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INDIAN RIVER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-001293 (1989)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001293 Latest Update: Mar. 28, 1990

The Issue The central issues in these cases are: As to case no. 89-1293--whether Indian River Memorial Hospital (Indian River) meets the statutory and rule criteria for a certificate of need (CON) to operate an inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory, and therefore, whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) should approve CON application number 5726. This application is opposed by Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood). As to case no. 89-1294--whether Lawnwood meets the statutory and rule criteria for a CON to operate an open heart surgery program and an inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory, and therefore, whether the Department should approve CON application number 5729. Indian River opposes the proposed approval of Lawnwood's inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory in case no. 89-1295. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. (St. Mary's) opposes the proposed approval of the inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory in case no. 89-1297.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final oider approving the certificate of need applications filed by Indian River Memorial Hospital and Lawnwood Regional Medical Center to establish inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratories. It is further recommended that Lawnwood's application to establish an open heart surgery program be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1990. Appendix to Case Nos. 89-1293 et seq. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY INDIAN RIVER: Paragraphs 1 through 16 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 17, it is accepted that Indian River physicians have established referral patterns outside of District IX for inpatient and outpatient cath procedures. To the extent that Indian River's application and response to the omissions letter made reference to this phenomenon, it is accepted that such activities were properly placed at issue in these proceedings. As to the calculations expressed in paragraph 17, no formal study was performed by any party to accurately quantify the number of procedures performed outside District IX on residents of Indian River and St. Lucie Counties. It is accepted that Dr. Celano and his partner performed outpatient procedures cn approximately 200 patients. It is further accepted that another 300 procedures were performed on Indian River residents at Holmes or Florida Hospital. Consequently, the utilization rate has been significantly understated. The total volume of which is unknown except as addressed herein, paragraph 17 is rejected as speculation or unsupported by the record in this cause. The first three sentences of paragraph 18 are accepted. The last sentence is rejected as speculation. With regard to paragraph 19, it is accepted that referrals to other hospitals can cause patient anxiety due to waits or transfer difficulties. Otherwise rejected as comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unnecessary. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as speculation unsupported by the weight of the evidence or irrelevant. Paragraph 25 is accepted. Paragraph 26 is accepted. Paragraph 27 is accepted. Paragraph 28 is accepted. To the extent that the "new rule" requires consideration of inmigration and outmigration, paragraph 29 is accepted. That data became available subsequent to the finding that these applications were complete is irrelevant. Since no data quantifying outmigration/inmigration was available, the rule read as a whole must dictate whether the applicants have established numeric need. The applicants and the Department knew of the outmigration, consequently, reading the rule as a whole establishes that the existing providers are performing an ample number of procedures to guarantee their continued success and that an additional two programs are warranted. See response to paragraph 29 above regarding paragraph 30. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument--see response to paragraph 29 and findings reached in paragraphs related to "new rule." Paragraph 32 is rejected as argument, comment or unnecessary. Paragraphs 33 through 41 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 42 through 80, except as noted by findings of fact related to the applicants and the assessment of their proposals, such paragraphs are unnecessary (need for two programs has been established), argument, irrelevant (as to allegations regarding Lawnwood's open heart proposal), or contrary to the weight of competent evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY LAWNWOOD: Paragraphs 1 through 7 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 8, it is accepted that currently Indian River does not have an outpatient cardiac cath program; however, regardless of the outcome of this proceeding, Indian River will establish an outpatient facility. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted but is unnecessary since it does not provide a fact related to the conclusions reached in this order. Except as accepted in the findings of fact related to the "old rule," paragraphs 12 through 15 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. In theory, Lawnwood's proposed findings correctly state how the "old rule" should be applied. The actual numbers differ slightly with the findings reached in the recommended order. Except as accepted in the findings of fact related to the "new rule," paragraphs 16 through 20 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. In theory, Lawnwood's proposed findings correctly state how the "new rule" should be applied. The actual numbers and conclusions differ slightly with the findings reached in the recommended order. Paragraph 21 is accepted. Except as accepted in the findings of fact related to open heart need, paragraphs 22 and 23 are rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence, argument, or irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraphs 25 through 28 are accepted. Paragraph 29 is rejected as contrary to the weight of competent evidence, irrelevant (an out of district provider would not have standing to oppose the request), or argument. Paragraph 30 is accepted to the extent that it states Martin's inpatient cath program located in Martin County has improved accessibility; however, that program did not exist when these applications were filed and evaluated by the Department otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 31 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or irrelevant. Paragraph 32 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence related to open heart. Open heart facilities are available and accessible for District IX residents. Transfers to open heart facilities under emergency circumstances after cardiac cath procedures would be the exception and not the rule. Paragraphs 33 and 34 are rejected as irrelevant to the issue of open heart. While outmigration is to be considered in determining need for cardiac cath under the "new rule," such outmigration does not establish inaccessibility for open heart services. Paragraphs 35 through 41 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, contrary to the appropriate rule application, or irrelevant. Paragraphs 42 (deleting open heart) through 44 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 45, the program located at Martin has not been considered in the evaluation of these applicants since approval for that program occurred after this batch closed. Paragraph 46 is accepted. Paragraph 47 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 48 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 50 and 51 are rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 52 is accepted. Paragraph 53 is accepted. Paragraph 54 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 55 is accepted. Paragraph 56 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 57 through 61 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 62 is accepted. Paragraphs 63 through 80 are accepted. Paragraph 81 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 82 through 85 (related only to cardiac oath) are accepted. Related to the allegations foil open heart, such paragraphs are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or irrelevant. Paragraphs 86 through 90 are accepted. Paragraphs 90 through 96 are accepted only as to representations of facility and staffing it is agreed Lawnwood will have. Otherwise, assumption that volume of surgical cases will exist is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 97 through 105 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 106, it is accepted that the term emergency vehicle includes helicopter; otherwise, rejected as a conclusion of law. Paragraph 107 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 108 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. The conclusion reached in paragraph 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 5 is accepted. The conclusion reached in paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraph 9 is rejected as to the conclusion reached regarding the cardiac cath program as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With regard to the conclusion reached regarding the open heart program, the paragraph is accepted. Paragraphs 10 through 13 are accepted. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 15 through 16 are accepted. Paragraph 17 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 18 is rejected as argument, contrary to the weight of the evidence, or irrelevant. Paragraph 19 is accepted. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraph 23 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, irrelevant or multiple facts. Paragraphs 24 through 25 are accepted. Paragraph 26 is rejected as comment, argument, or irrelevant. Paragraphs 27 and 28 are accepted. Paragraph 29 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 30 is rejected as repetitive or argument. The second sentence of paragraph 31 is accepted; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 32 is accepted. Paragraph 33 is accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 35 is accepted. Paragraph 36 is accepted. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraph 38 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 39 is accepted. With the substitution of the word "maintenance," paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41 is accepted. Paragraphs 42 through 47, with the exception of the conclusion that only one cath program is needed (that conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence), are accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY ST. MARY'S: Paragraph 1 is accepted. The first two sentences of paragraph 2 are accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as unsupported by the record. The first two sentences of paragraph 3 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 4 is accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as argument. It is accepted that Lawnwood does not have a significant history in connection with the outpatient cath facility. Paragraph 5 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 6 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 7 through 18 are rejected as argument, irrelevant, contrary to the weight of the evidence or recitation of testimony. The first sentence of paragraph 19 is accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as argument, contrary to the weight of the evidence, or irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 23 is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 25 is rejected as irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 26 is accepted. The balance is rejected as argument or conclusion of law. Paragraphs 27 and 28 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 29 is accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 30 is accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as argument. Paragraph 31 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 32 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 33 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 34 is accepted. Paragraph 35 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 36 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraphs 38 and 39 are accepted. Paragraph 40 is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. 2700 Blair Stone Road Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 John Radey Jeffrey L. Frehn Aurell, Radey, Hinkle & Thomas 101 North Monroe Street Suite 1000, Monroe Park Tower Post Office Box 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David Watkins Patricia A. Renovitch Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. 2700 Blair Stone Road Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Lesley Mendelson Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Ft. Knox Executive Center 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.54, 120.56

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SARASOTA COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL BOARD, D/B/A MEMORIAL HOSPITAL SARASOTA vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES AND HOSPITAL CARE COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, 88-001912 (1988)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001912 Latest Update: Sep. 26, 1988

The Issue The main issue in these proceedings is whether the Respondent Doctors is entitled to a certificate of need to establish a cardiac catheterization laboratory in Sarasota County. The parties stipulate that the only statutory and rule criteria which remain to be reviewed by the Hearing Officer areas follows: 1. Sections 381.705(1)(a) , (b) , (c) , (d) , , and (h), Florida Statutes. Section 38l.705(1)(h)) will be reviewed insofar as it refers to the availability of health manpower, management personnel, funds for capital and operating expenditures, the alternative uses of the applicant's resources, and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the district. Section 38l.705(1)(1) and (n), Florida Statutes. Section 381.705(2)(a) , (b) and () Florida Statutes. Rule 10-5.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code. 5. Rule 10-5.011 (8)b and (8)0, (9)b, (9)d, (9) e (1) and (9)e(ll) The other statutory criteria and the remaining subsections of the rule have either been stipulated to by the parties or are inapplicable.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57

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A. H., ON BEHALF OF R. H. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 16-006837 (2016)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Nov. 17, 2016 Number: 16-006837 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 2018

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.

Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.

Florida Laws (3) 110.123, 120.57, 120.68

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NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, D/B/A CORAL SPRINGS MEDICAL CENTER AND BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 86-001186RX (1986)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001186RX Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1986

USC (3) 42 CFR 121.207, 42 CFR 123.412(a)(5), 42 CFR 123.413(a) Florida Laws (3) 120.56, 120.57, 120.68

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ALL CHILDREN`S HOSPITAL, INC., AND VARIETY CHILDREN`S HOSPITAL, D/B/A MIAMI CHILDREN`S HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 95-003913RU (1995)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 1995 Number: 95-003913RU Latest Update: Mar. 15, 1996

The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether the following statement was made by Respondent, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION; whether the statement violates the provisions of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes; whether the statement constitutes a declaratory statement under Section 120.565, Florida Statutes; whether Petitioner, ALL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, INC., has standing to maintain this action; and whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The alleged agency statement which is at issue in this case is: The Agency for Health Care Administration takes the position that a shared service agreement may be modified, without prior approval of the Agency, as long as each party continues to contribute something to the program, and the shared service contract remains consistent with the provisions of Rule 59C-1.0085(4), Florida Administrative Code. In addition, the Agency takes the position that modifications to a shared service agreement do not require prior review and approval by the Agency.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52, 120.54, 120.565, 120.57, 120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59C-1.0085

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. MARVIN H. LEDBETTER, 84-002228 (1984)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002228 Latest Update: Oct. 11, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of federal and state Medicaid funds, and is authorized by statute to provide payments for medical services. Respondent, Marvin H. Ledbetter, is a doctor of osteopathy who is enrolled as a general practitioner provider in the Medicaid Program. His professional office is in Ormond Beach, Florida where he is engaged in family practice. Under the Program, Ledbetter is assigned a provider number (48220-0) which is used to bill Medicaid for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. During calendar year 1981, which is the only time period in question, Ledbetter received $42,809 in Medicaid reimbursements from HRS, of which $28,062 related to fees for Medicaid hospital patients. The latter category of fees is at issue. In order to qualify for federal matching Medicaid funds HRS must meet certain federally-imposed requirements, including the establishment of a program integrity section designed to insure that all Medicaid services are medically necessary. If they are not, HRS is obliged to seek recoupment of funds paid to the provider. This proceeding involves an attempt by HRS to recoup certain funds paid to Ledbetter for hospital services. After providing medical services to various hospital patients, Ledbetter completed and sent in the necessary forms to obtain payment. As noted earlier, these payments totaled $28,062 during 1981. Upon receipt of the forms, HRS input the information from the forms into a computer data base, along with similar information from other Medicaid providers throughout the State. This information included, among other things, the number of admissions, number of discharges, amount paid for hospital services and length of stay. The retention of such data is necessary so that possible overpayments may be detected by HRS through the statistical analysis of claims submitted by a group of providers of a given type. Because Ledbetter's total discharges exceeded the average of other family physicians throughout the State, the computer generated a report which flagged Ledbetter for further review and examination. An HRS analyst conducted such a review of Ledbetter's records, and found his average hospital length of stay for patients to be acceptable when compared to the average physician in the State. This report was forwarded to the HRS peer review coordinator who randomly selected thirty of Ledbetter's patients from the computer, and obtained their patient charts (numbering sixty-eight). Such a statistical calculation is authorized by Rule 10C-7.6(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. A medical consultant employed by HRS then reviewed twelve of the sixty-eight charts and recommended the records be sent to a Peer Review Committee (PRC) for its review and recommendation. This committee is authorized by Rule 7C-7.61(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code serves under contract with HRS, and is composed of eight members of the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association. It is their responsibility to review the files of physicians whose Medicaid payments are questioned by HRS's program integrity section. When Ledbetter's records were forwarded to the PRC by HRS, the transmittal letter stated that a "study" of his records had been made, and that said study revealed "overutilization of inpatient hospital services" and "excessive lengths of stay." After a PRC review was conducted in early 1984, the records were returned to HRS with a notation that "mild overutilization" had occurred. According to informal guidelines used by the PRC, this meant that Ledbetter's overutilization fell within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent. HRS accepted these findings but for some reason initially determined that a 40 percent overutilization had occurred, and that Ledbetter was overpaid in 1981 by 40 percent for his hospital services. Finding this amount to be inconsistent with the mild overutilization guidelines, HRS arbitrarily added back two days to each patient's hospital stay, which decreased overutilization to 33.8 percent, or $9,505.06 in overpayments. By proposed agency action issued on May 18, 1984, it billed Ledbetter this amount, thereby precipitating the instant controversy. All of the patients in question were from the lower income category, and most were black. Their home conditions were generally less than desirable, and the ability of the parents to supply good nursing care to ill or sick children was in doubt. At the same time, in 1981 Ledbetter was working an average of 56 hours per week in the emergency room of a local hospital and devoted only minimal time to his family practice. Because of this Ledbetter's number of hospital admissions greatly exceeded the norm when compared to general practitioners who engaged in an office practice. Consequently, he received most of these patients through the emergency room rather than his office and was dealing with patients whose socioeconomic conditions were an important consideration. These factors must be taken into account in analyzing Ledbetter's patient records. HRS does not contend that Ledbetter failed to perform the services for which he was paid--rather, it questions only whether some of the admissions were medically necessary and whether some of the lengths of stay were too long. In this regard, conflicting expert testimony was offered by the parties concerning the amount of overutilization, if any. Expert testimony by two local doctors of osteopathy support a finding that only mild overutilization of admissions and lengths of stay occurred. This is corroborated by HRS's expert (Dr. Smith) and by the testimony of its "live" expert, Dr. Conn, who conceded that lengths of stay were only "a little bit too long." The more persuasive testimony also establishes that while mild overutilization falls within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent, 10 percent is an appropriate median in this proceeding. Using this yardstick, Ledbetter should reimburse HRS for 10 percent for his billings, or $2,806.20.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent repay petitioner $2,086.20 in excess Medicaid payments received for calendar year 1981 claims. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57, 90.803

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ORLANDO-SURGI-CENTER, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 85-002444 (1985)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002444 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 1986

Florida Laws (1) 120.57

# 7

MERCY HOSPITAL, INC. vs. HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, 85-000160RX (1985)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000160RX Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1985

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D- 1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious? Mercy has also raised one issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

Florida Laws (4) 120.54, 120.56, 90.802, 90.803

# 8

MEASE HEALTH CARE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 90-002983RU (1990)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 16, 1990 Number: 90-002983RU Latest Update: Sep. 10, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mease Health Care, Inc. (Mease), is a private, not-for- profit acute care community hospital in Dunedin, Florida. It is located in District V, a health planning district established by respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Intervenors, Morton F. Plant Hospital, Inc. (Plant) and Bayfront Medical Center, Inc. (Bayfront), are acute care hospitals also located within District V. Mease has pending in Case Nos. 89-1652 and 89-4888 a challenge to HRS's fixed need pool determination for new cardiac catherization services and an application for a certificate of need (CON) authorizing it to establish a new inpatient cardiac catherization program in Dunedin, Florida. In the instant case, Mease has challenged an HRS policy as being an illicit rule. Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Health Facility and Services Development Act. For the purpose of assisting it in administering the act, HRS has promulgated Rule 10-5.011(1)(e), Florida administrative Code (1989), which pertains to inpatient cardiac catherization services and defines the requirements for the establishment of such services. Paragraph 8.c. of the rule contains the formula used for calculating fixed need pools for new inpatient cardiac catherization programs. The formula is: NN PCCPV - ACCPV - APP, where NN is the annual net program volume need, PCCPV is the projected adult cardiac catherization program volume, ACCPV is the actual adult cardiac catherization volume, and APP is the projected program volume for approved programs. This formula was applied by HRS to the September 1988 batching cycle, which was the first batching cycle after the rule became effective. For that cycle, HRS calculated NN to be -53 for District V. NN was therefore less than 300. Paragraph 8.d. of the rule provides the following relevant instructions on how the formula should be applied to batching cycles subsequent to September 1988: If NN is less than 300 in the first batching cycle after the rule becomes effective, the ACCPV value which is subtracted from the PCCPV will be the same value as ACCPV in the first batching cycle until the projected net need in a future batching cycle reaches a program volume of 300 or more. . . For the March and September 1989 batching cycles, which were the two batching cycles immediately subsequent to the first batching cycle after the rule became effective, HRS did not keep the ACCPV value constant, "or the same . . . as in the first batching cycle", even though NN was "less than 300 in the first batching cycle." Put another way, in all batching cycles after September 1988 HRS has recalculated ACCPV even though in the first batching cycle NN was a negative number and therefore was less than 300. HRS's affidavit confirms that this is the manner in which ACCPV has been calculated in all cases since the adoption of the rule. Since the policy has been consistently used in the above manner in all cases, creates rights and requires compliance, and is not apparent from a literal reading of the rule, the policy necessarily constitutes a rule. There is no dispute that the policy has not been formally adopted as a rule.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57, 120.68

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INDIAN RIVER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 97-004794 (1997)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Oct. 15, 1997 Number: 97-004794 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (2) 120.57, 409.913 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59G-1.010

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