The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Department should impose administrative penalties in the form of fines, costs and points assessment because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint and Order entered herein.
Findings Of Fact At All times pertinent to the issued herein, the Petitioner, SWFWMD, was the governmental agency responsible for the licensing of well contractors and the permitting of well drilling and abandonment within its jurisdictional area. Respondent, Edward Tanner, was a licensed water well contractor, holding license Number 2276 issued on July 21, 1982. On January 16, 1996, SWFWMD issued Well Construction permit 575267.01 to Respondent for the abandonment of a four-inch diameter water well on property owned by Mr. McCrimmon located at Five Tera Lane in Winter Haven. The well, a domestic water well, had failed and Respondent applied for a permit to construct a new well at the site and abandon the failed well. Stipulation Number Four of the permit issued to the Respondent provided that the well must be examined for debris or obstructions from the land surface to the original depth of construction, and further required that any debris or obstruction discovered be removed from the well prior to the commencement of abandonment. In addition, the stipulation called for the well to be plugged from bottom to top by an approved method of grouting. According to the permit, if any other method of abandonment was to be used, it must be approved in advance by specifically denoted District personnel. Though Respondent did not utilize the approved method of abandonment in this project, he did not apply for a variance from the District. Had he done so, he would have been required to show some emergency or hardship which would have prevented him from properly filling the abandoned well with cement from top to bottom and justified an alternative method of abandonment. In this case, Respondent plugged the well in issue, which was 210 feet in depth, from the land surface down to fifty five feet, utilizing six bags of portland cement. Deviation from the 210 foot plug required a variance to be granted by the District. Respondent did not seek this variance. Well abandonment is a regulated practice because, inter alia, improper abandonment may result in contamination of the aquifer. The well in question here is located in an area susceptible to contamination by ethylene dibromide, (EDB), recognized as a human carcinogen, which is known to be present in the area. In addition to failing to properly abandon the well, Respondent also failed to file a well completion report within thirty days of completion of his abandonment effort. The required report was submitted on June 10, 1996, nearly four months after it was due. Respondent relates that in January 1996, after he had worked on a well “commonly known” to be the subject of litigation, he was asked to try to fix the well in issue. When he saw the problem, he contends he repeatedly advised the authorities that the well was leaking sand and could not be cleaned out to the bottom as the District required. Therefore, to preserve the integrity of the well, he plugged it at a point below the break in the well lining. At that time, he told Mr. McCrimmon what the situation was and advised him the well needed to be abandoned, but he, Tanner, did not do that type of work. Respondent contends, supported by his son, that on January 16, 1996, while he was at Mr. McCrimmon’s property, he was told by Mr. Wheelus and Mr. Lee, both District officials, that Mr. Calandra, also a District official had said he, Tanner, had to pull a well abandonment permit or Calandra would not sign off on the new well. At that point, Respondent claims, he went to the District’s Bartow office to argue with Mr. Calandra, and asked Mr. Calandra to show him the law which supported Calandra’s position. Calandra persisted in his position and even, according to Respondent, bet with another District employees that Respondent had to do what he was told. This other employee does not recall any such bet. Therefore, under protest and only so he could get paid for the work he had done on the new well, Respondent agreed to pull the abandonment permit. At that time, he claims, he asked the District personnel in charge how many bags of concrete would be required to abandon the well and was told, “six”. When the time came to do the actual work, Respondent called for the required observer to be present from the District office, but because no one was available at the time, he was granted permission to do it without observation. He did the job as he felt it had to be done, and thirty days to the day after that, was served with the notice of violation. Respondent contends either that the witnesses for the District are lying in their denials of the coercive statements he alleges, or the situation is a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. He does not believe a well contractor should be required to stay current regarding all the District rules regarding well construction and abandonment because the rules change so often. Respondent admits, however, that the rules in existence at the time in question required the filling of a well all the way down and that he did not do that nor did he seek a variance., He knew he was required to comply with the conditions of a permit. He also admits that a completion report was due within thirty days of work completion. In that regard, however, he contends that when the issue went into litigation, he felt the district would advise him of what he had to do. In this he was mistaken, but he was not misled into believing so by anything done or said by District personnel. Taken together, the evidence does not demonstrate that anyone from the District staff coerced Respondent into abandoning the well. He was issued a permit to drill the new well for Mr. McCrimmon with no conditions thereon. By the same token, the abandonment permit he obtained did require the complete clearing and total plugging of the abandoned well, and this was not done. The costs incurred by the District in the investigation and enforcement of this alleged violation totaled in excess of $500.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order finding Respondent, Edward Tanner, guilty of improperly abandoning the well in issue and failing to file the required report in a timely manner, and assessing enforcement costs in the amount of $500.00 in addition to an administrative fine of $250.00. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret M. Lytle, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Edward Tanner 1137 Saint Anne Shrine Road Lake Wales, Florida 33853 Peter G. Hubbell Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899
The Issue Whether a consumptive-use permit for quantities of water as applied for should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 7500043 requested water from one (1) well. The center of withdrawal will be located at Latitude 27 degrees 40' 38" North, Longitude 82 degrees 29' 31" West in Hillsborough County. Said withdrawal is for disposal off-site. This application is for an existing use. Notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation, to-wit: The Tampa Tribune on May 14 and May 21, 1975 pursuant to Section 373.146, Florida Statutes. Notices of said public hearing were duly sent by certified mail as required by law. The application, map of the premises, legal description, receipts of certified mail, copy of the Notice, and affidavit of publication were received without objection and entered into evidence as Exhibit 1. No letters of objection were received. The witness for Permittee was duly sworn and agreement was reached on each point enumerated as required by Rule 16J-2.11, Rules of the Southwest Florida Water Management District and Chapter 373, Florida Statutes with the exception as enumerated in No. 7. Upon request of the Hearing Officer a Joint Stipulation was filed in which it was agreed that the following conditions to the permit should be attached: "1. That applicant, Carol A. Ranallo, construct two observation wells on the south side of the pit mutually agreeable locations by inserting six (6) inch casings and screens to the depth of at least fifty (50) feet. The casings to be grouted in the bore hole from the bottom of the casing to the top of the ground level. The sites of the observation wells shall be selected by James Hudson of Delta Engineering Company and G. P. Szell within 15 days after issuance of the Consumptive Use Permit. 2. That the applicant or its agents or employees submit monthly readings to the staff of the Southwest Florida Water Management District of the chloride content of the water being withdrawn from the two wells and the level of the water table as read and determined under static conditions."
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Frank A. Caluwe, Jr., was employed on a noncontractual basis by Respondent, South Florida Water Management District, during the period from April 8, 1974 through August 4, 1982. From August, 1981 until his termination, Caluwe held the position of water management engineer III. At all times relevant hereto, Richard A. Rogers, director of the Resource Control Department, was overall supervisor or department head. Charles Alan Hall served as his direct, day-to-day supervisor. Petitioner transferred into the Resource Control Department in 1977. He was eventually promoted to a supervising professional engineer I class in 1979 by Rogers and Hall. Caluwe's job evaluations received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 17 reflected outstanding and excellent ratings and included such glowing descriptions of his work performance as "excellent" and "well organized", and as having "a very good handle on all phases of the work". He received an excellent rating from Rogers and Hall as late as November, 1981. Rogers first began experiencing what he described as "difficulties" with Caluwe around 1980 when Caluwe went to lunch with several of his subordinates and did not return to work the rest of the afternoon. He did not take leave for his absence. Although Rogers claimed the employees were on a "drinking spree," this was not confirmed. Caluwe did not receive any disciplinary action for this "incident", although several months later Hall expressed displeasure with his absence. There was no evidence that any of the other employees in the group received any type of oral or written disciplinary action for their absences. Several other "problems" occurred during his employment tenure including unsuccessful attempts in 1980 to utilize law books at the agency's law library for personal use, admonishments for having too many incoming personal calls on his telephone during office hours and discussing nonworking matters with other employees, "negative" comments to two subordinates during a 1981 intra-agency election, and an alleged failure to return a long-distance telephone call to someone seeking information. However, no formal disciplinary action was taken against Petitioner for any of these actions, and his personnel file reflects no written comments. He also sued the agency twice, once in 1977 over an insurance claim, and a second time in 1980 concerning a cash award he claimed was due for making a suggestion. However, this action did not result in any written or oral warnings from his superiors. In May, 1981, Hall, Rogers and Caluwe met to discuss a transfer from a supervisory position (supervisor of water permit section) to a water management engineer III, which was a staff position. Although Caluwe admitted he was "burned out" in his supervisory role, he protested being demoted to a staff position and requested he be given an engineer IV slot. Notwithstanding his request he was demoted to the lower position. On March 17, 1982, an annual agency meeting was held at which time the agency executive director spoke to all employees. Prior to that time an undated memorandum was posted on the agency's bulletin board "urging" all employees to attend. Another memorandum dated March 1, 1982, which rescheduled the meeting to another date, simply advised members of Caluwe's department when the talk was to be held, but made no mention regarding attendance. Caluwe did not attend the meeting because he did not consider it to be mandatory. He based this conclusion upon the fact that the memorandum urged vis a vis required attendance, and because other employees had missed the meeting in prior years. He conceded, however, that it was "implied" from the memorandum that he attend the meeting. Respondent construed the memorandum to mean that attendance was compulsory, and that "everybody (was) expected to attend." Whether this specific meaning was ever conveyed to all employees, including Caluwe, before the meeting was not disclosed. During the annual agency meeting Caluwe remained working in his office. While there, an unidentified member of the public approached a temporary receptionist seeking information concerning a problem. The receptionist in turn went to Caluwe seeking his aid in responding to the inquiry. Caluwe responded, "I don't know. That's not my job. Pat Gleason's group handles that." Out of "curiosity", the receptionist reported his comments to a department head, who in turn told Rogers. Neither the receptionist nor the member of the public were identified, and neither appeared and testified at the final hearing. Whether or not the receptionist suffered "abuse" as a result of this as the agency claims was not confirmed. Rogers, Hall and Caluwe met on March 18 concerning his absence from the annual meeting and the "incident" with the receptionist. On March 22 Caluwe was given a written warning and assigned 25 disciplinary points for being guilty of a Category 2e offense under the agency's Corrective Action-Procedure Index and Corrective Action-Policy. The Index and Policy "defines appropriate corrective actions for resolving performance problems and violations of rules of conduct" by agency employees. In short, it represents the agency's written code of conduct for employees. A 2e offense is defined therein as a "(f)ailure to follow authorized instructions." In conjunction with the written warning, Caluwe was also given a memorandum prepared by Rogers on March 19 which explained in greater detail the conduct that precipitated the disciplinary action. In the memorandum Rogers referred to a number of things which prompted the disciplinary action, including the "incident" with the receptionist, the missed meeting, and Caluwe's apparent use of the telephone for personal use during the meeting as reported by the temporary receptionist. However, since the 25 points were given to Caluwe for failing to follow authorized instructions, it is found that disciplinary action was taken because he failed to attend the annual meeting. On March 29, 1982, Caluwe wrote a fourteen-page letter to Rogers giving his version of what occurred on March 17, and explaining in great detail other "incidents" that had occurred during the preceding eighteen months, Attached to the letter were 23 exhibits. Among other things, Caluwe accused Hall and Rogers of "improper conduct and abuse of authority" in handling the other incidents that had previously arisen. He also criticized their ability to manage and communicate with employees. The letter indicated that copies of the same were being mailed to each member of the agency's governing board, its Executive Director, Deputy Director, and Records Clerk, and an outside attorney. Rogers accepted the letter as merely being a response to his memorandum of March Caluwe was not disciplined for this action. On March 31, 1982 Caluwe wrote a two-page letter to the members of the governing board of the agency and enclosed his March 29 letter and exhibits previously sent to Rogers. In his March 31 letter, Caluwe stated, among other things, that management "occupie(d) a position of trust", that it had "breached this trust", that it "rule(d) by intimidation and fear and not in the spirit of cooperation", and urged the board members to conduct an independent investigation of his "allegations". A copy of this letter was also furnished an outside attorney. On May 13, 1982 Caluwe sent another letter to the members of the governing board in which he inquired as to the status of the investigation he had called for in his letter of March 31. Caluwe also raised allegations concerning the agency's general counsel, and claimed the general counsel had "used sick leave for purposes other than for which it was intended (and) falsified his bi-weekly time reports and received pay and benefits for periods he was absent from work", and that the problem was created because his leave slips had been approved by the agency's deputy executive director. That complaint is now the subject of a Florida Commission on Ethics proceeding. Caluwe had previously brought this subject to Rogers' attention sometime in 1980. There was no evidence his to the reaction, if any, by the members of the governing board to this letter or the one previously sent on March 31. Caluwe did not furnish his supervisors a copy of the letter but did copy the records clerk of the agency. Neither Rogers nor the agency personnel director received copies of the same until late July, 1982. In June, 1982 Caluwe contacted reporter for the Miami Herald to disclose the fact that the chairman of the agency's governing board had been involved in selling insurance to the board. On June 22, 1982 outside counsel for the agency wrote the agency's personnel director telling him, among other things, that it would call the director the next day concerning Caluwe and provide him "with language to be included in a letter of termination." It also referred to a need to review in detail "SFWMD's termination, grievance, and personnel policies to make sure that Caluwe's discharge, and the procedures used to implement the discharge, comport with due process." At this point, then, the agency had decided to terminate Caluwe. On July 21, 1982 Caluwe again wrote a letter to the members of the governing board. The text of the letter is set out below: To members of the Governing Board of the South Florida Water Management District: You are to be congratulated for your unity in not addressing controversial topics. It's an unfortunate situation when special interests are put ahead of the public trust that has been vested in you. The only reasonable conclusion that I can reach is that you condone poor management and theft. Perhaps some of you have committed acts similar to these and that's why you cannot afford to get involved. Well you are involved! It's satisfying to note the courts have held directors personally liable in civil actions and that penalties are not limited to compensatory damages but that punitive damages can be assessed. It's also interesting to note that you may be found culpably negligent in permitting acts like these to occur. Since you have been unwilling to do your own house cleaning, I have decided to help you in this matter. I think it would be an excellent idea if the citizens of South Florida had an opportunity to see how the South Florida Water Management District has acted in favoring special interests. When this happens you will not honestly be able to say, "we didn't know". One member of the Board responded by letter dated July 23, 1982 that she considered it inappropriate for Caluwe to write directly to board members and instructed him to use channels that were provided for handling complaints. She added that Caluwe's letter struck her as being "offensive". The letter made no direct reference to Rogers and Hall, and they were not furnished a copy. However, on July 26 Rogers was given a copy of the letter. On July 30, 1982 Rogers sent Caluwe a memorandum in which he informed Petitioner that his employment was being terminated at 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 1982, and not to report to work after July 30. In brief, the reasons given for Caluwe's termination were (a) his "uncooperativeness shown a co-worker" on March 19, and his "failure to respond to a request for information from a member of the public", which collectively constituted a 2e offense for which he was previously assigned 25 points on March 19, 1982; (b) his letter to Rogers on March 29, 1982 which alleged poor management, illegal activity and unfair treatment to Caluwe, and which "personally attacked and insulted Charles Hall and (Rogers)"; (c) his letter of July 21 to the board which contained "inflammatory, threatening, and abusive language" and which constituted Category 2h and 3a offenses for which he received 75 points in total, and an additional 25 points which was given for the same letter by virtue of Caluwe's "failure to follow promulgated grievance and complaint procedures'; 3/ (d) the accumulation of a total of 125 points since March 19 which was in violation of Section E.1.d. of the Corrective Action Policy; and (e) "actions" which interfered with Rogers' ability to maintain internal discipline", made it impossible to work with (Caluwe)", made it "impossible to transfer (him) to a different Department", which "interfered with (his) performance of assigned duties", and which showed a "tendency on (his) part to make untrue and misleading statements." A Category 2h offense is defined in the Policy-Index as the "(u)se of abusive language to a co-worker" while a Category 3a offense is defined as the "(u)se of abusive or threatening language to the public, or use of threatening language to a co-worker." Category 2e offenses carry the imposition of 25 points for each violation. Fifty points are assigned for a violation of a Category 3 offense. Section E.1.d, of the Policy-Index provides that "(a) total of 100 points in effect may be cause for termination." The Policy-Index requires that "(c)orrective action shall be taken as soon as possible, but not more than five working days from the time the supervisor becomes aware of the incident." The memorandum of July 30, 1982 was followed by a letter to Caluwe on August 5 from Rogers which confirmed that his employment had been terminated. The letter also instructed Caluwe on the time limitations for filing a request for an administrative hearing. Thereafter, a timely request for a hearing was filed. The agency adopted an "Employee grievance Procedure" on July 15, 1977. Its purpose was to allow all employees the opportunity to quickly and fairly resolve a grievance." The Procedure provides a specified procedure for hearing and resolving various types of complaints from employees, including a hearing by an Employee Relations Committee (ERC), a further review by the unit manager or department director, a second hearing by a Grievance Review Board, and a final decision by the agency's executive director. According to the agency's personnel director, the agency has fired employees in one of two ways in the past: (a) when the employe has accumulated more than 100 disciplinary points under the Policy-Index, and (b) when the employee has committed certain acts, irrespective of the Policy-Index. Thus, it contends the agency may, at its discretion, determine whether to terminate an employee by assessing points under the Policy-Index or by merely giving notice to the employee even though he has accumulated no points under its written code of conduct. Even though an employee has accumulated over 100 points, the agency may not necessarily fire an employee. For example, on one occasion an employee accumulated 135 points but was not fired. In the case at bar, the agency considered Caluwe's 125 points to be incidental to his termination, and viewed his supervisor's inability to work with him, his letter writing activities and prior "incidents" to be the major concern and basis for the termination. Whether the District had a policy of terminating an employee whenever his actions made it impossible to transfer him to another department or whenever a supervisor could not work with an employee was not disclosed. It was also not disclosed whether all employees, including Caluwe, were aware of such policies, and the ramification for violating the same. There was no evidence as to the reason for such policies, the types of proscribed conduct within each policy, and the authority for adopting the same. Caluwe blamed his firing primarily on the fact that he had prompted an investigation of the agency's general counsel, who was a long-time District employee. He acknowledged he failed to use the Employee Grievance Procedure when he wrote directly to the members of the governing board, but claimed the ERC was ineffective in dealing with management problems. Caluwe did not dispute that he missed the annual meeting, and wrote the letters in question; however, he contends they do not justify the disciplinary action imposed by the District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against Petitioner be dismissed except for one Category 2e offense for which 25 points should be imposed. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be reinstated in the position of water management engineer III retroactive to August 4, 1982 and that he be given full back pay between that date and the date of reinstatement. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1983.
The Issue Whether a consumptive-use permit for the quantities of water applied for should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Applicant, by Application No. 7500025, applied for a consumptive-use permit for an average daily withdrawal of 138,000 gallons of water from one (1) well penetrating the Florida Acquifer. This is an existing use. Exhibits were entered without objection, as follows: Original application with attachments, marked "Exhibit 1". Proof of Publication, marked "Exhibit 2". There were no written objections. The witness for permittee, George Szell, Hydrologist, was questioned at length by the staff attorney on issues to be resolved under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder by the Southwest Florida Water Management District, and particularly Rule 16J-2.11, Conditions for a Consumptive-Use Permit. A typed transcript of the testimony has been examined and made a part of the record for this hearing. The witness for the Board, Mr. Szell, objected to the granting of the permit on the grounds that the water crop was exceeded by 3.24 percent. Upon request of the Hearing Officer, the parties agreed to consider their differences and file a joint stipulation enumerating conditions upon which the parties agree. A joint stipulation signed by both parties was filed with the Division is marked "Supplement to the Record" and made a part of this recommended order. Mr. Szell recommended that the permit be granted consistent with the conditions in six (6) above.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received including the parties pre- hearing stipulation, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent DOT filed a dredge and fill permit based on its application filed with Respondent DER and proposed to upgrade a 4.9 mile segment of State Road 80 from a 2-lane roadway to a rural 4-lane divided roadway which included construction of new north and south bound bridges over a canal (designated as L- 8) and constructing a triple box culvert to replace the existing bridge over Callery Judge Canal, located from 20 mile bend to 5.5 miles west of State Road 7, Palm Beach County, Florida. (Joint Composite Exhibit 1). Respondent DER published the required notice of its intent to issue the applied for permit by DOT in the April 14, 1986 edition of the Palm Beach Post Times, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioner is the fee simple owner of the property located to the west of Callery Judge Canal. Petitioner's property includes a drainage easement which has been given to the Seminole Water Management District and includes submerged portions of the canal. Callery Judge Canal is a water control structure. Callery Judge Canal is connected to another canal designated as C-51, which is also a water control structure. The length of Callery Judge from the C-51 Canal extends approximately 400 feet. There are water control structures at the end of Callery Judge Canal and approximately 4 miles both east and west of the C-51 Canal. As such, there is limited navigability of the C-51 Canal by Petitioner. The C-51 Canal is used by Petitioner and unidentified public members for recreational navigation purposes. There is no commerce navigation on either the C-51 or Callery Judge Canal. Petitioner currently has navigational access to C-51 through Callery Judge. Petitioner owns two boats which he has from time to time used on the Callery Judge Canal to get to the C-51 Canal. Both C-51 and Callery Judge Canal are Class 3 water bodies. Respondent DER has dredge and fill jurisdiction over both canals as they connect to state waters. Respondent DOT, in addition to publishing notice in the Palm Beach Post Times, sent written notice to adjacent property owners advising them of DOT's application and only Petitioner protested based on his claim of impaired navigation from Callery Judge to C-51. Additionally, Petitioner objected on the basis that the project would adversely affect his riparian rights of access to C-51 and that the effect of issuing of the requested permits would amount to the taking of private property without first making payment of full compensation to him. The existing bridge which expands Callery Judge Canal does not meet state safety practices inasmuch as there is only the approximately 2 feet between the edge of the travel lane to the face of the railing. This space provides only a 2 foot recovery lane for disabled vehicles. With the triple box culverts as applied for by DOT, an adequate recovery lane of approximately 10 feet will be provided which meets state safety requirements for recovery lanes. (Testimony of Midgett). The triple box culverts will allow for DOT to complete its planned widening of the bridge on both ends and thereby eliminate adverse safety concerns relating to traffic "bottle necking." Fish, alligators, and other wildlife will be able to continue passing from Callery Judge to C-51 after installation of the triple box culverts as proposed by DOT and therefore there will be no adverse impacts on fish and wildlife conservation. The proposed culverts will allow drainage to continue and water flow will not be constricted. Following construction of the triple box culverts, Petitioner may continue to enjoy other riparian rights that he presently enjoys. Thus, Petitioner may continue to swim and bathe in Callery Judge Canal. Petitioner may also continue to navigate Callery Judge for fishing and other recreational purposes. There are no marinas, boat lifts, boat ramps or other facilities on C- 51 or Callery Judge Canals which would provide navigation access to the canals by the general public. The one boat facility in either canal is a boat ramp in C-51 maintained by the South Florida Water Management District. The Palm Beach County Health Department, a local approved DER program, (pursuant to Section 403.916, Florida Statutes), reviewed the subject application and determined that DOT's application, with modifications incorporated in Respondent DER's intent to issue, provided the reasonable assurances and was in the public interest pursuant to Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's riparian rights to navigate Callery Judge Canal and access to C-51 would be impaired by the Respondent DOT's installation of the triple box culverts as applied for. However, when these adverse impacts are balanced against the other factors as required pursuant to Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes, Petitioner's adverse impacts are considered to be negligible. Respondent DOT has provided Respondent DER reasonable assurances that water quality standards will not be violated based on the proposed project. Respondent DOT has provided Respondent DER reasonable assurances that by use of turbidity screens during construction of the culverts, turbidity values 50 feet down stream from the project site will not exceed 29 N.T.D.'s above background.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, grant Respondent, Department of Transportation, a dredge and fill permit as set forth with the conditions accompanied in its Notice of Intent to Issue, based on the determination herein that the proposed activities are not contrary to the public interest. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1846 Rulings on Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation's proposed Recommended Order. Paragraph 12, adopted as modified, paragraphs 12, 17 and 18, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, adopted as modified, paragraphs 15 and 16, Recommended Order. Paragraph 18, rejected as unnecessary for resolution of the issues. Paragraph 19, adopted as modified, paragraph 15, Recommended Order. Paragraph 21, first sentence adopted and remainder rejected as being speculative or conclusionary. Paragraph 24 the parties Stipulation and other statements respecting the parties positions were not incorporated in the Recommended Order as being unnecessary or was not the subject of testimony based on the stipulation. Rulings on Respondent, Department of Transportation's proposed Recommended Order. Paragraph 1 adopted as modified, paragraph 8, Recommended Order. Statutory and Code provisions are not recited in the Recommended as findings of fact. However, official notice was taken of the pertinent rules, regulations and statutory provisions. Paragraph 4 substantially adopted, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, Recommended Order. Paragraph 12 rejected as being unnecessary to determine the issues posed herein and based on the ultimate determination that the project was in the public interest, paragraph 15, Recommended Order. Rulings on Petitioner's proposed Recommended Order. Paragraph 5, first sentence attributable to Respondent, Department of Transportation, rejected as no evidence was introduced to substantiate that Respondent DOT was unaware that Petitioner was owner and holder of a riparian property right of access. Paragraph 4, last sentence rejected as evidence adduced indicates that Petitioner's rights to gain access between his riparian lands and the C-51 canal was considered, paragraph 16, Recommended Order. Paragraph 5, last sentence rejected as there was a determination that the proposed project was in the public interest and that any impairment of Petitioner's access was counter balanced against public considerations as required in Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. Paragraph 16, Recommended Order. Paragraph 6, rejected as being contrary to other credited evidence which indicates that the proper balancing test was in fact made. See paragraphs 10-18, Recommended Order which deals with the consideration of the public interest criteria set forth in Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Ulmer, Esquire 200 SE Sixth Street, Suite 404 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mel Wilson, Esquire Department of Transportation Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Karen A. Brodeen, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Twin Towers Office Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue As stated by the Hearing Officer the issue in this case is whether the District should issue a surface water management permit to Russell E. and Marilyn F. Scott, and Caloosa Television Corporation for the construction and operation of a surface water management system to serve a television signal tower and control building in Southeast Lee County, Florida. There are no significant water resource impacts related to the management of surface water by the proposed project. The harm at issue in this case is the potential for wood storks and other wading to strike the tower and guy wires which are not structures related to management and storage of waters. The parties disagree as to whether the District has jurisdiction to consider the bird impacts related to collisions with the tower and guy wires, and if so, whether the tower and guy wires will have a significant adverse impact on the water resources of the state through a reduction of wood storks, an endangered species, and other wading birds which through feeding on fish remove biomass from such water, thereby maintaining water quality. In determining jurisdiction in this case, the parties disagree on the meaning of "works" and "surface water management system" as used in Chapter 373, F.S. and Rule 40E-4, F.A.C. The petitioners argue that since one set of guy wires will be placed across one end of the cypress wetland located on the subject property, the entire project including the guy wire and tower is a "works" and part of the surface water management system, which is subject to the permitting jurisdiction of the District. The District and respondent Caloosa Television Corporation contend that the tower and guy wires are not structures related to surface water management and are not "works" nor part of the surface water management system, and therefore, bird mortality, as a result of hitting the tower and guy wires, is not subject to the permitting jurisdiction of the District. FINDINGS ON EXCEPTIONS At the Governing Board meeting of October 6, 1988, the petitioners waived Findings of Fact exceptions 1 and 2 of Petitioners' Exceptions to Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order. Therefore, Findings of Fact exceptions 1 and 2 are rejected. The petitioners' exceptions 1, 2, and 3 to Conclusions of Law of the Recommended Order are rejected as set forth in the District's Response To Exceptions Filed by Petitioners filed on September 27, 1988, and attached hereto as Exhibit B and made part of this Final Order. The Governing Board accepts the exceptions filed by the District and the respondent, Caloosa Television Corporation, as set forth herein under Conclusions of Law.
Findings Of Fact On or about September 14, 1987, Caloosa filed Application Number 09147- B, for a surface water management permit, with the District. This application was for the construction and operation of a surface water management system to serve a 1249 foot high television transmission tower and control building in southeast Lee County, Florida. The proposed location of Caloosa's project is approximately one mile north of the boundary of the Corkscrew Swamp Sanctuary, which is owned and operated by Audubon, and specifically, approximately two and one-half miles north of a wood stork colony located within the Sanctuary. This rookery is the largest rookery of wood stork, a federally endangered wading bird, in the United States. The project site is 60 acres in size, and approximately square in shape. It is improved agricultural land, with a circular cypress wetland of about 5.5 acres located near the center of the site. Extending outward from the cypress wetland are two ditches, one running due east and the other due west. The existing surface water flow varies with the seasons and intensity of storm events. During dry seasons, the rainfall runoff flows into the cypress wetland and percolates into the ground. However, during wet seasons, water builds up in the cypress wetland and flows into the two ditches. In larger storm events, the project site is entirely under water, and sheet flows occur to the southwest. The proposed project should have a negligible impact on the existing surface water system since the total impervious area will only be approximately one acre, or 1.7 percent of the total project area of 60 acres. The project consists of a radio tower and guy wires, a 3150 square foot control building, fill pad and parking area, guy wire anchor slabs, and approximately 1650 feet of lime rock road with an equalizer culvert to maintain existing flow. Three sets of six guy wires will extend from the 1249 foot high tower and connect to the ground at anchor slabs located near the edge of the project site. The entire project is located outside of the limits of the existing wetland, but one set of guy wires does cross the western edge of the cypress wetland. Caloosa proposes to use the tower as a "community tower" which will be capable of supporting more than one transmitting antennae. In addition to Caloosa's antennae, the tower will be able to support up to five commercial radio stations and up to sixty two-way communication antennae. Caloosa has had contacts from several commercial radio stations and governmental agencies which have expressed interest in co-locating their antennae on Caloosa's tower. After review of this application, District staff advised Caloosa, on November 23, 1987, that it was recommending approval of the application since it was felt that any impact from the project on wood storks would not result from the construction and operation of this project. At hearing, the District supported the issuance of this permit, but urged that the tower and guy wires are not a part of the surface water management system over which the District has any permitting jurisdiction. Audubon timely filed its request for a hearing on the District's intent to issue this permit, and at hearing opposed the issuance of this permit to Caloosa, urging that the tower and guy wires were an integral part of the surface water management system, and therefore subject to the District's permitting jurisdiction. The wood stork and other wading birds are an important link in the biological and ecological chain. They are the main mechanism for removing certain species of fish from ponds, lakes and waters of the state. If there is no predation by wading birds, then an increase in the biomass of the water system would be expected, water quality would decrease, and fish kills would result. Ponds that receive biomass reduction by wading birds have a reduction in fish biomass of approximately 75%, with no loss in species, while ponds that do not receive wading bird predation lose almost all individual aquatic animals through reduced water quality resulting from retention of up to 94% of the biomass from dead fish. The reduction in biomass is in direct proportion to the number of birds feeding in a pond, and therefore a 5% reduction in birds will result in a 5% lessening of the biomass reduction. Water quality will be reduced by a lowering of oxygen levels in such waters due to the excessive retention of nutrient laden biomass. During the nesting season, wood storks feed in various ponds and wetland areas that surround the rookery. Their primary feeding areas are within ten miles of the rookery. The proximity of these sites allow the birds to make several flights per day between the colony and the feeding site, and to do so with less energy expended than with feeding sites that are farther away. Caloosa's project site is located between the rookery and a primary feeding area to the north that is within ten miles of the rookery. The proximity of this feeding area allows the birds to fly low, at tree top level, to the site, without the use of thermal updrafts that they use to attain altitudes of up to 5000 feet when traveling greater distances. Thus, if the tower is built, it would be likely that wood storks would fly in the direction of, and at the height of, the tower to reach this primary feeding area. However, it was not established how many such birds actually feed in this nearby area, or how many fish are in these ponds and wetlands. The wood stork colony at Corkscrew Swamp Sanctuary has been experiencing a decline in productivity from approximately 6000 nesting pairs in 1960 and 1966, there has been a steady decline in the number of nesting pairs in the colony, and in 1987, there were no nesting pairs in the colony. During 1988, 750 nesting pairs have been observed. The steady decline in the wood stork colony population is the result of already existing developmental pressures and changes in drainage patterns which have adversely affected the birds' feeding habitats. For nesting to be successful, two adult birds are required per nest during the nesting season, which usually occurs from November to March. This allows one adult bird to be away from the nest obtaining food while the other adult keeps the nest warm and safe from predators. If a nest is left unattended through the loss of one adult bird, it is likely that the entire nest will be lost since the fledglings are very vulnerable throughout the nesting season to predators and changes in temperature. There are usually two or three fledglings per nest. For this reason, the loss of five adult birds per year, for example, results in a total loss to the colony of between ten to fifteen fledglings. This loss compounds each year, as birds lost one year are not available to reproduce in following years. Generally, transmission towers can pose a hazard to birds due to the potential for collisions. Illuminating such towers at night does not decrease this danger since the birds are simply attracted to lights. Strobe lighting has also been tried, but it appears that birds ignore, or are not deterred, by strobes. In this case, Caloosa has agreed to accept conditions placed upon the approval of this project by the Lee County Board of Zoning and Adjustments on March 16, 1987, which include placement of aircraft warning balls on the guy wires and the tower itself, habitat improvement including the creation of a wetland and a wildlife through way, if necessary, and commencement of a monitoring system to identify any problems with wood stork mortality as soon as possible. A very extensive study of bird kills and transmission towers was conducted over a thirty year period involving the WCTV tower in Tallahassee, Florida. The WCTV tower was found to kill 3.9 wading birds per year on average. Based in part upon this data, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that wood stork collisions with the tower will not result in significant mortality, and an "incidental take" of five wood storks per year should result. This is a level of mortality which is noteworthy, since any loss to an endangered species is significant, but is clearly below that which would cause jeopardy to the species. Although Audubon correctly pointed out that the conditions present in the WCTV study do not exactly match those present in this case, such as the fact that there are almost three times as many wading birds in the area of the Caloosa tower as were in the area of the WCTV tower, as well as the differences in the geographical relationship of the tower to nearby wading bird colonies and feeding areas, nevertheless, the WCTV study is relevant and should be considered by the District since it is the most exhaustive study of its kind ever conducted. Caloosa presented evidence of a study it conducted over approximately a one month period in May and June, 1988, of a comparable existing radio tower, the WHEW tower, located near the subject property to the east. Although substantial wood stork and other wading bird activity was observed around the WHEW tower, there were no collisions of wood storks with this 1010 foot high tower. While not a scientific study in the strictest sense, and although it was not conducted for as extensive a period as the WCTV study, nevertheless, the District should consider the WHEW study conducted by Caloosa since it involves a comparable tower in close proximity to the subject property, and the person who conducted the study for Caloosa and who testified at hearing, Robert E. Gatton, appeared particularly credible. The Federal Communications Commission has approved the location of Caloosa's tower. I5. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission has recommended that the proposed location for Caloosa's tower be changed to an alternate site which would present a less serious obstacle to the Corkscrew wood stork nesting colony and other wading birds. This recommendation is based on the policy that the mortality of even one wood stork is too much and may present a danger to the population of the wood stork rookery. It was not shown, however, that a basis in fact exists for concluding that the loss of five or fewer wood storks per year would present such a danger. The Commission's recommendation is also based upon a concern that transmission towers will proliferate in the area, and thereby further interfere with the flight paths of wood storks and other wading birds to their feeding locations. However, the fact that Caloosa is seeking to construct a "community tower" to be shared with several governmental agencies, as well as broadcasting stations, will actually serve to decrease this potential proliferation. While there is a potential for wood storks or other wading birds in the area to be killed or injured by striking Caloosa's tower or the guy wires while in flight, the extent of this danger is speculative, but would not appear to exceed five wood storks per year. Under these circumstances, there would not be a significant threat to the population, or continued viability, of the Corkscrew rookery. It has not been shown, by the evidence in this record, that any loss of wood storks and other wading birds caused by this project will result in fish kills through a significant reduction of predation and the resulting failure to remove accumulated biomass in ponds and waters in the area. It was not demonstrated that a fish kill will, or is even likely, to occur. While the loss of five wood storks would result in a certain amount of biomass not being removed from the area's wetlands, nothing in the record suggests that this amount will have an adverse impact on the state's water resources or will otherwise be significant. Therefore, any relationship between the tower proposed by Caloosa and impacts associated with biomass accumulation is purely speculative and de minimis. Fish kills occur naturally as water levels in seasonal marshes and ponds lower in the dry season. The water quality impact of such kills is relatively short-lived, lasting up to two months or until the next wet season begins, at which time water quality parameters return to normal. The evidence produced at hearing does not establish that the project and its surface water management system will have any significant or measurable effect on drainage of surface water runoff from the subject property, or on adjacent properties. The drainage system proposed by Caloosa will utilize the existing ditches and the natural cypress pond on the property. It was established that the post-construction effect of the project on drainage would be insignificant. There are, therefore, no drainage impacts associated with this project.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the District enter a Final Order approving Caloosa's application for surface water management permit number 09147-B, subject to the conditions, agreed to by Caloosa, which were imposed by the Lee County Board of Zoning and Adjustment in its approval of this proposed development. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5578 Rulings on Audubon's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3. 2-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise Rejected as a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. 4-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary, irrelevant and as a summation of testimony. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 7-8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 9-10 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 12-15. Adopted and Rejected, in part, in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 10, but otherwise Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 12, but otherwise Rejected as cumulative and as argument on the evidence. Rejected in Finding of Fact 13, and otherwise as simply a summation of the testimony and argument on the evidence. 20-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 22-23. Rejected in Findings of Fact 15-17. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Rulings on Caloosa's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted In Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, but otherwise Rejected as a conclusion of law and as simply a summation of testimony. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 9-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 15-16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18, but otherwise Rejected as irrelevant and as cumulative. Rulings on the District's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding-of Fact I. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 14, 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 15. Rejected as irrelevant. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 18-19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Lee Senior Vice President Florida Audubon Society 1101 Audubon Way Maitland, Florida 32751 Russell P. Schropp, Esquire Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 James K. Sturgis, Esquire Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416 John R. Wodraska Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: An Overview of Petitioner's Employment with the District Petitioner was employed by the District from June of 1988, until his termination, which was effective January 14, 1992. Prior to his termination he had an unblemished disciplinary record. Petitioner was initially hired by the District as a Construction Representative. In January of 1989, he assumed the duties of a Regulatory Professional I. He was promoted in 1990 to a Regulatory Professional II, a position he held until he was terminated. At the time of his termination, Petitioner had attained regular employee status inasmuch as he had successfully completed his probationary period. As a Regulatory Professional II, Petitioner was responsible for monitoring the public's compliance with the District's regulatory programs, a task that involved the exercise of considerable discretion with minimal supervision as well as frequent and substantial contact with citizens in his assigned territory, which covered all of Okeechobee and St. Lucie Counties and parts of Glades and Highlands Counties. Petitioner also supervised one subordinate employee, Donald Hagan, a Regulatory Professional I, who assisted Petitioner in his monitoring activities. Petitioner was assigned a District vehicle for official use during the workday. After hours, the vehicle was secured in the parking lot outside the District field station in Okeechobee where Petitioner was headquartered. Petitioner worked an eight-hour day. His normal work hours were 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., however, he occasionally deviated from this schedule when necessary to accommodate his workload. In addition to a lunch break, Petitioner was allowed to take two 15 minute work breaks during his eight-hour workday, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. He was permitted to take these breaks whether he was in the field station or out in the field. In September and most of October of 1991, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Edward Maciejko. Maciejko was headquartered in West Palm Beach, approximately 60 to 65 miles from the Okeechobee field station out of which Petitioner worked. On October 23, 1991, Alan Goldstein became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Goldstein's work station was located in Okeechobee approximately three miles from Petitioner's work station. Goldstein remained Petitioner's immediate supervisor until Petitioner's termination. The Employee Handbook The District has an Employee Handbook that is designed to provide information and guidance to District employees regarding employment-related matters. As do all new District employees, Petitioner received a copy of the Employee Handbook upon being hired and its contents were reviewed with him during his orientation. The Employee Handbook contains the District's Attendance and Leave Policy (Policy No. 300), which addresses the subjects of "normal work hours" and "work breaks" as follows: NORMAL WORK HOURS All full-time regular and initial probationary employees shall perform their assigned duties for 40 hours each work week unless otherwise authorized. All part-time regular and temporary employees shall perform their assigned duties for the total number of hours for which compensation is received. The normal workday shall be 8 hours unless otherwise authorized by the employee's Division Director. WORK BREAKS All District employees are provided one work break during the first half of their workday and one work break during the second half of their workday, except in extreme emergency. No single work break shall exceed 15 minutes. An employee is not permitted to accumulate unused work breaks nor may the work break be used to cover an employee's late arrival or early departure from duty. All employees shall take a minimum of one half hour lunch break each workday. The following discussion is found in the Employee Handbook concerning the "Code of Ethics:" Florida has been a leader among the states in establishing ethical standards for public officials and employees and recognizing the right of her people to protect the public trust against abuse. Our state constitution was revised in 1968 to require that (a)a code of ethics for all state employees and non-judicial officers prohibiting conflict between public duty and private interests shall be prescribed by law. Art III, Sec. 18, Fla. Constitution. The "Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees" by which the Legislature carried out this constitutional mandate is found in Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes. The purpose of the Code is to ensure that public officials and employees conduct themselves independently and impartially, not using their offices or positions for private gains other than remuneration provided by law and to avoid conflicts between public duties and private interest. . . . The standards of conduct summarized below generally apply to all District employees. The types of conduct prohibited are: Gifts- No public employee shall solicit or accept anything of value- including a gift, loan, reward, promise of future employment, favor, or service- that is based on any understanding that the vote, official action, or judgment of the employee would be influenced by such gift. Sec. 112.313(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). Unauthorized Compensation- No public employee or his/her spouse or minor child shall accept any compensation, payment or thing of value which, with the exercise of reasonable care, is known or should be known to influence the official action of such employee. Sec. 112.313(4), Fla. Stat. (1991). Doing Business with One's Agency- No public employee acting as a purchasing agent or acting in his/her official capacity shall, directly or indirectly, purchase, rent, or lease any realty, goods, or services from a business entity in which his/her spouse, or child is an officer, partner, director, or proprietor, or in which his/her spouse, or child (or any combination of them) has a material interest. Nor shall a public employee, acting in a private capacity, rent, lease, or sell any realty, goods or services to his/her own agency. Sec. 112.313(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Conflicting Employment or Contractual Relationship- No public employee shall hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or agency which is subject to the regulation of, or doing business with, the employee's agency. Nor shall an employee hold any employment or contractual relationship which will pose a recurring conflict between his/her private interests and his/her public duties or which would impede the full and faithful discharge of his/her duties. Sec. 112.313(7), Fla. Stat. (1991). Exemptions- Under certain circumstances the prohibitions of subsections (3) and (7) of Section 112.313, Florida Statutes, may not apply. Misuse of Public Position- No public employee shall corruptly use or attempt to use his/her official position or any property or resource within his/her trust, or perform his/her official duties, to obtain a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself/ herself or others. Sec. 112.313(6), Fla. Stat. (1991). Disclosure or Use Of Certain Information- No public employee shall disclose or use information not available to the general public and gained by reason of his/her public position for his/her personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of others. Sec. 112.313(8), Fla. Stat.(1991). More specific ethics laws address financial disclosure and the reporting requirements which apply to Governing Board members, senior management, and employees with contracting authority. The above information has been provided to help you understand State Ethics Laws. The District supports and enforces these laws to the best of its ability and expects each employee to conduct their activities in a lawful manner. Conflicts of interest may be avoided by greater awareness of these Ethics Laws. If you are in doubt about the applicability of the ethics laws to your own circumstances or the circumstances of a subordinate or co-worker, contact the District's Office of Counsel. They will answer your questions or assist you in obtaining an opinion from the Commission on Ethics. Also included in the Employee Handbook is the District's Corrective Action Policy (Policy No. 803), which establishes standards governing non- executive employee conduct and discipline. Section F. of Policy No. 803 lists those acts of misconduct for which a non-executive District employee who has attained regular status may be disciplined. It provides in pertinent part as follows: The following forms of misconduct are unacceptable and subject an employee to corrective action based on the particular circumstances surrounding the incident. The list is provided merely as examples and is not intended to be all inclusive. The identification of these examples does not preclude the District's right to discipline or dismiss employees for other causes, including acts of misconduct which breach the requirements inherent in the employment relationship. 1. Unbecoming conduct: Any action or conduct by an employee which impedes the District's efforts, brings discredit on the District, impairs the operation or efficiency of the District or any employee, or impairs the employee's ability to perform his or her job. . . . 5. Absence Without Authorized Leave: Failure to obtain approval from the proper authority prior to any absence from work, except in the case of an emergency, illness or accident which requires the employee to be absent prior to receiving approval; Inexcusable or repeated failure to notify the appropriate Supervisor or division office of absence, due to sickness, within ten (10) minutes from the start of the normal work day; Being more than ten (10) minutes late to work for an inexcusable reason or on a repeated basis without notifying the appropriate Supervisor, or division office. . . . Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment or Personnel: The use of any District property, services, equipment or personnel for any purpose other than District business. Employees shall be required to reimburse the District for the cost incurred by the District as a result of the unauthorized use of equipment or property. Improper or Careless Use of District Property, Including Vehicles: Failure to care for or properly use District property or equipment such as the failure to observe the proper speed limit while driving a District vehicle. . . . 11. Lying or Failure to Give Truthful or Requested Information: Oral or written statements that are deliberately inaccurate, incorrect or misleading but which do not constitute falsification of records. This includes lying or failure to provide information during an internal investigation. . . . 24. Violation or Disregard of Safety Practices: The failure to follow established safety practices as outlined in the District's Accident Prevention Manual. This includes failure to report any injury or accident; the performance of unsafe acts; or the failure to wear or use appropriate safety equipment. . . . Negligence: The failure to use ordinary or reasonable care, caution, attention, diligence or discretion in the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities. Falsification of a District Record: The intentional issuance of a false or incomplete report or record, either oral or written, or the intentional failure to issue a record regarding the performance of work duties, attendance, injury, illness, job qualifications or other work related matters. Policy No. 803 specifically provides for four basic types of "corrective action" to deal with acts of misconduct. They are, in order of severity: oral reprimand (OR); written reprimand (WR); suspension (S); and dismissal (D). In determining the appropriate "corrective action" to be taken in a particular situation, supervisory personnel must follow the "standards" set forth in Section G. of Policy No. 803, which provides as follows: This section has been established as a guide for use by Supervisors to help ensure that all employees receive similar treatment in like circumstances. The guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H. is not meant to be an exhaustive listing of all possible acts of misconduct or forms of corrective action. Appropriate corrective action of unlisted acts of misconduct may be derived by comparing the nature and seriousness of the offense to those listed in Section H. In many cases, the guidelines on severity of corrective action are based on the number of occurrences and the seriousness of the offense and are presented as a range of action which covers more than one form of corrective action. The use of a particular form of corrective action is not mandatory simply because it is listed in Section H. Realizing that some of the offenses listed will be more or less serious in certain cases, the supervisor taking the corrective action shall utilize good judgment in light of all available facts. The corrective action selected must ultimately be appropriate in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the incident and the employee's past performance and conduct record. For example, even for offenses where dismissal is not indicated for a first offense, dismissal on a first occurrence may be assessed for an aggravated offense or a continuous pattern of misconduct. Similarly, where dismissal is indicated, a less severe form of corrective action may be taken. This action may be taken so long as it is more severe than that given in the most recent prior occurrence that is still active, and is reasonably consistent with other cases of misconduct for other employees. Temporary and initial probationary employees may be suspended or dismissed without regard to the standards of corrective action. In determining the severity of corrective action to be applied, the authorized Supervisor should take into account the following variables: The severity of the specific act of misconduct. The circumstances under which the violation occurred. The consequences of the employee's actions in regard to its affect on the District operation and on other employees. The guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H. of this policy. The overall work record of the employee; length of employment; and the employee's prior history of other similar or unrelated corrective actions, including active and inactive offenses. The length of time since earlier corrective action, the similarity or dissimilarity of the offense, and the severity of earlier offenses. The following are among "the guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H." of Policy No. 803: 1. Unbecoming conduct: 1st occurrence- WR, S or D . . 5. Absence Without Authorized Leave (Does not affect scheduling or work of others): 1st occurrence- OR; 2nd occurrence- WR . . Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment, or Personnel (With intent to obtain personal gain: 1) Cost to District of less than $50.00): 1st occurrence- S; 2nd occurrence- S or D; 3rd occurrence: D Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment, or Personnel (With intent to obtain personal gain: 2) Cost to District of more than $50.00): 1st occurrence- S or D; 2nd occurrence- D Improper or Careless Use of District Property (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence: OR . . . 11. Lying or Failure to Give Truthful or Requested Information: 1st occurrence- WR or S; 2nd occurrence- S or D; 3rd occurrence- D . . . 24. Violation or Disregard of Safety Practices (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence- OR . . . Negligence (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence- OR . . . Falsification of District Record: 1st occurrence- S or D; 2nd occurrence- D The Accident and Related Events In the latter part of September of 1991, Petitioner's personal vehicle was in an automotive repair shop in Stuart. On September 17, 1991, at Petitioner's request, Donald Hagan, Petitioner's subordinate, drove Petitioner to the repair shop in Stuart, which was outside of their assigned territory, in a District vehicle. The purpose of the trip was to ascertain whether the repairs on Petitioner's personal vehicle had been completed. Upon his arrival at the repair shop, Petitioner was advised that the necessary parts had not come in and that therefore it would be another week until he would be able to pick up his vehicle. A week later, on September 24, 1991, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Hagan was in his District vehicle in the parking lot outside the Okeechobee field station when Petitioner walked up to him. Petitioner told Hagan that the repairs on Petitioner's personal vehicle had been completed. He then asked if Hagan would give him a ride to the repair shop in Stuart so that he could pick up the vehicle. Hagan responded in the affirmative. Petitioner thereupon entered Hagan's District vehicle and sat down in the front passenger seat. After Petitioner was situated, Hagan drove off, headed in the direction of the repair shop. Before reaching their destination, Hagan and Petitioner were involved in an automobile accident when Hagan lost control of the vehicle and it ended up in a ditch. The vehicle was damaged and it was towed to West Palm Beach for repairs. Hagan sustained two fractured ribs as a result of the accident. Petitioner was also injured, but not as seriously as Hagan. Both received medical treatment for their injuries. Hagan's and Petitioner's ill-fated trip did not have any District- related purpose. Nonetheless, following the accident, Petitioner reported otherwise, notwithstanding that he knew that he was providing false information to the District. On the night of the accident, he told his then immediate supervisor, Edward Maciejko, over the telephone that he and Hagan were on their way to conduct an inspection of distressed cypress trees in St. Lucie County when the accident occurred. Petitioner also prepared an accident report in which he made the same misrepresentation. A workers' compensation claim was filed on behalf of Petitioner in reliance upon this misrepresentation. Initially, Hagan corroborated Petitioner's story about the purpose of their September 24, 1991, trip. Later, however, he told supervisory personnel the truth about the matter. For his part in the incident and the subsequent cover-up, he was reprimanded and received a two-day suspension. On two occasions following Hagan's revelation regarding the true purpose of the trip, Petitioner was provided an opportunity by Alan Goldstein, who had recently become Petitioner's immediate supervisor and was looking into allegations of misconduct against Petitioner, to recant the statements he had previously made regarding the matter. Petitioner, however, declined to do so and instead repeated what he had said earlier on the subject. 2/ The Speeding Ticket and Related Events On October 3, 1991, while driving his District vehicle to a work- related meeting in Lake Placid, Florida, to which he did not want to be late, Petitioner was stopped by a Florida Highway Patrol trooper and given a traffic citation for travelling 84 miles per hour in a 55-mile per hour zone. Petitioner had exceeded the posted 55-mile per hour speed limit, but by less than the trooper indicated on the citation. Nonetheless, for convenience sake, Petitioner did not contest the citation. On the day he received the citation, Petitioner telephoned Edward Maciejko, who was still his immediate supervisor at the time, and told Maciejko that he had been "flagged down" by a trooper earlier that day while on his way to Lake Placid in his District vehicle. Subsequently, during an investigation of alleged wrongdoing on Petitioner's part conducted after Alan Goldstein, had become Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Goldstein asked Petitioner if he had informed Maciejko about the traffic citation he had received on October 3, 1991. Petitioner responded in the affirmative to this inquiry. To the best of his recollection, he had so informed Maciejko and therefore believed that he was being truthful in his response to Goldstein's inquiry. The Loan and Related Events Dry Lake Dairy (Dairy) is an Okeechobee dairy farm that has been owned and operated by the Rucks family since 1958. J. Boyd Rucks is President of the Dairy. As President, it is his responsibility to deal with governmental agencies that exercise regulatory authority over the Dairy and its operations. The District is one of these governmental agencies. In or sometime prior to 1990, the Dairy received a surface water management permit from the District. It subsequently obtained a modification to the permit to engage in a ditch clearing operation. In November of 1990, the District issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that the Dairy had violated the terms of its permit. Petitioner was actively involved in the investigation that led to the issuance of the NOV. Following the issuance of the NOV, it was his responsibility to make sure that the necessary steps were being taken by the Dairy to correct the problems identified in the NOV. At first, he visited the Dairy on a regular basis to monitor its compliance efforts. Thereafter, these regular visits ceased and his monitoring activities were confined to flying over the Dairy during his monthly aerial inspection of his territory. By the middle of October of 1991, the Dairy had made substantial progress toward correcting the violation with which it had been charged by the District, but the matter had not been finally resolved. 3/ At the time, Petitioner needed to borrow $500.00. Notwithstanding that the enforcement action against the Dairy, in which he played an integral role, was still ongoing, Petitioner ill-advisedly decided to approach the Dairy's President and its representative in its dealings with the District, J. Boyd Rucks, about loaning him the money. Petitioner knew Rucks through Petitioner's work with the District. Their relationship was purely a professional one. They did not socialize. While Rucks, on behalf of the Dairy, often made cash advances to its employees, neither he nor the Dairy was in the business of making loans to members of the general public. Never before had either of them made a loan to a District employee. At around noon on October 14, 1991, Petitioner was in his District vehicle on his way back from a field inspection when he stopped by Rucks' home and asked Rucks if he would lend Petitioner $500.00. Rucks told Petitioner that he would have to discuss the matter with other members of his family and that Petitioner should return later in the day for an answer. At around 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Petitioner returned to Rucks' home in his District vehicle. 4/ Having obtained the approval of the family members to whom he had spoken, Rucks gave Petitioner $500.00 from the Dairy's petty cash fund. Petitioner was to repay the money within ten days. There was no interest charged. Petitioner did not believe that he was doing anything wrong in soliciting and accepting this loan from Rucks. There was no understanding on the part of either Petitioner or Rucks that the making of this loan to Petitioner would in any way influence Petitioner in the discharge of his duties as an employee of the District. Petitioner never suggested, nor did Rucks expect, that the Dairy would receive favorable treatment in its dealings with the District as a result of the loan. The two viewed the transaction as a personal matter unrelated to District business. Because of illness that required hospitalization, Petitioner was unable to repay the loan within ten days. The loan was repaid in full within three weeks. Petitioner's Personal Circumstances During the period of time in which the alleged acts of misconduct in the instant case were committed, Petitioner was experiencing a significant amount of stress in his personal life. He was having money problems. In addition, his relationship with his wife was deteriorating. The day after he received the loan from Rucks, Petitioner was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for treatment. He remained hospitalized for two weeks.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the District enter a final order (1) finding that disciplinary action, in the form of a suspension covering the period from January 9, 1992, to the date of the issuance of said final order, should be taken against Petitioner, but based only upon those acts of misconduct described in Conclusion of Law 70 of this Recommended Order, (2) reducing Petitioner's dismissal to such a suspension, and (3) reinstating Petitioner to the position he previously held or a comparable position. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of October, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3101 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on what the parties have labelled as "findings of facts" in their proposed recommended orders: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. To the extent that this proposed finding states that "[e]mployees receive the Handbook at new employee orientation," it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 4-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 8. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that this proposed finding references Edward Muldowney's participation in the internal investigation and Muldowney's "extensive investigative experience," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 15-16. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 20-22. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 25a.-25b. To the extent that these proposed findings state that Petitioner was absent during non-break periods of the workday on September 24, 1991, and on October 14, 1991, without the authorization and approval of the appropriate authority, they have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, they have been adopted and incorporated in substance. 25c.-26a. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26b. Last sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26c. Last sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony adduced at hearing than findings of fact based upon such testimony. 26d. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26e. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 26f. Accepted and incorporated in substance. This proposed finding, which states that Petitioner lied or failed to give truthful or requested information on six, rather than three, occasions, has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 27a. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 27b. First, second and sixth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings state that Goldstein "specifically asked [Petitioner] if any part of the trip on the day of the accident was for personal reasons" and Petitioner "lied when he responded 'no'" to this question, they have been accepted and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, they have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 27c. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Goldstein talked to Petitioner about the September 17, 1991, trip to Stuart during the discussion referenced therein, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 27e. Last sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second, third and sixth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Fourth sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding states that Hagan "was a passenger in the vehicle at the time," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Otherwise, it has been rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based on such testimony; Fifth sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based on such testimony. 30-32d. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 32e. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed suggests that Petitioner did not perform "his regulatory functions, including those at the Dry Lake Dairy, in an unbiased manner" as a result of the loan, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 10/ Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 11/ 33-33b. Rejected because they concern alleged misconduct outside the scope of the charges specified in the notice of termination. 33c. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner's assigned territory included Martin County, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding recites verbatim the "Grievance Resolution," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent was "summarily" dismissed upon given his notice of termination without the opportunity to respond and that he never before "had an evaluation which was less than satisfactory," it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner was deprived of "due process," that he was terminated "arbitrarily" and that the charges against him "are so vague as to make them void," it has been rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
