The Issue Whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, correctly assessed and collected an assessment of penalty against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact On March 25, 2008, the Agency's investigator, Torry McClellan, conducted a compliance check at 6472 Tracy Lane, Tallahassee, Florida, to verify compliance with the workers' compensation statutes. At the worksite, Mr. McClellan observed three men carrying out carpentry work. Mr. McClellan interviewed John Harrell and Bradley Sheffield, II, and requested proof of workers' compensation coverage. John Harrell did not have proof of a current valid election to be exempt from workers' compensation. The Agency's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) lists active workers' compensation policies and exemptions throughout Florida. Utilizing CCAS, Mr. McClellan was unable to locate a current valid election to be exempt from the requirement of securing the payment of workers' compensation for John Harrell. John Harrell's previous exemption had expired in 2003. Mr. McClellan was also unable to locate proof of either John Harrell or Respondent LLC securing the payment of workers' compensation through the purchase of an insurance policy or by any other means. Mr. McClellan testified that John Harrell admitted, and Horace Bradley Sheffield, Sr., confirmed, to Mr. McClellan that John Harrell was a subcontractor of Respondent Horace Bradley Sheffield Builders LLC, on March 25, 2008. Mr. Sheffield Sr.'s statement is accepted in evidence as an admission by Respondent LLC via its corporate principal and agent. Mr. Harrell's alleged statement is not even supplemental hearsay, pursuant to Section 120.57 (1) (c), Florida Statutes. On March 25, 2008, Mr. McClellan issued and served a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent through Horace Bradley Sheffield, Jr., for failure of Respondent to meet the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code. Thereby, the LLC was ordered to cease all business operations, and a $1,000.00 penalty was assessed against the LLC, pursuant to Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes. On March 25, 2008, Mr. McClellan also issued and served on Respondent a Division of Workers' Compensation Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. Respondent complied with the Department's request and submitted the required records. Utilizing the SCOPES Manual, published by the National Council of Compensation Insurance and adopted by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021 as guidance, Mr. McClellan determined that carpentry is within the construction industry and assigned Occupation Code 5651 to Respondent's activities. Based on Respondent's business records, Mr. McClellan issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and served it on Respondent LLC through Horace Bradley Sheffield, Sr., on April 11, 2008, in the amount of $1,000.00, which is an amount greater than the calculated amount due per Respondent LLC's payroll. One thousand dollars is the statutory minimum. At some point, Respondent paid the $1,000.00, in order to get the Stop-Work Order lifted but did not withdraw the request for hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services that affirms, approves, and adopts the Stop-Work Order and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment at $1,000.00, and which permits the Agency's retention of the $1,000.00 penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas Dolan, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Horace Sheffield Horace B. Sheffield Builders, LLC 4564 Ambervalley Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether the Department may revoke and/or refuse to renew Mr. Moore's Certificate?
Findings Of Fact During 1982, 1983, 1984, part of 1985 and 1986, Mr. Moore acted as a farm labor contractor as those terms are defined in Section 450.28(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 38B-4.02, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Moore also acted as a crew leader as defined in Section 443.036(12), Florida Statutes, with a crew of approximately 16 to 20 farm workers. During 1982 through 1986 Mr. Moore failed to file quarterly unemployment compensation tax reports with the Department. When questioned by the Department about why he was not filing quarterly reports Mr. Moore would begin filing them. He would not continue filing them, however, and he paid no taxes due with the reports he filed. During 1982 through 1986 Mr. Moore failed to pay unemployment compensation taxes which totalled $6,831.27, including penalties, interest and filing fees, as of February 1, 1988. This amount will increase every month after January, 1988, that the debt is not paid because of the accrual of interest. By letter dated August 18, 1987, the Department gave Mr. Moore notice that it intended to revoke his Certificate. By letter dated December 16, 1987, the Department gave Mr. Moore notice that it intended to refuse to renew the Certificate. The Department gave Mr. Moore an opportunity to explain why he should be allowed to retain his Certificate. The Department also attempted to work with Mr. Moore to give him an opportunity to pay the delinquent taxes. At least two representatives of the Department have discussed the payment of delinquent taxes with Mr. Moore in the past. Mr. Moore would agree to make payments to the Department as a result of these discussions. For a while Mr. Moore would make payments. Within a short period of time after beginning payments, Mr. Moore would stop.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order revoking and refusing to renew Mr. Moore's Certificate. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: MOSES E. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY MONTGOMERY BUILDING, ROOM 117 2562 EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0658 ROBERT L. MOORE P. O. BOX 61 HASTINGS, FLORIDA 32045 ROD WILLIS, BUREAU CHIEF BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS P. O. BOX 1698 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302-1698 HUGO MENENDEZ, SECRETARY 206 BERKELEY BUILDING 2590 EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE, EAST TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2152 KENNETH HART GENERAL COUNSEL 131 MONTGOMERY BUILDING 2562 EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE, EAST TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent was an employee of the School Board of Sarasota County having started work there on August 6, 1986. He was a custodian and number one keyholder for the Board's 20 plus building administrative complex. At approximately 5:30 AM on June 20, 1989, Respondent arrived at the complex and started to walk toward building R-21 to unlock it. While he was on his way, he claims, Mr. Basil Mays, the regional assistant director of maintenance came up to him, grabbed him by the arm, and told him to "keep his mouth shut" about a purported alteration of a report of property loss he, Respondent had submitted. In response, Respondent told Mays not to "fuck" with him and walked away to his board-owned vehicle. At this point, Respondent noticed that neither Thomas Crown nor Calvin Albritton, other workers and friends of Mays who usually congregate in the parking lot in the morning, were present. However, they soon arrived and went up to Mays' van to talk. At this point, Respondent walked up, shoved his time card through Crown and Albritton and gave it to Mays. He advised Albritton, with whom he was to work that day, he would meet him at Sarasota High School. He then left to go purchase the ceiling tiles he was to bring to the school for Albritton to install. Respondent completed his tasks that day though his arm bothered him on and off the whole time. Before initially leaving the board grounds, he put cold water on the arm where he had been grabbed and was observed by Mr. Kaze, to whom he reluctantly told the story. Kaze recommended he see a doctor and report the incident to the police. He did not mention the incident to Albritton because they were not close, and though he did try to speak with Mr. Desormier about it at the pizza party held that day, every time he did, Mays would come up. He didn't mention the incident to anyone else at the Board offices. When he finally got to speak with Desormier the next day, he was advised to get the arm checked and if it did not get better, to see Mr. Palmer, head of risk management, about it. During the day of the incident and the next, Respondent tried to do his normal tasks, but was unable to fully do so. He did what he could but was unable to use the arm for any heavy work. He subsequently reported the incident to the police. Mr. Mays was not arrested at that time. On June 22, 1989, Donald W. Donovan, a physician's assistant, treated the Respondent for a large bruise on his right arm with numbness and pain radiating down the arm. His examination showed a 5 centimeter hematoma with nerve involvement in the 4th and 5th fingers which usually is an indication of lateral nerve involvement. Respondent claimed he had been grabbed by his supervisor whose thumb had caused the bruise. In Mr. Donovan's opinion, the injury was consistent with the Respondent's story. Admittedly, though difficult to do, this injury could have been self-inflicted. At the time he saw Otten, he appeared very apprehensive and fearful of repercussions about the incident. As a result, he suggested Respondent see a psychiatrist. He treated Respondent for about a month and prescribed physical therapy. Mr. Mays denies injuring Respondent. He admits, that he asked Otten to increase the value of the theft on his report form because he couldn't account for all missing tools and did not think Otten could account for them, either. He claims, however, that on the day in question he got to work about 5:20 AM and met Crown and Albritton there. When Respondent came up, Mays laid out the work schedule for the day and Otten walked off with one of the men. He had his regional meeting later in the day at which Respondent was present, but indicates they had no conversation. On June 21, 1989 Mays left for New York, remaining there until June 25, 1989. When he got back to work on June 26, 1989, he received a call from city detectives warning him to stay away from Otten. When he asked what this was all about, he was told that Otten had alleged he had grabbed him and was fearful that Mays would retaliate. Mays was not arrested at that time and though he subsequently was apprehended, the matter was dropped because the prosecutor determined the evidence was insufficient to warrant prosecution. Both Mr. Crown and Mr. Albritton saw Respondent on the morning of the alleged assault, after it supposedly happened, and he made no mention of it to them. Albritton claims that though he worked with Respondent all that day, Otten said nothing to him. He saw Otten the next day at Sarasota High School favoring his arm. When he asked what happened, Otten said somebody had grabbed him. This is consistent with Otten's story. Neither Crown nor Albritton are friends of the Respondent. In fact, Crown did not care to work with Otten and admits he may have said he would not be surprised if Otten broke into his own van. After Mays was contacted by the police, he reported the matter to his supervisor, Dr. Francis who asked that Mays write out a statement. Thereafter, Otten filed a notice of injury which required other paperwork and an investigation by the Deputy Superintendent for Human Resources. Dr. Francis then prepared a memo to that officer recommending that Respondent be terminated for filing a false claim of injury and a false report against a supervisor. There is no report of any additional investigation made by Dr. Francis into the incident before making that recommendation. However, before any action was taken, an investigation was conducted by Dr. Price, the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources, (not made available at the hearing), and after the Respondent's worker's compensation claim was rejected, the Board took its action to terminate him from employment. Respondent claims to never have been in trouble with his employers before this incident. When his van was broken into, he immediately prepared a report of the theft, listing, to the best of his ability, the tools stolen from him. It was this report which Mays asked him to falsify and which was the basis for the incident here. His reputation as a school board employee, at least with Mr. Desormier, formerly a regional custodian manager and now manager of the Board's Custodian Academy is that of a very good and cooperative employee. Desormier never knew Otten not to tell the truth over the approximately 3 1/2 years they worked together. Worker's Compensation benefits were denied Mr. Otten because the Judge of Compensation Claims found that his version of the facts was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that Respondent, Stephen J. Otten, be reinstated as a classified employee. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-0865 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3.-5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8.-12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. Accepted as a restatement of the testimony, but not as dispositive of the issue. 14.-17. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. 20.-22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. Accepted. 24.-25. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a proper Finding of Fact. 4.-10. Accepted. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13.-14. Not proper Findings of Fact. 15. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of and comment on the evidence. 16.-17. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18.-19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22.-24. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Maria D. Korn, Esquire Kunkle & Miller 290 Cocoanut Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236 Frederick P. Mercurio, Esquire Mercurio & Hogreve 1800 Second Street, Suite 290 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Dr. Charles W. Fowler Superintendent of Schools Sarasota County 2418 Hatton Street Sarasota, Florida 34237 Hon. Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment based on perceived handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 5, 1991, to work as a server at Respondent's restaurant, Bon Appetit. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 8, 1991, Petitioner was promoted to restaurant manager. During her tenure as restaurant manager, Petitioner was counselled about her appearance and personal hygiene. Additionally, Petitioner had problems with Respondent's performance including balancing the cash and credit card receipts collected during her shifts. Respondent required its managers to notify Respondent in advance of any absence due to a medical condition where possible. In all cases; however, managers were required to communicate with Respondent concerning their absence so that Respondent could schedule and plan for a manager's absence to avoid any disruption in its business and the scheduling of other employees. During her employment as restaurant manager, Petitioner was diagnosed as having "hammer toes". Petitioner was out of work for three weeks to have this condition surgically corrected. This absence was approved in advance by Respondent and Petitioner received full compensation for that medical leave. Following the scheduled three week absence for the surgery, there was an additional two to three week period during which Petitioner reported for work late or would leave early. Respondent considered those late arrivals and early departures to be unexcused absences. Following foot surgery, Petitioner returned to her position as manager with the same pay. Subsequently, during May 1992, Petitioner was out of work for surgery to have an ovarian cyst removed. This absence was approved by Respondent and Petitioner was out of work for five days. During this period of medical leave, Petitioner received her pay and returned to work following surgery. Following the cyst surgery, Petitioner complained of lower back pain which her gynecologist attributed to swelling from the cyst surgery. On May 30, 1992, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Morton Plant Hospital in Tampa suffering from lower back pain. Petitioner contacted restaurant manager, Leo Enciso, and told him of her visit to the hospital and "not to count on her reporting for work that day". Petitioner also informed Enciso that she would call as soon as she had been examined to give an update on her status. Subsequent to her initial phone call to Enciso on May 30, 1992, Petitioner did not speak with Enciso nor did he receive any messages from Petitioner concerning her status from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. Following her treatment in the emergency room at Morton Plant, Petitioner sought treatment on that same date, May 30, 1992 from chiropractor Dr. Lynn Colucci. At that time, Petitioner knew she would be out of work until at least one more day. Petitioner did not communicate that information to Respondent or any of its management personnel. Petitioner's next consultation with her chiropractor to evaluate her condition was June 1, 1992. Following that session, Petitioner was advised that she would be out of work for at least two more days. Petitioner did not communicate this information to Respondent or any of its management staff. Petitioner again met with her chiropractor on June 3, 1992 and was told that she would be unable to return to work until June 8, 1992. Petitioner failed to communicate this information to any of Respondent's management or staff. Kailie Borzoni, Peter Kreuziger and Sharon Verhage, all managerial employees of Respondent, made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Petitioner by phone. Verhage left a message on Petitioner's answering machine but Petitioner did not return her phone call. Petitioner was released to return to work by her treating chiropractor on June 9, 1992. There were no restrictions placed on her when she was released for work and her physician related that Petitioner's back problem had "resolved itself". Petitioner was discharged by Respondent on June 9, 1992, when she reported for work. Peter Krueziger made an independent decision to discharge Petitioner based on what he considered to be poor performance, poor appearance, excessive absences and failing to truthfully advise of her work status and whereabouts from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. When Petitioner was initially employed as a restaurant manager, Respondent's manager, Krueziger, noticed that Petitioner's dress apparel did not meet up to the standards of a "four star" restaurant that Respondent was operating. As a result, Respondent spoke with Petitioner about his expectations with regard to her dress and advised the controller to advance Petitioner some funds to purchase a wardrobe. Respondent sent one of its managerial employees to accompany Petitioner on a shopping trip to upgrade her wardrobe to reflect what Respondent considered to be appropriate dress for a restaurant manager. Respondent's managerial staff noted and complained to Petitioner on several occasions after she was given a new wardrobe, that her attire did not measure up to the standards that they expected of a manager. Negative comments were made about Respondent's stained clothing, her fingernails and her unkempt hair. Petitioner conceded that she had an exceptionally hard time balancing her cash and credit card accounts at the end of each shift. While some managers experience difficulty at the outset of their employment because an antiquated accounting system was being used, they soon became proficient in closing out the cash and credit card accounts following their shift. Respondent discharged Petitioner based on her failure to properly notify it of her absence from work during the period May 30, 1992 through June 8, 1992. Petitioner's medical condition, real or perceived, played no part in Respondent's decision to terminate her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief as she failed to establish that she was terminated from employment because of a perceived handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 3 adopted as modified, paragraph 2 recommended order. Paragraph 4 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5 recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4 recommended order. Paragraph 7, adopted as modified, paragraphs 9 and 10 recommended order. Paragraph 8 rejected, irrelevant. Paragraphs 9 and 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 15 recommended order. Paragraphs 11-16 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 17 rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraphs 18 and 19 rejected, conclusionary. COPIES FURNISHED: C. A. Sullivan, Esquire 311 S. Missouri Avenue Clearwater, FL 34616 Charles A. Powell, IV, Esquire Peter W. Zinober, Esquire Zinober and McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1750 Tampa, FL 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
Findings Of Fact Petitioner enrolled in "Plan A" of the Teachers Retirement System on August 13, 1954 as a teacher in the Orange County Florida school System. Petitioner transferred to Jacksonville, Florida and began teaching in Duval County on August 18, 1959 and continued hem membership in the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A". Petitioner requested a change from the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A" to Teachers' Retirement System "Plan E" by letter dated April 5, 1965. Petitioner was approved on March 26, 1966 for Teachers' Retirement System benefits and received disability retirement benefits for a period of time until she re-entered the teaching profession on November 27, 1970 in Duval County, Florida. She subsequently repaid an overpayment of these disability benefits which been paid for a period of time when she had returned to work in Duval County without notice to the Division of Retirement. Petitioner transferred from the Teachers Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System on October 15, 1970 when she signed a ballot entitled "Social Security Referendum and Application for Florida Retirement System Membership". Petitioner complains that she did not know when she signed the ballot that she was in fact changing her retirement from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System contending that the statements of the person conducting the meeting at which the ballots were distributed informed the group the ballots were for an election for social security coverage. The ballot, however, clearly reflects that if social security benefits are desired, a change in the retirement system is necessary. Petitioner applied for Florida Retirement System disability benefits on October 20, 1971 and was approved. This benefit is $26.07 per month greater than the benefits she would have received had she remained in the Teachers' Retirement System. On October 3, 1975, Petitioner was supplied with the various documents concerning her actions in regard to her retirement benefits and was informed that her election to transfer into the Florida Retirement System was irrevocable and there was no method by which she could be transferred back into the Teachers' Retirement System. She requested a hearing on the transfer.
Recommendation Dismiss the Petition of Petitioner Martha A. Crosson. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martha A. Crosson 801 West Myrtle Independence, Kansas 67301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT MARTHA A. CARSON, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1456 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a Police Sergeant with Metropolitan Dade County. He is 38 years old and has 13.83 years of creditable service under the Florida Retirement System. (Exhibit A) On February 16, 1973, Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in Broward County, Florida while serving with a detached drug abuse unit. On February 25, 1974, Petitioner applied for disability retirement benefits under Section 121.091(4) and Section 121.021(13), Florida Statutes, stating: "I believe I am incapacitated for further service in Florida because of injuries received in an in-line-of-duty automobile accident that occurred on 16 February 1973." (Exhibit A) After considering the evidence submitted in support of Petitioner's application, the Administrator of the Florida Retirement System determined that insufficient information was submitted to substantiate a finding of total and permanent disability as provided by Section 121.091(4), Florida Statutes. As a result, Petitioner was notified on March 20, 1975 of the Administrator's intention to deny the subject disability retirement application. (Exhibit B) Notice of Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, was also provided at that time. On April 2, 1975, Petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to Petition for an administrative determination of his disability application pursuant to Section 120.47(1), Florida Statutes. (Exhibit C) Whereupon, the Director of the Respondent requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a hearing officer to conduct a hearing which was ultimately held at 1350 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida on the 12th day of September, 1975. (Exhibit D) The first witness to appear at this hearing on Petitioner's behalf was Detective Pete Kreimes who is employed by Metropolitan Dade County. The witness testified that he was trained by the Petitioner for the narcotics section and the two later became personal friends. He has known Petitioner for about five (5) years. Mr. Kreimes testified that Petitioner was an outstanding investigator while employed by Metropolitan Dade County. While performing these duties, Petitioner participated in the physically demanding activities of a law enforcement officer. He related the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's accident of February 16, 1973, and the long range affects he felt the accident had on Petitioner's physical condition. This included Petitioner's apparent discomfort in walking, standing or sitting for extended periods of time. The witness also stated that Petitioner developed a serious drinking problem after the accident due to what he believed was the frustration of not being able to continue in police work and because of the financial problems being encountered. Mr. Kreimes felt there were no jobs available in the area of law enforcement wherein the Petitioner could render useful and efficient service on a full-time basis. The next witness to appear was one Dr. Gilbert. Dr. Gilbert is a Medical Doctor with specialties in Psychiatry and Neurology. He also holds a Ph.D.. degree in the field of Psychology. Dr. Gilbert detailed the neurological impairments to the cervical and lumbar areas of Petitioner's spine. The witness related that the Petitioner suffered from a post concussion syndrome following a brain concussion. The doctor also diagnosed a traumatic neurosis resulting from the pain and trauma of the accident and manifesting itself in tension and anxiety. The witness acknowledged Petitioner's allergies to various medications which might otherwise be used to alleviate muscle spasm, tension and some of the pain brought on by neurological probless. Dr. Gilbert felt that the combination of Petitioner's inability to alleviate pain in this manner and his various emotional problems led to the excessive use of alcohol. However, the witness did not feel that Petitioner's excessive use of alcohol was advisable; although, he did feel, considering Petitioner's allergies, that the only hope of Petitioner's dealing with his pain was by mental conditioning. Dr. Gilbert felt that the Petitioner had not reached maximum medical improvement, because he had not yet completed his diagnosis and work up on Petitioner's disability due to possible brain damage. However, he did feel that, due to the combination of Petitioner's post concussion syndrome, neurological and emotional problems, he was unemployable at this time, without regard to Petitioner's excessive drinking. Mr. Harold Dunsky also testified as an employment expert on behalf of the Petitioner. Mr. Dunsky holds B.A., M.A., and J.D. degrees and has worked in the area of job placement and vocational counseling for the State of Illinois and the U.S. Government for over twenty years. Mr. Dunsky testified that after interviewing the Petitioner and considering various unidentified medical reports, he felt the Petitioner was unemployable on a full-time basis. The final witness to testify was the Petitioner, Robert Barr. The Petitioner related his educational and employment experience which consisted of an in precriminology and approximately fourteen (14) years as a police officer with Metropolitan Dade County. Mr. Barr explained that the first indication of his allergy problems was in 1961 when his upper back, shoulders and arm began to ache while playing ball. As a result of his allergic reaction to the medication taken at this time, he suffered his first cardiac arrest. In 1966 the Petitioner suffered another cardiac arrest as a result of a penicillin shot administered during a bout with the flu. Another allergic reaction took place in a dentist's office in 1970 as a result of an injection of sodium penathol. The medical witnesses had been advised by Barr of his past allergic reactions. Petitioner next detailed the circumstances surrounding his accident in February of 1973. He also related his current physical limitations, his financial problems, his desire to return to the field of law enforcement and his frequent use of alcohol to alleviate his pains and problems. At this point the Deposition of Dr. William Scott Russell, Jr., Dadeland Medical Building, Suite 303, Miami, Florida, was made a part of the record. Dr. Russell is a neurologist who began treating the Petitioner on September 10, 1973. Dr. Russell testified that the Petitioner complained of shoulder and arm pain due to thoracic outlet syndrome. The witness stated that this could be caused by a so-called jerk-injury or as a secondary phenomena in association with muscle spasm produced by an underlying disc injury. Dr. Russell also explained an impairment to the lower lumbar region of Petitioner's spine. This was diagnosed as nerve roots irritation of the, S1 nerve root. (Dep. Russell, 20) The witness stated that the Petitioner had a history of low-back problems relating to an automobile accident which occurred several years prior to his accident in February of 1973. (Dep. Russell, p. 14) Dr. Russell stated that the Petitioner represented that the pain from his prior accident ceased over a period of eight (8) months. (Dep. Russell, p. 14 and 44) Dr. Russell stated that based upon Barr's statements to him Barr had apparently fully recovered from that accident. The witness also stated that the Petitioner had a congenital defect in the lower lumbar area of his spine. Dr. Russell however concluded that this congenital defect had not effected Barr prior to the February 1973 accident because Barr had not had any pain prior to that accident, and lack of pain would have been evidence of an absence of disease or problems with regard to the congenital defect. (Dep. Russell, p. 29) The witness testified further as follows: "Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion, based on the reasonable degree of medical probability, as to whether or not the laminectomy defect was, is related at all to the accident here? First of all, I don't think it is a laminectomy defect. I think a laminectomy implies a surgical defect. I think it is probably a bony, let's say a failure, of the bone to fuse over a specific area. Q. Does that contribute, Doctor, in your diagnosis of the disc, does that contribute to the pain and discomfort in the area that you found? A. By itself it should not but it can contribute to an unstable back which may, in turn, make it easier for that particular individual to have to sustain disc injury." (emphasis supplied) Dr. Russell also testified that the Petitioner had multiple and severe drug allergies. Dr. Russell testified that the Petitioner began consuming excessive amounts of alcohol as a substitute for various muscle relaxants. As a result of Petitioner's resort to alcohol he began experiencing episodes of alcoholic gastritis or peptic ulcer disease. (Dep. Russell, p. 38) When asked to express in layman's terms the extent of the Petitioner's physical limitations, Dr. Russell testified: "A. I don't -- I wouldn't consider him, at present, employable under any circumstances or under any quasi- responsible type position, either from the point of view of having to do any sort of physical activity or, I hate to say this, but from the point view of his reliability at this particular moment. Q. What do you mean by that, 'reliability'? A. I'm not certain that alcohol and reliability go hand in hand." (emphasis supplied)
The Issue Whether at the time of his father's death, Armando Martinez, Jr., was a "dependent beneficiary" of his father, a vested member of the Florida Retirement System, so as to be entitled to his father's retirement benefits?
Findings Of Fact Armando Martinez, Jr., was born on February 22, 1974, to Natalie M. Martinez and the late Armando Martinez, Sr. In 1992, when Armando, Jr., was eighteen years old, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were divorced. The following year, 1993, less than two weeks after Armando, Jr.'s, nineteenth birthday, Armando Martinez, Sr., died. The cause of death was liver cancer, a disease from which Ms. Martinez presently suffers. At the time of his death on March 7, 1993, Mr. Martinez was a vested member of the Florida Retirement System. A municipal employee, he had been a bus operator. At some point close to commencement of his employment, slightly more than ten years prior to his death, Armando Martinez, Sr., had executed a Form M-10. The form named his wife, Natalie, as his primary beneficiary. Armando, Jr., the only child of Armando, Sr., and Natalie Martinez, was named as the sole contingency beneficiary. Following Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s death, Ms. Martinez disclaimed Florida Retirement System benefits. She did so in order for Armando, Jr., as the contingent beneficiary, to be able to receive the benefits. On February 17, 1997, the Division of Retirement denied Armando, Jr., survivor benefits. Had Mr. Martinez, Sr., died one-year and several weeks earlier, that is, prior to Armando, Jr.'s eighteenth birthday, the Division would have approved distribution of survivor benefits to him. But, although he was still a high school student, since he was older than nineteen by a few days at the time of his father's death, the Division required proof that Armando, Jr., had received half of his support from his father at the time of his father's death. No such proof was provided to the Division prior to or at the time of its preliminary denial. In fact, in his 1992 tax return, Mr. Martinez did not claim his son Armando, Jr., as a dependent. In this formal administrative proceeding, however, Armando Martinez, Jr., provided such proof, proof which was lacking until hearing. The year 1992 was very difficult for Armando Martinez, Jr., and his family. His parents separated, Armando, Jr., lived with his mother. Armando, Sr., lived elsewhere. Prior to his death, divorce proceedings were finalized. In the meantime, Ms. Martinez had lost her job. She remained unemployed for the entire year and in early 1993 as well. Armando, Jr., was still in high school at the time of his father's death. During the 1992-93 school year, to support himself and his mother, he obtained work part-time while he remained in school. Ms. Martinez paid the rent for their apartment at a rate of between $370 and $500 per month. The monthly phone bill of Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr., was approximately $50; utility payments $70; groceries $300; gasoline $10, automobile insurance $100; and school supplies $40. There were other expenses, clothes, for example, that occurred from time-to-time. In addition to minimal government support to Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr.'s, part-time employment income, Armando, Jr., was supported by cash payments provided by his father. Two or three times a month, Armando's father and a girl friend, Karen Jones, would drive to the front of the house. Because of his illness, Mr. Martinez remained in the car while Ms. Jones brought cash, usually between two and five hundred dollars in an envelope to the front door. On more than one of these occasions, Ms. Jones, the envelope, and the cash were observed by friends of the family at the moment of delivery. Ms. Martinez log of the estimates of these payments totals approximately $8,500, an amount in excess of Mr. Martinez's income reported in his 1992 tax return filed before his death in 1993 to be $6,389.00. But, Mr. Martinez, Sr. had access to other means of support and other monies including proceeds from insurance policies. The $8,500 provided to Armando, Jr., by Armando Martinez, Sr. constituted more than half of Armando, Jr.'s, support for the year 1992 and up until Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death in early 1993.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the Division of Retirement recognize Armando Martinez, Jr., to have been the dependent beneficiary of Armando Martinez, Sr., at the time of Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death, and therefore entitled to retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Natalie Martinez Suite 3811 3801 Northgreen Avenue Tampa, Florida 33624 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Santos Samarrippas, Sr., a farm labor contractor and holder of a certificate of registration issued by Petitioner at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Respondent's current certificate of registration was issued April 26, 1988. Respondent has renewed his certificate of registration on an annual basis since 1984. As of January 9, 1989, Respondent was indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $5,195.27. This sum represents unpaid unemployment compensation taxes, along with interest and penalties for nonpayment from 1984 to through 1988. In April of 1985, Respondent was informed of his liability for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes in 1984. He completed, after consultation with Petitioner's representative, requisite forms for tax reporting purposes, but neglected to pay the delinquent taxes. Respondent continued his failure to completely pay the required taxes in 1986 and 1987. He made only "pittance" payments. In 1988, Respondent and Petitioner's representative agreed upon a payment plan whereby Respondent agreed to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties and interest at a rate of $100 per week until the total amount owed by him was paid. Respondent made those payments from February 21, 1988 until April 5, 1988. He then ceased to make further payments. The proof establishes that Respondent, after subtraction of the minor payments he made, owed Petitioner a total sum for delinquent taxes, interest, and filing fees for each of the following years in the amounts shown: AMOUNT YEAR $2039 1984 $ 504 1985 $1468.09 1986 $1183.56 1988 Respondent made two timely quarterly tax reports to Petitioner out of a total of 14 required in the period 1984-88, but never made timely payments of the amounts of unemployment compensation taxes owed to Petitioner Also, Respondent never made full payments of the amount of taxes owed. As a result of Respondent's nonpayment of unemployment compensation taxes, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter dated November 17, 1988, of intent to revoke Respondent's Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration for his failure to comply with applicable rules of the United States or the State of Florida relating to unemployment compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Joel Chawk, Esquire Post Office Drawer 8209 Lakeland, Florida 33802-8209 Santos Samarrippas, Sr. 3501 Avenue K Northwest Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Moses E. Williams, Esquire Suite 117 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658 Hugo Menendez, Secretary 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, Esquire 131 Montgomery Building 2563 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner properly secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits for employees by securing proper workers' compensation insurance coverage, as delineated by Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2004) and, if not, what if any penalty for such failure is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this proceeding is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction industry. Its business domicile is Destin, Florida, and the job site at issue was in the town of Cinco Bayou, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, specifically Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2004), requiring employers to secure the payment of compensation benefits for employees in the event they have an on- the-job injury. In this proceeding the Respondent has charged that the Petitioner failed to abide by the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, regarding two subcontractors, Scott Williams, d/b/a Vinyl Masters, LLC, (Williams) domiciled in Alburn, Alabama, and J & L Concrete a/k/a Moses Construction, Inc., (J & L) of Liliburn, Georgia. There is no dispute that the Petitioner did not have its own workers' compensation insurance policy as of February 10, 2005. The most recent policy ended July 2, 2003. The Petitioner thus did not itself secure payment of workers' compensation on behalf of Williams or J & L during the period of proposed penalty assessment, September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. The Petitioner was the general contractor engaged to perform construction operations at 1028 Anniston Court, Cinco Bayou, Florida (job site), on February 10, 2005, the date of the investigator's inspection visit and investigation. The Petitioner was sub-contracting certain vinyl siding work at that job site to Williams, a subcontractor. The Respondent's investigator, Ralph Taylor, conducted his investigation at the job site and observed four workers installing vinyl siding. Upon investigation he determined that the four workers were employed by Williams in this effort and identified the workers as Juan Oriz, Noe Mendieta, Jose Palma, and Jose Aboyte. Mr. Taylor's investigation revealed that Williams did not have a current workers' compensation exemption applicable to Florida law nor did he have a Florida workers' compensation insurance policy. He determined this by examination of the Respondent's data base, the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). Williams informed Mr. Taylor, however, that he had obtained a policy of workers' compensation insurance through the Cruchfield Insurance Agency of Birmingham, Alabama. A facsimile of the declaration page from a workers' compensation insurance policy issued by Alabama Home Builders Self Insurance Fund to Vinyl Masters, LLC (Williams) was transmitted to Mr. Taylor by a representative of the Cruchfield Insurance Agency of Birmingham. Florida law requires that an employer who has employees engaged in work in Florida must obtain a Florida policy or endorsement for such employees which employs Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals that are in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440 as well as the Florida Insurance Code. See § 440.10(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2004). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.019(2) requires that in order for an employer to comply with Sections 440.10(1)(g) and 440(38)(7), Florida Statutes, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove the fact of workers' compensation coverage for employees engaged in Florida work must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. The insurance policy held by Williams did not satisfy the standard. First, the Alabama Home Builders self-insurance fund is not authorized to write insurance in Florida. Secondly, the premium was based on a rate that was less than the Florida premium rate. The policy declaration page shows that Alabama Home Builders insured Vinyl Master effective January 1, 2005, for carpentry operations under class code 5645 at a premium of $20.58 per $100 of payroll. The premium rate using Florida rates for that same class code should have been $38.40 for $100 of payroll. Thus Vinyl Masters/Williams was not in compliance with the coverage law requirements at that job site at the time of the investigation on February 10, 2005. Employers employing on job sites in Florida are required to keep business records that enable the Respondent to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. § 440.107(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). Investigator Taylor issued a request for production of business records to Williams on February 10, 2005. That same date the Respondent issued a request for production of business records to the Petitioner. Each request asked the employer to produce, for the preceding three years, documents that reflected payroll, payments to each subcontractor, and proof of insurance. Williams produced no records. The Petitioner produced no records related to employment of Williams or Vinyl Masters. When an employer fails to provide requested business records which the statutes requires it to maintain and to make available to the Respondent Agency, the Respondent is authorized to impute that employer's payroll using "the statewide average weekly wage as defined in Section 440.12(2), multiplied by l.5." § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. (2004). The statewide average weekly wage for the four quarters beginning June 30, 2004, was $651.38. The Respondent thus could have imputed payroll for the entire three-year period for which it requested business records which were not produced. The Respondent imputed payroll however, for a lesser period, January 11, through February 10, 2005. This corresponds to the one-month period that the four Williams workers had told Investigator Taylor that they had worked "in the area." The amount that the Petitioner would have paid in premium under Section 440.107(7)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), based on payroll imputed from the statewide average weekly wage of $651.38 for work under class code 5651, during the period January 11, through February 10, 2005, multiplied by the statutory multiplier factor of 1.5, yields a penalty amount of $5,629.52. In any event, Williams did not properly secure the payment of compensation for Williams or the four workers in question, named above. Under Section 440.10(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (2004), the Petitioner could became the "statutory employer" of Williams and its workers if Williams, the subcontractor, had not secured the payment of workers' compensation. The credible evidence at hearing reveals, however, that Williams has already entered into a payment agreement with the Respondent to pay the subject penalty, referenced above, concerning Williams' failure to have "Florida-complaint" workers' compensation coverage properly secured for Florida workers and Florida operations. Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Grubbs, the manager for the Petitioner (which is accepted), reveals that the four workers in question only worked three days at most. Moreover, their hourly wage rate was only $15.00 per hour. Therefore, although the Petitioner supplied no business records in advance to the investigator regarding the subcontractor, Williams, which might allow the Respondent to impute payroll based on average weekly wage for calculation for a penalty under the applicable statutory authority; in this de novo proceeding context, the Petitioner did supply sworn testimony and records showing the actual wage rate and time worked for these employees, thus obviating use of the average weekly wage and imputed payroll for penalty calculation. Additionally, the Petitioner showed, through the testimony of Mr. Grubbs, that indeed the Petitioner had a certificate of insurance showing, to the best of Petitioner's knowledge at the time, that Williams had secured the payment of workers' compensation through the Alabama insurance carrier, named above, in accordance with accepted industry practice. Thus the Petitioner was under a good faith, reasonable belief that this subcontractor, Williams, had secured proper payment of workers' compensation coverage at the time the Petitioner engaged Williams as a subcontractor on the job-site in question. In summary, in view of these facts the assessment of penalty to the Petitioner is incorrect. The Investigator, Mr. Taylor's, testimony itself shows that had he known that the workers only worked for three days, the penalty should only be based upon that amount of work or hours applied to the penalty calculation formula. Because Williams has undertaken and agreed to pay the penalty in question for not properly securing workers' compensation coverage, no penalty is justifiably assessed against the Petitioner. If that were done the Respondent, in effect, would be treating both Williams and the Petitioner as employers of the same employees simultaneously, for the same job and occurrence. No evidence justifying this, given the relevant statutory scheme and case law, has been adduced. Subcontractor J & L Concrete In response to the Respondent's request for business records from the Petitioner concerning subcontractor J & L Concrete, the Petitioner produced ledgers showing payments to J & L. The Petitioner contracted with J & L during the period September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. During that period it paid J & L $155,413.98 for labor under class code 5403. During this period of time J & L had a workers' compensation policy covering its employees issued by Auto Owners Insurance Company of Lansing, Michigan (Auto Owners). The testimony of Maureen Haxton, a senior underwriter in the workers' compensation underwriting department of Auto Owners, confirmed that a policy endorsement was issued which took effect on July 13, 2004. That endorsement listed the State of Georgia in item 3A but did not list the State of Florida in item 3A. Auto Owners later issued a policy endorsement on May 10, 2005, that added Florida to item 3A, effective on March 18, 2005. The later endorsement issued by Auto Owners was not effective on February 10, 2005, when the SWO was issued to the Petitioner. The penalty sought to be assessed against the Petitioner for work attributable to J & L, based upon Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2004), is based on remuneration paid by the Petitioner to J & L for work under class code 5403 for period September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. Keith Cowart is an authorized insurance agent for Auto Owners Insurance Company. His agency is located in Lawrenceville, Georgia. He originally issued a workers' compensation policy to J & L in July of 2002 and a current policy is in effect for J & L to and including July 2006 and was in effect during the penalty assessment period. Mr. Cowart testified that had an employee in Florida suffered an injury on or before February 10, 2005, that the employee would have received workers' compensation benefits from Auto Owners and that employees injured in Florida would have received the level of benefits required by Florida law. Cowart indicated in his testimony that there are annual audits of J & L, under their contractual arrangement, by Auto Owners, to determine how much of its payroll is attributable to work conducted in Florida for workers' compensation insurance premium purposes. The J & L payroll is audited annually and J & L is billed a premium rate based upon Florida work and payroll and premium rates for workers' compensation insurance attributable to work done by its employees in the State of Florida. J & L is thus charged a higher premium for employees working in Florida and is obligated to pay that Florida premium rate. J & L previously paid $40,000.00 in payroll for Florida workers on Florida jobs and was billed Florida premium rates for workers' compensation coverage based upon that payroll after an annual audit. It was projected for the year 2005-2006 J & L would owe premiums for at least $70,000.00 of workers' compensation payroll in Florida and had paid premiums due for workers' compensation coverage in the past for Florida job workers based upon Florida premium rates, according to Mr. Cowart. In summary, the evidence, including Mr. Cowart's sworn testimony, establishes that J & L had a workers' compensation policy coverage in effect during the period of alleged non- compliance. Mr. Cowart opined that injured Florida employees during that period of time would have received the benefits authorized by Florida law. He established that J & L was charged Florida premium rates, and pursuant to the audit being conducted in July 2005, would be charged Florida premium rates for workers, jobs performed, and payroll attributable to Florida during the period of time in question in this case. Although the endorsement issued by Auto Owners showing Florida as a listed state in "item 3A," for purposes of the rule cited below, did not take effect until after March 18, 2005, the persuasive evidence, in the form of Mr. Cowart's testimony, shows that J & L had secured workers' compensation coverage which paid Florida- mandated benefits at Florida premium rates for workers at Florida jobs at times pertinent to the SWO. Moreover, the Petitioner required the sub-contractor J & L to provide evidence of workers' compensation coverage and relied on that evidence reasonably and in good faith. It changed its position to its detriment by continuing to work on the job without securing its own appropriate coverage.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Respondent Agency rescinding Stop Work Order number 05-0721-1A issued to the Petitioner on February 10, 2005, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued to the Petitioner on March 30, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael William Mead, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549 David C. Hawkins, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues here, the Petitioner, Carol C. Bledsoe, was a part-time employee of the University of Central Florida (U.C.F.) U.C.F. is an agency of the State of Florida, whose employees are eligible for participation in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Plan (Plan), administered by Respondent, D.O.A. On December 1, 1980, Petitioner applied for full family coverage under the Plan, with coverage to be effective January 1, 1981. The application form executed by Petitioner was submitted to the Benefits Coordinator at the personnel office at U.C.F. At the time of submission, that portion of the form reserved for "payroll clerk use only" was left blank. The Benefits Coordinator, after checking the form to insure all required information was supplied by the applicant, Petitioner, forwarded it to the payroll department at U.C.F. It was at that office that the payroll clerk inserted an erroneous deduction code on December 2, 1980. The incorrect deduction code inserted was "0.2." the proper deduction code which should have been inserted to reflect Petitioner's status was "42." Though the current Benefits Coordinator indicates an applicant who is a part-time employee, such as Petitioner here, is given, at the time application for coverage is made, a form to show what the correct deduction for the requested coverage will be, this calculation is made by the Benefits Coordinator for the employee based on a formula which calls for a different rate for part- time employees. A part-time employee's contribution to the premium (the amount deducted) is higher than that of a full-time employee. The current coordinator, Ms. Evans, cannot state that Petitioner got the described form when she applied, and Petitioner denies having received it. There is no evidence to show Petitioner received any indication of what the deduction should or would be until the deductions from her pay began on January 9, 1981, with the deduction for the pay period December 19, 1980 - January 1, 1981. At that time, the deduction made was $14.37. The corrected deduction should have been $19.52 per pay period. Here, the deduction from Petitioner's pay was calculated on the erroneous basis that she was a full-time employee, thereby resulting in a smaller deduction that was correct. This insufficient deduction continued until the discrepancy was discovered due to an audit in March, 1983. The parties stipulate that the total shortage in issue is $345.78. During the approximately 2 1/4 years that the improper deduction was being withheld from Petitioner's pay each pay period, Petitioner was fully covered under the full family coverage plan. During this period, she filed only one claim -- a small one for an injury to her son -- and was paid the amount claimed. During this same period, she underwent several inquiries into her pay, instigated by her, to correct other inaccuracies in her pay. At no time prior to the March, 1983 audit was the incorrect health insurance deduction discovered, and Petitioner had no indication that amount being deducted for that purpose was incorrect. From an examination of her biweekly employee's earning statement, there was no way she could have known her pay was in error in this particular. Several factors contributed to the error. One of these was that personnel in the payroll department of U.C.F. were doing things wrong. Another was that Petitioner was not a typical employee, and her situation required specialized handling by personnel and payroll which was not given. None of these factors, however, was within the control of the Petitioner. Changes made in the procedures followed within the agency as a result of a reorganization in January, 1982 -- made as the result of the recognition of numerous payroll problems over several months involving numerous other employees on the insurance plan -- should prevent recurrence of Petitioner's situation. However, Petitioner was in no way responsible for the creating of her situation and acted in good faith throughout the entire period. When she was notified of the error, she immediately took the appropriate steps to correct it and now pays the appropriate premium for the desired coverage. When an error is discovered, as happened here, the employee is notified that he or she has overpaid and the employee is reimbursed. On the other hand, if the employee has underpaid, as here, the employee is notified of the liability and advised of various settlement systems. If the employee desires to pay other than in one lump sum, periodic payments can be arranged in an amount not less than 3% of the employee's salary for not more than 24 months. The insurance office, under Respondent D.O.A., contends it has no authority to waive the reimbursement of the shortage and states that if Petitioner does not make up the shortage, here coverage will be terminated. If that happens, she will not be eligible to reenroll until the shortage is reimbursed. Under the insurance plan in question here, the State is a self-insurer. Petitioner's contribution and that of her agency goes into a trust fund administered by Respondent and is used to pay benefits through Blue Cross, which processes the claims. Since in this case, Petitioner paid less than she should have as a part-time employee, the U.C.F. paid more than its appropriate contribution for her coverage.
Recommendation That Petitioner, Carol C. Bledsoe, pay the underpayment of $345.78.
