The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2013)1/, by failing to obtain workers? compensation insurance coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement that employers secure the payment of workers? compensation insurance coverage, pursuant to chapter 440, Florida Statutes, for their employees. Respondent is a Florida-limited liability company engaged in business operations for the time period of March 16, 2010, through March 15, 2013. Mark Markisen is the managing member of Respondent listed with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations. On March 15, 2013, Jack Gumph, an investigator with the Department, conducted a random on-site compliance inspection of a construction site for a single family residence. Gumph determined that the general contractor for the job was Gulf Shore Homes and that it had subcontracted with Tradewinds Design for certain work inside the home. As Gumph interviewed the different workers present on the worksite, he spoke with Mark and Brett Markisen, who informed him that they worked for Tradewinds Design. Gumph observed Brett Markisen installing a wine cabinet in the home. Gumph confirmed through the Department?s online records that Gulf Shores Homes and Tradewinds Design had current workers? compensation insurance coverage on March 15, 2013. Based on this initial information, Gumph left the worksite. On March 19, 2013, Gumph subsequently learned from a conversation with Mark Markisen that Mark and Brett Markisen were not employees of Tradewinds Design. Rather, Tradewinds had subcontracted with Respondent, Cabinetry by Design of Collier County, L.L.C., to build and install the wine cabinets. Mark Markisen stated that he was the managing member of Cabinetry by Design of Collier County, L.L.C., and that he had selected to be exempt from workers? compensation insurance coverage. Gumph confirmed that Mark Markisen had selected to be exempt from workers? compensation insurance coverage. However, because Respondent did not have worker?s compensation coverage for Brett Markisen, the Department issued a Stop-Work Order on March 19, 2013, and Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation on April 8, 2013. Mark Markisen possessed an exemption from the workers? compensation insurance coverage requirement during the penalty period of March 16, 2010, through March 15, 2013. Brett Markisen did not possess an exemption from the workers? compensation insurance coverage requirement during the penalty period. Brett Markisen was employed by Respondent throughout the penalty period. During the penalty period, Brett Markisen received approximately $187,000.00 from Respondent. The amount of this money attributed to wages is unclear, based on the fact that Mark Markisen indicated that some of the payments reflected loans, not wages. Respondent was an “employer” as defined in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, throughout the penalty period. On March 15, 2013, Brett Markisen was Respondent?s “employee” working on the installation of cabinets in the single family residence.2/ On March 15, 2013, Respondent failed to provide workers? compensation insurance coverage for Brett Markisen. Respondent also failed to provide coverage during the penalty period of March 16, 2010, through March 15, 2013. Therefore, the Department properly entered a Stop-Work Order on March 19, 2013. Respondent failed to provide sufficient business records in order to establish a payroll. Therefore, the Department correctly imputed payroll against Respondent. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment used the proper class code for the calculation of the penalty, concerning the installation of cabinets, and correctly followed the procedure set out in section 440.107(7)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order upholding the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, assessing a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $21,436.61. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2013.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent conducted business operations in Florida without obtaining workers’ compensation coverage that met the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2009), for its employees, and if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency that is responsible for enforcing Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, which requires employers to secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees. Respondent is a Louisville, Kentucky-based corporation that is engaged in the construction, maintenance, and painting of elevated water tanks. Respondent has a second fabrication facility located in Newnan, Georgia. Respondent’s work constitutes construction. On March 4, 2010, Petitioner’s investigator, Lawrence F. Eaton, observed Respondent’s employees working on a water tower in Pace, Florida. While visiting the worksite, one of Respondent’s employees stated that he did not have any information regarding if and how the men were covered by workers’ compensation. The employee gave Mr. Eaton a telephone number for Respondent. Next, Mr. Eaton consulted the Kentucky Secretary of State website to find information concerning the corporate status of Respondent. The website indicated that Respondent was incorporated in 1892 and that it had three corporate officers. Mr. Eaton then consulted Petitioner’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) database. CCAS contains workers’ compensation policy information for each employer that has a Florida policy and information relative to workers’ compensation exemptions that have been applied for and issued to individuals by Petitioner. Mr. Eaton was unable to find any indication on CCAS that Respondent had secured workers’ compensation coverage by purchasing a Florida policy. CCAS also provided no evidence that Respondent had entered into an arrangement with an employee leasing company to provide workers’ compensation coverage to its employees. Additionally, CCAS did not show that Respondent had obtained exemptions for its corporate officers. Mr. Eaton subsequently spoke with one of Respondent’s representatives. Mr. Eaton was informed that Respondent was self-insured for workers’ compensation in Kentucky. Mr. Eaton also learned that Respondent had another workers’ compensation policy. Respondent’s representative indicated that she would send Mr. Eaton the policy paperwork. When he received the paperwork from Petitioner, Mr. Eaton determined that the insurance coverage did not comply with the requirements of Florida’s workers’ compensation law. The paperwork included an excess policy of workers’ compensation and a Georgia workers’ compensation policy. On March 5, 2010, Mr. Eaton issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment against Respondent. Specifically, the Stop-Work Order states that Respondent was not in compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, because Respondent failed to obtain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. On March 5, 2010, Mr. Eaton issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation to Respondent. On March 8, 2010, Respondent provided Mr. Eaton with additional workers’ compensation policy information. The information included the declarations page for Chartis Company Policy No. WC 005-73-7942. The Chartis policy is a Workers’ Compensation and Employers Liability Policy. In Item 3A, the policy lists the states that are covered, in Part One of the policy, pursuant to each state’s workers’ compensation law. Georgia is named as a covered state in Item 3A. In Item 3C, the Chartis policy lists the states that are covered, in Part Three of the policy, as "other states insurance." Florida is listed only in Item 3C. Item 4 of the Chartis policy states that "[t]he premium of this policy will be determined by our Manuals of Rules, Classifications, Rates and Rating Plans. All information required below is subject to verification and change by audit." In response to the request for business records, Respondent provided Petitioner with payroll information for work it had performed in Florida between September 2007 and February 2010. After receiving this information, Respondent’s Penalty Calculator, Robert McAullife, calculated a penalty. Because Respondent had not provided all of the requested business records, Mr. McAullife imputed Respondent’s payroll for a portion of the relevant time period. In calculating the penalty, Mr. McAullife first sought to determine the amount of premium that Respondent would have paid had it been properly insured for the relevant three-year period. Mr. McAullife assigned a class code for each of Respondent’s employees, reflecting the work they performed. Mr. McAullife then took 1/100th of the payroll and multiplied that figure by the approved manual rate applicable to each class code. Mr. McAullife then took the previously obtained product and multiplied it by 1.5 to find a penalty in the amount of $122,242.23. This penalty is based on Respondent having $382,146.90 in Florida payroll that would have required $81,494.66 in workers’ compensation premium. There are no errors in Mr. McAullife’s penalty calculation. Mr. Eaton issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on March 23, 2010. On March 24, 2010, Respondent and Petitioner entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty that required ten percent of the penalty to be paid in advance and the remainder to be paid in 60 interest-free monthly payments. Respondent also produced a policy that provided coverage in compliance with Florida law with an effective date of March 12, 2010. As a result, Petitioner issued an Order of Conditional Release, permitting Respondent to return to work. During the hearing, Respondent presented evidence that it is a registered self-insured company in Kentucky for the first $500,000.00 of workers’ compensation. Additionally, Respondent has excess insurance for any workers’ compensation claims that exceed the $500,000.00 threshold. Because it is self-insured in Kentucky, Respondent must purchase letters of credit on an annual basis. Respondent paid the following for its recent letters of credit: (a) 2007, $26,755.54; (b) 2008, $32,438.48; (c) 2009, $33,626.38; and (d) 2010 to date, $8,931.39. The State of Kentucky assesses qualified self-insureds a six and one half percent tax based on an annual simulated premium. The amount of the simulated premium represents what a qualified self-insured would pay for a "first dollar" policy of workers’ compensation insurance. Respondent’s recent simulated premiums are as follows: (a) 2007, $453.440.00; (b) 2008, $480,637.00; (c) 2009, $623,940.00; and (d) 2010, $1,006,243.00. Respondent also maintains a "high dollar" deductible policy of insurance that provides workers’ compensation coverage for its Georgia employees. Respondent’s Georgia policy, Chartis Company Policy No. WC 005-73-7942, which includes Florida as part of "all other states" in Item 3C of the declarations page, also requires the payment of premiums. Respondent recently paid the following premiums for this insurance: (a) 2007, $124,736.78; (b) 2008, $125,950.08; and (c) 2009, $64,465.28. The premiums paid by Respondent for the Chartis Company Policy No. WC 005-73-7942 are not based on Florida rates. From 2007 to 2010, Respondent provided workers’ compensation benefits for at least four different workers that were injured while performing work for Respondent in Florida. The workers’ compensation benefits paid by Respondent on these claims totaled $147,958.25.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order, finding that Caldwell Tanks, Inc., failed to comply with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty in the amount of $122,224.22. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude M. Harden, III, Esquire Carr Allison 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jamila Georgette Gooden, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julie Jones, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been subjected to discrimination within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon alleged sexual harassment in the course of her employment and retaliation for her complaints concerning the alleged sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at times pertinent hereto. It is undisputed that that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and that timeliness and jurisdictional requirements have been met. The Respondent obtained a contract with the United States Navy for a project to be performed at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. It became the contractor for the project in approximately December of 1991. The contract, in pertinent part, provided that the Respondent would provide local cartage trucking services for the Navy on and in the environs of the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The project involved loading and transportation of aircraft parts and related supplies and equipment. The Petitioner was hired as a truck driver, delivering aircraft parts for the naval aviation depot (NADEP). During the course of that employment, there came a time when the Petitioner contended that she had been discriminated against because of her gender. The Petitioner contends that in a meeting in December of 1991, she was told by Terry Meyers, an employee of the Respondent and the Petitioner's supervisor, that she "didn't look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to look for another job. The meeting in which the statements were allegedly made was a meeting called by the Petitioner's supervisor and the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis, to address certain deficiencies in the Petitioner's performance. Another employee, Mr. Braughton, was also counseled at the meeting concerning his performance as a truck driver. His was the same type of employment position as that occupied by the Petitioner. Mr. Braughton is a white male. The Petitioner maintains that she informed a white male employee, Mike Morris, of the statements allegedly made at the meeting and that he immediately made a telephone call to Mr. Frank Moody, the president of the corporation, to put the president and the corporation on notice of sexual discrimination against the Petitioner. The Petitioner, however, was not present when Mr. Morris made that telephone call to Mr. Moody. Even had he made reference to alleged sexual discrimination in his telephone call to Mr. Moody, Mr. Morris only learned of the purported sexually-discriminatory statements from the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintained that Mr. Morris informed her that he had heard the statements made while standing at the door of the room in which the meeting occurred and that Mr. Morris initiated the telephone call on his own volition to Mr. Moody, based upon hearing those statements. Mr. Morris, however, testified to the contrary, stating that the Petitioner approached him and claimed that she was on probation and was fearful of being laid off from employment and that the Petitioner told him of the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements and that he did not hear them himself. He further testified that the Petitioner instructed him to contact Mr. Moody concerning her fears about her job and the alleged discriminatory statements or she would contact "HRO and EEO and have the contract shut down". Mr. Morris, indeed, called Mr. Moody but never mentioned the statements alleged by the Petitioner to have been made to her by Mr. Meyers during the performance evaluation meeting. In fact, it has been demonstrated by Mr. Morris' testimony, which the Hearing Officer accepts as more credible, that the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Morris about a sexually-discriminatory statement or purported sexual discrimination. Mr. Morris, instead, spoke to Mr. Moody about problems he saw occurring in the operation in Pensacola which he attributed to the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis. He told Mr. Moody that Mr. Francis was allowing employees to leave work early without Mr.. Moody's knowledge and still crediting them with working a full day on such occasions which, in effect, cost the corporation additional salary monies which were unearned. The meeting in which the Petitioner was allegedly confronted with the statement that she did not look like a truck driver and had three weeks to look for another job was called and conducted by Mr. Francis and Mr. Meyers was present. It is undisputed that Mr. Moody terminated Mr. Francis shortly after the telephone conversation with Mr. Morris. He replaced Mr. Francis with the current project manager, John Jacobs. Mr. Moody testified that in a telephone conversation with the Petitioner that she never mentioned to him the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements referenced above. Instead, he was told by both Mr. Morris and the Petitioner that she was concerned that she might lose her job because of the results of the meeting with Mr. Francis, in which he told her that she needed to improve her job performance. In fact, the management of the Respondent perceived a genuine job performance problem involving the Petitioner's conduct of her job duties. This was disclosed in the testimony of both Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Morris, where it was revealed that the Petitioner had had a continuing problem performing her job correctly and that Mr. Morris and the management personnel had worked with her constantly during the course of her employment term with the Respondent, taking more time and personal attention with her than with other employees. This was done in order to repetitively explain her job duties and give her additional chances to improve her work performance, in comparison to the lesser degree of attention and remedial help that they accorded other employees. Prior to February 3, 1993, the Petitioner had been employed with the Respondent for over a year. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs established, however, that even though her probationary period had long since elapsed, he still considered the Petitioner to be, in effect, an employee in training because she was deficient in correctly accomplishing all of the duties of her job. She was slow in performing her job duties, including preventive maintenance inspections of her vehicle and in making the "pickups and deliveries" of freight she was required to transport on her truck in the performance of her duties. The counseling session concerning her work performance occurring in December of 1991, referenced above, was during her probationary period. The white male employee, Mr. Rick Braughton, who was also counseled about deficient work performance on that occasion, was informed that he might not remain employed past his probationary period unless his performance improved. The Respondent had a regular practice and procedure, as part of its truck safety and preventive maintenance program, that employees, who were drivers, were required to give a preventive maintenance and safety inspection of their vehicles each day prior to leaving the company facility or terminal to transport aviation parts or other freight. This was regarded as crucial to proper job performance by the employer because of the concern about safety of the drivers and avoidance of damage, and liability for damage, to the expensive equipment and parts which the Respondent was required by its contract to transport, such as expensive military aircraft parts and related equipment. Among these preventive maintenance inspection duties that driver/employees, such as the Petitioner, were required to perform daily was the requirement to check the air in the truck tires and "top off" the tires with the required air pressure, if necessary. 10 Mr. Jacobs established that there came a time when the Petitioner was noted to have failed on multiple occasions, in the same week, to check and air her tires. Finally, upon this deficiency coming to his attention again on February 3, 1993, Mr. Jacobs suspended the Petitioner for a day without pay, for failing to check and air her tires. The Petitioner claims that she was the only employee singled out for this treatment concerning failure to inspect and air her tires. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs is deemed more credible, having observed the candor and demeanor of all of the witnesses, and it is determined that the employer had a good-faith belief that the Petitioner was deficient in this regard and that the reprimand, consisting of the one-day suspension, was justified. It was not demonstrated that, even if the Petitioner's version of events is true and that other driver/employees were not disciplined for failure to air their tires, that such a circumstance occurred as a result of the employer's knowledge of other driver/employees failing to air their tires and arbitrarily choosing not to discipline them. In fact, it was not demonstrated by preponderant, non-self-serving evidence that other employees had not been disciplined for failure to air their tires. In fact, it was not shown, other than by the self-serving testimony of the Petitioner, that other employees had failed to air their tires when required. The other drivers are mostly male, but one is a female. There was no showing that she was treated any differently than the male drivers. In summary, it has been established that the employer accorded the reprimand to the Petitioner because of a good-faith belief that her performance had been deficient, on repeated occasions, in this respect. It is undisputed that prior to the date the Petitioner received the reprimand, consisting of one-day suspension without pay, that the Petitioner had a generally good attitude about her job insofar as management was able to observe. Even though management had had some concerns about her performance and the slow manner in which she was learning certain aspects of her job, with resulting deficient effects upon her performance, management forbore from using these concerns to reduce her performance rating. She received good evaluations of her performance, insofar as her personnel record is concerned, prior to the time she was suspended for one day on February 3, 1993. After the Petitioner received the suspension she developed a "bad attitude" insofar as her perception of management was concerned. She began to complain frequently about vehicle safety or purported concerns she had about the condition of her vehicle related to safety, particularly the truck brakes. Prior to her suspension, she had never complained in this regard. Management also perceived that she appeared to show down her work performance and management came to believe that it was an intentional delay of her work performance on an ongoing basis. Prior to receiving the reprimand, she was never known to complain to management concerning discrimination on account of her gender. She had never informed the project manager or any other supervisory personnel concerning her purported belief that employee Meyers was "following her". Only after she received the reprimand on February 3, 1993 did she elect to file a sexual discrimination charge with the Commission. Mr. Meyers had some supervisory authority over the Petitioner. His job duties also required that he drive his truck around the Naval Air Station and the immediate vicinity in the normal performance of his duties. This circumstance resulted in his being in close proximity to the Petitioner during the course of their respective work days. He contends that he was not purposely following her for the purpose of harassing her. The overall evidence of record reveals, however, that he, indeed, did follow or stop in her vicinity on a number of occasions to observe her work performance. This was not shown to be out of the ordinary scope of his supervisory duties, especially because of management's concern that the Petitioner was not progressing in the learning and performance of her job duties as well as other employees, including the other female driver. The project manager, Mr. Jacobs, felt that the Petitioner's attitude continued to decline after the February 3, 1993 reprimand. He felt that her attitude and performance reached its lowest level on the date she was observed to be loading "unauthorized equipment" (apparently a portion of a helicopter assembly weighing approximately 4,000 pounds) on the flatbed trailer of her assigned work truck. She was not authorized to load that equipment and apparently, according to her testimony, she did so in order to provide a substantial amount of weight on her trailer for the purpose of having her brakes inspected by the quality assurance official for the project. She went to an unauthorized area for approximately one hour to have this inspection performed without the approval of the Respondent's management. Further, it was not necessary, in order to evaluate the brakes on the vehicle for proper function and safety, to have the weight of the unauthorized load placed on the trailer. If, indeed, the brakes had been defective, it would have been entirely possible that the expensive aircraft parts she had placed on the trailer without authorization could have been substantially damaged, the truck or other property could have been damaged, and, indeed, the Petitioner or other persons could have been injured. Additionally, the Petitioner misrepresented the reason she was in the unauthorized area where she had her brakes inspected by Mr. Lett, the quality assurance officer. In this connection, because she had begun to complain repeatedly about the condition of her brakes and her vehicle (after her reprimand), the project manager, Mr. Jacobs, had had certain other employees come in on several occasions at approximately 6:00 a.m., before normal working hours, and before the Petitioner arrived on the job site, to inspect the Petitioner's truck for safety and appropriate preventive maintenance purposes. These employees were not informed that it was the Petitioner's truck they were inspecting at the time they were told to do the inspections. The Respondent was attempting to ascertain the true condition of the Petitioner's truck and determine whether her reports concerning safety problems, particularly with her brakes, were accurate or not. In fact, on the morning of the day when the unauthorized load was placed on the truck and the Petitioner had Mr. Lett perform the inspection of her brakes at the unauthorized area, one of the Petitioner's co-employees had inspected her brakes before she arrived to take custody of her truck that morning. He had determined that the brakes were operating properly. The Petitioner and Mr. Lett apparently felt that the brakes were deficient when they were inspected early in the afternoon of that day. The record does not reveal whether the brakes were deficient when Mr. Lett inspected them or that some change in the adjustment of the brakes or other problem had arisen since the employee inspected them early that morning and found them to be in proper operating order. Be that as it may, management was of the belief on that day and prior thereto that the Petitioner, although reporting brake deficiency problems, did not truly experience such brake deficiency problems with her truck. This belief was based upon management perceptions concerning the Petitioner's attitude after her reprimand and upon the independent, confidential inspections management had other employees do on the Petitioner's truck. Accordingly, whether its belief was accurate or not, management was of the good-faith belief, on the date she was observed loading unauthorized, expensive equipment onto the flatbed truck, in an unnecessary fashion, for the purpose of having her brakes inspected, while being absent from her work assignment for one hour in an unauthorized area, that it had performance-related reasons to terminate her, which it did. This decision was made against the background of the increasingly poor attitude displayed by the Petitioner since her reprimand and because of the continuing problems management had experienced with the Petitioner's job performance since her initial employment one and one- half years previously. Although the Petitioner testified that as early as December of 1991, the management of the Respondent had spoken with her regarding her work performance and she interpreted that meeting as an attack on her gender and not upon her poor work habits, this contention was not verified by any other testimony. Having observed the candor and demeanor of the Petitioner versus that of the other witnesses, it is determined that her testimony is less creditable because of its self-serving nature. Although the Petitioner testified that a comment was made that "she did not look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to find another job, this was not verified through testimony of any other witness. To the extent that any other witnesses testified concerning these statements being made in a belief that discrimination had been exhibited toward the Petitioner, the evidence reveals that this information only came to these people through self-serving reports by the Petitioner herself. Meyers directly contradicts that these statements were made to the Petitioner and he states that he never heard anyone tell her that she had three weeks to look for a job or that she "didn't look like a truck driver". The petitioner provided no testimony or evidence which could show how these alleged statements constituted "sexual discrimination" or how the statements related to her sexual discrimination claim. It was not shown that any member of management, with employment-decision authority, made or condoned such statements even if it had been established that they evidenced gender-based discrimination, which was not done. The Petitioner did not complain of sexual discrimination per se until after she had received a reprimand from management. Likewise, she began to repetitively claim that her equipment was unsafe after the reprimand. The Petitioner may have been overly sensitive to management's concern for safety inspections of her truck because of being reprimanded for safety violations and was afraid she would "get into trouble" with management if she did not constantly report feared safety problems. The fact was established, however, that management had a genuine, good-faith belief that it was being harassed by these repetitive, unsafe equipment reports by the Petitioner, given the then- prevailing atmosphere surrounding the Petitioner's employment, characterized by her less than satisfactory attitude, as perceived by management, and the fact that management's confidential inspections of her equipment did not reveal any safety problems of the type reported by the Petitioner. Finally, it is especially noteworthy that during this period of time when the Petitioner made the claim of sexual discrimination and retaliation based upon her claim, that the Respondent had in its employ, in an identical job position, a female truck driver who had had no unsatisfactory experience by management with her performance, was not subjected to investigative or disciplinary measures, and who is still satisfactorily employed with the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the petition herein in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1459 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact which are not in separately-numbered, discrete paragraphs. The paragraphs contain some proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and some which are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the same subject matter. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are intertwined with argument and discussions of the weight of the evidence or testimony. Because the paragraphs in the proposed findings of fact contain both findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and which the Hearing Officer rejects, discrete, specific rulings thereon are not practicable. It suffices to say that all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are subordinate to, but have been considered and addressed in the findings of fact portion of this Recommended Order and have been in that fashion completely ruled upon. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The same considerations are true of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Some portions of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent consist of merely discussions and argument concerning the weight of the evidence and some are acceptable to the Hearing Officer based upon the Hearing Officer's determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence. Some are rejected as being unnecessary or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact made on the same subject matter. Here, again, this Recommended Order completely and adequately addresses the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, and the Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with those made by the Hearing Officer and to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, they are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence or as being immaterial, unnecessary, or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry W. McCleary, Esquire 3 West Garden Street Suite 380 Pensacola, FL 32501 Donna Gardner, Esquire 213 South Alcaniz Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether the Stop-Work Order and the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment entered by Petitioner on July 25, 2013, and August 13, 2013, respectively, should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency tasked with the responsibility of enforcing the requirement of section 440.107(3), Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation for their employees. Respondent, Mad Dog Marketing Group, Inc., is a corporation organized under chapter 607, Florida Statutes, and was registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, throughout the period of July 26, 2010, to July 25, 2013. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was engaged in the operation of a hardware store business with three locations in Florida. On July 25, 2013, based upon an anonymous referral, Tracey Gilbert, the Department's compliance investigator, commenced a workers' compensation compliance investigation of Respondent by visiting the job site, an appliance parts store at 730 West Brandon Boulevard, Brandon, Florida, and interviewing Sharon Belcher. According to Ms. Gilbert, Ms. Belcher informed her that she had 11 employees at the time of the site visit and that she did not have workers' compensation coverage for them. Ms. Belcher showed Ms. Gilbert an application for workers' compensation insurance and said she had not taken action with it since the company wanted a $10,000 premium. She also showed Ms. Gilbert some OSHA and workplace posters, but not the typical "broken arm poster" that describes workers' compensation coverage for a place of business. Ms. Belcher then gave Ms. Gilbert a list of Respondent's 11 current employees. On her laptop computer, Ms. Gilbert consulted the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) database to determine whether Respondent had secured workers' compensation coverage or an exemption from the requirements for coverage for its employees. CCAS is the database Ms. Gilbert routinely consults during the course of her investigations. She determined from CCAS that Respondent neither had workers' compensation coverage for her employees nor had received an exemption from such coverage from the Department. Ms. Belcher's recollection of her meeting with Ms. Gilbert differs from Ms. Gilbert's. Ms. Belcher recalled that she had applied for insurance with ADP on July 11, 2013, received the "broken arm poster," and believed she was covered at the time Ms. Belcher conducted her investigation. She offered an exhibit showing photographs of posters (but not the "broken arm poster") on the office bulletin board. She also offered an exhibit she testified was the UPS label from the tube containing the "broken arm poster." No photograph of the "broken arm poster" was produced as an exhibit. Ms. Gilbert did not contact ADP to verify whether Respondent had coverage on the date of her site visit to the Brandon store. Ms. Gilbert issued a Stop-Work Order to Respondent and a concurrent Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation at 11:20 a.m. on July 25, 2013. Ms. Belcher first submitted an application for workers' compensation coverage on July 11, 2013, but coverage was not bound on that date. Ms. Belcher submitted the paperwork to bind her insurance coverage on the afternoon of July 25, 2013, according to Mark Cristillo, an employee of ADP Insurance. Mr. Cristillo testified that he had made several attempts during the month of July 2013 to obtain the signed documents from Ms. Belcher, including an attempt as late as July 23, 2013, at 11:45 a.m. Ms. Belcher told Mr. Cristillo at that time that she had not reviewed the quote package. At 11:20 a.m., the time Ms. Gilbert's issued the Stop-Work Order on July 25, 2013, Ms. Belcher had not bound her insurance coverage. When she submitted the payment with the signed documents to ADP later that afternoon, the coverage was bound effective 12:01 a.m. on July 25, 2013. The records produced by Ms. Belcher were given to Chad Mason, one of the Department's penalty auditors, to calculate the penalty. He reviewed the records and determined the amount of gross payroll paid to Respondent's employees during the three- year penalty period preceding the investigation during which Respondent was not in compliance with the workers' compensation coverage requirements. Using Respondent's bi-weekly payroll chart, Respondent's Florida Department of Revenue UCT-6 reports, and the classification codes for each employee, Mr. Mason calculated a Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment of $42,251.43, based upon what Respondent would have paid in workers' compensation premiums had it been in compliance with Florida's Workers' Compensation Law. The order was issued on October 24, 2013. Mr. Mason determined that the appropriate codes for Respondent's employees were 8010 and 8810, which are hardware store employees and general clerical employees, respectively. These codes were derived from the Scopes Manual, which lists all of the various jobs that may be performed in the context of workers' compensation. The manual is produced by NCCI, the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., the nation's most authoritative data collecting and disseminating organization for workers' compensation. The parties stipulated prior to hearing that all of the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were "employees" in the state of Florida of Respondent during the periods of non-compliance listed on the penalty worksheets. However, Respondent claimed that some of the employees were out-of-state and not subject to Florida law. Ms. Belcher testified that, as of July 25, 2013, three of its employees, Fred Hasselman, Douglas Strickland, and Josh Hyers, were employees of the Tennessee store and not subject to a Florida penalty. Mr. Hyers was a Florida employee prior to July 1, according to Ms. Belcher. However, all three of the employees were listed on the Florida Department of Revenue's UCT-6 form for the time period of the non-compliance. The UCT-6 form lists those employees who are subject to Florida's Unemployment Compensation Law. Mr. Mason reasonably relied upon the UCT-6 filings for the relevant time period to calculate Respondent's gross payroll in Florida. No evidence was produced to show them listed as Tennessee employees on that state's comparable tax form or any official document from outside Florida. The logical assumption is that they are Florida employees under the law. Accepting all the employees disclosed by Respondent as Florida employees led Mr. Mason to make his calculations of the penalty assessment using the appropriate codes from the Scopes Manual for hardware store and general clerical workers, 8010 and 8810. All the named employees on the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were paid by Respondent in the amounts indicated on the penalty worksheet that accompanies that assessment during the penalty period of July 26, 2010, through July 25, 2013. Even though small discrepancies came up at the hearing regarding the classifications of some of Respondent's employees, the parties had stipulated to the accuracy of the classifications of those employees so those numbers will be accepted for purposes of this decision. Based upon the testimony at the hearing and the pre-hearing stipulations of the parties, the penalty assessment in the amount of $42,251.43 is accurate. Mr. Mason correctly applied the methodology for determining the amount of coverage required, determining that the appropriate premium for the three- year period would have been $28,167.50. When multiplied by the factor used to calculate the penalty, 1.5 times the premium, the total amount due is $42,251.43. The Department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the Stop-Work Order was issued and served on Respondent on the morning of July 25, 2013, Respondent had not secured workers' compensation coverage for its employees as required by chapter 440. On two occasions, August 2 and August 21, 2013, Ms. Gilbert returned to Respondent's Brandon location after the Stop-Work Order had been issued. The first was to serve the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and the second was to serve the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. On both occasions, the business was open in violation of the Stop-Work Order. A business under a Stop-Work Order may elect to enter into a payment plan after a ten percent down payment to keep the business open while a challenge to DOAH is under way. Respondent had not entered into such a plan. Therefore, the Department seeks $1,000 penalty for each of the days Ms. Gilbert visited the Brandon store and saw it open for business. This total additional penalty of $2,000 could have been greater had the Department further investigated whether the business remained open on other days after the Stop-Work Order had been imposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order upholding the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and assess a penalty in the amount of $42,251.43. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Department fine Respondent an additional $1,000 per day for the two days Respondent did not comply with the Stop-Work Order, resulting in a total penalty of $44,251.43. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kristian Eiler Dunn, Esquire Dickens and Dunn, P.L. 517 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a payroll clerk with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Prior to November 1994, Petitioner was employed by Markings and Equipment Corporation, first as a receptionist, later as a payroll clerk for several years. She had a good working relationship with management and staff. In November 1994, Edward T. Quinn and two other investors purchased the assets of Markings and Equipment Co. and established a new corporation named Mill-it Striping, Inc., a Florida corporation. On November 7, 1994, Mill-It Striping began operations. Edward T. Quinn was named Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. Petitioner and one other person were retained as office staff. Other employees of the former owner were retained as field workers in their same positions. Petitioner and the other employees were retained on a 90-day probationary period. All employees were required to complete application forms for the new company. The organization of the company was revamped and operating policies were changed. Petitioner and Quinn became embroiled in disputes over policy and procedures on a nearly daily basis. Quinn's management style was gruff and unprofessional. Foul language was directed toward Petitioner's work by Quinn on a regular basis. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Quinn's derogatory remarks of a social nature were directed toward Petitioner. On December 5, 1994, Petitioner was terminated from her position as a payroll clerk. Quinn alleged that Petitioner was terminated because of her poor work performance and reporting to work late on more than one occasion while on probation. Petitioner, who is an African-American female, was replaced in her position by a Caucasian female. Respondent's company presently has been administratively dissolved, as of September 24, 1999. There is no evidence that the corporation is active, is a subsidiary to another company, or that it has any remaining assets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Edward T. Quinn as former Vice President Mill-It Stripping, Inc. 107 Shore Drive Longwood, Florida 32779 Valerie A. Roberts Post Office Box 543 Maitland, Florida 32751 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Royal Roofing and Restoration, Inc. (Respondent or Royal Roofing), failed to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees; and, if so, whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Petitioner or Department), correctly calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement of chapter 440, that Florida employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent is a Florida for-profit corporation organized on July 28, 2015, and engaged in the business of roofing and storm damage restoration. The company was formed, and initially conducted business, in Tallahassee, Florida, but expanded to the Panama City area in 2016. Traci Fisher is Respondent’s President and Registered Agent, with a mailing address of 1004 Kenilworth, Tallahassee, Florida 32312. DOAH Case No. 17-0879 On May 4, 2016, Department Compliance Investigator Jesse Holman, conducted a routine workers’ compensation compliance inspection at 374 Brown Place in Crestview, Florida. Mr. Holman observed four men removing shingles from the roof of a residential structure at that address. Mr. Holman first interviewed a worker who identified himself as Dustin Hansel and reported that he and the other three workers on site were a new crew for Respondent, the permit for the job had not yet been pulled, and the workers were not aware of the rate of pay for the job. Mr. Hansel telephoned Respondent’s sales manager, Dillon Robinson, who then spoke directly with Mr. Holman via telephone. Mr. Robinson informed Mr. Holman that Respondent obtained workers’ compensation coverage through Payroll Management Inc. (PMI), an employee-leasing company. Mr. Holman identified the three remaining workers at the jobsite as Milton Trice, Winston Perrotta, and Kerrigan Ireland. Mr. Holman contacted PMI and secured a copy of Respondent’s then-active employee roster. None of the workers at the jobsite, including Mr. Hansel, were included on Respondent’s employee roster. Upon inquiry, Mr. Holman was informed that PMI had no pending employee applications for Respondent. Mr. Holman consulted the Department’s Coverage Compliance Automated System (CCAS) and found Respondent had no workers’ compensation insurance policy and no active exemptions. During Mr. Holman’s onsite investigation, the workers left the jobsite. Mr. Holman could not immediately reach Ms. Fisher, but did speak with her husband, Tim Fisher. Mr. Fisher informed Mr. Holman that the crew was on their way to the PMI Fort Walton office to be enrolled on Respondent’s employee roster. On May 5, 2016, based on his investigation, and after consultation with his supervisor, Mr. Holman issued Respondent Stop-Work Order (SWO) 16-148-1A, along with a Business Records Request (BRR) for records covering the audit period of July 27, 2015 through May 4, 2016. Later that day, Mr. Holman spoke to Ms. Fisher, who informed him the crew did not have permission to begin the work on that date, as she had not yet pulled the permit for the reroof. Ms. Fisher further explained that the crewmembers had been instructed to complete applications with PMI prior to departing Tallahassee for Crestview. Ms. Fisher confirmed the crewmembers were completing applications at PMI Fort Walton that same day. Mr. Holman met with Ms. Fisher the following day and personally served SWO 16-148-1A. Ms. Fisher delivered to Mr. Holman an updated employee roster from PMI which included Mr. Hansel, Mr. Perrotta, and Mr. Ireland; a letter documenting Mr. Trice was not employed by Respondent; and a $1000 check as downpayment on the penalty. Respondent initially submitted business records in response to the BRR on May 23 and 25, 2017. DOAH Case No. 17-1558 On June 8, 2016, Mr. Holman conducted a random workers’ compensation compliance inspection at 532 Rising Star Drive in Crestview. The single-family home at that address was undergoing renovations and Mr. Holman observed three men on the roof removing shingles. None of the men on the roof spoke English, but a fourth man, who identified himself as Jose Manuel Mejia, appeared and stated he worked for Respondent, and that all the workers onsite were paid through PMI at a rate of $10.00 per hour. Mr. Mejia admitted that one of the worker’s onsite, Emelio Lopez, was not enrolled with PMI and explained that Mr. Mejia brought him to the worksite that day because he knew Mr. Lopez to be a good worker. The remaining workers onsite were identified as Juan Mencho and Ramon Gonzalez, both from Atlanta, Georgia. Mr. Mejia produced some PMI paystubs for himself and Mr. Mencho. Mr. Mejia stated that he and his crews also received reimbursement checks directly from Respondent for gas, rentals, materials, and the like. Mr. Holman contacted PMI, who produced Respondent’s then-active employee roster. Mr. Mejia and Mr. Mencho were on the roster, but neither Mr. Gonzalez nor Mr. Lopez was included. Mr. Holman next contacted Ms. Fisher, who identified Mr. Mejia as a subcontractor, but was not familiar with any of the other men Mr. Holman encountered at the worksite. Mr. Holman consulted via telephone with his supervisor, who instructed him to issue an SWO to Respondent for failing to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. Mr. Holman issued SWO 16-198-1A by posting the worksite on June 8, 2016. Department Facilitator Don Hurst, personally served Ms. Fisher with SWO 16-198-1A in Tallahassee that same day. SWO 16-148-1A Penalty Calculation1/ Department Penalty Auditor Eunika Jackson, was assigned to calculate the penalties associated with the SWOs issued to Respondent. On June 8, 2016, Ms. Jackson began calculating the penalty associated with SWO 16-148-1A. Ms. Jackson reviewed the documents submitted by Respondent in response to the BRR. The documents included Respondent’s Wells Fargo bank statements, check images, and PMI payroll register for the audit period.2/ Based on a review of the records, Ms. Jackson identified the following individuals as Respondent’s employees because they received direct payment from Respondent at times during the audit period: David Rosinsky, Dylan Robinson, Jarod Bell, Tommy Miller, and David Shields. Ms. Jackson determined periods of non-compliance for these employees based on the dates they received payments from Respondent and were not covered for workers’ compensation via PMI employment roster, separate policy, or corporate officer exemption. Ms. Jackson deemed payments to each of the individuals as gross payroll for purposes of calculating the penalty. Based upon Ms. Fisher’s deposition testimony, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) class code 5551, Roofing, to Mr. Miller; NCCI class code 5474, Painting, to Mr. Rosinsky; NCCI class code 8742, Sales, to Mr. Bell and Mr. Robinson; and NCCI class code 8810, clerical office employee, to Mr. Shields. Utilizing the statutory formula for penalty calculation, Ms. Jackson calculated a total penalty of $191.28 associated with these five “employees.” Ms. Jackson next calculated the penalty for Dustin Hansel, Kerrigan Ireland, Milton Trice, and Winston Perrotta, the workers identified at the jobsite as employees on May 4, 2016. The Department maintains that the business records submitted by Respondent were insufficient to determine Respondent’s payroll to these “employees,” thus, Ms. Jackson used the statutory formula to impute payroll to these workers. Ms. Jackson calculated a penalty of $14,970.12 against Respondent for failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance for each of these four “employees” during the audit period. The total penalty associated with these four “employees” is $59,880.48. Ms. Jackson calculated a total penalty of $60,072.96 to be imposed against Respondent in connection with SWO 16-148- 1A. Business Records In compliance with the Department’s BRR, Respondent submitted additional business records on several occasions-- March 21, May 3 and 31, June 7, and August 15 and 24, 2017--in order to establish its complete payroll for the audit period. While the Department admits that the final documents submitted do establish Respondent’s complete payroll, the Department did not issue amended penalty assessment based on those records in either case. The Department maintains Respondent did not timely submit records, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028(4), which allows an employer 20 business days after service of the first amended order of penalty assessment to submit sufficient records to establish payroll. All business records submitted by Respondent were admitted in evidence and included as part of the record. The undersigned is not limited to the record before the Department at the time the amended penalty assessments were imposed, but must determine a recommendation in a de novo proceeding. The undersigned has relied upon the complete record in arriving at the decision in this case. Penalty Calculation for Ireland, Trice, and Perrotta For purposes of workers’ compensation insurance coverage, an “employee” is “any person who receives remuneration from an employer” for work or services performed under a contract. § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. Respondent did not issue a single check to Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, or Mr. Perrotta during the audit period. Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, and Mr. Perrotta are not included on any PMI leasing roster included in the record for the audit period. The uncontroverted evidence, including the credible and unrefuted testimony of each person with knowledge, established that Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, and Mr. Perrotta were newly hired for the job in Crestview on May 4, 2016, and began working that day prior to submitting applications at PMI, despite Ms. Fisher’s directions otherwise. Petitioner did not prove that either Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, or Mr. Perrotta was Respondent’s employee at any time during the audit period. Petitioner did not correctly calculate the penalty of $44,911.26 against Respondent for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance for Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, and Mr. Perrotta during the audit period. Penalty Calculation for Hansel Ms. Fisher testified that Mr. Hansel has owned several businesses with which Respondent has conducted business over the years. Originally, Mr. Hansel owned a dumpster rental business, now owned by his father. Mr. Hansel also owned an independent landscaping company with which Respondent occasionally transacted business. When Respondent expanded business into the Panama City area, Ms. Fisher hired Mr. Hansel as a crew chief to supervise new crews in the area. The job on May 4, 2016, was his first roofing job. A review of Respondent’s records reveals Respondent issued the following checks to Mr. Hansel during the audit period: December 4, 2015, in the amount of $360, $300 of which was for “dumpster rental” and the remaining $60 for “sod”; May 4, 2016, in the amount of $200 for “sod repair”; May 6, 2016, in the amount of $925 as reimbursement for travel expenses; May 9, 2016, in the amount of $1,011.50 (with no memo); and May 21, 2016, in the amount of $100 for “7845 Preservation.” Mr. Hansel was included on Respondent’s PMI leasing roster beginning on May 13, 2016. Petitioner proved that Mr. Hansel was Respondent’s employee at times during the audit period. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent’s records were insufficient to determine payroll to Mr. Hansel during the audit period, which would have required an imputed penalty. Petitioner did not correctly calculate the penalty of $14,970.42 against Respondent for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for Mr. Hansel during the audit period. Sod repair by Mr. Hansel is a service performed for Respondent during the audit period. Reimbursement of travel expenses is specifically included in the definition of payroll for purposes of calculating the penalty. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L- 6.035(1)(f) (“Expense reimbursements, including reimbursements for travel” are included as remuneration to employees “to the extent that the employer’s business records and receipts do not confirm that the expense incurred as a valid business expense.”). Dumpster rental is neither work performed on behalf of, nor service provided to, Respondent during the audit period. The correct uninsured payroll amount attributable to Mr. Hansel is $2,296.50. Petitioner correctly applied NCCI class code 5551, Roofing, to work performed by Mr. Hansel based on the observation of Mr. Holman at the worksite on May 4, 2016. With respect to Mr. Hansel’s services for sod and sod repair, Petitioner did not correctly apply NCCI class code 5551. Petitioner did not introduce competent substantial evidence of the applicable NCCI class code and premium amount for landscaping services performed during the audit period.3/ Uninsured payroll attributable to Mr. Hansel for roofing services during the audit period is $2,036.50. The approved manual rate for workers’ compensation insurance for NCCI class code 5551 during the period of non- compliance--May 9 and 21, 2016--is $18.60. The premium amount Respondent would have paid to provide workers’ compensation insurance for Mr. Hansel is $378.79 (One percent of Mr. Hansel’s gross payroll during the non-compliance period--$20.36--multiplied by $18.60). The penalty for Respondent’s failure to secure worker’s compensation coverage insurance for Mr. Hansel during the period of non-compliance is calculated as two times the amount Respondent would have paid in premium for the non- compliance period. The correct penalty for Respondent’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Hansel during the period of non-compliance is $757.58. Penalty Calculation for Salesmen Independent contractors not engaged in the construction industry are not employees for purposes of enforcing workers’ compensation insurance requirements. See § 440.02(15)(d)1., Fla. Stat. Sales is a non-construction industry occupation. The Department calculated a penalty associated with payroll attributable to the following persons identified by Ms. Fisher as independent salesmen: Dylan Robinson, Kevin Miller, Marc Medley, Mike Rucker, Colby Fisher, David Jones, Jarod Bell, Matt Flynn, and Todd Zulauf. Section 440.02(15)(d)1. provides that an individual may be an independent contractor, rather than an employee, as follows: In order to meet the definition of independent contractor, at least four of the following criteria must be met: The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations; The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal regulations; The independent contractor receives compensation for services rendered or work performed and such compensation is paid to a business rather than to an individual; The independent contractor holds one or more bank accounts in the name of the business entity for purposes of paying business expenses or other expenses related to services rendered or work performed for compensation; The independent contractor performs work or is able to perform work for any entity in addition to or besides the employer at his or her own election without the necessity of completing an employment application or process; or The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services rendered on a competitive-bid basis or completion of a task or a set of tasks as defined by a contractual agreement, unless such contractual agreement expressly states that an employment relationship exists. If four of the criteria listed in sub- subparagraph a. do not exist, an individual may still be presumed to be an independent contractor and not an employee based on full consideration of the nature of the individual situation with regard to satisfying any of the following conditions: The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for a specific amount of money and controls the means of performing the services or work. The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform. The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform. The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job basis and not on any other basis. The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services. The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations. The success or failure of the independent contractor’s business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. Ms. Fisher testified that each of the above-named salesmen sold roofing jobs for her at various times during the audit period on a commission-only basis. The contractors inspect homeowner roofs, draft schematics, use their own equipment (e.g., drones), incur all of their own expenses, and handle the insurance filing for the homeowner’s insurance to pay on the claim. Ms. Fisher further testified that each of the salesmen also sells for other roofing contractors in the Tallahassee area. She pays the salesmen on a per-job basis. Ms. Fisher does not compensate the salesmen for the time involved in inspecting a roof, preparing schematics, or making the sale. Nor does Ms. Fisher reimburse the salesmen for travel to sales jobsites. Ms. Fisher’s testimony was credible, persuasive, and uncontroverted. Respondent introduced in evidence four “Independent Contractor Checklists” allegedly completed by Mr. Robinson, Mr. Medley, Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Flynn. Each form checklist follows the format of section 440.02(15)(d)1., listing the criteria set forth in subparagraphs a. and b. The forms indicate that they each meet all the criteria listed in subparagraph b.: they perform, or agree to perform services for a specific amount of money and control the means of performing the service; they incur the principal expenses related to the service performed; they are responsible for satisfactory completion of the services performed; they receive compensation for the services performed on a per-job or commission basis; they may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing the services; they have continuing and recurring business liabilities or obligations; and the success or failure of their business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures.4/ In its Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioner conceded the nine men identified by Respondent as independent sales contractors “would not be considered employees of Respondent” because the “salesmen would seem to meet the majority of [the] requirements [of section 440.02(15)(d)1.b.].” Respondent issued Dylan Robinson, Mark Medley, Colby Fisher, Matt Flynn, Kevin Miller, Mike Rucker, Jarod Bell, David Jones, and Todd Zulauf an IRS FORM 1099-MISC for income paid during the 2016 tax year. Respondent did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the above-named salesmen were Respondent’s employees during the audit period. For SWO 16-148-1A, Respondent did not correctly calculate the penalty because Respondent included a penalty associated with Petitioner’s failure to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for Dylan Robinson and Jarod Bell. Penalty in the amount of $20.70 associated with Dylan Robinson and Jarod Bell should not be included in the total penalty. The correct penalty amount for SWO 16-148-1A, based on records submitted by Respondent on or before March 20, 2016, is $929.16. Draft Revised Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment The additional records submitted by Respondent revealed payments made to persons during the audit period who were not included in the Department’s Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Department and Respondent disagreed at hearing whether the payments qualified as payroll. At hearing, Petitioner submitted a draft revised second amended penalty calculation for SWO 16-148-1A based on all records received from Respondent. The revised penalty is in the amount of $61,453.50. Ms. Jackson populated the spreadsheet with the name of every individual to whom a check was written on Respondent’s business bank account during the audit period, removing only those payments to individuals and entities which, to Petitioner’s knowledge, were not Respondent’s employees. Respondent’s calculations in the revised penalty suffer from some of the same errors as in the second amended penalty calculation--they include individuals Petitioner did not prove were Respondent’s employees, as well as payments which were not uninsured payroll. For the reasons explained herein, Petitioner did not prove that salesmen David Jones, Dylan Robinson, Jarod Bell, Kevin Miller, Mark Medley, Matt Flynn, Mike Rucker, Tim Fischer, and Colby Fisher were Respondent’s employees during the audit period. Respondent did not accurately calculate the penalty associated with those persons. Respondent made payments to David Shields during the audit period, which the Department argues should be included as payroll. The Department included payments to Mr. Shields in its draft revised second amended order of penalty assessment and assigned NCCI class code “8810” for clerical work. Mr. Shields is a licensed professional roofing contractor who acts as “qualifier” for Respondent’s business. A qualifier is a licensed professional who certifies plans for permit applications submitted by another business. Respondent pays Mr. Shields a flat fee per permit application qualified by him. The record evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Shields provides clerical services to Respondent. Mr. Shields provides some sort of professional services to Respondent, and is likely an independent contractor providing his own materials and supplies, maintaining his own business accounts, and liable for his own business success. Assuming Mr. Shields were Respondent’s employee, the Department introduced no evidence of an appropriate NCCI class code for Mr. Shields’ services. The Department did not prove that payments to Mr. Shields should be included as Respondent’s uninsured payroll during the audit period. Respondent paid Susan Swain a total of $258 during the audit period for clerical work. Ms. Fisher maintained Ms. Swain’s work was casual at first, and the payments reflect a time when she worked on-again, off-again, handling the paperwork for restoration insurance claims. Later, Ms. Swain came to work for Respondent full-time and was added to the PMI leasing roster. Section 440.02(15)(d)5. provides that a person “whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer” is not an employee. The statute defines “casual” employment as work that is anticipated to be completed in 10 working days or less and at a total labor cost of less than $500. See § 440.02(5), Fla. Stat. In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department argues Ms. Swain’s wages should be included as payroll because the “testimony regarding Ms. Swain does not suggest that she was employed for less than 10 days[.]” However, it was the Department’s burden to prove that Ms. Swain was a statutory employee. The Department did not prove that Ms. Swain’s wages should be included within Respondent’s uninsured payroll. The largest portion of the penalty assessed by the Department, as well as in the draft revised second amended penalty assessment, against Respondent is in connection with various roofers who were employed by Respondent at times during the audit period. Each of the roofers was included on Respondent’s PMI leasing roster, but received checks directly from Respondent in addition to PMI payroll checks. The Department included all the direct payments to those roofers as payroll for purposes of calculating a penalty in this case. As Ms. Fisher explained, the company bids a reroof on a per job basis--usually a per square foot price. Ms. Fisher adds each roofing contractor’s name to the PMI leasing roster to ensure that each roofer is covered by workers’ compensation insurance for the duration of the job. When the job is completed (which is a matter of just a few days), the contractor reports to Ms. Fisher what amount of the contract price was spent on materials, supplies, or other non-labor costs. Ms. Fisher cuts a check to the contractor for that amount and authorizes PMI to issue payroll checks for the “labor cost” (the difference between the contract price and the non-labor costs). Ms. Fisher refers to this process as “back-charging” the contractors for their materials, maintenance, tools, and other non-labor costs. The Department is correct that the direct payments are payroll to the roofing contractors. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.035(1)(b) and (h) (remuneration includes “payments, including cash payments, made to employees by or on behalf of the employer” and “payments or allowances made by or on behalf of the employer for tools or equipment used by employees in their work or operations for the employer.”). The Department would be correct to include these payments in the penalty calculation if they represented uninsured payroll. However, the evidence supports a finding that the direct payments to the roofing contractors were made for the same jobs on which Respondent secured workers’ compensation coverage through PMI. The roofing contractors were covered for workers’ compensation throughout the job, even though they may have received partial payment for the job outside of the PMI payroll checks.5/ The direct payments were not for separate reroofs on which the roofers were not otherwise insured. The Department did not correctly calculate penalties associated with the following roofing contractors: Donald Tontigh, Joseph Howard, Keith Mills, Aaron Kilpatrick, Gustavo Tobias, Jose Mejia, and Tommy Miller. Ms. Fisher also received cash payments from Respondent during the audit period. These payments were made in addition to her payroll through PMI. Ms. Fisher described these payments as “cash tickets,” which were paid outside of her PMI payroll to reimburse her for investments made in the company. For purposes of calculating the penalty in this case, these “cash tickets” are clearly payroll, as that term is to be calculated pursuant to rule 69L-6.035. Similar to the issue with the roofing contractors, the question is whether the payments represent uninsured payroll. Ms. Fisher did not hold a corporate officer exemption at any time relevant hereto. Ms. Fisher testified that she was covered through PMI payroll leasing. In contrast to the roofing contractors, Ms. Fisher’s direct payments do not directly coincide with any particular job or specific time frame during which Ms. Fisher was covered for workers’ compensation insurance through PMI. The evidence was insufficient to determine that the amounts were insured payroll. The Department properly calculated a penalty associated with payroll attributable to Ms. Fisher. Respondent made one payment of $75 to Donald Martin during the audit period. The Department calculated a penalty of $27.90 associated with this payment to Mr. Martin. Ms. Fisher explained that Mr. Martin was a down-on-his-luck guy who came by the office one day complaining that Mr. Hansel owed him some money. Ms. Fisher offered to put him on a roofing crew and wrote him the $75 check to help him out. Ms. Fisher’s testimony was both credible and unrefuted. Mr. Martin was never hired by Respondent, put on any roofing crew, or added to the PMI leasing roster. Mr. Martin was not Respondent’s employee because he did not receive remuneration for the “performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire” with Respondent. § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. Cale Dierking works for Respondent full-time in a clerical position. During the audit period, Respondent paid Mr. Dierking directly by check for $1,306.14. This payment was made outside of Mr. Dierking’s PMI payroll checks. Ms. Fisher testified that she paid Mr. Dierking directly on one occasion when “PMI’s payroll got stuck in Memphis, I believe it was a snow-in situation where payroll checks didn’t come.” Rather than ask her employee to go without a timely paycheck, she advanced his payroll. Ms. Fisher’s testimony was both credible and unrefuted. The payment to Mr. Dierking is clearly payroll. However, Mr. Dierking was covered for workers’ compensation through PMI for the period during which the check was issued. Thus, there is no evidence that it was uninsured payroll. The Department did not correctly calculate a penalty associated with payments to Mr. Dierking. The correct penalty to be assessed against Respondent for failure to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees during the audit period in connection with SWO 16-148- 1A is $770.60. Penalty Calculation for SWO 16-198-1A Ms. Jackson calculated a total penalty against Respondent in connection with SWO 16-198-1A in the amount of $19,115.84, as reflected in the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Department correctly imputed penalty against Respondent in the amount of $91.68 each for uninsured payroll to Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Lopez. The evidence supported a finding that these workers were Respondent’s statutory employees on June 8, 2016, and were not enrolled on the PMI leasing roster. The Department did not correctly calculate the penalty associated with salesmen Dylan Robinson, Jarod Bell, Kevin Miller, Mark Medley, Matt Flynn, and Todd Zulauf. The Department did not correctly calculate the penalty associated with roofing contractors Abraham Martinez- Antonio, Edwin Kinsey, Dustin Hansel, Efrian Molina-Agustin, Jose Mejia, Joseph Howard, Keith Mills, Samuel Pedro, and Tommy Miller. The Department did not correctly calculate the penalty against Respondent associated with Mr. Shields, Respondent’s qualifier. Based on a review of Respondent’s complete “untimely” records, the Department discovered direct payments made to additional employees not included on the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. Respondent made a direct payment to Ethan Burch in the amount of $602.50 during the audit period. Ethan Burch is one of Respondent’s full-time clerical employees. The evidence is insufficient to determine whether the payment of $602.50 was insured or uninsured payroll. As such, the Department did not prove it correctly calculated the penalty associated with Mr. Burch. Respondent also made a direct payment to Chelsea Hansel in the amount of $965 during the audit period. Ms. Hansel is another clerical employee. Ms. Hansel’s PMI enrollment was delayed due to some background investigation. Respondent paid Ms. Hansel for work she completed prior to enrollment. The direct payment to Ms. Hansel constitutes uninsured payroll. The Department correctly calculated the penalty associated with the payment to Chelsea Hansel. The correct penalty amount to be imposed against Respondent for failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage for its employees (Gonzalez, Lopez, and Chelsea Hansel) during the audit period in connection with SWO 16-198-1A is $187.80.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, finding that Royal Roofing and Restoration, Inc., violated the workers’ compensation insurance law and, in DOAH Case No. 17-0879, assessing a penalty of $770.60; and in DOAH Case No. 17-1558, assessing a penalty of $187.80. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2018.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Customs Logistics Services, Inc., failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for its employees in violation of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement in chapter 440 that employers in Florida secure workers' compensation coverage for their employees. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a corporation registered to do business in Florida. Respondent is a family-owned-and-operated customs brokerage service with its principal office located at 6940 Northwest 12th Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At the time of the inspection giving rise to this proceeding, Respondent employed seven or eight employees.2/ The Compliance Inspection On September 29, 2014, Petitioner's compliance inspector, Hector Fluriach, conducted an onsite inspection at Respondent's principal office to determine whether Respondent was in compliance with the workers' compensation coverage requirements established in chapter 440. At that time, Respondent's co-owners, Astrid Escalona and Carlos Henoa, told Fluriach that Respondent employed six employees and two corporate officers, and also paid two family members who did not work at the principal office. Upon inquiry, Escalona and Henoa informed Fluriach that Respondent did not have workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees. Using Petitioner's Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS") and the National Council for Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") insurance coverage verification system, Fluriach confirmed that Respondent had not obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees, and that it was not in compliance with chapter 440 during certain periods within the two years preceding the inspection. Under the NCCI basic occupational classification system and Scopes Manual, six of Respondent's employees are classified as clerical (Code 8810), and one is classified as a driver (Code 7380). None of Respondent's employees is classified as employed within the construction industry. As a private entity employing four or more employees in a non-construction industry occupation, Respondent was required under chapter 440 to provide workers' compensation coverage for its employees. Respondent's corporate officers were eligible under section 440.05 to elect to be exempt from the workers' compensation coverage requirements of chapter 440; however, none had elected to be exempt. Fluriach issued Stop-Work Order No. 14-329-D5 ("Stop- Work Order"), personally served it on Respondent, and explained it to Escalona. The Stop-Work Order included an Order of Penalty Assessment, ordering assessment of a penalty against Respondent in an amount equal to two times the amount Respondent would have paid in workers' compensation coverage premiums when applying the approved manual rates to Respondent's payroll during the periods for which it had failed to secure workers' compensation coverage during the preceding two years (for convenience, hereafter referred to as the "look-back period"). Fluriach also served a business records request, requesting Respondent to provide specified business records3/ for Petitioner's use in determining the penalty. In a series of submittals, Respondent provided the requested business records to Petitioner. The evidence showed that during the two-year look- back period, Respondent did not have workers' compensation coverage for its employees during a substantial portion of the period in which it employed four or more employees, and none of its corporate officers were exempt from the workers' compensation coverage requirement. As such, Respondent violated chapter 440 and, therefore, is subject to penalty under that statute. Petitioner's Computation of Penalty Amount To calculate the applicable penalty, Petitioner must determine, from a review of the employer's business records, the employer's gross payroll for the two-year look-back period. For days during the look-back period for which records are not provided, Petitioner imputes the gross payroll based on the average weekly wage for the state of Florida. Here, the look-back period for purposes of calculating the applicable penalty commenced on September 30, 2012, and ended on September 29, 2014, the day on which the compliance inspection was conducted. Respondent's business records revealed that Respondent had fewer than four employees between January 1 and March 31, 2013, so Respondent was not required to have workers' compensation coverage for that period. Thus, Petitioner did not assess a penalty against Respondent for that period. For the rest of the look-back period, Respondent employed four or more employees, so was required to obtain workers' compensation coverage for those employees for that portion of the period. Respondent provided business records sufficient for Petitioner to determine Respondent's gross payroll for all but September 30, 2012. For that day, Petitioner imputed Respondent's gross payroll using Florida's statewide average weekly wage. On the basis of Respondent's business records submittals, Petitioner's auditor, Eric Ruzzo, recalculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on October 17, 2014, imposing a total penalty of $5,617.04. On November 7, 2014, following receipt of additional records, Petitioner issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, reducing the penalty to $3,982.52. Finally, after receiving more records, Petitioner issued a Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on January 12, 2015, further reducing the penalty to $3,205.70. Each of these penalty assessments was served on Respondent. Petitioner seeks to impose a $3,205.70 penalty against Respondent in this proceeding. In calculating the penalty, Ruzzo examined three-month (i.e., quarterly) periods within the two-year look-back period. Ruzzo identified the occupational class code applicable to each of Respondent's employees. As stated above, all but one of Respondent's employees were classified as clerical, and one of Respondent's employees was classified as a driver. For each employee, Ruzzo determined the gross payroll paid to that employee for the specific quarter in which Respondent was non-compliant during the look-back period, divided the employee's gross payroll by 100 pursuant to Petitioner's calculation methodology, then multiplied that amount by the numeric rate set by NCCI for that employee's specific occupational class code. This calculation yielded the workers' compensation coverage premium for that specific employee for the specific quarter for which Respondent was non- compliant during the look-back period. The premium amount then was multiplied by two, as required by statute, to yield the penalty to be imposed for failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for that specific employee. As previously noted, Respondent did not provide gross payroll records covering September 30, 2012; thus, for that day, Ruzzo imputed the gross payroll for each of Respondent's employees using the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2)4/ multiplied by two. Ruzzo then performed the same computations to yield the penalty amount to be imposed for Respondent's failure to provide workers' compensation on September 30, 2012. Ruzzo then added each penalty amount determined for each employee using actual gross payroll and imputed payroll, to yield the total penalty amount of $5,286.70. Because Respondent had not previously been issued a stop-work order, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d)1., Petitioner applied a credit toward the penalty in the amount of the initial premium Respondent paid for workers' compensation coverage. Here, the premium payment amount for which Respondent received credit was $2,081.00. This was subtracted from the calculated penalty of $5,286.70, yielding a total penalty of $3,205.70. Respondent's Defense At the final hearing, Escalona testified that she and the other co-owners of Respondent always have attempted to fully comply with every law applicable to Respondent's business, and have never had compliance problems. She testified that neither she nor the other co-owners of Respondent realized that Respondent was required to have workers' compensation coverage for its employees, and they did not intentionally violate the law. Petitioner apparently mailed a memorandum regarding verifying workers' compensation coverage requirements to businesses in the area before it conducted compliance inspections. The memorandum was dated October 8, 2014, and Escalona testified Respondent received it on October 13, 2014, approximately two weeks after the compliance inspection that Fluriach conducted. Escalona asserted that had Respondent received the memorandum before the compliance inspection was conducted, she would have called Petitioner to determine if Respondent needed to obtain workers' compensation coverage, would have asked how to obtain it, and would have obtained coverage for its employees and exemptions for its corporate officers. Escalona testified that the $3,205.70 penalty is a substantial amount that Respondent, a small family-owned business, cannot afford to pay. Findings of Ultimate Fact Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated chapter 440, as charged in the Stop-Work Order, by failing to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees. Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the $3,205.70 penalty proposed to be assessed against Respondent pursuant to the Third Amended Penalty Assessment is the correct amount of the penalty to be assessed in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order determining that Respondent, Customs Logistics Services, Inc., violated the requirement in chapter 440 to secure workers' compensation coverage and imposing a total penalty of $3,205.70. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's discrimination statement dated February 18, 1997, states as follows: I believe that I was discriminated against when the sheriff's department used illegally obtained information from my employer and a relative of mine working in the department, to give negative references and information to the general public. Petitioner has never applied for employment or been employed by the Suwannee County Sheriff or his office. Petitioner's claim apparently arises out of a family dispute between the Petitioner, her mother, Lotis Musgrove, and her sister, Eyvonne M. Roberson, who works for the Suwannee County Sheriff's Department. The family dispute is not related to the Petitioner's employment with the Suwannee County Sheriff.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Bond, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler and Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Faye Musgrove Post Office Box 657 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Charmin Christensen, Director Suwannee County Personnel 200 South Ohio Avenue Live Oak, Florida 32060 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Respondent James Seay, who had worked as a teacher in Suwannee County for many years, was out sick first with a stomach virus and then with recurring head pain for the entire school week of March 4-8, 1991. He visited physicians on March 5, 7 and 8, and took three prescribed medicines. Mr. Seay telephoned the morning of March 4, 1992, and told Sonja Suber, a secretary who was "the designated person at the school," (T.48) responsible for obtaining substitute teachers and maintaining sick leave records, that he was ill and would not be in that day. The parties agree that respondent was on sick leave through March 8, 1991. On the evening of March 4, 1991, he telephoned Nancy Roberts, director of elementary education for the Suwanee County School District and principal of Douglass Center. When Mr.Seay told her he would not be in the following day, she cancelled an observation she had scheduled for his benefit. The next day or the day after Sonya Suber telephoned respondent to relay Ms. Roberts' advice that a meeting scheduled for March 11, 1991, had been cancelled. On Saturday, March 9, 1991, Mr. Seay telephoned Ms. Suber and said "that he would be coming Monday to the school but he would not report to the classroom." T. 29. He had earlier expressed to Ms. Roberts discomfort "with the students that were assigned" (T. 46) to him. On Monday, March 11, 1991, at 7:53 o'clock in the morning, he appeared as promised and signed in at Suwanee County School District's Douglass Center. After greeting Sonya Suber, he went to the teachers' lounge. He did not give any indication that he was unwell or make any request for leave. Ms. Roberts saw Mr. Seay reading a newspaper in the lounge. She asked him to accompany her to her office, where she "let him know that he was a teacher assigned to the Alternative Program at the Douglass Center and what his responsibilities were . . . working with the students there." T.50. Respondent handed Ms. Roberts one of his attorney's cards, and told her "that there was nothing [she] could do to make him go in that classroom and that he was not going to that classroom," (T.50) and asked her "to stop harassing him." Id. After Mr. Seay's return to the teachers' lounge, Ms. Roberts gave an account of events to Mr. Charles F. Blalock, Jr., petitioner here. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The following morning Mr. Seay signed in at the Douglass Center at ten before eight, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he again went to the teachers' lounge rather than to his assigned classroom. Again he told nobody he was ill, and asked nobody for sick leave. Ms. Roberts twice asked him to go to his classroom. When she told him his failure to teach the class he had been assigned "could be construed as insubordination on his part," (T.53) he asked her to clarify what she meant by insubordination and, with her permission, made a tape recording of her answer. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. He refused to go to his classroom. On Wednesday, March 13, 1991, Mr. Blalock wrote a letter to Mr. Seay advising him that he was suspended with pay, and that, as superintendent, he would recommend suspension without pay and ultimately dismissal at the next regular meeting of the School Board. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. When Ms. Roberts telephoned Thursday morning with word that Mr. Seay was at Douglass Center, Mr. Blalock went himself to speak to Mr. Seay. Twice he personally directed Mr. Seay to go to his classroom and get to work. Confronted with Mr. Seay's silent refusal, Mr. Blalock handed him the letter of suspension, dated the day before. When the School Board met, heard what had transpired, and listened to a presentation by Mr. Seay's lawyer, it decided that Mr. Seay should have a physical examination and be examined by a psychiatrist. At the school board meeting, nobody suggested that respondent was on sick leave at any time after March 8, 1991. In keeping with the collectively bargained agreement between the School Board and teachers like Mr. Seay under continuing contract with the School Board, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, petitioner demanded that respondent go for medical and psychiatric examinations, by letter dated April 10, 1991. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. A second, follow-up letter reiterating the demand, dated April 29, 1991, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, reached Mr. Seay by registered mail. As of the time of the hearing, Mr. Seay had not complied with the Board's demand that he submit to a physical examination and be examined by a psychiatrist.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner terminate respondent's employment. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1992. APPENDIX FOR NO. 91-6046 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-11 and 13-20 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12 pertains to immaterial matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 21, respondent apparently also took the position that he had been on sick leave in the unemployment compensation case. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 22 and 23 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-3, 5-8 and 19 have been adopted in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4, 9-12, 21 and 24 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 13 and 15 are immaterial since respondent never requested sick leave. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 14, 16, 17 and 18 have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Ms. Roberts' testimony in that regard is unrebutted. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 22, there is no disagreement. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 23 pertains to an immaterial matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Charles Blalock, Superintendent Suwanee County School Board 224 W. Parshley Street Live Oak, FL 32060 J. Victor Africano, Esquire Post Office Box 1450 Live Oak, FL 32060 Linsey Moore, Esquire 50 East 2nd Street Jacksonville, FL 32206
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Resolution of Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Dispute, pursuant to section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, C. G. was employed by Solo Printing, Inc., which had workers' compensation coverage through Intervenor. On March 2, 2012, C. G. was injured at work as a result of falling onto his knee during a fight with a coworker. C. G. was transported from the worksite by ambulance to Petitioner's hospital, where he was admitted. Later the same day, C. G. underwent emergency surgery to his knee. He was discharged from the hospital on March 8, 2012. On April 2, 2012, Petitioner billed Intervenor for services rendered to C. G. during his hospitalization. On May 11, 2012, Intervenor issued a Notice of Denial. On June 8, 2012, Petitioner filed with Respondent the Petition. On June 14, 2012, Respondent issued the Dismissal. Intervenor's Notice of Denial cites three grounds for denying payment for the bill: section 440.09(3), which prohibits compensation for injuries to an employee "occasioned primarily" by his willfully trying to injure another person; lack of authorization for services; and any other defense that may become available. The Dismissal cites one ground for dismissing the Petition: Petitioner's failure to submit an EOBR with its Petition. The only ground cited in the preceding paragraph that is relevant is the first cited by Intervenor. This ground raises the issue of compensability by disclosing that Intervenor has not conceded that C. G.'s injuries are compensable. Nor has a Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) ever entered an order determining that C. G.'s injuries are compensable. In fact, G. has never filed a claim for benefits. At the time in question, C. G. had health insurance, but his insurer reportedly denied coverage on the ground that it insured's injuries were covered by workers' compensation. It does not appear that Petitioner has commenced a legal action against C. G. for payment for the services that it rendered to him in March 2012.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Lorne S. Cabinsky, Esquire Law Offices of Lorne S. Cabinsky, P.A. Suite 1500 101 Northeast 3rd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mari H. McCully, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 James T. Armstrong, Esquire Walton Lantaff Schroeder and Carson, LLP Suite 1575 200 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Division of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
