2007-2008. Administrative Law Judge Daniel Manry found that the Department's practice of calculating a per diem rate for service days in secure detention was inconsistent with the Department's rule 63G-1.004(2). Instead of limiting Hillsborough County's contribution to a percentage of the amount "appropriated"6/ by the Legislature to the Shared Trust Fund, the Department was including its own General Revenue appropriation in the calculation, which inflated the county's assessment. Hillsborough I at ¶ 24. Judge Manry's findings led the Department to conclude, in its Final Order, that the calculation of a "per diem" rate for the counties should be abandoned as inconsistent with rule 63G-1.004. In a companion case to Hillsborough I, Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 07-4432 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 10, 2008; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. June 4, 2008)("Hillsborough II"), Judge Manry dealt with Hillsborough County's challenge to the Department's determination of utilization days allocated to the county for predisposition care. In this case, Judge Manry found that the Department had failed to comply with the requirements of section 985.686(6), which provides: Each county shall pay to the department for deposit into the Shared County/State Juvenile Detention Trust Fund its share of the county's total costs for juvenile detention, based upon calculations published by the department with input from the counties. (Emphasis added). The Department had allocated 47,714 predisposition utilization days to Hillsborough County, which was reduced to 47,214 after the reconciliation process. The county argued that the correct number of predisposition days was 31,008. The Department identified 16,206 challenged days under nine categories: contempt of court; detention orders; interstate compacts; pick up orders; prosecution previously deferred; transfer from another county awaiting commitment beds; violation of after care; violation of community control; and violation of probation. Hillsborough II, ¶¶ 25-27. Judge Manry found that the Department had allowed input from the counties during the rulemaking workshops for chapter 63G-1, but had "thwarted virtually any input from the County during the annual processes of calculating assessments and reconciliation." Id. at ¶ 28. The data provided by the Department to the county each year did not include final disposition dates, making it virtually impossible for the county to audit or challenge the Department's assessments. Judge Manry also found that the absence of disposition dates deprived the trier-of-fact of a basis for resolving the dispute over the nine categories of utilization days that the Department had categorized as "predisposition." Id. at ¶ 30. Judge Manry rejected the Department's contention that the county's allegation of misclassification was a challenge to agency policy. He found that the issue of the correct disposition date was a disputed issue of fact not infused with agency policy or expertise that could be determined through conventional means of proof, including public records. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. The Department failed to explicate "any intelligible standards that guide the exercise of agency discretion in classifying the nine challenged categories of utilization days as predisposition days." Id. at ¶ 34. Judge Manry made the following findings of significance to the instant proceeding: The trier-of-fact construes the reference to placement in Subsection 985.03(18)(a) to mean residential placement. Secure detention includes custody in a detention center for both predisposition and post-disposition care. Predisposition care occurs prior to adjudication or final disposition. Post-disposition care occurs after adjudication or disposition but prior to residential placement. Post-disposition care also includes custody in a detention center after final disposition but prior to release. Although this type of post-disposition care comprises a small proportion of total post-disposition care, references to post-disposition care in this Recommended Order include care after final disposition for: juveniles waiting for residential placement and juveniles waiting for release. (Emphasis added). Judge Manry found that "secure detention after final disposition, but before residential placement for the charge adjudicated, is post-dispositional care." Id. at ¶ 36. He recommended that the Department enter a final order assessing the county for the costs of predisposition care within the county "in accordance with this Recommended Order and meaningful input from the County." The Department adopted Judge Manry's recommendation. In Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 09-1396 (Fla. DOAH June 30, 2009; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. Sept. 17, 2009) ("Hillsborough III"), the dispute between Hillsborough County and the Department centered on 9,258 detention days that the Department had assigned to the county for which no disposition dates were available. Hillsborough III at ¶ 2. The Department took the position that it could identify disposition dates for all juveniles who had been transferred to its care and supervision, and that the "no date" cases indicated that those juveniles had not been transferred to the Department and were therefore the responsibility of the county. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Hillsborough County contended that any court order in a juvenile detention case is a dispositional order, after which the Department becomes responsible for the expenses related to retaining the juvenile. Id. at ¶ 5. Administrative Law Judge William F. Quattlebaum found that neither section 985.686 nor previous Final Orders suggest that fiscal responsibility for a juvenile is transferred to the Department upon the issuance of any court order. Id. at ¶ 6. He concluded that it is . . . reasonable to presume that the [Department] would have disposition information about juveniles who had been committed to [its] custody, and it is likewise reasonable to believe that, absent such information, the juveniles were not committed to the [Department's] custody. The [Department] has no responsibility for the expenses of detention related to juveniles who were not committed to the [Department]'s care and supervision. Id. at ¶ 13. However, the evidence also indicated that in some of the "no date" cases, the Department's records identified addresses of record that were facilities wherein the Department maintained offices. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Judge Quattlebaum recommended that the Department amend the annual reconciliation to give the Department responsibility for the disputed cases which lacked disposition dates but included Department addresses, and to give Hillsborough County responsibility for those cases with no disposition dates and no Department addresses. In its Final Order, the Department accepted the recommendation to the extent that cases lacking disposition dates were properly assigned to Hillsborough County. However, the Department concluded that "there is no legal authority to assign responsibility for detention stays based upon proximity to a Department office location," and therefore declined to amend the annual reconciliation as recommended by Judge Quattlebaum. In Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 09-4340 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 18, 2009; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. Jan. 20, 2010) ("Hillsborough IV"), the issue was the Department's authority to issue multiple annual reconciliations. On January 30, 2009, the Department issued an annual reconciliation to Hillsborough County along with an invoice for a sizable credit due the county for having made estimated payments in excess of its actual costs for fiscal year 2007- 2008. The county did not object to this reconciliation statement. Hillsborough IV at ¶ 8. On February 24, 2009, the Department issued a second annual reconciliation that increased the county's assigned predisposition days and decreased the county's credit. Id. at ¶ 9. On March 18, 2009, the county sent a letter to the Department requesting clarification as to the two annual reconciliations. The Department did not respond to the letter. Id. at ¶ 10. On May 1, 2009, the county sent a second letter to the Department disputing a portion of the assigned utilization days. The Department did not respond to the letter. However, on May 14, 2009, the Department issued a third annual reconciliation to the county that again increased its assigned predisposition days and reduced its credit. Id. at ¶ 11. On June 4, 2009, the Department issued a fourth annual reconciliation. This reconciliation decreased the county's assigned predisposition days but nonetheless again reduced the county's credit. Id. at ¶ 12. On July 17, 2009, the Department finally responded to the county's May 1, 2009, letter by advising the county to file an administrative challenge to the allocation of predisposition days. Id. at ¶ 13. With these facts before him, Judge Quattlebaum reviewed section 985.686 and the Department's rules and then arrived at the following conclusions: There is no authority in either statute or rule that provides the [Department] with the authority to issue multiple annual reconciliation statements to a county. The [Department] is required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.008 to issue an annual reconciliation statement on or before January 31 of each year. The rule clearly requires that March bills (payable in April) reflect any excess payment credit due to a county and that any additional assessment related to excess usage must be paid by a county on or before the following April 1. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the annual reconciliation statement issued pursuant to the rule is final unless successfully challenged in an administrative proceeding.... * * * 28. At the hearing, the parties suggested that the issuance of multiple annual reconciliation statements is the result of the resolution of objections filed by counties in response to the annual reconciliation statement. The resolution of such objections can result in additional costs allocated to another county. There was no evidence that counties potentially affected by resolution of another county's objections receive any notice of the objections or the potential resolution. The county whose allocated costs increase through the resolution of another county's objections apparently receives no notice until the [Department] issues another annual reconciliation statement for the same fiscal period as a previous reconciliation statement. * * * 30. Perhaps the most efficient resolution of the situation would be for the [Department] to require, as set forth at Section 120.569, Florida Statutes (2009), that protests to quarterly reports and annual reconciliations be filed with the agency. Such protests could be forwarded, where appropriate, to DOAH. Related protests could be consolidated pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.108. Where the resolution of the proceedings could affect the interests of a county not a party to the proceeding, the county could be provided an opportunity to participate in the proceeding (and be precluded from later objection) pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.109. As is apparent from the lengthy inset quotation, Hillsborough IV touched upon the subject of the Department's "tethering" of the counties, explained at Findings of Fact 50- 53, infra, though the validity of the practice was not directly at issue. Judge Quattlebaum addressed the due process concerns in counties' having no notice of administrative proceedings that could result in the allocation of additional costs to those counties, but did not address the underlying issue of the Department's authority to reallocate costs in the manner described. Judge Quattlebaum recommended that the Department issue a Final Order adopting the January 30, 2009, annual reconciliation for fiscal year 2007-2008. The Department adopted the recommendation and directed that "all successive reconciliations for that fiscal year shall be disregarded and expunged." In Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 09-3546 (Fla. DOAH Feb. 26, 2010; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. Mar. 23, 2010) ("Hillsborough V"), the main issue was Hillsborough County's contention that the Department had unilaterally and without authority increased the counties' per diem rate for detention care. The undersigned found that the Department had abandoned the calculation of a per diem rate in light of the findings in Hillsborough I, and that the increased "per diem" rate alleged by the county was simply the result of the Department's recalculation of the counties' estimated costs in accordance with its own rule.7/ Fiscal year 2008-2009 assessments and reconciliation By letter dated June 3, 2008, the Department issued its calculation of the amounts due from each county for their estimated share of the predispositional detention costs for fiscal year 2008-2009, which would run from July 1, 2008, through June 30, 2009. As noted at Finding of Fact 19, supra, the predispositional budget was estimated at $99,583,854. The estimate was based on county utilization during the most recently completed fiscal year, 2006-2007, and the amount identified in the chapter 2008-152, Laws of Florida. The Department made the following estimates for the Counties' shares of predispositional days and costs: Days Percentage of Days Estimated Cost Miami-Dade 47,450 8.56% $8,522,140 Santa Rosa 5,213 0.94% $936,268 Alachua 10,957 1.98% $1,967,905 Orange 43,330 7.81% $7,782,177 Pinellas 32,627 5.88% $5,859,892 Escambia 15,044 2.71% $2,701,940 Hernando 2,978 0.54% $534,856 Broward 38,490 6.94% $6,912,901 City of Jacksonville8/ 28,957 5.22% $5,200,750 Bay 5,409 0.98% $971,470 Brevard 13,760 2.48% $2,471,331 Seminole 12,857 2.32% $2,309,150 Okaloosa 4,612 0.83% $828,327 Hillsborough 44,577 8.04% $8,006,142 43. The Counties incorporated the Department's estimate into their budgets and made monthly payments to the Department. By letter dated December 7, 2009, the Department issued its annual reconciliation for fiscal year 2008-2009. As noted above, the purpose of the annual reconcilation is to "reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period." The annual reconcilation set forth the following as the "Actual Predispositional Days" and the "Share of Trust Fund Expenditures" for the Counties, along with the "Difference Debit/(Credit)" between the estimated sums already paid by the Counties and the amount set forth in the annual reconciliation. Those amounts were as Days follows: Percentage of Days Share of Trust Fund Miami-Dade 38,925 11.45% $10,926,117 Santa Rosa 2,555 0.75% $717,180 Alachua 5,511 1.62% $1,546,919 Orange 25,286 7.44% $7,097,695 Pinellas 19,218 5.65% $5,394,428 Escambia 6,734 1.98% $1,890,211 Hernando 1,383 0.41% $388,203 Broward 31,339 9.22% $8,796,752 City of Jacksonville 21,246 6.25% $5,963,681 Bay 3,824 1.13% $1,073,384 Brevard 10,598 3.12% $2,974,823 Seminole 8,944 2.63% $2,510,551 Okaloosa 3,613 1.06% $1,014,157 Hillsborough 27,120 7.98% $7,612,493 The Department's letter advised the counties as follows, in relevant part: . . . Any counties that have a debit amount owed will find enclosed with this correspondence an invoice for that amount. This amount is due by March 1, 2010. A credit amount . . . means the county overpaid based on their utilization and a credit invoice is enclosed with this correspondence. (If the credit amount is larger than the amount currently being paid by the county, the credit will be applied to future invoices until the credit is applied in total.) It is critical that all credits be taken prior to June 30, 2010. . . . (emphasis added). In comparing the estimated costs with the "Share of Trust Fund Expenditures," an untutored observer might expect a correlation between the absolute number of predisposition days and the money assessed by the Department. However, it is apparent that no such correlation was present in the Department's calculations. Dade County, for example, had 8,525 fewer actual predisposition days than the Department estimated at the outset of fiscal year 2008-2009, yet was assessed $2,403,976.89 in the annual reconciliation over and above the $8,522,140 in estimated payments that the county had already made over the course of the year. (For all 67 counties, the Department had estimated 538,836 predispositional days for the fiscal year. The actual number of predispositional days was 339,885.) The correlation, rather, was between a county's percentage of the total number of predispositional days and the money assessed. Though its actual number of days was less than estimated, Dade County's percentage of predispositional days was 2.89% higher than its estmated percentage. Therefore, the Department presented Dade County with an annual reconcilation assessment of $2.4 million. The correlation between percentage of days and the final assessment was caused by the Department's practice of treating the Shared Trust Fund appropriation of $95,404,5799/ as an amount that the Department was mandated to raise from the counties regardless of whether the counties' actual predisposition days bore any relation to the estimate made before the start of the fiscal year. At the final hearing, the Department's representatives made it clear that the Department believed that the Legislature required it to collect the full Shared Trust Fund appropriation from the counties. Reductions in actual usage by the counties would have no bearing on the amount of money to be collected by the Department. The Department views its duty as allocating costs among the counties, the "actual cost" being the Legislature's appropriation to the Shared Trust Fund. Beth Davis, the Department's Director of the Office of Program Accountability, testified that if all the counties together only had one predispositional secure detention day for the entire year, that day would cost the county in question $95 million.10/ In practice, the Department treated the Shared Trust Fund "appropriation" as an account payable by the counties. In this view, the appropriation is the Department's mandate for collecting the stated amount from the counties by the end of fiscal year 2008-2009, even while acknowledging that the Shared Trust Fund number in the General Appropriations Act was no more than an estimate based on the actual usage for the most recently completed fiscal year, which in this case was 2006-2007. Because the Department felt itself bound to collect from the counties the full amount of the Shared Trust Fund appropriation, any adjustment to one county's assessment would necessarily affect the assessments for some or all of the other counties. A downward adjustment in Orange County's assessment would not effect a reduction in the absolute number of dollars collected by the Department but would shift Orange County's reduced burden proportionally onto other counties. The Department has "tethered" the counties together with the collective responsibility to pay $95,404,579 for fiscal year 2008-2009. Richard Herring is an attorney and longtime legislative employee, including 16 years as a deputy staff director to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and was accepted as an expert in the appropriations process. Mr. Herring was knowledgeable and persuasive as to the appropriations process and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Herring testified as to a "disconnect" in the way the Department treats the Shared Trust Fund program. The Shared Trust Fund appropriation is not an amount of money; rather, it is an authorization to spend money from that trust fund. Mr. Herring found that the Department mistakenly "treats appropriations almost as though it were a revenue-raising requirement." Mr. Herring could not think of any other example in which a state legislative appropriation mandates that another governmental entity such a county spend its own funds.11/ The Department allocates 100% of the Shared Trust Fund appropriation to the counties and collects that amount, even though section 985.686(5) limits the Department's collections to "actual costs." Mr. Herring clearly and correctly opined that the Appropriations Act cannot amend a substantive law on any subject other than appropriations. Therefore, the Department cannot rely on the appropriation made in chapter 2008-152, Laws of Florida, as authority for substituting the appropriated amount for the "actual costs" that the substantive statutory provision allows the Department to collect. Mr. Herring found that it is "a huge stretch to say an appropriation means that I will, no matter what, collect that amount of money." He concluded: [O]ther than this program, I'm not aware of any place in the budget where somebody takes an appropriated amount, where it's not another State agency involved, and tries to true up at the end of the year to make sure that every penny of that . . . authorization to expend, that the cash has come in to match the authorization. * * * Again, an appropriation is not an authorization to levy taxes, fees, fines. It's not an authorization to raise revenues, to collect revenues. It may provide, where there are double budgets between two agencies or within an agency, it may be authority to move money from one pot within the State treasury . . . to another. But to go out and extract money from someone who's not a State agency, who's not subject to receiving appropriation, I don't know any place else that we do that. And I can't come up with another example. Fiscal year 2008-2009 challenges In a letter to the counties dated January 26, 2010, Ms. Davis wrote as follows, in relevant part: I am writing this letter to ensure everyone understands the proper procedure for handling any challenges to the annual reconciliation data sent to you in December 2009 for FY 2008-09 and any future year's reconciliation. As a result of the State of Florida, division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) challenge in case no. 09-4340 between Hillsborough County (Petitioner) and the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent), the reconciliation completed for FY 2008-09 is considered "final" and adjustments can only be made to the reconciliation using the following steps. Counties have 21 days from receipt of the reconciliation to file their challenges to the reconciliation with the Department. The Department will review the challenges and determine if any adjustments need to be made and which counties will be affected by those potential changes. All affected counties will be notified of the potential adjustments even if those counties did not submit a challenge. If challenges to the reconciliation cannot be resolved with the concurrence of all affected counties, the Department will file a request for a hearing with DOAH. Affected counties will be able to present their case regarding the adjustments at the hearing. . . . Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.009 set forth the Department's dispute resolution process. It provided that the quarterly report "marks the point at which a county may take issue with the charges referenced in the report," but that such an objection was not a basis for withholding payment. All adjustments based on a county's objections to quarterly reports would be made in the annual reconciliation. Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.009(1). Though the rule was silent as to counties' ability to file challenges or disputes to the annual reconciliation, the Department interpreted the rule as allowing such challenges. Twelve counties, Pasco, Sarasota, Brevard, Lee, Polk, Broward, Santa Rosa, Pinellas, St. Johns, Hillsborough, Hernando, and Miami-Dade, filed disputes using the form prescribed by the Department, providing specific reference to the disputed charges and setting forth specific charges for the Department to reconsider. The remaining counties did not file challenges to the annual reconciliation. At least some of these counties, including Orange, Alachua and Escambia, had already accepted their overpayment credit in the manner required by the Department's December 7, 2009 letter. See Finding of Fact 46, supra. The record contains letters that Ms. Davis sent to Broward, Hernando, Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Santa Rosa Counties on different dates in January and February 2010, but containing substantially the same text. The letter sent to the deputy director of Broward County's human resources department, dated February 19, 2010, is representative: The Department has received challenges to the 2008-2009 reconciliation from 12 counties, including your challenge. In keeping with the Final Order from DOAH case no. 09-4340 [Hillsborough IV] the Department is evaluating all of the challenged assessments. If the Department determines there are any adjustments that need to be made, we will attempt to reach agreement with all of the counties affected by the changes. However, if we cannot reach agreement, the Department will combine all of the challenges and request an administrative hearing from the DOAH at which all of the issues can be resolved. Because of the number of challenges involved, and time constraints in working on next year's budget, we anticipate the review process taking about 30 days. This time period exceeds the general requirement for referring challenges to DOAH for those counties that have requested an administrative review. We are asking that the counties seeking administrative review will allow the Department additional time. If after the review it is necessary to proceed with an administrative hearing, we will notify all potentially affected counties so that one final resolution can be reached in a timely manner. The Department reviewed the disputes filed by eleven of the twelve counties. In reviewing the disputes, the Department looked only at challenges to specific cases and did not consider broader policy disputes raised by the counties. Ms. Davis testified that Miami-Dade's dispute was not reviewed because Miami-Dade failed to include specific individual records. Ms. Davis stated that Miami-Dade was making a conceptual challenge not contemplated by rule 63G-1.009. Barbara Campbell, the Department's data integrity officer, testified that she reviewed every record that was disputed by a county. Ms. Campbell stated that her review for Hillsborough County alone took about a month. Hillsborough County disputed 50,528 days in 6,963 entries for the following reasons: adults in juvenile status (493 days), charges not disposed (22,495 days), invalid disposition end date (5 days), non-adjudicatory charges (2,987 days), extended period of detention (763 days), invalid zip code (352 days), invalid address (63 days), out of county (88 days), institutional address (1,560 days), escape after disposition (78 days), guardian (21,552 days), transfer after adjudication (45 days), no criminal charge (13 days), and duplicated entry (34 days). Ms. Campbell concluded that Hillsborough County should remain responsible for 45,873 of the rejected 50,528 days. Despite Ms. Campbell's conclusion, the annual reconciliation assessed Hillsborough County for only 27,120 days. This discrepancy was not explained at the hearing. Ms. Campbell testified that one of the corrections she made for Hillsborough County related to the waiting list for placement of juveniles in committed status. At that time, the waiting list was used to determine the commitment date for billing purposes, but Ms. Campbell found that the list contained commitment dates that were several days after the actual commitment dates. This error resulted in a substantial number of extra days being billed to Hillsborough County.12/ Ms. Campbell testified that this sizable error as to Hillsborough County did not prompt a review of the records of all counties to determine if the error was across the board. The Department lacked the time and manpower to perform such a review for all counties. The Department was already stretched thin in reviewing the specific challenges made by the counties. In a letter to the counties dated March 23, 2010, Ms. Davis wrote as follows, in pertinent part: The Department has concluded it [sic] analysis of challenges submitted by counties for the 2008-09 final reconciliation for detention utilization. A total of twelve counties submitted challenges. After reviewing all the data, resulting adjustments affect a total of 45 counties, ten of which are fiscally constrained. Enclosed with this letter is a document outlining the specifics regarding adjustments as they pertain to your county. For counties that filed a challenge with the Department, each type of dispute category is addressed. Counties subsequently affected by the original twelve counties' challenges are impacted by either address corrections and/or as a result of their percentage of the total utilization being changed by adjustments made. An adjustment to a county's percentage of utilization occurs when days challenged are subsequently found to be the responsibility of the State or another county. Changes made based on address corrections are listed on the enclosed disc, if applicable to your county. Each county is asked to review the adjustments and respond back to the Department indicating agreement or disagreement with the findings. If a county has issue with the proposed adjustments they will need to file a petition with the Department to initiate proceedings with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to 28-106-201 [sic] Florida Administrative Code. For the few counties that have already filed a petition with the Department, still complete the attached form and return to the Department but an additional petition is not required. Responses from the counties must be postmarked by April 9, 2010. . . . Ms. Davis' March 23, 2010, letter was the first notice given to non-disputing counties by the Department that twelve counties had filed disputes to the annual reconciliation. Thus, counties that believed they had closed their ledgers on fiscal year 2008-2009 were forced to reopen their books to deal with the Department's "adjustments" to the amounts of their final annual reconciliations. Attached to the letter was a spreadsheet containing the "08-09 Pending Challenge Adjustments" containing the following information for the Counties: Adjusted Adjusted Days Percentage Share of Trust Fund Miami-Dade 38,944 11.77% $11,229,123 Santa Rosa 1,980 0.60% $570,914 Alachua 5,581 1.67% $1,589,043 Orange 27,048 8.17% $7,799,027 Pinellas 15,523 4.69% $4,475,906 Escambia 6,734 2.04% $1,941,683 Hernando 1,327 0.40% $382,628 Broward 31,231 9.44% $9,005,154 City of Jacksonville 21,300 6.44% $6,141,647 Bay 3,830 1.16% $1,104,343 Brevard 8,816 2.66% $2,542,008 Seminole 8,965 2.71% $2,584,970 Okaloosa 3,613 1.09% $1,041,773 Hillsborough 22,465 6.79% $6,477,564 72. In addition to making adjustments to the accounts of the challenging counties, the Department modified the amounts set forth in the annual reconciliation for all 38 non-fiscally constrained counties.13/ A total of 9,010 days were reclassified as post-dispositional and therefore shifted from the counties' to the Department's side of the ledger. This shift did nothing to lessen the overall burden on the counties in terms of absolute dollars because the overall amount the Department intended to collect remained $95,404,579. Of the twelve counties that challenged the annual reconciliation, five did not contest the Department's adjustment and are not parties to this proceeding: Pasco, Sarasota, Lee, Polk, and St. Johns. The record does not indicate whether these counties notified the Department that they accepted the adjustment. Four counties that challenged the annual reconciliation, and are parties to this proceeding, notified the Department that they accepted the adjustment: Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough, and Santa Rosa. However, because all affected counties did not accept the adjustments, the Department did not refund monies to the counties that were awarded a credit by the adjustment. In correspondence with Pinellas County's Timothy Burns, Ms. Davis stated that the credit set forth in the adjustment would not be applied to the county's account "until the final decisions from the DOAH hearing." At the hearing, Ms. Davis explained the Department's action as follows: Each county's utilization is considered a percentage of the total utilization and that percentage is multiplied by the expenditures. So if you change one number in that mathematical calculation, it has a rippling effect and will affect the other-- in this case it's 45 counties. So all of the counties had to accept those changes and agree to the modifications, those pending adjustments, if we were going to modify the reconciliation, the agency's final action. To restate, the following are the estimates, the annual reconciliation each County: amounts, and the adjustment amounts for Miami-Dade: 47,450 8.56% $8,522,140 38,925 11.45% $10,926,117 38,944 11.77% $11,229,123 Santa Rosa: 5,213 0.94% $936,268 2,555 0.75% $717,180 1,980 0.60% $570,914 Alachua: 10,957 1.98% $1,967,905 5,511 1.62% $1,546,919 5,581 1.67% $1,589,043 Orange 43,330 7.81% $7,782,177 25,286 7.44% $7,097,695 27,048 8.17% $7,799,027 Pinellas 32,627 5.88% $5,859,892 19,218 5.65% $5,394,428 15,523 4.69% $4,475,906 Escambia 15,044 2.71% $2,701,940 6,734 1.98% $1,890,211 6,734 2.04% $1,941,683 Hernando 2,978 0.54% $534,856 1,383 0.41% $388,203 1,327 0.40% $382,628 Broward 38,490 6.94% $6,912,901 31,339 9.22% $8,796,752 31,231 9.44% $9,005,154 City of Jacksonville 28,957 5.22% $5,200,750 21,246 6.25% $5,963,681 21,300 6.44% $6,141,647 Bay 5,409 0.98% $971,470 3,824 1.13% $1,073,384 3,830 1.16% $1,104,343 Brevard 13,760 2.48% $2,471,331 10,598 3.12% $2,974,823 8,816 2.66% $2,542,008 Seminole 12,857 2.32% $2,309,150 8,944 2.63% $2,510,551 8,965 2.71% $2,584,970 Okaloosa 4,612 0.83% $828,327 3,613 1.06% $1,014,157 3,613 1.09% $1,041,773 Hillsborough 44,577 8.04% $8,006,142 27,120 7.98% $7,612,493 22,465 77. Overall, the 6.79% Department $6,477,564 had estimated there would be 538,836 predisposition utilization days for all counties. The actual number of predisposition days indicated in the annual reconciliation was 339,885, some 198,951 fewer days than estimated. The number of actual days was further decreased to 330,875 in the Department's March 23, 2010, adjustment. Nonetheless, the absolute number of dollars assessed by the Department against the counties remained unchanged because the only variable in the Department's formula for ascertaining a county's "actual costs" was the county's percentage of the total number of predisposition days. The $95 million set forth in the General Appropriations Act for the Shared Trust Fund remained unchanged. Thus, even if a county's actual number of predisposition days was several thousand fewer than the Department originally estimated, the county's assessment could be higher than the estimate because that lesser number of days constituted a higher percentage of the overall number of predisposition days. The City of Jacksonville, for example, was found by the adjustment to owe $940,897 more than the original estimate despite having actual usage that was 7,657 days fewer than the original estimate. The Counties forcefully argue that Department's use of the General Appropriations Act as a substitute for calculating the counties' actual costs results in a gross disparity between the amounts per day paid by the state and those paid by the Counties for the same services at the same facilities, echoing the argument made by Hillsborough County in Hillsborough V. Robert M. Dunn, the Department's director of policy development for detention services, testified as follows: Q. But in terms of the actual cost of detention, there's no difference in the cost of a predisposition detention day and a post-disposition detention day? A. None. They receive the same services: food, clothing, supervision, mental health, medical, all of those issues. Every youth receives the same services in detention. Ms. Davis testified that the General Appropriations Act provided the Department with General Revenue sufficient to cover roughly 20% of the cost of all secure detention.14/ Ms. Davis conceded that approximately 38% of the secure detention utilization days were post-disposition days that were the Department's responsibility. She further conceded that through the Shared Trust Fund the counties are paying the 18% difference for the state's portion of secure detention. Evidence introduced at the hearing established a downward trend in the use of predisposition detention utilization since fiscal year 2005-2006, but no corresponding decrease in the amount that the counties pay for detention services. Mr. Herring, the appropriations expert, testified that as a result of the manner in which the Department allocates costs, counties pay approximately $284 per day for detention services, whereas the state pays only $127 per day. Mr. Burns, bureau director of Pinellas County's Department of Justice and Consumer Services, calculated that an average per diem rate for all detention days, predisposition and post-disposition, would be $229.56. Ms. Davis testified that if the utilization ratio and the budget ratio were the same--in other words, if the Legislature fully funded the state's share of detention services--then the per diem rates for the counties and the Department would be almost the same. Despite the fact that the counties were partially subsidizing the state's share of secure detention for juveniles, the Department nonetheless reverted $9,975,999 of unspent General Revenue funds back to the state's general revenue in fiscal year 2008-2009. Of that amount, approximately $874,000 had been appropriated for secure detention. Section 985.686(3) requires the counties to pay the costs of providing detention care for juveniles prior to final court disposition, "exclusive of the costs of any pre- adjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services and $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care at the detention centers." (Emphasis added). The underscored language was added to the statute by section 11, chapter 2007-73, Laws of Florida, the appropriations implementing bill for fiscal year 2007-2008. Vickie Joan Harris, the Department's budget director, testified that the Legislature appropriated an additional $2.5 million for medical and mental health care in 2007-2008, but that no additional money has been appropriated for those services since that fiscal year. For fiscal year 2008-2009, the counties shared these costs with the Department. The Counties are correct in pointing out that the cost of a utilization "day" is the same whether it occurs predisposition or post-disposition, and their desire for a per diem basis of accounting is understandable from a fiscal planning perspective. If the Department announced a per diem rate at the start of the fiscal year, then a county could roughly calculate its year-end assessment for itself without the sticker shock that appears to accompany the annual reconciliation. However, there are two obstacles to such an accounting method, one practical, one the product of the Department's purported understanding of the term "actual cost" as used in section 985.686(5). The practical objection is that the actual cost of maintaining and operating the Department's secure detention system is not strictly related to the number of days that juveniles spend in detention facilities. Robert M. Dunn, the Department's director of policy development for detention services, testified as follows: For whatever reasons, detention population has decreased significantly over the last few years. However, we have to maintain the capability of providing adequate and proper services for 2,007 beds. In our system, we do not staff centers based on the number of beds or the number of youth who are in the center. We typically follow a critical post staffing process. We know that within center, there are certain posts that have to be manned 24/7, such as intake. We have to be able to provide staff to perform intake duty should a youth be delivered to the center for detention. We have to provide someone in our master control unit 24/7. Those people are responsible for outside communications, directing staff to where they are needed within the center, answering the phones inside the center for requests for assistance, monitoring the camera system to provide assistance. So that position, that post has to be staffed 24/7, whether we have one kid in the center or 100 kids. It's irrelevant. Mr. Dunn went on to describe many other fixed costs of operating a secure detention facility for juveniles. He also discussed the Department's ongoing efforts to identify redundant facilities and streamline the program in light of falling usage, but the point remains that the Department's actual costs do not fluctuate significantly due to usage. Simply keeping the doors open carries certain costs whether one child or 100 children come into the facility, and a pure per diem assessment approach might not cover those costs. While the evidence establishes that there is a significant degree of county subsidization of the state's share of juvenile detention costs, there is a lack of credible evidence that a pure per diem approach would capture a given county's "actual costs" in keeping with the mandate of section 985.686.15/ It is apparent that the Counties have seized on the per diem concept not merely because it was the measure used by the Department prior to Hillsborough I, but because the system used for fiscal year 2008-2009 gave the Counties no way to even roughly predict their annual expenses for predisposition secure juvenile detention. At the start of the fiscal year, a non-fiscally constrained county received an estimate of its predisposition days and its estimated portion of the Shared Trust Fund. The county made monthly payments based on those estimates. As the year progressed, it became apparent to the county that its actual usage was proving to be far less than the estimate. The annual reconciliation confirmed that the county had fewer predisposition days than the Department had estimated, which led the county to expect a refund. In defiance of that expectation, the county was presented with a bill for additional assessments. In the case of Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, the additional bill was for millions of dollars despite the fact that their actual usage was several thousand days fewer than the Department's estimate. The Counties were, not unreasonably, perplexed by this turn of events. This perceived anomaly points to the second obstacle to the Counties' proposed per diem accounting method: the Department's working definition of "actual costs" is unrelated to anything like a common understanding of the term "actual costs." It is a fiction that renders nugatory any effort by the Counties to limit their assessed contributions to the Shared Trust Fund to the money that was actually spent during the fiscal year. As to fiscal year 2008-2009, the Department simply made no effort to ascertain the counties' actual costs or, if it did, it failed to disclose them to the counties. "One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that the courts give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the Legislature." City of Venice v. Van Dyke, 46 So. 3d 115, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), citing Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 312 (Fla. 2004). The Legislature did not define the term "actual cost" in section 985.686. "Actual cost" is not a term of art.16/ The Florida Statutes are replete with uses of the term "actual cost" that rely on the common meaning of the words and do not attempt further definition.17/ Those few sections that do provide definitions of "actual cost" indicate that the Legislature is capable of limiting that common term when appropriate to its purposes.18/ Nothing in Section 985.686 gives any indication that the Legislature intended the words "actual costs" to carry anything other than their plain and ordinary meaning. By statute, the Department is obligated to reconcile "any difference between the estimated costs and actual costs . . . at the end of the state fiscal year." § 985.686(5), Fla. Stat. By rule, this reconciliation is to be performed on a county by county basis: On or before January 31 of each year, the Department shall provide a reconciliation statement to each paying county. The statement shall reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period. Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.008(1). Nothing in the statute or the implementing rules authorizes the Department to base its annual reconciliation on the anything other than actual costs. Section 985.686(5) speaks in terms of the individual county, not in terms of "counties" as a collective entity. Rule 63G-1.008(1) states that the Department will provide a reconciliation statement to "each paying county." That statement must reflect the difference between the estmated costs "paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period." Like the statute, the rule speaks in terms of the individual county; the rule does not purport to authorize the Department to treat the 67 counties as a collective entity. Neither the statute nor the rule supports the rationale that the Shared Trust Fund liability of one county should in any way depend upon the costs incurred by any other county. At the end of the fiscal year, the amount collected in the Shared Trust Fund should be no more or less than the amounts of the counties' actual costs. Nothing in the statute or the implementing rules authorizes the Department to tether the counties together with the collective responsibility to pay $95,404,579 for fiscal year 2008-2009, as opposed to paying a reconciled amount based on each county's actual costs of providing predisposition secure detention services for juveniles within its jurisdiction.19/ Nothing in the statute or the implementing rules has changed in such a way as to vitiate Judge Quattlebaum's conclusion in Hillsborough IV that "the annual reconciliation statement issued pursuant to the rule is final unless successfully challenged in an administrative proceeding" pursuant to section 120.569, Florida Statutes. See Finding of Fact 37, supra. Therefore, the December 7, 2009, annual reconciliation constituted final agency action as to all counties that did not contest the reconciliation in accordance with the Department's January 26, 2010, letter. The Department did not have the statutory authority to recalculate the amounts set forth in that annual reconciliation for the 55 counties that did not file challenges.20/ As regards the parties to this proceeding, the following Counties did not contest the December 7, 2009, annual reconciliation: Alachua, Orange, Escambia, City of Jacksonville, Bay, Seminole, and Okaloosa. As to these Counties, the annual reconciliation should have constituted final agency action and spared them further involvement in litigation. The amounts set forth for these Counties in the annual reconciliation should be reinstated and their accounts reconciled on that basis, as follows: Reconciled Share of Trust Fund Alachua $1,546,919 Orange $7,097,695 Escambia $1,890,211 City of Jacksonville $5,963,681 Bay $1,073,384 Seminole $2,510,551 Okaloosa $1,014,157 105. The following Counties did contest the reconcilation pursuant to the Department's January 26, 2010, letter: Brevard, Broward, Santa Rosa, Pinellas, Hillsborough, Hernando, and Miami-Dade. By letter dated March 23, 2010, the Department informed all 67 counties that it had completed its analysis of the challenges21/ submitted by 12 counties and was instituting adjustments to the accounts of 45 counties, including 10 that were fiscally constrained. For the reasons stated above, the March 23, 2010, adjustment was effective only as to the 12 counties that challenged the annual reconciliation. Of those 12, seven are parties to this litigation. Of the seven Counties, four accepted the adjustment announced by the March 23, 2010, letter: Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough, and Santa Rosa.22/ As to these four Counties, the Department's March 23, 2010, adjustment letter should have ripened into final agency action without need for further litigation.23/ The amounts set forth for these counties in the adjustment letter should be reinstated and their accounts reconciled on that basis, as follows:24/ Share of Trust Fund Santa Rosa $570,914 Pinellas $4,475,906 Brevard $2,542,008 Hillsborough $6,477,564 To this point, the resolution of the amounts owed has been based on the simple principle of administrative finality as to 10 of the Counties that are parties to this proceeding: proposed agency action that is accepted, affirmatively or tacitly, by a party becomes final agency action as to that party and as to the agency upon the expiration of the time for requesting an administrative hearing. However, there remain three Counties that challenged the annual reconciliation, contested the later adjustment, and continue to assert their statutory right to be assessed only the "actual costs" associated with predisposition secure detention: Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward. During the course of this litigation, some of the parties asked the Department to perform an alternative calculation of the fiscal year 2008-2009 reconciled amounts. In an email dated January 12, 2011, the Department transmitted to the Counties a speadsheet that the Department titled "2008/2009 Secure Detention Cost Sharing Data Analysis," taking care to point out that the document was "not an amended or revised reconciliation."25/ Several Counties, including the three whose contributions to the Shared Trust Fund remain unresolved, have urged this tribunal to adopt this most recent analysis as the most accurate available measure of their pre-disposition detention days and actual costs of detention. In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department also argues that it should be allowed to employ this "more accurate methodology" to amend the annual reconciliation as to all counties. Ms. Campbell, the Department's data integrity officer, testified as to several changes in programming that are reflected in the results of the January 12 analysis. The dispositive change for purposes of this order is that the analysis was performed in accordance with the Department's new rule 63G-1.011(2), which provides: "Commitment" means the final court disposition of a juvenile delinquency charge through an order placing a youth in the custody of the department for placement in a residential or non-residential program. Commitment to the department is in lieu of a disposition of probation. Ms. Campbell stated that in previous reconciliations and adjustments, the Department stopped billing the counties at the point a final disposition was given by the court. Under the new rule, the Department would continue billing the counties if the disposition did not result in the child's commitment to the Department. Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.011 became effective on July 6, 2010, well after the close of fiscal year 2008-2009 and well after the Department's annual reconciliation and adjustments for that fiscal year were performed. Aside from the increased accuracy claimed by the Department, no ground has been cited for its retroactive application in this case. Further, rule 63G-1.011 has recently been found an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the precise ground that its narrow definition of "commitment" is in conflict with section 985.686(5), Florida Statutes, which limits the counties' responsibility to "the period of time prior to final court disposition." Okaloosa Cnty. et al. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 12-0891RX (Fla. DOAH July 17, 2012).26/ In other words, the Department's prior practice was more in keeping with its statutory mandate than was the "correction" enacted by rule 63G-1.011. In fairness to the Department, it should be noted that its revised definition of commitment was at least partly an outcome of Hillsborough III. In that decision, Judge Quattlebaum concluded, "The [Department] has no responsibility for the expenses of detention related to juveniles who were not committed to the [Department]'s care and supervision. Nothing in the statute or the previous Final Orders indicates otherwise." Hillsborough III at ¶ 13. On this point, however, Hillsborough III adopts the position of the Department that was not seriously challenged.27/ However, section 985.686(3) requires the county to pay "the costs of providing detention care... for the period of time prior to final court disposition." The statute does not state that "final court disposition" is equivalent to "commitment to the Department."28/ Okaloosa County provides a more comprehensive analysis statute: the Department is responsible for the expenses of all post-disposition detention, not merely detention of juveniles who are committed to the Department. The evidence in the instant case made it clear that probation is another post- disposition outcome that may result in detention, and that the Department has made a practice of charging the counties for detentions related to this disposition. Judge Anthony H. Johnson, the Circuit Administrative Judge of the Juvenile Division, Ninth Judicial Circuit, testified as to the procedures that a circuit court follows after the arrest of a juvenile charged with delinquency: Okay, we'll begin by the arrest of the juvenile. And the juvenile is then taken to the JAC, the Joint Assessment Center, where a decision is made whether to keep the juvenile in detention or to release the juvenile. That decision is based upon something called the DRAI, the Detention Risk Assessment Instrument. How that works probably is not important for the purpose of this except to know that some juveniles are released, and some remain detained. The juveniles that are . . . detained will appear the following day or within 24 hours before a circuit judge, and it would be the duty judge, the emergency duty judge on the weekends, or a juvenile delinquency judge if it's regular court day. At that time the judge will determine whether the juvenile should be released or continue to be retained. That's also based upon the DRAI. If the juvenile is detained, he or she will remain for up to 21 days pending their adjudicatory hearing. Everything in juvenile has a different name. We would call that a trial in any other circumstance. Now the 21 days is a statutory time limit: however, it's possible in some cases that that 21 days would be extended. If there is a continuance by any party, and for good cause shown, the judge can decide to keep the juvenile detained past the 21 days. That's relatively unusual. It's usually resolved, one way or the other, in 21 days. After the trial is conducted, if the juvenile is found not guilty, of course he or she is released. If they're found guilty, then a decision is made about whether or not they should remain detained pending the disposition in the case. The disposition—- there needs to be time between the adjudication and the disposition so that a pre-disposition report can be prepared. It's really the Department of Juvenile Justice that decides whether or not the child will be committed. We pretend that it's the judge, but it's not really.29/ And that decision is made—- is announced in the pre-disposition report. If the child is committed at the disposition hearing, the judge will order the child committed to the Department. Now, one or two things will happen then. Well, maybe one of three things. If the child scores detention-- let me not say scores. If it's a level eight or above, then the child will remain detained. If it's not that, the child will be released and told to go home on home detention awaiting placement. Here's where things get, I think, probably for your purposes, a bit complex. Let's say at the disposition, the child-- the recommendation of the Department is not that the child be committed, but that the child be placed on probation. Then the child goes into the community. The disposition has then been held, and the child's on probation. If the child violates probation, then the child comes back into the system, and then you sort of start this process again, on the violation of probation. If the child is found to have violated his or her probation, then you go back to the process where the Department makes a recommendation. Could be commitment, it could be something else. The child may be detained during that time period. Often what will happen is the misconduct of the child will be handled in a more informal manner by the court. The court may decide instead of going through the VOP hearing, violation of probation, I'm going to handle this by holding the child in contempt for disobeying the court's order to go to school, to not use drugs, or whatever the violation was. In that case, the child may be detained for contempt, for a period of 5 days for the first offense, or 15 days for a subsequent offense. Judge Johnson testified that "by definition, anything after the disposition hearing would be post-disposition." He went on to explain: You know, the problem here, I think, is we have a couple of different dispositions. We have one disposition that's the initial disposition. And if the child is put on probation, and then violates the probation, then you have a whole other hearing as to whether or not there was a violation of probation. And, if so, you have a whole new disposition hearing as to what the sanction ought to be for violation of probation. The probation issue was a key point of contention between the Counties and the Department. The Department does not consider itself responsible for detentions of juveniles who been given a disposition of probation. Thus, when a juvenile is picked up for a violation of probation, the Department considers that detention to be "pre-disposition" and chargeable to the county. The Counties contend, more consistently with section 985.686(3), that probation is a consequence of "final court disposition," and any subsequent detentions arising from violation of probation should be considered post-disposition and paid by the Department. Aside from the legal barriers, there are practical considerations that render the January 12, 2011, analysis unsuitable as a measure of the Counties' actual costs. Ms. Davis testified that the analysis is "a little deceiving because it only includes an analysis based on commitment." She noted that the analysis did not take into account the adjustments that had been made in light of the twelve counties' challenges to the annual reconciliation. Ms. Davis stated: "We simply ran an analysis per the request of the counties as to what the days would be based on commitment only, using our new programming that we do today. . . [W]e couldn’t submit it as a reconciliation because it's not correct. There are some address errors. We didn't fix those." Ms. Davis testified that the Department never had any intention that the January 12 analysis should be considered a reconciliation. The programming and the data set had changed since the annual reconciliation. The information in the analysis was not the same information that was analyzed in the reconciliation. Comparing the reconciliation to this analysis would be "apples to oranges" in many respects, according to Ms. Davis. Based on the foregoing, it is found that the January 12, 2011, analysis does not establish the "actual costs" of the remaining counties and is not an accurate basis for settling their final accounts for fiscal year 2008-2009. It is further found that, because the Department has never attempted to ascertain the Counties' actual costs and provided no such data to this tribunal, the record of this proceeding offers insufficient evidence to establish the actual costs for secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008- 2009 for Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties. The Department conceded that its annual reconciliation and the adjustment thereto were based on inaccurate data and included significant errors. The January 12, 2011, analysis was based on a definition of "commitment" that has since been found in derogation of section 985.686(5), Florida Statutes. None of the analyses performed by the Department went beyond the calculation of the number of detention days to the calculation of any county's actual costs of providing detention care. The Department bears the burden of providing a reconciliation to each of these three counties that reflects their actual costs of providing secure juvenile detention care. Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties are each entitled to an accounting of their actual costs without regard to the costs of any other county.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order that: Reinstates the amounts set forth in the Department's December 7, 2009, annual reconciliation letter for the following Counties: Alachua, Orange, Escambia, City of Jacksonville, Bay, Seminole, and Okaloosa; Reinstates the amounts set forth in the Department's March 23, 2010, adjustment letter for the following Counties: Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough, and Santa Rosa; and Provides that the Department will, without undue delay, provide a revised assessment that states the actual costs of providing predisposition secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008-2009 for the following Counties: Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2012.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner's request for exemption from employment disqualification should be approved.
Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner is 32 years old, unmarried, and a 1992 graduate of Auburn University with a degree in business administration. He attended college on a athletic scholarship and was a captain of the football team. 2. Since graduation he has worked extensively with teenagers as a youth development professional with Boys and Girls Club of Central Plorida, as a recreational leader with Orange County Parks and Recreation; as a substitute teacher at Maynard Evans High School, where he worked with physically impaired students; and as a night monitor at The Center for Drug Free Living. 3. On November 27, 2000, Petitioner submitted an Employment Application with the Department of Juvenile Justice seeking the position of Juvenile Probation Officer. 4. As a part of the November 27, 2000, Employment Application, Petitioner indicated that he had not been convicted, pled nolo contendere, or had adjudication withheld on a crime which is a felony or first-degree misdemeanor. 5. On October 30, 2000, Petitioner executed an Affidavit of Good Moral Conduct which states, in part, "I have not committed an act which constitutes domestic violence .. ." 6. As a result of background screening, it was determined that on a January 14, 1990, Petitioner was charged with "Assault 3rd" in Auburn, Alabama, as a result of a meleé involving members of a fraternity and the football team. On February 19, 1990, the charge was dismissed. 7. The background screening also revealed that on November 11, 1995, Petitioner was charged with Battery (Domestic Violence); was arrested on November 29, 1996 (over a year later) for the offense; and had adjudication withheld after a plea of nolo contendere to the offense on February 5, 1997. 8. On February 5, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to supervised probation for 363 days, required to attend a batterer's intervention program, and charged $115 in court costs. He successfully completed probation. 9. On December 16, 2000, Petitioner wrote the IG stating: This letter is to clarify why I failed to indicate the offenses on the notarized Affidavit of Good Moral Character. I did not indicate the offenses because I thought you are only supposed to write down convictions of a felony or first-degree misdemeanor. I did not know pleading no contest was counted as guilty. Therefore, I thought the circumstances did not fit my offenses. I conversed with a Department of Juvenile Justice employee when applying for the position, and they [sic] informed me that the Department was only looking for felony convictions. They said a misdemeanor arrest will not disqualify me. This is the reason why I failed to indicate the offenses. 10. On January 11, 2001, Petitioner wrote the IG stating: This letter is to clarify the incident that happened on the evening of November 11, 1995 at Heroes Night Club, Orlando, Florida. This incident was between a Ms. Monica Pryor and myself. At the time Ms. Pryor and I were dating. At the nightclub, Ms. Pryor and I got into an argument and exchanged harsh words that resulted in us pushing and shoving one another. Ms. Pryor then left the nightclub with her girlfriends. She called my cell phone to inform me that her girlfriends were taking her to the police station. We talked later that evening and apologized to each other. During the conversation, she let me know that she had filed charges against me and there was a warrant out for my arrest and would drop the charges in the morning. As far as I can recall from our conversation, Ms. Pryor didn't suffer any physical bruising from this incident. This is one incident in my life that I deeply regret. I feel that I was in the wrong place at the wrong time, doing the wrong thing. This incident happened over 5 years ago. Since then, I have experienced healthy relationships without any hostile contact involved. I have been blessed to counsel several young people and I've helped young men from making the same mistake that I made. I believe this experience has made me a better person and has given me a testimony to share with others. In the past 7.5 years, I have worked in child development, education and recreation. I have worked with the Boys and Girls Club of Central Florida, Center for Drug Free Living, Orange County Parks and Recreation, and I am presently employed with Orange County Public Schools. I ama member of the New Church of Faith in Orlando, Florida were I've helped with youth banquets and church activities. If you have any questions about my spiritual leadership and commitment, please call Pastor David Beacham at (407) 296-2664. 11. Petitioner testified that even though Ms. Pryor had told him that she would "drop the charges," he elected to plea nolo contendere just to get the matter behind him. 12. On January 19, 2001, Petitioner submitted a second affidavit of Good Moral Character indicating that his record contained "one or more of the disqualifying acts or offenses .," and circled the reference to the domestic violence statute. 13. Ken Davis, of Maynard Evans High School in Orlando, Florida, submitted a letter which observed that Petitioner was a "diligent and conscientious person." 14. Yvette Johnson, Universal Orlando, an occupational health and safety specialist, submitted a letter in which she characterized Petitioner as an "asset to the troubled youth in the community . . . never failing to instill the values desired by the church." 15. Ruthenia Moses, who has a Master's Degree in Social Work from the University of Connecticut, who has worked as a clinical therapist, and who was, at one time, the second in command of the Orange County Work Release Center, testified that Petitioner has "an amazing ability to relate to young people," was a "kind and sincere individual of good moral character. I highly recommend him to anyone who works with young people." She further testified that "if I had a business serving youth at risk I would want Petitioner on her team." 16. Christine Barbery, who has a Master's Degree in Legal Studies from the University of Central Florida and is employed by Florida Department of Children & Families as a Family Services Counselor Supervisor, reports that Petitioner is "responsible, hard-working," "setting an admirable example," "an excellent candidate for a Juvenile Probation Officer-type position." She worked for the Department of Juvenile Justice from 1995-1997 and Department of Children and Families since 1997. She has worked with Petitioner with young people at Maynard Evans High School and finds him "caring and dedicated." She "has no qualms about Petitioner's qualifications to be a probation officer." 17. Gloria P. Cleary, Recreation Specialist, Orange County Parks and Recreation, in a letter, characterized Petitioner as a "very enthusiastic and responsible person." She had observed Petitioner in his role as a recreational leader at Liberty Middle School. She further indicated that she would not hesitate in hiring Petitioner in the future. 18. Petitioner was guilelessly candid in his testimony. He is remorseful and contrite regarding the 1995 domestic violence incident. He has conducted his life since that incident in such a way that rehabilitation is indubitably demonstrated. He has an obvious desire to work with troubled teenagers as a Juvenile Probation Officer.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Charles Brown, pro se 7251 Minippi Drive Orlando, Florida 32818 For Respondent: Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Recommendation It is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order granting Petitioner an exemption from disqualification in employment. DONE AND ENTERED this “Ir day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. lec Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us 10 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this XI day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Brown 7251 Minippi Drive Orlando, Florida 32818 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification from working with children.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was responsible for administration of a program whereby Departmental employees were screened for employment with the Department to ensure that only persons qualified though training, experience, and behavior had direct contact with clients of the Department. Petitioner, Brian Reed, was employed by ACTS as a drug laboratory technician on the alcohol, drugs, and mental health, (ADM), side of Bradlee Manor, a residential facility operated by the DJJ. Bradlee Manor also operates a program for the DJJ for children between the ages of 10 and 13 who have been convicted of felony offenses. Mr. Reed also worked on the department’s side of the facility for about six months when the facility first opened, but found that he did not like it. His preference was to work with children with a substance abuse problem, and as a result, he was transferred to the ADM side of the facility. He does not want to work on the Department’s side but instead wants to continue working with the substance abuse residents because he is good at it and he likes it. However, as a part of his job it is necessary for him to come into contact with the DJJ residents from time to time for such things as lab work, and serving as a driver when no one else is available. Throughout his five and a half years of employment at the institution, Petitioner has received periodic performance appraisals. At first, admittedly, he had some minor problems with the accomplishment of his duties, but as he learned the requirements of his job, his difficulties disappeared. At no time were any of his problems related to his discipline or inappropriate behavior, and only on one report was his performance classified as conditional. On all other reports he has been rated either satisfactory or above satisfactory. There are no recorded instances of inappropriate behavior recorded in Petitioner’s employment file. In fact, the supervisor who at one time rated him lower than satisfactory later requested Petitioner be reassigned with him to a new facility. Petitioner has a criminal record. In June 1983, when he was a young man, he was arrested for car theft and for stealing a radio from the car and pawning it. At the time of this offense, Petitioner was 18 years old and almost consistently under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and he admits to having committed the offense to get money to support his habit. He was, at the time, living with his father who was also a drunk. As a result of this offense, adjudication was withheld and Petitioner was placed on two years probation which he subsequently violated in October 1983 by stealing his step- father’s truck. Again adjudication was withheld, but in February 1984, Petitioner was arrested for grand larceny and dealing in stolen property. Though the grand larceny charge was dropped, he was convicted on dealing in stolen property and was incarcerated. He claims that during this period, he was still on drugs and his offenses related to his habit. On October 13, October 15, and November 5, 1985, Petitioner was arrested on a total of 12 counts of burglary and grand larceny and was found guilty of all counts. He was sentenced to four and one half years confinement with a recommendation by the sentencing judge that he be confined in a facility where drug rehabilitation treatment was available. Petitioner remained in prison until he was released in July 1987. While in prison, Petitioner contends he realized he must change his life and weaned himself from drugs and alcohol, both of which were available in prison. On his release he entered a 12-step program for help with his alcohol and drug problem and is still enrolled. It is a life-time commitment, and he attends meetings two or three times a week. He has been drug and alcohol free since January 1988, when he had two glasses of wine on his wedding anniversary. He has not had any adverse involvement with the law since his discharge from prison, and is currently engaged to be married a second time. He owns a home and has a three-year-old son. He owns animals, fishes for a hobby, and associates only with people who do not drink or take drugs. When Petitioner was first hired by the DHRS, the predecessor agency to the DJJ, he made a complete disclosure of his criminal record and was cleared for employment by the Department’s screening process. By letter of August 19, 1993, James E. Thomas, the District Screening Coordinator for DHRS’s District Six, advised ACTS Inc., Petitioner’s employer, that the screening background check on Petitioner had been completed and had found nothing which would disqualify him from working in the ACTS program. The screening was considered to be valid for five years. Between 1993 and 1998, the Florida Legislature changed the statute to include misconduct of the nature committed by Petitioner among the bases for disqualification. By letter dated April 1, 1998, Priscilla A. Zachary, Background Screening Unit Supervisor for the DJJ, advised Petitioner that he was ineligible for continued employment in a position of special trust because of his prior criminal record. The record relied upon for this determination was identical to that made known to the DHRS when Petitioner was first hired and cleared by that agency. No additional of different misconduct was involved. Petitioner was also advised of his right to request an exemption from disqualification and he did so. By letter dated April 16, 1998, Jenny Spence, the ACTS program supervisor for the program in which Petitioner was employed, supported Petitioner’s continued employment, pointing out that one of the main concepts under which the organization operates is to support the employment of individuals who have made unfavorable choices in the past, have been rehabilitated, and are now leading productive lives. Petitioner is a prime example of such an individual, and was considered to be of good moral character now. Ms. Stone also pointed out that Petitioner had made full disclosure of his background and had been cleared for employment by the predecessor agency. On April 21, 1998, a District Screening Committee was appointed to consider Petitioner’s request for exemption. One of the members of the committee was Donald W. Lewis, a senior management analyst II, who has served on numerous exemption committees. As was pointed out in the letter of appointment, Mr. Lewis indicated the role of the committee is to look at the material presented, to listen to the evidence presented, and to make a determination if there is sufficient evidence to indicate the applicant’s employment should be continued, consistent with the guidelines provided by the Department. The committee met on April 28, 1998, and heard the Petitioner’s presentation. Petitioner testified in person, describing his offenses, his previous problems and how he had dealt with them, and his rehabilitation efforts. Petitioner also presented testimony from others by telephone and introduced documentary evidence in his behalf. He was completely forthcoming and gave the committee all the information it requested. The open session of the committee meeting lasted approximately one and a half hours. Petitioner did not ask for additional time nor did he ask to submit additional information. After Petitioner was excused, the committee immediately deliberated in closed session and, after considering all the information which had been presented, concluded unanimously that Petitioner should not be granted the exemption. The factors on which the committee relied in its decision were, in the main: the fact that Petitioner’s criminal record was so extensive as to both gravity and repetition. (Even while on probation, and after release from [the first] incarceration, Petitioner committed additional offenses.) the fact that Petitioner was twice incarcerated. Petitioner’s violation of probation. All of the above factors were not the characteristics that were desired in the DJJ programs contracted to ACTS. Mr. Lewis sees a difference between ADM residents and DJJ residents. In his opinion, Petitioner should not be in direct supervision of DJJ residents with his criminal background, but could work in other programs with children for other agencies. He is of the opinion that DJJ residents, themselves felony offenders, should have role models who do not have criminal backgrounds. According to Mr. Lewis, the committee found some degree of rehabilitation in Petitioner, but not enough evidence to show total rehabilitation. Such evidence would include presentations from people to show no likelihood of relapse, notwithstanding the extended period of time which has already elapsed since his last offense without relapse, and Petitioner’s successful and continuing participation in the 12-step program. Mr. Lewis was unable to state what objective information would be enough. He compares Petitioner with other employees who have not been convicted or incarcerated, but admits there are no objective definitions of what would be enough evidence to demonstrate complete rehabilitation. The committee took the position that Petitioner’s moral character has been good recently, but contrasted that with his youthful record. This was enough, it was believed, to give a legitimate concern about his relapsing. Another concern expressed by Mr. Lewis, but which was not raised by any of the evidence presented, is that Petitioner might have learned conduct while in prison which might make him a danger to children. No evidence to give rise to that suspicion was presented and it is pure speculation. The Department’s Inspector General, Mr. Perry Turner, pointed out that the number one goal of the Department is to improve the environment so that citizens can have a reduction in fear of crime and a better quality of life as a result of a reduction in juvenile delinquency. In hiring employees, both departmental and contract, the Department applies three priorities. The first is the public safety. The second is cooperation with communities. The third is accountability by offenders and the Department. Employment screening standards are applicable to both the Department and contractor employees. The screening process is overseen by the Inspector General who sits as action officer on exemption requests after the screening by the exemption committee. In the instant case, Mr. Turner reviewed the Petitioner’s file and the record of the committee, and based on the entire package, decided to deny the request for exemption. His reasons for doing so rest on Petitioner’s extensive criminal record, the severity of the acts committed, his double incarceration, and his violations of probation along with all the information submitted by Petitioner. The issue is whether Petitioner should be allowed to work with the special needs clients of the DJJ, and whether he could be a good role model for children already involved with the criminal justice system. Considering the criminal justice purpose of the agency, as opposed to its social service purpose, and consistent with the dictates of the enabling statute, Mr. Turner concluded the exemption should be denied. Petitioner disagrees with the position taken by Mr. Turner. In his opinion, he would be an appropriate role model for the young people incarcerated in the department’s facility. His success and rehabilitation would, he claims, show that an individual who was on drugs and alcohol, who gave up those substances, and who applied himself to making a better life for himself, can, with appropriate help, guidance, and assistance, make good. Ms. Loretta Longworth, an administrative assistant in personnel management for ACTS, is the individual who submitted the screening request for Petitioner. She recalls that when Petitioner was hired in 1993, he disclosed his complete criminal history which was forwarded to the DHRS. That agency approved him without restriction. Since that time, Petitioner has worked successfully for ACTS in a number of different positions, including serving as a direct care worker for children and as a shift supervisor. Based on their experience with Petitioner, ACTS has no reason to believe he is not of good moral character. He has demonstrated no problems, nor has he received any bad reports, and there is no reason to believe he would be a danger to children who would come into contact with him. Much the same opinion is held by Kenneth Hogue, Petitioner’s long-time supervisor at Bradley Manor, and the individual who hired Petitioner at ACTS more than five years ago. Petitioner made him aware of his criminal background at that time, and over the several years he has supervised Petitioner, has found his performance to be above satisfactory. In fact, he asked Petitioner to go with him from one facility to another. Though his experience with Petitioner is purely work- based, Mr. Hogue finds Petitioner to be of good moral character and has no reason to believe Petitioner would pose any danger to children. Mr. Hogue does not believe a criminal record by itself should be disqualifying. The individual is the issue, and Petitioner’s story is a prime example of learning from mistakes and succeeding. Mr. Hogue has no reservations at all about Petitioner working with DJJ residents. Based on his day-to-day observation of Petitioner, he finds Petitioner to be a positive role model for young people. In Hogue’s opinion, it is important to have both reformed malefactors and individuals with clean records working with children in the juvenile justice system. Lawrence Douglas, a personal friend and prior co-worker, and himself a recovering alcoholic, works as an addiction counselor at another facility. He found Petitioner to be very good with clients who gave orderly directions and never posed a threat to the clients. According to Mr. Douglas, it is not unusual for recovering substance abusers to work in counseling, and they are usually good at it. Petitioner is, and Hogue does not believe Petitioner, who he finds to be of good moral character, would pose any threat to his clients. Nadine Griffith, a teacher in Hillsborough County, met Petitioner at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting about 12 years ago and sees him weekly at their home group sessions. She has observed Petitioner in the company of juveniles in their recovery group, and from those repeated observations does not believe he would be any danger to juveniles. Juveniles seem to like Petitioner and come to him for guidance. He passes his substantial recovery experience on to these juveniles, and this is helpful to their recovery.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a Final Order granting Brian Reed an exemption from disqualification from employment to work in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary L. Greenwood, Esquire Greenwood & Associates Law Group, P.A. 2130 West Brandon Boulevard Suite 101 Brandon, Florida 33511 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Inspector General’s Office 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rule. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioners have standing to challenge the Challenged Rule. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Challenged Rule implements Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, which provides: (3) The department shall advance the release date of a nonparole contract releasee by up to 30 days and shall forward to the Department of Labor and Employment Security a release assistance stipend of up to $200 for the purpose of motivating the releasee to participate in prerelease orientation, secure permanent employment, and secure permanent residence. The Department of Labor and Employment Security shall distribute the release assistance stipend to the releasee in accordance with the provisions of law and of the release contract. Violation of the terms of the contract may constitute grounds for the forfeiture of the release assistance stipend and the termination of the contract. Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code, currently provides: (7) Each facility is authorized to release a contract releasee up to 30 days prior to his sentence expiration date after the Bureau of Admission and Release has verified the expiration date as computed in accordance with instructions of the sentencing court and applicable statutes. The discharge certificate and any related documents must reflect the actual date of release. Parole releasees and inmates excluded in subsection (2) will not be eligible for a further reduction in their release date. The only modification to Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code, made by the Challenged Rule is to replace the terms "up to 30 days" with the terms "one day." The Transition Assistance Program. The program established by the Legislature in Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, is known as the Transition Assistance Program (hereinafter referred to as "TAP"). In creating the TAP, the Legislature has evidenced an intent to assist certain inmates in adjusting to their release back into the community. Indirectly, the TAP also creates an early release mechanism which has helped control inmate population. In the past the Respondent has relied on the TAP and Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, as a means of meeting required inmate population levels. The early release of inmates through TAP is conditioned upon their participation in the pre-release activities of the TAP, the payment of a $200.00 stipend to inmates to encourage their participation in the TAP and participate in post-release activities of the TAP. There is no requirement that inmates be released early contained in Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, unless an the inmate meets these conditions. Pre-release activities of the TAP includes analysis of inmates, a pre- release orientation program and paper work for referrals in the community for post-release activities. The pre-release orientation program lasts 40 hours. The $200.00 stipend is paid in part when an inmate is released, in part when the inmate reports to a community contact person and in part when the inmate returns to the community contact person. Post-release activities of the TAP included housing and employment referrals which were provided by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security and community-based organizations through a contract with the Respondent. Purpose For the Challenged Rule. In 1991, the Legislature did not appropriate any funds to the Respondent to carry on the TAP. No funds were authorized for the $200.00 stipend, to fund the contracts for post-release programs or to fund staff needed for the pre-release program. The Respondent, since the 1991-1992 fiscal year has only been able to provide a two-hour pre-release orientation video to inmates prior to their release. The Respondent has not been able to provide inmates with a $200.00 stipend or any post- release TAP activities. As a consequence of the Legislature's failure to fund the TAP, the Respondent has been unable to provide the means for inmates to meet the conditions for any significant early release required by Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes. The Control Release Authority was created by Section 947.146, Florida Statutes, in 1989. The Primary purpose of the Control Release Authority is to implement a system of uniform criteria for determining the number and categories of inmates who must be released in order to maintain required prison populations. The need to rely on the TAP to maintain required prison populations was eliminated by the creation of the Control Release Authority. Based upon the inability to provide the TAP caused by loss of funding and in light of the creation the Control Release Authority, the Respondent decided to limit early release of inmates pursuant to Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, to one day. This decision was initially implemented by non- rule policy. This policy was declared invalid for failure to adopt the policy as a rule in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, in a Final Order entered September 6, 1991, in Richard Charles Gaston v. Department of Corrections, DOAH Case Number 91- 3203R. The Respondent subsequently promulgated the Challenged Rule. Although it cost more to house an inmate than to release an inmate, the Respondent has no authority under Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, to simply release inmates early because it is cheaper. Early release pursuant to Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, is conditioned on participation in the TAP. If the Respondent is unable to provide the programs necessary for inmates to meet the conditions of Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, for early release, then the Respondent may not release inmates simply because it is cheaper than housing them. In light of the program that the Respondent is able to provide inmates (a two-hour orientation video), a one day early release is reasonable. Although the Respondent testified that any number of days could have been authorized by the Challenged Rule (up to a maximum of thirty), this testimony ignores the requirement of Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, that early release is conditioned on inmates receiving the programs contemplated. The testimony was merely an indication that the Respondent could select any number of days for early release from a practical- logistical basis. It does not appear, however, that such authority is granted the Respondent by Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by pleading guilty to the felony charge of child neglect pursuant to Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), as set forth in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Veronica A. Smith, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. She was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 135464 on December 11, 1992. Respondent was employed by the Lee County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period September 21, 1992, through June 24, 2002. On or about June 12, 2002, Respondent was charged by Information with two counts of felony child neglect in violation of Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), by the state attorney for the Twentieth Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida. On or about May 27, 2003, Respondent, while represented by counsel and in open court, withdrew her previous plea of "not guilty" to the Information and entered a plea of guilty to one count of felony child neglect before the circuit court for Lee County, Florida, State of Florida v. Veronica Smith, Case No. 02-1878CF. Said plea was accepted and the court entered an Order Withholding Adjudication dated May 27, 2003, which withheld adjudication of guilt but placed Respondent on probation for a period of two years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Following notification of her arrest, the Lee County Sheriff's Office opened an internal affairs investigation relating to the underling charges which resulted in her termination on June 24, 2002, from her position as Bailiff Corporal with the Lee County Sheriff's Department. By pleading guilty to felony child neglect, Respondent has failed to uphold her qualifications to be a correctional officer by failing to maintain her good moral character. Although Respondent's employment record does not show any prior disciplinary violations, she has failed to produce any evidence in explanation or mitigation of the conduct which resulted in her arrest and plea before the circuit court or in her termination of her employment with the Lee County Sheriff's Office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002). Respondent's certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Veronica A. Smith Post Office Box 6812 Fort Myers, Florida 33911 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that he is of good moral character, and should be granted an exemption from employment disqualification, thereby allowing him to work in a position of special trust or responsibility pursuant to Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 25, 1995, the Orlando Police Department responded to an emergency call from Petitioner's residence. Petitioner was arrested and charged with domestic violence, aggravated assault and false imprisonment. The domestic violence and false imprisonment charges were subsequently dropped. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the reduced misdemeanor charge of simple assault upon his wife, an act of domestic violence. On September 18, 1996, adjudication of guilt was withheld by the Orange County Circuit Court. Petitioner was given credit for 43 days time served in the Orange County Jail. He was also ordered to pay court costs. Petitioner was not placed on probation and was not ordered to attend domestic violence counseling. Petitioner disputes the narrative contained in the charging affidavit and claims that at no time did he threaten his wife, and that the firearm was present in the room only for cleaning, and was not displayed inappropriately. Petitioner's description of the events is not credible. Petitioner began work as a detention care worker at the Orange Regional Juvenile Detention Center in October 1995. The position required a level 2 background screening be conducted. On August 23, 1996, Petitioner submitted an affidavit of Good Moral Character which did not disclose his arrest or sentence. In August of 1996, a background screening request packet was submitted to the Background Screening Unit of Respondent's Inspector General's office. A preliminary FCIC/NCIC screening check conducted on Petitioner revealed that he had a disqualifying offense (assault on a spouse). His background screening received a rating of "Unfavorable Disqualifying." In a letter from Respondent dated August 7, 1997, Petitioner was notified that he had been disqualified and was, therefore, ineligible to work in a caretaker's position with Respondent. This disqualification was based upon the 1995 domestic assault charge. Petitioner is a 52-year-old Divinity School graduate and former church minister. Petitioner holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Bethune-Cookman College in Daytona Beach, and a Master of Divinity Degree from Morehouse School of Religion in Atlanta. Prior to commencing his employment with Respondent, Petitioner had successfully worked with juveniles for many years in a variety of capacities, to-wit: school teacher, counselor, youth group leader, civic leader, and minister. Petitioner received numerous awards and certificates documenting his involvement with and commitment to the welfare of his community and of juveniles in particular. After starting his work as a Detention Care Worker at the Orlando Regional Juvenile Detention Center, several Juvenile Detention Center workers in both supervisory and co-worker roles testified to the exceptional quality and caliber of Petitioner's work with juveniles. Since the alleged incident of domestic violence three years ago, no claim of any other alleged illegal conduct has been made against Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy Terry, Esquire 1407 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 536914 Orlando, Florida 32801 Lynne Winston, Esquire Inspector General's Office 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue Whether Respondent, Cheraine D. Nelson (Respondent), failed to maintain good moral character required of correctional officers by engaging in the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Background On September 15, 2015, Respondent was certified by the State of Florida, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, as a correctional officer. Respondent’s Correction Certification number is 327096. Respondent is the state agency responsible for enforcing standards applicable to correctional officer certificates, pursuant to section 943.12 and chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The incident which provides the basis for the instant action occurred on February 10, 2017. At the time of the incident, Respondent was employed by Moore Haven Correctional Facility. Respondent is a military veteran, having served eight years of active duty with the United States Army. Respondent exited the military soon after the birth of her son, C.P., who is her only child. Respondent was 34 years of age and C.P. was seven years of age at the time of “the incident” that provides the basis for the instant action. Respondent is the custodial parent of C.P., and, at all times material to the instant matter, raised C.P. with minimal assistance from C.P.’s biological father. Respondent describes herself as a single parent. At all times material hereto, Respondent held Associate of Arts degrees in criminal justice and radiological science. Respondent testified that she is four classes shy of completing the requirements necessary to obtain a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice. Respondent, when the incident involving C.P. occurred, was employed as a correctional officer at the Moore Haven Correctional facility. Respondent was assigned to the morning shift, which began at 7:00 a.m. and ended at 7:00 p.m. Respondent would occasionally work mandatory overtime, which required her to extend her regular 12-hour shift by four hours. Respondent’s travel time to and from the correctional facility added an additional three hours to her work day. The Incident During the course of the 2016-2017 school year, C.P. regularly misbehaved while at school, and as a consequence thereof, Respondent had numerous discussions with school officials regarding appropriate strategies for minimizing the disruption to the learning environment resulting from C.P.’s behavior. It is fair to say that Respondent’s relationship with school officials was, at best, acrimonious, and that Respondent and C.P.’s teachers were frustrated with C.P.’s classroom behavior. On the morning of February 10, 2017, Respondent, prior to leaving for work, found in C.P.’s backpack a letter from his school advising that C.P. was again misbehaving in the classroom. It is inferred from the evidence that Respondent had no knowledge of the letter prior to discovering the same in C.P.’s backpack. According to Respondent, after reading the letter, she became upset at her son for again “getting in trouble at school,” and she “let [her] emotions take over.” While in this state of heightened emotional agitation, Respondent grabbed a belt and struck C.P. several times about his body. Respondent admits that on the morning of February 10, 2017, she struck C.P. five to seven times with a belt, and that her actions were excessive. Soon after striking C.P. with the belt, Respondent sent C.P. to school where officials noticed bruising over several areas of his body. Per protocol, school officials contacted child protective services, who in turn interviewed C.P. and photographed the bruises on his body. The photographs of C.P.’s injuries were received into evidence as Petitioner’s composite Exhibit 1, photographs 1 through 7. Photograph 1 depicts bruises to the left side of C.P.’s face and head.2/ Photographs 2 and 3 depict bruises to the inside forearm area of C.P.’s right arm. Photograph 4 shows, from a different angle, the bruises depicted in photograph 1. Photograph 5 depicts bruises to the inside area of C.P.’s right leg. Photograph 6 does not clearly identify the body part depicted, but the photograph does clearly depict the presence of a bruise. Photograph 7 depicts bruises to the lower thigh and upper calf area of the backside of C.P.’s right leg. The photographs depicting C.P.’s bruises capture all physical injuries sustained by C.P. as a result of Respondent’s actions on February 10, 2017. Respondent admits that the photographs accurately depict the injuries to C.P., which resulted from her striking C.P. with a belt. C.P. is a child of light complexion, and the bruises to his body, as reflected in the photographs, were, in most instances, easily discernable. Based on her conduct with respect to C.P., Respondent, on or about February 10, 2017, was arrested and charged with “child abuse without great harm” in violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (2016). Section 827.03(2)(c) provides that a person commits a third-degree felony when “knowingly or willfully abuse[ing] a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child.” It is undisputed that Respondent entered into, and successfully completed, a pretrial diversion program in lieu of prosecution. The Administrative Complaint alleges that “[o]n or about February 10, 2017, the Respondent, Cheraine D. Nelson, did unlawfully and intentionally inflict physical or mental injury upon C.P., a child under the age of eighteen, without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disgifurement [sic], to wit: struck the victim on his arms, legs, face, and head.” The evidence establishes that Respondent unlawfully and intentionally inflicted physical injury upon C.P. as alleged in paragraph 2 of the Administrative Complaint.3/ The Aftermath In reviewing the record, it reasonably appears as though Respondent was released from jail a few hours after she was arrested. As a consequence of Respondent’s actions, C.P. was sheltered with the Department of Children and Families (DCF), which, in turn, placed the child with a friend of Respondent’s. The day after Respondent was released from jail, it is undisputed that she enrolled in, and eventually completed, an on- line parenting class. In this regard, Respondent credibly testified as follows: A: Yes. Before I even –- when I was released from the jail the next – the day after, I took it upon myself to enroll into classes. Q: What kind of classes? A: I enrolled into a parenting class, because I felt like what I did was wrong and I knew like that something needed to be done to me as a parent. I’ve never been a parent, and at the time I think my son was like eight. And I called my mom and she’s like, “you need to figure this out, because you’ve been doing this by yourself.” So I went online and I just started looking at –- Googling things parents do to help them parent as single mothers. So I went to the David Lawrence Center and I enrolled into a parenting class. And I did that, I completed the class. As a result of her actions towards C.P., Respondent was required by DCF to enroll in an approved parenting and anger management class. Respondent successfully completed both classes. Respondent was also ordered to undergo psychological testing, which she did. C.P. was sheltered by DCF for a period of about two months. The undisputed evidence establishes that DCF allowed Respondent to have unsupervised visits with C.P. after one month, and returned C.P. to Respondent after two months. In explaining how this experience impacted her as a parent, Respondent credibly testified as follows: I did everything that I felt that I needed to do to fix my -- the situation I’m in. I have grown a lot from that. And that this whole situation has made me just a better person, as a mom, as a woman. And I look at things differently now when –- when it comes to my child, as far as when he –- if he’s having behavior issues or any type of issues, whether at home or at school, so I changed a lot of things. I don’t let the little things get me upset. I talk to my son a lot more, now that he’s older, and I just –- we do punishment differently. And I take a lot of things away from him rather than do what I did before.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement finding that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by law, and prospectively suspending Respondent’s correctional officer certification for a period of seven months. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2019.
