Findings Of Fact The College realized that it needed a new telecommunication system about three years ago, when it began to renovate some of its buildings. On June 8, 1992, the College issued an Invitation To Bid, No. 3656, to eight vendors to replace its fifteen-year-old AT&T Dimension Private Branch Exchange (PBX) System and install a voice and data communications network among the College's four campuses. The bids were to be opened at 2:30 p.m. on July 29, 1992. The College believed replacement of the existing PBX system would result in lower operating costs, permit the system to serve more functions and permit the system to expand as the College's needs grew. Two vendors, NEC and AT & T, submitted bids. The College already has gone through two prior bids for the new PBX system, which did not result in contracts with any of the bidders. AT&T had submitted a bid in response to each of those attempts to let a contract for replacement of the College's communications system. The process of developing the bid specifications was initiated by the College's Vice President for Business Affairs, Dr. Clinton Hamilton, who asked those who would be using the communications system (the Registrar, the Learning Resources Department, the Provost, and others) to explain their needs so they could be incorporated in the new system. He also asked College employees familiar with information systems and telecommunication systems to help draft the bid documents to incorporate the functions the users desired. The College received assistance from a committee made up of representatives of the State's Department of General Services, Division of Communications; the State Department of Education; Miami Dade Community College; Nova University; and the School Board of Broward County. These groups reviewed the proposed bid specifications before each of the College's three attempts to let a contract and advised the College on them. The College made a careful effort to craft its specifications to ensure it would purchase the most appropriate communications system for its needs. The College currently has separate and independent voice and data communications systems. For data, each of the College's locations (South campus, Central campus, North campus and the College's administrative center in Fort Lauderdale) use more than one data circuit (AT&T Exhibit 5; Bid page D-1). For example, the eight controllers at the South campus are connected to the Fort Lauderdale Center by a pair of data circuits. The 15 controllers at the Central campus are linked to the Fort Lauderdale Center by four data circuits. If the controllers associated with one data circuit should go down for some reason, those connected to the other data circuits at campus will continue to operate, and the campus will only suffer "partial paralysis." The bid at issue seeks a single "voice and data T-1 network" to link each of the campuses to Fort Lauderdale Center in a unified system, which eliminates the need for separate voice and data systems. The new system is designed so that controllers at each campus will communicate with the mainframe computer at Fort Lauderdale Center through T-1 trunk lines, the same lines connecting the voice telephone system at each campus. Each campus will have its own PBX system, and the T-1 lines will allow users at each campus to place telephone calls to extensions at all campuses internally, i.e., without leaving the College's own network. They can also use the local Southern Bell network to place calls if all internal lines are in use, just as the Southern Bell network is used to place calls to numbers outside the College's campuses. Connection of the voice system (the PBX equipment) and data terminals at each of the College's three campuses to the Fort Lauderdale Center requires the use of multiplexors, devices which improve efficiency in networks by concentrating and combining signals and switching them over connecting links (i.e., the T-1 circuits) to other locations or devices. The bid solicitation document requires a multiplexor known as a "40- Series" multiplexor at each campus to perform the concentrating and combining role. The bid solicitation document also specifies a single multiplexor of a more complex type, a "45-Series" multiplexor, at the Fort Lauderdale Center. This multiplexor performs the switching function to redirect signals from one location to another. The bid solicitation document instructs bidders to supply a Comsphere 6800 Network Management System, which is a type of software to operate the hardware components. Comsphere is manufactured by a wholly owned subsidiary of AT & T, known as "AT&T Paradyne." This software manages the entire network, and allows remote troubleshooting of any problems on the network, Comsphere's system can automatically dial out to the AT&T Paradyne Center in Largo, Florida, so that a technician can investigate and often solve problems without the need to send anyone to a campus to perform maintenance. On July 7, 1992, the College held a bidders conference to explain the bid documents and their requirements, in order to insure that the bids the College received would be accurate and complete. During that conference, the vendors were told: (1) any price corrections must be initialed or the bid would be disqualified; (2) all pages of the bid documents which contain signature lines had to be signed; (3) bidders could not modify the general conditions or special conditions of the bid documents; and (4) any questions about the specifications would be answered only by written addendum. The same instructions can be found in text of the bid solicitation document (AT&T Exhibit 4). The College issued Addendum One to its bid documents on July 9, 1992, Addendum Two on July 14, 1992, and Addendum Three July 22, 1992. Addendum Two is the source of the dispute here. As is the College's practice, all bids were opened publicly after the hour for the receipt of bids had passed on July 29, 1992. Each bid submission had two parts. The first was a bid summary sheet containing a required format for the vendor's price. The second part of the submissions were bound volumes explaining how the vendor would satisfy each of the specific requirements in the bid specifications. During the bid opening, a College employee opened the sealed envelopes containing the vendor's bid summary sheet, and read aloud the prices found on each bidder's summary sheet. Page 13, paragraph 19.6 of the Bid Specifications told bidders that the bid summary sheets must recite the total bid price for the entire system, which had to include any upgrades to the standard features of the vendor's equipment so that the equipment provided would meet the College's specifications. When the bids were opened, representatives of AT & T, AT&T Paradyne, and NEC were present. As the bid summary sheets were opened and the prices announced, no one from AT&T objected to the prices read out or contended there was an error in AT&T'S pricing. The College's Director of Purchasing, Janet Rickenbacker, and the senior buyer handling the acquisition, Susan Kuzenka, then reviewed the extensive responses to the specifications submitted by the two bidders. They determined that NEC was the low responsive bidder. The amount AT&T bid based on the bid summary sheet found in its sealed bid was $1,558,836.57, NEC's bid was $1,549,895.15. 1/ After the bid opening, Mr. Zinn of AT&T had two conversations with Ms. Kuzenka about the AT&T bid. These conversations focused on the conflict in the entry for system maintenance on the bid summary sheet for AT&T which had been opened and read aloud on July 22, 1992, and the backup data for the system maintenance figure found in a section of AT&T'S bid response documents. On the bid summary page, AT&T had listed its "four-year maintenance totals M[onday] through F[riday] 8 a.m. through 5 p.m." as $755,536.16. But on page 53 of its bound bid response, AT&T listed the "total maintenance" cost as $530,204.00. This lesser figure is consistent with other maintenance price information found on page 61 of the AT&T bound bid documents, which set out total monthly maintenance costs for Monday through Friday maintenance from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for all four college locations as $11,045.92 per month. If this monthly figure is multiplied by the maintenance term (48 months) the sum is the $530,204.00 shown on page 53. During his first conversation, however, Mr. Zinn told Ms. Kuzenka that the higher figure of $755,536.16 was correct, because AT&T had neglected to add in the maintenance for the AT&T Paradyne multiplexor in the entries in the bound bid documents at pages 53 and 61. During a second conversation, Mr. Zinn reversed his position and indicated that he had added the maintenance for the multiplexor twice, which resulted in an erroneously high figure of $755,536.16 on the bid summary sheet, and that the $530,204 figure on page 53 was correct. One week after the bid opening, on August 5, 1992, AT&T sent a fax letter to Ms. Kuzenka, which confirmed Mr. Zinn's second conversation, and stated that the correct maintenance price was the $530,204.00 found on page 53 of the AT&T bid, rather than the $755,536.16 figure found on its bid summary sheet. Ms. Kuzenka had not asked anyone from AT&T to submit this price change to its bid, and it was not accepted by the College, under its standard policy that price changes will not be accepted once a sealed bid has been received and opened. The College has consistently adhered to this practice through the entire term of Ms. Kuzenka's employment. While a lower maintenance price can be found in one portion of the voluminous response of AT&T to the Bid Specifications, the figure on the bid summary sheet controls. See the "Special Instructions" found at page 5 of the bid solicitation documents (AT&T Exhibit 4). A bidder should not be permitted to look for ambiguities in the supporting documentation to contradict clear entries of price components found on its bid summary sheet. Use of the bid summary sheet permits the College to rely on a specific portion of the bid submission, which will be comparable from bidder to bidder, and to avoid wading through voluminous and perhaps internally inconsistent submissions to try to determine exactly what the bidder's price is. The "Special Instructions" state: "Bidder must use bid pages provided by the College and submit bid in the order issued; failure to do so will result in rejection of your bid" (AT&T'S Exhibit 4). Over and above the maintenance price differential, the College staff found the submission by AT&T to be materially non-responsive to the Invitation to Bid. Ms. Kuzenka found five problems with the AT&T submission, which led her to conclude that the response submitted by AT&T failed to meet the bid specifications: (1) AT&T qualified or modified the terms and conditions of the specifications; (2) price corrections were not initialed by AT & T; (3) the maintenance contract was partially assigned to another vendor; (4) the bid was not signed by AT&T on all pages which have required signature lines; and (5) AT&T failed to provide a qualification statement. Modification of terms and conditions The College's bid document stated in paragraph 54.1 that the terms and conditions of the bid and purchase order constitute the contract and "no other terms and conditions apply" (Tr. 157). The maintenance agreement, titled "Product Agreement," which is appended to the AT&T Service Offerings and Support Plan is a standard AT&T form (College Exhibit 6). It contains a provision in paragraph 20G., which states "THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE LOCAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY" (emphasis in original). The general conditions of the bid required that the contract be governed by Florida law (Tr. 152). AT&T argues that the standard product agreement it attached to its bid response had not been signed by a representative of AT & T, and that the College had the right to accept or reject the terms of the Service Offerings and Support Plans and the attachments to it. This is true, but the inclusion in its bid response of the New Jersey choice of law provision certainly creates an ambiguity over the applicable law, if AT&T'S bid were accepted. This ambiguity would be completely avoided had it not been proposed by AT & T, in contravention of the bid's general conditions. Paragraph 2 of the Product Agreement states "Terms and conditions on any non-AT&T order form shall not apply." Fairly read, AT&T was attempting to have its duties under its standard Product Agreement governed by the laws of New Jersey, not the laws of Florida. As a matter of sovereignty, Florida agencies do not subject themselves to foreign law. The College acted within its legitimate range of discretion when it rejected the choice of law provision as inconsistent with its bid documents. The same problem is caused by similar language in paragraph 12F of the AT&T Service Agreement (College Exhibit 5). The AT&T Product Agreement also has an integration clause, Paragraph 20H, stating that it constitutes the entire agreement of the parties, and supersedes any other oral or written agreements. This provision also attempts to modify the terms and conditions of the bid specifications to give the terms of AT &T's Service Offerings and Support Plan priority over the specifications. The College was entitled to reject this as inconsistent with the bid specifications. The same problem is presented by similar language in paragraph 12G of the AT&T Service Agreement (College Exhibit 5). The Service Offerings and Support Plan also contained a provision allowing AT&T to assign the agreement, which violates the anti-assignment provisions of paragraph 56.1 of the bid specifications. AT&T'S bid response stated that the College would be required to pay the cost for installing any additional cable. The bid specifications required vendors to inspect existing facilities at the College during a pre-bid walk- through, so that bidders could determine whatever cabling would be needed, and incorporate all necessary cable in their bid price. AT&T'S attempt to make the College liable for any cabling over and above that estimated by AT&T when submitting its bid is inconsistent with the bid specifications. The AT&T submission includeds a statement that the College was obligated to pay for the cost of a site survey to be performed by the project manager before the execution of the contract. Yet a site survey had already been performed, and the bidder's price was to have been inclusive of a total system, with no additional cost to the College for items such as surveys. Finally, the AT&T Service Offerings and Support Plan required the College to provide, at the College's expense, a secured and protected area for storage of tools and equipment near the equipment room, which was not part of the bid specifications. At the walk-through, AT&T should have determined whatever its security needs were and included those costs in its bid price. In essence, AT&T submitted preprinted forms without tailoring them to the carefully crafted requirements of the College's bid specifications. It cannot now disavow the contents of its forms which violate or fail to conform to these specifications. The time to review the company's standard forms was before they were submitted in its bid response, not afterward. Price correction There is a price correction on page 48 of the AT&T bid which is not initialed. The bid specifications require that "all corrections, manual or written or white-out must be initialed by the person signing the bid" (Bid Specifications, page 63, paragraph C). This was not done. The specifications stated "Failure to initial price corrections will result in the rejection of your bid" (AT&T Exhibit 4, page 5, numbered paragraph 2). Assignment provisions There was also confusion in the AT&T bid arising from the attachment of two proposed maintenance agreements, one from AT&T itself, another from AT&T Paradyne. The two maintenance contracts are not identical. 2/ College personnel believed that one contract was for part of the equipment, while the other contract was for another block of equipment. The College had been concerned about the difficulty in having to deal with different companies; it had drawn its specifications so that the bidder would be the single entity responsible to the College for maintenance. The submission of a proposed maintenance contract from an entity other than the bidder was inconsistent with the bid specifications. Signature Not all pages with signature lines had been signed by AT&T'S representative. These included page D1, which had a bearing on the equipment allowance being provided for the existing system traded in by the College. While AT&T regards these failures as trivial, the College went to pains to require bidders to sign pages with signature lines. Page 5 of the Bid Specifications stated: "Failure to sign all pages with a signature line will result in the rejection of your bid" (AT&T Exhibit 4, page 5, numbered paragraph 3). It is not arbitrary for the College to insist that these requirements be followed or to enforce the penalty stated in the specifications. Qualifications statement The special conditions for the bid required that vendors submit a qualifications statement listing similar work done for others (Tr. 168; Bid Specifications Section 25.1 at page 25). The College intended to consult those listed to determine whether they were satisfied with the equipment the vendor installed and the service it provided. AT&T did not provide that list, but rather provided an annual report which contains no customer references. This was not responsive to the bid. The College had experience with AT&T'S fifteen- year-old Dimension system, but not with the new equipment AT&T bid. The failure to submit the qualifications statement deprived the College of the opportunity to check with entities which had purchased the equipment AT&T had bid, something it had been careful to require of bidders. Deciding how to treat these inadequacies is a matter of discretion. Staff recommended rejection of the AT&T bid for genuine instances of noncompliance with specific requirements of the bid specifications the College had carefully crafted. This action cannot be characterized as arbitrary. The College's decision The College's purchasing department recommended to Dr. Hamilton that the bid be awarded to NEC as the low responsive bidder. A bid tabulation was posted on August 7, 1992, awarding the contract to NEC and rejecting AT&T'S bid. The protest AT&T filed a Notice of Protest, and later a Formal Written Protest on August 18, 1992, which dealt with a number of technical aspects, but did not claim that NEC's rival submission failed to conform to the bid specifications. Dr. Hamilton advised the College's president that, to be fair to both bidders, an outside consultant should be retained to evaluate the issues raised by AT&T in its Formal Written Protest. This was done, and the College retained Technology Associates for $8,600 to report to the College on the issues raised by AT & T. Technology Associates found that AT&T did not meet the emergency 911 requirements outlined in the College's bid documents. Southern Bell requires that when 911 calls are made from the College, the telephone system be capable of identifying to the police dispatcher which campus, which room and which extension number originated the emergency 911 call. The consultant also found that NEC's system met this requirement. AT&T did not attempt to refute this determination at the final hearing. The consultant found that AT&T'S proposed system was "over designed," in that it included elements not required by the bid documents. AT&T argues that Addendum Two, issued on July 14, 1992, 14 days before the bid opening, was so ambiguous with respect to necessary redundancy that the two bidders were bidding on fundamentally different systems, so that the matter should be bid for a fourth time. The portion of the addendum at issue states: The College requires two additional T-1 lines; not one as previously stated, to be added to diagram D-2 to ensure redundancy. A T-1 line is to connect North Campus with Central Campus and an additional T-1 line is to connect Central Campus with South Campus. (Tr. 85) Addendum Two explains that these lines are required to "ensure the ability to redirect calls if required, enabling the system to be fully redundant" (Tr. 86- 87, emphasis added). The addendum directed only the addition of two T-1 lines. This can be done, as NEC proposed, by connecting additional T-1 lines, one from the PBX at the North Campus to the PBX at the Central Campus and the other from the PBX at the Central Campus to the PBX at the South Campus. AT&T chose to feed each of the PBX installations at the North Campus, Central Campus and South Campus first into its own additional 45-Series multiplexor (the complex multiplexor, see Finding 10 above) so that a 45-Series multiplexor will handle T-1 connections from North Campus to a 45-Series multiplexor at Fort Lauderdale center, and to a 45-Series multiplexor at Central Campus. The PBX at Central Campus, because it has its own 45-Series multiplexor, then can be connected by T-1 lines to the 45- Series multiplexors at North Campus, South Campus and Fort Lauderdale Center. The PBX at South Campus, through its 45-Series multiplexor, then can connect to the 45-Series multiplexors at Central Campus and Fort Lauderdale Center (this configuration is shown on the final page of AT&T Exhibit 5). This is a more complex way to provide the T-1 connections between North and Central Campus and Central and South Campus than the addendum required, and uses four 45-Series multiplexors rather then one. AT&T argues its more complex solution was necessary so that both voice and data systems would be redundant, thus meeting the requirement in the addendum that the system be "fully redundant." The problem with the approach taken by AT&T is that it fails to follow the language of Addendum Two. There is no reference to alternative routing or redundancy for data, the redundancy is required to redirect calls, i.e., PBX or voice components. See the final quotation in Finding 40, above. Redundancy for data transmissions, something the AT&T solution provides, was not required. AT&T'S solution is overdesigned. This is not a pivotal issue, however, because for the reasons stated in the foregoing findings, the submission by AT&T was properly rejected by College staff as non-responsive to the terms of the Invitation to Bid. NEC is the low responsive bidder. Software certification AT&T argues in pages 16 through 20 of its proposed recommended order that the bid of NEC fails to conform to the requirements of the Invitation to Bid. AT&T had not raised the issue of whether the bid of NEC was responsive in its Formal Written Protest, and the attempt to do so at the beginning of the final hearing was rejected. As a result, this is not an issue which should have been addressed in the proposed recommended order. Nonetheless, it may be easily disposed of. The bid documents require that each bidder provide the College with a certification that the bidder: [O]wns, leases or controls the software it offers in response to this bid. If the bidder does not own the software, their certificate must include the source from which the software shall be obtained, and that the bidder has a right to sell or lease this software (Bid Specifications at 26, AT&T Exhibit 4.) The bidder also must certify that it is "eligible to maintain and support the software." (Id.) In its certification, NEC stated: NEC is the manufacturer of the NEAX2400 IMS that has been proposed to Broward Community College. As the manufacturer, we developed all software utilized on the NEAX2400. NEC owns all the rights to the software and has over 600 software engineers in Dallas dedicated to maintain and support the software. (AT&T Exhibit 4, final page) AT&T objects that this certification goes only to NEC's hardware, and does not constitute a certification that NEC has the rights to convey to the College the software necessary to operate the Comsphere 6800 Network Management System, which is a product of AT&T Paradyne. When reviewing the submissions of both bidders, the College staff found that their software certifications were equivalent. Both companies certified that they had the right to sell the software to operate the system each offered to the College. The College is entitled to rely on the certification given to it by NEC. If NEC is wrong, and does not have the right to provide the necessary software because AT&T or AT&T Paradyne will refuse to permit it to use that software, NEC may be liable in damages for failure to meet its contractual obligations to the College. NEC did not offer at the hearing evidence on why it believes it is entitled to use the software for the Comsphere 6800 Network Management System, because AT&T's attempt to raise this issue had been rejected when AT&T's motion to amend its Formal Written Protest of August 18, 1992 was denied.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Trustees of Broward Community College awarding Bid No. 3656, the rebid of the College-wide PBX system, to NEC for a bid price of $1,549,895.15. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of March 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March 1993.
The Issue Whether the School Board of Seminole County's, notice of intent to award Bid No. 102589, for air filter maintenance, service, and replacement to Filter Service and Installation Corporation was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Seminole County School District is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, created by Article IX, Section 4, Florida Constitution. The powers and duties of the school board are enumerated in Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. The Superintendent of the Seminole County School District is a constitutional officer, whose office is created by Article IX, Section 5, Florida Constitution. The powers and duties of the Superintendent are enumerated in Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. The Seminole County School Board issued a call for bids for air filter maintenance service and replacement under Bid No. 102589 on September 14, 1998. Bids were submitted by Con-Air Industries, Inc., the protester, and Filter Service & Installation Corp., the apparent low bidder. The bids were opened on September 28, 1998, and were evaluated. Each bidder was determined to be a responsible bidder to the CFB. Intervenor submitted the lowest numerical bid. On October 1, 1998, Respondent's staff recommended that the CFB be awarded to Intervenor. The decision to recommend the award of the filter service Bid No. 102589 complies with the bid specifications. The instructions to bidders, as stated on the Proposal Form, direct a bidder to total lines A-C and to enter the total at line D. The instructions state that a bidder is not to include the cost as stated at lines E & F in the total. The proposal form then states that the total cost, as stated at line D shall be used to determine the apparent low bidder. The bid proposal document stated that the total of the prices stated at items A, B, and C would be used to determine the lowest numerical bid. The bid proposal document stated that the Respondent reserves the right to negotiate unit cost proposed for item E. The line D total submitted by the Petitioner is stated at $3.45. The line D total submitted by the apparent low bidder, is stated at $2.60. Intervenor submitted the lowest numerical bid. Intervenor does business under the fictitious name Filter Sales & Service. That fictitious name has been registered with the Secretary of State for the State of Florida. Filter Service & Installation Corp., and Filter Sales & Service are one and the same. The reference by Intervenor at line F to "Per Price Sheet" and the failure of Filter Service & Installation Corp. to attach a price sheet to its proposal form is not a material deviation from the requirements of the bid specifications. The total at line D is the total used to determine the lowest bidder. Filter Service & Installation Corp. is the lowest and best bid from a responsive and responsible bidder. The Petitioner followed the procedure set forth in the bid proposal document in making a determination that the Intervenor was the lowest numerical bidder. Petitioner reserved the right to reject all bids and to waive any informalities. Petitioner failed to prove that the notice of intent to award the bid to Intervenor was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent award the contract for filter maintenance, service, and replacement under Bid No. 102589 to the Intervenor, Filter Service and Installation Corp., as recommended by its staff. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert N. Hering, President Con-Air Industries, Inc. 3055 Pennington Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County Public Schools Legal Services Department 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Robert W. Smith, Esquire 430 North Mills Avenue, Suite 1000 Orlando, Florida 32803 Dr. Paul J. Hagerty, Superintendent Seminole County Public Schools 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Department of Corrections acted in a manner contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid specifications in giving notice of its intent to award the contract for Invitation to Bid No. 96-DC- 6847R to Intervenor Behring Diagnostics, Inc.
Findings Of Fact On February 19, 1996 the Department issued an ITB for the provision of automated drug testing equipment, an automated data management system, and drug assays for the analysis of urine specimens collected at the Department’s major institutions and community facilities. After receiving and reviewing bids from Roche, Behring, and Abbott Laboratories (Abbott), the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Reject All Bids on April 10, 1996. On April 30, 1996 the Department issued ITB 96-DC-6847R for the same services. The same three vendors, Roche, Behring and Abbott, submitted bids which were opened on June 5, 1996. On its face, Roche’s bid of $.60 per test was the lowest cost of the three bids. Behring submitted a bid of $.90 per test. The Department’s evaluation committee correctly determined that bids submitted by Roche and Abbott were not responsive to the bid specifications. Roche’s bid was not responsive because: (1) it failed to include the cost of a printer at each site as part of the equipment package; and (2) it failed to indicate the vendor’s unconditional willingness to provide litigation support at no cost to the Department in defense of a legal challenge to the vendor’s technology. The bid specifications clearly required that printers be included as part of the computer hardware. Roche did not list printers anywhere in the narrative portion of its bid response. Roche’s response stated that it covered all items pertaining to the system hardware portion of the bid. The response indicated that Roche would provide the Department with Antek-LabDAQ report management software and listed specific items of hardware that would be included. But Roche did not list a printer. Roche’s bid response stated that the LabDAQ system would print reports. Roche included copies of a sample report sheets. Roche submitted other information describing the LabDAQ system that contained pictures of a printer. It also submitted a magazine article reviewing the LabDAQ system which listed an “Okidata printer” as part of the required hardware. However, the article noted that the software could be purchased separately. Submittal of this information was insufficient to indicate that Roche’s bid included the cost of a printer. Roche’s failure to include a printer in its bid was a material deviation from the bid requirements. The ITB clearly required the vendor to provide unequivocal litigation support at no cost to the Department if someone challenged the provider’s technology in a court action. This was a material requirement in the ITB. Roche responded that “upon request from the State and if deemed necessary Roche will provide documentation, affidavits and sworn testimony to substantiate the performance of the technology incorporated in the OnLine system.” (Emphasis added.) This ambiguous response was not an absolute commitment for Roche to provide the litigation support required by the specifications. In one section of Roche’s response it stated that it was “not aware of any past or present lawsuits that have been filed in connection to the COBAS MIRA Plus or the OnLine reagents.” In another section, Roche responded that a federal district court upheld drug testing results provided from a COBAS/Online system. These inconsistent statements may have resulted in a minor deviation from the bid specification. However, they are sufficient to further undermine confidence in Roche’s bid as submitted. During the hearing, Roche presented testimony that it intended for its bid of $.60 per test to include both printers and unconditional litigation support. This testimony constitutes an inappropriate attempt to amend Roche’s bid response. It does not change the fact that Roche’s bid, on its face, was not responsive as submitted. On the other hand, Behring’s bid was responsive to the specifications. It contained only one minor irregularity that provided no advantage to Behring. Roche has presented no evidence to the contrary. The Department’s evaluation committee did not complete the scoring process to compare the three vendors’ scores. Such a comparison is unnecessary where there is only one responsive bidder. By letter dated August 26, 1996 the Department again informed the vendors that it intended to reject all bids and issue a new request for proposals in September. Even though the Department had determined that Behring was the only responsive bidder, the letter did not address the responsiveness of any of the bids. The letter stated that the Department anticipated making changes to the specifications that would require a more structured response, i.e. revise the ITB to include a checklist for every required item which the bidder would cross-reference in its bid response. There is no evidence that the Department anticipated making changes to the substance of the specifications. On or about September 5, 1996 Behring sent the Department a Notice of Intent to protest the rejection of all bids and subsequently filed a timely formal written protest. In its formal protest, Behring referred to the Department’s conclusions in a memorandum dated August 23, 1996 that Behring was the only bidder to submit a conforming bid. Roche did not file a protest of the decision to reject all bids. On or about September 26, 1996 the Department sent Roche notice of Behring’s protest and enclosed a copy of Behring’s formal protest in Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 96-4475BID. Roche did not intervene in the bid protest. The final hearing in the bid protest was scheduled for final hearing on October 23, 1996. The day before the hearing, representatives of the Department and Behring met to discuss the possibility of settling the case. Shortly before the settlement conference, the Department’s counsel called a Roche representative, Betty Bennett, and informed her that Behring had requested a meeting to attempt to resolve the protest. He was unable to make contact with an Abbott representative. No one from Roche attended the meeting. The Department did not issue any formal written notice that it intended to settle the case with Behring. The Department did not know prior to the meeting what the parties would discuss. The Department did not attend the meeting expecting to “negotiate a contract.” At the meeting, Behring initially took the position that the Department should award the contract to Behring at $.90 per test and not seek further competitive bids. The Department took the position that the contract should be subject to additional competitive bidding to determine what the result would be with more than one competitive bid. After further discussion, Behring offered to lower its bid price. The Department’s representatives left the room to discuss the offer. Upon their return, Department representatives made Behring a lower counteroffer. Behring and the Department eventually arrived at an oral settlement under which the Department would award the contract to Behring at a price of $.77 per test and Behring would dismiss its protest. The Department based its decision to settle the bid protest with Behring on the following: (a) the risk of losing the bid protest and being required to pay Behring $.90 per test; (b) the desire not to further extend the existing contract at the current price of $1.07 per test; (c) the risk that a third attempt to solicit competitive bids would result in another protest and further delay; (d) the fact that Behring had submitted responsive bids to the two previous solicitations; (e) the assumption that subsequent bids by Roche and Abbott would be higher when they included the omitted items that caused their rejection. There is no persuasive evidence to indicate that the Department’s reasons for settling Behring’s bid protest were pretextual or otherwise invalid. The Department correctly concluded that it might have to pay Behring $.90 per test if it lost the bid protest regardless of the applicable standard of proof in that proceeding. The Department also was justified in assuming that Roche’s bid price would be higher when it included the previously omitted printers. For these and other reasons set forth above in the Findings of Fact, the Department’s decision to settle the case by negotiating a lower contract price with Behring was in the best interest of the state of Florida. On October 23, 1996 the Administrative Law Judge in Case No. 96-4475BID entered an order closing the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings and relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department. The Department did not issue a Final Order setting forth the final disposition of the case. By letter dated October 30, 1996 the Department informed Roche and Abbott that it had negotiated a satisfactory contract with Behring pursuant to Rule 60A-1.018(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. This letter advised Roche that the Department intended to award the contract to Behring. In the letter, the Department gave Roche the opportunity to request a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, to protest the intended agency action. By letter dated November 8, 1996, Roche protested the notice of intended award to Behring. Without objection, Roche submitted an amended petition on December 10, 1996. Behring filed a petition for leave to intervene on November 27, 1996. An order dated December 11, 1996 granted that motion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order awarding the contract for ITB No. 96-DC-6847R to Behring Diagnostic, Inc., and dismissing the protest of Roche Diagnostic Systems. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1997.
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid for Lease NO. 590:1944, Respondent invited lease proposals for approximately 15,206 square feet of office space "located within the following boundaries: On the North, Aloma Avenue/Fairbanks Avenue the East, Semoran Boulevard the South, Colonial Drive, and on the West, Mills Avenue." The geographic area includes as many as 100 office buildings, although the invitation only generated three bids. The Invitation to Bid announced a Pre-Bid Conference on December 22, 1987. Interested parties were directed to contact Linda N. Treml, whose telephone number was provided, for "bid specifications and information regarding the space." The Invitation to Bid stated that "[a]ny questions concerning this project are to be directed to [Ms. Treml]" and "prospective bidders are encouraged to consult with [Ms. Treml] beforehand in an attempt to enable as correct a bid submittal as possible." The Invitation to Bid required that certain attachments accompany the bid proposal and referred the prospective bidder to paragraph 9 of the Bid submittal Form. The required attachments included a scaled floorplan "showing present configurations with measurements," net rentable square footage calculations using floorplan measurements, and a preliminary site layout. The Invitation to Bid stated that Respondent reserved the right to waive any minor informalities or technicality and seek clarification" of bids received, when such is in the best interest of the state. Responding to Respondent's newspaper advertisement and direct-mail solicitation for bids, James W. Boyle, who is a real estate broker active in leasing and property management, requested from Ms. Treml an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form. Mr. Boyle regularly reviews announcements of forthcoming leasing activity by state agencies. If he is aware of a building that appears to meet the agency's requirements, he contacts the building's owner or manager and informs him or her that he may have a prospective tenant. After receiving the bid materials for Lease No. 590:1944, Mr. Boyle contacted Kathryn Doyle, who is the leasing manager of Petitioner, and learned that Petitioner could accommodate Respondent's space needs for the term sought in the Lakeview 436 office building. Mr. Boyle assisted Ms. Doyle in the preparation of the Bid Submittal Form for Petitioner. In his first conversation with Ms. Doyle, Mr. Boyle ascertained that Petitioner's building carried a Semoran Boulevard street address and in fact had direct access to Semoran Boulevard. Petitioner's building lies on the east side of Semoran Boulevard, which serves as the eastern boundary of the geographic area described in the Invitation to Bid. Three bids were submitted in response to the subject Invitation to Bid. When they were opened, Ms. Treml and her supervisor, George A. Smith, determined that bids of Petitioner and a third party were nonresponsive because their office buildings were outside the geographic area specified in the Invitation to Bid. These bids were not considered further. Mr. Boyle had previously represented the owners of the FARE building several months earlier in a bid for Lease No. 590:1895. The Invitation to Bid in that case, which was issued by Respondent and named Ms. Treml as the contact person, provided that the proposed office space must be located within the following boundaries: Beginning at the intersection of US 17-92 and Colonial Drive, then west on Colonial Drive to the intersection of Edgewater Drive, then north on Edgewater Drive to the intersection of Kennedy Blvd. . ., then east on Kennedy Blvd. . . . to the intersection of US 17-92, then south on US 17- 92 to the point of beginning." Although Mr. Boyle's client was not awarded Lease NO. 590:1895 for reasons not relevant here, his client's bid, as well as the bid of another unsuccessful bidder owning a building on the east side of the highway serving as the east boundary of the geographic area, were considered responsive and thus within the specified geographic area. Ms. Treml interpreted the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1944 differently from the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1895. The description for Lease NO. 590:1895 defined the boundaries by "beginning" at a certain intersection, then proceeding "on" a highway, and so on. The description for Lease NO. 590:1944 defined the boundaries by identifying landmarks "on the north," then the "east," and so on. At the time of assisting in the preparation of Petitioner's bid, Mr. Boyle was also aware of an Invitation to Bid issued by Respondent for Lease NO. 590:1875. In this case, Respondent specified office space "in the following area of Brevard County, Florida: Beginning at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and State Road 50, then West on SR-50 to the intersection of 1-95, then North on 1-95 to the intersection of SR-406 . . . then East on SR-406 to the intersection of U.S. 1, then South on U.S. 1 to the point of beginning." In the case of Lease NO. 590:1875, the bid contact person, Lynn Mobley, issued a clarification letter stating that any building located on either side of the boundary road with an address on the boundary road would be considered to be within the boundary. Ms. Mobley and her supervisor, Ernest Wilson, who are Respondent's District 7 Facilities Services Assistant Manager and Manager, respectively, have consistently advised potential bidders that a building located on a boundary highway is included in the geographic area even though it would be outside the area if the dividing line were the centerline of the highway. Mary Goodman, Chief, Bureau of Property Management of the Department of General Services, testified that, in the course of her review of leasing activities by various state agencies, she has historically guided agencies that, if a building abuts a boundary highway but is not, strictly speaking, within it, the agency "could waive that as a minor technicality and consider it a responsive bid." Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner spoke to Ms. Goodman prior to submitting the subject bid proposal. Ms. Treml customarily waives minor irregularities in bid submittals. However, she does not treat the location of a building outside the geographic area as a minor irregularity. To do so would be unfair to owners of other buildings outside the geographic area who took the geographic description at its face value and never submitted bids. Ms. Doyle received the bid materials from Mr. Boyle after the Pre-Bid Conference had taken place. However, Mr. Boyle elected not to attend the Pre- Bid Conference at which Ms. Treml explained, among other things, her interpretation of the specific geographic area. He chose not to attend because he felt that he would not learn anything relevant at the conference, which was attended by a representative of Intervenor. Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner contacted Ms. Treml prior to submitting Petitioner's bid. Mr. Boyle, whose compensation in this case is entirely contingent upon a successful bid, estimates that he spent about 20 hours working on Petitioner's bid. Ms. Doyle estimates that she spent about 40 hours working on the bid. Petitioner also spent $800 in obtaining an "as-built" drawing of the space that accompanied its proposal. By letter dated February 22, 1988, Respondent notified the bidders of its decision to award the lease contract to Intervenor. Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the award by letter dated February 24, 1988. Ms. Treml met Mr. Boyle and Ms. Doyle on March 1, 1988, and cited the location of Petitioner's building as the only reason for the determination of nonresponsiveness. The attempt at mediation having failed, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the award by letter dated March 3, 1988. Petitioner attached to its bid proposal an "as-built" drawing. Although drawn to scale, the drawing did not bear the measurements of the then- present interior tenant improvements, mostly walls, nor did it disclose on its face any calculations showing how the rentable area was computed from the gross area. These omissions were due to Mr. Boyle's advice to Ms. Doyle that such information would be unnecessary in this case. The omissions from Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were rendered less critical by the fact that Respondent would have the right under the lease to require the landlord, at its expense, to remove the present improvements and re- configure the space to Respondent's demands. However, one purpose of the floorplan is to show where the space is located within the building. Another purpose is to verify the rentable area calculation by showing the measurements of items, such as restrooms, that should not be included in the rentable area for which Respondent is charged rent. The drawing is supposed to show the rentable area computation. Additionally, even though Respondent could insist on a total renovation of the premises, Respondent might wish to evaluate whether it could use a portion of the existing space in order to reduce the possibility of construction delays. George A. Smith, the Senior Management Analyst for Respondent who reviewed Ms. Treml's determination of nonresponsiveness prior to the award of the subject lease, testified that the deficiencies in Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were not a "minor irregularity."
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation’s decision to reject all bids for Financial Project No. 209278-1-52-01 (J. Turner Butler Blvd.) a major interchange in Duval County, Florida, was exercised illegally, arbitrarily, dishonestly or fraudulently.
Findings Of Fact On April 1, 2004, the Department of Transportation advertised its Bid Solicitation Notice (BSN), for the JTB Project. H. W. Lochner, Inc. (Lochner) designed the JTB Project. Petitioner, Superior Construction, and Archer Western Contractors, LTD, submitted bids on May 26, 2004. Petitioner had the apparent low bid, and Superior had the second apparent low bid. On or about May 27, 2004, Robert Burleson, President of the Florida Transportation Builders Association (“FTBA”), contacted the State Construction Engineer, Ananth Prasad, P.E., and alerted him to potential issues regarding MOT phasing. (T. p. 876, lines 18-24; p. 880, lines 14, 15). Richard Ayers, of Superior Construction, called the Jacksonville Urban Office of the Department of Transportation, District 2, alerting the District to the concerns regarding the maintenance of traffic issues. Ayers had reviewed the bid and plans generally to assess its bid in light of the Petitioner's bid, and had discovered in the process MOT issues that he believed would add substantially to the costs and time required to construct the project. As a result of these calls, Robert Hansgen, P.E., District 2 Resident Engineer, was directed by someone within the Department to review the MOT plans. On June 1, 2004, Mr. Hansgen forwarded to Henry Haggerty and Al Moyle a memorandum outlining seven areas of MOT concern relating to the "constructability" and safety of the JTB project. On June 1, 2004, Hansgen's memorandum was forwarded to Mohammed Majboor, P.E., Design Consultant Engineer for the Department, who forwarded the memo to Lochner. Lochner reviewed its plans in light of the Hansgen memorandum and forwarded its response on June 3, 2004, to Hansgen, who reviewed the responses and added his comments. He e-mailed Henry Haggarty seven concerns he had with the MOT plans. On June 2, 2004, Allen Moyle, Jacksonville Construction Engineer, received Hansgen's and Lochner's responses regarding the MOT plans and determined that the project plans needed revisions because of safety issues. Moyle concluded that all the bids needed to be rejected in light of the MOT revisions. He transmitted a request to Cathy Thomas at the Department's headquarters to arrange a meeting with Lochner to commence revision of the plans at the earliest possible date. On June 8, 2004, Hansgen briefed the District 2 Secretary, Schroeder, and other District 2 staff members on the issues regarding maintenance of traffic issues based on his memo, a marked-up copy of the MOT sheets, and pictures. Rejection of all bids was discussed at this meeting. Mr. Hansgen testified at the formal hearing concerning his findings and his actions with the aid of the original memorandum and Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2. Mr. Hansgen's concerns were about safety issues and included the reduction of traffic lane widths in areas to 11 feet where barrier walls would be erected on both the inside and outside medians where traffic would be traveling at 55 miles per hour. Another concern was the length of these lanes that would be restricted by concrete barriers. These barriers prevented easy access of emergency vehicles in these areas, which presented a significant hazard at this interchange, which accesses a major hospital complex. Mr. Hansgen’s also identified an inconsistency regarding where the contractor could work in an area close to the barrier wall; a portion of the roadway where a cross slope or tilting of the traveling lane created dangerous vehicle control issues; and plans to widen a portion of the roadway while vehicles traveled on the same portion of roadway which would require further narrowing of lanes. Because the State of Florida has one of the highest fatality records in the nation in work zones, the Department is very concerned about this issue. After the meeting on June 2, 2004, the Jacksonville Urban Office for District 2 recommended rejection to DOT in Tallahassee of all bids based on the need to “clarify uncertainties within the phasing of the maintenance of traffic (MOT) plans.” The recommendation of District 2 was reviewed by the Technical Review Committee, which is comprised of six voting members. On June 9, 2004, the Technical Review Committee recommended rejection of all bids on the JTB Project to the Contract Awards Committee based upon MOT safety issues. The Contracts Award Committee, composed of three voting members, met on June 15, 2004, to consider the recommendations regarding the JTB Project of the Technical Review Committee and District 2. The Contracts Award Committee concurred with the recommendations of the Technical Review Committee and District 2 and rejected all bids based upon MOT safety issues. The Department posted its notice of intent to reject all bids on June 17, 2004. The Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest the Department’s rejection of all bids with a Formal Written Protest, filed on July 1, 2004, including an appropriate protest bond. The Department’s engineers met with engineers from H.W. Lochner, Inc., to discuss the issues of concern raised in the Hansgen memorandum. The Department commissioned Lochner to revise the plans to enhance the safety features for MOT, and certain other enhancements. Lochner and the Department entered into Supplement Agreement #13 that included both the requested enhancements and the changes to accommodate the concerns referenced in the Hansgen Memorandum. Richard Kelly testified regarding “animus,” and “dislike” displayed by employees of the Department. He pointed to past decisions and actions of Department employees as proof of “dislike” and “animus." These included a Letter of Concern to the Petitioner, on April 16, 2004, from the Department outlining five areas the Department had identified as important in making a determination on the pre-qualification of the Petitioner for bidding on Department contracts for the 2004-2005 fiscal year. Also mentioned were disputed issues between the Department and the Petitioner arising during construction of the I-95/I295 Interchange Project, including Jacksonville ordinances on noise ordinance, and trees and deficiency letters from the Department to AMEC Civil. In addition, the disqualification of Morse Diesel, LLC, as the Petitioner was formerly named, from bidding on construction contracts with the State of Florida, and in 2002, the revocation of the pre-qualification of the Petitioner to bid on DOT projects were described. Ananth Prasad, P.E., who was identified by the Petitioner's witnesses as a primary source to opposition to the Petitioner, testified that he did not hold the position of State Construction Engineer in 2000, and was not involved in the decision to deny pre-qualification of Morse Diesel. Mr. Prasad also was not involved with the initial decision to revoke the pre-qualification of AMEC in 2002. Mr. Prasad does not personally hold a position on the Technical Review Committee. Mr. Prasad did not vote on the decision to recommend rejection of all bids on the JTB project. The decision to reject all bids for the JTB Project was made by the Contracts Award Committee based on recommendations from the Technical Review Committee, and District 2. The Department’s Contracts Award Committee exercised its statutory authority to reject all bids based on concerns regarding the MOT phasing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Formal Written Protest concerning the bid rejection for the project in this litigation. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: F. Alan Cummings, Esquire S. Elysha Luken, Esquire Smith, Currie & Hancock, LLP 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Post Office Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589 Mike Piscitelli, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 305 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Calvin C. Johnson, Esquire C. Denise Johnson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Agency Clerk Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue presented is whether the bid submitted in the name of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., was non-responsive and, therefore, the lease should be awarded to Petitioner as the lowest and best bidder.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, published an Invitation to Bid for approximately 29,126 net square feet of rental space in the south central area of Dade County. The lease to be entered into with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is for a 9-year term with three 2-year options. On June 20, 1990, the Department received and opened three bids. Two of those bids were submitted on behalf of Petitioner, Intercontinental Properties, Inc., and Intervenor, Coliseum Lanes, Inc. The third bid was declared non-responsive and is not involved in this proceeding. The bids of Petitioner and Intervenor were declared responsive and were reviewed and evaluated by the Department's evaluation committee. It is stipulated that Coliseum Lanes, Inc., received a substantially higher score than Intercontinental Properties, Inc., and that Coliseum Lanes submitted a better bid than Intercontinental Properties. Based upon the evaluation committee's recommendations, the Department awarded the bid to Coliseum Lanes, Inc. Thereafter, Intercontinental Properties, Inc., timely filed its protest. The Invitation to Bid contains instructions for the preparation and submission of bids. Item 4 on page 6 specifically provides as follows: Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s), corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE ORIGINAL SIGNATURES AND MUST BE NOTARIZED. FAILURE TO NOTARIZE SIGNATURES WILL DEEM THE BID NON-RESPONSIVE. [Emphasis appears in the Invitation to Bid.) The Invitation to Bid also contains requirements for bidders to submit bids. Item 1 on page 3 specifically provides as follows: Control of Property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must provide evidence of one of the following qualifications with the bid: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documentation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas though the term of the base lease and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas ) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in- turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required by the state. ) Submit documentation of notarized letter of agency detailed trust agreement. [Emphasis appears in the Invitation to Bid.] The Bid Submittal Form of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., was signed by Pamela A. Stewart. She represented her title to be Property Coordinator, Coliseum Lanes, Inc. Stewart has never been an officer or director of Coliseum Lanes, Inc. She has never been employed by that company, and Coliseum Lanes, Inc., has never paid any monies to her. Stewart is employed by Custom VP. Custom VP is a joint venture. The joint venture partners are Vine-Peal, Inc., and Custom Land, Inc. Coliseum Lanes, Inc., is not a partner of the joint venture. Custom VP is a tenant at the Coliseum building, the property which is the subject of Coliseum Lanes, Inc.'s, bid submittal. Custom VP is somehow involved in renting space at the Coliseum. No written agreement between Custom VP and Coliseum Lanes, Inc., was submitted with Coliseum's bid or offered in evidence at the final hearing. The bid submitted by Stewart on behalf of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., did not include any written evidence from Coliseum Lanes, Inc., the owner of the subject property, authorizing Stewart to act as the agent of that corporation or authorizing Stewart to submit a bid and/or enter into a lease on behalf of Coliseum Lanes, Inc. No such written authorization exists. Stewart had only been given written authorization to act on behalf of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., on one occasion involving a break-in at the Coliseum. No corporate resolution was passed by Coliseum Lanes, Inc., authorizing Stewart to act as its agent, to submit a bid to the Department, to enter into a lease with the Department, or to commit Coliseum Lanes, Inc., to any financial obligations regarding such a lease agreement. After the bids were opened, one of the Department's employees telephoned Stewart and requested her to provide something in writing setting forth her relationship with Coliseum Lanes, Inc. She typed a letter and had it delivered to the Department by courier later that same day. The entire body of that letter reads as follows: "To clarify my position with Coliseum Lanes, Inc., owners of the Coliseum. I am employed by Coliseum Lanes in their development venture, as the Property Coordinator for the Coliseum." This time, she identified her title under her signature as being the Property Administrator. The stationary on which she wrote that letter is not the stationary of Coliseum Lanes, Inc.; rather, it is stationary used by Custom VP in its marketing efforts on behalf of Coliseum Lanes, Inc. That letter does not establish an agency relationship between Stewart and Coliseum Lanes, Inc. Likewise, that letter does not establish authorization for Stewart to submit a bid on behalf of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., or to bind that corporation to enter into any contracts. Even if it did, it was provided after the opening of the bids and is not part of Coliseum Lanes, Inc.'s, bid submittal. Stewart did not submit a copy of the deed to the Coliseum property with her bid submittal, as required by the Invitation to Bid for a bid to be responsive. The only document submitted by Stewart to show ownership of the property forming the subject matter of the bid was a copy of a tax bill for 1989 real property taxes. A tax bill does not constitute proof of ownership. Caroline Weiss is the President of Intercontinental Properties, Inc. However, Intercontinental Properties, Inc., is not the owner of the Intercontinental Building, the property which is the subject of the bid submittal of Intercontinental Properties, Inc. The Intercontinental Building is owned by Royal Trust Tower, Ltd., a Florida general partnership. Weiss is one of the general partners. As part of her bid submittal, Weiss attached a Management Agreement between Intercontinental Properties, Inc., and Royal Trust Tower, Ltd., whereby Royal Trust Tower, Ltd., employed Intercontinental Properties, Inc., to manage the premises of the Intercontinental Building. That Management Agreement contains restrictions on the authority of Intercontinental Properties, Inc., to bind Royal Trust Tower, Ltd., the owner of the Intercontinental Building, as follows: - It is further mutually agreed that: * * * (c) The OWNER expressly withholds from the AGENT, any power or authority to make any structural changes in any building or to make any other major alterations or additions in or to any such building or equipment therein or to incur any expense exceeding $500.00, chargeable to the OWNER other than expenses related to the exercising of the expressed powers stated herein, without the prior written consent of the OWNER, except such emergency repairs as may be required because of danger to life or property or which are immediately necessary for the preservation and safety of the premises or the safety of the tenants and occupants thereof, or are required to avoid the suspension of any necessary services to the premises. * * * - The OWNER hereby expressly gives authority to the AGENT to sign and execute leases on behalf of the OWNER for the rental of space to tenants in the subject premises. Said authority, given by the OWNER to the AGENT, is limited to the execution of form leases substantially similar to the form that is attached to this Agreement and which has been previously approved by the OWNER. Said authority is further limited with regard to the minimum amount of rent and with regard to the duration of the lease which said minimum amount of rent and minimum duration of lease are attached hereto and have been previously approved by the OWNER. In addition to the foregoing, the AGENT'S authority to sign leases on behalf of the OWNER, where said leases require the OWNER to expend certain sums to finish the premises for the tenant, is limited to those expenses as attached to this Agreement and have been previously approved by the OWNER. In the event that a lease is presented to the AGENT for signature on form that is not substantially similar to the form attached to this Agreement, or at a rate per square foot that is less than the minimum specified on the attachments to this Agreement, or for a duration of time that is less than that specified herein or which obligates the OWNER to finish the premises for the tenant at a cost which exceeds that of previously approved herein, then, in that event, prior written approval of the OWNER is necessary before the AGENT has the authority to execute any such lease. None of the attachments to the Management Agreement was included with Intercontinental Properties, Inc.'s, bid submittal. Accordingly, the Management Agreement prohibits Intercontinental Properties, Inc., from incurring expenses in excess of $500 for structural changes and major alterations without the prior written consent of the owner. The alterations and changes required to be made to the structure of the Intercontinental Building attendant to this bid award will cost in excess of $450,000. Weiss did not include, as part of her bid submittal, written authorization from the owner to incur such expenses on behalf of the owner related to this bid submittal, and no evidence was offered that any such prior written consent exists. Similarly, the Management Agreement authorizes Intercontinental Properties, Inc., to execute leases on behalf of the owner using only the specific lease form previously approved by the owner. Yet, the Invitation to Bid requires that the bidder will execute a lease form utilized by the Department, which will also incorporate the bid submittal form. No prior written approval of the owner authorizing Intercontinental Properties, Inc., to execute the Department's required lease or to change the terms of the lease approved by Royal Trust Tower, Ltd., was submitted by Weiss as part of her bid submittal package. Further, no evidence was offered that any such prior written consent exists. There is no writing authorizing Intercontinental Properties, Inc., or Caroline Weiss to submit the bid she submitted or to bind the owner of the Intercontinental Building to the terms of her bid submittal. At the time of the final hearing in this cause, the Intercontinental Building property was the subject matter of a foreclosure proceeding. Both the bid submitted by Coliseum Lanes, Inc., and the bid submitted by Intercontinental Properties, Inc., failed to include written authorization from the owner of the property for which the bid was submitted authorizing the person submitting the bid to do so on behalf of the owner. Failure of an agent to show that the agent has written authority to bind that agent's principal in submitting the bid for the lease of real estate and in entering into an extended lease for the rental of real estate is not a minor irregularity. Such failure to show agency sufficient to bind the principal legally is a material deficiency and makes those bids non-responsive. The Management Agreement submitted as part of the bid submittal of Intercontinental Properties, Inc., specifically prohibits Intercontinental Properties, Inc., from signing the lease required by the Department and from making the alterations required by this bid award without prior written consent of the owner. Such prior written consent does not exist. That deficiency is not a minor irregularity but is a material defect. Accordingly, the bid of Intercontinental Properties, Inc., is non-responsive for this additional reason. Only a copy of a tax bill was submitted as proof of ownership of the subject property to be leased pursuant to the bid submitted by Coliseum Lanes, Inc. A copy of a tax bill is not proof of ownership. Further, the Invitation to Bid specifically requires a copy of the deed to prove ownership. Failure to prove ownership is not a minor irregularity but is, rather, a material defect. That failure makes the bid submittal of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., non-responsive for that additional reason.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that: The bid of Intercontinental Properties, Inc., is non-responsive; The bid of Coliseum Lanes, Inc., is non-responsive; and Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2197 to either Intercontinental Properties, Inc., or Coliseum Lanes, Inc. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of February, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5797BID Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 6-9, 11, 12, 14- 16, 23, and 25-27 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent, credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5 and 21 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 13, 17-20, 22, 24, and 28-33 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3, 15, 18, and 28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 4, 5, 11, 13, 25, and 26 have been rejected as being irrelevant to this issues under consideration in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 6, 7, 10, 16, and 27 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 8, 12, 17, 20, and 24 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent, credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 9, 14, 19, and 21 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 22 and 23 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 16, 17, 27, 29, 31, 35, 36, 41, 44-46, 49, 50, 54-57, 60, 62, 64- 66, and 69 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 8, 12, 18, 20, 26, 30, 33, 38, 42, 47, 48, 67, 68, and 70 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 9- 11, 13, 14, 19, 21- 25, 28, 37, 40, and 51-53 have been rejected as being unnecessary to determine the issues in this cause. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 15, 43, 58, and 61 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 32, 34, 39, 59, and 63 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent, credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Alexander D. Varkas, Jr., Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, P.A. 465 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morton Laitner, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, S-424 Miami, Florida 33128 Michael Cherniga, Esquire Keith Hetrich, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact In November, 1990, the Respondent, the Department of State, sought proposals for the lease of office space for its Division of Licensing. On or prior to December 7, 1990, the proposal opening date, at least six proposals were received by the Respondent. Those proposals were designated by the Respondent as "Tallahassee Associates" (the Petitioner's proposal), "Crossland Agency" (the Intervenor's proposal), "Woodcrest A", "Woodcrest B", "T.C.S." and "DeVoe". On January 2, 1991, the Respondent posted a standard form Bid Tabulation indicating that the following scores had been awarded to the following proposals: Proposal Score Woodcrest A 82 Woodcrest B 82 Tallahassee Associates 73 Crossland Agency 85 DeVoe 54 The proposal of T.C.S. was not evaluated by the Respondent because it was determined to be non-responsive. The Respondent also posted a copy of a memorandum dated January 2, 1991, with the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The memorandum was from John M. Russi, Director of the Division of Licensing, to Ira Chester, Chief of the Bureau of General Services. Mr. Russi indicated in the memorandum that the Intervenor would be awarded the lease. Attached to Mr. Russi's January 2, 1991, memorandum was a Lease Evaluation Worksheet which indicated the scores which had been awarded by the evaluation committee to the responsive bidders for each of the criteria to be considered in determining the winning bidder. Printed at the top-center of the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation was the following notice: FAILURE TO FILE A PROTEST WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 120.53(5), FLORIDA STATUTES, SHALL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CHAPTER 120, FLORIDA STATUTES. . . . The January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation was posted at 1:00 p.m., January 2, 1991. Therefore, pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, any bidder desiring to contest the Respondent's proposed award of the lease was required to file a notice of protest with the Respondent no later than 1:00 p.m., January 5, 1991, and a formal written protest on or before January 15, 1991. T.C.S. filed a notice of protest and a formal written protest to the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation within the time periods prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. T.C.S. contested the Respondent's determination that it was not responsive. The Petitioner did not file a notice of protest or a formal written protest to the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation within the time periods prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, the Respondent reviewed the formal written protest filed by T.C.S. and agreed that T.C.S. was responsive. After agreeing that T.C.S. was responsive, the Respondent evaluated T.C.S.'s proposal and awarded points for each of the criteria to be considered. Toward the end of January, 1991, after deciding that T.C.S.'s proposal was to be evaluated, the Respondent notified all other bidders of its decision in a document titled Posting of Notice of Agency Decision. The Posting of Notice of Agency Decision was signed by the Respondent's General Counsel and was addressed to "All Responsive Bidders". The Posting of Notice of Agency Decision provided, in pertinent part: Notice is hereby given that the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing, is reviewing the bid tabulation which was posted at 1:00 P.M., January 2, 1991 for Lease No. 450:0070. The revised bid tabulation will be posted at 8:00 A.M. on February 4, 1991 at the Purchasing Office of the Department of State . . . . Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person interested in the new tabulation should contact . . . after the posting time listed above. The Petitioner filed a notice of protest and a formal written protest challenging the Posting of Notice of Agency Decision within the times prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The Respondent dismissed this formal written protest by final order dated February 22, 1991. On or about January 31, 1991, more than four weeks after the posting of the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, Ocie Allen spoke by telephone with Phyllis Slater, the Respondent's General Counsel. Ms. Slater told Mr. Allen that all proposals would be reevaluated as a result of T.C.S.'s protest. Mr. Allen was a lobbyist for the Petitioner in January, 1991. On February 4, 1991, the Respondent posted another standard form Bid Tabulation indicating that the following scores had been awarded to the following proposals: Proposal Score Crossland Agency 83 Woodcrest A 80 Woodcrest B 80 Tallahassee Associates 71 T.C.S. 71 DeVoe 51 The differences in the scores of the proposals which had been listed on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, which are reflected in the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation were caused by automatic changes in the scores resulting from the addition of T.C.S. and the fact that T.C.S. had the lowest priced bid. The points awarded for the "rental" criterion, which was worth up to 25 points, were determined by a mathematical formula by which the scores of each bidder are calculated based upon the proposed rental charges of all bidders. The award of points for this criterion was determined objectively based upon the mathematical formula. By adding another bidder, T.C.S., the points awarded to all the proposals automatically changed. The scores of the proposals which had been listed on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, were not otherwise changed. Nor were the proposals of any bidder reevaluated. The Respondent also posted a copy of a memorandum dated January 24, 1991, with the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The memorandum was from John M. Russi, Director of the Division of Licensing, to Ira Chester, Chief of the Bureau of General Services. Mr. Russi indicated the following in the memorandum: Pursuant to the settlement stipulation signed by Counsel for T.C.S. Associates on January 23, 1991, in reference to the Bid Protest filed January 11, 1991, the attached "Lease Evaluation Work Sheet" is provided for you to re-post. After reevaluating six bid proposals, the evaluating committee concludes that Crossland Agency should be awarded this bid. Each bidder needs to be notified by certified mail of this action. . . . . Attached to Mr. Russi's January 24, 1991, memorandum was a Lease Evaluation Worksheet which indicated the scores of the responsive bidders which had been awarded by the evaluation committee for each of the criteria to be considered in determining the winning bidder. On February 6, 1991, the Petitioner filed a notice of protest to the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The Petitioner filed a Formal Written Protest, Request for Formal Hearing and Motion for Stay with the Respondent on February 18, 1991. These documents were filed within the time periods specified in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's Formal Written Protest was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent on February 28, 1991. Crossland Agency, Inc., was allowed to intervene in the proceeding. On March 1, 1991, the Respondent and Intervenor filed a Motion to Dismiss. A motion hearing was conducted on March 6, 1991, to consider the Motion to Dismiss.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Respondent granting the Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this case, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3, 5 and 9. 2 12-13. 3 15-16 and 18-21. See 14. 15. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the scores of the bidders for the "option period" criterion reflected on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation were modified or reconsidered on the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The suggestion that "the department had discretion to change scores in any of the remaining eight categories" is a conclusion of law and is rejected. These proposed facts are not relevant to the issue raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Nor was any evidence presented to support these proposed findings. 12. The last sentence is a conclusion of law and is rejected. Proposed Findings of Fact of the Respondent and Intervenor Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 3 and 7. 5-6 and hereby accepted. 4 8-12. 5 See 14. 6 15 and 17. 18. The last sentence involves an issue not raised in the Motion to Dismiss or at the motion hearing. Nor was any evidence presented to support these proposed findings. See the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire 1589 Metropolitan Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Benjamin E. Poitevent Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues presented in this proceeding are whether Petitioner submitted the lowest and best bid on CTB 5998 and whether Petitioner is entitled to the bid award.
Findings Of Fact On November 5, 1990, Florida A & M University, acting as the agent of the Board of Regents, issued a Call to Bid (CTB) for the repainting and renovation of Bragg Stadium (repainting project). The total project was estimated to cost $595,000.00. The funds for the project would come from the Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund appropriated by the legislature and passed into law in the State's budget. 1/ Specifically, the funds for the repainting project were appropriated by the legislature as a specific line item in the 1990-1991 budget. The line in the budget read, "Fire Code Corrections/Repainting-Bragg Stadium (includes $490,000.00 Reimb. to Aux. Fund), of $682,000.00." The $682,000.00 figure was obtained from several documents submitted by FAMU to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents then submitted the University's budget requests to the Commissioner of Education who, in turn, submitted an integrated budget to the governor and legislature. See Chapter 216 and 235, Florida Statutes, for the specifics of this budgetary process. The beginning of the budgetary process in relation to the repainting project occurred on October 16, 1989, when Louis A. Murray, the Associate Vice President of Florida A&M sent a document titled "the University's 1990-91/1992- 93 Capital Improvement Fee Project List for Legislative Consideration" to Dr. Carl Blackwell, the Vice Chancellor for Budgets. The document contained two attachments entitled "Capital Improvement Fee Project List, Project Information Sheet" (Project Information Sheet) for the fire code corrections at Bragg Stadium and the repainting of Bragg Stadium. It also included a Project Information Sheet for the remodeling of the Commons Building. The Project Information sheet dealing with the repainting and renovation of Bragg Stadium contained the amount of funding being requested by FAMU for the repainting project and a breakdown of the project's estimated costs. The project cost detail for the repainting of Bragg Stadium states: Construction $495,000.00 (Assumes bid date of 1991) Professional Fees . . . . 43,000.00 Resident Supervision . . . (No entry) Equipment . . . . . 30,000.00 Contingency . . . . . 27,000.00 Total Project Cost: $595,000.00 Importantly, the Project Information Sheet for the repainting of Bragg Stadium contains the basis utilized by FAMU to arrive at the repainting project's estimate. FAMU represented in the Project Information Sheet as follows: The basis for the estimate is the bid experience of a prior advertisement of the project by our own Plant Operations Maintenance Office, which came in at over $400,000. 2/ This estimate was again verified in a letter, dated October 25, 1989, from Dr. Murray to Dr. Blackwell. The letter states, in part, as follows: . . . . Since the opportunity for completing this project is between football seasons, the University wishes to advance dollar requirements from its Auxiliary Trust Fund with expected reimbursement from Capital Improvement Trust Fund after Legislative approval on July 1, 1990. This action will permit us to proceed with the Bid process and construction contract through completion before the 1990 football season. The scope of this project is summarized as follows: This project includes sandblasting, repainting and structural repairs for Bragg Stadium. Sandblasting and repainting is estimated at $415,000, while structural repair, primarily isolated rust spots, will cost approximately $75,000. . . . . The total estimate in Dr. Murray's October 25, 1990, letter was $490,000.00. It was this letter which prompted the parenthetical language in the line item of the General appropriations act for 1990-1991, passed by the legislature and enacted it to law. The Project Information Sheet for the fire code corrections to Bragg Stadium (fire code project) contained a project cost detail as follows: Construction $70,000.00 Professional . . . . . 7,000.00 Resident Supervision . . . (No entry) Equipment . . . . . (No entry) Contingency . . . . . 10,000.00 Total Project Cost: $87,000.00 The contract for the fire code corrections was let for bid prior to the repainting project. The amount of the contract for the fire code project was approximately $107,000.00. This contract amount exceeded the amount of the construction portion of the Project Cost Detail of $70,000.00 shown in the Project Information Sheet for the fire code project. Dr. Murray testified that this action was acceptable because it was within the discretion of Florida A&M to use the $682,000.00 appropriation to perform the fire code project in any amount it deemed appropriate, without regard to the break-outs shown in the Project Information Sheets. However, even assuming the correctness of Dr. Murray's position and deducting the amount of the fire code project's contract and the architectural fees of $7,000.00 listed in the Project Information Sheet, $568,000.00 of the original budgeted amount of $682,000.00 would remain for use on the repainting project. Florida A&M University, also prepared a document titled, "Summary of Capital Improvement Fee Projects for 1990-91/1992-93." The document is a summary of Florida A&M's budget requests for those years. This document also lists the fire code project and the repainting project along with the requested funding for those projects for the years 1990 through 1991. The funds requested for the projects are broken into three categories; Planning, Construction and Equipment. The entries for the repainting project show that the amount of $522,000.00 is for "Construction". The $522,000.00 figure was obtained by taking the $495,000.00 figure for construction contained within the Project Information Sheet for the repainting project, and adding the amount of the contingency cost ($27,000.00) for the project which was also shown on the Project Information Sheet. The combined total for the two projects was $682,000.00, the exact amount appropriated by the legislature for the two projects. Once the legislature had appropriated the money, FAMU, on November 5, 1990, requested that A Capital Outlay Implementation Plan be established with the Capital Outlay Trust Fund. The establishment of such a Plan is similar to creating a special account within the trust fund from which the University can draw. On November 26, 1990, the Plan was established for both projects in the amount of $682,000.00, as had been appropriated by the legislature. 3/ The Capital Outlay Implementation Plan contained a section titled, "estimated budget". The estimated budget contained estimates for the various phases of both projects as follows: Construction. $565,000 Professional Fees. 50,000 Furnishings and Equipment. 30,000 Contingencies. 37,000 .................................$682,000 Significantly, these documents were the only pre-established construction budgets developed by FAMU prior to the opening of the bids in this case. 4/ The specific pre-established construction budget for the repainting project was $522,000.00. Later, after the filing of the bid protest, FAMU would attempt to render a strained interpretation of the phrase "pre-established construction budget" contained in the bid specifications and engage in some inappropriate accounting in order to create several lower budget estimates. The Bid Package for CTB 5998 provided in the "Instructions to Bidders", Item D-21, Rejection of Bids, as follows: The owner reserves the right to reject any and all bids when in the opinion of the owner such rejection is in the best interest of the owner. The Bid Package further provided in the "Instructions to Bidders" at B-23, Contract Award, page 16 of 106, in relevant part: The contract will be awarded by the Florida Board of Regents for projects $500,000 or more, and by the President of the University, on behalf of the Florida Board of Regents, for projects of less than $500,000.00, to the lowest qualified and responsible bidder provided the bid is reasonable and it is in the best interest of the owner to accept it. . . . The contract award will be made to the responsible bidder submitting the lowest responsible aggregate bid within the pre-established construction budget. The aggregate bid shall consist of the base bid plus accepted active alternate bids, or less accepted deductive alternate bids, applied in the numerical order in which they are listed on the bid form. If the base bid exceeds the amount of the pre-established construction budget, the owner may reject all bids. (Emphasis added) A mandatory pre-bid conference was held on December 6, 1990, and was attended by seventeen contractors, including Petitioner. By the terms of the bid package, the bid opening date was set for December 18, 1990. However, by addendum, the bid opening date was extended to December 21, 1990. Seven bids were submitted in response to the original solicitation. 5/ The bids were opened at 10:00 a.m. on December 21, 1990, at the conference center of Florida A&M University. The bids were opened by Chuks Onwunli on behalf of Florida A&M, and tabulated by William Sabella, a representative of the architectural firm , Barnett, Fronczak Architects, the consulting architects for the repainting project. The opening and tabulation of all the bids was recorded on a document titled "Bid Tabulation". The result of the opening was that Phoenix Coating was the low bidder with a bid of $419,000.00. Feimster-Peterson, Inc., was the second lowest bidder with a bid of $474,320.00, and Monoko, Inc., was the third low bidder with a bid of 487,462.00. The four other bidders listed on the bid tabulation sheet were all over the amount of $490,000.00. 6/ As can be seen from the numbers, the top three bids were well within the pre-established construction budget for the repainting project. On December 21, 1990, Feimster-Peterson sent a Notice of Protest by telecopy and overnight delivery for delivery on Monday, December 24th. The basis of the protest was that the low bidder, Phoenix Coating, was not responsive because it had not attended the mandatory pre-bid conference and had not complied with the minority participation requirements of the specifications. On December 28, 1990, Feimster-Peterson sent its formal protest to Forrest Kelly, the Director of Capital Programs at the Florida Board of Regents by telecopy and by overnight delivery with delivery on December 31, 1990. The formal protest was filed in a timely manner. On or about January 14, 1991, Oscar Martinez, the Purchasing Director for Florida A&M issued a letter regarding Bid No. 5927 for the repainting and renovation of Bragg Stadium. 7/ The letter rejected all seven bids. Phoenix Coating's bid was found to be nonresponsive because it did not meet the 15% minority participation requirements of Bid 5998 and because the company had not attended the December 6, 1990, mandatory pre-bid meeting. Because Phoenix Coating's bid was non-responsive, Petitioner became the lowest responsive bid on CTB 5998. The letter further advised that the other six bids, including Petitioner's bid, were rejected because all six bids allegedly exceeded the pre- existing construction budget estimate for the project. The letter did not contain any language affording Petitioner a clear point of entry as required by Section 120.53, Florida Statutes. The letter did indicate that the University would modify the scope of work. Attached to the same letter was a new invitation to bid. Clearly, at this point in time, FAMU knew or should have known that there was a bid protest filed with it which was unresolved and which required a formal administrative hearing. However, during this time instead of following its statutory duties under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, FAMU, at its peril, chose to re-let the project for bids. The new bid opening was set for February 28, 1991, and a new mandatory pre-bid meeting was also set for February 28, 1991. The bid deadline was extended to March 21, 1991. The scope of the work was not significantly altered in the re-bid. 8/ On or about January 16, 1991, counsel for Feimster-Peterson sent a letter to the Florida Board of Regents. The letter was prompted by Robert Petersen's, president and stockholder of Petitioner, belief that something was not right about the monetary and funding claims that FAMU was putting forth as its basis for rejecting all the bids. In essence, the numbers Mr. Petersen was aware of, which did not include any of the Project Information Sheet figures referenced above, did not make any sense to him. The letter stated, in part, as follows: Re-bidding the Project is unfair to all bidders now that the results of the first bid have been made public. Each bidder now has a target . . . to shoot at which will override the customary free market environment. Rewriting the Specifications will not eliminate this effect. Be advised that Feimster-Peterson requests the opportunity to either see the estimates or negotiate with the Board to reach a mutually acceptable scope of work. I request that you delay re-bidding until this option can be explored. (Emphasis added). On January 23, 1991, counsel for Feimster-Peterson again wrote to the Office of General Counsel at Florida A&M University and stated in relevant part: This letter is to reiterate our concern for the actions taken by the Florida A&M Purchasing Department and regarding the painting contract for Bragg Stadium. We filed bid protest for the Florida Board of Regents filed on December 28, 1990 pursuant to paragraph B-22 of the bid documents. Neither the Florida Board of Regents or the administration of Florida A&M has acted upon our bid protest. The bid protest remains unresolved and we intend to pursue the administrative remedies provided to us through the bid protest procedure. Moreover, it is our position that the decisions taken by the Florida A&M Purchasing Department subsequent to our filing may be included and adjudicated within the administrative procedures of the original bid protest . . . Mr. Martinez apparently takes the position that a new bid protest filing is necessary to formally dispute his decision [about the University's available budget]. As indicated, we disagree and intend to dispute this action within the existing, unresolved bid protest . . . By indicating the precise amount of the budget, Mr. Martinez has eliminated the basic purpose of competitive bidding, which is to achieve the lowest responsive price. All bidders now have a target price, and a minor modification of the specifications will not eliminate this effect. This serves neither Florida A&M's interest nor the interest of the original responsive bidders. Feimster-Peterson has requested that negotiations be commenced so that a mutually beneficial contract price be determined and the contract work commenced. To date, Mr. Martinez has refused to enter such negotiations and have given several oral, unsatisfactory reasons for this position. The Purchasing Department's refusal to negotiate with Feimster-Peterson, the lowest responsible bidder, should be clearly articulated in writing and sent to us. Feimster-Peterson believes such negotiations may prove successful, and work could commence without further delay or expense to Florida A&M . . . . (Emphasis added). Feimster-Peterson intends to pursue its rights under the bid protest originally filed on December 28, 1990. As low responsive bidder, Feimster-Peterson is entitled to an award of the contract . . This letter was sent by both telecopy and Federal Express to Mr. Holifield at the Office of the General Counsel and added the additional issues of whether FAMU's action in regard to this bid constituted bid shopping and whether Petitioner's bid, in fact, exceeded the estimated construction budget for Bid 5998. 9/ Significantly, the Martinez letter did not mention that Respondent was rejecting Petitioner's bid because the University believed that it could increase the number of contractors participating in a re-bid and could achieve a lower price by re-bidding the project. This issue was raised for the first time at the hearing. In that regard, the evidence clearly indicates that Respondent was attempting to shop its bid in order to obtain a lower price by re-bidding the project. Bid shopping is a process by which the general contractor or, as in this case, the owner of a project attempts to play off one bidder against another bidder in order to obtain a lower price. Bid shopping is done either by establishing a target figure which is represented to bidders to be a number which must be beaten in order to obtain the contract; or by the bid shopper relaying the amount of a competitor's bid to a bidder or group of bidders in order to encourage the bidder or group of bidders to lower its bid to below that of the competitor in order to secure the contract. A basic assumption in bid shopping is that the scope of the work is not significantly altered in order to lower the cost of the project. Bid shopping is considered to be unethical in a public competitive bidding situation and has been disapproved of by the Florida courts. In this case, Respondent established a target price in its letter of January 14, 1991, by communicating the amount of the alleged overage, enabling a bidder to calculate the budget figures to shoot for and, at the same time, keeping the scope of the work substantially the same in the re-bid. Additionally, the amount of the bids, as well as details involving those bids became public once the bids were opened, converting the possibility of unfair advantage accruing to potential bidders on the re-bid to a probability of such unfair advantage in this instance. 10/ Such a reason for rejecting the bids in this case strikes at the very heart of the bid process, which is to ensure that bidders have an equal and fair opportunity to have their bids considered and prevent an agency from picking and choosing among various bidders or potential bidders. There was absolutely no evidence which indicated that the number of contractors participating in Bid 5998 was non-competitive or was in any way fundamentally unfair. 11/ By rejecting all the bids in order to attempt to shop its bid, Respondent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and therefore, its rejection of the bids in this case cannot stand. Additionally, Respondent's attempt to reject the bids in order to allegedly increase the number of bidders participating in the re-bid and thereby reduce the price, violated its own specification in the bid documents which states: The contract award will be made to the responsible bidder submitting the lowest responsible aggregate bid within the pre-established construction budget. (emphasis supplied) By going outside the scope of its bid specifications, Respondent has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and may not reject Petitioner's bid on this basis. After the protest of Feimster-Peterson raised the issue of the amount of the budget/estimate and after its request to see the budget, Florida A&M began to review documents to determine its response to Feimster-Peterson. The basis underlying the figures cited in Mr. Martinez's letter of January 13, 1991, was arrived at by subtracting amounts spent by Florida A&M from the $682,000.00 appropriated by the legislature for the fire code and repainting projects. The overage of $55,000.00 claimed in Mr. Martinez's letter of January 14, 1991, was calculated by taking the "proposed budget" of $682,000.00 and subtracting the amount of $257,105.00 "in expenses for the stadium", for an "available balance" of $424,895.00. 12/ It was this account balance which was being claimed by FAMU to be the pre-existing construction budget referred to in the bid documents. Such an account balance does not constitute a pre-established construction budget because the balance was not established prior to the submission or opening of the bids. Additionally, an account balance is simply not a budget as that term is normally defined and used in the bid documents. Mr. Martinez did not identify the source of the expenses or the purpose for those expenditures. Mr. Martinez deferred all questions as to verification of the figures or the purpose of the expenditures to "Bob", which referred to Robert Goodwin, Jr. Mr. Goodwin was and still is, the Director of the Facilities Planning Office of Florida A&M and is responsible for the various purchase orders involved in this case. Mr. Goodwin took his instructions on which purchase order numbers to use from Dr. Murray and/or Dr. Humphries, Associate Vice President and President of Florida A&M University, respectively. For reasons outlined later in this Recommended Order, the expenditures claimed for the stadium are highly suspect. On or about February 6, 1991, Mr. Holifield, General Counsel of Florida A&M University, responded to Petitioner by enclosing a statement of budget estimate for Bid No. 5998. 13/ Attached to Mr. Holifield's letter of February 6th was a memorandum addressed "[t]o whom it may concern" dated February 5, 1991, from Robert Goodwin, Jr., the Director of Facilities & Planning for Florida A&M. The memo stated that the "budget estimate" for the Project was $367,351.00. Mr. Holifield's letter noted that Feimster-Peterson's bid "exceeded the budget estimate by $106,969.00." (emphasis added). He further noted that FAMU had chosen to re-bid the repainting project rather than accept the bid of the Petitioner. Mr. Holifield also addressed the pending bid protest by Feimster-Peterson as follows: Florida A&M University feels that it is the best interest of the citizens and taxpayers of the State of Florida to re-bid this Project rather than to award the job to your client. In view of the discrepancy between the bidder and the client and the estimated budget it would seem that now that you have been provided with the budget estimate, that you and your client would be willing to forego the bid protest which you are attempting to pursue. Rather, it would appear to be far more appropriate for you to simply join in the rebidding process. (emphasis added). Again, the basis for the decreasing budget figure was the legislatively appropriated funds available for the project less amounts which were supposedly attributable to the repainting and fire code projects, i.e. the account balance. However, what the evidence clearly showed was that, like the budget figures underlying Mr. Martinez's assertions in his letter of January 14, 1991, the latest budget figure of $367,351.00 was calculated by Florida A&M subtracting sums for expenditures which were made for projects unrelated to the fire code or repainting projects. In fact, several of the expenditures were for improvements to the public address system at Bragg Stadium. Similarly, some of the amounts claimed to have been expended for the repainting and fire code projects were expended for architectural fees on other projects. 14/ FAMU's officials were aware that such accounting was inappropriate. From this evidence, it appears that FAMU is attempting to spend or has spent money specifically appropriated for two certain purposes on projects unrelated to the appropriation and not approved for such use by either the legislature or the Board of Regents. Since these expenditures are all part of other projects separate and distinct from the fire code and repainting projects, they should not have been subtracted from the amount of money available to FAMU for the repainting project. 15/ There is no doubt that this "budget estimate" and the budget underlying the assertions made by Mr. Martinez in his letter of January 14, 1991, were false and were red herrings, developed after the fact, in an attempt by Respondent to throw Petitioner off the track of an otherwise valid bid protest. Moreover, beyond utilizing improper accounting, one of the most significant facts in this proceeding was that FAMU created no less than eight separate figures which it claimed to be the budgets for this project. Which figure FAMU used depended on who FAMU was dealing with at the time and the result FAMU desired to achieve. Such tactics by an agency are totally unacceptable and the use of such false figures to justify rejection of a bidder's bid is nothing short of bad faith on the part of an agency akin to fraud. Since Petitioner submitted the lowest and best responsive bid, Petitioner, at this point in time, was entitled to the award of Bid 5998. Another point not directly raised by FAMU in this proceeding, but suggested by the underlying facts and necessary to the resolution of this bid protest, is the question of whether bids may be rejected by an agency if the funds necessary to complete the project are no longer available, i.e. the agency has run out of money. On the surface, given the constraints of Florida's finance system, an honest lack of funds would appear to be an appropriate basis for an agency to reject all the bids. See Section 235.42, Florida Statutes. However, in this case, the evidence does not support a finding that the University no longer has the necessary funds to pay for the repainting project since the actual money from the trust fund has not been disbursed to FAMU and since FAMU's representations in regards to the status of the repainting project's account balance appear to be based on unlawful accounting and are less than credible. Since the evidence did not establish that FAMU no longer has the funds necessary to complete the project, Petitioner was entitled to the award of Bid 5998. However, because of FAMU's actions regarding Petitioner's bid protest which actions were highly prejudicial to Petitioner, time had moved on and, on February 25, 1991, FAMU discovered that there was lead in some portion of the paint on Bragg Stadium, in the amount of 1.9% by weight. The test was conducted by Professional Services Industries, Inc. on some paint chips from the stadium. The test utilized by Professional Services is known as the TCLP test. This discovery began a review by Florida A&M, in conjunction with Barnett, Fronczak Architects, of what changes, if any, needed to be made to the Specifications and what options were available for carrying out the repainting of the stadium. 16/ On March 19, 1991, the Project was "cancelled" by Addendum number 4 until the fall of 1991. Presently, it appears uncontradicted that the paint which is on Bragg Stadium contains lead. It is probable that the lead is contained in the primer coat, which is the first coat on the steel. In fact, the current specifications for the repainting project call for a red lead and oil primer coat to be placed on the steel structure of the stadium. Of the options which have been proposed by the architect, two of them assume that the lead paint will not be removed from the structure, but will essentially be sealed in by the new coatings. These options will avoid the creation and need for disposal of any hazardous waste containing lead and should result in either the same cost to perform the work or in a reduction in cost to perform the work. The third option is to completely remove all the paint and possibly create material which may be hazardous waste. This option is essentially the same type of sandblasting called for in Bid 5998, but may require more money to perform. Any possible increase in the cost of Bid 5998 would be due to the greater expense of disposing of any hazardous waste, if any such waste is created by the blasting operation, and whether the presence of the lead is an unforeseen condition as defined in the proposed contract which would entitle Petitioner to an increase of the bid price caused by the potential cost of disposal to it. In this case, the evidence did not demonstrate that the presence of the lead was an unforeseen condition. Article 3.15 of the proposed contract when compared to Article 10.1 appears to comtemplate the discovery of potentially hazardous materials. Additionally, as indicated earlier, the current specifications of Bid 5998 call for a lead primer coat. Under all the facts of this case, the presence of lead or lack of lead in the paint on Bragg Stadium would appear to be a circumstance the risk of which is assumed by the bidder in bidding the project; and therefore, would not be a changed or unforeseen condition which would justify rejecting all the bids. Importantly, the scope of the work, i.e. sandblasting and structural repair, would not change. Sandblasting is the same whether the surface being removed contains lead or does not contain lead. The structural repair required by Bid 5998 is not effected by the presence of lead in the paint on Bragg Stadium. The only differences would occur in the type of equipment used and the type of respirators worn by the workers. The equipment for lead removal has vacuums incorporated in its operation and uses a steel grit instead of sand. The steel grit actually reduces the amount of any potential hazardous waste by compacting it into a smaller volume. The respirators differ in the type of filters. Neither of these differences affect the cost of the work required in Bid 5998. Similarly, disposing of the end product of the blast operation would still be required under Bid 5998 whether the debris contains lead or does not contain lead. The only difference would be the ultimate disposal site of the barrels of debris, i.e whether at a regular landfill or at a disposal site for hazardous waste. All of these differences are already required under EPA, OSHA and DER rules regulating lead abatement, toxic chemicals and hazardous waste and are utilized by Petitioner when it encounters lead in its paint removal operations. Moreover, the bid documents contemplate that the bidder is familiar with all federal, state and local laws and regulations which affect the project in any manner. See Section B-3 "Instructions to Bidders." While it is uncontroverted that the paint contains lead, it is also not clear whether the end product created by a blasting operation would be hazardous waste requiring expensive disposal in a hazardous waste landfill and what amount, if any, would need to be placed in a hazardous waste landfill. The TCLP tests performed by Professional Service Industries were run on paint chips and not the abrasive debris that remains after a blasting operation. Therefore, the TCLP test results have no relevance as to what amount of hazardous waste, if any, would need to be removed from the site. In fact, it is impossible to determine whether the debris left over from the blast operation will be hazardous waste until the blast operation has begun and produced debris sufficiently representative of what may be expected during the course of the work and which is capable of being tested. The issue of lead arose long after the rejection of the bids on the basis of Feimster-Peterson's bid being over the budget and would not have become a potential basis had FAMU acted in a responsible manner in the award of this bid. It is understood that the University and its architects are still trying to determine what, if any, action needs to be taken regarding the presence of lead in the paint. The evidence established that at a minimum the architect would have suspended the project to give them time to study the lead and determine what course of action should be taken. At the most, the architect would have cancelled the project. Added to such an analysis is the fact that the Bid specifications appear to require a red lead and oil primer paint to be placed on the structural steel of the stadium and that under the facts of this case, the presence of lead in the paint on the stadium would not be an unforeseen condition. In either event, the discovery of the lead did not undermine the scope of the repainting project as it is comtemplated in the bid documents and may have only resulted in change orders under the terms of the proposed contract. 17/ The General Conditions of the contract provide in Article 3, Administration of the Contract, paragraph 4.3, Claims and Disputes, subparagraph 4.3.6, Claims for Concealed or Unknown Conditions, as follows: If conditions are encountered at the site which are (1) subsurface or otherwise concealed physical conditions which differ materially from those indicated in the contract documents or (2) unknown physical conditions of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily found to exist and generally recognized as inherent in construction activities of the character provided for in the Contract Documents, then notice by the observing party shall be given to the other party promptly before conditions are disturbed and in no event later than twenty-one days after the first observance of the conditions. The Architect/Engineer will promptly investigate such conditions and, if they differ materially and cause an increase or decrease in the contractor's cost of, or time required for, performance of any part of the work, will recommend an equitable adjustment in the Contract Sum or Contract Time, or both . . . . Article 7, Changes in the Work, also provides a mechanism by which the Architect/Engineer and the Owner may order changes in the work after execution of the contract. Paragraph 7.3, Construction Change Directives, provides the mechanism by which the amount of a construction change directive is determined. A change order is simply a revision of the scope of the contract, requiring that something be done differently, that more be done, or that less be done, than what is within the original scope of work of the contract. Article 14, Termination or Suspension of the Contract, paragraph 14.3, Suspension by the Owner for Convenience, provides in relevant part: The owner may, without cause, order the contractor in writing to suspend, delay or interrupt the work in whole or in part for such period of time as the owner may determine. An adjustment shall be made for increases in the cost of performance of the contract including profit on the increased cost performance, caused by suspension, delay or interruption . . . . (Emphasis added). It is clear that conditions, such as the lead in this case, are contemplated by both the bid and the contract which is part of that bid. In this case, but for FAMU's actions, Petitioner would have been awarded the contract prior to the discovery of the lead. Had Florida A&M entered into a contract with Feimster-Peterson to perform the repainting project when it should have, it would have been guided by Article 14.3 of the specifications, "Suspension by the Owner for Convenience." The evidence did not demonstrate that the discovery of the lead would sufficiently change the scope of the repainting project to the extent that a new bid would have to be developed and that the contract terms of Bid 5998 were inadequate to handle any changes in the scope of the work for the repainting project. Such a result is especially desirable where, as in this case, the University has acted in such a way so as to undermine the fairness of the competitive bidding process and is attempting to spend appropriated money in a manner not authorized by statute. In essence, FAMU has undermined the competitive bidding process to the extent that it would be unfair to re-bid the project since it is impossible to remove FAMU's past conduct from any rebid on any re-vamped specifications. The only remedy, in this case is to award Bid 5998 to Petitioner as the lowest and best responsible bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Florida A&M University enter, on behalf of the Board of Regents, a Final Order awarding Bid 5998 to Petitioner as the lowest, responsible bidder on the repainting project. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of September, 1991 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 1991.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Environmental Protection's decision to reject all bids submitted for the project entitled BDRS 52-01/02 was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, All America Homes of Gainesville, Inc. (All America), is a corporation doing business in the State of Florida. All America submitted a timely written bid in response to the Department's ITB and filed timely protests to the Department's actions. The Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection, is an agency of the State of Florida which manages and operates state parks under its jurisdiction, and solicits construction projects in state parks, pursuant to Chapter 258, Part I, Florida Statutes, through its Division of Recreation and Parks, Bureau of Design and Recreation Services. The ITB In November, 2001, the Department issued an ITB on a construction project entitled Hillsborough River State Park Concession Building, project number BDRS 52-01/02. The ITB included the Bid Specifications for the project. Bids were required to be submitted no later than 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday, December 18, 2001, at the Bureau's Tallahassee, Florida, office. The written Specifications define several terms, including, but not limited, to the following: ADDENDUM: A written explanation, interpretation, change, correction, addition, deletion, or modification, affecting the contract documents, including drawings and specifications issued by the OWNER [Department] and distributed to the prospective Bidders prior to the bid opening. ALTERNATE BID: Separate optional bid item for more or less project requirement used for tailoring project to available funding. Also may consist of alternate construction techniques. BASE BID: Formal bid exclusive of any alternate bids. BID FORM: The official form on which the OWNER requires formal bids to be prepared and submitted. ORAL STATEMENTS: Verbal instruction. NOTE: No oral statement of any person, whomever shall in any manner or degree modify or otherwise affect the provisions of the contract documents.[1] SEALED BID: The formal written offer of the Bidder for the proposed work when submitted on the prescribed bid form, properly signed and guaranteed. The Bid Specifications also contained the following relevant sections: Alternatives If the OWNER wishes to learn the relative or additional construction cost of an alternative method of construction, an alternative use of type of material or an increase or decrease in scope of the project, these items will be defined as alternates and will be specifically indicated and referenced to the drawings and specifications. Alternates will be listed in the bid form in such a manner that the Bidder shall be able to clearly indicate what sums he will add to (or deduct from) his Base Bid. The OWNER will judge for himself that such alternates are of comparable character and quality to the specified items. The Order of the alternate may be selected by the Department in any sequence so long as such acceptance out of order does not alter the designation of the low bidder. ADDENDA If the Consultant[2] finds it would be expedient to supplement, modify or interpret any portion of the bidding documents during the bidding period, such procedure will be accomplished by the issuance of written Addenda to the bidding documents which will be delivered or mailed by the OWNER'S Contracts section to all bidders who have requested bidding documents. Interpretation No interpretation of the meaning of the drawings, specifications or other bidding documents and no correction of any apparent ambiguity, inconsistency or error therein will be made to any Bidder orally. Every request for such interpretation or correction should be in writing, addressed to the Consultant. All such interpretations and supplemental instructions will be in the form of written Addenda to the bidding documents. Only the interpretation or correction so given by the Consultant in writing and approved by the OWNER shall be binding, and prospective Bidders are advised that no other source is authorized to give information concerning, or to explain or interpret, the bidding documents. B-16 Bid Modification Bid modification will be accepted from Bidders, if addressed as indicated in Advertisement for Bids and if received prior to the opening of bids. No bid modification will be accepted after the close of bidding has been announced. Modifications will only be accepted if addressed in written or printed form submitted with the bid in sealed envelopes. Telegrams, facsimiles, separate sealed envelopes, written on printed modifications on the outside of the sealed envelopes will not be accepted. All bid modifications must be signed by an authorized representative of the Bidder. Modification will be read by the OWNER at the opening of formal bids. B-21 Rejection of Bids The OWNER reserves the right to reject any and all bids when such rejection is in the interest of the State of Florida, and to reject the bid of a bidder who the OWNER determines is not in a position to perform the work. B-23 Award of Bid . . .The qualified Bidder submitting the lowest bid will be that Bidder who has submitted the lowest base bid plus any selected alternates. . . . The OWNER reserves the right to waive any minor irregularities in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the OWNER. The Award of Bid will be issued by the OWNER only with responsible Bidders, found to meet all requirements for Award of Bid, qualified by experience and in a financial position to do the work specified. Each bidder shall, if so requested by the OWNER, present additional evidence of his experience, qualifications and ability to carry out the terms of the Agreement. (Emphasis in original, except for Section B-10.) The Bid Form is included with the Specifications and provides in part: Base Bid: Furnish labor, equipment, Lump Sum $ supervision and material to construct a new concession building of 2940 square feet located at the Hillsborough River State Park along with the alteration of the existing concession building according to plans and specifications. Alternate #1: Furnish labor, equipment, Add Amt.$__ supervision and material to renovate the existing concession building according to plans and specifications. There is a separate section for "Allowances," i.e., Section 01210, for the Hillsborough State Park. This section provides in part: SECTION 01210 – ALLOWANCES * * * 1.2 SUMMARY This Section includes administrative and procedural requirements governing allowances. Certain materials and equipment are specified in the Contract Documents and are defined by this [sic] specifications as material and labor to be provided against a pre-determined allowance. Allowances have been established in lieu of additional requirements and to defer selection of actual materials and equipment to a later date when additional information is available for evaluation. If necessary, additional requirements will be issued by Change Order. * * * 3.3 SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES A. Allowance #1: Include in the base bid an allowance for the purchase and installation of. . . kitchen equipment. . . . The total dollar amount of the allowance to be included shall be $12,000.00. There is also a separate section for "Alternates," i.e., section 01230, for Hillsborough River State Park, which provides in part: SECTION 01230 – ALTERNATES * * * 1.3 DEFINITIONS Alternate: An amount proposed by bidders and stated on the Bid Form for certain work defined in the Bidding Requirements that may be added to or deducted from the Base Bid amount if OWNER decides to accept a corresponding change either in the amount of construction to be completed or in the products, materials, equipment, systems, or installation methods described in the Contract Documents. The cost or credit for each alternate is the net addition to or deduction from the Contract Sum to incorporate alternate into the Work. No other adjustments are made to the Contract Sum. . . . . 3.1 SCHEDULE OF ALTERNATES A. Alternate No. 1: Renovate the existing concession building in its entirety as shown in the drawings and specified herein. (emphasis added.) At this stage of the bidding documents, the contractor/bidder is requested to provide a Base Bid/Lump Sum on the Bid Form to "[f]urnish labor, equipment,. . .to construct a new concession building," and to provide an additional and separate amount for Alternate No. 1 to "[f]urnish labor, equipment, . . . to renovate the existing concession building." On December 13, 2001, the Bureau issued "Addendum No. One (1)" (written by the architect) to the ITB on the "Hillsborough River State Park – Concession Building." The Addendum contained the following relevant sections: Specification Section 01210: Allowances Add the following new paragraph 3.3.B: ”Allowance #2: Include in the base bid an allowance for the renovations of the existing concession building; renovations shall be defined by the Owner. The total dollar amount of the allowance to be included shall be $25,000." Specification Section 01230: Alternates Modify paragraph 3.1.A. as follows: "Alternate No. 1: Renovate the existing concession building as defined by the Owner, and as provided for under Section 01210, Allowances." (emphasis added.) Each contractor was required to sign the Addendum and attach it to the bid. By definition, and pertinent here, an addendum is an additional written instruction to a contractor during the bidding process. Based on the weight of the evidence, the purpose of this Addendum was to require the contractor to include a $25,000.00 Allowance (for Allowance # 2) in the Base Bid, for the work which might be performed if the Department requested the work to be performed for Alternate No. 1, i.e., for the renovation of the existing concession building.3 (The Department's architect decided it would cost approximately $25,000.00 to renovate the existing concession building, hence Allowance # 2.) In other words, the Addendum does not have a specific dollar amount to be included for Alternate No. 1. Rather, the $25,000.00 is an Allowance for the work described as Alternate No. 1, but the amount is to be included in the Base Bid and not as a separate line item, dollar amount. But, importantly, the Addendum did not delete the potential work to be performed as described in Alternate No. 1, although Mr. Bowman and others believed that the Addendum deleted Alternate No. 1. It deleted the necessity to place a specific dollar amount on the Bid Form for Alternate No. 1. (Mr. Bowman is a registered Professional Engineer and a licensed contractor. He has worked for the Department for 15 years and has served as Bureau Chief for two years. He supervises the contract section and the design section, which was responsible for preparing the technical plans and specifications and bidding out the job.) Mr. Bowman offered the following explanation why he believed the Addendum was confusing: Okay. I think the confusion that was created, you know, I think the addendum in itself, you know, said add $25,000 to the base bid, but then on the bid form, it still had the space down there for alternate number one, which alternate number one, which alternate number one had become $25,000 that was to be allowed for the concession building, and I think that's where the confusion came in because I think they were still confused, that they weren't really sure that they should not put that 25 down there but they knew they had been told in the addendum to do it and I think that's the reason for the notes and we got to the correspondence on the bid form, was they wanted to make sure that that's what we were wanting to do. And I think that's where the confusion came in. Like I said, it's always, if you could go back and do it again, it would be much wiser just to issue a whole new bid form and then we wouldn't be here today. But, we didn't do that. Okay. So, that's why we are here. The language in this Addendum, when read with the original Bid Specifications, apparently caused confusion with some of the bidders on the project. Several bidders called Marvin Allen (an architect and project manager for the Department's Bureau of Design and Recreation Services) prior to the submission of the bids, to clarify how the $25,000.00 Allowance should be shown on the Bid Form. (Mr. Allen did not author any of the specifications, including the Addendum.) He was listed as a contact person. He did not contact any bidders. But, Mr. Allen recalled telling each bidder who asked that the Allowance of $25,000.00 should be included in the Base Bid. But, he does not recall the names or numbers of the bidders who called, "possibly" three, four or five. Mr. Allen believed the Addendum was clear. According to Mr. Allen, the bidders who called him found the Addendum confusing. The oral responses to the bidders can be construed as interpretations of the Addendum. However, pursuant to Section B- 10 of the Specifications, any such interpretations were required to "be in the form of written Addenda to the bidding documents." Also, any such questions should have been in writing. If Section B-10 were complied with, all bidders would have been potentially on the same footing, or, at the very least, would have had access to a written clarifying document. Opening of the Bids On December 18, 2001, the bids were opened by Mike Renard, Contracts Manager with the Bureau of Design and Recreation Services, and Susan Maynard, Administrative Assistant. Mr. Dwight Fitzpatrick, a representative of All America, also attended the bid opening. The Bid Form submitted by Nelco showed a Base Bid of $355,478.00 (Lump Sum $355,478.00), and also showed an amount of $25,000.00 on the Alternate # 1 line (Add Amt. $25,000.00). See Finding of Fact 6. (It was clear to Mr. Renard that the $25,000.00 should have been included on Nelco's Base Bid. But Mr. Renard believed that Nelco submitted a responsive bid because the Department only accepted the Base Bid. Mr. Bowman agreed.) Nelco was the only one of five bidders to have a dollar amount in the Alternate #1 line under "Add Amt. $ ." All America submitted the second lowest Base Bid of $362,000.00. There was also a hand-written note on the All- America Bid Form that stated: "Addenda # 1 instruction to place $25,000 allowance in both Base Bid and as alternate # 1." Another hand written note was located below the "Add Amt. $-0-" line: "amount added in Base Bid with $25,000 allowance per Marvin Allen." The Department considered All America's bid responsive. It is a fair inference that three out of five of the other Bid Forms contained language indicating that the bidders were relying on Addendum No. One by placing the $25,000.00 Allowance in the Base Bid.4 It is uncertain whether they did so in light of the instructions of Mr. Allen concerning how to complete the Bids Forms. However, given the nature of the calls to Mr. Allen, there is a reasonable inference that there was some confusion among some of the bidders. The Department determined that Nelco submitted the lowest Base Bid, but the Department's staff had a question as to whether Nelco had included the $25,000.00 in its Base Bid. After conferring with his superiors, Mr. Renard was instructed to call Nelco to make certain that its Base Bid included the Allowance amount ($25,000.00). Mr. Renard spoke with Steve Cleveland, Nelco's Project Manager, "to verify the fact that [Nelco] had the allowance in their base bid." Mr. Cleveland orally confirmed that Nelco's Base Bid included the $25,000.00 Allowance. Mr. Renard asked Mr. Cleveland to send him a letter verifying this statement. Mr. Renard viewed this inquiry as a request for clarification or verification, not an opportunity for Nelco to modify its bid. Mr. Bowman agreed. (Mr. Renard did not believe Addendum No. 1 was confusing.) In a letter dated December 20, 2001, Mr. Cleveland confirmed that Nelco’s Base Bid of $355,478.00 included the Allowance amount and that Nelco could still perform the contract if the $25,000 Allowance was removed from its Base Bid pursuant to the ITB, i.e., that Nelco would perform the contract for $355,478.00 less $25,000.00, or $330,478.00, if the Department did not accept Alternate # 1 and the Allowance. (An alternate does not have to be accepted by the Department.) According to Mr. Renard, Mr. Cleveland never mentioned modifying, changing, or altering Nelco's bid. The Department only accepted the Base Bid for each bid. Mr. Renard did not consider it unusual to call a bidder or contractor to verify information to determine whether they can or cannot perform the work at the stipulated price. He considered it common to make this inquiry. Also, it was common in Mr. Bowman's experience to call a bidder to get clarification. Mr. Renard was not aware of any statute or rule which authorizes the Department to request clarification from a bidder after the bids are opened. Mr. Renard was more familiar with the bid forms than Mr. Allen. After receiving Mr. Cleveland's letter, the Department determined that Nelco submitted the lowest Base Bid and that the $25,000.00 amount that Nelco wrote on the Bid Form Alternate # 1 line, was a minor irregularity in the bid which the Department, as the Owner, could waive pursuant to the ITB. On December 20, 2001, the Department posted the Tabulation of Bids showing the anticipated award of the contract to Nelco. At the hearing, an unsigned letter on Department letterhead was introduced, which was addressed to Nelco and stated that Nelco submitted the apparent low bid. However, Mr. Renard testified that these letters are prepared routinely, but not mailed out without his signature. Mr. Renard did not recall signing the letter or ever sending out such a letter to Nelco. On December 21, 2001, the Department received a Notice of Intent to Protest letter from Allen E. Stine, the President of All America. In his letter, Mr. Stine stated that Nelco’s bid should have been rejected for failure to follow the specified format as per Addendum No. 1, or adjusted to have the $25,000.00 amount added to their Base Bid. Bid Protests All America filed a written formal bid protest on January 4, 2001. On January 9, 2001, Cindy Otero of All America, notified Mr. Renard by letter, and stated that Mr. Stine was available for a hearing regarding the bid protest. On January 28, 2002, Mr. Renard returned All America's check for the bond, stating that it was unnecessary. Mr. Stine recounted a number of unanswered telephone calls after the first protest was filed. During one conversation, Mr. Renard recalled Mr. Stine saying to him, "You can't do this, you can't do this." After receiving the first formal protest, the Department staff consulted with legal staff and reviewed the documents and bid procedures. Based on the number of questions received concerning the Addendum and the hand-written notes on several of the bid forms, Mr. Bowman, Bureau Chief, determined that the bid documents were confusing and ambiguous. (Mr. Bowman stated that this was their first bid protest in his 15 years with the Department.) Therefore, Mr. Bowman decided that it would in the best interest of the State of Florida to reject all of the bids pursuant to the Bid Specifications. Mr. Bowman felt that the ITB should be re-written in order to make it clearer and allowing all of the bidders to re-bid the project without any confusion or ambiguity. Mr. Stine stated that his "senior estimator" told him that the bid language "could be confusing." He and his "senior estimator" had a discussion about whether the Allowance should have been placed in the Base Bid or not. At the time of submission of All America's bid, Mr. Stine was clear that the Allowance should be placed in the Base Bid, especially after calling Mr. Allen. But, his senior estimator was not so clear. In order to appease him, Mr. Stine placed the hand-written note on All America’s proposal. Mr. Stine essentially, "cleaned" up his proposal. At the hearing, Mr. Bowman testified Rule 60D-5.0071, Florida Administrative Code, see Conclusion of Law 59, does not list "confusing or ambiguous bid specifications" as one of the circumstances allowing for the rejection of all bids. However, Mr. Bowman later stated during the hearing that he believed the circumstances listed in Rule 60D-5.0071 were not the only circumstances authorizing the Department to reject all bids. Mr. Bowman testified that he believed that general confusion among the bidders caused by the ambiguous ITB constituted sufficient grounds for rejecting all bids. Mr. Bowman was advised by legal counsel that rejecting all of the bids would probably result in another bid protest by Nelco, All America, or both. Thus, the Department decided to delay addressing All American’s first protest until after posting the rejection of all bids and receiving the subsequent protests, so that all of the protests could be resolved at once in an efficient and economical manner. Notwithstanding the Department's justifications for rejecting all bids and not proceeding on All America's initial protest, the record is unclear why the Department waited several months to reject all bids. On May 13, 2002, the Department posted the rejection of all bids. On May 16, 2002, the Department received a formal written protest of the rejection of all bids filed by All America. On May 17, 2002, Jerome I. Johnson, attorney for the Department, contacted Mr. Robert A. Lash, All America's counsel at the time, concerning the resolution of All America’s formal protest. (Before the final hearing, Mr. Lash, with All America's consent, withdrew as counsel for All America.) The parties agreed to suspend formal bid protest procedures until a meeting could be held between the parties in an attempt to resolve the protests. Mr. Johnson sent a letter dated May 21, 2002, to Mr. Lash confirming this conversation. On June 26, 2002, a meeting was held among the Department staff, legal staff, and Mr. Lash and Mr. Stine, representing All America. The parties were unable to resolve the protests. At the conclusion of the meeting, the parties agreed that formal protest procedures would not be implemented until Mr. Stine could confer further with his counsel. In a letter dated July 5, 2002, Mr. Lash stated that his client wished to proceed with formal protest procedures and requested an administrative hearing on the protests. Are the Specifications and Bid Documents Ambiguous and Was There Confusion? The parties stipulated that "[t]he Addendum language was confusing," notwithstanding the testimony of several witnesses that they were not confused. The Department's determination that the bid Specifications, including the Addendum, and the Bid Form, which remained unchanged after the Addendum was issued, were confusing and ambiguous, is supported by the weight of the evidence. This is particularly true regarding the Bid Form. The Addendum required the bidder to include an Allowance of $25,000.00 in the Base Bid for work described as Alternate # 1. But the Bid Form was unchanged to reflect the Addendum changes. The Bid Form retained a line for the bidder to submit an additional amount for Alternate # 1. Further, it appears that several bidders were confused, including, Mr. Stine, who spoke with Mr. Allen and requested and received clarification. Further, it is unclear whether all of the bidders, including Nelco, were aware of the oral interpretations or clarifications of the Addendum rendered to some of the bidders. Rejection of All Bids Based upon the foregoing, given the standard of review in this proceeding discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the weight of the evidence indicates that the Department's action, in rejecting all bids, was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent. The Department's staff was well-intended and made some mistakes along the way, e.g., by not changing the Bid Form, which they readily admit. But there was a rationale for rejecting all bids under the circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department issue a final order dismissing All America’s Petition to Prevent Rejection of Bids and Award Contract to Petitioner and denying All America's request for attorney’s fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September 2002.
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.
Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.
