The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to additional credit for her responses to Question Nos. 14 and 21 of the Special State Firesafety Inspector Certification Examination administered on November 13, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Alma Elaine Carlus, is an applicant for certification as a firesafety inspector in the State of Florida. Applicants for certification as firesafety inspectors are required to complete a training course, which consists of 80 hours of training in firesafety inspection and must be completed prior to taking the Special State Firesafety Inspector Certification Examination. The approved textbooks for the Special State Firesafety Inspector Certification Examination training courses are Fire Inspection and Code Enforcement (6th Edition), which is published by the International Fire Service Training Association, and the National Fire Prevention Association Life Safety Code. Petitioner successfully completed the required training program and, thereafter, took the Special State Firesafety Inspector Examination on May 29, 2003. The Special State Firesafety Inspector Examination is a written examination containing 50 multiple choice, objective questions, worth two points each. The candidates are given two hours to complete the exam. In order to obtain a passing score, an applicant must earn a score of at least 70 percent. Petitioner did not pass the examination on May 29, 2003. On November 13, 2003, Petitioner retook the examination and earned a score of 66 percent. Because a minimum score of 70 percent is required to pass the examination, Petitioner needs an additional four points to earn a passing score. Petitioner challenged the scoring of two questions on the Special State Firesafety Inspector Examination, Question Nos. 14 and 21. Question No. 14 required the examinee to identify the "least important" characteristic involved in evaluating storage of flammable and combustible liquids. The answer choices given were: (a) the foundations and supports; (b) size and location of vents; (c) design of the tank; and (d) size of the tank. Question No. 14 is clear and unambiguous and the correct answer is included among the choices provided. The answer to Question No. 14 is found on page 325 of the textbook, Fire Inspection and Code Enforcement (Sixth Edition). The correct answer to Question No. 14 is "(d) size of the tank." Petitioner did not select "d" as the correct response and, thus, is not entitled to any additional points for Question No. 14. Question No. 21 states: In above ground tanks containing liquids classified as Class I, Class II, or Class IIIA, the distance between the tanks must be at least the sum of their diameters. The answer choices given were: a) 3/4; b) 1/2; c) 1/4; and d) 1/6. Question No. 21 is clear and unambiguous and the correct answer is included among the choices provided. The answer to Question No. 21 is found on page 327 of the textbook Fire Inspection and Code Enforcement (Sixth Edition). The correct answer to Question No. 21 is "(d) 1/6." Petitioner did not select "d" as the correct response and, thus, is not entitled to any additional points for Question No. 21. The knowledge tested in the Special State Firesafety Inspector Examination is essential for any firesafety inspector to know in order to properly conduct inspections required of individuals in that position.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner is not entitled to additional points for her responses to Question Nos. 14 and 21 of the Special State Firesafety Inspector Examination and denying Petitioner's application for certification as a special state firesafety inspector. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Casia R. Belk, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Alma Elaine Carlus 2419 Paradise Drive Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Tallahassee, Florida, on September 23, 1963, and continued in employment until May 5, 1979. (The suggestion by Petitioner that he had 24 to 27 days of leave accrued upon the last day of his employment is not utilized in determining the official termination date of employment. Beyond May 5, 1979, Petitioner was entitled to be paid for leave time, but was no longer obligated to perform as a firefighter, having been terminated effective May 5, 1979.) During his service as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Petitioner received a certificate of tenure in 1974, pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes. This provision has been referred to as the savings clause or grandfather clause and allows firefighters who were employed upon the effective date of that section to be certified without the necessity of complying with provisions of law related to certification through training and examination. Section 633.41, Florida Statutes became effective in 1969, thus Petitioner was certified by the terms and conditions of that provision. Petitioner left his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department to pursue private business and for reason of family obligations. Having terminated his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department on a voluntary basis, there was no prohibition against reapplying for employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department at some future date. That eventuality occurred when the petitioner contacted the Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department in April, 1981 to discuss the possibility of reemployment. The Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department then and now is one Edwin C. Ragans. Shortly after this discussion with Chief Ragans, and in the same month, April, 1981, Ragans hired Petitioner with the effective date of Petitioner's reemployment being July 21, 1901. The delay between April and July was caused by the petitioner's need to conclude certain business undertakings before assuming his duties as a firefighter. The State of Florida, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, had been informed of the date of original employment for the Petitioner, September 23, 1963, and the date of termination, May 5, 1979, based upon a notice of termination which was submitted by Chief Ragans in behalf of the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 1 admitted into evidence. Likewise, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training was made aware of the reemployment of the Petitioner through the filing of a form known as Qualification of New Employee. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 2 admitted into evidence. That exhibit reflects the date of reemployment or rehiring as being July 21, 1981, and further notes that the initial employment was September 23, 1963. That form does not allude to the date of original termination of employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department which was May 5, 1979. When Petitioner returned to employment in July, 1981, Chief Ragans made mention of the "two year rule", which is a reference to Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), dealing with the idea that firefighters who had been employed with an employing agency, such as the Tallahassee Fire Department, would not have to reapply for certification in this same fashion as the person seeking initial employment as a firefighter, if that former individual resumed full time paid employment with the employing agency within a period of two years immediately subsequent to termination of the initial employment. In this connection Ragans told the Petitioner at the point of reemploying the Petitioner in 1981, that Petitioner had two options. First, he could challenge the examination related to firefighters and gain certification or if that choice was not made it would be necessary for the Petitioner to go through a minimum standards class before recertification. At the commencement of reemployment, Petitioner was mindful of the existence of the two year provision pertaining to continuing certification for those persons who had not been away from employment as a firefighter for more than two years. Furthermore, this topic had been discussed between Petitioner and some other individuals of the fire department on one occasion. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contacted an official within the training division of the Tallahassee Fire Department and obtained books necessary to study in preparation for standing the examination for certification as a firefighter. Petitioner had commenced preparation for the examination when he happened to see Bobby Presnell a lieutenant within the Tallahassee Fire Department and president of the local firefighters union. In the course of this conversation with Presnell, Petitioner mentioned that he was going to have to be examined through a test before receiving certification. Presnell indicated that he would check into the situation and find out exactly what would be necessary to obtain certification. A couple of weeks after that conversation, Presnell called the Petitioner and told him that he had spoken with Olin Greene the then Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal in the state of Florida. Presnell reported to the Petitioner that in the course of the conversation between Greene and Presnell, Greene had stated that the Petitioner was a certified fireman. These conversations between Petitioner and Presnell occurred some time in August or September, 1981. Presnell testified that the discussion between Presnell and Greene concerned the problem which Petitioner had with the two year requirement for continuing certification without the necessity of testing or schooling. In testimony, Presnell indicated that he told Greene that the Petitioner had been reemployed and everything was "supposed to be okay, and then a month or two or three later the problem arose", meaning a certification problem. Greene, according to Presnell, stated that he would get back in contact with Presnell on this subject. Again, per the testimony of Presnell, some ten days to two weeks later, beyond the initial discussion between Greene and Presnell, Greene called Presnell and told him that as far as he, Greene, was concerned, and the Fire Marshal's office was concerned, that "They didn't have any problem with Mr. Adams' recertification or certification." Greene has no recollection of any conversation with Presnell on the subject of the certification situation related to the Petitioner. Having considered the testimony of Presnell and Greene, the Presnell testimony is accepted as factually correct. Following the occurrence wherein Presnell related remarks attributed to Greene as described before, a few days after those events, Petitioner had a discussion with District Fire Chief Raymond Love of the Tallahassee Fire Department. In this conversation Love describes a discussion which he claims to have taken place between himself and Buddy Dewar, whose actual name is Dennis Dewar, in which Dewar is reported to have said that Petitioner was certified. At that time Dewar was the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. At present he is the Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal, having been promoted to that position in April 1982. In testimony, Love's account of the Dewar conversation concerning certification of the Petitioner, was that in the course of a fireman's convention in October 1981, Dewar asked Love if he knew Jimmy Adams, and Love replied in the affirmative. Given this opening, Love then related that he was impressed with Adams as a person and in terms of his capabilities as a firefighter. Love then recounts that he began to tell Dewar that there was a problem related to the Adams certification and if there was any help that Dewar could give, it would be most appreciated. To which, according to Love, Dewar replied that "he didn't see any problem with the recertification." Dewar, per Love's comments, did not state that he considered the Petitioner to be certified at the time of that conversation, nor was the two-year requirement pertaining to the return to the employment roles, to remain in a certified position without reapplication for certification mentioned in the Dewar conversation with Love, according to Love. Dewar, in his testimony, denied that the conversation between Love and Dewar concerned the Petitioner. His recollection is that Love asked Dewar how long the retention of certification would be valid for, to which he responded two years. Having considered the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, a decision cannot be reached on which of the witnesses Love or Dewar should be believed pertaining to the conversation which took place between them in October, 1981. Following discussion with Chief Love, and particularly on the next morning after that discussion, Petitioner talked to another fire chief within the Tallahassee Fire Department, whose name is Revel. This conversation was instituted by Revel in his inquiry of the petitioner on the subject of whether Petitioner was studying for the examination for certification. In response Petitioner stated that he had been but that he had found out the night before that he was certified. Revel in turn told Chief Ragans of this conversation and Ragans summoned the Petitioner to his office and the conversation between Love and Petitioner on the question of certification was recounted for the benefit of Chief Ragans. Petitioner and Love indicate that in the course of the meeting with Ragans, Ragans made a phone call and having concluded that phone call, stated that Petitioner did not have any problem with certification, or something to that effect, as Love recalls Ragans comments. Petitioner's recollection of the comment after the phone call was that Chief Ragans said, "You are a certified fireman." Ragans, in his testimony, does not relate having phoned someone on the topic of certification of the Petitioner in the presence of Petitioner and Love as previously described. His recollection is to the effect that some time prior to Love having stated in the fleeting between Ragans, Love and the Petitioner, that Dewar had confirmed Petitioner's status as a certified firefighter, he, Ragans, had talked to a Mr. Schaffner, Standards Coordinator, at the State of Florida, Fire College, and Schaffner had indicated that the time which Petitioner had been out of employment as a firefighter in a Florida department, was so close to being within the two years allowed, that Petitioner would not be required to go back through the certification process. At the time this case was placed at issue Schaffner had died. Having considered Ragans comments in the context of the other proof, it is determined that Ragans was sufficiently acquainted with Schaffner's voice to identify Schaffner in the course of the telephone conversation on the topic of the Petitioners certification. It is also concluded that this was the only conversation which Ragans had with officials within the State of Florida, Office of the State Fire Marshal, during 1981. Whether this conversation between Ragans and Schaffner occurred while Petitioner and Love were in Ragans office is uncertain. Benjamin E. Mclin, inspector with the Fire Department, speaks in terms of a conversation which he had with Olin Greene in October 1981, in the course of a seminar. Mclin introduced himself to Greene and, Greene is reputed, according to Mclin, to have asked Mclin if he knew Jimmy Adams, the Petitioner, and to have asked what kind of person Adams was. Mclin reports that he replied that he thought that Petitioner was an outstanding person as well as an impressive fireman, to which Mclin says that Greene stated, "Well, I know I did the right thing." Greene has no recollection of this conversation. Having considered the comment, even if it can be attributable to Greene, it is sufficiently ambiguous that it has no value in resolving the certification issue related to the Petitioner. After the conversation with Chief Ragans and Chief Love, which took place in Ragans office, Petitioner assumed that he was certified without the necessity of standing examination to receive certification. He had received no written indication from Respondent confirming or denying this understanding and had never personally spoken to anyone in the employ of the Respondent, on this subject. Petitioner continued his duties throughout 1981, into the beginning of 1984, serving in the capacity as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department. At that point, Petitioner had been promoted to Lieutenant within the Fire Department, and in the face of that action, a grievance was filed by another firefighter employed by the Tallahassee Fire Department indicating that Petitioner was not a certified firefighter. Ragans, in response to the grievance contacted Paul R. Steckle who was employed with the Office of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as a Field Representative Supervisor. Steckle had been asked by Dewar to check the Petitioner's file to determine the period of time between the termination of initial employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department and reemployment with that employer. Having made this check Steckle believed that the period was beyond the two years and reported this finding to Dewar. In conversation with Ragans, Steckle had asked Ragans when Petitioner had been employed and Ragans had indicated that Petitioner had been rehired in April but did not report to work until July, 1981. Steckle told Ragans that if Petitioner had been hired in April, 1981, and had been granted a leave of absence, allowing Petitioner to start work in July, 1981, that the reemployment would have been within the two year limit. Ragans indicated that the City of Tallahassee had no policy of allowing a leave of absence such as inquired about by Steckle. Nonetheless, Ragans got the impression that petitioner was duly certified based upon remarks made by Steckle. On January 30, 1984, Ragans wrote Steckle verifying that Petitioner had not returned to work in April, in view of commitments which would not allow him to be actually at work until July. (Mention is made of 1979, but it is determined that Ragans is referring to 1981.) This correspondence also mentions the conversation between Ragans and Schaffner. A copy of the correspondence is Respondent's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. On February 22, 1984, Steckle wrote to the Petitioner and advised the Petitioner that a review of the records of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training revealed that the Petitioner had been out of fire service for over two years before reemployment. This correspondence refers to May 5, 1979, as the date of termination and July 21, 1981, as the date of reemployment. It alludes to the fact that Petitioner must regain certification through provisions of Rule 4A-37.52, Florida Administrative Code, (1981) 1/ related to an equivalency examination and encloses a copy of the package related to that examination process. It requests that the examination be taken in April, 1984. Otherwise, it is indicated in the correspondence, the Petitioner would be terminated from employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department upon request from the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training to the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 14, admitted into evidence. On April 10, 1984, through correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel for the petitioner, the case is discussed and the Petitioner is requested to stand the equivalency examination and it alludes to the fact that in view of the error of the Respondent in failing to note at the time of reemployment that Petitioner had been away from fire fighting for more than two years, Petitioner is given until February 22, 1985, to undergo an equivalency examination for purposes of recertification. In lieu of this disposition, Petitioner is afforded the opportunity for a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes hearing, which he availed himself of, leading to the present Recommended Order. A copy of the April 10, 1984 correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 15 admitted into evidence. Luther Richter had been employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department and was dismissed from that employment after being arrested on a federal drug smuggling charge. He subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to the charge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1976 and was given a three year probation. In April of 1979 he applied to the Tallahassee Fire Department to be reemployed. Through the reemployment paperwork, Chief Ragans recommended that Richter not be accepted based upon an alleged lack of good character. In response, Dewar, the then Bureau Chief of the Fire College, wrote Ragans on May 22, 1979 stating that Richter was not eligible for employment because of his drug conviction. Another letter was sent on June 15, 1979, from Dewar to Ragans to the same effect. On July 17, 1979, Dewar requested a legal interpretation of the Richter situation from the point of view of the Respondent's duties in considering the question of Richter's certification as a firefighter in Florida. On September 10, 1979, the City of Tallahassee and Richter entered into an agreement for Richter's reinstatement as an employee with the City of Tallahassee. In the face of the action of the City of Tallahassee, the Respondent accepted Richter for purposes of certification as if he had never been dismissed. As stated in the October 16, 1979 correspondence from Olin Greene to Daniel E. A. Kleman, City Manager of the City of Tallahassee, with Richter's reinstatement as an employee of the City of Tallahassee the Respondent would ". . . have no alternative but to accept the reinstatement order and allow his certification that was in effect prior to September 1, 1975, to come back into effect." The agreement for reinstatement can be found as part of the composite exhibit number 6 of the Petitioner, admitted into evidence. The October 16, 1979 correspondence may also be found within that document. Those items are copies of the originals. In furtherance of Greene's perception, Richter having been reinstated by the City of Tallahassee was deemed by the Respondent never to have left employment. Richter's certification continues from September 1, 1975, the dismissal date, and his initial certification remains valid to this date as established in the correspondence of Olin Greene to Kleman dated January 9, 1980, a copy of which is found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit number 6. In essence, Respondent felt that in view of the reinstatement it could not refuse to recognize Richter's certification as if it had never lapsed between the interim period of his dismissal in 1975 and the agreement for reinstatement in 1979. In early 1984 a minimum standards training course for firefighters in Florida was taught at Indian River Community College. An unusually high failure rate was experienced by those students who took that course and this led to an investigation by the State Fire College. Through the investigation it was learned that one of the instructors in the minimum standards course had not been properly certified. To resolve this problem, all students who attended that course were required to take further training with a certified instructor. Following that additional training session, another examination was given and those persons who passed the second examination, in addition to those persons who had passed the initial examination, were certified. Those who failed the second examination were not accepted for certification. On other occasions where tenured firefighters, as recognized by Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, have gone beyond the two year time period for reemployment and continuing certification without examination, those firefighters have had to stand the examination, without exception.
The Issue Whether Petitioner achieved a passing score on the Practical Examination for Retention of Firefighter Retest.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for the certification of firefighters in the State of Florida, pursuant to chapter 633, Florida Statutes. In or around 2008, Petitioner achieved his Firefighter Minimum Standards Training Certification, which was valid for three years. To maintain his certification, it was necessary for Petitioner to either: maintain employment as a firefighter (or serve as a volunteer firefighter) for at least six consecutive months during the three-year period subsequent to his certification; or successfully complete the retention examination, which is identical to the practical examination given to new applicants.1/ Petitioner could not satisfy the first option, and was therefore required to take the retention examination. Petitioner's first attempt to successfully complete the retention examination occurred on May 20, 2011, and included four components: self-contained breathing apparatus ("SCBA"), hose operation, ladder operation, and fireground skills. To pass the retention examination, an examinee must earn scores of at least 70 on each section. Each portion of the retention examination has certain evaluative components that are graded. For instance, the ladder operation consists of 15 skills——e.g., maintaining contact with the ladder at all times, lifting and securing the ladder properly, using proper hand position——that the examinee must complete within the maximum time of four minutes and 30 seconds. A failure to finish the tasks within the allotted time results in an automatic failure and a score of zero, even if the examinee performs each of the 15 skills successfully.2/ Although Petitioner achieved perfect scores of 100 on the ladder operation and fireground skills components, he was unable to achieve scores of 70 or higher on the SCBA or hose portions of the practical examination. Petitioner, like all candidates who fail the retention examination on the first attempt, was offered one retest opportunity.3/ Petitioner's retest was administered on September 22, 2011, at the Ocala Fire College. On that occasion, Petitioner passed the SCBA and hose portions——the sections that he failed during his previous attempt——with scores of 85. Interestingly, however, the Department's field notes indicate that Petitioner exceeded the ladder evaluation's maximum permitted time by 32 seconds, a performance 58 seconds slower than his recorded time just four months earlier, when he achieved a perfect score. The field notes further reflect that Petitioner committed no errors in connection with the 15 ladder skills and that his failing score was entirely attributable to the examiner's conclusion that the time limit had been exceeded. During the final hearing, Respondent called Thomas Johnson, the field representative for the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training that administered Petitioner's retest, who testified that he timed the ladder examination with a stopwatch, and that Petitioner did not complete the evaluation within the prescribed time period. Significantly, however, the Department elicited no detail from Mr. Thomas with respect to the causes——e.g., loss of ladder control, tripping, fumbling, etc.——of Petitioner's purported failure to complete the evaluation within the allotted time.4/ In contrast, Petitioner testified that although he was not permitted to bring a timekeeping device to the examination (the Department forbids examinees from doing so), he is confident that he completed the ladder retest within the prescribed time limit: Mr. Saintilmond: All right. On the date of the retest, I was taking the ladder examination. I've gone through the evolution. I did not fumble around. I did not take any time. I went through the exam as trained. No fumbling around, no waiting, no nothing. And I believe that I completed the evolution on time. And I passed the examination before. I've done it several times. But on this particular day, on my retake, I know I went through this evolution and I passed it with no fumbling around. Final Hearing Transcript, p. 12. Notwithstanding the anecdotal nature of Petitioner's evidence, his description of the evaluation, which was credible and adequately detailed, carries significant persuasive force in light of his perfect completion of the same ladder examination—— with 26 seconds to spare——just four months before the retest. The undersigned therefore accepts Petitioner's version of the events and finds that he did not exceed the maximum time limit of four minutes and 30 seconds during the September 22, 2011, retention examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter an order granting Petitioner's application to retain his certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's apparent failure to achieve a passing score on the written portion of the Firefighter Minimum Standards retest resulted from improper administration or grading of the examination by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Cruz's petition and denying his application for certification as a Florida firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Hipolito Cruz, Jr. 1214 Southwest 46 Avenue Deerfield Beach, Florida 33442 James Morrison, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Orange County Fire Rescue (Respondent) committed an act of unlawful employment discrimination against Marlene Serrano (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a Puerto Rican-born Hispanic female. At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Orange County Fire Rescue Department (FRD), a unit of the Orange County government. In order to increase the number of firefighters available to the Respondent, the FRD posted a job advertisement in July 2008 ("Job Req. #007931"), seeking to hire state- certified paramedics who were capable of becoming state-certified firefighters. The advertisement clearly indicated that applicants should be state-certified paramedics who were "[c]apable of successfully completing and maintaining the Florida State Firefighter certification after three (3) years of being hired." Employees hired into the new paramedic-firefighter positions were identified as "paramedics." Employees hired as paramedics only were identified as "PMOs." On September 8, 2008, the FRD officially hired four paramedics for the positions advertised by Job Req. #007931. The group included the Petitioner, two Caucasian females (Sarah Wilson and Jennifer Massey) and a Caucasian male (Shane Doolittle). It was commonly understood by those hired, including the Petitioner, that they were required to obtain state certification as firefighters by September 18, 2011, the third anniversary of their employment. Pursuant to the advertised job requirements, the paramedics were required to pass a physical ability test (referred to as the "CPAT") and complete the Orange County firefighter orientation program. The Petitioner passed the CPAT on her second attempt and completed the orientation program. Candidates seeking to be certified by the State of Florida as firefighters are required to complete a 450-hour firefighter training course (commonly referred to as Firefighter I and II Minimum Standards classes) and to pass a firefighter certification exam. The Petitioner had completed the Firefighter I and II Minimum Standards classes as of December 17, 2010. On December 22, 2010, the Petitioner took the firefighter certification exam at the Central Florida Firefighter Academy and failed the hose and ladder components of the exam. When the Petitioner failed to pass the exam, the Respondent placed her in a fire station with a ladder truck company so that she could improve her ladder skills. On February 22, 2011, the Petitioner retook the firefighter certification exam at a training facility in Ocala, Florida, where she successfully completed the hose component of the exam, but again failed the ladder component. A candidate for firefighter certification is permitted to take the exam twice. A candidate who twice fails the exam is required to retake the Firefighter II Minimum Standards class before being permitted to retake the certification exam. On March 8, 2011, the Petitioner met with FRD officials to assess her progress towards obtaining the firefighter certification. The Petitioner had received notice of the meeting on March 1, 2011, from Assistant Fire Chief Brian Morrow. Similar meetings occurred with the other paramedics employed by the Respondent. During the meeting, the Petitioner advised the FRD officials that she intended to dispute the results of her second test. The Petitioner was aware that she could not retake the certification exam without retaking the Firefighter II Minimum Standards class. Although the Petitioner contacted a training facility to inquire about course schedules, she did not attempt to retake the training course. The March 8 meeting and discussion was memorialized in a letter to the Petitioner dated March 14, 2011. The letter contained an assessment of her progress towards certification. The letter also noted that she was required to obtain her state certification prior to September 18, 2011, and that failure to obtain certification by that date could result in termination of her employment. The Petitioner received the letter on March 16, 2011. In an email dated March 22, 2011, to FRD Lieutenant John Benton, the Petitioner advised that she was trying to determine how she would be able to go to class and maintain her work schedule. Lt. Benton forwarded the email to Assistant Fire Chief Morrow. Assistant Fire Chief Morrow replied to the Petitioner's email on March 29, 2011, wherein he advised her that the FRD had met its obligation to fund the certification training. He asked the Petitioner to advise him of the status of her appeal, to identify the class she was planning to take, and to outline her schedule and specify the hours she would use as vacation time and as "time trades." He asked for a response "as soon as possible" and invited the Petitioner to contact him directly to resolve any questions. The Petitioner received Assistant Fire Chief Morrow's March 29 email, but did not respond to it. Assistant Fire Chief Morrow subsequently contacted the Petitioner by telephone to inquire as to the issues noted in the email, but received little additional information from the Petitioner regarding her plans. After receiving the official notice that she had failed her second attempt at the certification exam, the Petitioner filed an administrative appeal (DOAH Case No 11-1556) to dispute the scoring of the exam. A hearing was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 24, 2011. On July 7, 2011, the ALJ issued a Recommended Order finding that the Respondent failed the exam and recommending that the appeal be denied. By Final Order dated August 20, 2011, the State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshall, adopted the findings and recommendation of the ALJ and denied the Petitioner's appeal of the exam grading. The Final Order specifically noted that the Petitioner's certification was denied until she obtained a passing score on the exam. The Petitioner made no further efforts to become a state-certified firefighter. She did not register to retake the Firefighter II Minimum Standards class. As of September 17, 2011, the Petitioner was not a certified firefighter and was not actively engaged in seeking certification. Because the Petitioner did not meet the published job requirements and was making no effort to meet them, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment on September 17, 2011. The Respondent offered to permit the Petitioner to resign from her employment rather than be terminated, but she declined the offer. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that, after she twice failed to pass the certification exam and was unsuccessful in challenging the scoring of the second attempt, she had no further interest in obtaining the certification. There is no evidence that the Petitioner requested an extension of the applicable three-year certification deadline. Nonetheless, the Petitioner has asserted that the Respondent provided deadline extensions to other paramedics and that the Respondent's actions, in not providing an extension to her and in terminating her employment, were based on her race or national origin. There is no evidence to support the assertion. The March 14, 2011, letter specifically referenced the published job requirements set forth in Job Req. #007931, as well as the applicable provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) governing the Petitioner's employment by the Respondent. The Petitioner was a member of the Orange County Professional Fire Fighters Association. Her employment by the Respondent was subject to a CBA dated December 14, 2010, between the Respondent and the Orange County Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 2057, International Association of Fire Fighters. Section IV, Article 60, of the CBA provided as follows: ARTICLE 60 - PARAMEDIC PROMOTIONS/STATUS CHANGE Employees in the Paramedic classification agree to, upon reaching three (3) years of employment [sic] to meet the requirements of the Firefighter classification. Either upon reaching three (3) years of employment, or upon the desire of the department, the employee shall be moved from the Paramedic pay plan to Step 1 of the Firefighter pay step plan or to the higher nearest step to the employee's Paramedic current rate of pay. Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the Orange County Fire/Rescue Department from terminating the employment of a Paramedic when upon reaching three (3) years employment the minimum requirements for the position of Firefighter have not been met. Employees not meeting the minimum qualifications by the three (3) year employment anniversary may be separated from county employment without a predetermination hearing (PDH) and without access to Article 17 - Grievance and Arbitration Procedure of this contract. It is the sole discretion of Fire Rescue Management to extend the three (3) year time frame limitation due to case-by-case circumstances and/or operational need. The evidence establishes that certification deadlines have rarely been extended by FRD officials. The evidence fails to establish that FRD officials have considered race or national origin in making decisions related to deadline extensions. Sarah Wilson, a Caucasian female, was hired at the same time as the Petitioner and the deadline by which she was required to have obtained firefighter certification was September 18, 2011. Ms. Wilson completed the training course on September 15, 2011. She was scheduled to sit for the certification exam on October 4 and 5, 2011. The scheduling of the exam was the responsibility of the training facility. Neither Ms. Wilson nor the Respondent had any control over the testing date or the scheduling of the exam. The Respondent permitted Ms. Wilson to remain employed beyond the certification deadline and through the dates of the exam, an extension of 17 days. The extension granted to Ms. Wilson was the only time that the Respondent has allowed a paramedic more than 36 months of employment in which to obtain the required certification. Ms. Wilson passed the firefighter exam on October 4 and 5, 2011, and became a state-certified firefighter. Had Ms. Wilson not passed the exam on October 4 and 5, 2011, her employment would have been terminated by the Respondent. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Wilson retained all required certifications and remained employed as a firefighter paramedic with the FRD. In contrast to Ms. Wilson, the Petitioner was making no effort to obtain the required certification when the certification deadline passed. There was no evidence that the Respondent's extension of Ms. Wilson's certification deadline was based upon race or national origin. Jennifer Massey, a Caucasian female who was hired at the same time as the Petitioner, left her employment with the Respondent prior to the certification deadline. Shane Doolittle, a Caucasian male, was hired at the same time as the Petitioner, and the deadline by which he was required to have obtained firefighter certification was originally September 18, 2011. However, Mr. Doolittle was called to active military duty for three months during the three-year certification period. In order to provide Mr. Doolittle with the full 36 months of employment prior to the certification deadline, the Respondent extended Mr. Doolittle's certification deadline by three months, to December 18, 2011. In contrast to Mr. Doolittle, the Petitioner was employed and present with the FRD throughout the three-year period and had a full 36 consecutive months in which to obtain the required certification. There was no evidence that the Respondent's extension of Mr. Doolittle's certification deadline was based upon race or national origin. Mr. Doolittle did not become certified by the extended deadline, and the Respondent terminated his employment on December 18, 2011. There is no evidence that the Respondent was not invested in each paramedic successfully completing their training and meeting the requirements set forth in Job Req. #007931. The Respondent hired 12 paramedics in 2008. The Respondent paid the tuition and equipment costs for each paramedic who sought state certification as a firefighter. Additionally, the Respondent paid the salaries and benefits for the paramedics while in classes or exams, as well as the costs of the employees who covered the shifts of such paramedics. The Petitioner received the same training and benefits as all other employees seeking certification. The Respondent anticipated that the Petitioner would ultimately complete the training and exam requirements for certification, and she participated in the recruit training graduation ceremony with her colleagues. The 2008 hires included a Puerto Rican-born Hispanic male who obtained his firefighter certification prior to the deadline, and a Caucasian male who resigned from employment in lieu of termination because he had not obtained the firefighter certification by the deadline and was making no progress towards doing so. During the termination meeting with the Petitioner, FRD Chief Michael Howe advised the Petitioner that she was eligible for re-employment with the FRD if she obtained the firefighter certification. About a week after the termination meeting, Chief Howe called the Petitioner and left a voice message, offering to loan equipment to the Petitioner and to sponsor her for a discount on tuition costs, should she choose to retake the required course and become re-eligible for the certification exam. Chief Howe received no response from the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan T. Spradley, Esquire Gray Robinson, P.A. Post Office Box 3068 Orlando, Florida 32802 Scott Christopher Adams, Esquire LaBar and Adams, P.A. 1527 East Concord Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 69A- 62.001, 69A-62.003, 69A-62.006, and 69A-62.007, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Sections 120.52(8)(d), 120.52(8)(e), and 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is and, at all times material to this case, was a volunteer firefighter. The size of the volunteer firefighter population is dependent on the ability of volunteer fire departments to attract and keep volunteers. People are willing to volunteer as firefighters if the experience is rewarding, training is not excessive, and conflict is minimized. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the subject rules do not detract from the volunteer experience, impose excessive training, or create between conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Petitioner testified that a reduction in volunteer population will result in increased hazards to volunteers and a reduction in the delivery of services to citizens. This testimony is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is no persuasive testimony that the subject rules will result in a reduction of the number of volunteer firefighters. Second, the most persuasive evidence indicates that the subject rules will reduce hazards to volunteers without impairing the delivery of services to Floridians. Some labor unions that represent career firefighters discourage their members from volunteering their services with volunteer fire departments. The competition between the unions and the volunteer fire departments is commonly referred to as the "turf-war." There is no persuasive evidence that the subject rules contribute to the tension between the two groups of firefighters. The firefighter labor unions are usually very active in the political arena. It is undisputed that the unions support legislation that benefits their members. However, the subject rules were not promulgated to eliminate or place hardships on volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters. The safety needs and concerns of firefighters have evolved over time. Technology has improved firefighting equipment to such an extent that the greatest threat to firefighters is from heart attacks and transportation accidents. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject rules focus on safety enhancement at the scene of a fire instead of firefighter health and transportation safety does not render them invalid. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003 provides as follows in pertinent part: (3) With respect to 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.134(g)(4), the two individuals located outside the immediately dangerous to life and health atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander, pumper operator, engineer, or driver, so long as such individual is able to immediately perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at an incident. (a)1. Except as provided in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4., no firefighter or any other person under the authority of the firefighter employer at the scene of a fire is permitted to participate in any operation involving two-in, two-out as one of the two or more persons inside the IDLH atmosphere or as one of the two or more persons outside of the IDLH atmosphere unless such firefighter or other person at the scene of a fire is certified in this state by the division as a Firefighter I or a Firefighter II, as established in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. Such training shall consist of the training described in subsection (6) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. This requirement specifically applies to volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters but is also applicable to any other person working under the authority of the Firefighter Employer at the scene of a fire. 2.a. A volunteer firefighter who possesses the State Basic Volunteer certificate previously issued by the division is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1. The training encompassed in the basic volunteer certificate in itself may not meet “trained commensurate to duty” as defined depending upon duties or tasks assigned or undertaken in the exclusionary zone. A volunteer firefighter who provides evidence of having completed curriculum equivalent to the Florida Firefighter I course of study as provided in subsection 69A-37.055(6), F.A.C., prior to January 1, 2004, is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1., if The fire chief or other chief administrative officer of the fire department of which the firefighter is a member files with the State Fire Marshal form DFS-K4-1594, “Firefighter I Training Exemption Application,” which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, and The said form is accepted by the State Fire Marshal after confirmation of the evidence provided. Form DFS-K4-1594 may be obtained by writing the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Any volunteer exempted by sub- subparagraph a.or b. is permitted to take the Florida Firefighter I examination until December 31, 2005, upon the completion and filing with the division of form DFS-K4- 1380, “Firefighter I Training Record,” Rev. 03/00, adopted in Rule 69A-37.039, F.A.C., by a Florida certified instructor that verifies equivalent training and demonstration of competency. The above-referenced rule sets forth ways that a firefighter, trained prior to the current regulations, may keep his or her interior-firefighter status without becoming certified as a Firefighter I or Firefighter II. The rule will not disqualify all previously qualified firefighters as long as they are "trained commensurate to duty" for any type of work they are requested to perform. There is no persuasive evidence that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a) will cause a reduction in the number of volunteer firefighters due to newly created administrative hurtles. The rule, which has its basis in safety enhancement, clearly is not arbitrary or damaging to the safety of volunteers. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a)4. states as follows: 4. Volunteer firefighters having NWCG S- 130, S-190, and Standards for Survival certification by the Florida Division of Forestry are permitted to participate in wild land fire suppression without the Firefighter I certification. The above-referenced rule allows a volunteer to fight wild-land fires without earning Firefighter I certification. The rule sets forth an exception to the Firefighter I certification requirement; it does not mandate that the NWCG courses are the exclusive means to qualify as a wild-land firefighter. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)4. is not invalid or arbitrary because it requires volunteers to pass training courses that are accepted as setting national standards or because the training courses teach firefighting techniques that are applicable across the nation as well as Florida. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence to the contrary. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006 states as follows: 69A-62.006 Requirements for Recognition as a Fire Department. To be recognized as an organized fire department by the division, compliance with the following must be documented: Capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day, seven days a week; Responsibility for response in an area capable of being depicted on a map; and Staffing with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters who are employed full-time or part-time or serve as volunteers and who shall have successfully completed an approved basic firefighting course recognized by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. (2)(a) A fire department shall meet the requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 Protection, the 2003 edition, the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, effective February, 2003, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference and which may be obtained from Insurance Services Office (ISO), 545 Washington Blvd., Jersey City, NJ 07310-1686 or at www.iso.com. If the fire department does not meet the requirements of this section, the fire department shall submit a plan of compliance which provides for meeting these requirements within 90 days of the date of submission of the plan. ISO measures the major elements of a community’s fire-suppression system and develops a numerical grade ranging from 1 to 10. Class 1 represents the best public protection rating and Class 10 indicates no recognized protection. The requirements for ISO 9 may be obtained at the ISO website located at www.iso.com, or it may be obtained by writing to the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(a) is not invalid because it requires fire departments to document their capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day/seven days a week. The requirement for full-time availability will provide significant safety enhancement for the communities being served. This is true because some voluntary fire departments in rural communities historically have provided only part-time service. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring full- time fire protection will result in the following: (a) the creation of a fire-suppression performance standard that is unauthorized by law; (b) the closing of some volunteer fire departments; (c) a reduction in services to the public; and (d) uncorrectable rule-violations; an increase in conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(c) requires that each fire department be staffed with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters. The rule is not vague because it uses the word "sufficient" to determine the number of firefighters that are required. One must read the applicable rules in their entirety and consider the needs of each community to determine adequate staffing. There is no persuasive evidence that the staffing requirement fails to establish adequate standards for determining compliance. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(2) requires fire departments to meet certain requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 protection. This requirement determines the minimum equipment that is necessary to safely fight a structure fire. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring a fire department to provide Class 9 protection will make it impossible to start a new voluntary fire department. The rule clearly is not arbitrary in setting this minimum standard. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(1) states as follows in pertinent part: 69A-62.007 Minimum Requirements for Class 9 Protection. To be considered for Class 9 protection, the following minimum facilities must be available: Organization: The fire department shall be organized on a permanent basis under applicable state or local laws. The organization shall include one person responsible for operation of the department, usually with the title of chief. The fire department must serve an area with definite boundaries. If a municipality is not served by a fire department solely operated by or for the governing body of that city, the fire department providing such service shall do so under a contract or resolution. When a fire department’s service area involves one or more jurisdictions, a contract shall be executed with each jurisdiction served. Membership: The department shall have a sufficient number of firefighters/members to assure the response of at least 4 firefighters/members that can assemble at the scene of a fire as contemplated by subsection (1) of Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., to be compliant with Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., the two-in, two-out rule. The fire chief may be one of the 4 responding firefighters/members. The above-referenced rule does require fire departments to have four "interior-qualified" firefighters at the scene of a structure fire. The requirement is necessary to comply with the longstanding "two-in, two-out" rule. However, the rule does not preclude a fire department from relying on mutual-aid from other fire departments in order to comply with the rule. The rule clearly is not vague. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(4)(a) states as follows in relevant part: (4)(a) The chief of any fire department that includes volunteer firefighters shall annually submit a Roster of Volunteer Firefighters to the State Fire Marshal utilizing form DFS-K4-1581, effective 05/04, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, no later than June 30 of each year. Form DFS-K4-1581 may be obtained by contacting the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486 or at the division’s website located at http://www.fldfs.com/SFM/. The roster shall include: The fire department name, The fire department identification number (FDID), The complete fire department address, The fire department contact person, telephone number and the fire department fax number, if any, The certification level for each firefighter reported and, if any equivalency exemption has been issued, the number of persons for whom such exemption has been issued, and The firefighter certification number, the issue date of the certification, the status of the certification, i.e., volunteer or career, and the status of each firefighter who has been issued an equivalency exemption, i.e., volunteer or career, if any. The above-referenced rule requires the chief of a fire department to submit an annual roster of volunteer firefighters. Petitioner objects to the rule because some career firefighters volunteer their off-duty hours with the local volunteer fire department. Career firefighters who also perform volunteer work may do so contrary to their union rules. Publication of the roster might keep some professional firefighters from volunteering their services. Nevertheless, there is no persuasive evidence that losing some speculative number of career/volunteer firefighters will undermine the safety of firefighters or the public. The information that the roster contains is a public record. The information is necessary so that Respondent can perform statutorily-mandated studies involving injuries to firefighters. The rule clearly is not arbitrary.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner successfully completed the Practical Examination for Retention of Firefighter Retest.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Pointon is a candidate for re-certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. In 2004, Mr. Pointon obtained his Firefighter Minimum Standards Training Certification. A certification is valid for three years. Since 2004, he has been unable to find gainful employment as a firefighter. In 2007, Mr. Pointon obtained re- certification. He has been working two jobs, unrelated to firefighting, and has been unable to volunteer as a firefighter. To maintain certification, a certified firefighter, within the three-year period, must either be employed as a firefighter in a career status position or a volunteer firefighter for at least six consecutive months. If a certified firefighter fails to fit within either of the two statuses within the three-year period, the certified firefighter must take the practical portion of the Firefighter Minimum Standards examination, i.e., the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination (Practical Examination) to retain certification as a firefighter. The Practical Examination includes a written examination, as well as four practical components. The four practical components include (a) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA); (b) Hose Operations; (c) Ladder Operations; and (d) Fireground Skills. In order to pass the Practical Examination, a candidate must achieve a score of at least 70 percent on each of the four components. Pertinent to the instant case, the SCBA component is scored using a form listing five mandatory steps, which the candidate must pass, and ten "evaluative component" steps worth ten points each. During the SCBA portion of the examination, a candidate is required to follow the mandatory criteria; the mandatory criteria are required to be completed correctly, including completion of all protective equipment, which includes pulling on the candidate's hood that protects the skin from flash fire; and (c) a candidate is required to complete the mandatory criteria within the maximum allotted time. A candidate, who successfully completes the five mandatory steps, receives a total score of the sum of the points from the ten "evaluative component" steps. A candidate's failure to comply with the mandatory criteria is considered a critical failure. A critical failure is grounds for an automatic failure. A candidate is able to take the re-certification test twice. If a candidate fails the first time, the candidate is automatically afforded an opportunity for a retest. On May 25, 2010, Mr. Pointon took his initial Practical Examination for the re-certification. He completed the SCBA in two minutes and 45 seconds, which was beyond the maximum allowed time of one minute and 35 seconds. Therefore, the Department determined that Mr. Pointon failed to successfully complete that component and, as a result, failed that section of the Practical Examination. Mr. Pointon contends that, on May 25, 2010, during his inspection of the equipment, bottle and air pack, to make sure that it was functioning properly, he discovered that the equipment was not functioning properly. Further, he contends that he made two exchanges of equipment before he obtained properly functioning equipment. Mr. Pointon's testimony is found to be credible. The field representative who administered the initial Practical Examination testified. The field representative did nothing different with Mr. Pointon than he did with any of the other candidates. Furthermore, Mr. Pointon was the eleventh candidate to undergo testing and, by being the eleventh candidate, Mr. Pointon had ample opportunity to test his equipment and ensure that the necessary preparation was conducted before his (Mr. Pointon's) exam began. The field representative's testimony is found to be credible and more persuasive. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Pointon failed to successfully complete the SCBA component within the maximum allotted time. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that, on May 25, 2010, Mr. Pointon failed the SCBA section of the Practical Examination. On September 23, 2010, Mr. Pointon took a retest of the SCBA component. The Department determined that he failed the retest for failure to don all Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), in particular his NOMEX hood. Failure to don all PPE is grounds for automatic failure. As to the retest, Mr. Pointon contends that he was wearing his NOMEX hood. The field representative who administered the retest testified. The field representative observed the NOMEX hood around Mr. Pointon's neck; Mr. Pointon was not wearing the NOMEX hood. The field representative's testimony is more persuasive. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that, on September 23, 2010, Mr. Pointon failed to don all the PPE by failing to don his NOMEX hood. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that, on September 23, 2010, Mr. Pointon failed the retest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order: Finding that Mark Pointon failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination for Retention of Firefighter Retest; and Denying Mark Pointon's application for recertification as a firefighter in the state of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2011.
Findings Of Fact At all times, material to this case, Petitioner has been licensed by the Department to operate an adult congregate living facility (ACLF) which is located at 6200 West Fairfield Drive, Pensacola, Florida, and is known as the Warrington House. Francis Cooper is the sole shareholder and operator of the Warrington House. Prior to 1984, the Warrington House was known as the Heritage House and was owned by a Mr. Mitchell. Sometime in 1984, Mr. Mitchell was criminally charged with elderly abuse on his residents and the Heritage House went into receivership. Another branch of HRS who was represented by Esther Ward, asked Ms. Francis Cooper to take over the facility. HRS was apparently well satisfied with Ms. Cooper's qualifications in running an ACLF since she had another such facility. When Ms. Cooper took over the Heritage House the electrical power to the facility was about to be turned off. Only by Ms. Cooper's pleading with Gulf Power was that circumstance forestalled. There were only thirteen (13) patients at the facility out of the sixteen (16) that were supposed to have been there. Three (3) of the patients had been mysteriously removed during the night. The residents that were at the house could not identify themselves and very few resident records were at the facility. The building was infested with roaches, there was raw sewage in the yard and the sewage system was completely blocked to the extent that sewage came up through the showers when a toilet was flushed. There was urine in every carpet. None of the appliances in the house worked. There were no air conditioners, fans or plastic dishes. The floors were in bad shape. In fact, Ms. Cooper fell through two of the bathroom floors. When Ms. Cooper questioned HRS representatives about the appalling conditions of the facility, she received no responsive answer. After Ms. Cooper had taken over the facility, she discovered that Mr. Mitchell had absconded with three months advance rent from the residents. Ms. Cooper, therefore, had to operate the premises for three months without income from the residents that were there. She used her own money. Ms. Cooper started with the air conditioning, flooring and carpeting. All these items were replaced. The bathrooms were tiled and additional bathrooms were added. She put in a $6,000.00 sewage system, a lift station and paid $1,000.00 to hook the building onto city sewage. She also brought in an exterminator to get rid of the bugs. All of this took place over a period of two years wherein Ms. Cooper worked diligently to bring the building up to "snuff." In fact, in the time since she has had the facility she has accomplished wonders in improving conditions at the house. These conditions clearly did not appear overnight, but over several years and were apparently overlooked by Respondent until the crisis with Mr. Mitchell had occurred. Ms. Cooper went into the house with the understanding that the corporation would eventually build another facility and close what had become the Warrington House. The reason for the new construction was that the current building, regardless of the amount of repair, was still an old building not worth maintaining and which was allowed to deteriorate badly prior to her stewardship. However, due to a falling out with her brother, who was then a co- shareholder of the corporation, Ms. Cooper was unable to complete her plans for moving the residents of the Warrington House to a new facility. She continues to attempt to obtain financing to build a new facility. At least once a year, HRS does a full survey on a ACLF like the Warrington House. A full survey is simply an inspection of the property in order to determine the degree of compliance with HRS rules and regulations. Upon completing the inspection, the inspector goes through an exit briefing with the ACLF's management. During the exit briefing, the inspector will go over any deficiencies he or she has discovered and attempt to establish mutually agreeable correction dates. The inspector also explains that these time periods are the best estimates that they can come up with at that point to allow a reasonable amount of time for the required corrections to be made. If any problems should arise, the inspector requests that the manager communicate with his or her office and ask for an extension. Extensions are not always forthcoming. After the full survey inspection is done, a follow-up visit is normally scheduled to determine whether the earlier cited deficiencies have been corrected. If, after the follow-up survey there are items that are still not corrected, the inspector will explain to the person in charge that they are subject to administrative action and that he or she will report he facility's noncompliance to his or her office. Whether or not administrative action is taken is determined at a level above the inspector. However, it appears that the customary practice of the office is to pursue an administrative fine for any noncompliance after the correction date has been passed. After the first follow-up survey has been made it depends on the particular factual situation whether or not further follow-up surveys are made until compliance is achieved. If there are efforts being made to correct the problems further follow-up surveys will be made. If not, further follow-up surveys may not be made. In this case, James Temkin, an HRS Fire Protection Specialist, performed a full survey fire safety inspection on the Warrington House on September 24, 1986. During that survey, he cited 11 deficiencies. Various compliance dates were established for the deficiencies. A follow-up survey was conducted by Mr. Temkin on January 14, 1987. During that survey, he noted that 6 of the previously cited deficiencies had not been corrected. He recommended administrative action on all the uncorrected deficiencies. The six remaining uncorrected deficiencies were as follows: No up to date fire plan and the July 7th fire drills were not documented; No fire alarm test since July 1986 and fire alarm zones were not shown on the actuator panel; Smoke detectors not working in four (4) rooms; Exit sign lights burned out at the front and center exits, emergency lights not working at the front, rear and upstairs exit halls; Sleeping rooms had hollow core doors; and There was no documentation of fire safety on the wood paneling and tile ceilings on the first and second floors. All other deficiencies cited during the September 24, 1986 full survey were corrected. As to the alleged deficiencies contained in the latter half of (b) and (c)-(f) above, none appear at any point in HRS' rules governing ACLF's. Supposedly, these deficiencies are cited in the NFPA life safety code, which is incorporated by reference in the Fire Marshal's rule on ACLF's, Rule 4A-40, Florida Administrative Code. The 1984 version of Rule 4A-40, Florida Administrative Code is incorporated by reference in HRS' rule, Rule 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code. Both HRS' rule and the Fire Marshal's rule are contained in the Florida Administrative Code. However, the 1984 version of NFPA is nowhere to be found in the Administrative Code. The current Fire Marshal's rule adopts portions of the 1985 NFPA life safety code. However, the HRS' rule adopts the 1984 version of the Fire Marshal's rule. No showing was made by Respondent as to what the 1984 version of the NFPA code contained. The HRS inspector's testimony regarding a particular deficiency's inclusion in the NFPA cannot be relied on since both inspectors apparently used the 1985 version of the NFPA which is not the 1984 version included in HRS's rule. Without proof of the contents of the NFPA, HRS has failed to prove any deficiencies for which it may take administrative actions. As to the other deficiencies, attempts to comply were in fact made by the Warrington House. The facility's personnel in fact thought they had complied with HRS' desires based upon previous inspections. However, for one reason or another, these attempts were rejected by the HRS inspector and the deficiency was cited again, but because of another reason. The lack of an up- to-date fire plan (cited in (a) above) was met by the Warrington House when they obtained a fire plan prior to the established correction date from another arm of HRS responsible for devising such plans. However, upon the January 14th follow-up inspection, the plan obtained from HRS by Petitioner was considered insufficient in that it did not outline staff responsibilities during a fire. The same thing occurred with the lack of fire alarm tests, cited in the latter part of (a) and the first part of (b) above. The Warrington House obtained the testing document and test from another branch of HRS responsible for such testing. However, the inspector at the follow up survey did not deem his own agency's testing documents sufficient since it did not show a different type sending unit was being tested at least once a year. 1/ These are simply not repeat deficiencies since in each instance the earlier grievance had been met and it was another grievance which cropped up. On July 9, 1987, a second follow-up survey to the Temkin September 24, 1986, full survey was performed by O.B. Walton, an HRS fire safety inspector. The evidence was not clear as to any remaining uncorrected deficiencies, if any, he found. Therefore, Respondent failed to establish any repetitive deficiencies as a result of the July 9 follow-up survey. Apparently, however, Mr. Walton, did perform another full survey on July 9, 1987. Several additional deficiencies were cited by him. A follow-up visit was conducted by Mr. Walton on October 23, 1987. Four alleged deficiencies remained uncorrected as follows: Ceiling not repaired in hot water heater closet, i.e. not taped; Kitchen fire door latch was jammed open so it would not latch, but it would stay closed; Plug by hot water heater had no cover; No documentation that drapes were fire retardant. Again, none of the above alleged deficiencies appear in HRS' rules or in the fire marshal's rule and a reasonable person could not glean from any of the other provisions contained in HRS' rules that the above conditions might be included in these provisions. The lack of clarity or uniformity in interpretation of HRS' rules is especially born out in this case since two different inspectors while inspecting the same building cited different deficiencies under their respective interpretation of the rules. When the experts differ it is difficult to see how a reasonable lay person could even begin to know or understand the contents of HRS or the Fire Marshal's rules. This lack is especially true since the relevant contents of the 1984 NFPA life safety code are not contained in the Florida Administrative Code and were not demonstrated by HRS. HRS, therefore, failed to prove any repeat deficiencies from the October 23, 1987 follow-up survey. A third fire safety follow-up visit was conducted by Pat Reid, a human services program analyst, on January 21, 1988. She has no expertise or license to perform fire safety inspections. She found all of the earlier cited uncorrected deficiencies corrected except for the documentation on the drapes. That alleged deficiency was partially corrected since Petitioner was replacing the drapery with metal blinds. However, as indicated earlier the lack of documentation for fire retardant drapes was not proven to be a violation by Respondent. Ms. Reid had previously conducted a full survey of Petitioner on August 17 and 18, 1987 in her area of expertise operation and general maintenance of an ACLF. Several deficiencies were cited and correction dates were established. Ms. Reid conducted a follow-up survey to the August 17 and 18 full survey on October 23, 1987. The following alleged deficiencies had not been corrected: Facility staff do not have documentation of being free of communicable diseases; The physical examination (Health Assessment) of resident identified as M. B. does not indicate that the resident is free from communicable disease; Broken or cracked window panes in windows of second floor exit door, both first floor bathrooms nearest kitchen, and resident rooms identified as C. W., W. S., and W. L.; Shower tile missing in second floor bathroom nearest exit door; Linoleum of first floor bathroom is loose as well as badly stained with cigarette burns; Hole in wall next to sink and toilet of second floor bathroom nearest exit door and square hole in wall of second floor blue bathroom; Faucet of first floor bathroom is loose; Carpeting in first floor resident room (#7) is badly stained; Three vinyl chairs in dining room have tears, exposing foam padding; Second floor bathroom faucet nearest exit does not clearly distinguish between hot and cold water taps. As to the alleged deficiency contained in (a) above, the regulations do not contain a requirement that any documentation be kept regarding staff members being free of communicable disease. The regulations only require that the facility administrator assure that staff is free of communicable disease. The evidence showed that Petitioner had in fact assured that the staff was free of communicable disease. Therefore, no violation occurred. The alleged deficiency cited in (b) above does constitute a violation of Rules 10-5.081(1)(b), (2)(a)4.d., and (2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. However, in this instance, there are several mitigating circumstances. Foremost is the fact that Petitioner attempted on several occasions to obtain this information from another arm of HRS who had M. B. under its care prior to his admission to Petitioner's facility and had actually failed to complete M. B.'s Health Assessment form properly. Petitioner received many assurances from HRS that it would obtain and forward the information. HRS failed to do so. Moreover, after several years of M. B. living at the Warrington House and after several years of HRS care prior to his admission, common sense would dictate that M. B. is free of communicable diseases. Petitioner has in fact received confirmation of that fact from an examining physician who certified M. B. free of communicable diseases. 2/ As to (c) above, the evidence showed that the windows were only cracked and not broken. No evidence was presented as to the severity of the cracks. Cracked windows are not included in Rule 10A-5.022(a), Florida Administrative Code, which only addresses broken window panes. Moreover, cracked windows without proof of the severity of the cracks is not sufficient evidence of the lack of good repair or other hazardous conditions similar to those listed in Rule 10A-5.022(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Rule requires proof of the hazardous nature of such a condition. Cracked windows are not hazardous in and of themselves and no showing was made that these cracked panes constituted a hazard. Nor do cracked window panes standing alone constitute a violation of Rule 10A-5.022(d). The rule requires evidence that such cracked panes are unreasonably unattractive and no showing was made that the cracks were unreasonably unattractive. Likewise, the missing shower tile in (d) above fails to constitute a violation of Rule 10A-5.022(a) since the deficiency is not listed, and no showing was made that the missing tile constituted a hazardous condition. Similarly, the missing tile, by itself, does not constitute a violation under Rule 10A-5.022(d) since no showing was made that the missing tile was unreasonably unattractive. The same failure of proof occurs with the alleged deficiencies listed in (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i). See Rules 10A-5.022(c), (e) and (i). The alleged deficiency cited in (j) above does constitute a violation of 10A-5.023(9)(e). However, the violation was not repeated after October 1, 1987, the effective date of Section 400.414(2)(d), Florida Statutes. Ms. Reid conducted a second follow-up survey to the August 17 and 18 full survey when she performed the fire safety follow-up on January 21, 1988. All previously cited deficiencies had been corrected except for: Facility staff do not have documentation of being free of communicable diseases. The physical examination (Health Assessment) of resident identified as M. B. does not indicate that the resident is free from communicable diseases. The following maintenance problems exist: broken or cracked window panes in windows of second floor exit door, both first floor bathrooms and resident room identified as W. S. A third follow-up was conducted by Ms. Reid on April 15, 1988. All the previously cited deficiencies had been corrected except for: The physical examination (Health Assessment) of resident identified as M. B. does not indicate that the resident is free from communicable disease. Broken or cracked window panes in windows of second floor exit door, both first floor bathrooms nearest kitchen, and resident rooms identified as C. W., W. S., and W. L.; Shower tile missing in second floor bathroom nearest exit door; Linoleum of first floor bathroom is loose as well as badly stained with cigarette burns; Hole in wall next to sink and toilet of second floor bathroom nearest exit door and square hole in wall of second floor blue bathroom. All of the alleged deficiencies cited in the January 21, 1988 follow- up and the April 15, 1988 follow-up survey were carried forward from the alleged deficiencies discussed above, cited in the October 23, 1987 follow-up survey. The same findings are made as to the alleged deficiencies which were carried forward. Only the physical health assessment of M. B. was cited by Respondent and shown to be a repeated deficiency since the information was not obtained by the established correction dates occurring after October 1, 1987. By the date of the hearing all the above alleged deficiencies had been corrected. Respondent notified Petitioner that it proposed to deny renewal of Petitioner's license to operate the Warrington House on December 23, 1987. The basis for the denial was Section 400.414(1) and (2)(d) which states: 400.414 Denial, revocation, or suspension of license; imposition of administrative fine; grounds. The department may deny, revoke or suspend a license or impose an administrative fine in the manner provided in chapter 120. Any of the following actions by a facility or its employee shall be grounds for action by the department against a licensee: * * * (d) Multiple and repeated violations of this part or of minimum standards or rules adopted pursuant to this part. The language of Subsection (d) was added to Section 400.414 F.S. on October 1, 1987. Prior to that date Respondent had no authority to take punitive action against the license of an ACLF licensee for multiple and repeated violations of Respondent's statutes and rules. The only action Respondent could take against a facility for such violations was in the form of a civil fine the amount of which could be raised if the violation was repetitive. Section 400.426, Florida Statutes. No multiple violations were shown by the evidence through the April 15, 1988 follow-up survey. More importantly, however, no multiple violations were shown by Respondent after October 1, 1987, the effective date of the statutory language at issue in this case. No showing was made by Respondent as to any legislative intent that the statute operate retrospectively. The statute operates only prospectively. Therefore, any alleged deficiencies cited prior to October 1, 1987 are irrelevant for purposes of imposing the punishment contemplated under Section 400.414, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services renew Petitioner's license. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1988.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for the certification of firefighters in the State of Florida, pursuant to chapter 633, Florida Statutes. In or around 2008, Petitioner achieved his Firefighter Minimum Standards Training Certification, which was valid for three years. To maintain his certification, it was necessary for Petitioner to either: maintain employment as a firefighter (or serve as a volunteer firefighter) for at least six consecutive months during the three-year period subsequent to his certification; or successfully complete the retention examination, which is identical to the practical examination given to new applicants.1/ Petitioner could not satisfy the first option, and was therefore required to take the retention examination. Petitioner's first attempt to successfully complete the retention examination occurred on September 26, 2011, and included four practical components: self-contained breathing apparatus ("SCBA"), hose operation, ladder operation, and fireground skills.2/ To pass the retention examination, an examinee must earn a score of at least 70 on all sections. Each portion of the retention examination has certain evaluative components that are graded. For instance, the ladder operation consists of 15 skills——e.g., maintaining contact with the ladder, lifting and securing the ladder properly, using proper hand position——that the examinee must complete within the maximum time of four minutes and 30 seconds. The ladder operation also requires the examinee to fulfill ten mandatory components, which include, among other things, maintaining control of the ladder at all times and securing the "dogs"3/ properly. Pertinent to the instant case, noncompliance with respect to any of the mandatory elements results in automatic failure, irrespective of the examinee's performance in connection with the 15 evaluative components. It is undisputed that Petitioner achieved passing scores on the fireground skills, SCBA, and hose components of the retention examination; Petitioner was unable, however, to complete the ladder evaluation within the prescribed time limit, which resulted in an automatic failure. Petitioner, like all candidates who fail the retention examination on the first attempt, was offered one retest opportunity.4/ Petitioner's retest was administered on November 15, 2011, at the Ocala Fire College, during which he passed the SCBA and hose portions of the examination. (For reasons not explained during the final hearing, Petitioner was not required to re-take the fireground skills component.) Once again, however, Petitioner failed the ladder evaluation, as established by the final hearing testimony of Tuffy Dixon, the field examiner on that occasion.5/ Mr. Dixon explained, credibly, that Petitioner scored an automatic failure because he neglected to lock one of the ladder's "dogs"——one of the ladder evaluation's ten mandatory components.6/ Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed the November 15, 2011, retention examination retest.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter an order denying Petitioner's application to retain his certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2012.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of compliance as a fire fighter under the provisions of Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner completed 240 hours of firefighter minimum standards training at the Orlando/Orange County Fire Training Academy in 1982 and was issued a certificate of completion at the end of the course. Between 1982 and 1985, Petitioner served as a reserve firefighter with the Winter Park Fire Department. From 1985 to June 1989, Petitioner was on inactive status. From June 1989 until March 1990, Petitioner completed technical training in American Sign Language. From 1990 through 1993, Petitioner completed a Bachelor of Science degree, with a double major in business and marketing. Between 1996 and February 1997, Petitioner was re-certified and also became a fire inspector. In February 1997, Petitioner was awarded an Associate of Science degree in Fire Science. Petitioner has served as a contract fire inspector with the Orange County Fire Department and has been a principal in a private arson investigation company for the past thirteen or fourteen years in Orange County, Florida. Florida law was amended in 1989 to require that a person pass an examination as prescribed by the Department, in addition to completing the firefighter minimum standards training program and being qualified for employment to be issued a certificate of compliance. Promulgated in 1991 and amended in 1995, a Florida administrative rule granted those persons that had been issued a certificate of completion by the opportunity to upgrade their certificate of completion to a certificate of compliance by June 30, 1995, without having to comply with the current requirements of the law. Petitioner did not upgrade her certificate of completion to a certificate of compliance by June 30, 1995. During the years 1991 through 1995, Petitioner made no effort to keep informed about the current requirements of becoming certified as a firefighter. Petitioner had a total of four years in which to upgrade her certificate of completion into a certificate of compliance. More than 11,000 certificates of completion were upgraded to certificates of compliance by June 30, 1995; 2,900 were not. Eighty percent of those certificates of completion that had been issued by the State, since certificates of completion were first issued in 1969, were upgraded to certificates of compliance by June 30, 1995. Petitioner's first inquiry into the status of her certificate of completion and request for a certificate of compliance was made by letter dated August 12, 1997, to the Fire Marshall's office. Respondent responded to Petitioner's August 12, 1997, letter with a letter dated October 3, 1997, which informed Petitioner that any certificate of completion not upgraded by June 30, 1995, was revoked. Respondent's October 3, 1997, letter also informed Petitioner that failure to follow the procedures outlined in Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, for upgrading certificates of completion would require the individual to meet the current requirements of the law, which include having to complete 360 hours of firefighter minimum standards training, passing the Minimum Standards Certification Examination, and being qualified for employment according to Section 633.34, Florida Statutes, in order to be issued a certificate of compliance. There are no provisions in the rule for an extension after the cutoff date of June 30, 1995. There is no firefighter minimum standards training program consisting of 120 hours of instruction for the Petitioner to take which would enable Petitioner to meet the current requirements of Section 633.35, Florida Statutes, which require a total of 360 hours of firefighter minimum standards training, as Petitioner had completed only 240 hours of firefighter minimum standards training in 1982. Prior to 1984, a person needed both a certificate of completion and a certificate of compliance to become a firefighter. At that time, to be qualified for a certificate of compliance, a person had to successfully complete firefighter minimum standards training and satisfy the qualifications for employment found in Section 633.34, Florida Statutes. Section 633.35, Florida Statutes, was amended in 1984 with the result that the Respondent no longer issued certificates of completion, which had been issued since 1969, for the successful fulfillment of the firefighter minimum standards training program. Rule 4A-37.56 Florida Administrative Code, was amended in order to implement the amendments made in 1989 to Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. Rule 4A-37.056, Florida Administrative Code, was amended to establish the Minimum Standards Certification Examination, as required by the 1989 amendments to Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated in order to implement the amendments made in 1989 to Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. In order to upgrade a certificate of completion to a certificate of compliance, Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, provided that a person who had been issued a certificate of completion was required to make application to the Respondent for certification as a firefighter. Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, as initially promulgated in 1991, stated that certificates of completion had to be upgraded to certificates of compliance by June 30, 1993. Respondent published a Notice of Changes to Rule Chapter 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, including the promulgation of Rule 4A-37.0515, in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 15, 1991. Respondent keeps a mailing list, which includes every fire department and training center in the State of Florida, to facilitate mailing out notices of anything that effects the fire service, including changes in the statutes and rules governing the fire service. Respondent sent a copy of the Notice of Changes to Rule Chapter, 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, including the promulgation of Rule 4A-37.0515, to every fire department and training center in the State of Florida on July 26, 1991. Respondent sent a copy of the Notice of Changes to Rule Chapter 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, including the promulgation of Rule 4A-37.0515, to every fire department and training center in Orange County, Florida appearing on the Department's mailing list. Petitioner has lived and worked in Orange County, Florida, all of her life. Individual notices were not sent to certificate holders. Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, became effective on June 30, 1991. Petitioner did not upgrade her certificate of completion to a certificate of compliance by June 30, 1993. Section 633.35, Florida Statutes, was amended in 1993 to require that firefighter minimum standards training would be composed of at least 360 hours of instruction. Respondent published a Notice of Changes to Rule Chapter, 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, including the Rule 4A-37.0515, in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly on December 2, 1994. Respondent also sent a copy of the Notice of Changes to Rule Chapter, 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, including the amendment of Rule 4A-37.0515, to every fire department and training center in the State of Florida on April 24, 1995. Respondent sent a copy of the Notice of Changes to Rule Chapter, 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, including the amendment of Rule 4A-37.0515, to every fire department and training center in Orange County, Florida appearing on the Department's mailing list on April 24, 1995. Notice of Changes to the rule were not sent to individuals who held certificates. On March 20, 1995, Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, was amended, extending the deadline by which certificates of completion could be upgraded to certificates of compliance from June 30, 1993, to June 30, 1995. Rule 4A-37.0515, Florida Administrative Code, was further amended to state that those individuals who held certificates of completion but did not upgrade them by June 30, 1995, would be required to meet the current requirements of Section 633.35, Florida Statutes, which included having to complete 360 hours of firefighter minimum standards training, passing the Minimum Standards Certification Examination, and being qualified for employment according to Section 633.34, Florida Statutes, in order to be issued a certificate of compliance. Certificates of completion which were not upgraded to certificates of compliance by June 30, 1995, were revoked that same day.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the Petitioner's request for a certificate of compliance by the Department's Bureau of Fire Standards and Training of the Division of the State Fire Marshal. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen Mohr 4702 Abaca Street Orlando, Florida 32808 M. Joel Prather, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson, Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
