The Issue Whether Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., denied Petitioners full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered at its place of public accommodation, in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction Petitioners are African Americans who reside in the State of Ohio, who visited Orlando, Florida, in June 2011 and stayed at Lake Eve Resort beginning on June 21, 2011. Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., was the owner of Lake Eve Resort, located at 12388 International Drive, Orlando, Florida, at all times relevant hereto. Each Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission as follows: Jessica Austin – July 20, 2012 Denise Austin – July 21, 2012 Tracie Austin – January 18, 2013 (Amended Complaint)2/ Bonlydia Jones – July 11, 2012 James Austin – July 31, 2012 Dionne Harrington – August 1, 2012 Esther Hall – January 28, 2013 (Amended Complaint)3/ Boniris McNeal – March 27, 2013 Summer McNeal – March 27, 2013 Derek McNeal – March 27, 2013 In each Complaint, the Petitioner alleges that the most recent date of discrimination is June 22, 2011. On June 21, 2012, Petitioners Esther Hall, Summer McNeal, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, and Dionne Harrington, each filed a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) with the Commission. Each TAQ is signed by the named Petitioner, is stamped received by the Commission on June 21, 2012, and contains the specific facts alleged to be an act of discrimination in the provision of public accommodation by Respondent. Allegations of Discrimination On or about May 23, 2011, Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, entered into a Standard Group Contract with Lake Eve Resort (the Resort) to reserve 15 Resort rooms for five nights at a discounted group rate beginning June 21, 2011.4/ The rooms were to accommodate approximately 55 members of her extended family on the occasion of the Boss/Williams/Harris family reunion. Petitioners traveled from Ohio to Orlando via charter bus, arriving at the Resort on the evening of June 21, 2011. Erika Bell, a relative of Petitioners, drove a rental car from Ohio to Orlando. She did not arrive in Orlando until June 22, 2011. Petitioners checked in to the Resort without incident. However, one family member, John Harris, was informed that the three-bedroom suite he had reserved for his family was not available due to a mistake in reservations. He was offered two two-bedroom suites to accommodate his family. Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, dined off-property on the evening of June 21, 2011, to celebrate her wedding anniversary. Petitioner, Bonlydia Jones, left the Resort property shortly after check-in to shop for groceries. Petitioners, Dionne Harrington and Esther Hall, were very tired after the long bus trip and went to bed early on June 21, 2011. Petitioner, Denise Austin, arrived in Orlando with the family on June 21, 2011. On the morning of June 22, 2011, Ms. Jones received a call from Mr. Harris, informing her that the Resort management wanted to speak with them about his room. That morning, Ms. Jones and Mr. Harris met with two members of Resort management, Amanda Simon and Marie Silbe. Mr. Harris was informed that he needed to change rooms to a three-bedroom suite, the accommodation he had reserved, which had become available. Mr. Harris disputed that he had to change rooms and argued that he was told at check-in the prior evening he would not have to move from the two two-bedroom suites he was offered when his preferred three-bedroom suite was not available. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Harris would move his family to an available three-bedroom suite. The Resort provided an employee to assist with the move. Following the meeting with management, Ms. Jones went to the pool, along with Ms. Harrington and other members of the family. After a period of time which was not established at hearing, Mary Hall, one of Ms. Harrington’s relatives, came to the pool and informed Ms. Harrington that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Harrington left the pool and entered the lobby, where she observed police officers and members of Resort management. She approached a member of management and was informed that she and her family were being evicted from the Resort and must be off the property within an hour. Ms. Harrington left the lobby and returned to her room, where her mother, Ms. Hall was sleeping. Ms. Harrington informed Ms. Hall that the family was being evicted from the Resort and instructed Ms. Hall to pack her belongings. Ms. Jones’ cousin, Denise Strickland, came to the pool and informed her that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Jones entered the lobby where she was approached by a member of management, who introduced herself as the general manager and informed her that the family was being evicted. Ms. Jones requested a reason, but was informed by a police officer that the owners did not have to give a reason. In the lobby, Ms. Jones observed that an African- American male was stopped by police and asked whether he was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion. He was not a family member. Ms. Jones observed that no Caucasian guests were approached in the lobby by management or the police. Ms. Austin was on a trolley to lunch off-property on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from her cousin, Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland informed Ms. Austin that the family was being evicted from the Resort and she needed to return to pack her things. Ms. Austin returned to the property, where she was escorted to her room by a security guard and asked to pack her belongings. Ms. McNeal was en route to rent a car and buy groceries on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from Ms. Strickland informing her that the family was being evicted and that she needed to return to the Resort to pack her belongings. Upon her arrival at the Resort, Ms. McNeal entered the lobby. There, she was approached by Resort staff, asked whether she was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion, and informed that the Resort could not honor the reservations and the family was being evicted. Ms. McNeal observed that Caucasian guests entering the lobby were not approached by either the police or Resort management. Ms. McNeal was escorted to her room by both a police officer and a member of management and instructed to be out of the room within 30 minutes. Ms. McNeal inquired why they were being evicted, but was told by a police officer that the Resort was not required to give a reason. Erika Bell received a call from her mother, Ms. Austin, while en route to the Resort on June 22, 2011. Ms. Austin informed Ms. Bell that the family was being evicted from the Resort and asked her to call the Resort and cancel her reservation. Respondent gave no reason for evicting Petitioners from the property. Respondent refunded Petitioners’ money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: Finding that Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., committed an act of public accommodation discrimination in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011), against Petitioners Jessica Austin, Denise Austin, Tracie Austin, James Austin, Bonlydia Jones, Esther Hall, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, Summer McNeal, and Dionne Harrington; and Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a place of public accommodation, violated Chapter 760 and Section 413.08, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to accommodate Petitioner, an individual with a disability.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Ricky Krell, is physically disabled and entitled to the protection of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent is the owner of Dustin's Barbeque, which is a structure for public accommodation. On June 5, 2007, Petitioner, accompanied by his wife and his service dog, Zsa-Zsa, visited Respondent restaurant for the purpose of eating therein. Petitioner and his wife were seated and ordered their meal without incident. Zsa-Zsa was on a leash which was several feet in length, long enough to allow the dog to "sniff" other customers and food. Zsa-Zsa began "sniffing" contiguous customers and their food. The lease was stretched across the aisle between tables. On one occasion, a waitress almost tripped over the leash. Respondent's employees, who were familiar with service dogs having been in the restaurant, opined that the dog did not conduct itself as a trained service dog. As a result of the dog's activities and concern for the health and safety of other customers and employees, Respondent's on-site manager requested that Petitioner control the dog. Petitioner was unwilling or unable to control the dog, and the dog's inappropriate conduct continued. As a result, the manager asked Petitioner to take the dog outside. Petitioner would have been able to complete his meal if he had been able to control the dog or he had opted to take the dog outside and return to his meal without the dog. Petitioner refused the request to take the dog outside and became loud and used profanity. Petitioner finished his meal. The request that Petitioner remove the dog from the restaurant was reasonable under the existing circumstance and did not reflect a discriminatory act against Petitioner. The City of Melbourne police were called and when the officer arrived, she issued a trespass warning to Petitioner and his wife.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Katherine Hurst Miller, Esquire Kelly V. Parsons, Esquire Cobb Cole 150 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2491 Ricky Krell 1889 Cedarwood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32935
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Ann Marie Augustino, was denied copying services by Respondent, Kwikie Printing, because of her religion in violation of Pinellas County Code Section 70-214, when Kwikie Printing refused to print the GreenSong Grove, Inc.'s, newsletter, "Voices of the Grove."
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Ann Marie Augustino, is a self-proclaimed witch who follows the Wicca religion. Petitioner is a member of a religious organization, GreenSong Grove, Inc., a Florida not-for-profit corporation. Respondent, Kwikie Printing, operates a printing business in Pinellas Park, Florida. It operates a business which provides goods and services to the public. Among GreenSong Grove, Inc.'s, purposes, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation, are the following: to provide a place of worship to celebrate, support and teach the penance of the Pagan religion; to provide and disseminate information regarding Paganism and the Pagan faith to the general public, other religions and secular bodies in order to educate and inform. In furtherance of its stated corporate purpose, GreenSong Grove, Inc., regularly publishes a newsletter, "Voices of the Grove." For several years prior to the incident which gave rise to the complaint of discrimination, Respondent printed materials for Petitioner and GreenSong Grove, Inc. In addition to the "Voices of the Grove" newsletter, Respondent had printed business cards, hats, and T-shirts; all contained the GreenSong Grove, Inc., logo. In October 2001, Respondent's employees, including Patricia Hall, Respondent's manager, and her husband, Robert Hall, a part-time employee, had occasion to read portions of the "Voices of the Grove" newsletter and were offended by its content. On this occasion, the printing job, which was in progress when its content was discovered by Respondent, was completed as contracted, and the newsletter was delivered to a representative of GreenSong Grove, Inc. Petitioner did not pick up the October newsletter; however, the individual who picked up the newsletter was advised that the newsletter would no longer be printed by Respondent because of its content. In December 2001, Petitioner returned to Respondent's printing establishment seeking to have the newsletter printed; Respondent through the Halls advised Petitioner that Respondent would not print the newsletter because they found the contents offensive to their religious views. This was essentially confirmed by a witness who had accompanied Petitioner when she returned to Respondent's facility the following day and was again refused. Respondent, through the Halls, advised Petitioner that Respondent would print other non-offensive materials as it had done in the past. The testimony of Petitioner and the Halls is consistent regarding the stated purpose for Respondent's refusal to print the newsletter. In Petitioner's original Charge of Discrimination filed with the City of St. Petersburg, she states: "When I asked for an explanation, Rob Hall came out and stated that the letter was about Witchcraft and Paganism and he would not support those religious views since he was a born again Christian." Petitioner's testimony at the hearing and that of the Halls confirmed that the reason that the newsletter was not printed was due to its content. She further testified that she believed that the Halls' religious-based motivation for not printing her newsletter was a sincere exercise of their religious beliefs. Petitioner confirms that Respondent, through the Halls, offered to continue to perform other printing services for her. In addition, they offered to allow her to use a copier in their place of business on which she could print the newsletter. Petitioner offered no evidence, nor did she testify, that Respondent discriminated against her, personally, as opposed to their objection to the content of the material she sought to have printed on behalf of GreenSong Grove, Inc. Robert Hall testified that he believes the Bible speaks against witchcraft and produced an extensive list of Bible verses that support his contention. He further believes that the advocacy of witchcraft is against God and that printing the subject newsletter would be blasphemy. Patricia Hall testified that her religious beliefs are consistent with Robert Hall's and, in her capacity as Respondent's general manager, confirmed the decision not to print the newsletter. Respondent has, in the past, refused to provide printing services for individuals who presented materials that Respondent found offensive. Respondent would not provide services to any individual, regardless of the individual's religious preference, if the material submitted was found to be offensive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the public accommodations discrimination complaint against Kwikie Printing be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Ann Marie Augustino 7139 62nd Street, North Pinellas Park, Florida 33780 W. Oliver Melvin, Compliance Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, Fifth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Barbara J. Weller, Esquire Gibbs Law Firm, P.A. 5666 Seminole Boulevard, Suite 2 Seminole, Florida 33772 Drew A. Gardner, Esquire 8313 West Hillsborough Avenue, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33615 Leon W. Russell, Human Rights/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, Fifth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a public lodging establishment, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, who is African-American, by refusing to provide her accommodations or service based upon race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Phyllis Phyl ("Phyl") is an African-American woman who resides in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent G6 Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Studio 6 ("Studio 6"), is the owner and operator of the Studio 6 Extended Stay Hotel located in Pompano Beach, Florida (the "Hotel"). Phyl arrived at the Hotel at around 1:30 p.m. on February 22, 2014. Previously, she had made a reservation for a two-night stay, booking a nonsmoking room with a queen bed. Phyl was aware that check-in time at the Hotel was 3:00 p.m., but she decided to take a chance that a room would be available for earlier occupancy. When Phyl attempted to register, however, the clerk informed Phyl that no rooms were available for early check in. Phyl elected to wait in her car, which was parked in the Hotel's parking lot. From there, she watched a black man enter the Hotel and walk out a few minutes later. Phyl assumed that he, too, had been told that his room was not ready. She did not, however, witness his attempt to check in (if that is what occurred), and therefore Phyl lacks personal knowledge of this man's transaction with the Hotel, if any.2/ Unhappy, Phyl walked around the Hotel grounds and peered through the window of an apparently vacant room, which she determined, based on her observation, was clean and ready for occupancy. Phyl might have been mistaken, for she could not see, e.g., the bathroom, but even if her assumption were correct, the fact is not probative of discriminatory intent. This is because a room is not "available" for guest occupancy at this Hotel until after a manager has inspected the room, deemed it "clean," and caused such information to be entered into the Hotel's computer system, at which point the front-desk clerk is on notice that the room is ready. Thus, there is a delay between the time the housekeeping staff finishes cleaning a room and the time the front-desk clerk is able to let the room to a guest. After peeking in the seemingly empty room, Phyl returned to her car, and soon she noticed a white couple enter the Hotel, from which they exited several minutes later. Phyl did not witness the couple's activities inside the Hotel. The man and woman got into their car and drove around the Hotel premises. Phyl followed. She watched the couple park, leave their car, and enter a room. She observed the man retrieve some luggage and bring his bags to the room. Phyl assumed that this couple had just checked in. Phyl returned to the Hotel lobby and inquired again about the availability of a room. This time the clerk told her a room was ready. Phyl checked in at 2:09 p.m. Phyl stayed two nights, as planned, and paid the rate quoted in her reservation. When she checked out on February 24, 2014, the clerk refunded the $25 security deposit Phyl had given the Hotel at check in, which was required because she wanted to pay cash for the room (and did). Phyl claims that the clerk was rude to her, and so she left without taking a receipt. Hotel business records show that on February 22, 2014, no guest checked in between Phyl's arrival at 1:30 p.m. and 2:09 p.m., when she herself checked in. The white man who (together with a female companion) seemed to have checked in while Phyl was waiting actually had checked in earlier that day, at 11:14 a.m. The undersigned rejects as unfounded Phyl's contention that the Hotel's records are unreliable and possibly fraudulent and instead accepts them as persuasive evidence. Ultimate Factual Determinations At the material time, the Hotel was a "public lodging establishment" within the reach of section 509.092, Florida Statutes, and a "public accommodation" as that term is defined in section 760.02(11). Thus, the Hotel is accountable to Phyl for unlawful discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act if such occurred. The greater weight of the evidence, however, fails to establish that the Hotel refused accommodations or service to Phyl, or otherwise unlawfully discriminated against her. Rather, the Hotel provided Phyl the type of room she had reserved, at the quoted rate, for the length of stay she requested. Indeed, despite arriving 90 minutes before the Hotel's published check-in time, Phyl was able to get a room early, after waiting little more than half an hour. The Hotel's conduct, in this instance, cannot be faulted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Phyl's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a restaurateur, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners, who are African-Americans, by refusing to serve them based upon race.
Findings Of Fact On or about July 7, 2001, Petitioners Veronica King and Walter King (the “Kings”), who were then on vacation in Miami Beach, Florida, decided to eat dinner at La Playa de Varadero Restaurant (“La Playa”), a Cuban restaurant near their hotel.2 They entered the restaurant some time between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. Though the dining room was full of patrons, there were a few empty tables. The Kings seated themselves. The Kings reviewed the menus that were on the table and conversed with one another. They waited for a server, but none came promptly. After waiting about 10 or 15 minutes, Mrs. King signaled a waitress, who came to their table and took their drink and food orders.3 The waitress brought the Kings their drinks without delay. The food, however, did not appear, and the Kings grew increasingly impatient and irritated. It seemed to the Kings, who are African-Americans, that other customers——none of whom was black——were being served ahead of them.4 After about a half an hour or so, having yet to be brought food, the Kings decided to leave without eating. On the way out of the restaurant, the Kings paid the cashier for their drinks. They complained to the cashier about the slow service and expressed to her their dissatisfaction at having waited so long, and in vain, for their meals.5 The Kings perceived that the cashier and other employees, including their waitress who was standing within earshot, were indifferent to the Kings’ distress. Ultimate Factual Determinations At the material time, La Playa was a “public food service establishment” within the reach of Section 509.092, Florida Statutes, and hence subject to liability for unlawful discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that La Playa refused to serve, or otherwise unlawfully discriminated against, the Kings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Kings’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2003.
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Respondent, Walmart, violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 6, 2017, Petitioner, who is Hispanic, visited the Walmart in his neighborhood in Tampa (store #5255) to make several purchases. Petitioner is a frequent customer of the store, shopping there every two to three days. After selecting several items and placing them in a cart, Petitioner proceeded to the self-checkout area. When he arrived at the self-checkout section, Petitioner found all the registers in use by other customers. So, he waited for an opening. As he stood with his cart, Petitioner observed a Walmart employee, Dipti Vora, stationed in the self-checkout area. Ms. Vora was working as the self-checkout “hostess” to assist and monitor the customers using the self-checkout registers. Petitioner was familiar with Ms. Vora who he had seen on previous visits. Petitioner recalled that they exchanged pleasantries while he waited for a free register. While he waited, Petitioner noticed another Walmart employee, who he later learned was Sara Revelia, walk up to Ms. Vora. As Ms. Revelia approached Ms. Vora, Petitioner saw her raise a finger to her eye, and then point her finger at him. Petitioner also observed Ms. Revelia give him a nasty look. Petitioner interpreted Ms. Revelia’s actions as instructing Ms. Vora to “keep an eye on him” because she suspected that he might steal something. Petitioner believed that Ms. Revelia, who appeared to be white, pointed at him solely because he is Hispanic. Petitioner expressed that he did not see Ms. Revelia point at any other customers. Petitioner particularly noted that Ms. Revelia did not point to any other white customers who were waiting in the self-checkout area. Petitioner was so upset by Ms. Revelia’s presumptuous gesture that he abandoned his cart in the self-checkout area and left the store without purchasing his items. Petitioner declared that he has never returned to that Walmart store and has no plans to ever shop there again. Petitioner was very embarrassed and disturbed by Ms. Revelia’s action singling him out to be watched. Petitioner is convinced that Ms. Revelia racially profiled him because he is Hispanic. Based on her demeanor, Petitioner declared that Ms. Revelia acted in a very arrogant and authoritative manner and prejudged his character. When questioned by Walmart at the final hearing, Petitioner conceded that he did not hear any words pass between Ms. Vora and Ms. Revelia. Nor did any Walmart employee (including Ms. Revelia) accuse him of stealing or instruct him to leave Walmart. However, Petitioner firmly believes that Ms. Revelia perceived him as a thief or a bad person who might not pay for the items he was carrying. Petitioner asserts that Ms. Revelia’s action was an “injustice,” and Walmart must take responsibility for its employee’s actions. Walmart denied that it failed to allow Petitioner access to its facility or services or took any actions based on his race. Walmart further asserts that at no time did it ask Petitioner to leave or refuse to sell him the items he wished to purchase. Walmart specifically refuted Petitioner’s allegation that an employee suspected that he was going to steal from the store or singled him out as a thief. Walmart presented the testimony of Ms. Vora, the employee who was assigned as the “hostess” in the self-checkout area at the time of Petitioner’s visit. Ms. Vora had worked in store #5255 for approximately 12 years. She was familiar with Petitioner and had regularly seen him shopping at that Tampa Walmart. Ms. Vora recalled the incident involving Petitioner. Ms. Vora also remembered the encounter with Ms. Revelia, the employee who allegedly pointed at Petitioner. Ms. Vora testified that while Petitioner was standing in the self-checkout area, another customer with a baby stroller was also waiting to use a register. Just at that moment, Ms. Revelia walked up to her and alerted her to watch the woman with the stroller. Ms. Vora explained that the woman had placed several items in the open compartment below the stroller seat. Ms. Revelia was cautioning her to ensure that the woman did not neglect to scan all the items she brought to the register, specifically including the items in the lower section of the stroller. Ms. Vora stated that Ms. Revelia was not pointing at Petitioner. Instead, she was signaling Ms. Vora to monitor the woman pushing the stroller, who was standing just ahead of Petitioner. Ms. Vora also recalled that, after Ms. Revelia walked away, Petitioner approached her and asked who was the employee who had just talked to her. At that time, Ms. Vora did not know Ms. Revelia’s name because she was visiting from another store. Ms. Revelia testified at the final hearing. Ms. Revelia is an Asset Protection Manager for Walmart. She principally works in a Walmart store in Largo, Florida. However, she does visit the Tampa store regularly as part of her area of assignment. Ms. Revelia explained that her job duties include overseeing inventory preparation and compliance at Walmart facilities, as well as assisting with the detection and apprehension of shoplifters. She was specifically trained on how to “shrink” financial losses at Walmart facilities due to theft. Ms. Revelia relayed that she was instructed to constantly watch for any suspicious behavior from Walmart customers. Ms. Revelia recalled working at the Walmart Petitioner visited on March 6, 2017. However, she did not remember talking to Ms. Vora, pointing at a customer, or seeing Petitioner while he waited in the self-checkout area. Instead, Ms. Revelia conveyed that she was primarily focused on helping store #5255 prepare for its annual inventory. Although she did not recall specifically pointing out a customer to Ms. Vora, Ms. Revelia described suspicious situations she frequently sees that cause her alarm. Such activity includes customers who wear heavy jackets in summer or carry open backpacks. In addition (and particularly relevant to this matter), Ms. Revelia is also cognizant of customers who bring in strollers that are equipped with a compartment or shelf under the baby seat. Ms. Revelia expounded that, in her experience as an asset manager, she has personally witnessed customers place goods and items in a stroller’s “undercart” and forget (either intentionally or unintentionally) to scan them at the self- checkout register. Despite not remembering the incident involving Petitioner, Ms. Revelia offered that, if she did walk by the self-checkout area and saw a stroller with items stored under the seat, she very well may have instructed the hostess to “keep an eye on” that customer. Conversely, Ms. Revelia denied that she would point at any Walmart customer simply because he or she was Hispanic. Neither would she automatically suspect that a customer would steal from Walmart because of their race. Ms. Revelia adamantly denied that she took any discriminatory action against Petitioner. As additional evidence that Walmart did not discriminate against Petitioner, Elsie Rodriguez, the store manager for store #5255, testified that approximately 70 percent of the customers who shop at her store are Hispanic. Furthermore, in light of the populace it serves, store #5255 specifically offers Spanish based foods and other products catering to the Latino community. Consequently, Ms. Rodriguez asserted that it would not make sense for Walmart, or any of its employees, to discriminate against its Hispanic customers. Walmart also maintains a Statement of Ethics and Discrimination, as well as a Harassment Prevention Policy, which prohibit discrimination by its employees based on race and national origin. Ms. Rodriguez also testified that store #5255 does not hold itself out as, nor does it include, a cafeteria, dining facility, or restaurant. Ms. Rodriguez explained that store #5255 is a “Neighborhood Market.” The store does not offer food principally for consumption on its premises. Neither does it contain an area where customers can sit and dine. Instead, all the facility sells is groceries. In response to the testimony from the Walmart witnesses, Petitioner insisted that the Walmart employees were not telling the truth. Petitioner vigorously maintained that Ms. Revelia was pointing at him and not another customer with a baby stroller. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the record, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Walmart discriminated against Petitioner based on his race. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he was denied full and equal enjoyment of goods or services in a place of public accommodation in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Walmart, is not a “place of public accommodation” under the facts of this case; and, even if it were, that Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Petitioner’s race. Petitioner’s Petition for Relief should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2018.
The Issue Whether the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Respondent or Department) discriminated against Deborah Owens (Petitioner) by denying her reasonable accommodation and discharging her based on her disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a Career Service employee of the Department as an Environmental Specialist II from 2009 until her termination on May 5, 2016. As an Environmental Specialist II, commonly referred to as an “inspector,” Petitioner worked in the Department’s Division of Agricultural Environmental Services, Bureau of Inspection and Incident Response (Department’s Bureau). As an inspector, Petitioner spent approximately 40 percent of her time performing inspections and investigations pursuant to chapters 388 (mosquito control), 482 (pest control), 487 (pesticide regulation and safety), 576 (agricultural fertilizers), 578 (seed), and 580 (commercial feed and feedstuff), Florida Statutes,1/ and related administrative regulations. The rest of Petitioner’s duties consisted of preparing reports based on her inspections and investigations, and maintaining knowledge of applicable statutes and rules. All of the inspectors in the Department’s Bureau were required to be physically capable of performing assigned inspections. While the amount of climbing varied from month to month and place of inspection, Environmental Specialist IIs, as part of their job as inspectors, are required to climb. In the case of fertilizer inspections, inspectors are required to take samples from fertilizer plants, storage vehicles, and trailers in the field. While climbing is not required at those fertilizer plants that have sampling rooms, not all fertilizer plants have sampling rooms. Therefore, inspectors need to be prepared to climb at fertilizer plants. In addition, inspectors are required to climb atop Killebrew trailers2/ or similar equipment in the field to take samples. For inspection of Killibrews, which have separate storage compartments housing fertilizer, an inspector must use a ladder to climb to the top of the Killibrew and obtain samples. Seed inspections may also involve climbing, depending on how the seed is arranged. In some cases, bagged seed is stacked on large pallets, in which case, unless it can be moved, an inspector may have to climb in order to take a sample. During Petitioner’s tenure as an inspector, chapter 482 pest control inspections were added to the inspection duties of Environmental Specialist II following a reorganization of the Department’s Bureau. While, at the time of the hearing, climbing for those types of inspections had been put on hold, fumigation inspections have, at times, required climbing on a ladder into attic spaces or to reach higher exterior portions of a building. Climbing is a variable part of every inspector’s job. The amount of climbing that is required increases during heavy agricultural growing seasons. Although a variable activity, when climbing for inspections is required, it can be laborious. All of the testifying witnesses, who were inspectors for the Department’s Bureau, reported they were required to climb in performing their jobs for the Department. In applying for her Environmental Specialist II position, on a document entitled “Pesticide Compliance Environmental Specialist II Self-Screening/Willingness Questionnaire,” which listed requirements necessary for all candidates, Petitioner affirmatively acknowledged that she was willing and able to “[c]limb and work on top of delivery and application equipment to obtain samples when necessary.” While the climbing requirement varies in frequency, climbing was a necessary part of Petitioner’s job duties as an inspector for the Department, and is a necessary component of an Environmental Specialist II’s job. In 2015, Petitioner took medical leave and underwent double knee replacement surgery. Historically, Department management meets each fiscal year to review inspection numbers by region for purposes of determining and assigning the minimum number of inspections for each inspector for the fiscal year. At the meeting for the 2015-2016 fiscal year, Petitioner was assigned a reduced number of inspections based on the understanding that she would be absent from work for approximately six months due to her medical leave in 2015. Instead of a full fiscal year of goals, Petitioner was given six months of performance goals, reducing the total number of inspections assigned to Petitioner based on her medical leave of absence. Upon her return to work in November 2015, Petitioner had physical limitations stemming from her knee surgery. Petitioner presented to her then-supervisor at the Department, “Dusty” Markham, a doctor’s note dated November 20, 2015. The doctor’s note, from Petitioner’s treating physician, Dr. Richard Vlasak, on UF Health Physician’s stationary, stated, in pertinent part: Deborah Owens has been under my care for treatment of bilateral knee DJD, which included surgery S/P bilateral total knee arthroplasties performed 5/20/15. Limitations: Patient may return to work as of 11/20/15 with restrictions. No cannot [sic] climb on fertilizer trailers, killbrews [sic] no climbing ladders. The above limitations are temporary for 3 months after return to work. Patient is expected to make a full recovery and resume all activities after 3 months time. Upon her return, based on medical information Petitioner provided to the Department’s management, Petitioner was assigned only those inspections that she was medically capable of performing. In February 2016, Petitioner was assigned to the Department’s Region I, and Bryan Smithey, an environmental manager with the Department, became Petitioner’s direct supervisor. Mr. Smithey oversees all of Region I, a territory stretching from Levy County, northward, and westward to Escambia County. Mr. Smithey supervised Petitioner and eight other environmental specialists. Petitioner was assigned a territory within Region I consisting of Gilchrist, Dixie, and Levy Counties. Petitioner’s assigned territory included a fertilizer plant in Trenton, Florida. This plant did not have a sampling room. Because of Petitioner’s temporary restrictions on climbing, other inspectors were assigned to cover Petitioner’s inspections at the Trenton plant. One of the inspectors who covered for Petitioner was Andreas Coveney. Mr. Coveney conducted numerous inspections for Petitioner at the Trenton plant. In order to conduct the Trenton plant inspections, Mr. Coveney had to drive over two hours, one-way, from his home. Another inspector, Ed Harris, conducted over 40 inspections for Petitioner at the Trenton plant. In doing so, Mr. Harris had to drive from his assigned area of Ocala. The inspections that Mr. Coveney and Mr. Harris conducted for Petitioner were additional inspections, separate and apart from their regularly assigned duties. The inspections conducted for Petitioner were not accommodations for her disability. Rather, they were temporary assistances provided for Petitioner at a time when Petitioner was unable to perform the essential duty of climbing as an inspector. Petitioner argues in her Proposed Recommended Order that an e-mail dated November 19, 2015, in which she suggested working from home “while the matter gets cleared up” was a request for accommodation for her disability. It is found, however, that Petitioner’s suggestion was a request for permission to do some work from home for a short time, before actually returning to work, because she was out of sick leave; and it was not a request for accommodation of her disability. In March 2016, Petitioner presented another doctor’s note to management. This note, dated March 10, 2016, was also from Dr. Vlasak. The note again stated that Petitioner “[c]annot climb on fertilizer trailers, killbrews [sic] or climbing ladders.” The new letter, however, stated: “The above limitations are permanent.” Respondent has a policy governing Inefficiency or Inability to Perform Job Duties in Administrative Policy and Procedure (AP&P) No. 5-3. The policy states, “Employees shall, at a minimum, be able to perform duties in a competent and adequate manner.” Id. A violation of this standard can result in termination. By letter dated April 1, 2016 (Intent to Terminate Letter), the Department informed Petitioner of its intention to dismiss her. The Intent to Terminate Letter explained, in part: On March 10, 2016 we received a letter from your physician stating that you are permanently restricted from climbing on fertilizer trailers, killibrews and ladders. While your medical condition is not being questioned, you are expected to, at the minimum, be able to perform duties in a competent and adequate manner. As an employee with the department since December 11, 2009, you are aware that you must be able to perform the essential duties of your position. Your actions constitute a violation of AP&P No. 5-3, Section V, Inefficiency or Inability to Perform Assigned Duties, (Page 3). The Intent to Terminate Letter further informed Petitioner of her right to attend a meeting to be conducted pursuant to section 110.227(5)(a), Florida Statutes, on April 26, 2016 (Predetermination Conference), where she would be allowed to answer, orally or in writing, the charges against her. On April 12, 2016, prior to the scheduled Predetermination Conference, Petitioner provided to Department management another letter regarding her work status. The letter, dated April 12, 2016, was not signed by her physician. Rather, it was signed by a licensed practical nurse (LPN). The April 12, 2016, letter states that it is a “revised work status letter.” The letter restates the previous “[c]annot climb on fertilizer trailers, killbrews [sic] or climbing ladders,” but, instead of advising that the restrictions were permanent, states that “[t]he above limitations are temporary for 12 months as of 3/10/16 at which time we will re-evaluate work status.” The April 12, 2016, letter was apparently authorized by Petitioner’s treating physician, as the LPN’s signature appears above Dr. Vlasak’s signature block, and the letter bears the same UF Health Physician’s letterhead as previous letters from Dr. Vlasak. Petitioner attended the Predetermination Conference, during which she advised that she was currently unable to climb. The April 12, 2016, letter was considered at the Predetermination Conference. The Department’s memorandum dated April 27, 2016, regarding the Predetermination Conference, authored by the Department’s assistant director of Division of Food Safety, states in part: A subsequent letter dated April 12, 2016, from a member of the physician’s staff specified that these same limitations were temporary for the next 12 months at which time they will be re-evaluated. Even though the April 12, 2016, letter was considered, the assistant director supported the recommendation to terminate Petitioner. As he explained in the April 27, 2016, memorandum: In considering the information provided, I looked at Ms. Owens current position description and considered the physical requirements of the inspector position. The position requires someone with full physical capability. Ms. Owens has been medically limited from performing certain duties for almost a year already and is expected to be limited for at least another full year or possibly permanently. Therefore, I am supporting the recommendation for termination for inability to perform assigned duties. Consistent with the Intent to Terminate Letter and the assistant director’s support for termination, by letter dated May 5, 2016, signed by the chief of the Department’s Bureau of Personnel Management, Petitioner was terminated from her position with the Department. Petitioner never requested an accommodation for a disability prior to her termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2018.
