Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mary Anna Cline (Ms. Cline), is a fifty-two year old female who was employed by USBI Company (USBI) from 1985 until November 15, 1994. USBI refurbishes the solid rocket boosters for the space shuttle program at the Kennedy Space Center, Brevard County, Florida. It employs substantially more than fifteen full-time employees. Ms. Cline was hired for the position of technical illustrator, which position is responsible for drawing mechanical components, doing illustration and charts, and preparing manuals and documents that apply to the day-to-day work of the company. She was a good employee and had excellent technical skills, as reflected in her performance evaluations and numerous commendations. At the time that she left the company, she was in a position titled "senior technical illustrator." In early 1992 the company had some internal reorganization, and Ms. Cline and a group of employees were transferred from Management Services to Documentation Support. The job duties remained substantially the same, but the new group also had responsibility for the Routing of Documents (RODS) program, which involved the tracing of detailed technical drawings, to be used on a computer mainframe by the "techs" (engineers). Documentation Support generated technical documentation for the rockets, all technical manuals, standard procedures, testing, fliers and presentations - generally all of the paperwork used by the company, including verbiage and graphics. The supervisor of Documentation Support, then and now, is a woman, Monica Teran. Approximately seventy-five percent of Ms. Cline's work group were women. In June 1992, Richard Bowen was hired by USBI as a technical illustrator and was assigned to Documentation Support. He became a coworker of Ms. Cline and their assigned work stations were side-by-side without a partition. Richard Bowen's two main hobbies are photography and computers. He was generally accepted as the computer expert in the work group; when there were problems with the computers, Richard Bowen could often work them out. Bowen's interest in photography is also more than a casual avocation. He attended photography school in Chicago when he was younger and worked with a modeling agency. He holds an occupational license to conduct a photography business and performs commercial photography services that do not conflict with his 9-5 job: weddings, portraits, some modeling photographs and some work with a theme park in Orlando. He is a member of the Audubon Society and takes wildlife photographs and does computer work for the organization. The Photograph Incident Staff in the work group were interested in Bowen's photographs. He brought samples of his pictures to work to show off. He usually left the pictures on his desk, face up, so that people could come to his work area and look at them. Some time in the latter months of 1992, Bowen purchased an expensive special soft-focus lens that gives the subject a soft, romantic, mystical look and deletes the wrinkles or blemishes. He discussed the lens with a fellow photographer at work and brought in a sample of photographs he had taken with the lens. Most of the pictures among the twelve to fifteen which he brought on this occasion were wildlife; there also were a few photographs of a model. She was bare-breasted, but was not exposed from the waist down. While there is no clear description of her pose in the record, she was described by some as nude and others as partially nude. None described the photographs as sexually suggestive or pornographic. In the early morning before work started, some female staff members were shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline was part of the group looking on. Bowen said something semi-jokingly like, "You might not want to look at these; there's a bare-breasted model." One of the women replied that it was nothing that she had not seen before, and continued shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline saw the model's photograph, remarked that the girl had pretty eyes, and returned to her own work station. Several months later, after a workshop that management had initiated to deal with problems in the workplace, Ms. Cline reported the photographs to Carol DuBray, Director of Human Resources and Darryl LeCanne, the immediate supervisor of Monica Teran. Ms. Cline was embarrassed by the photographs. Management's Response As soon as Ms. Cline left Darryl LaCanne's office, he called Monica Teran, and the two supervisors met with Richard Bowen. They informed him that USBI had a policy of not tolerating nude photography or pin-up calendars in the workplace and that his bringing the photographs to work was unacceptable behavior. Darryl LaCanne told Richard Bowen that the next time severe disciplinary action would be taken. Richard Bowen was also called in to speak with USBI's director of security, Barry Wysocki. Mr. Wysocki informed him that nude pictures were prohibited by USBI's regulations. Mr. Bowen received the message in clear terms that the matter was very serious. Bowen never again brought nude or semi-nude photographs to work and Ms. Cline never again saw such photographs at work. Offensive Shop Talk Work stations in the Documentation Support unit were divided into cubicles, some separated by dividers, some (Richard Bowen's and Ms. Cline's) were side by side, facing a partition with two other workers on the opposite side. Workers interacted within a small space and moved about to use different computer equipment, printers, files, and similar work tools. Among some of the workers there was occasional bawdy banter and comment about boyfriends, weekends and vacations, and the like. It was sexually oriented in a sophomoric, adolescent schoolyard manner. It included terms like "shit" and "fuck" and included conversation about "blow jobs" or "hard-ons," and other slang words involving male genitalia. With one exception, the language was not directed to Ms. Cline. That exception was one occasion when Richard Bowen responded to her criticism of some work with the expletive "fuck." Both male and female workers engaged in the banter, which was overheard by Ms. Cline and others. Ms. Cline was particularly offended by banter between Bowen and a female worker, Anna Silvestri, who occupied a workstation on the other side of the partition in front of Ms. Cline and Mr. Bowen. Ms. Silvestri sometimes initiated this banter. In May or June of 1993 Ms. Cline reported to her supervisor, Monica Teran, that Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri used the word "fuck" and engaged in sexually explicit conversations. Ms. Teran went to her supervisor to see what to do about the complaint and Carol DuBray requested that Barry Wysocki conduct an investigation. Barry Wysocki interviewed and took statements from employees in the Document Support Unit, including Ms. Cline. She complained that Richard Bowen created a hostile environment; that she heard him say "fuck" on one occasion in the past two months and that she heard Anna Silvestri say the word on two occasions. Ms. Cline said that Bowen and Silvestri discussed Ms. Silvestri's sex life and that on one occasion Ms. Silvestri tried to discuss her sex life with Ms. Cline, but she cut her off with a comment that it was improper. Ms. Cline reported hearing Monica Teran and Beth Seaman use the word "fuck" in the work area. Bowen and Silvestri did not deny mild profanity and mildly sexual conversations. Other employees reported hearing some profanity, primarily "shit," "damn" and "bullshit." Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri were seriously reprimanded by Barry Wysocki, by Barry Smoyer, by Darryl LaCanne and by Monica Teran. Each supervisor impressed on the two employees that the use of foul language was not tolerated and was against company policy. Barry Smoyer gave the two employees a letter "for the record," documenting the counselling session and reprimand. Monica Teran moved Ms. Cline to Anna Silvestri's workstation on the other side of the partition from Richard Bowen. She moved Anna Silvestri two cubicles away, with several partitions between her and Mr. Bowen. And George Roberts was placed next to Richard Bowen in Ms. Cline's former workstation. The intent by the supervisor was to accommodate Ms. Cline's concerns and to separate the two prime offenders. In the two years that he worked for USBI, including the time that he worked next to Richard Bowen, George Roberts heard nothing more than "hell" or "damn" from Bowen. Nevertheless, around August 1994, during her performance review, Ms. Cline informed Monica Teran that the sexual conversations were continuing. Ms. Teran informed her supervisors and another investigation commenced, this time by USBI's new security director, Al Eastlack. Mr. Eastlack conducted an interview with Ms. Cline, among others, and took her formal statement in September 1994. Barry Smoyer reviewed a draft report of Mr. Eastlack's investigation and although he understood the results were "inconclusive," Mr. Smoyer renewed his admonishments to Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri in separate memoranda to the two, reminding them of USBI's intolerance of sexual harassment in any form and warning them that inappropriate language would result in disciplinary action. Alleged Threats After the photograph incident, but before she complained, Richard Bowen and Mary Anna Cline had a conflict over the use of some computer graphics software. Bowen was advocating one type of software that Ms. Cline opposed. Monica Teran had to intervene and instructed Ms. Cline to install the program and learn how to use it. After she complained about the photographs, Ms. Cline became convinced that Richard Bowen was going to retaliate. She complained to Monica Teran that she was afraid of Bowen but her complaints were non-specific. She began to complain of stress and sleep problems. Ms. Teran recommended that she go to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counsellor or to see her own counsellor or doctor. This was around the same time that Ms. Cline complained about the offensive language and conversations, and Ms. Cline took the recommendation to mean that Ms. Teran did not believe her, or that Ms. Teran felt Ms. Cline was at fault. Ms. Teran also commented to Ms. Cline that she should simply tell Bowen to stop talking like that. Another employee, Dorothy Stokey, who was offended by Bowen's use of "fuck" had told him to stop. Ms. Cline was too intimidated by him to confront him directly. Some time in the latter months of 1993, Monica Teran found Ms. Cline in the ladies' room crying and upset to the point of incoherence. Ms. Cline had overheard a conversation between Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri involving a gun and made a connection between that and incidents of violence in the workplace and coworkers being shot. With the help of Barry Smoyer, Ms. Teran was able to get Ms. Cline out of the ladies' room and calmed down. Then, at Mr. Smoyer's direction, Ms. Teran called Ms. Silvestri and Mr. Bowen into her office to find out what had happened. Mr. Bowen did not have a gun at work and he had been discussing a gun show early that morning. Ms. Teran was satisfied that the discussion had been innocuous and reported her findings to Barry Smoyer. No other employee reported that Bowen had a gun or saw him with a gun. None, including Ms. Cline, ever complained that Bowen had threatened them with a gun. Alleged Retaliation Ms. Cline contends that USBI retaliated against her for reporting sexual harassment. Specifically she claims that her job duties were shifted from work on RODS, which she liked, to word processing, which she disliked and with which she had difficulty, due to some dyslexia. It is undisputed that Ms. Cline was a very competent graphics illustrator. She and Mr. Bowen and a couple of other employees in the unit were considered the core of the illustration function, and other employees in the unit preferred and were more skilled in the word processing and language component of the unit's responsibilities. However, the work assignments were not so clearly divided between "illustration" and "word processing." The production and modification of company manuals required both types of work. Monica Teran was interested in cross-training her staff to do a variety of tasks. There was a time, after mid-1993, when Ms. Cline's assignments involved word processing. She also continued to do a substantial amount of RODS work, as evidenced by handwritten logs maintained by the employees. Monica Teran never instructed the staffperson responsible for making assignments to remove Ms. Cline from RODS or other graphics work. RODS was not considered high profile or creative work since it primarily involved tracing technical components repetitively. There was a period when RODS work was put on hold. There was another period when temporary employees, such as George Roberts, were taken in to work exclusively on RODS. At no time during her employment with USBI was Ms. Cline demoted in job title or pay. In 1993 and 1994 her employment evaluations reflected a need to improve communications and attendance, but she was still rated "excellent," "good" and "acceptable" in all categories, and overall "excellent" and "good." There is no evidence to indicate that anyone tampered with Ms. Cline's computer or sabotaged her computer, as she claimed. On occasion it was necessary for Monica Teran or other staff to work at Ms. Cline's and other stations, to see if programs were loaded or the machine was set up properly. Although certain equipment, such as a printer, was located at an individual workstation, other staff needed access to that equipment. Job-Related Stress Ms. Cline's attendance did suffer and she did experience job-related stress. She went to an EAP counsellor and to a psychiatrist. She was on medication and there were problems with adjusting the type and amount of medication. Ms. Cline experienced sleep disorders; she reported falling asleep at the wheel of her car and had a minor accident. She also experienced other physical phenomena such as pains in her chest and arms, or numbness. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her medical condition as "adjustment reaction of adult life with mixed emotions, basically depression and anxiety." (T-415) Accommodation and Resignation Monica Teran's staff was located in two buildings: the modular unit occupied by Ms. Cline, Mr. Bowen, Ms. Silvestri and others; and another separate building which also included other USBI employees. Ms. Teran's staff was moved around routinely, as new employees were added or other work space needs arose. In Fall 1993 USBI offered to move Ms. Cline to the other building, allowing her to retain her same position and duties; she declined, and the company did not insist that she move. Later, Ms. Cline was offered a lateral position at the same pay and position level. Carol DuBray met with Ms. Cline to discuss this attempt to accommodate her. Ms. Cline also rejected that offer. She explained at hearing that she was afraid she would have been in line for a layoff, if she transferred. However, there is no competent evidence to support that fear. Ms. DuBray explained to Ms. Cline in their meeting that she would retain all benefits, including seniority. In fact, USBI has no departmental seniority policy. Seniority is based on the date an individual is hired by the company, rather than time within a department in the company. On November 15, 1994, Ms. Cline voluntarily resigned, citing "continuing stress brought on by sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation and the flagrant disregard by USBI and its management in the handling of this problem. . . ." (Petitioner's exhibit no. 31) The Formal Complaints At the time she resigned Ms. Cline had already filed her complaint of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). That charge is dated December 6, 1993. The charge of discrimination alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, by sexual harassment and retaliation. It does not cite the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to a worksharing agreement between EEOC and FCHR, the charge was sent to the Florida agency for initial investigation. That workshare agreement, which refers to the FCHR as the "FEPA," provides, in pertinent part: FILING OF CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION In order to facilitate the filing of charges of employment discrimination, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges. The FEPA shall take all charges alleging a violation of Title VII, ADEA, EPA, or the ADA where the parties have mutual juris- diction and refer them to the EEOC for dual filing, so long as the allegations meet the minimum requirements of those Acts. Each Agency will inform individuals of their rights to file charges with the other Agency and to assist any person alleging employment discrimination to draft a charge in a manner which will satisfy the require- ments of both agencies to the extent of their common jurisdiction. As part of the intake duties, investigators are to verify with the charging parties if they have filed a charge of discrimination with other agencies prior to filing the charge. For charges that are to be dual-filed, each Agency will use EEOC Charge Form 5 (or alternatively, an employment discrim- ination charge form which within statutory limitations, is acceptable in form and content to EEOC and the FEPA) to draft charges. When a charge is taken based on disability, the nature of the disability shall not be disclosed on the face of the charge. * * * H. The delegation of authority to receive charges contained in Paragraph II. a. does not include the right of one Agency to determine the jurisdiction of the other Agency over a charge. * * * DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES * * * D. EEOC will not defer or refer any charge for the FEPA to process that is not jurisdictional on its face with both Agencies. If it is apparent that one Agency might have jurisdiction when another does not, then the Charging Party will be referred to the appropriate Agency. * * * (Petitioner's exhibit no. 41) (emphasis added) A notice dated December 20, 1993, on EEOC form 212, states that the FCHR has received the charge and will initially investigate the charge. The FCHR did investigate the charge and the FCHR investigator's report is dated July 13, 1994. A document styled "Determination: No Cause" is dated August 25, 1994 and has the apparent signature of FCHR's Executive Director. An accompanying document, with the same date, is styled "Notice of Determination: No Cause" and informs Ms. Cline as complainant of her right to file her petition for relief within 35 days. The petition for relief dated September 27, 1994, was filed with FCHR, and cites the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as well as Title VII. The petition alleges sexual harassment and retaliation. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 6, 1994. The amended petition for relief, filed on April 10, 1995, and referenced in the order and notice of hearing dated May 16, 1995 deletes any reference to Title VII and recites instead that the claims for relief are based on Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The amended petition does not claim constructive discharge nor does it mention that Ms. Cline left the company approximately five months earlier. Sexual Harassment Policy and Summary of Findings USBI has, and during the relevant period had a sexual harassment policy which provides: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's amended "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex" include a section prohibiting sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is either an explicit or implicit term or condition of employment, or submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for an employment decision affecting the person rejecting or submitting the conduct, or such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an affected person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment is unacceptable behavior by any USBI employee or outside vendor. Any form of harassment, like any conduct contrary to common decency or morality, cannot and will not be tolerated. The company will take whatever corrective action necessary to prevent or deal with acts of sexual harassment in the work place. (Respondent's exhibit no. 61) The policy provides names and phone numbers for persons to report sexual harassment and states that reports at that point will be confidential. Employees are informed of the policy through annual letters from the company head, through posters on the facility walls and through mandatory workshops for managers and their staff. USBI responded appropriately to Ms. Cline's complaints. Its response as to the photographs was effective; the sexually-themed banter, however, continued. The banter did not constitute sexual harassment of Ms. Cline, nor did it create a sexually hostile work environment. No one at USBI ever made a sexual advance towards Ms. Cline; no one suggested or requested sex from her or asked her for a date. No one touched her inappropriately. The sexual banter was never directed to or about her. The banter overheard by Ms. Cline, and the use of the "f word," were occasional, not daily or even weekly. The banter was not directed solely to, or about women; it was engaged in, and was overheard, by men and women, alike. The work quarters were close; the unit which included Ms. Cline was in a small "modular" building with work stations divided by movable partitions. By necessity, workers moved around the office to use various equipment. Coworkers of Ms. Cline did not find the environment sexually hostile, offensive or intimidating. No one else of the primarily female group complained about a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment. According to both a friend and her psychiatrist, Ms. Cline was more sensitive than most to profanity and off-color language. Without question, Ms. Cline suffered from stress at work. The stress was manifest in the myriad physical symptoms which caused absenteeism and loss of performance. USBI appropriately offered to Ms. Cline accommodations which would have allowed her to continue working at the same job level and salary but outside of the environment she found intolerable. She rejected the offers and voluntarily resigned. The resignation was not urged, directly or indirectly, by the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ms. Cline's complaint and petitions for relief in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5634 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in part in paragraph 33; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted by implication in paragraph 60. Adopted in substance in paragraph 48. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 50. Adopted in paragraph 52. Adopted in paragraph 53. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Subparagraphs are addressed as follows: Adopted in substance: a (but not the date), b, c, h, i, m, n. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial or misleading: d, e, f, g, j, k, l. Rejected, as to the "escalation," as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence; adopted generally in summary in paragraph 17; but some of the specifics alleged were not established (for example, the "sucking" statement). Rejected as a mischaracterization of the incident, although use of the word, "fuck," was proven. 19.-22. Rejected as not credible. 23.-24. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. 25.-28. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraphs 39-41, but it was not proven that the stress was the result of a "hostile work environment," within the scope of gender-based discrimination. Rejected as unnecessary. 31.-32. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 33.-34. Accepted that she complained, but the dates and frequency were not established with competent evidence 35. Conclusion that the steps were "inadequate" is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 36.-41. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial, or misleading. 42. Rejected (as to characterization of "retaliation") as contrary to the weight of evidence and the law. 43.-46. Rejected as unnecessary, given the recommended disposition. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 48 and 49. 5.-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 54. 7. Adopted in paragraph 1. 8. Adopted in paragraph 55. 9. Adopted in paragraph 3. 10. Adopted in paragraph 4. 11. Adopted in paragraph 5. 12.-13. Adopted in paragraph 4. 14.-15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 6. 18.-21. Adopted in paragraphs 7 and 8. 22. Adopted in paragraph 9. 23. Adopted in substance in paragraph 59. 24. Adopted in paragraph 61. 25. Adopted in paragraph 10. 26. Adopted in paragraph 12. 27.-28. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 11 and 12. 29. Adopted in paragraph 13. 30. Adopted in paragraph 27. 31. Rejected as unnecessary. 32.-35. Adopted in paragraphs 14 and 15. 36.-38. Adopted in paragraph 19. 39.-43. Adopted in paragraphs 20 and 21. 44. Adopted in paragraph 22. 45. Rejected as unnecessary. 46. Adopted in paragraph 23. 47.-48. Rejected as unnecessary. 49. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 50. Adopted in paragraph 24. 51. Adopted in paragraph 26. 52. Adopted in paragraph 28. 53. Adopted in paragraph 29. 54. Adopted in paragraph 31. 55. Adopted in paragraph 30. 56. Rejected as unnecessary. 57.-62. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 43 through 46. 63.-64. Adopted in part in paragraph 47; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 65.-72. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 32 through 38. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia E. Lowrey, Esquire Mark B. Roberts, Esquire STEEL HECTOR and DAVIS 1900 Phillips Point West 777 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Wayne L. Allen, Esquire 700 North Wickham Road, Suite 107 Melbourne, Florida 32935 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, specifically sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment due to Petitioner's gender in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, a Caucasian female, from sometime in December of 2003 until termination of her employment on June 21, 2004. Petitioner worked in Respondent’s warehouse facility from December, 2003 until sometime in February, 2004, when she was transferred to one of Respondent’s retail stores, the Ocala store, where she worked until she was transferred back to the warehouse at the end of May or beginning of June, 2004. Petitioner conceded at hearing that she was terminated after she argued with her supervisor and called her a bitch. Petitioner does not believe that she was terminated on the basis of her sex. During the course of her employment, Petitioner alleges that Respondent’s president, Barry Lay, made inappropriate comments to her of a sexual nature and touched her in an inappropriate way twice. All alleged sexually inappropriate conduct occurred from December of 2003 through February of 2004, during the period of time Petitioner worked in Respondent's warehouse facility. Petitioner testified that Barry Lay engaged in the following inappropriate conduct: At the end of her initial employment interview when she was hired, and out of the presence of other witnesses, Barry Lay allegedly said to her, “If we were to fuck that’s nobody’s business but ours.” In her charge of discrimination, Petitioner alleged that this statement was “said in front of witnesses.” Due to Petitioner's inconsistencies in testifying, her demeanor while testifying and Barry Lay's candid testimony of denial with regard to making such statements to Petitioner at any time, Petitioner's allegation is not credited. Petitioner testified that, right before Christmas of 2003, Barry Lay told her, "if I would let him eat me out just one time I wouldn't think about any other man." (T. 23). Petitioner testified that other witnesses, including her mother, were sitting nearby at a processing table when this comment was made. No witnesses corroborated Petitioner's testimony on this allegation and, coupled with Barry Lay's denial testimony, Petitioner's allegation is not credited. Petitioner testified that Barry Lay grabbed her face and tried to kiss her about the same time as he allegedly made the comment discussed above. Again, Petitioner alleges that witnesses were present, but all witnesses testifying in the matter, including Barry Lay, denied that such an incident occurred. Petitioner's testimony on this point is not credited. Petitioner also testified that Barry Lay grabbed her hips and tried to pull her from behind when she was bent over at a refrigerator. The allegation was denied by Lay and no corroborating testimony was presented. Petitioner's allegation is not credited. On one occasion, Barry Lay overheard conversation between Petitioner and her mother regarding their breast size and that they could form the “little titty committee.” Lay commented to the duo that both of them could be president of the committee. Barry Lay never attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with Petitioner and never threatened her with job transfer or termination if she failed to provide sexual favors. On one occasion during the course of Petitioner's employment, when employees were discussing a rumor that Barry Lay was having an affair with several people at one time, he overheard the discussion, became irritated, and addressed the employees as a group saying, “It doesn’t matter if I’m fucking you, you, you, or you, it’s none of your business.” Petitioner was transferred to the Ocala Store during the course of her employment to assist her in getting her children to day care on time. Additionally, the store hours were more suitable to her schedule at the time. Petitioner made sexual remarks, participated in discussions of a sexual nature, or participated in sexual horseplay in the workplace during the course of her employment with Respondent. Petitioner was heard and observed to smack or slap Barry Lay’s bottom and say, “I want a piece of that.” Barry Lay did not do anything to provoke Petitioner’s conduct, but responded by saying, “if you did, you’d never go back to your boyfriend.” While at work Petitioner discussed having oral sex with her boyfriend and the length and frequency of those encounters. During Petitioner's assignment to the Ocala store, she developed problems with absenteeism from the job. She quit calling in when she unable to work and demonstrated a poor attitude when she was at work. As a consequence, Petitioner was transferred back to Respondent's warehouse, where any absenteeism by the Petitioner would result in less of a hardship to operations. The transfer occurred at the end of May or beginning of June, 2004. After Petitioner was transferred back to the warehouse, she continued to exhibit a poor attitude and unacceptable conduct while at work. In June of 2004, just before she was terminated, Petitioner screamed at her supervisor that she was not going to perform a requested task due to medical restrictions. The supervisor informed Petitioner that she was not being asked to perform the task by herself, but simply to assist. Petitioner began using abusive language to the supervisor, calling her a “bitch.” Petitioner was asked to leave, but replied that she would not unless and until the supervisor “fucking” fired her. Petitioner pushed the supervisor and call her a “fucking whore” and “bitch.” Eventually, after using further epithets, Petitioner left the premises. Barry Lay did not witness the argument between Petitioner and the supervisor, but when he was later informed he instructed the supervisor to tell Petitioner that her employment was being terminated. The decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was communicated to her the next day. Petitioner's stated response to the supervisor, before walking away, was “get fucked.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Hesser, Esquire Seven East Silver Springs Boulevard Suite 300 Ocala, Florida 34470 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope and Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the Respondent, Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Coke), engaged in an unlawful employment practice on the basis of race in its termination of James Andrews, the Petitioner. Andrews was purportedly terminated because of allegations that he had repeatedly sexually harassed and touched female employees. Resolution of the ultimate issue does not require a determination of whether such sexual harassment actually occurred. Instead, the issue is whether Coke's motivation for the termination was racially based and thus impermissible.
Findings Of Fact Andrews, who is black, was initially hired by Coke in 1969 and worked on the production line until he quit in 1971. Andrews was rehired by Coke in 1973, also in the production department. He worked in various positions in both the production department and in the inventory warehouse, and was promoted to assistant production superintendent in 1977. When the production department was closed in June 1982, Andrews transferred to the warehouse as assistant warehouse supervisor. In 1983, he assumed the responsibilities of head shipping and receiving clerk, and was placed in charge of inventory control, plant security and vehicle maintenance. Warehouse Supervisor Dale Dunlap resigned in July 1988 and Andrews was promoted to Warehouse Supervisor. As warehouse supervisor, Andrews had primary responsibility for the overall management of the warehouse, including inventory control, shipping and receiving, personnel management, and warehouse and vehicle maintenance. Andrews' performance evaluations were generally excellent, but the most recent evaluations were less favorable than his earlier reviews. Reports of Sexual Harassment Prior to Andrews' termination reports of sexual harassment were made to Coke by three employees: Susan Lingerfelt, Mandy Stinson, and Sue Rosenthal (now Rubin). In summer 1989, Lingerfelt reported to Office Supervisor Mandy Stinson that Andrews had just grabbed her in the warehouse by the Coke machine and had forced her head back and kissed her. She had shoved Andrews into the Coke machine, told him not to do that, and went to report it to her supervisor. Because the Sales Center Manager had resigned and his replacement had not yet been appointed, the two women agreed not to tell anyone about the incident, but instead to wait until the new manager arrived. In February 1990, around Valentine's Day, Lingerfelt reported that Andrews came up behind her when she was sitting alone at a computer terminal, grabbed her hair, pulled her head back, and again kissed her on the lips. Lingerfelt again protested and tried to get away from Andrews. Lingerfelt again reported the incident immediately to Stinson. Stinson and Lingerfelt went immediately to Lee Burk, the new Sales Center Manager, and reported the incident and the earlier incident at the Coke machine. During this same meeting with Lee Burk, Stinson also complained that she had been repeatedly harassed by Andrews and that Andrews had come up behind her, given her a "bear hug," and tried to kiss her. Burk was confused about what had happened to Lingerfelt because a black employee, Roosevelt Humphrey, had reported to him a couple of months before that he had seen two employees consensually embracing at the Coke machine. Humphrey had not identified the two employees except to say one was a supervisor. Burk mistakenly believed that the two separate Coke machine incidents were the same event. Based on this mistaken belief, Burk thought that a supervisors' meeting would be enough to solve the problem. A few days later, Burk called a supervisors' meeting and discussed several topics, including sexual harassment. He redistributed and discussed Coke's written policy forbidding sexual harassment. Burk told all the supervisors in no uncertain terms that he would not tolerate unwelcome sexual advances at the plant and that if anything of that sort had happened, the supervisor had better clean up his act. In August 1990, Andrews again was reported by Lingerfelt for grabbing her hair, pulling her head back and kissing her on the lips. Lingerfelt tried to slap Andrews, but missed, hitting him on the shoulder. Lingerfelt went immediately to Stinson and they went to see Burk. Lingerfelt was quite upset and was crying. When Burk heard the report, he said he would take care of it. Lingerfelt left the plant for about an hour to collect herself. While Lingerfelt was gone, Burk called Andrews to his office and confronted him with the two women's allegations, including the previous reports by both women. Andrews categorically denied the allegations, except that he had once put his arms around Lingerfelt. He denied ever kissing her and said he did not mean anything by his actions. Burk stressed to Andrews that he could not touch any female employee again, even if he didn't think anything was wrong with it--that he must stop it. Andrews claimed that Lingerfelt had invited the contact by bumping against him and that she was making the allegations because he was black. Andrews also claimed that Lingerfelt had allowed sexually explicit advances from a white supervisor, Doc Roddenberry, and that Roddenberry, not Andrews, should be the subject of Burk's admonitions. Burk told Andrews that he had only gotten complaints about him (Andrews) and that if he continued with his unwelcome conduct, he could lose his job. No advances were reported by Lingerfelt for a few months, but she did complain that Andrews was uncooperative with her about work. In January 1991, Lingerfelt noted that Andrews was calling her frequently and spending long periods of time in her office. Because this behavior was similar to Andrews' conduct before the previous incidents, Lingerfelt became concerned. On January 16, 1991, Stinson was in Jacksonville at Coke's regional office. Lingerfelt became so concerned that she called Stinson in Jacksonville and reported that Andrews had spent several hours that day in Lingerfelt's office staring at her. Stinson immediately asked the Regional Human Resources Manager, Thomas Bauman, for assistance. Stinson informed Bauman of all the prior alleged sexual harassment by Andrews. The next day Stinson returned to Tallahassee and she and Lingerfelt spoke with Burk. Lingerfelt, who was visibly scared and crying, explained to Burk that Andrews had been standing around her office staring at her. Burk said he would address the problem immediately. After talking with Bauman and obtaining his approval, Burk called Andrews into his office and confronted him again. Andrews denied that he had been hanging around Lingerfelt's office staring at her. Burk then brought Stinson into his office to confront Andrews about his persistent harassment against her. Andrews denied the allegations and accused Stinson of "coming on" to him. Andrews again asserted that the women's allegations were racially motivated. He also brought up his allegations against Roddenberry and Lingerfelt and demanded to know why Roddenberry could "get away with it" and he couldn't. Burk advised Andrews that it was only his own misconduct which was being addressed at the moment. Burk also informed Andrews that the allegations of Andrews' misconduct would be brought to the attention of Bauman for further action. Shortly thereafter, Coke's Special Events Supervisor, Sue Rosenthal (now Rubin), reported several events of sexual harassment by Andrews. She had come forward to help support Lingerfelt. Coke's Investigation After discussing the situation and receiving instructions from Buddy Donaldson, Coke's Florida Human Resources Director, Bauman travelled to Tallahassee to conduct an investigation on January 24 and 25, 1991, into the allegations against Andrews. Bauman first met with Burk and received a briefing on the series of allegations. Burk reported the incident which Roosevelt Humphrey had reported to him, still thinking that incident involved Andrews. Bauman interviewed Lingerfelt, who related in great detail each of the alleged incidents set forth above. Bauman took notes and Lingerfelt signed those notes as being an accurate account of her statement. Bauman asked Lingerfelt whether she had any racial motivation for her reports. Lingerfelt denied that Andrews' race had anything to do with her allegations. At this meeting, Lingerfelt told Bauman that she had hired an attorney and had filed sexual harassment charges against Coke with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Bauman next interviewed Roosevelt Humphrey. Humphrey told Bauman that the two people he had reported were Lingerfelt and Roddenberry, not Lingerfelt and Andrews. Humphrey also acknowledged that he had not seen any other such incidents involving Lingerfelt and Roddenberry since the one incident he had reported to Burk without giving names. Bauman then went to Lingerfelt and asked if Roddenberry had sexually harassed her. Lingerfelt denied that Roddenberry had ever harassed her. Bauman next interviewed Rosenthal. Rosenthal told Bauman that before she became a supervisor in early 1989, Andrews had engaged in unwelcome sexual conduct toward her on three occasions. The first two times, Andrews came up behind her in her office, lifted the hair on the back of her neck, and kissed her on the neck. The third time, Andrews surprised her by kissing her on the lips after she had finished a telephone call and had turned around. Rosenthal said she was too startled to say anything after the first incident, but after the second and third events, she told Andrews not to do that. She said she did not report these incidents at the time because she was new, young and nervous. Rosenthal also reported that she had recently seen Andrews "stalking" Lingerfelt, staring at her for long periods of time and waiting for Rosenthal to leave so that he could be alone with Lingerfelt. Bauman asked Rosenthal whether her allegations could be racially motivated. Rosenthal said race had nothing to do with it and, in fact, she lived with a black roommate. Rosenthal had selected that woman from a pool of applicants who had responded to her newspaper ad seeking a roommate. Bauman next interviewed Stinson. Stinson told Bauman of the harassment she had suffered from Andrews, which included several attempts by Andrews to hug and kiss her. She also related information about the times Lingerfelt would come to her and they would go to Burk about Andrews' actions toward Lingerfelt. On January 25, 1991, Bauman officially interviewed Burk. Burk related the actions he had taken, including the supervisors' meeting in February 1990 and the personal meetings with Andrews in August 1990 and January 1991. Burk also recommended that Andrews be terminated for sexual harassment and stalking. Suspension and Termination Bauman then called Donaldson and discussed the information he had learned. They decided that Andrews should be suspended immediately, pending a final decision. They also decided not to interview Andrews again because he had denied any wrongdoing twice, most recently a week earlier. They had no reason to believe that Andrews would recede from his denials. Before suspending Andrews, Bauman asked Lingerfelt and Stinson to leave the building. He did so because of his concern and the women's concerns about their personal safety, especially when Andrews was told of the suspension. As soon as the two women had left the building, Bauman called Andrews to Burk's office. They told Andrews that he was being suspended for conduct unbecoming a supervisor. Andrews wanted to know "who said what" about him, but Bauman declined to give him further details. As he was leaving Burk's office, not knowing that Lingerfelt and Stinson had left the building, Andrews shouted to the closed door of Stinson's office something to the effect of "Did you women hear that--are you happy now?" As soon as Andrews was escorted from the premises, Coke changed all the locks at the Tallahassee facility, which was standard procedure. Bauman also had an automatic front door lock installed so that no one could enter the front office without being pre-screened. The following week, Bauman and Donaldson reviewed all the information, including the interview notes which had been attested to by the three women. They concluded that sufficient evidence existed to require termination of Andrews' employment. On January 31, 1991, Donaldson came to Tallahassee, summoned Andrews to the facility, and terminated him for misconduct. The decision to terminate Andrews was based on a good faith belief that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct on multiple occasions, despite and in the face of at least two warnings by the sales center manager. Coke did not immediately replace Andrews. Due to a "cost containment" program that had recently been instituted and because Tallahassee's volume was too low, Burk was not permitted to hire a replacement. In February 1992, more than a year later and after two neighboring sales centers were closed and their operations consolidated at the Tallahassee facility, Burk was allowed to hire a replacement. He hired the warehouse manager from one of the closed sales centers, a white male. Other Victims Come Forward While Coke knew of only three female employees who had been harassed by Andrews when Coke terminated him, three additional women also came forward to testify about sexual harassment they had suffered at the hand of Andrews. Johnnie Mae Marshall, a black woman who had worked for Coke as a receptionist, said Andrews had suggestively rubbed her arms and hands when she handed him documents. To stop it, she ceased to hand him papers, instead placing all such documents in a mail tray for him. Christen Cheshire, a white female telephone sales operator, testified that Andrews harassed her beginning in late 1988. She said Andrews came into her office once or twice a day, hugged her around the neck, and kissed or attempted to kiss her. This went on for about two months before Cheshire was able to persuade Andrews to stop the unwelcome advances. While Cheshire never reported Andrews' advances, Marshall remembers Cheshire complaining to her about it. Jeanie Benton, a white female who worked for Coke from 1987 to 1990, also testified about Andrews' unwelcome advances. One time when she rose from her desk and turned around, Andrews was right behind her and tried to kiss her. She told him to get back and leave her alone. On a later occasion, Andrews tried to massage her shoulders and she told him to stop. Thereafter, Andrews would stand in her office door and stare at her. Andrews' Claims of Discrimination Andrews' claims that the termination was motivated by racial discrimination and that Coke's reasons for terminating him were pretexts for discrimination. As evidence, he offered a story that Roddenberry committed egregious acts of sexual harassment and misconduct, but was not disciplined. Additionally, he alleged that a "white clique" wanted to get rid of him because they did not like that a black man was made warehouse supervisor. Not one shred of credible evidence was given to support Andrews' claims. Besides Andrews' own testimony, the only witness who claimed to have seen any sexually inappropriate conduct between Roddenberry and anyone, including Lingerfelt, was Roosevelt Humphrey. Humphrey was not a credible witness. First, he was terminated by Coke for stealing a check from a coworker and cashing it. Next, he said he saw Roddenberry and Lingerfelt three times a week with Roddenberry kissing Lingerfelt, rubbing her buttocks and her breasts. However, he was not even working at the warehouse during most of the time he said he saw this and his testimony was filled with contradictions and discrepancies. Finally, he named others who saw and discussed this behavior; but each of those named persons denied ever seeing any sexually inappropriate behavior between Roddenberry and Lingerfelt or other female employees. Andrews' suggestion that his termination was racially motivated by false reports from a group of white employees, including Lingerfelt, Stinson, Rosenthal, and Roddenberry, is also unworthy of belief. Andrews' purported to support his conspiracy theory with anecdotes about other white employees, Jeanie Benton and William Beck, who tried to help him in the face of the covert actions of the alleged conspirators. However, Benton and Beck both denied that the events Andrews described in his anecdotes ever occurred. Additionally, Andrews' version of all these incidents was simply implausible and inconsistent with the credible and substantial evidence. Finally, Andrews presented no credible evidence to rebut Coke's evidence of its legitimate reason for the termination. Andrews simply offered no competent or probative evidence of a racial motivation for his termination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by James Andrews, Jr. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2063 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, James Andrews, Jr. 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 9-12(8-11); 17-19(13- 15); 23-25(20-22); 34(29); 36(31); 37(32); 40(35); 41(36 & 37); 42(38); 45(42); 46(43); 50 & 51(46); and 53(47). 2. Proposed findings of fact 4-8, 13-16, 20-22, 26-33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47-49, and 54 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed finding of fact 52 and 55 are irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 53(35). 2. Proposed findings of fact 4, 5, 12-17, 19, 20, 22-27, 29-36, 40, 43, 44, 47-52, 55, 56, 79, 80, 87-90, 127, and 137 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed findings of fact 6-9, 11, 18, 85, 91, 102, 107-113, 117, 118, 121, 128-130, 134, and 136 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. 4. Proposed findings of fact 10, 21, 28, 37-39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 54, 57-78, 81-84, 86, 92-101, 103-106, 114-116, 119, 120, 122-126, 131-133, 135, and 138-152 are irrelevant, repetitive, unnecessary, and contain summaries of testimony and argument which are not appropriate proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Marie A. Mattox Attorney at Law 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William R. Radford Attorney at Law 5300 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2339 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates the Best Western Admiral’s Inn and Conference Center in Winter Haven. Petitioner worked as a waitress in the hotel’s first floor restaurant from March 8, 2005, through March 18, 2006. Petitioner testified that she was sexually harassed “for months” by Marcus Owens, a cook who worked with her in the restaurant. According to Petitioner, Mr. Owens made vulgar and sexually-explicit comments to her on a number of occasions while they were working together. Petitioner could not recall precisely when the harassment started, but she estimated that it started approximately two weeks after Mr. Owens started working at the restaurant. Mr. Owens started working in the restaurant on July 28, 2005, which means that the harassment would have started in mid- August 2005. Petitioner did not complain about the harassment until November 9, 2005, when she reported it to her supervisor, Cory Meeks. This was the first notice that Respondent had about the alleged harassment. Petitioner’s testimony that she complained to the hotel’s general manager, Jeffrey Vandiver, about the harassment several weeks prior to her complaint to Mr. Meeks was not persuasive. Petitioner and Mr. Meeks met with the hotel’s human resources manager, Lin Whitaker, on the same day that the complaint was made, November 9, 2005. Ms. Whitaker told Petitioner that she needed to put her complaint in writing for the hotel to take formal action. Petitioner refused to do so because she was scared of retribution by Mr. Owens, even though Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whittaker assured her that she would be protected from Mr. Owens. Petitioner asked Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker to address the situation with Mr. Owens without using her name, which they did. Mr. Owens denied sexually harassing anyone when confronted by Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker. On December 2, 2005, Petitioner again complained to Mr. Meeks about Mr. Owens. She told Mr. Meeks that the harassment had not stopped and that it had gotten worse through even more vulgar comments. Petitioner again did not want a formal investigation into the allegations, but Ms. Whitaker told her that an investigation was required by company policy since this was the second complaint. Mr. Owens was immediately suspended without pay pending the completion of the investigation. The investigation was conducted by Mr. Vandiver, Mr. Meeks, and Ms. Whitaker on December 7, 2005. They first met with Petitioner to get her side of the story. Then, they met separately with Mr. Owens to get his side of the story. Finally, they interviewed all of the employees who worked with Petitioner and Mr. Owens. This was the first time that Petitioner went into detail about what Mr. Owens had said and done. She stated that, among other things, Mr. Owens asked her whether she had “ever had a black man” and whether her boyfriend “is able to get it up or does he require Viagra.” She also stated that there were no witnesses to the harassment because Mr. Owens was "discreet" about making the comments to her when no one else was around. Mr. Owens again denied sexually harassing anyone. He acknowledged asking Petitioner whether she had ever dated a black man, but he stated that the question was in response to Petitioner asking him whether he had ever dated a white woman. (Mr. Owens is black, and Petitioner is white.) The other employees who were interviewed as part of the investigation stated that they had not witnessed any sexual harassment or overheard any sexually explicit conversations in the restaurant. Mr. Vandiver, Mr. Meeks, and Ms. Owens concluded based upon their investigation that “there is not enough evidence of sexual harassment to terminate Marcus Owens.” They decided to let Mr. Owens continue working at the hotel, provided that he agreed to be moved to the hotel’s second floor restaurant and that he agreed to attend a sexual harassment training program. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker conveyed the results of their investigation and their proposed solution to Petitioner. She was “fine” with the decision to move Mr. Owens to the second floor restaurant where she would not have contact with him. On that same day, Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker conveyed their proposed solution to Mr. Owens. He too was “fine” with the decision, and he agreed that he would not go near Petitioner. Mr. Owens came back to work the following day, on December 9, 2005. On December 14, 2005, Mr. Owens was involved in an altercation with Stephen Zulinski, a dishwasher at the hotel and a close friend of Petitioner’s. The altercation occurred at the hotel during working hours. Mr. Zulinski testified that the incident started when Mr. Owens made vulgar and sexually explicit comments and gestures about Mr. Zulinski’s relationship with Petitioner. Mr. Zulinski was offended and angered by the comments, and he cursed and yelled at Mr. Owens. Mr. Zulinski denied pushing Mr. Owens (as reflected on Mr. Zulinski’s Notice of Termination), but he admitted to putting his finger on Mr. Owens’ shoulder during the altercation. Mr. Owens and Mr. Zulinski were immediately fired as a result of the altercation. Petitioner continued to work as a waitress at the hotel’s first floor restaurant after Mr. Owens was fired. Petitioner received awards from Respondent for having the most positive customer comment cards for the months of October and November 2005, even though according to her testimony she was being sexually harassed by Mr. Owens during those months. She testified that her problems with Mr. Owens affected her job performance only to a “very small degree.” Petitioner had no major problems with her job performance prior to December 2005, notwithstanding the sexual harassment by Mr. Owens that had been occurring “for months” according to Petitioner’s testimony. Petitioner was “written up” on a number of occasions between December 2005 and February 2006 because of problems with her job performance. The problems included Petitioner being rude to the on-duty manager in front of hotel guests; taking too many breaks and not having the restaurant ready for service when her shift started; failing to check the messages left for room service orders; and generating a guest complaint to the hotel’s corporate headquarters. Petitioner was fired after an incident on March 11, 2006, when she left the restaurant unattended on several occasions and the manager-on-duty received complaints from several hotel guests about the quality of service that they received from Petitioner that night. Petitioner ended up being sent home from work that night because, according to her supervisor, “she was in a crying state,” unable to work, and running off the restaurant’s business. Petitioner’s employment with Respondent was formally terminated on March 18, 2006. The stated reason for the termination was “unsatisfactory work performance” and “too many customer complaints.” None of the supervisors who wrote up Petitioner were aware of her sexual harassment complaints against Mr. Owens. Petitioner claimed that the allegations of customer complaints and poor job performance detailed in the write-ups were “ludicrous,” “insane,” “almost a complete fabrication,” and “a joke.” The evidence does not support Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner admitted to having “severe” bi-polar disorder, and she acknowledged at the hearing and to her supervisor that she was having trouble with her medications over the period that she was having problems with her job performance. For example, the comment written by Petitioner on the January 27, 2006, write-up stated that she was “at a loss” to explain her job performance and that she “hope[d] to have [her] mental stability restored to what everyone else but [her] seems normalcy.” Petitioner worked 25 to 30 hours per week while employed by Respondent. She was paid $5.15 per hour, plus tips, and she testified that her biweekly take-home pay was between $200 and $250. Petitioner applied for unemployment compensation after she was fired. Respondent did not dispute the claim, and Petitioner was awarded unemployment compensation of $106 per week, which she received for a period of six months ending in September 2006. Petitioner has not worked since she was fired by Respondent in March 2006. She has not even attempted to find another job since that time. Petitioner does not believe that she is capable of working because of her bi-polar disorder. She applied for Social Security disability benefits based upon that condition, but her application was denied. Petitioner’s appeal of the denial is pending. Petitioner testified that one of the reasons that she has not looked for another job is her concern that doing so would undermine her efforts to obtain Social Security disability benefits. Respondent has a general “non-harassment” policy, which prohibits “harassment of one employee by another employee . . . for any reason.” Respondent also has a specific sexual harassment policy, which states that “sexual harassment of any kind will not be tolerated.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include verbal sexual conduct that “has the purpose or effect of interfering with the individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” The general non-harassment policy and the specific sexual harassment policy require the employee to immediately report the harassment to his or her supervisor or a member of the management staff. The Standards of Conduct and the Work Rules adopted by Respondent authorize immediate dismissal of an employee who is disrespectful or discourteous to guests of the hotel. The Standards of Conduct also authorize discipline ranging from a written reprimand to dismissal for an employee’s “[f]ailure to perform work or job assignments satisfactorily and efficiently.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald T. Ryce, Esquire 908 Coquina Lane Vero Beach, Florida 32963 Nora E. Bartolone 119 Alachua Drive Southeast Winter Haven, Florida 33884
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex, by sexual harassment, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1) and/or (2), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an adult female, and as such, is a member of a protected class. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to protect the public through the incarceration and supervision of offenders and to rehabilitate offenders, pursuant to Section 20.315, Florida Statutes. In August 2007, Petitioner applied for a job as a correctional officer with the Florida Department of Corrections through the Charlotte Correctional Institution (the Facility) located in Punta Gorda, Florida. Petitioner's contact person during the application process was Recruitment Sergeant Dennis Britton. Petitioner was initially interviewed by Sergeant Britton. At the conclusion of the interview, Petitioner was about to leave when Britton grabbed her by the shoulder, pulled her to him and bent down to her face in a kissing position. Petitioner put her hands on his chest, pushed him away and left. On other occasions during the interview process, specifically on August 21, 2007, and October 1, 2007, Briton coerced Petitioner to come into his office at the Facility and proceeded to physically and sexually assault Petitioner. Britton would grope, grab, and forcibly kiss Petitioner against her will. Throughout the recruitment process, both Britton and Petitioner exchanged e-mails of a professional and personal nature. On or about September 10, 2007, Warden Adro Johnson approved Petitioner for employment with the DOC. Warden Johnson, not Sergeant Britton, made the hiring decisions at Charlotte Correctional Institution. November 30, 2007, was Petitioner's first day of employment at the Facility. On November 30, 2007, Petitioner was again compelled to appear at Britton's office where he proceeded to physically and sexually assault Petitioner. Britton groped, grabbed, and forcibly kissed Petitioner against her will. On several other occasions between November 2007 and March 2008, Britton would summon Petitioner to his office and proceed to make sexual advances on her against her will. In December 2007, Petitioner completed New Employee Orientation. A component of the New Employee Orientation is training with regard to Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and, specifically, the Sexual Harassment policy. Petitioner completed the computer-assisted training on sexual harassment in December 2007. In addition, new employees are routinely provided with hard-copy pamphlets on sexual harassment. Respondent's sexual harassment policy is also posted at various locations at Charlotte Correctional Institution. At no time during this period did Petitioner complain, verbally or in writing, to her supervisor or anyone else at the Facility. On March 14, 2008, Petitioner started the correctional officer training academy at the Facility. On March 17, 2008, Petitioner filled out an incident report stating she had been sexually harassed by Sergeant Dennis Britton. The report was sent up the chain of command, and Warden Johnson immediately removed Sergeant Britton from his position as the recruitment sergeant and reassigned him to a position on the compound. An investigation into the allegations was started on March 19, 2008, by Respondent's Office of the Inspector General. The investigation was led by Inspector Daryl J. McCasland of the Office of the Inspector General. The findings of the investigation were that Britton violated Section 784.03, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-208.033(22) (Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee). On April 9, 2008, while the investigation was still pending, Sergeant Britton submitted his resignation, effective May 1, 2008. Britton admitted to the accusations of sexual battery against Petitioner to the warden of the Facility. Britton was removed from the Facility on or about April 9, 2008. Petitioner testified that on at least five separate occasions between April 23, 2008, and May 23, 2008, Respondent allowed Britton to return into the Facility and granted Britton access into the restricted-access inner-compound where Petitioner worked so that he was able to continue to harass Petitioner. However, this testimony was uncorroborated and deemed unreliable. At no time during Petitioner's employment did Sergeant Britton supervise Petitioner or work directly with her. He did not discipline her, set her schedule, or assign her duties. From November 30, 2007, until March 14, 2008, Petitioner worked inside the secure perimeter, while Britton worked as the recruitment sergeant outside the secure perimeter in the administration building at the Facility. Petitioner was in the academy beginning March 14, 2008, and Sergeant Britton had no supervisory or training responsibilities over officers in the training academy. Petitioner was continually in the correctional officer academy from the time she filed her initial complaint on March 17, 2008, until Britton's resignation became effective on May 1, 2008. While in the academy, Petitioner was continually with other trainees and other instructors. Sergeant Britton never made any additional sexual advances or had any conversation with Petitioner following her complaint on March 17, 2008. Inspector Daryl McCasland substantiated the complaint against Sergeant Britton for battery, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and failure to follow written procedures. The inspector forwarded his results to the Office of the State Attorney in Punta Gorda which declined to prosecute. Respondent acted in a prompt and reasonable manner to stop the harassment and address it once it was known. Petitioner failed to exercise reasonable care in the reporting of the harassment. Petitioner presented no evidence on the issue of retaliation. Petitioner presented no evidence of quantifiable damages. Her testimony was that she felt harassed and physically upset by the conduct of Britton and that she felt harassed and physically upset by her fellow officers after her complaint become known, but no proof of an adverse employment action was presented. Given the lack of evidence to support Petitioner's allegations, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issued a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white female. Petitioner worked as a salesperson at Respondent’s Melbourne store from April 2006 to September 2006. Petitioner’s primary job duty was selling appliances to retail customers. She also performed ancillary duties, such as tagging merchandise, cleaning and organizing the showroom floor, scheduling deliveries, and making follow-up calls to customers. Petitioner was not paid a salary. Her income was solely commission-based. She earned a total of $11,826.14 while working for Respondent, which equates to an average weekly gross pay of $537.55. Petitioner had several managers during the term of her employment. She did not have a problem with any of her managers, except for Jeffrey Rock. Mr. Rock is a black male, and by all accounts, he was a difficult manager to work for. He was “strict”; he often yelled at the salespersons to “get in the box”2 and “answer the phones”; and, unlike several of the prior managers at the Melbourne store, Mr. Rock held the salespersons accountable for doing their job. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rock "constantly" made sexual comments in the store, including comments about the size of his penis and his sexual prowess; comments about sex acts that he wanted to perform on a female employee in Respondent’s accounting office, Ms. Miho; “stallion” noises directed at Ms. Miho; and a question to Petitioner about the type of underwear that she was wearing. Petitioner’s testimony regarding the sexual comments and noises made by Mr. Rock was corroborated by Neina Blizzard, who worked with Petitioner as a salesperson for Respondent and who has also filed a sexual harassment claim against Respondent. Mr. Rock denied making any sexually inappropriate comments or noises in the store. His testimony was corroborated by Guy Ruscillo and Carissa Howard, who worked as salespersons with Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard and who are still employed by Respondent. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock gave favorable treatment to Ms. Howard and two other female salespersons with whom he had sexual relationships and/or who found his sexual comments funny. Mr. Rock denied giving favorable treatment to any salesperson, except for one time when he gave a “house ticket”3 to Ms. Howard because she took herself off the sales floor for six hours one day to help him get organized during his first week as manager at the Melbourne store. Ms. Howard is white. The record does not reflect the race of the other two female salespersons -- Rebecca and Shanna -- who Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified received favorable treatment by Mr. Rock, and the anecdotal evidence of the favorable treatment that they allegedly received was not persuasive. Petitioner did not have any complaints regarding her schedule. Indeed, she testified that Mr. Rock changed her schedule at one point during her employment to give her more favorable hours. Petitioner’s testimony about other salespersons having sexual relationships with Mr. Rock and/or receiving favorable treatment from Mr. Rock was based solely upon speculation and rumor. Indeed, Rebecca, one of the salespersons with whom Mr. Rock allegedly had a sexual relationship, was “let go” by Mr. Rock because of the problems with her job performance observed by Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard. Petitioner’s last day of work was Saturday, September 30, 2006. On that day, Petitioner came into the store with Ms. Blizzard at approximately 8:00 a.m. because, according to Petitioner, another manager had changed her schedule for that day from the closing shift to the opening shift. Mr. Rock confronted Petitioner when she arrived, asking her why she came in at 8:00 a.m. since he had put her on the schedule for the closing shift. An argument ensued and Petitioner went into the warehouse in the back of the store to compose herself. When Petitioner returned to the showroom several minutes later, Mr. Rock was engaged in an argument with Ms. Blizzard. During the argument, Ms. Blizzard demanded a transfer to another store, which Mr. Rock agreed to give her. Then, as a “parting shot,” Ms. Blizzard told Mr. Rock that he was a “racist” who was “prejudiced against white women.” Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock told her that she was fired immediately after she called him a racist. Petitioner testified that after Mr. Rock fired Ms. Blizzard, he asked her whether she wanted to be fired too. Petitioner testified that even though she did not respond, Mr. Rock told her that “you are fired too.” Then, according to Ms. Blizzard and Petitioner, Mr. Rock escorted them both out of the store. Mr. Rock denies telling Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner that they were fired. He testified that they both walked out of the store on their own accord after the argument. Mr. Rock’s version of the events was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo, who witnessed the argument. Mr. Ruscillo testified that he heard a lot of yelling, but that he did not hear Mr. Rock tell Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner at any point that they were fired. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard met with an attorney the Monday after the incident. The following day, Petitioner gave Ms. Blizzard a letter to deliver on her behalf to Respondent’s human resources (HR) Department. The letter, which Petitioner testified that she wrote on the day that she was fired by Mr. Rock, stated that Petitioner “was sexually harassed and discriminated against based on being a white female by my manager, Jeff Rock”; that Petitioner “previously reported numerous incidents of this discrimination and sexual harassment to upper management”; and that she was fired “as a result of this discrimination and the refusal to put up with Mr. Rock’s sexual advancement.” This letter was the first notice that Respondent had of Petitioner’s claims of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Rock. Petitioner considers herself to be a very good salesperson, but Mr. Rock described her as an “average” salesperson. Mr. Rock’s characterization of Petitioner’s job performance is corroborated by Petitioner’s acknowledgement that her sales figures were lower than those of at least Mr. Ruscillo, Ms. Blizzard, and Ms. Howard. Petitioner complained to another manager, Al Sierra, about Mr. Rock’s management style at some point in mid-September 2006. She did not complain to Mr. Sierra or anyone else in Respondent’s upper management about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock. Indeed, as noted above, the first time that Petitioner complained about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock was in a letter that she provided to Respondent’s HR Department several days after she was fired and after she met with a lawyer. Petitioner testified that she did not complain about the sexual harassment by Mr. Rock because he threatened to fire any salesperson who complained to upper management about the way that he ran the store and because she did not know who to complain to because she never received an employee handbook. There is no evidence that Mr. Rock fired any salesperson for complaining about how he ran the store, and he denied making any such threats. He did, however, acknowledge that he told the salespersons that they were all replaceable. Mr. Rock’s testimony was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo and Ms. Howard, who were at the sales meetings where Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard claim that the threats were made. The training that Petitioner received when she started with Respondent was supposed to include a discussion of Respondent’s policies and procedures, including its policy against sexual harassment. The trainer, Kit Royal, testified that he remembered Petitioner attending the week-long training program and that the program did include a discussion of the sexual harassment policy and other policies and procedures. Petitioner, however, testified that no policies and procedures were discussed during the training program. Petitioner was supposed to have received and signed for an employee handbook during the training program. No signed acknowledgement form could be located for Petitioner, which is consistent with her testimony that she never received the handbook. The fact that Petitioner did not receive the employee handbook does not mean that the training program did not include discussion of Respondent’s sexual harassment policies. Indeed, Petitioner’s testimony that the training program did not include any discussion regarding salary and benefit policies (as Mr. Royal testified that it did) and that she was never told what she would be paid by Respondent despite having given up another job to take the job with Respondent calls into question her testimony that the sexual harassment policy was not discussed at the training program. Petitioner was aware that Respondent had an HR Department because she met with a woman in the HR Department named Helen on several occasions regarding an issue that she had with her health insurance. She did not complain to Helen about the alleged sexual harassment by Mr. Rock, but she did tell Helen at some point that Mr. Rock “was being an ass” and “riding her,” which she testified were references to Mr. Rock’s management style not the alleged sexual harassment. Petitioner collected employment compensation of $272 per week after she left employment with Respondent. Petitioner testified that she looked for jobs in furniture sales and car sales while she was collecting unemployment, but that she was unable to find another job for approximately three months because of the slow economy at the time. She provided no documentation of those job-search efforts at the final hearing. Petitioner is currently employed by Art’s Shuttle. She has held that job for approximately nine months. Petitioner drives a van that takes cruise ship passengers to and from the airport. The record does not reflect how many hours per week Petitioner works at Art’s Shuttle, but she testified that she works seven days a week and earns approximately $500 per week. No written documentation of Petitioner’s current income was provided at the final hearing. Respondent has a “zero tolerance” policy against sexual harassment according to its president, Sam Pak. He credibly testified that had he been aware of the allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Rock that he would have conducted an investigation and, if warranted, done something to fix the problem. The policy, which is contained in the employee handbook, states that Respondent “will not, under any circumstances, condone or tolerate conduct that may constitute sexual harassment on the part of its management, supervisors, or non-management personnel.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include “[c]reating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment or atmosphere by . . . [v]erbal actions, including . . . using vulgar, kidding, or demeaning language . . . .” Mr. Pak agreed that the allegations against Mr. Rock, if true, would violate Respondent’s sexual harassment policy. The employee handbook includes a “grievance procedure” for reporting problems, including claims of sexual harassment. The first step is to bring the problem to the attention of the store manager, but the handbook states that the employee is “encouraged and invited to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources” if the problem involves the manager. Additionally, the handbook states in bold, underlined type that “[a]nyone who feels that he or she . . . is the victim of sexual or other harassment, must immediately report . . . . all incidents of harassment in writing to your manager or the store manager, or if either person is the subject of the complaint, to the president.” Mr. Pak had an office at the Melbourne store. He testified that he had an “open door policy” whereby employees could bring complaints directly to him. The only complaint that Mr. Pak ever received about Mr. Rock was from another salesperson, Rod Sherman, who complained that Mr. Rock was a “tough manager.” Mr. Pak did nothing in response to the complaint and simply told Mr. Sherman that different managers have different management styles.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2007.
The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Rural Metro of North Florida, Inc., violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on October 11, 1999, as an Emergency Medical Technician Basic, until July 2001 when he was reclassified with Respondent as an Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic, until his termination from employment with Respondent on April 16, 2003. In July 2001, Petitioner told his then manager, Dominic Persichini, that he no longer wanted to work with his partner, Marlene Sanders, and he requested a transfer. Petitioner gave as his reason for the transfer that Ms. Sanders was interested in him in an inappropriate way which disrupted his family life. He never actually heard Ms. Sanders make any inappropriate sexual remarks directed at him. Ms. Sanders accused Petitioner of allowing his wife to interfere with their working relationship and to involving herself in Ms. Sanders' personal life, which made her uncomfortable working with Petitioner. On March 27, 2002, Stephen Glatstein, Respondent's new General Manager, wrote a letter to Petitioner in which he acknowledged that problems had occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Sanders, that the two of them would be separated and reassigned to new shifts, and that Petitioner was being reassigned to the B-shift rotation (1800-0600 hours), which conflicted with his family duties. Petitioner received a good evaluation and a pay raise dated February 15, 2003, in which his supervisor, Ryan Jenkins, stated that "Michael's abilities meet or exceed industry standards. Michael keeps current by completing CEU's and taking refresher classes. There is one new Corrective Action Notice in his file since last year involving a post move. The incident was on 08-07-02 and to my knowledge there have not been any further problems since." Further, the evaluation reads that "Michael shows a great attitude and appears to really enjoy his job. This makes him very easy to work with. Michael's good personality and working knowledge of E.M.S. is a benefit to the customers that he serves. It is clear that we should be proud to have Michael as part of our team." Petitioner received letters of commendation from his supervisors and letters of thanks from patients and their families he had served. In April 2003, Natashia Duke, a new employee with Respondent, went to the General Manager, Mr. Chalmers, and accused Petitioner of having made statements of a sexual nature to her and of touching her inappropriately. Ms. Duke provided a written statement to Mr. Chalmers who forwarded the information to the Division General Manager, Chris Rucker. Mr. Rucker advised Mr. Chalmers to place Petitioner on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation concerning Ms. Duke's complaint. Mr. Chalmers followed this instruction and placed Petitioner on leave. Mr. Rucker traveled to Pensacola to meet with Mr. Chalmers and Ms. Duke. At this meeting, Ms. Duke reaffirmed what she had written in the complaint against Petitioner and told Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers about another employee she believed had been sexually harassed by Petitioner, Kristy Bradberry. The next day, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers interviewed Ms. Bradberry who informed them that she had been sexually harassed by Petitioner. She provided a written statement which described the alleged harassment in detail. Ms. Bradberry told the interviewers of another person she believed had suffered sexual harassment by Petitioner, Tina Dunsford (Tina Richardson at the time of her complaint). Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers next interviewed Ms. Dunsford who confirmed that Petitioner had sexually harassed her as well by making sexual comments and propositions to her, and by touching her inappropriately. After Ms. Dunsford's interview, Ryan Jenkins, another of Respondent's employees, reported that Ms. Dunsford had complained to him of sexual harassment by Petitioner a few months earlier. Mr. Jenkins had failed to take any action on the previous complaint. After interviewing the three complainants, Ms. Duke, Ms. Bradberry, and Ms. Dunsford, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers met with Petitioner. At that meeting, Petitioner denied all of the allegations made by the three female co-workers and gave no explanation for what they alleged had happened. Mr. Rucker believed the statements given by the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner were credible. Mr. Rucker made the decision with Mr. Chalmers to terminate Petitioner's employment. Respondent had no prior history of problems with any of the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner. Petitioner believes the sexual harassment charges were trumped up against him so that Respondent could fire him, since he was beyond the company probationary period and therefore could be terminated only for a business purpose pursuant to the company employee handbook. No evidence was produced at hearing to support a violation of company policy by Respondent in Petitioner's termination. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was employed with the Escambia County E.M.S.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Welch 2060 Burjonik Lane Navarre, Florida 32566-2118 John B. Trawick, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge 226 Palafox Place Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32591-1831 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Miami-Dade County committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioner and, if so, what relief should she be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Among the various departments of County government is the Finance Department. There are approximately 300 employees working in the Finance Department. At all times material to the instant case, Rachel Baum was the Finance Director responsible for overseeing the operations of the Finance Department. The Tax Collector's Office is administratively located within the Finance Department. There are approximately 210 employees assigned to the Tax Collector's Office. The Occupational Licenses section and the Tourist Tax section are operational units within the Tax Collector's Office. At all times material to the instant case, Xiomara Vuelta was the Manager of the Occupational Licenses section, Marie Esquivel was the Assistant Manger of the Occupational Licenses section, and Cristine Mekin was a Tax Records Clerk Supervisor I in the Occupational Licenses section. At all times material to the instant case, Allen Eagle was a supervisor in the Tourist Tax section. Harold Ginsberg was a superior of Mr. Eagle's. At all times material to the instant case, the County had in effect a policy prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. The policy was codified in Administrative Order No. 7-28, which read as follows: Statement of Policy: The policy of Dade County is to insure that all employees are able to enjoy a work environment free from all forms of discrimination, including sexual harassment. Employees who have experienced sexual harassment shall have the right to file complaints with the County's Affirmative Action Office and have those complaints properly investigated. Employees who are found guilty of sexually harassing other employees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions, depending on the circumstances. These may range from counseling up to and including termination. Definition: Sexual harassment consists of unsolicited, offensive behavior involving sexual overtures or conduct, either verbal or physical It does not refer to occasional comments of a socially acceptable nature; it refers to behavior that is not welcome, that is personally offensive, that lowers morale, and that, therefore, interferes with the work environment. As explained in the EEOC Guidelines: "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute[] sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment." Implementation: In order to effectively implement the above policy, all County employees must refrain from Threatening or insinuating, either explicitly or implicitly, that an employee's refusal to submit to sexual favors or advances will adversely affect another employee's employment, performance evaluations, wages, promotion, assigned duties, shifts, or any other condition of employment or career development. Creating a sexually harassing environment by such actions as offensive sexual flirtations, advances, propositions, verbal abuse of a sexual nature, graphic verbal commentaries about an individual's body, sexually degrading words, or such other conduct that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. Taking retaliatory action of any kind against any other employee as a result of that person's seeking redress for, or complaining of, sexual harassment under this policy or through other legitimate channels. Exhibiting any other conduct that falls within the above-stated definition of sexual harassment. It shall be the responsibility of each County supervisor to maintain his or her work place free of sexual harassment. This duty includes discussing this policy with all employees and assuring them that they need not endure insulting, degrading, or exploitive sexual treatment, and informing employees of their right to file complaints about such conduct. Complaint Procedure: Employees who believe they have been the subject of sexual harassment have the right to file a complaint with the County's Affirmative Action Office. Employees may, if they desire, also report such incidents of sexual harassment to their supervisor but are under no obligation to do so prior to filing a complaint. All complaints of sexual harassment will be investigated to determine whether the allegations are well- founded. If the investigations confirm the continuation of sexual harassment, the Affirmative Action Office will pursue prompt corrective action, including positive relief for the victim, and appropriate disciplinary action against the offender. Compliance: It shall be the responsibility of the Affirmative Action Office to provide compliance information to managers and supervisors concerning the County's sexual harassment policy, the gravity of such conduct, and the procedures to be employed in conducting sexual harassment investigations. The Affirmative Action Office shall also provide necessary training to managers and supervisors in the area of sexual harassment. This administrative order is hereby submitted to the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, Florida. Documents describing the contents of Administrative Order No. 7-28 were posted at various County work locations. Petitioner is a black female who was employed by the County from 1984 until July of 2001, when she was terminated. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner worked as a Tax Records Clerk II in the Finance Department, initially in the Tourist Tax section under the direct supervision of Mr. Eagle5 and then in the Occupational Licenses section under the direct supervision of Ms. Mekin. At no time did Mr. Eagle inappropriately touch Petitioner, discuss with her any matters of sexual nature, make sexual advances towards her, threaten to retaliate against her if she did not provide him with sexual favors, or otherwise, in his dealings with her, engage in conduct violative of the County's policy against sexual harassment. Nonetheless, in or around early 1999, Petitioner (who was aware of the County's anti-sexual harassment policy) falsely accused Mr. Eagle of having subjected her to such harassment. The County's Office of Fair Employment Practices (FEP) thoroughly investigated, in good faith, the allegations made by Petitioner. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave with pay during the investigation. Juan de Ona, an investigator with FEP, conducted the investigation, with the assistance Finance Department personnel who did not work in the Tourist Tax section (Marie Carpenter, the department's then-Personnel Manager, and Arlesa Leverette, the department's Affirmative Action Coordinator). Mr. de Ona interviewed Petitioner, Mr. Eagle, and others who worked with them in the Tourist Tax section and who would have been in a position to corroborate Petitioner's allegations of sexual harassment were the allegations true. Based on his investigation, Mr. de Ona reasonably concluded that Petitioner's allegations were unfounded. On May 27, 1999, Mr. de Ona issued a written report of his investigation, which contained the following "Findings and Recommendations": No evidence was found about any of Ms. Ferguson's allegations pertaining [to] Mr. Eagle's behavior. Testimony provided by all employees in the workplace directly contradicted all allegations made by the complainant. Witnesses all expressed shock, stating that such behavior would be out of character [with] the manner they are supervised by Mr. Eagle. They believe he's a fair, capable supervisor. There is no corroboration at all that sexual harassment took place between Mr. Eagle and Ms. Ferguson or to other incidents of a sexual nature as she alleged. Ms. Ferguson appears to have some serious problems about her perceptions of interpersonal relationships and communications in the workplace. In light of the following I recommend the following: Make it mandatory for Ms. Ferguson to participate in the Employee Support Services (ESS) program. Request through the ESS office, a fitness for duty test if that office supports the approach. If possible, transfer Ms. Ferguson to another work station under a different supervisor. As the head of the County department in which Petitioner worked, Ms. Baum received a copy of Mr. de Ona's report. On or about July 25, 1999, before any formal action had been taken by Ms. Baum in response to Mr. de Ona's report, Petitioner filed EEOC Charge No. 150993522 (which is described above). In accordance with Mr. de Ona's recommendation, Ms. Baum took the reasonable step of transferring Petitioner to the Occupational Licenses section effective on or about August 16, 1999, so that Petitioner would no longer be supervised by Mr. Eagle. This action was not taken to retaliate against Petitioner for having filed EEOC Charge No. 150993522. Ms. Baum had no reason to believe that Petitioner would have any difficulties with the supervisory personnel in the Occupational Licenses section, none of whom had been identified by Petitioner as being in any way involved in the alleged sexual harassment to which Petitioner claimed she had been exposed in the Tourist Tax section. Ms. Baum also followed Mr. de Ona's recommendation that Petitioner be referred to the County's Employee Support Services (ESS) program. She did so with the hope that Petitioner would benefit as a result of her participation in the program. Although she did not know "exactly what [Petitioner's] problem was," Ms. Baum felt that there were "issues there" because Petitioner had made allegations that were not true. In addition, Ms. Baum suspended Petitioner for five days for having made "false statements" about her co-workers in her complaint to the FEP.6 Ms. Baum took this action because "people's reputations were tarnished" by Petitioner's "false statements" and, in Ms. Baum's view, Petitioner "need[ed] to understand that you can't make [such] false statements" without retribution. Ms. Baum advised Petitioner of the referral to ESS and the five-day suspension by letter dated September 7, 1999, which read as follows: This is to advise you that you are being suspended without pay for five days on the following dates: September 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1999. This action is a[] result of your failure to comply with Miami-Dade County Personnel Rule, Chapter VIII, Section 7, to wit: That the employee has been offensive in h[er] conduct toward fellow employees, Wards of the County or the Public. That the employee is antagonistic towards Superiors and fellow employees, criticizing orders, rules and policies and whose conduct interferes with the proper cooperation of employees and impairs the efficien[cy] [of] County Service." Specific charges are detailed in the discipline action report attached hereto. Upon return to work, you must attend sessions as designated by the Employee Support Services (ESS) . The initial appointment will be made for you. You must attend that meeting as well as all subsequent meetings set by ESS. You must also provide and maintain your current address and telephone number on file with your supervisor. It will be your complete responsibility to inform your immediate supervisor of any changes. While you were within your rights to file a discrimination complaint with the Office of Fair Employment Practices, it was unnecessary and irresponsible of you to include falsehoods and personal attacks directed towards your superiors and fellow employees. By doing so, you have demoralized your co-workers and damaged the overall morale of the Tax Collector's Office. This type of behavior exhibited by you is discouraging and cannot be tolerated. You may appeal your suspension to a Hearing Examiner within 14 days from receipt of this letter by requesting an appeal hearing in writing to the Director of the Employee Relations Department at the Stephen P. Clark Center, 111 NW 1st Street, Suite 2110, Miami, FL 33128. Petitioner did not appeal her suspension. When she reported to the Occupational Licenses section, Petitioner was trained by her immediate supervisor, Ms. Mekin. At the beginning, in training Petitioner, Ms. Mekin treated Petitioner no differently than Ms. Mekin would treat any clerical employee new to the section. Petitioner, however, was unable to grasp the basic procedures required to be followed by the section's clerical staff, so Ms. Mekin had to provide Petitioner with additional training beyond that which was standard for a new employee in the section to receive. Despite the extra help she was offered, Petitioner continued to make numerous mistakes of a serious nature. Ms. Mekin monitored Petitioner's work in the same manner and with the same frequency (on a daily basis) that she monitored the work of her other subordinates. Petitioner made far more errors than her co-workers (and, for that matter, any other employee who had ever worked under Ms. Mekin's supervision in the Occupational Licenses section7). Although Petitioner occupied a Tax Records Clerk II position (and was paid accordingly), she was assigned Tax Records Clerk I duties, which she performed at the "public counter" in the office. Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with her assignment and asked Ms. Mekin to assign her Tax Records Clerk II work.8 Ms. Mekin declined to do so inasmuch as Petitioner lacked the "specialized knowledge" needed to perform such work. As Ms. Mekin explained in her testimony at the final hearing (which the undersigned has credited), "I couldn't get her trained as a [Tax Records Clerk] I, how could I put her in a specialized [Tax Records Clerk] II position?" There being no other assignment Ms. Mekin could reasonably make given Petitioner's limitations, Petitioner remained at the "public counter" performing Tax Records Clerk I duties. In addition to making many mistakes while at the "public counter," Petitioner engaged in disruptive workplace behavior, initiating confrontations with co-workers, as well as visiting members of the public. It reached a point where, due to Petitioner's offensive and abusive conduct, no one in the office wanted to be seated next to her at the "public counter." Also interfering with the efficient operation of the office was Petitioner's poor attendance. She had numerous absences and was frequently late reporting to work. In addition, there were instances when, before the end of the workday, Petitioner would just walk out of the office without permission and letting anyone know where she was going and not return until several days later. On occasion, after being out of the office, Petitioner submitted doctor's notes. None of the notes stated that Petitioner was suffering from any substantially limiting mental impairment, and there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that any supervisory personnel perceived her as having such an impairment and took adverse action against her based upon such a perception. Petitioner was counseled verbally and then in writing by her supervisors in the Occupational Licenses section concerning her shortcomings, but such counseling did not yield any positive results. Ms. Mekin waited well longer than usual to "write-up" Petitioner. She gave Petitioner this "extra leeway" because she knew that Petitioner had "personal problems" and was missing a lot of work. In or around late December of 1999, Petitioner received a written reprimand for "insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in lower morale in the organization or result in loss, inconvenience or injury to the County service or to the public" because she had stopped going to the psychiatrist (Dr. Charles Gibbs) to whom she had been referred by ESS.9 The "facts" upon which the written reprimand was based were described therein as follows: In the disciplinary action dated July 27, 1999 your continued employment with Miami- Dade County was contingent upon: "Seek assistance from Employee Support Services and attend sessions as designated by ESS. Failure to attend and participate in them will result in further disciplinary action up to and including dismissal." You have failed to follow the recommendation of the Employee Support Services Section. Further violation of the Disciplinary Action requirements will result in dismissal. Less than a month later, Petitioner received a Record of Counseling, dated January 14, 2000, which read as follows: A. That the employee is incompetent or inefficient in the performance of his/her duty. K. That the employee has hindered the regular operation of the Department or Division because of excessive absenteeism. V. That the employee has been habitually tardy in reporting for duty or has absented himself/herself frequently from duty during regular working hours, or has refused to perform a reasonable amount of emergency work after working hours when directed to do so by h[er] superior officer. Facts: The employee has been given the same training afforded any new employee, however the excessive absenteeism and habitual tardiness are negatively reflecting in the productivity and effectiveness of the employee's performance. The excessive absenteeism of the employee is disruptive to the section, resulting in a diminished effectiveness in the service to the public and reducing the inspectors['] field collections. See attachment II: Attendance and tardiness statistic table. "[A]ttachment II" reflected that, from August 26, 1999, to January 11, 2000, Petitioner had been absent 28.47 of a total of 86 work days and had been tardy 22 times. Petitioner received another Record of Counseling on March 10, 2000. This Record of Counseling read as follows: You have had several performance conferences regarding your numerous mistakes and have received copies of all your errors. I have pointed out ways in which you can improve your efficiency, nevertheless you have failed to improve your performance. In addition to the regular training afforded all new employees, you were re-trained when I observed that you were not improving and were repeating the same mistakes on a daily basis. Your poor performance negatively impacts our section[.] [I]t lowers our productivity and affects customer service. You must correct this situation immediately[.] [F]ailure to improve your performance will result in further disciplinary action. On Friday, May 12, 2000, Petitioner again was given a Record of Counseling. This Record of Counseling read as follows: You have been informed on multiple occasions that you had depleted your annual and sick time. Since you started to work with Occupational License[s] you have been habitually tardy in reporting for duty and have been excessively absent. In addition you have absented yourself frequently from duty during regular working hours. Your excessive and erratic pattern of absenteeism is disruptive to the Section, resulting in a diminished effectiveness in the service to the public. Furthermore, it affects the inspectors['] field productivity who must stay inside to cover your absences. You must correct the situation immediately by being on time everyday and by planning the usage of accrued time in advance. Failure to comply will result in a disciplinary action leading to dismissal. See attachment of attendance and tardiness table. The "attendance and tardiness table" attached to the Record of Counseling reflected that, from August 26, 1999, to Sunday, May 14, 2000, Petitioner had been absent a total of 303.25 hours out of a total of 1264 possible work hours. On June 1, 2000, Petitioner was sent a memorandum regarding her "[f]ailure to follow procedures." It read as follows: On May 25, 2000 you failed to follow the established procedures concerning licenses under legal status. You served a taxpayer at the counter who came to pay license #444002-0 (under sheriff warrant)[.] [T]his license owed $150.00 [to] Occupational License[s] and $70.00 to the Sheriff['s] Department. You ignored the intermediate screen with the message "Do not print application- Do not file maintenance. Check with your Supervisor first." This failure to follow procedures resulted in a loss to the County, since the taxpayer was not directed to pay the $70.00 Sheriff fee. This is to remind you that you must strictly adhere to the established procedures at all times. Further incidents of this nature will result in a Disciplinary Action up to and including dismissal. That same date, June 1, 2000, Ms. Mekin sent to Ms. Vuelta the following memorandum regarding a "[c]ounter [i]ncident": This is to inform you that Jacquelyn Ferguson claims that someone opened a stapled shopping bag full of papers she had inside her desk drawer, while she went to an assignment at the 1st floor. Ms. Ferguson accused co-workers of opening the paper bag and then passed inappropriate remarks to the clerks assigned to the counter. I informed Ms. Ferguson that no one had been at her desk while she was downstairs. Martha Manthorpe and Milagros Valdivia expressed to me how stressed and upset they feel about the false accusations Ms. Ferguson is making. She then approached Marie Esquivel to claim that for the second time someone had gone into her paper bag. Since Ms. Ferguson was assigned to the Occupational License[s] Section, she has antagonized each person that she has ever worked next to her. All clerks and inspectors have complained of her lack of teamwork skills, her constant harassment , false accusations, and uncooperative behavior. As you are aware, I had to train Ms. Ferguson twice because of her numerous mistakes, nevertheless, I had to give her a Record of Counseling for poor performance[.] [T]o this date she has failed to improve. In addition, I had to give her a second Record of Counseling because of her poor attendance. At this point I feel that I have exhausted all that is available to me as a Supervisor to motivate Ms. Ferguson to perform as expected of any County employee. It is extremely frustrating to divert time [to] constantly monitor Ms. Ferguson in order to diffuse incidents with other employees and taxpayers. This situation is causing undue stress and hardship to the other O.L. employees[.] [T]hey feel it is a punishment when I have to assign them to work next to Ms. Ferguson. Please advise on what my next steps [should] be regarding Ms. Ferguson. On June 21, 2000, a co-worker of Petitioner's, Martha Manthorpe, sent a memoranda to Ms. Vuelta complaining about Petitioner. The memorandum read as follows: I am writing to inform you that working with Jackie has caused considerable aggravation to my co-workers and [me]. I have worked in this department for over seven years, and have never had a problem with another employee. From the time that Jackie began working in our department, she has had problems with her co-workers. She never liked being trained or told what to do by a Clerk I, for no apparent reason, other than the fact that [that person's] classification is less than her[']s. Any clerk that has had to work next to her has endured constant negative comments and insinuating remarks. It has also been noted that she has this particular attitude towards her female co-workers only. Ranier Castro has noticed the different attitude & tone she demonstrates toward another co- worker, Milagros Valdivia, in comparison to him. This attitude has gotten to the point that Milagros was very thankful when she was moved from the counter desk to the mail desk. With me, she portrays an attitude that my job is to serve her alone and that I should drop whatever I am doing when she needs anything. If I do not know the answer to her question, she becomes upset that she needs to ask Cristina. If I am checking in inspectors or balancing their money, she will throw her paperwork in front of me, in order to force me to attend to her needs. Today, she became very rude towards me. She was arguing with Milagros regarding some ticket numbers that she claimed were missing and that someone had taken them. After Milagros told me what had happened, I then told Jackie that nobody had taken her numbers. She then turned her head away from me, put her hand up, and told me that she was not talking to me and that I was not to speak to her. She proceeded to repeat this a few more times while there were taxpayers in the lobby. Another problem that we have had with Jackie is that she has an extreme problem with smells either in the office or at the counter area. She will spray room deodorizers several times a day in front of taxpayers that are waiting to be served. In addition, Jackie has been noted to give incomplete information to taxpayers, specifically Hispanic taxpayers, or sending them to incorrect departments to solve their problems. It is very difficult & stressful to work in a[n] office environment with a co-worker that does not work as a team player & can be disrespectful to others. On June 22, 2000, Ms. Vuelta sent Petitioner a memorandum regarding an "[u]nauthorized [a]bsence." It read as follows: On Thursday, June 22, 2000 you left for lunch at 1:05 P.M. and did not return to work.[10] You have walked out of your job on several occasions since you started to work at Occupational License[s]. Once again you failed to inform your Supervisor about your absence[.] [T]his is considered an abandonment of your responsibility at the public counter, therefore creating a Customer Service crisis. On June 27, 2000, Ms. Vuelta, acting on the suggestion of Ms. Mekin, signed a Disciplinary Action Report (June 2000, DAR) recommending the termination of Petitioner's employment. "Attachment I" of the June 2000, DAR set forth the "charge[s]" against Petitioner. It read as follows: That the employee is incompetent or inefficient in the performance of [her] duty. That the employee has been offensive in [her] conduct toward [her] fellow employees, wards of the County or the public. D. That the employee has violated any lawful or official regulation or order, or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction given [her] by a supervisor, when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonabl[y] be expected to result in lower morale in the organization or result in loss, inconvenience or injury to the County Service or to the public. K. That the employee has hindered the regular operation of the department or division because of excessive absenteeism. S. That the employee is antagonistic towards superiors and fellow employees, criticizing orders, rules and policies, and whose conduct interferes with the proper cooperation of employees and impairs the efficiency of the County service. V. That the employee has been habitually tardy in reporting for duty or has absented [herself] frequently from duty during regular hours, or has refused to perform a reasonable amount of emergency work after working hours when directed to do so by [her] superior officer. "Attachment II" of the June 2000, DAR described the "specific actions [of Petitioner and the] statements" made by her, which warranted the termination of her employment: On March 10, 2000 you were given a Record of Counseling because of your poor performance[.] [T]his Record of Counseling had to be given to you because of your lack of response to repeated training sessions where your Supervisor pointed out your errors and outlined expectations. You also had several performance conferences where your Supervisor tried to motivate you to improve your efficiency[.] [A]s of this date you have failed to achieve the expectations of this unit. On several occasions you have been offensive and abusive with your co-workers in front of taxpayers[.] [Y]ou have also been abusive and offensive to the taxpayers in front of your co-workers. On April 14, 2000 you were given a memo in reference to a complaint letter from a taxpayer. Your behavior has created an intimidating and hostile working environment. D. On multiple occasions you have failed to comply with the rules, policies and directives of the section. This situation results in a disruption of the smooth operation of this unit, affecting both our effectiveness and our Customer Service. On December 20, 1999 you were given a Disciplinary Action for failure to follow the recommendations of the Employee Support Services. On June 1st, 2000 a memo had to be given to you for failure to follow procedure that resulted in an economic loss to the County. On May 12, 2000 you were given a Record of Counseling because of your excessive absenteeism. From August 1999 through May 14, 2000 you were absent 303.25 hours, with 209.00 hours of this total being a result of your calling in sick. S. On December 10, 1999 you were antagonistic with a Tax Record[s] Supervisor II from another section. You were advised to stay away from any other section of the Tax Collector and to resolve your differences using the proper channels. Furthermore we had had to rotate all Clerks and Field Inspectors to work next to you at the counter because they have all complained of your lack of teamwork, unreasonable conduct and your poor Customer Service. This situation has created an antagonistic environment interfering with your peers['] work performance. You have been verbally counseled by your immediate Supervisor, by my Assistant and by me on multiple occasions regarding appropriate behavior expected from you. V. During your time at Occupational License[s] you have been habitually tardy and have on several occasions walked out of the office abandoning your duties, without notifying any Supervisor. You were given written counseling on June 26, 2000 for the most recent occurrence. You have been with Occupational License[s] since August, 1999. During this time your inadequate and antagonistic conduct as well as your poor performance have caused an adverse working environment for your peers and your Supervisors, hindering the proper delivery of Customer Service. Petitioner was not served with the June 2000, DAR until a little more than a year after it had first been signed by Ms. Vuelta. Petitioner had stopped coming to work on June 25, 2002 (the same date that Ms. Mekin had recommended Petitioner's termination) and was not heard from until a month or two later when she contacted Geneva Hughes, who had replaced Ms. Carpenter as the Finance Department's Personnel Manager, and told Ms. Hughes that she was "not feeling well." At Ms. Hughes' suggestion, Petitioner applied for a year's leave of absence (retroactive to when she stopped coming to work in June). Ms. Baum granted the leave request because she "felt that [Petitioner] needed the time to get whatever [were] . . . the problems [Petitioner was experiencing] in order, and if [Petitioner] needed that time, then [Ms. Baum wanted to] be accommodating." At no time did Petitioner fill out the necessary paperwork to apply to participate in the sick leave pool, although Ms. Hughes explained to Petitioner what she needed to do to make such application. On or about December 19, 2000, before any formal action had been taken on the termination recommendation contained in the June 2000, DAR, Petitioner filed a second employment discrimination charge with the EEOC against the County, EEOC Charge No. 150A10614 (which is described above). Ms. Vuelta re-signed the June 2000, DAR on June 28, 2001, and the re-signed document was served on Petitioner after she returned to work from her year's leave of absence. Ms. Baum (who was responsible for making the "final decision" on the matter) accepted the recommendation of termination contained in the June 2000, DAR, and by letter dated July 10, 2001, which read as follows, so advised Petitioner: This letter is to advise you that you are terminated from County Employment, effective close of business Friday, July 06, 2001. This action was taken in accordance with Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraphs (A), (B), (D), (K), (S), and (V) of Dade County's Personnel Rules, as detailed in the Disciplinary Action Report presented to you on June 28, 2001 (copy attached).11 You may, if you desire, in accordance with Chapter VIII, Section 5, of the Dade County Personnel Rules, appeal this action to a Hearing Examiner by writing to Maria Casellas, Director, Employee Relations Department, 111 Northwest First Street, Suite 2110, Miami, Florida 33128. This appeal must be received within fourteen (14) days of the receipt of this letter. 61. Petitioner was terminated because she was "just not progressing and she was just not functioning" as an employee should. Neither her termination nor the "write-ups" that preceded it were motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for having previously complained that she was the victim of employment discrimination by the County or by any other illicit motive. Petitioner did not "appeal [her termination] to a Hearing Examiner," but the representative of the collective bargaining unit of which she was a member did file a grievance and seek arbitration on Petitioner's behalf. The collective bargaining representative ultimately "withdr[ew] the [grievance] without prejudice," explaining in its letter of withdrawal that it had been unsuccessful in its efforts to contact Petitioner concerning the grievance and, based on Petitioner's "non- respons[iveness]," it had concluded that Petitioner was "not interested in the pursuance of her dismissal arbitration." Thereafter the American Arbitration Association closed the file in the case. In summary, there has been no persuasive showing of any acts of commission or omission by the County adversely affecting Petitioner's compensation or other terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment with the County that were based on any protected status she enjoyed or any protected activity in which she had engaged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order in these consolidated cases finding that the County is not guilty of any of the "unlawful employment practices" alleged by Petitioner in EEOC Charge Nos. 150993522, 150A10614 and 150A13134 and, based upon such finding, dismissing these charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her gender and by allowing her to be sexually harassed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a for-profit Florida corporation owned by Robert J. Morrisseau, Sr. Even though he was Respondent's president, Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., was not usually involved in the company's day-to-day operations. Robert J. Morrisseau, Jr., is Respondent's vice- president. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was primarily responsible for the company's operation. He also served as crew supervisor. Most of Respondent's work, which involved installing carpeting and tile in commercial facilities, was performed in locations that required the work crew to travel. Respondent's crew often had to stay in motels. Respondent contracted with an employee leasing company to handle Respondent's payroll and workers' compensation administration. All employees filled out an application provided by the employee leasing company, but Respondent made all hiring and firing decisions. Respondent did not give its employees information regarding Respondent's human resource policies and procedures. Employees were not told what to do when they believed someone in the company was discriminating against them. Petitioner is a female who dated Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., in the fall of 2008. While they were dating, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner he would give her a job and teach her to lay tile. Petitioner and Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., stopped dating in December 2008. However, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., made good on his promise to Petitioner, hiring her as a laborer on January 26, 2009. In January 2009, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., wanted to reestablish a personal relationship with Petitioner. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., hoped giving Petitioner a job would facilitate that goal. Petitioner was thankful for the job, but she did not want to date Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., again. At all times material here, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was Petitioner's supervisor. He also employed and supervised Petitioner's sister and her boyfriend and Petitioner's daughter and her boyfriend. Off and on in January 2009 through March 2009, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., supervised a crew laying carpet and tile in Spanish Fort, Alabama. Petitioner and Petitioner's daughter and sister and their boyfriends were also part of the crew on at least two trips to Alabama. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., rented three motel rooms for the Alabama job. He took one room with one bed. The other two rooms had two beds. On one occasion, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner she could sleep in the room with him or with her sister and the sister's boyfriend or the other male employees. On another occasion, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner she could sleep with her daughter and her daughter's boyfriend or the other male employees. On both occasions, Petitioner chose to sleep on the extra bed in a room with one of the couples. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., never threatened Petitioner, directly or indirectly, with consequences if she did not choose to stay in his room. There is no evidence that Petitioner felt Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was giving her a quid pro quo choice. Petitioner's job responsibilities included driving company vehicles, preparing floors for tile, and learning to lay tile. She was not expected to carry 40-foot rolls of carpet or to carry heavy loads of tile up three flights of stairs. However, Petitioner was willing to help any way she could. One time in Alabama, Petitioner and her daughter were on their knees, preparing a floor for tile. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., took pictures of the women from the back and made a comment about the daughter's backside, stating it was as big as a man's. Respondent also had a job in Daytona Beach, Florida. Petitioner was part of the crew that worked in Daytona Beach, along with Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., and several male employees during the weeks of February 27, 2009, and March 2, 2009. Once again, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., rented three motel rooms. He gave Petitioner the option of staying in the room with him or with the other men. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., did not think anything of asking Petitioner if she wanted to stay in the room with him because he and Petitioner had stayed in the same hotel room previously on other occasions. During the weeks of February 27, 2009, and March 2, 2009, Petitioner elected to stay in the room with her co-workers rather than in the room with Mr. Morrisseau, Jr. There is no evidence that Petitioner believed Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was giving her a quid pro quo choice. On one trip to Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., and another male employee bought cocaine and brought it back to the motel. Petitioner does not deny that she used some of the cocaine that night. The next morning, the crew, including Petitioner, went back to work at 7:30 a.m. On March 11, 2009, Respondent fired Petitioner. During the hearing, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., testified that he did not fire Petitioner because she used drugs in Daytona Beach. This testimony is contrary to a statement made by Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., in an e-mail dated December 7, 2009. During the hearing, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., testified that Petitioner was not fired because she was a woman and inadequate to perform the work. However, Petitioner and other employees heard Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., and Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., state that Petitioner and her daughter, as females, were inadequate for the job and/or that women did not need to work out of town. According to Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., he fired Petitioner because, after returning from Daytona Beach, Petitioner's work was not satisfactory. He claims that she failed to report for work because she was using illegal drugs with her boyfriend. He also claims that Petitioner was fighting with other employees, referring to an alleged altercation between Petitioner and her daughter. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., admitted during the hearing that he had no first-hand knowledge that Petitioner continued to use drugs after returning from Daytona Beach. He did not see Petitioner fighting with other employees. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., testified at hearing that he had no issue with Petitioner's work the one weekend he went to the Alabama job. According to Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., Petitioner "worked her little tail off" that weekend. The reason Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., gave for terminating Petitioner's employment is not credible. The most persuasive evidence indicates that Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., terminated Petitioner's employment because she was a woman and, in his opinion, inadequate to do the job. Respondent also fired Petitioner's daughter on March 11, 2009. However, Respondent rehired the daughter on March 20, 2009. The daughter worked for Respondent until the company went out of business in June 2009. The jobs in Alabama and Florida were not done properly. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., had to bring in another company to redo and complete at least five jobs. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., closed down the business and let all employees go in June 2009. Petitioner was unemployed from March 11, 2009, through January 1, 2010. She is entitled to lost wages for that period of time. However, Petitioner failed to present any evidence regarding the amount of lost wages during the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order, directing Respondent to cease violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2010.
