The Issue The ultimate issue for determination is whether the Petitioner's discharge by the Respondent constituted discrimination on the basis of handicap within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Having considered all of the evidence in the record, the Hearing Officer makes the following findings of fact: Petitioner was hired as a Mechanic II (Electrician) by Respondent on January 25, 1982 in the Plant Engineering Department. The term "Mechanic II" denoted Petitioner's pay grade. The term "Electrician" designated Petitioner's speciality. Petitioner's pay grade was changed to Electrician and the Mechanic II pay grade was eliminated by Respondent for all such employees on or about November 16, 1983. Petitioner's duties as an Electrician included ladder work, running conduit and wire, repairing laundry and laboratory equipment and appliances, changing ballasts, and repairing electrical beds and nurse-call equipment. Petitioner performed all of the duties of an electrician, including ladder work until approximately November 27, 1985. Three months after he was employed in 1982, Petitioner injured his back while repairing electrical beds. Repairing electrical beds required much bending and stooping. Petitioner filed for Worker's Compensation benefits for the injury he sustained in repairing electrical beds. Petitioner suffered an off-the-job injury in 1983. Respondent permitted Petitioner to go on medical leave for two months. Petitioner again injured his back while working at the Hospital on or about November 27, 1985. Due to his injury, Petitioner was on leave of absence from November 30, 1985, through December 11, 1985. Petitioner returned to work but again went on leave of absence from January 9, 1986, through February 17, 1986. Petitioner returned to work subject to a "light duty" restriction imposed by his physician. On or about June 10, 1986, Petitioner's physician released him for full duty subject to a 15 pound restriction on any lifting. In September, 1986, Petitioner's physician indicated that it was "probably best" for Petitioner to work only 4 hours per day. The Respondent again allowed Petitioner to work 4 hours per day even though he occupied a full-time, 8 hour per day position. In early October, 1986, Petitioner was released by his physician to perform full duty work, even though Petitioner was restricted to half days. Frank Kleese, Petitioner's foreman, asked Petitioner to investigate a problem with an overhead light. Petitioner refused Kleese's directive and stated that, even though he had been released for full duty work, he would not climb a ladder unless his doctor approved it. Petitioner argued with Kleese and used "strong language". Petitioner became belligerent. Petitioner received reprimands for insubordination. When Petitioner refused Kleese's second request to do ladder work, Petitioner received a reprimand for refusing to do the job assigned to him. Both reprimands were discussed with Petitioner. Petitioner later presented a doctor's note stating he could "return to full active duty," but could work only half days with no ladder work. As a result of Petitioner's half day schedule, other electricians were required to do more work. The department as a whole fell behind in its work. Furthermore, light duty work was not always available for Petitioner. While working half days in late 1986, Petitioner was late to work on three occasions. Petitioner's reason for being late, as explained to Frank Kleese, his foreman, was that Petitioner's injury made it difficult for him to get out of bed in the morning. In November, 1986, Clark, Kleese, and Kunz met with Petitioner and advised him that he could not remain on half days indefinitely. Petitioner was advised that unless his condition was found to have improved by his upcoming doctor's appointment on December 1, 1986, he would be placed on medical leave. On December 1, 1986, Petitioner visited his physician, Dr. Richard D. Strain, Jr. Dr. Strain stated that there was no reason to think that Petitioner's condition would change quickly. Dr. Strain was going to send Petitioner home and put him on physician therapy (i.e., not allow him to work at all). Petitioner asked Dr. Strain if he could work half days, and Dr. Strain agreed. Kleese, Kunz, and Clark met with Petitioner and informed him that he would be placed on medical leave as a result of the Petitioner's medical condition. Continuation of his half-day status without any foreseeable cutoff date was not acceptable to the Respondent. On December 4, 1986, Respondent Benefits Supervisor Ralph Rettig advised Dr. Strain that Petitioner had been placed on medical leave of absence because there were no part-time positions available in Petitioner's department. Rettig requested Dr. Strain to advise him as to whether Petitioner's condition was the result of his injury at work and whether Petitioner would ever improve to the level where he could work more than half day duty. Dr. Strain responded to Mr. Rettig in a letter dated December 22, 1986, which indicated that Petitioner's condition was partially caused by degenerative changes. Dr. Strain further stated: Mr. Cabany tells me he is unable to work more than a half day, and I think that is a reasonable thing for him to do. Certainly, a man of his elderly years with the degenerative changes that he has, with super imposed trauma, that would be a good way to go. Petitioner went on medical leave beginning December 17, 1986. Prior to the beginning of his leave, Petitioner failed to fill out the leave of absence request form. When this came to Rettig's attention, Rettig requested that Vernon Clark send Petitioner the form. Clark wrote to Petitioner and informed him that he must fill out the leave of absence request form Clark had enclosed. Clark further informed Petitioner that he would have to request renewal of his leave when it expired in mid-January, 1987, in accordance with Respondent policies. During a telephone conversation several days prior to the expiration of Petitioner's leave, Clark reminded Petitioner that he still had not sent in the original request form for the leave he was then under. Clark also reminded Petitioner that, if he wished to extend his leave, Petitioner would have to submit a written request for extension. Petitioner eventually sent in the signed request form for the leave of absence which he was then under. The signed form stated: "If I do not request an extension of my Leave prior to expiration . . . my employment at Memorial Respondent will be terminated. . . ." Petitioner never submitted a request for an extension of his leave, and Petitioner was terminated. In February, 1987, Ralph Rettig became aware of a part-time porter position in the Respondent's Dietary Department. Mr. Rettig contacted Petitioner and asked him to meet with Joseph Marino, Administrative Director of Food and Nutrition Services, with regard to a job in the Dietary Department. Marino offered Petitioner a porter position which required only half days and involved no bending or lifting of heavy objects. Marino explained the duties and responsibilities of the position to Petitioner and showed him the work area. Petitioner refused the position because he felt it was "beneath his dignity". Petitioner said virtually the same thing to Rettig. Hospital Benefits Supervisor Rettig, a quadriplegic, was involved throughout in dealing with Petitioner's medical situation. Rettig testified that he has never witnessed discrimination by the Respondent based upon handicap and felt that the Respondent reasonably accommodated Petitioner's back problem. Eighty percent of an Electrician's work at the Respondent involved the use of a ladder. Petitioner could not do ladder work. Petitioner also could not work on ceilings or do much bending or lifting. Petitioner cannot work at all now, still has pain, and has not worked since leaving the Respondent's employ. Petitioner did not know of any available half-day jobs he could have performed at the Hospital other than the porter position that was offered to Petitioner by Mr. Marino. Prior to his 1985 injury, Petitioner had repeatedly requested to work part time as an Electrician because his wife had arthritis and he needed to care for her. Petitioner was consistently turned down because no such part-time position existed in his department. During his employment with Respondent, a few half-day positions existed throughout the Hospital as PBX Operators, Cashiers, and Porters. No part-time Electrician positions in the Plant Engineering Department where Petitioner was employed were ever available. Petitioner occupied a full-time position even though he worked only part-time. Sandy McNeil, a former Electrician, is now a Systems Technician/Welder who works full days on a part-time basis. Mr. McNeil operates a lathe and works full weeks when needed. Petitioner is not a welder and could not perform the duties required of Mr. McNeil. Richmond Blatch is a painter who works a full week every other week. Petitioner is not a painter and could not perform Mr. Blatch's duties. Tom Nottage, another individual who had been working in the Engineering Department, obtained a courier position with the Hospital. For a brief period, Mr. Nottage worked 2 full days a week in the Engineering Department and 3 days week as a courier. Since mid-January, 1987, Mr. Nottage has worked full-time as a courier. His job requires driving over 25,000 miles per year, lifting mail tubs weighing between 20 and 50 pounds, often lifting heavier packages, and getting in and out of his car between 20 and 40 times per day. Petitioner could not perform the duties required of Mr. Nottage. A part-time position could not be created for an Electrician. Electricians are given jobs which frequently carry through from day to day. Permanently employing someone on a half-day, health-restricted basis presented scheduling and work load problems. Jobs that do not carry through from day to day are frequently comprised of so-called bench work. Some bench work requires an entire day to complete. There was not always a half-day's worth of bench work available. During his employment with the Respondent, Petitioner had been receiving Social Security pension benefits. In 1987, Petitioner would have been required to reimburse Social Security for a portion of his pension benefits if he earned more than $8,000,00. Half day employment would have afforded Petitioner the ability to earn the maximum allowed by Social Security. Because Petitioner refused to accept a job for which he was physically qualified, the worker's compensation benefits begun as a result of his injury on the job in 1982, were stopped. If Petitioner had accepted the porter position offered to him by Mr. Marino, his worker's compensation benefits would have compensated him for the wage loss resulting from the lower paying job. Petitioner's termination had no effect on the worker's compensation benefits Respondent was paying Petitioner. Respondent would have gained a financial benefit from retaining Petitioner as a part time Electrician because there would have been less of a wage loss to make up through worker's compensation benefits. Glen Mora and Luis Villanueva, two other Electricians, were injured while Petitioner was working half days. Both individuals were allowed to take medical leave, and return to work on light duty until they returned to full duty status. Both individuals in fact returned to full duty status. Petitioner received a merit pay check from Respondent in 1986 even though Petitioner had not achieved the requisite "fully proficient" rating in his evaluation. Vernon Clark, Director of Plant Engineering, intervened on behalf of Petitioner. Mr. Clark recommended that Petitioner receive the merit pay because Petitioner would have received a higher rating had it not been for Petitioner's injury.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Human Rights Commission issue a Final Order that Respondent is not guilty of discharging Petitioner in violation of the Human Rights Act. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1989. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner submitted no proposed findings of fact. Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection NONE The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in Findings 1, 2 2-3 Rejected as irrelevant 4-9 Included in Findings 3-10 Included in Finding 35 Included in Finding 11 Included in Finding 25 Included in Finding 26 Included in Finding 31 15-17 Included in Findings 27-30 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 36 Included in Finding 32 21-28 Included in Findings 12-21 29 Included in Finding 22 30-31 Included in Findings 33-34 Included in Finding 22 Included in Findings 15, 17 34-35 Included in Findings 23, 24 COPIES FURNISHED: George Cabany 3905 Garfield Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 James S. Bramnick Muller, Mintz, Kornreich, Caldwell, Casey, Crosland & Bramnick, P. A. Hollywood Memorial Respondent Suite 3600 Southeast Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2338 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating or retaliating against Petitioner based on an alleged disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a Maintenance Technician III in March 2007. He held that position until his employment ended in January 2009. Petitioner was responsible for performing maintenance duties at two of Respondent's properties. The Majestic Sun is a 96-room, 10-story high-rise. Beech Street has 48 units in 24 two-story buildings. Both properties are located in Destin, Florida. A Maintenance Technician III is required to perform a wide range of maintenance duties. The position involves the following: (a) moving and lifting furniture, refrigerators, stoves, televisions, and washers and dryers; (b) stooping and kneeling to repair toilets, sinks, water heaters and air conditioners; (c) climbing on ladders to change light bulbs, repairing ceiling fans and performing other work; and (d) climbing stairs. The written Job Description Summary for the Maintenance Technician III position describes the physical requirements as follows: “Lift and carry up to 50 pounds; stand, sit and walk for prolonged periods of time; climb up and down several flights of stairs; frequent reaching, stooping, bending and kneeling; manual dexterity and mobility; extensive prolonged standing and walking.” Petitioner injured his knee in a job-related incident on September 6, 2008. He was treated at the Destin Emergency Care Center and placed on restrictions requiring “no work for now.” He was unable to work for approximately a week and a half. On September 17, 2008, Petitioner was given a Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment Status Reporting Form imposing medical restrictions of no lifting, pushing or pulling greater than 10 pounds, and no ladders or stairs for four weeks. With those restrictions, Petitioner returned to work on light duty on September 18, 2008. While on light duty, Petitioner was given only those functions of his job that did not require him to exceed his medical restrictions. Other employees had to perform all of Petitioner’s other functions. Petitioner's work restrictions were extended for another four weeks by a Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment Status Reporting Form dated October 15, 2008. The October 15 form imposed the same medical restrictions as the September 17 form. Petitioner aggravated his knee injury approximately a week later. On October 22, 2008, he was given a Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment Status Reporting Form imposing the following work restrictions: (a) desk duty only; no lifting, pushing, or pulling at all; and (c) no standing or walking for more than 15 minutes at a time. Petitioner returned to work for a day or two after being restricted to desk duty. Respondent, however, had no desk-duty position available for him, so Petitioner was placed on a leave of absence beginning October 24, 2008. Petitioner requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). His request was denied on November 21, 2008, because he did not provide all of the required information. The obligation to provide that information is the employee’s. FMLA leave was denied not by Respondent but by Cigna, which is a third-party administrator for these benefits. Because FMLA leave had been denied, Petitioner’s employment was protected from termination for only 30 days from the date he went on leave, through November 24, 2008. Employees receiving workers’ compensation benefits are not protected from termination. If a worker is not on FMLA leave, Respondent's policy is that he or she may be terminated after 30 days of leave. Even though Respondent could have terminated Petitioner after November 24, 2008, it did not do so. Petitioner was medically restricted to desk duty throughout November and December 2008. He remained on a leave of absence during that time and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits from the date his leave of absence commenced. On December 16, 2008, Petitioner’s supervisor, John Diaz, e-mailed the Assistant Resort Manager at the Majestic Sun to ask about Petitioner’s status. Mr. Diaz had hired a temporary employee to cover for Petitioner while he was on leave. The cost of the temporary employee was significantly more than the cost of a regular employee. Mr. Diaz was concerned about the impact of the temporary help on his budget. Mr. Diaz also was concerned about the lack of information that he had received regarding the date Petitioner would return to work. Mr. Diaz's inquiry was forwarded to Raina Ricks, a Human Resources Generalist in Respondent’s Human Resources (HR) Department. Ms. Ricks responded on December 16 and 18, 2008, reporting that Petitioner’s physician had recommended surgery. She expected to have information about his surgery schedule and recovery period within a few days. The next day, December 19, 2008, Ms. Ricks e-mailed Melanie Doubleday, an Analyst in Respondent’s HR Department, to ask about Respondent’s policy on the length of time an employee can remain on active status and not be terminated while unable to work due to a job-related injury. Ms. Doubleday is located in Respondent’s office in Orlando, Florida. Ms. Ricks asked Ms. Doubleday at what point Petitioner would possibly be terminated if he could not return to work soon. Ms. Doubleday responded on December 22, 2008, providing Respondent’s approved guidelines for processing workers’ compensation injuries. She explained that if the employee is eligible for FMLA, they would remain on workers’ compensation for the duration of their FMLA leave and not be terminated during that leave. If not eligible for FMLA, the employee would receive 30 days of leave. Ms. Ricks updated Mr. Diaz and Chrysse Langley, the Resort Manager, by e-mail the following day, December 23, 2008. Ms. Ricks explained that, since Petitioner’s FMLA leave had been denied, he was subject to termination 30 days following the commencement of his leave on October 24, 2008. Ms. Ricks had also been told by Petitioner’s workers’ compensation caseworker that they still did not have an exact date for Petitioner’s surgery, but that once the procedure was complete, he should be able to perform his normal job duties without restrictions within two to four weeks, or six weeks at the most. Ms. Ricks asked Mr. Diaz and Ms. Langley for their thoughts on terminating Petitioner. Mr. Diaz responded later that day, stating that he was “not trying to have [Petitioner] terminated.” Mr. Diaz's concern was that he had not received any information about when Petitioner would be required to return to work, and Petitioner himself did not seem particularly motivated to return. If Petitioner could return to work without restrictions within eight weeks, Mr. Diaz was prepared to “live with that.” Ms. Langley also responded later that day and confirmed that she and Mr. Diaz both wanted to keep Petitioner, if feasible. She also said that Respondent should proceed with hiring the temporary employee who had been covering for Petitioner during his absence, because Mr. Diaz was planning to terminate one of the other Maintenance Technician III’s for poor job performance. Subsequently, the temporary employee was hired to replace the other Maintenance Technician III. Two weeks later, on January 5, 2009, Ms. Doubleday e-mailed Ms. Ricks regarding Petitioner’s “exhausted leave of absence.” She said Petitioner was entitled to 30 days of leave and must then either return to active status or be terminated. For consistent application of Respondent’s policies, she instructed Ms. Ricks to send Petitioner a Return to Work/Administrative Termination Letter. Ms. Ricks’ employment with Respondent ended a few days later as part of a corporate restructuring. She did not send the “Return to Work” letter before she left. Denise Sniadecki, one of Respondent's HR Managers, assumed Ms. Ricks’ responsibilities. She did not know about Ms. Doubleday’s earlier e-mail or the denial of Petitioner's FMLA leave. Respondent’s HR system, Oracle, showed Petitioner's employment status as “Leave - Workers Comp - FMLA,” indicating that he was on FMLA leave, despite the denial of his FMLA application two months earlier. Ms. Sniadecki thus assumed Petitioner was nearing the end of his FMLA leave, which would have expired on January 24, 2009, 12 weeks after his medical leave began on October 24, 2008. Ms. Sniadecki e-mailed Ms. Doubleday on January 20, 2009, asking what letter she should send to Petitioner in light of the fact that his leave would soon be ending. After a further exchange of e-mails, Ms. Sniadecki e-mailed Ms. Doubleday on January 21, 2009, and explained that Petitioner was listed in Oracle as being on FMLA leave, that he had not been terminated after 30 days, and that she was just getting involved because of Ms. Ricks’ departure. She asked whether she should process Petitioner’s employment as having been terminated 30 days after his leave commenced on October 24, 2008. Ms. Doubleday responded later that day. She said that Petitioner’s status should be changed in Oracle to "WC/Non FMLA" and suggested he be terminated that day. Coincidently, Petitioner came to the workplace that same day, January 21, 2009, to drop off his latest Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment Status Reporting Form. Petitioner's knee surgery had taken place a week to 10 days earlier. The form he brought in on January 21, 2009, imposed job restrictions of no lifting, pushing or pulling greater than 10 pounds, no ladders, and limited kneeling or squatting for four weeks. Mr. Diaz informed Ms. Sniadecki of Petitioner’s new work restrictions by e-mail that day. Mr. Diaz was not comfortable having Petitioner return to work on light duty because the medical restrictions severely limited his ability to do what the job required and he might further injure his knee. Mr. Diaz assumed Respondent still planned to administratively release Petitioner later that week. Mr. Diaz copied Ms. Langley on the e-mail. Ms. Langley responded a short time later, stating that there was no position that would fit Petitioner’s latest job restrictions. Ms. Sniadecki responded shortly afterward and told Mr. Diaz that Petitioner “will not be returning as we do not have light duty available for him.” Petitioner was terminated effective January 24, 2009. Ms. Doubleday and Ms. Sniadecki made the decision to terminate Petitioner based solely on the application of company policy. Mr. Diaz was not involved in the decision to terminate. Ms. Sniadecki sent Petitioner a letter dated January 26, 2009, stating he had been administratively terminated for failure to return from leave because he could not perform the essential functions of the Maintenance Technician III position with his medical restrictions. The reference to failure to return from leave referred to Petitioner’s inability to return to work without medical restrictions. Petitioner was invited to reapply for employment upon receiving a release to return to work. All of this was consistent with Company policy. Petitioner continued to be subject to medical restrictions for six months after his employment with Respondent ended. According to Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment Status Reporting Forms given to Petitioner in March and April 2009, he was subject to restrictions against lifting, pushing, or pulling greater than 20 pounds until the end of July 2009. The form given to him on July 29, 2009, stated he had reached maximum medical improvement and imposed a permanent restriction against pushing, pulling or pulling greater than 50 pounds. He was given a two percent permanent impairment rating of the body as a whole. Petitioner never reapplied to Respondent for employment. He continued to receive workers’ compensation benefits until he reached maximum medical improvement. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner had found other employment. Petitioner presented no credible evidence showing that he has a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”). To the contrary, he testified that, as of January 21, 2009, the date he attempted to return to work, he believed he could do everything the job required, with the possible exception of squatting down. Petitioner failed to present persuasive evidence that he has any impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Petitioner likewise failed to demonstrate that he was a qualified individual for purposes of the ADA or FCRA. At the time he was terminated, Petitioner was subject to medical restrictions prohibiting him from lifting, pushing or pulling greater than 10 pounds, using ladders, and kneeling or squatting for more than a limited period of time. These are essential functions of the Maintenance Technician III position. The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner was unable to perform the essential functions of the job at the time he was terminated, either with or without a reasonable accommodation. Petitioner presented no evidence that he engaged in any protected activity that would support a retaliation claim. When asked why he thought Respondent had retaliated against him, Petitioner responded that it was “because of his injury” and “because [Mr. Diaz] was upset because he didn’t have the staff to do the job.” Even if this testimony is accepted as true, it does not constitute protected activity and will not support a claim for retaliation. In addition, Petitioner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his termination and any protected activity. The greater weight of the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner was terminated because he could not perform the essential functions of the Maintenance Technician III position, not because he engaged in any sort of protected activity. Petitioner failed to prove any facts to support a retaliation claim. Petitioner attempted to demonstrate that other injured employees received more favorable treatment than he did. None of the alleged comparators identified by Petitioner was similarly situated to him. One of them had a knee injury, but her position required that she work at a desk, so the injury did not interfere with her ability to perform the essential functions of her job. The other alleged comparators were maintenance technicians, but none of them had an injury like Petitioner's that required a lengthy leave of absence. None of them was subject to medical restrictions limiting them to desk duty for even a short period of time. Even if the other employees were similarly situated to Petitioner, such a showing would not support a claim of discrimination or retaliation. Petitioner would need to present evidence demonstrating that non-disabled employees were treated more favorably than he was, and he did not do that. In short, Petitioner failed to identify any comparators that would support his claim for discrimination or retaliation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Derek Griffin 1136 Sweetbriar Station Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32547 Jae W. Im, Esquire Wyndham Vacation Ownership 8427 South Park Circle, Suite 500 Orlando, Florida 32819 W. Douglas Hall, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Randall Lee Southerland, conducted operations in the construction industry in the State of Florida without obtaining workers’ compensation coverage, meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2007),1 in violation of Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes. If so, what penalty should be assessed by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69L.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Respondent is a sole proprietor, allegedly engaged in the construction industry, providing tile and grouting services and carpet removal to private residences in Florida. On November 30, 2007, Eric Duncan and Alison Pasternak, both of whom are workers’ compensation investigators for Petitioner, were conducting random compliance checks in Lee County. Investigator Duncan noticed two men working outside of a residence in Cape Coral, one using a power saw and the other mixing a substance in a bucket. Investigators Duncan and Pasternak decided to conduct a compliance check of these two men to ensure they were workers’ compensation coverage compliant. The two men identified themselves as Randall Lee Southerland and Tim Weaver. Weaver produced his Exemption Certificate for workers’ compensation coverage. No further action was taken in regards to that investigation. Southerland was observed mixing the substance, which was later determined to be tiling grout. Southerland did not have a workers’ compensation insurance policy, a coverage exemption certificate, nor was he employed via a leasing agency. After consulting with his supervisor, Investigator Duncan issued SWO No. 07-364-D7 to Respondent along with a Business Records Request for the time-period of December 1, 2004, through November 30, 2007. Respondent provided records to Petitioner shortly thereafter, and, subsequently, a penalty assessment was calculated. The calculations of Respondent’s gross payroll was necessary since it was alleged that he worked in the construction field of tiling. Respondent disputes this classification and argues that grouting is separate from the installation of tiles and is not a classification within the construction field. Therefore, neither a workers’ compensation insurance policy, nor an exception is required. The National Counsel on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) established a codification of construction employment activities; all of which have been adopted by Petitioner and are commonly referred to as “class codes.” The NCCI class code for tiling is “5348.” It is undisputed that Respondent was doing the grout- work for the newly installed tiles. It is further undisputed that the definition of tiling, per the NCCI class code “5348,” included the finishing, setting, and installation of tiles. It was also established that loose tiles, merely laying on the floor, are not finished, nor set, until the grout is laid. Pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, the calculation of the penalty was completed on a penalty calculation worksheet. The worksheet was completed by examining the records received from Respondent and calculating the gross payroll that was paid to him. The penalty was later amended to reflect additional records provided through discovery, the evidence of the payment for the November 30, 2007, job consisting of a $500.00 check from the real estate agent. The Amended Order assessed a penalty of $1,168.68, which is the applicable amount of the premium evaded and includes the 50 percent penalty for the time period of December 1, 2004, through November 30, 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding that Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for the sole proprietor, Randall Lee Southerland, in violation of Subsections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a penalty against Respondent, in the amount of $1,168.68, which is equal to 1.5 times the evaded premium based on the payroll records provided by Respondent and the applicable approved manual rate and classification code. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation (Division), administers the State Unemployment Compensation Program, which includes the payment of benefits to unemployed individuals and the collection of taxes or reimbursement payments from employers to finance these benefits. By law petitioner is authorized to seek reimbursement from political subdivisions for a pro-rata portion of benefits paid to their employees. If a subdivision fails to timely reimburse the State, the Division may certify the delinquent amount to the Department of Banking and Finance, and request the Comptroller to transfer funds otherwise due that entity to the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund (Trust Fund). If a subdivision contends an employee is not entitled to unemployment benefits, it may contest a claim for benefits with a claim examiner employed by the Division. That decision may be reviewed by an appeals referee, and if either side is still aggrieved, a final administrative appeal may be heard by the full Unemployment Compensation Commission. Those decisions are then reviewed only by the First District Court of Appeal. Respondent, Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County (Board), is a political subdivision of the state, and is required by law to reimburse the Trust Fund for its pro-rate share of benefits paid to former employees. On July 10, 1984, petitioner issued to respondent a notice of intent to certify delinquency wherein it claimed that between October 1, 1979 and December 31, 1983 respondent incurred a liability to the State totaling $6,409.71. This amount included $5,704.92 in benefits paid to former employees and $703.79 for 6 percent interest on overdue payments. That precipitated the instant controversy. The amount due was later reduced to $5,204.79 by the issuance of an amended notice of intent to certify delinquency on January 11, 1985. At hearing respondent conceded it owed all claimed monies except those due for two individuals: Emma Worthington and Margaret Prather. This resolved more than 60 percent of the Division's claim leaving only around $600 in dispute. Emma Worthington was a former employee of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Flagler County (Clerk) and was never employed by the Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County. Nonetheless, for some reason, the Clerk reported Worthington's wages to the Division under the Employer Identification Number assigned to respondent. Because of this, the Division assumed respondent was Worthington's employer. When Worthington was terminated by the Clerk's office, she requested unemployment benefits. The Clerk filed an appeal with a claims examiner contesting the payment of such benefits. The examiner ruled that such benefits were due, and this decision was affirmed by both an appeals referee and the full commission. As required by law, on an undisclosed date the Division forwarded a reimbursement notice to respondent advising that certain monies were due because of unemployment compensation payments made to Worthington. The Board did not respond to this notice but simply referred it to the Clerk's office. There is no evidence that the Division was ever formally notified by the Board that the employee was actually a Clerk employee, that the bill was forwarded to another party, or that the wrong Employer Identification number had been used. The bill was never paid. Margaret Prather was an employee of the Flagler County Supervisor of Elections (Supervisor) when she was terminated from employment. Before that, she was a Board employee. While employed by the Supervisor of Elections, Prather's wages were erroneously reported to the Division under the Employer Identification number of respondent. Because of this, the Division assumed Prather was a Board employee. After she was terminated by the Supervisor, Prather received unemployment benefits. Whether the Supervisor contested these benefits is not known. In any event, the Division sent the Board a Reimbursement Invoice on an undisclosed date requesting reimbursement for benefits paid to Prather. The Board did not respond to the Invoice but simply forwarded it to the Supervisor. Again, there is no evidence that the Board advised the Division of the erroneous use of its Employer Identification number, that the bill had been forwarded to another party, or that Prather was not an employee. To date, the bill has not been paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent reimburse petitioner for benefits paid to employees Worthington and Prather as set forth in the amended notice of intent to certify delinquency within thirty days from date of final order. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1985.
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against Ruby D. Johnson on the basis of a handicap in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent at its Lake City, Florida, plant during 1977 or 1978. The Respondent manufactures metal parts for automobiles. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a parts assembly worker. At the time the Petitioner began employment with the Respondent, she informed the Respondent that she did not have any handicap. On June 28, 1984, the Petitioner was accidently struck on the head with a broom by another employee while at work. She was struck with the straw end of the broom. The Petitioner did not return to her job for approximately two months after being struck on the head. The Petitioner was treated by George G. Feussner, M.D. When Dr. Feussner authorized the Petitioner's return to work, he recommended that she not be required to perform any work requiring standing or leaning, climbing or operation of dangerous equipment for approximately three to four weeks. In September, 1985, the Petitioner experienced dizziness and fell while at work. In a letter dated October 2, 1985, Dr. Feussner informed the Respondent of the following: Despite and [sic] extensive evaluation of this lady, I cannot find objective findings to go along with her symptoms. I believe that she should be able to return to work at her regular job, but I still think that it would be dangerous considering her emotional dedication to her symptoms she is likely to injure herself if she works around dangerous equipment or at heights. She should therefore find a job that does not involve these activities... The Petitioner, when she tried to return to work, was not allowed to work because she had filed a workmen's compensation claim as a result of her alleged condition. This claim was being disputed by the Respondent's workmen compensation insurance carrier. On October 31, 1985, the Respondent laid off several employees with seniority equal to or greater than the Petitioner's seniority. Employees were laid off because of a lack of work. The Petitioner would have been laid off also, but was not because of the disputed claim over workmen's compensation. In November, 1985, the Petitioner's workmen compensation claim was denied. At that time the Petitioner was informed that she was also being laid off. In October, 1986, the Respondent began recalling the employees it had laid off in November, 1985. The Petitioner was not recalled, however, because of the restrictions on the Petitioner's ability to work. The Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with the Commission in October, 1986. On November 13, 1987, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby D. Johnson 1802 North Georgia Street Lake City, Florida 32055 William B. Hatfield Supervisor of Human Relations ITT Thompson Industries - Metal Division Post Office Box 928 Valdosta, Georgia 31603-0928 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1025 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Thompson Enterprises of Jacksonville, LLC (Respondent), violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes,1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing workers' compensation coverage requirements applicable to employers under Florida law. Respondent is a Florida limited-liability company organized on October 25, 2011. The managing members listed on Respondent’s State of Florida Articles of Organization are Thomas Thompson, Michael Thompson, and Vicky Thompson. In May 2016, Department Compliance Investigator Ann Johnson was assigned to conduct a job site visit on Respondent’s business because its name appeared on the Department’s Bureau of Compliance’s “lead list.” The “lead list” is one of the Department’s databases listing employers that are potentially out of compliance with Florida's workers' compensation insurance requirements. Prior to the job site visit, Investigator Johnson reviewed the Division of Corporations website, www.sunbiz.org, and confirmed Respondent's address, managing members' names, and that Respondent was a current, active Florida company. Respondent’s website advertised towing, wrecker, mechanic, and body shop services. On May 6, 2016, Investigator Johnson visited Respondent's principal address located at 7600 Bailey Body Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32216. She noted a large commercial sign near Respondent’s address that advertised towing and wrecker services. During her visit, Investigator Johnson spoke with Vicky Thompson and Michael Thompson, both of whom advised that they were owners of Respondent. The Thompsons informed Investigator Johnson that Respondent had six employees, including the three listed as managers on Respondent’s Articles of Organization. When Investigator Johnson asked for proof of workers’ compensation coverage, Michael Thompson admitted that Respondent had no such coverage. Under Florida law, employers in the non-construction industry, such as Respondent, must secure workers' compensation insurance if "four or more employees are employed by the same employer." §§ 440.02(17)(b) and 440.107, Fla. Stat. On the same day as her site visit, Investigator Johnson confirmed Respondent’s lack of insurance with a search of the Department's internal database, Coverage and Compliance Automated System. At the time, Respondent had no active exemptions from the requirements of obtaining workers’ compensation for its three managing members. Based on her investigation, Investigator Johnson served Respondent with the Stop-Work Order and a Request for Production on May 6, 2016. Upon serving the documents, Investigator Johnson explained the effect and purpose of the documents and how Respondent could come into compliance. Respondent came into compliance that same day by paying a $1,000 down payment, reducing Respondent's workforce to three employees, applying for exemptions for its three managing members, and executing an agreed Order of conditional release with the Department. Respondent subsequently complied with the Department’s Request for Production. In June 2016, the Department assigned Penalty Auditor Eunika Jackson to review records obtained from Respondent and calculate the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. In accordance with applicable law, the Department's audit spanned the preceding two-year period, starting from the date of the Stop-Work Order. See § 440.107(7)(d)1., Fla. Stat. The audit period in this case was from May 7, 2014, through May 6, 2016. Based on information obtained during the investigation, Auditor Jackson assigned classification codes 7219, 8380, and 8810 to those identified as employees working for Respondent during the audit period. Classification codes are four-digit codes assigned to various occupations by the National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") to assist in the calculation of workers' compensation insurance premiums. Classification code 8810 applies to clerical office employees, code 7219 applies to trucking and "towing companies," and code 8380 applies to automobile service or repair centers. According to Respondent, it was out of compliance with the coverage requirements of chapter 440 for only "368 days" during the two-year audit period. Respondent's records, however, do not support this contention. Respondent provided a detailed "Employee Earnings Summary" for each employee stating the employee’s name, pay rate, and pay period. Respondent's payroll records reflect that Respondent employed "four or more employees" during the audit period. Throughout the two-year audit period, Respondent employed four or more employees with the following duties: Anna Lee, mechanic/bodywork; Cedric Blake, mechanic/bodywork; David Raynor, mechanic/bodywork; James Budner, mechanic/bodywork; Jason Leighty, mechanic; Kevin Croker, Jr., porter/detailer; Nicholas Conway, bodywork; Ralph Tenity, bodywork; Rebecca Thompson, secretary/office help; Stephen Collins, shop helper/porter; Todd Gatshore, tow truck driver/shop helper; and Williams Reeves, tow truck driver/shop helper. Evidence further demonstrated that, during the audit period, managing member Michael Thompson worked as a wrecker truckdriver, and worked with the Sheriff's Office to clear traffic accidents. He was assigned class code 7219 — tow truck driver. Managing member Vicky Thompson was given the clerical class code 8810 because she was observed working in the office during Investigator Johnson's site visit. Managing member Thomas Thompson was assigned the clerical class code 8810 based upon the fact that he occasionally does office work for the business. The corresponding approved manual rates for classification codes 8810, 7219, and 8380 were correctly applied to each employee for the related periods of non-compliance to determine the final penalty. In accordance with the Request for Production, Respondent provided the Department payroll summary reports, tax reports, and unemployment tax reports. The payroll summary reports and records provided by Respondent listed the payroll and duties for each employee. The gross payroll amounts for each employee reflected in the penalty in this case were derived from those documents. Upon receiving those reports and records, the Department correctly determined the gross payroll for Respondent's employees. On June 13, 2016, the Department served the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent, assessing a penalty of $33,788.90. A portion of the first penalty was based on imputed payroll for Respondent’s three managing members. After service of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, Respondent provided additional records showing the payroll of its three managing members, and the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was calculated after removing the imputed payroll. On August 22, 2016, the Department served the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent, assessing a penalty of $33,112.44, which was correctly calculated in accordance with section 440.107(7)(d)1. and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027(1). In sum, the clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that Respondent was a tow truck company engaged in the wrecker/tow truck and body shop mechanic industries in Florida during the periods of noncompliance; that Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation for its employees in violation of Florida's Workers' Compensation Law; and that the Department correctly utilized the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L-6.027(1) to determine the appropriate penalty of $33,112.44.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order, consistent with this Recommended Order, upholding the Stop-Work Order and imposing the penalty set forth in the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment against Thompson Enterprises of Jacksonville, LLC. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2017.
Conclusions This cause came on before Tom Gallagher, as Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, for consideration of and final agency action on the Recommended Order issued herein on October 4, 2003, by Administrative Law Judge J.D. Parrish. No exceptions to that Recommended Order were filed. , Having reviewed the Recommended Order and the record of this proceeding, and being otherwise apprised in all material premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made and announced by the Administrative Law Judge in the Recommended Order are adopted without exception as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law of the agency. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Janusz Kraj shall pay to the Division of Worker's Compensation a civil penalty in the amount of $1,100, within thirty days from the date hereof, said sum to thereafter bear interest at the rate of 9% per anum until paid. IT {S$ HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Stop Work And Penalty Assessment Order entered by the Division of Worker's Compensation is affirmed, and that Janusz Kraj shall cease all business operations unless and until he provides evidence satisfactory to the Division of Worker's Compensation of having now complied with the workers compensation law by securing the necessary worker's compensation for covered employees and, pursuant to Section 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes, paid the civil penalty imposed herein. Lh DONE AND ORDERED this 3° — day of November, 2003. ST ) Sie \eouw Tom Gallag Chief Financial Officer Tomy “ay a PEF LAO
The Issue Whether Respondent was required and failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage for his employees during the period from March 7, 1997 through March 7, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be assessed, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. On March 7, 2001, one of Petitioner's investigators observed two individuals, Worker 1 and Worker 2,3 painting a sidewalk, curb stops, and lines in the parking lot of a 7-Eleven store in Lake Worth, Florida. At that time, the investigator performed an on-site inspection. The investigator interviewed the two workers and completed a worksheet to determine if they were independent contractors. Worker 1 and Worker 2, among other things, worked for and were paid weekly by Respondent as painters, did not maintain a separate business from Respondent, did not control the means of performing their work, did not incur the expenses of their work, and did not incur the principal expenses related to their work. The investigator determined that the two workers were not independent contractors but were employees of Respondent. Neither Worker 1 nor Worker 2 was granted a workers' compensation exemption. Both workers were unprotected by workers' compensation insurance. Respondent provided to Petitioner's investigator federal tax Form 1099s for the years 1998 and 1999, pertaining to Worker 1 and Worker 2 and a handwritten note indicating the compensation paid to them during the year 2000. The documents indicated that Respondent paid the workers for the years 1998 through 2000 the following: Worker 1--$9,685 for 1998, $19,180 for 1999, and $3,330 for 2000; and Worker 2--$2,790 for 1999, and $240 for 2000. A compilation of approved classifications that groups employers according to their operations is published by the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI). The publication is Scopes Manual, Scopes of Basic Manual Classifications (Scopes Manual). NCCI is a rating organization in Florida, which represents workers' compensation carriers. NCCI seeks approval from Florida's Department of Insurance of rates charged by workers' compensation carriers. NCCI and Professional Insurance Associates, as well as other sources, publish tables of approved rates for each classification code. It is undisputed that NCCI's publication of class codes and rates is relied upon and used by Petitioner to determine an employer's class code and the workers' compensation insurance rate. On March 7, 2000, Petitioner's investigator issued a SWO to Respondent. On March 8, 2000, Petitioner issued a NPAO to Respondent, indicating an assessment and penalty of $18,824. The investigator determined that, based upon what he had observed and the information that he had obtained, the work being performed by Worker 1 and Worker 2 was painting and was classified under Scopes Manual Code 5474. The investigator determined the evaded premium, or the premium that Respondent would have paid had he secured workers’ compensation insurance, by multiplying the gross compensation to employees each year by the premium rate for that Code for that year. The statutory penalty on the evaded premium is twice the evaded premium. The calculated penalty was $18,724. Added to the $18,724 was $100, which represented the penalty for the one day, March 7, 2000, that Respondent was not in compliance with the workers’ compensation requirement. On October 20, 2000, Petitioner issued a Second Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order, which was the final assessment, against Respondent assessing a penalty of $69,569, which included the $100 penalty. Pursuant to an agreement, Respondent performs general maintenance and preventative maintenance (GMPM) for Southland Corporation at 100 or more 7-Eleven stores in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties. Petitioner was able to interview 13 of Respondent's employees, Worker 1 through Worker 13.4 As not a part of the GMPM agreement, Respondent's employees paint curbs, bumpers, and lines in the parking lot of each 7-Eleven store once each year. Respondent’s employees also engaged in the following: painting of buildings’ exterior and interior, parking lots, and loading docks; hanging drywall; setting of tile; paving of parking lots; repairing stucco and concrete; minor plumbing; carpentry, including trim, installation of doors and locks; filling potholes; and installing walls and cabinets. For example, Worker 10, who was employed with Respondent between June 1996 and January 1998, initially performed a daily activity of painting lines and curbs in parking lots at 7-Eleven stores. He could be assigned three stores in one day performing this activity. Later, Worker 10 performed under the GMPM agreement doing the following: painting the exterior and interior of stores, which could be the entire outside or a storeroom; tiling floors and ceilings; patching blacktop and repairing asphalt; and engaging in carpentry work, including putting up wooden shelves in storage rooms, cutting, nailing and screwing boards, and operating saws. Worker 10 also assisted Worker 6, who was a carpenter, repairing enclosures for dumpsters. The repairs consisted of sinking four-by-four posts into the ground, replacing slats, and occasionally replacing the entire enclosure due to damage caused by a truck backing into the enclosure. As another example, Worker 11 was employed with Respondent during 1998 and 1999 for 14 months and worked under the GMPM agreement. Worker 11 performed all activities under the agreement in maintaining the 7-Eleven stores, except for electrical and internal plumbing. The work to which he was assigned generally lasted four days a week, but for one day a week, he was assigned to handling service calls or performing line striping. Worker 11 performed the following: resurfacing asphalt; painting the entire parking lot, including lines for parking spaces and curbs; replacing or repairing ceiling and floor tile; laying tar on the roof; performing carpentry, including building shelves in storing rooms, reinforcing shelving, hanging new doors, replacing door hardware, and performing carpentry alongside Worker 6; and repairing enclosures for dumpsters by re-hanging doors, replacing slats, and replacing four-by-four posts. Even though Respondent stated that he subcontracted the repair of roofs and dumpsters, the installation of doors and electrical and plumbing work, he failed to present evidence showing to whom and when the work was subcontracted.5 Petitioner presented evidence demonstrating that Respondent’s employees performed all of the work described, except for electrical work. The work performed by Respondent’s employees included multiple class codes. NCCI requires the assignment of the highest rated classification under such circumstances. Carpentry is the highest-rated classification for all the work performed by Respondent’s employees, and the Scopes Manual Code for carpentry is 5403. Scopes Manual Code 5403 is also the code for the enclosure of a dumpster and the installation of a pre-hung door. The corresponding rate per $100 of payroll assigned to Scopes Manual Code 5403 is different for the applicable years 1997 through 2000. The rate for 1997 was 29.77; for 1998 was 29.09; for 1999 was 26.66; and 2000 was 27.96. Worker 1 through Worker 13 did not maintain a separate business from Respondent, did not control the means of performing their work, did not incur the expenses of their work, and did not incur the principal expenses related to their work. None of Respondent’s 13 employees had a valid workers’ compensation exemption. None of them were protected by workers’ compensation insurance. Respondent’s usual and customary practice was to pay his employees on a weekly basis. His usual and customary practice was to employ four or more employees during a weekly pay period. Respondent’s usual and customary practice was to employ four or more employees during any payroll period. Respondent asserts that he relied upon subcontractors for some of the work. The identity of the subcontractors, the service performed, and the frequency of their work are unknown. Whether the subcontractors had workers’ compensation insurance is also unknown. As a result, a determination cannot be made as to what Respondent’s responsibility, if any, was to the subcontractors as to workers’ compensation insurance, which in turn would affect an assessed penalty under worker’s compensation. To establish what his payroll was for the three years preceding the issuance of the SWO on March 7, 2000, Respondent used federal tax Form 1099s and cancelled business checks. For the years 1997 through 2000, Respondent’s payroll was as follows: Worker 1--1998 was $9,685, 1999 was $19,180, and 2000 was $3,330; Worker 2--1999 was $2,790, and 2000 was $240; Worker 3--1997 was $2,100, 1999 was $2,035, and 2000 was $3,045; Worker 4--1999 was $2,100; Worker 5--1997 was $1,900; Worker 6--1997 was $4,620, 1998 was $15,965, 1999 was $5,100, and 2000 was $3,303; Worker 7- -1999 was $610; Worker 8--1997 was $1,380, 1998 was $5,640, 1999 was $7,640, and 2000 was $350; Worker 9--1997 was $3,120; Worker 10--1997 was $8,450, and 1998 was $960; Worker 11--1998 was $7,095, and 1999 was $7,225; Worker 12--1998 was $2,883; and Worker 13--1999 was $2,675. Consequently, Respondent’s total payroll for 1997 was $21,570, for 1998 was $42,228, for 1999 was $49,355, and for 2000 was $10,268. Respondent’s payroll of $21,570 for 1997, was for the entire year. Petitioner made no reduction for the time period in the year 1997 prior to March 8, 1997, which would have been three years prior to the SWO on March 7, 2000. The statutory penalty assessed by Petitioner in its Second Amended Notice and Assessment Order against Respondent was $69,569, which included the penalty of $100. Petitioner’s assessment should be reduced to compensate for the Respondent’s payroll during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 7, 1997.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance enter a final order against Gregory Dennis Nelly: Sustaining the Stop Work Order. Sustaining the penalty assessed in the Second Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order minus the calculation for the payroll during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 7, 1997. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2001.
The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Olender is a Delaware corporation that is registered to do business in Florida and engaged in the business of construction. Primarily, Olender frames the walls of structures and installs siding, windows and moisture barriers to such structures. Such activities are construction activities under the Florida’s workers’ compensation law. See Ch. 440, Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6. On June 22, 2006, an investigator for the Department visited the Alta Westgate Apartment complex construction project, located at 6872 Alta Westgate Drive, Orlando, Florida. The visit was prompted by a “confidential tip” received by the Department from Tyler Balsinger, a former employee of Petitioner. The Alta Westgate complex is owned by Alta Westgate, LLC. The general contractor responsible for the construction of the complex was W.P. South Builders. The overall project manager for the general contractor was Robert Beliveau. The on-site representative for the general contractor was Danny Campbell. Mr. Campbell provided the Department’s investigator with a list of subcontractors on the project worksite. The list reflected that the subcontractor for framing was Olender and that John Olender was the person in charge of the company’s work at the project site. Among other things, the contract also included the installation of a moisture barrier, generally known as Tyvek, on the framed structures. Because of the nature of construction work, it is not unusual to have several subcontractors on a construction worksite at the same time. It is unlikely that Olender was the only subcontractor working on the day the Department’s investigator visited the Alta Westgate project. The subcontract required that Olender secure the payment of workers’ compensation on its employees. The evidence was not clear regarding whether the general contractor, under its subcontract with Olender, would provide workers’ compensation insurance on the employees of Olender’s subcontractors. However, the evidence was clear that J.P. Builders did not secure such workers’ compensation insurance on the employees of Olender’s subcontractors. Mr. Campbell also provided the certificate of insurance for Petitioner. The certificate reflected that Modern Business Associates, Inc. (MBA), an employee leasing company, provided workers’ compensation for Olender’s leased employees. See § 468.520, Fla. Stat. MBA entered into a client service agreement with Olender. Under the agreement, Olender would lease employees from MBA and MBA would provide payroll services and workers’ compensation coverage for the employees it leased to Petitioner. The agreement terminated on August 30, 2006. MBA’s Client Service Agreement with Petitioner states on p. 3: Insurance Coverage. MBA is responsible for providing Workers’ Compensation coverage to workers employed by MBA and assigned to Client, in compliance with applicable law, and as specified in the Proposal. Workers performing services for Client not covered by this Agreement and not on MBA’s payroll shall not be covered by the workers’ compensation insurance. Client understands, agrees, and acknowledges that MBA shall not cover any workers with workers’ compensation coverage who has not completed and submitted to MBA an employment application and tri- fold, and which applicant has not been reviewed and approved for hire by MBA. (emphasis supplied) Other than information necessary to supply its services, MBA was not aware of any specific project or projects on which Olender was working when it leased employees from MBA. John Olender and Ruben Rojo were two employees that Olender leased from MBA and for whom MBA provided workers’ compensation insurance. The workers’ compensation policy complied with Florida’s workers’ compensation requirements. After speaking with Mr. Campbell, the Department’s investigator, who is fluent in Spanish, walked around the complex’s worksite. She did not have a hardhat on. She eventually saw about 10 to 12 workers on the third floor of one of the buildings under construction (Building 8 or 9). The Department’s investigator could not say if they were framing. At some point, John Olender, the company’s project superintendent, saw the Department’s investigator, noticed she did not have any safety equipment on, and went to meet her. The investigator yelled to the workers on the third floor and showed her Department badge or identification. She was speaking Spanish to them. The workers ran in an effort to avoid the Department’s investigator. Mr. Olender, who does not speak or understand Spanish, sent for Ruben Rojo. Mr. Rojo is the assistant superintendent for Olender and works under John Olender. He is fluent in Spanish. He does not hire employees for Olender, but oversees the work being performed under Olender’s subcontracts. The Department’s investigator continued to attempt to explain to the workers that she was not interested in their immigration status, but was there to make sure they were covered by workers’ compensation insurance. At least some of the workers came down to talk to her. Mr. Rojo thought the investigator was asking about the workers’ immigration status and told them that they did not have to talk to her. However, apparently some workers very reluctantly gave her limited information. The workers who talked to her were Pedro Antonio Mendez, Jaco Sarmentio, Juan Cardenas, Alvaro Don Juan Diaz, Jose Varela Orellana, Nesto Suarez Ventura, Miguel Martinez Diaz, Jose Perez Renaldo and Antonio Hernandez. She did not obtain any addresses, phone numbers or other identifying information from the employees. The evidence did not show whether these individuals gave the Department’s investigator the correct information. Importantly, they did not tell her who their employer was or what duties they were performing. None of these individuals testified at the hearing. John Olender did not recognize these workers. Mr. Rojo told the investigator that Olender subcontracted the framing portion of its contract to “T-Bo”. T-Bo was also known as Primitivo Torres. In his deposition testimony, Mr. Torres did not recognize these workers’ names. He also thought that most of the workers he employed for his framing subcontract with Olender were illegal immigrants. Mr. Torres was unclear in his testimony regarding his status with Olender. He did indicate that he worked in both Orlando and Tampa. Apparently, at times, he was an employee and at other times he was a subcontractor. He was listed as a leased employee under MBA’s contract with Olender. The evidence suggests, but does not prove, that Mr. Torres was a person who supplied immigrant workers to construction sites. In Orlando, Mr. Torres lived in an apartment complex in the Rosemond area with his employees. The rent was sometimes paid by Olender and then deducted from the remuneration paid to Mr. Torres. Mr. Torres paid his employees from the money he received under his subcontract with Olender. Mr. Torres also testified that when the Department’s investigator contacted him in June 2006, to discuss workers’ compensation insurance, he told her that he neither secured the payment of workers’ compensation for himself nor for the other workers in both Tampa and Orlando. Donna Knoblauch, who oversaw Olender’s main office, received a faxed copy of a certificate of workers’ compensation insurance from Mr. Torres. However, the faxed certificate was an illegible copy of what appeared to be a certificate of liability insurance issued by a company in Texas. The certificate does not have a legible “sent date,” a legible workers’ compensation policy number, legible dates of coverage, a legible producer name, or any information indicating that coverage includes the State of Florida. The document is insufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Torres provided workers’ compensation coverage for his employees that worked under his subcontract with Olender. John Olender testified that Mr. Torres utilized, at most, 20 framers for the construction at Alta Westgate. Mr. Torres corroborates that number and indicates that various people worked in crews of around five. On the other hand, Danny Campbell testified that Olender had approximately 20 workers when the project started, increased to approximately 75 people performing framing duties on the worksite and decreased to about 20 workers by the time the Department’s investigator visited the worksite. Mr. Campbell testified that on January 22, 2006, he believed that Olender had approximately five individuals for the punch-out group, three–to-five cleaners, a forklift operator, approximately two individuals installing the Tyvek moisture- barrier paper, two individuals performing window installation and approximately 15–to-20 individuals installing siding at the worksite. No other testimony supports the number of workers Mr. Campbell believed to be at the jobsite on June 22. On balance, the best evidence of the approximate number of workers was that of Mr. Olender and Mr. Torres. However, these figures were only estimates of the actual number which may have been less than 20 workers. In any event, the employment of these 12 workers on the third floor was not demonstrated by the evidence. Their names did not appear on the list of employees leased by Olender from MBA and were otherwise, unknown to the Mr. Olender, Rojo and Torres. While at the jobsite, the Department’s investigator also spoke with Victor Ibarra. Mr. Ibarra drove a forklift and indicated that he worked for Olender. Again, no address or other identifying information was supplied to the investigator. Later, the investigator spoke with a woman who purported to be Mr. Ibarra’s wife. There was no information on the forklift indicating that it belonged to Olender and Olender denies employing a person named Victor Ibarra. Mr. Campbell testified in his deposition that Olender had forklifts on the jobsite. However, he did not testify that the forklift Victor Ibarra drove on June 22, 2006, was owned by Olender. Likewise, Mr. Campbell did not testify that Mr. Ibarra was an employee of Olender. Mr. Ibarra’s name did not appear on the list of leased employees provided by MBA. The Department's investigator included Mr. Ibarra as an employee of Olender based on Mr. Ibarra’s statements. However, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Ibarra was an employee of Olender, since Mr. Ibarra did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Campbell’s testimony does not corroborate the hearsay statements of Mr. Ibarra since the testimony does not indicate the forklift Mr. Ibarra drove belonged to Olender or to another subcontractor on the project. After talking to Mr. Ibarra, the Department’s investigator met Rosa Barden, Martha Alvarado and Ismael Ortiz, who were applying a moisture barrier paper known as “Tyvek” to a building at the construction site. The three individuals told the investigator that that they had been hired by Mr. Rojo on behalf of Olender and had only worked for about a day. The investigator included these three individuals as employees of Olender. No addresses or other contact information was obtained by the investigator. None of these individuals testified at the hearing. Mr. Rojo testified that he did not know the three individuals on the “paper crew” and did not hire them. None of the three individuals were listed as leased employees with MBA. However, Olender’s subcontract clearly lists the application of Tyvek as a part of its contract. Additionally, the payment information supplied by the general contractor shows that Olender was paid for Tyvek application on all the buildings in the complex. Unlike Mr. Ibarro’s testimony, the contract and payment evidence independently corroborates the otherwise hearsay statements of these three individuals and Olender should have provided workers compensation insurance on them. There was no evidence that Olender provided such workers’ compensation insurance; such failure violates Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. See §§ 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.019. In total, the Department’s inspector met with John Olender for approximately one hour discussing the work performed by Olender and the employees retained by Olender. During this meeting, Mr. Olender, identified members of a “punch-out” crew who had worked on the project. The punch-out crew repaired any defects in framing prior to inspection. The names supplied by Mr. Olender were Juan Gonzalez, Miguel, Sal, William, WI Gerardo (noted as El Guardo in the third Amended Order of Penalty assessment), Pedro, Jacobo and Boso. Mr. Olender did not know their last names. The evidence did not show the period of time that the punch-out crew would have been working at the project site. Presumably, they would have begun some time after the initial building was framed. The Department’s investigator did not personally see the punch-out crew at the project. Mr. Olender also informed the Department’s investigator that he did not handle matters concerning workers’ compensation insurance and that she would have to contact the Company’s main office in Missouri. He provided the number for the office. He also gave the investigator the number for Michael Olender, the president of the company and the number for Mr. Torres. The investigator issued a Workers’ Compensation Request for Production of Business Records to Olender. She left the Request with John Olender. The request for records asked for certain categories of Olender’s business records for the period of January 22, 2004 to June 22, 2004. Of importance here, the Department requested records in categories 1, 4, 5 and 6. In general, category 1 covers all payroll records, including checks and check stubs, time sheets, attendance records and cash payment records. Categories 4, 5 and 6 cover all records that relate to subcontractors, including their identity, contract, payment thereof, workers compensation coverage for all the subcontractor’s employees, and/ or the employees’ exemption status. These records are required to be maintained by a company doing business in Florida. Mr. Campbell testified that some members of the punch- out crew often approached him about whether he had paid Olender so that they in turn could be paid. Again, none of these individuals testified at the hearing. However, given the admissions of Olender’s employee and Mr. Campbell’s testimony, the evidence supports the conclusion that the eight individuals on the punch-out crew were employed by Olender. None of these employees were leased employees and therefore, were not covered by the workers’ compensation policy provided by MBA. There was no evidence that Olender secured any workers' compensation insurance on these eight employees. Such failure violates Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. See §§ 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.019. The Department’s investigator contacted Ms. Knoblauch while she was on her way to a medical appointment. The investigator requested Olender’s proof of workers’ compensation insurance. Ms. Knoblauch told the investigator that she was not at the office where the records were kept, but on the way to a medical appointment. She said she would be returning to the office after the appointment. The investigator said she needed the records immediately. Ms. Knoblauch offered to skip her appointment and requested time to turn around and return to the office. The investigator refused to permit her the time to return to the office. At some point, MBA supplied the Department’s investigator with a list of Olender’s leased employees. The list did not contain any of the names she had gathered during her visit to the worksite. Within a few hours from the beginning of the investigation, the Department's investigator issued a Stop Work Order and an Order of Penalty Assessment on June 22, 2006. The Order was served via certified mail on Michael Olender and Olender’s legal counsel. The Stop Work Order required that Olender "cease all business operations in this state" and advised that a penalty of $1,000.00 per day would be imposed if Olender were to conduct any business in violation of the Stop Work Order. Additionally, along with the Order, the Department issued and served on Petitioner via certified mail a Division of Workers’ Compensation Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Calculation, requesting records for a period of three years. The request, made pursuant to Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes, asked the employer to produce, for the preceding three years, documents that reflected payroll, proof of insurance, workers’ compensation audit reports, identity, duration, contracts, invoices and check stubs reflecting payment to subcontractors, proof of workers’ compensation coverage for those subcontractors, employee leasing company information, temporary labor service information, and any certificate of workers’ compensation exemption. The request asked for the same type of records that had been requested earlier. Neither request for records was specific to a particular construction job that Olender may have performed work on. The investigator informed Mr. Campbell that Petitioner was being issued a Stop-Work Order and gave him a copy of the Order. Mr. Campbell faxed the Order to Olender’s office in Missouri. The Department’s investigator also checked the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) database. The system tracks workers' compensation insurance policy information provided by workers’ compensation carriers on an insured employer. The database did not contain an entry that reflected a current State of Florida workers' compensation insurance policy for Olender. The database did reference that Olender had a stop-work order served on it on July 12, 2002, which had been lifted on July 31, 2002, with payment of the penalty. Florida law requires that employers maintain a variety of business records involving their business. See § 440.107(5), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.015. The Rule is limited to records regarding a business’ employees and any payout by the employer to any person. In this case, under the Rule, the only records Olender was required to maintain related to its employees and its subcontractor, Mr. Torres. There was no evidence regarding any other subcontractors Olender may have contracted with. The only records supplied by Olender to the Department were the records from MBA that included workers’ compensation information and W-2 forms for Olender’s leased employees, the illegible proof of insurance for Mr. Torres and copies of checks from Olender to Mr. Torres for the subcontract. Those records reflected that John Olender, Ruben Rojo and Primitivo Torres were leased employees and covered by workers’ compensation insurance under Olender’s contract with MBA. Olender supplied no records regarding workers’ compensation coverage for the eight employees who were members of the punch- out crew, the three workers who were members of the paper crew or the 12 workers who were on the third floor. When an employer fails to provide requested business records that the statute requires it to maintain, the Department is required to impute the employer's payroll using "the statewide average weekly wage as defined in Section 440.12(2)." § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.028. The penalty for failure to secure the workers' compensation insurance coverage required by Florida law is 1.5 times the premium that would have been charged for such coverage for each employee identified by the Department. The premium is calculated by applying the approved manual rate for workers' compensation insurance coverage for each employee to each $100.00 of the gross payroll for each employee. In this case, the Department, after several amended assessments, imputed the payroll for Olender for the period beginning January 22, 2004, Petitioner’s date of incorporation, and ending June 26, 2006. Included in the calculation were the eight individuals on the punch-out crew identified by John Olender, the 12 employees who were working on the third floor, the forklift driver Victor Ibarra, and the three individuals on the paper crew. In calculating the premium for workers' compensation insurance coverage, the Department's investigator used the risk classifications and definitions of the National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. ("NCCI") SCOPES Manual. The appropriate code for Olender’s employees was classification code 5561 which covers framing of multiple family dwellings. The gross payroll imputed to each of the 27 employees was $683.00 per week. The Department then utilized the imputed payroll for same employees for the years 2004 and 2005. The Department’s calculation resulted in an assessed penalty of $1,205,535.40. However, the evidence establishes that Olender had 11 direct employees rather than 27 employees during the period of the Alta Westgate contract. Olender’s performance under that contract began on April 3, 2006. Other than the period of time involved with the Alta Westgate project, there was no evidence regarding the period of time Olender conducted business in Florida that would require it to comply with Florida law. The date of incorporation of Olender is insufficient to demonstrate that Olender engaged in any business in Florida that would require it to comply with Florida’s workers’ compensation law. Therefore, the penalty calculation must be modified to reflect only those eleven employees for the time period Olender performed under its contract on the Alta Westgate project.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Olender Construction Co., Inc., failed to have Florida workers' compensation insurance coverage for 11 of its employees, in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; and Recalculating the penalty against Olender. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Jeremy T. Springhart, Esquire Broad and Cassel 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1500 Orlando, Florida 32801 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent, AAR Airlift Group, Inc. (Respondent), committed the unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Gabriel C. Gaudio (Petitioner), be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a male over 50 years of age. On or about May 9, 2009, a company located in North Carolina hired Petitioner to work as a Technical Publications Clerk. Petitioner was over 40 years of age at the time of his employment. Prior to March 2012, Petitioner relocated to Florida to continue employment with the company that then became known as AAR Airlift Group, Inc. Respondent does business in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida, and has over 15 employees, one of whom was Petitioner. At all times material to this matter, Respondent employed Steve Lane (Lane) and Melvin Zahn (Zahn) as supervisors with the company. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent had policies that prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and any other reason prohibited by law. Any employee who believed discrimination had occurred was directed to report to the local Human Resources Department or to the Corporate Vice President of Human Resources. Respondent’s employees are considered “at will.” Respondent reserves the right to involuntarily terminate any employee for any reason or for no reason unless to do so would violate law. Petitioner maintains he was terminated in retaliation for a complaint he submitted because of his age, or because of his disability. All of the actions complained of occurred between March 2012 and June 2012 (when Petitioner was terminated). It is undisputed that Petitioner’s age would establish he is a member of a protected class. It is undisputed that Petitioner was terminated after he submitted a complaint against his co-workers. Although Petitioner asserted he is disabled, Petitioner presented no evidence to establish the nature of his disability or that Respondent required him to perform tasks contrary to his physical or mental limitations. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to accommodate any claimed limitation Petitioner might have had. In April 2012, Respondent issued a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) to Petitioner to outline areas of his job performance that needed improvement. It was anticipated that Petitioner would address the areas of concern and make improvement within 90 days. Upon receipt of the PIP Petitioner filed a claim of hostile work environment with the company’s human resources office. More specifically, Petitioner claimed two employees, Zahn , technical publications manager, and Rachel Grygier (Grygier), a technical publications librarian, had disparaged him regarding his age and disability. To address Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent initiated an internal investigation of the claim. As part of the investigation process, Respondent directed Petitioner not to disclose or discuss the accusations of his claim with anyone. Respondent sought to resolve the matter without having the allegations discussed among employees before individual statements could be taken. Contrary to the directive, Petitioner discussed his complaint against Zahn and Grygier with at least one other employee. That employee (Barnett) e-mailed support for Petitioner to JoAnne Paul (Paul), Respondent’s human resources compliance manager. When Paul confronted Petitioner as to whether he had discussed his complaint with Barnett, Petitioner falsely denied knowing Barnett. Paul took Petitioner’s failure to maintain confidentiality regarding his complaint to Lane, Respondent’s director of quality assurance and internal evaluations. Together, Paul and Lane decided to terminate Petitioner. The basis for the termination was two-fold: the failure to follow a directive not to discuss the complaint; and the lack of truthfulness when asked about knowing Barnett. Petitioner maintains that his termination was in retaliation for his complaint against Zahn and Grygier and that the company wanted him out. Petitioner presented no evidence that after his termination he was replaced with a younger employee. Even though Petitioner did not establish the nature of his disability, Petitioner presented no evidence that he was replaced by a non-disabled person or that his handicap caused Respondent to terminate him. Further, Petitioner did not establish that any area of concern noted in his PIP related to his disability. Neither Zahn or Grygier had anything to do with Petitioner’s termination. Finally, Petitioner failed to present credible evidence that filing a complaint against Zahn and Grygier was the genesis for his termination. Petitioner was a long-time employee with the company. He had started in North Carolina and moved to Melbourne with the company. Had Respondent wanted to terminate him for any reason it could have done so prior to the move or after the move. Petitioner’s claim that his complaint against Zahn and Grygier caused the termination is not supported by the weight of persuasive evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gabriel Gaudio 259 Abernathy Circle, Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Chelsie J. Flynn, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 1300 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Michelle Wilson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
