Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DENNIS BLACKNELL vs FREIGHT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., 04-002854 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Aug. 13, 2004 Number: 04-002854 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 2005

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed discriminatory employment practices against Petitioner in violation of Chapter 70 of the Pinellas County Code as alleged in the Complaint, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.

Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner is a 44-year-old African-American male. FMS is a package delivery company that does business in Pinellas County. According to Petitioner, FMS has more than 100 employees. FMS was provided due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing in this case, but no appearance was made on its behalf. Petitioner’s Job Duties and Salary at FMS Petitioner started working for FMS in late 1999 or early 2000 as a “driver.” Petitioner’s primary job responsibility was to drive a delivery truck along a designated route to deliver and pick up packages. Petitioner was also responsible for loading the to- be-delivered packages on his truck in the morning and then unloading any picked-up packages from his truck in the evening. Petitioner worked Monday through Friday. His shift started at 7:00 a.m. each day. Petitioner’s gross pay was initially $650 every two weeks, but at some point Petitioner's salary was increased to $750 every two weeks.1 Petitioner did not receive health or dental insurance or other benefits. Failure to Switch Trucks as Directed (Complaint, Count III) Chronologically, the first event alleged in the Complaint as a basis of Petitioner’s discrimination claim started on the morning of Friday, February 8, 2002, when Petitioner’s boss, Tom Aliotti, directed Petitioner to switch trucks with another driver named Eddie. Later that day, Mr. Aliotti told Petitioner that he would switch the trucks over the weekend. As a result, Petitioner and Eddie did not switch the trucks on Friday. The trucks were not switched over the weekend, and on the morning of Monday, February 11, 2002, Mr. Aliotti again directed Petitioner to switch trucks with Eddie. Petitioner did not switch the trucks on Monday morning as directed by Mr. Aliotti because he was too busy preparing to run his delivery route. Petitioner testified that Eddie was equally responsible for the trucks not getting switched because he could not switch trucks with Eddie without Eddie’s participation; however, it is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony what specifically Eddie did or did not do in regard to switching the trucks. After Petitioner failed to switch the trucks on Monday as directed, he was given a written reprimand for insubordination by Mr. Aliotti. The written reprimand, which is referred to as a Counseling Sheet (see Exhibit P4), stated: “[Petitioner] will switch trucks tonite [sic] 2/11/02 or [he] will not be working 2/12/02. Day off without pay.” Petitioner testified that he did not switch the trucks even after the directive on the Counseling Sheet. It is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony whether he was suspended without pay on February 12, 2002. According to Petitioner, Eddie was not reprimanded for the incident. It is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony whether a reprimand was appropriate for Eddie because it is unknown whether Mr. Aliotti also told Eddie to switch the trucks and, as stated above, it is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony what specifically Eddie did or did not do to frustrate the truck switching. Eddie, like Petitioner, is an African-American male. Attendance Issues in March 2002 (Complaint, Counts I and II) The other allegations of discrimination in the Complaint relate to discipline imposed on Petitioner for his unexcused absences from work on several occasions in March 2002. Petitioner submitted a written request for a half-day of leave on Friday, March 1, 2002, in which he stated that he needed to “go out of town to attend a funeral” because of a “death in [his] family.” See Exhibit P1, at page 3. That request was approved, and Petitioner was expected to be back at work on Monday, March 4, 2002. Petitioner attended the funeral of his brother in Largo, Florida, on Saturday, March 2, 2002. Later that same day, he traveled to Madison, Florida, to attend funeral services for his uncle. See Exhibits P2 and P3. For reasons that are unclear in the record, Petitioner did not return to work on Monday, March 4, 2002, as he was expected to do. If a driver was going to be unexpectedly absent from work, he or she was required to let the boss know before 7:00 a.m. so that a substitute or “on-call” driver could be contacted to take over the absent driver’s route. Getting another driver to take over the absent driver's route was important to FMS because some of the packages that the company delivers have to get to the customer by 10:30 a.m. Petitioner understood the importance of this requirement. According to Petitioner, he tried to call his boss before 7:00 a.m. on Monday to let him know that he would not be coming into work, but he was not able to reach his boss until several hours after 7:00 a.m. Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence to corroborate his testimony that he attempted to call his boss prior to 7:00 a.m. on Monday, and the documents introduced by Petitioner include conflicting statements as to whether Petitioner ever called on that date.2 Nevertheless, Petitioner’s testimony on this issue is accepted. When Petitioner returned to work on Tuesday, March 5, 2002, he was suspended for the day and, according to Petitioner, his delivery route was taken away. The Warning Letter that was received into evidence (Exhibit P1, at page 1) references the suspension, but not Petitioner’s route being taken away. According to Petitioner, his delivery route was given to a white female, whose identity Petitioner did not know. Thereafter, Petitioner was given menial tasks such as sweeping the floor and taking out the trash, although he also helped load packages onto the delivery trucks in the morning. Petitioner submitted a written request for leave on March 19 and 20, 2002, because he planned to be in Kentucky on those dates. Petitioner stated in the request that “I will be back to work on the [sic] 3-21.” See Exhibit P1, at page 2. The leave requested by Petitioner was approved, and he was expected to be back at work on March 21, 2002. Petitioner got a “late start” on his drive back from Kentucky, which caused him to miss work on March 21, 2002. According to Petitioner, he used his cellular phone to call his boss before 7:00 a.m. on March 21, 2002, to let him know that he would not be coming into work, but he was not able to reach his boss until 7:30 a.m. Petitioner did not present any credible evidence, such as his cellular phone records, to corroborate his claim that he attempted to call prior to 7:00 a.m. Petitioner’s testimony on this issue was not persuasive. The record does not reflect what, if any, discipline Petitioner received for not calling prior to the start of his shift to report that he would not be coming into work on March 21, 2002. Petitioner’s pay was not reduced at any point during his employment with FMS even though, according to Petitioner, his primary job duties were changed from driving a delivery truck to sweeping the floors and taking out the trash. Petitioner continued to work at FMS until April or May 2002 when he was injured on the job while lifting a box. Petitioner’s Post-FMS Activities and Employment After his injury, Petitioner could not and did not work for approximately one year. During that period, Petitioner collected workers' compensation at the rate of $500 every two weeks.3 Approximately one year after his injury, Petitioner’s doctor allowed him to return to work on “light duty.” Thereafter, in April or May 2003, Petitioner tried to return to work with FMS but, according to Petitioner, he was told that there were no available “light duty” positions. That effectively ended Petitioner’s employment relationship with FMS. The Complaint does not allege that FMS’s failure to re-hire Petitioner was a discriminatory employment practice, nor is there any credible evidence in the record that would support such a claim. From April/May 2003 to approximately March 2004, Petitioner held only one job. He worked for approximately one week cleaning floors at a nursing home, but he left that position because of his back problems. After leaving the floor cleaning job, Petitioner did not actively look for other employment. He briefly attended a training class to become a security guard, but he did not complete the class after learning that he would not be able to be licensed as a security guard “because of his prior record.” In approximately March 2004, Petitioner was hired by a former acquaintance to work as a driver for a mortgage company. In that position, Petitioner is paid $11 per hour and he typically works 40 hours per week, which equates to gross pay of $880 every two weeks. As of the date of the hearing, Petitioner was still employed by the mortgage company. Lack of Evidence Regarding Similarly Situated Employees Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding any “similarly situated” employees, i.e., employees who engaged in conduct that was the same as or similar to that for which Petitioner was disciplined.4 Although Petitioner testified that he “had heard” of situations where other employees had “put a manager off,” rather than immediately doing what the manager told them to do, he was not able to offer any specific examples of such insubordination. Petitioner also presented no credible evidence regarding how other employees (of any race) were disciplined for conduct that was the same as or similar to that for which Petitioner was disciplined.5

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint against FMS. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2004.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.65440.15760.01760.11
# 1
PETA-GAYE MORRIS vs AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC., 10-001797 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Apr. 02, 2010 Number: 10-001797 Latest Update: Oct. 27, 2010

The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unfair labor practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race and retaliating against Petitioner, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes (2008).

Findings Of Fact On September 28, 2005, Respondent AirTran Airways hired Petitioner, who is Black, as a customer service agent. During her entire term of employment, Petitioner was assigned to Respondent's station in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Between January and June of 2006, Petitioner was issued five attendance warnings. During the same period, Petitioner was issued two written warnings that related to other violations of company policy.2 Nevertheless, on August 6, 2007, Petitioner was promoted to the position of station supervisor. Several months after her promotion, Petitioner was issued a "final warning" and suspended for three days. This occurred after an internal fraud investigation revealed that on several occasions, Petitioner received insufficient funds from customers in connection with round-trip and business class upgrades. Following the "final warning," Petitioner's employment was uneventful until February or March of 2008. At that point, Dan Mellgren, who had been employed with Respondent for approximately eight years, transferred to Fort Lauderdale from Chicago and assumed the position of station manager. Petitioner's claims of racial discrimination and retaliation relate solely to Mr. Mellgren. As explained during the final hearing, a station supervisor, the position held by Petitioner, is subordinate to one or more duty managers. In turn, duty managers report to the station manager, and the station manager reports to the director of the southern region. Mr. Mellgren admits that upon taking over as the Fort Lauderdale station manager, he made the decision that "swipe cards," which were limited in number (four or five) and permitted parking in a preferred lot closer to the terminal, would be distributed based on seniority. In addition, one swipe card was reserved for a supervisor who frequently ran work- related errands. As a result of Mr. Mellgren's change in policy, Petitioner lost her swipe card and was thereafter required to park in the regular employee lot. Although Petitioner claims that the reassignment of swipe cards was racially motivated, there is no credible evidence supporting the allegation. According to Petitioner, Mr. Mellgren committed other discriminatory acts. For example, Petitioner claims that she was not permitted to bring her children to the weekly staff meetings (which took place on her day off), while at least one white employee was permitted to do so. In contrast, Mr. Mellgren testified that all employees, including Petitioner, were authorized to bring well-behaved children to a staff meeting if said meeting occurred on the employee's day off. Mr. Mellgren further testified that at no time did he prevent Petitioner from bringing her children to a staff meeting. The undersigned accepts Mr. Mellgren's testimony as credible with respect to this issue. As an additional allegation of discriminatory conduct, Petitioner claims that Mr. Mellgren required her, on one occasion, to work eight hours without a lunch break. While Mr. Mellgren did not deny that this occurred, he explained that in the airline industry, customer service agents and supervisors will occasionally miss lunch breaks during peak hours. Any such missed lunch break is recorded in an "exception log," which enables the employee to obtain additional compensation. The undersigned accepts Mr. Mellgren's explanation concerning the incident and concludes that any deprivation of a lunch break was due solely to busy conditions at the airport. Petitioner further alleges that shortly after Mr. Mellgren's transfer to Fort Lauderdale, Mr. Mellgren forged her name on a security badge sign-out form. Mr. Mellgren testified, credibly, that this did not occur. Pursuant to AirTran Airways policy, which is outlined in the "AirTran Crew Member Handbook," an employee who is experiencing harassment based upon race or other protected classification is directed to handle the situation by first confronting the harasser politely. If the harassment continues, or if the aggrieved employee believes that a confrontation could result in harm, the employee should contact a supervisor or manager. If the complaint involves the employee's supervisor or manager, the employee is directed to take the complaint to the next level of management or to the human resources department. Petitioner admits that she did not report her issues with Mr. Mellgren to AirTran's human resources department or to a level of management superior to Mr. Mellgren. Petitioner did, however, report at least some of her problems with Mr. Mellgren to Everton Harris, a duty manager whom Petitioner trusted.3 There is no evidence that Mr. Harris communicated Petitioner's concerns to the human resources department, a superior, or anyone else. It is undisputed that on March 27, 2008, Petitioner arrived at the Fort Lauderdale station after attending training in Atlanta. Petitioner noticed that one of the gates was busy, so she decided to assist two AirTran customer service agents (Eduardo Baez and Donna Heghinian) who were working the counter. Shortly thereafter, in violation of AirTran policy, a revenue passenger (i.e., a paying customer) was bumped from a flight to accommodate a non-revenue flight attendant employed with Spirit Airlines. In the following days, AirTran's Internal Audit and Fraud Department investigated the incident to determine the identity of the employee responsible for replacing the revenue customer with the non-revenue flight attendant. During the investigation, statements were obtained from Mr. Baez and Ms. Heghinian, both of whom implicated Petitioner as the responsible party. Petitioner also provided a statement in which she vehemently denied responsibility. The findings of the investigation were subsequently provided to Ms. Kellye Terrell, an Employee Relations Manager with AirTran. Ms. Terrell is African-American. After reviewing the findings, Ms. Terrell determined that Petitioner should be separated from her employment with AirTran due to two violations of company policy.4 Ms. Terrell drafted a termination letter, which was provided to Petitioner on April 7, 2008. Although the termination letter was actually signed by Mr. Mellgren, it should be noted that Mr. Mellgren did not participate in the decision to terminate Petitioner. In addition, Mr. Harris, the only person to whom Petitioner communicated any of her complaints regarding Mr. Mellgren, did not participate in Petitioner's termination. At the time of Petitioner's termination, neither Ms. Terrell, nor any other decision-maker was aware of any complaints made by Petitioner to Mr. Harris concerning Mr. Mellgren. The undersigned finds that Respondent's decision to terminate Petitioner was based upon a good faith belief that Petitioner violated company policy by bumping a revenue passenger, as well as Petitioner's previous disciplinary history. Petitioner offered unrebutted testimony that her position was filled by a Caucasian female.5 The undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race. The undersigned also finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondent retaliated against Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2010.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
# 2
ROBINSON NELSON vs ALUTIIQ-MELE, LLC, 08-001436 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 20, 2008 Number: 08-001436 Latest Update: Oct. 10, 2008

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, when Petitioner was an employee of Respondent.

Findings Of Fact From November 2004 until early 2008, which period includes all times relevant to this case, Petitioner Robinson Nelson ("Nelson") worked for Respondent Alutiiq-Mele, LLC ("AML") as a security guard. Nelson, who is black, alleges that on two discrete occasions, AML unlawfully discriminated against him based on race, once denying him an overtime shift which he requested, and the other time refusing to assign him "equal work hours." The first incident allegedly took place on "or about March 1, 2005." According to Nelson, he called his supervisor that day, using a telephone at his workstation, to ask that he be scheduled to work overtime on his day off. The supervisor, Nelson claims, told him that overtime had been "eliminated" and denied Nelson's request. Shortly thereafter, as Nelson tells it, the supervisor called Nelson's coworker, Nadja Abreu, and offered her the overtime that Nelson had just been denied. Nelson's story cannot be squared with AML's records, which the undersigned considers reliable and truthful and hence credits. Nelson's timesheet for the week of February 27 through March 5, 2005, shows (and it is found) that he worked all seven days that week, putting in 40 regular hours and 26 overtime hours. Ms. Abreu's timesheet for the same period shows (and it is found) that she worked four days, accruing 40 regular hours and four overtime hours. At hearing, Nelson claimed (apparently for the first time) that the telephone conversation with his supervisor regarding overtime had not occurred on or about March 1, 2005—— as he had alleged originally in his Charge of Discrimination (signed on November 20, 2005) and maintained as recently as the Joint Prehearing Stipulation (dated May 30, 2008)——but rather some two weeks later, on or about March 15, 2005. Again, however, credible contemporaneous records belie Nelson's claim. A payroll document shows (and it is found) that Nelson and Ms. Abreu each worked 40 regular hours during the week of March 13, 2005——and neither put in overtime. (Moreover, Nelson did not work on March 15 and 16, 2005, which means that, if Nelson called his supervisor on March 15, as he asserted at hearing, then he likely would not have been at his workstation at the time, which is inconsistent with his testimony that he placed the call while at work.) Regarding the second alleged incident of discrimination, Nelson claims that on Monday, October 31, 2005, shortly before 9:00 a.m., he received a telephone call at home from his supervisor, who wanted to know why Nelson had failed to report for work that morning. Nelson says he told his supervisor that he had not been scheduled to work that day, and he could not work because he was babysitting. Nelson complains that, in connection with this situation, AML "denied" him regular work hours because of his race. In addition to being facially illogical, Nelson's claim of discrimination is contradicted by reliable and persuasive documentary evidence. First, AML's payroll record shows (and it is found) that Nelson worked four hours on Sunday, October 30, and seven-and-a-half hours each day the next Tuesday through Friday, making a total 34 regular hours during the week of October 30, 2005. While this was not quite a full-time workweek, that Nelson worked fewer than 40 hours one week is not, of itself, proof that AML "denied" him six hours of work. In fact, AML did not "deny" Nelson a work opportunity, as other contemporaneous documents——not to mention Nelson's own testimony——show. In evidence are two work schedules pertaining to the week of October 30, 2005. One was printed on October 28, 2005, and the other on October 30, 2005. There are a number of differences between them; each, however, notes that "scheduled hours are subject to change as needed." On the earlier schedule, Nelson was to be off on Monday, October 31, 2005. On the subsequent schedule, he was to work from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. that day. Had Nelson reported to work on October 31, 2005, as (ultimately) scheduled——and as he was asked to do——Nelson would have worked more than 40 hours the week of October 30, 2005. Ultimate Factual Determinations Taken as a whole, the evidence in this case is either insufficient to establish that AML discriminated unlawfully against Nelson on the basis of his race; or it proves, affirmatively, that AML did not, in all likelihood, unlawfully discriminate against him. Either way, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that AML did not violate the civil rights laws in its treatment of Nelson while he was an employee of AML.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AML not liable to Nelson for racial discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141 Christine L. Wilson, Esquire Jennifer A. Schwartz, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
# 3
HENRY L. ROBERTS vs ARGENBRIGHT SECURITY, INC., 03-004711 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 15, 2003 Number: 03-004711 Latest Update: Mar. 24, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully terminated the employment of Petitioner on July 31, 2000, because of his race and/or age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2001).

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Argenbright Security, Inc., now known as Cognisa Security, Inc., is an Atlanta, Georgia-based corporation that provides commercial security services to customers on a nationwide basis. Respondent employs security officers who are placed on assignments at customers' premises. Relevant to this action, Respondent maintains an office in Orlando, Florida, to support its commercial security services in Central Florida. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Petitioner was employed with Respondent from May 1998 to July 31, 2000. Petitioner is an African-American male who was 50 years of age upon hiring and 52 years of age upon his discharge from Respondent's employ. During his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was provided with Respondent's employment policies, including the equal employment opportunity policy which prohibits all types of unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Throughout his employment with Respondent, Petitioner worked as a district manager and was supervised by Buckwalter, who was Respondent's vice president and general manager of the Southeast region. Buckwalter made the decision to hire Petitioner and made the decision to discharge him. Based on a decline in business and a lack of work, Buckwalter himself was discharged by Respondent in January 2002. Petitioner's job duties as a district manager included supervising Respondent's account managers who managed security officer accounts and ensured overall customer satisfaction. Petitioner was responsible for supervising the management of approximately 60 customer accounts in Orlando, Jacksonville, Tampa, and St. Petersburg. Petitioner supervised a staff of approximately 33 employees, excluding Respondent's security officers. The list of Respondent's customers in Petitioner's region included, but was not limited to, the following entities: the City of Orlando, U.S. Airways, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Orange County, C&L Bank, Citrus Center (also known as Tricony Management), Florida Power Corporation, Solivita (also known as Avitar), and Ocwen. Respondent alleges that Petitioner's performance deteriorated during the last six months of his employment, and as a result, Petitioner was discharged on July 31, 2000. Buckwalter testified that he made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment based on his receipt of numerous customer complaints regarding Petitioner's management of accounts and failure to resolve problems, numerous complaints from Petitioner's subordinates regarding Petitioner's management style and lack of guidance, and Petitioner's failure to properly perform his administrative duties. Buckwalter received eight to ten complaints from Respondent's customers about Petitioner's management of their accounts. Several of Respondent's customers repeatedly complained about Petitioner's management skills. Buckwalter received complaints from Respondent's customers regarding Petitioner's lack of attentiveness towards their accounts, failure to conduct client meetings, and inability and unwillingness to resolve client problems. When Buckwalter discussed the customer complaints with Petitioner, Petitioner sometimes acknowledged the seriousness of the concerns and sometimes became defensive and dismissed the complaints as unreasonable client demands. Two of Respondent's customers, Tricony Management and C&L Bank, specifically demanded that Petitioner be removed from the management of their accounts based on his lack of service and "cavalier" attitude toward their requests. Linda Mansfield, who was the client contact at Tricony Management, sent an e-mail complaint to Respondent's business development manager, Warren Bovich, in regard to Petitioner and Robert Stevenson on February 8, 2000. Tricony Management did not cancel its account with Respondent. However, they insisted that Robert Stevenson and Petitioner be removed from the account. Petitioner admitted that the following customers complained regarding his servicing of or management of their accounts: Ocwen, Citrus Center/Tricony Management, City of Orlando, Avitar/Solivita, C&L Bank, and Florida Power Corporation. Petitioner disagreed with the substance of those complaints. Petitioner also admitted that he had a personality conflict with a Citrus Center employee. Regarding the City of Orlando account under Petitioner's supervision, Petitioner admitted that employee turnover was a problem, that the account was not meeting the budgeted goals, and that Respondent's employees routinely missed their scheduled work shifts. Petitioner further admitted that Avitar/Solivita was upset with him about his unauthorized recruiting efforts. In addition to the customer complaints, Buckwalter received approximately 30 to 35 complaints from Petitioner's subordinates regarding Petitioner's management style. Petitioner's subordinates complained that Petitioner was not concerned with their career development, failed to provide them with timely performance evaluations, failed to conduct staff meetings on a routine basis, failed to attend staff meetings which he had scheduled, did not provide proper support and mentoring for customer accounts, and was generally unavailable to them based on his lack of time in the office. Petitioner admitted that a subordinate complained to Buckwalter regarding Petitioner's failure to provide him with a performance evaluation in a timely manner. Petitioner also acknowledged that Buckwalter received a complaint from Respondent's employee regarding his failure to properly process administrative paperwork. Petitioner admitted that he does not know whether Buckwalter received additional complaints from his subordinates regarding his management. Accordingly, Buckwalter's testimony that he received 30 to 35 complaints from Petitioner's subordinates regarding Petitioner's management is credible. Buckwalter's decision to discharge Petitioner was also based, in part, on Petitioner's failure to properly process administrative paperwork. Buckwalter informed Petitioner, in writing, that his neglect of his administrative duties was unacceptable. Buckwalter also determined that on several occasions, Petitioner provided misleading information about his whereabouts by falsely reporting that he was out of the office conducting client appointments. In addition to Petitioner, Buckwalter supervised several other of Respondent's district managers, including Blake Beach (Beach) and Scott Poe (Poe)--both of whom were formerly employed as district managers in South Florida. While serving as Beach's supervisor, Buckwalter received a single complaint from Respondent's customer, United Airlines (United), regarding Beach's sending of an inappropriate e-mail. United's compliant did not concern Beach's servicing or management of United's account. Other than United's single compliant, none of Respondent's other customers submitted complaints regarding Beach. Based on United's complaint regarding Beach's inappropriate e-mail, Respondent transferred Beach from South Florida to the Baltimore/Washington, D.C., area. While serving as Poe's supervisor, Buckwalter received complaints from two of Respondent's customers (in the South Florida region) regarding Poe's management of their accounts. Because Poe had been successful with other accounts, Buckwalter believed that the two complaints might have been based on a personality conflict. Buckwalter decided to transfer Poe from the district manager position in South Florida to the district manager position in Central Florida. Buckwalter never received complaints from Poe's subordinates regarding Poe's management or supervision. After Poe became the district manager in Central Florida, Respondent received additional complaints from several customers regarding Poe's handling of their accounts. Based on these complaints, Buckwalter made the decision to terminate Poe's employment with Respondent. Buckwalter made the decision to discharge Poe and Petitioner based on a similar number of complaints received from customers in their respective regions; but unlike Poe, Petitioner was discharged for additional reasons: the numerous complaints from his subordinates and the neglect of his administrative duties. Robert Matecki, who was 55 years old when he was hired, replaced Petitioner as Respondent's district manager in Orlando. Petitioner does not allege that Respondent discriminated against him at any time prior to Petitioner's termination on July 31, 2000. Petitioner does not contend that Buckwalter (the decision-maker in this case) ever made any discriminatory comments to him. Petitioner admits that he does not know what factors Respondent considered in making the decision to terminate his employment. Buckwalter testified that he did not consider Petitioner's age and race in making the decision to discharge Petitioner. Instead, he based the decision on customer and subordinate complaints about Petitioner's management style and Petitioner's failure to perform his administrative duties. Because Petitioner admits that he does not know upon what factors Buckwalter based his decision, Buckwalter's testimony is undisputed. Petitioner bases his allegations on his own personal beliefs about his performance and his disagreement with the substance of the complaints made by Respondent's customers and his subordinates.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which denies Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismisses his complaint with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne Johnson, Esquire DeCiccio, Johnson, Herzfeld & Rubin 652 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789 John S. Snelling, Esquire James P. Ferguson, Jr., Esquire Duane Morris, LLP 1180 West Peachtree Street, Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
# 4
REZA M. MAHALLATY vs CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, 11-003849 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 01, 2011 Number: 11-003849 Latest Update: Oct. 03, 2012

The Issue Whether Respondent, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store (Respondent), committed the unlawful employment practice, as alleged, in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Reza Mahallaty (Petitioner), be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner did not testify in this case. Based upon the undisputed testimony of the witnesses, Petitioner was employed by Respondent and served as a senior assistant manager (SAM). At all times material to the allegations of the case, Respondent employed Petitioner. As a nationally recognized purveyor of food and goods to the public, Respondent presumably employs more than 15 employees. At all times material to this matter, Respondent used a management structure at its stores that included managers in training, assistant managers, senior assistant managers, and general managers. Persons seeking to become general managers typically work their way through the ranks and serve as a SAM before promotion to general manager of a store. On or before August 2010, Petitioner sought a position with Respondent as a general manager. He did not get the promotion. Thereafter, he filed the underlying complaint with FCHR. The complaint stated: I have been employed by Cracker Barrel Old Country Store since June 26, 2006. My most recent position is Senior Associate Manager. I hereby allege that I have been discriminated against due to my race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. The foregoing allegations were made under penalty of perjury and for purposes of this case have been accepted as to the facts alleged, but not as to the legal conclusion of discrimination. Petitioner presented no evidence as to his race or national origin. Petitioner’s Petition for Relief reiterated his conclusion that he had been discriminated against based upon his claim of being Iranian and of Persian origin. In addition to not having received promotions, Petitioner included complaints about retaliation that were not addressed by the FCHR. As previously indicated, retaliation issues are not part of the determination that was presented for administrative review. With regard to Petitioner’s attempt(s) to be promoted prior to August 2010, Petitioner did not present evidence that he was more qualified than the applicant Respondent chose. Respondent uses an interview process that rates the candidates for general manager by a selection team. The selection team looks at the candidates’ credentials, history with the company, and responses to the interview questions to rate each applicant for the position sought. Petitioner did not present evidence that he had achieved a higher score in the rating process than the applicant chosen. Petitioner did not present evidence that Respondent knew or should have known Petitioner was the best qualified candidate for the position of general manager. Petitioner did not present evidence that Respondent selected a candidate for general manager that had fewer years of employment with the company than Petitioner. Petitioner did not present evidence that any general manager Respondent selected in preference to Petitioner was of a race or national origin that received special deference over Petitioner. Other than Petitioner’s assertion that he must have been denied promotional opportunities due to his race and national origin, Petitioner failed to establish bias on Respondent’s part. To the contrary, Respondent asserted that Petitioner was not qualified to be a general manager because he was unwilling to master and fully support the company’s core operating systems, the company’s philosophies, and the company’s initiatives. Petitioner presented no credible evidence to refute Respondent’s assertion.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Shane T. Munoz, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP 101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 900 Tampa, Florida 33602 Reza Mahallaty 656 English Lake Drive Winter Garden, Florida 34787 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (2) 29 U.S.C 62342 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68760.01760.10760.11
# 5
MARY COTTRELL vs CONCORD CUSTOM CLEANERS, 11-004572 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 13, 2011 Number: 11-004572 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2012

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based upon her race.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, an African-American female, submitted an application for employment directly with the store manager, Jerry Wienhoff. Mr. Wienhoff personally interviewed Petitioner and hired her within 48 hours of her application for the afternoon clerk position. She began working for Respondent on July 21, 2009. Petitioner received a notice of a disciplinary issue on March 9, 2010. Respondent cited Petitioner for failure to complete her work in a timely manner. Petitioner was warned that if her work did not improve, her employment would be terminated. Not long after issuance of this disciplinary notice, Mr. Wienhoff, the store manager and Pensacola Regional Manager for 17 years, began receiving complaints about Petitioner's behavior. One complaint came from a long-time customer, while another came from a co-employee. The complaints were that Petitioner treated them rudely. During her employment, Petitioner complained that her work duties were heavier than those of the morning clerk. Mr. Wienhoff relieved Petitioner of certain duties related to tagging each garment dropped off during the afternoon shift. None of the other stores out of the four area stores had similar requests to remove this duty. Petitioner testified that the morning clerk, a white female, Amanda Sidner, was given a lighter workload. Petitioner further testified that Ms. Sidner was given additional hours during Petitioner's vacation, yet Petitioner was not given additional hours during Ms. Sidner's vacation. Mr. Wienhoff testified and Petitioner admitted that she took vacation days during the same week that Ms. Sidner took vacation days. Further, Petitioner was given additional hours during the days Ms. Sidner was on vacation, and the balance of those hours that Petitioner was not interested in working went to Petitioner's daughter, Anastarsia Martinez, also an African- American female. On December 14, 2010, Petitioner was issued her second and final corrective action report by Mr. Wienhoff. At that time, Mr. Wienhoff terminated Petitioner due to the ongoing complaints about her behavior in the workplace. Respondent also established the racial composition of every employee under Mr. Wienhoff's supervision. The company profile in Pensacola shows a racially diverse mix of employees. Petitioner candidly testified that she never heard Mr. Wienhoff make racially insensitive comments to her or any other employee. Her claim of discrimination is based upon favoritism. She believes that other employees were treated better than she, but did not tie this perceived favorable treatment to their race.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that no act of discrimination was committed by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Douberley & Cicero 1000 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 590 Sunrise, Florida 33323 Mary Cottrell 776 Backwoods Road Century, Florida 32535 Christopher J. Rush, Esquire Christopher J. Rush & Associates, P.A. 1880 North Congress Avenue, Suite 206 Boynton Beach, Florida 33426 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.02760.10760.11
# 6
MIKE OSTROM vs BEACHERS LODGE CONDO ASSOCIATION, 12-003488 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Oct. 23, 2012 Number: 12-003488 Latest Update: Apr. 04, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mike Ostrom, was employed by Respondent, Beachers Lodge Condo Association, Inc., as a maintenance man for approximately seven years until his termination on March 23, 2012. Respondent is a Florida condominium association, located at 6970 A1A South, St. Augustine, Florida 32080. James W. Gilliam is the licensed community association manager for Respondent, is 78 years old, and has many years of property management experience. Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination on the grounds of his age (55) and disability (eye surgery) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) on March 23, 2012. Following an investigation, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause on September 27, 2012. Petitioner filed a timely appeal of the Commission's determination on October 19, 2012. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and a final hearing was conducted on December 11, 2012, in St. Augustine, Florida. Petitioner's work as a maintenance man involved numerous duties, including general maintenance to the grounds and buildings, painting, repairing balconies and other structures not requiring a general contractor, electrical work, and maintaining the pool. Petitioner worked alone much of the time. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Gilliam as the association manager, Petitioner had a good working relationship with the former manager, Steve Burdick. Under Mr. Burdick's supervision, Petitioner had more freedom to perform his maintenance work without what he calls "interference." Mr. Gilliam is more of a "hands on" supervisor than the previous manager had been. Petitioner was resistant to the constant checking on his work by Mr. Gilliam. He believed Mr. Burdick recognized his experience and left him alone to perform his daily tasks with passive supervision. Mr. Gilliam, as a new manager with Respondent, was given instruction by the association president, Joanne Dice, on behalf of the board of directors, to more closely supervise the maintenance staff. In Petitioner, Mr. Gilliam saw a good employee who "liked to do things his way." Mr. Gilliam estimates that Petitioner would do about 90 percent of the assigned tasks differently from how he would prefer them done. Mr. Gilliam tried to get Petitioner to come around to his way of doing things because he was responsible to the board of directors for properly maintaining the property. Mr. Gilliam believes he did not harass Petitioner, but does remember upsetting him on one occasion when he called him "Michael" rather than his given name of "Mike." After Petitioner made clear the fact that he preferred to be called "Mike," Mr. Gilliam never called him "Michael" again. Mr. Gilliam gave clear instructions as to how he expected the tasks assigned to Petitioner be performed, yet Petitioner continued to do things his way. Mr. Gilliam often had a certain order or priority for performing required maintenance tasks which Petitioner regularly failed to follow. After Petitioner had eye surgery and was placed on limited duty by his physician, Dr. Oktavec, Mr. Gilliam confirmed the light detail in a letter dated March 19, 2013, so that Petitioner would not suffer further injury to his eye through over exertion. Ms. Dice was elected president of the board of the condo association in 2010. She lives in Gainesville, Florida. On three separate occasions (July 26, October 27, and November 3, 2011), she drove from Gainesville to St. Augustine to discuss Petitioner's complaints of alleged harassment by Mr. Gilliam. She believed that Mr. Gilliam's job was to establish priorities and assign tasks to be completed. Sometimes, due to inclement weather and other factors, priorities would have to shift. Ms. Dice observed that Petitioner complained that he did not need anyone to tell him how to perform his job. She noted that Beachers Lodge Condominiums is a large property that requires the cooperation of all employees along with the board of directors to maintain it to the standards expected by the owners and their guests. For a year, Ms. Dice and Mr. Gilliam tried to help Petitioner improve his performance, eliminate any deficiencies, and brighten his attitude, all to no avail. A few months after the final meeting Ms. Dice held with Petitioner, she agreed with Mr. Gilliam that Petitioner's behavior could no longer be tolerated and that he should be terminated for cause. The March 23, 2012, letter from Mr. Gilliam terminating Petitioner's employment was explicit in its reasons for termination. The letter offered 13 reasons for the termination and addressed all charges made by Petitioner against Mr. Gilliam. The reasons may be summarized as follows: On October 11, 2011, Mr. Gilliam gave Petitioner a list of daily and weekly duties which he acknowledged having received. Petitioner complained about receiving such a list. On October 25, 2011, Mr. Gilliam gave Petitioner a disciplinary letter for having falsified his timecard on October 19, when Mr. Gilliam observed Petitioner driving down A1A at a time he said he was still at work. Petitioner requested owners send letters to Mr. Gilliam that he was giving Petitioner too much direction and that Petitioner was doing a good job, another indicator of not taking direction. On October 14, 2011, Petitioner did not complete a washing task he was assigned, but went on to perform another task he deemed more important. Again, on March 13, 2012, Mr. Gilliam issued Petitioner a letter addressing corrective action for not following instructions. Petitioner accused Mr. Gilliam of jerking him by the coat in front of witnesses. No witnesses came forward to support this claim. Mr. Gilliam listed issues with Petitioner's work ethic in the March 13, 2012 letter. Petitioner had broken a floor during cleaning which was cited in the March 13 letter. Another refusal to take guidance was listed in the March 13 letter. Mr. Gilliam advised Petitioner that that the failure to correct his behavior concerning following direction would lead to "additional correction." Petitioner refused to sign this letter. Petitioner had been previously advised that he was to engage in light activity based upon his physician's prescription, and as set forth in a March 19 letter from Mr. Gilliam. On March 23, 2012, a St. Johns County deputy came to the office of the association and advised Mr. Gilliam that Petitioner had filed a complaint for assault against him, which the deputy determined not to be a criminal matter. Petitioner applied for unemployment compensation after receiving the March 23 letter terminating his employment. His claim was denied by the Department of Economic Opportunity, since he had been terminated for misconduct. He is currently in the process of losing his home and has only found work with his church for 7-8 hours a week. Petitioner admits that he stood up for himself when he disagreed with Mr. Gilliam by cursing him, calling him names, and writing complaint letters to condo owners and board members. Petitioner claims he was discriminated against by his 78-year-old boss, Mr. Gilliam, who allegedly said, "if you were 30 and not 50, you could do this job better." This alleged statement was not corroborated by any witnesses and was denied by Mr. Gilliam. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Gilliam discriminated against him by making fun of him after he had eye surgery. The letter dated March 19 shows that Respondent recognized the eye injury and surgery and warned Petitioner to engage in only light duty as ordered by his doctor. No witnesses testified to the alleged derogatory comments concerning Petitioner's vision. Respondent was never made aware of any claim of discrimination against Petitioner based upon his alleged disability. Their understanding was that Petitioner needed surgery on his eyes which was performed successfully by his physician and corrected the problem. Petitioner was not replaced by a younger employee when he was terminated. Respondent continued with just one full-time maintenance man and two part-timers. The roster of employees for Respondent shows that the remaining maintenance men are ages 56, 45, and 23. Petitioner is seeking $800,000 in lost wages, yet provided no evidence to support an award of that magnitude should he be successful in his discrimination claim.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James W. Gilliam Beachers Lodge Condo Association, Inc. 6970 A1A South St. Augustine, Florida 32080 Mike Ostrom 900 South Rodriguez Street St. Augustine, Florida 32095 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.02760.10760.11
# 7
KENNETH W. JOHNSON vs DAYTONA INN BEACH RESORT, 09-001592 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Wewahitchka, Florida Mar. 27, 2009 Number: 09-001592 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race.

Findings Of Fact In February 2006, Respondent hired Petitioner, an African-American male, knowing that he had a criminal record. Respondent employed Petitioner as a porter. Respondent employed other African-American and Caucasian people as porters, housekeepers, and janitors. Initially, Respondent paid Petitioner $7.25 per hour. Respondent was impressed with Petitioner's enthusiasm and willingness to perform physically demanding work. Respondent gave Petitioner a reward for always being on time and not being absent. Respondent eventually raised Petitioner's salary to $10.00 per hour or $400 per week. Respondent gave Petitioner the promotion so that he and his wife could qualify for a mortgage. Respondent helped Petitioner pay off his wife's credit card debt for the same reason. After Petitioner and his family moved into their new home, Carol Collett, Respondent's Caucasian General Manager, helped Petitioner furnish the house. Ms. Collett also attended the christening of Petitioner's new baby. Ms. Collett tried to help Petitioner as much as she could because she believed that everyone deserves a second chance. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked the night shift when there was no supervisor on the premises. Petitioner's position required Ms. Collett's trust because his duties included taking care of the front desk. From approximately June 2007 through November 2007, Petitioner worked an average of 62 hours per week with no overtime compensation. There is no persuasive evidence that the other porters, Caucasian and/or African-American, were paid more than Petitioner or for overtime work. Petitioner never requested a raise, but he did request to work as a janitor. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that a janitor's position was available. More importantly, Petitioner lacked the skills to perform janitorial/maintenance work for Respondent. In time, Ms. Collett noticed a change in Petitioner's behavior. On one occasion, Petitioner's wife informed Ms. Collett that Petitioner had not come home with his pay check. On or about November 3, 2007, Ms. Collett confronted Petitioner about his declining job performance and his suspicious activities involving hotel guests. Petitioner denied that he was using or selling drugs or that he brought hookers to the job site. During the conversation, Petitioner began to cry, stating that he had let Ms. Collett down. Petitioner said that he "would rather to go back jail where life was easier and he would not have the pressure of daily life." Ms. Collett did not have a chance to terminate Petitioner because he left voluntarily. Petitioner came back to the hotel one time to pick up his last pay check. At that time, Ms. Collett confronted Petitioner about some money that was missing from the front office. The office had been locked the night before, but someone had entered it through the ceiling from the adjoining room. Petitioner could not find another job. He is now in prison.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth W. Johnson, DC #646344 Gulf Correctional Institution 699 Ike Steele Road Wewahitchka, Florida 32465 Jerome D. Mitchell, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 1326 South Ridgewood Avenue Suite 8 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (4) 120.569760.01760.10760.11
# 8
DARCELLA D. DESCHAMBAULT vs TOWN OF EATONVILLE, 08-002596 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida May 28, 2008 Number: 08-002596 Latest Update: May 14, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her color and/or her age.

Findings Of Fact The Town is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired by the Town in November 2004 as an administrative assistant to Mayor Anthony Grant. Petitioner is a dark-skinned African-American woman who was 51 years of age at the time of the hearing. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by a committee appointed by Mayor Grant. The committee included town clerk Cathlene Williams, public works director Roger Dixon, and then- chief administrative officer Dr. Ruth Barnes. Mayor Grant did not meet Petitioner until the day she started work as his administrative assistant. The mayor's administrative assistant handles correspondence, filing, appointments, and anything else the mayor requires in the day-to-day operations of his office. For more than two years, Petitioner went about her duties without incident. She never received a formal evaluation, but no testimony or documentary evidence was entered to suggest that her job performance was ever less than acceptable during this period. In about August 2007, Petitioner began to notice a difference in Mayor Grant's attitude towards her. The mayor began screaming at her at the top of his lungs, cursing at her. He was relentlessly critical of her job performance, accusing her of not completing assigned tasks. Petitioner conceded that she would "challenge" Mayor Grant when he was out of line or requested her to do something beyond her job description. She denied being disrespectful or confrontational, but agreed that she was not always as deferential as Mayor Grant preferred. During the same time period, roughly July and August 2007, Petitioner also noticed that resumes were being faxed to the Town Hall that appeared to be for her job. She asked Ms. Williams about the resumes, but Ms. Williams stated she knew nothing and told Petitioner to ask the mayor. When Petitioner questioned the mayor about the resumes, he took her into his office and asked her to do him a favor. He asked if she would work across the street in the post office for a couple of weeks, to fill in for a post office employee who was being transferred to the finance department; as a team player, Petitioner agreed to the move. While she was working as a clerk at the post office, Petitioner learned that the mayor was interviewing people for her administrative assistant position. She filed a formal complaint with the Town. For a time after that, she was forced to work half-time at the post office and half-time in the mayor's office. On or about October 22, 2007, Petitioner was formally transferred from her position as administrative assistant to the mayor to the position of postal clerk in the post office. Her salary and benefits remained the same. At the hearing, Mayor Grant testified that he moved Petitioner to the post office to lessen the stress of her job. Based on his conversations with Petitioner, he understood that Petitioner was having personal or family problems. He was not privy to the details of these problems, but had noticed for some time that Petitioner seemed to be under great stress. The post office was a much less hectic environment than the mayor's office, and would be more amenable to her condition. Ms. Williams, the town clerk, testified that the mayor told her that Petitioner was stressed and needed more lax duties than those she performed in the mayor's office. Mr. Dixon, the public works director, testified that Petitioner had indicated to him that she was under pressure, but she did not disclose the cause of that pressure. He recalled that, toward the end of her employment with the Town, Petitioner mentioned that she felt she was being discriminated against because of her skin color. Petitioner denied ever telling Mayor Grant that she was feeling stressed. She denied telling him anything about her family. Petitioner stated that the only stress she felt was caused by the disrespect and humiliation heaped upon her by Mayor Grant. Petitioner's best friend, Gina King Brooks, a business owner in the Town, testified that Petitioner would come to her store in tears over her treatment by the mayor. Petitioner told Ms. Brooks that she was being transferred to the post office against her will, was being forced to train her own replacement in the mayor's office,3 and believed that it was all because of her age and complexion. Mayor Grant testified that he called Petitioner into his office and informed her of the transfer to the post office. He did not tell her that the move was temporary. He did not view the transfer from administrative assistant to postal clerk as a demotion or involving any loss of status. Mayor Grant testified that an additional reason for the change was that he wanted a more qualified person as his administrative assistant. He acknowledged that Petitioner was actually more experienced than her eventual replacement, Jacqueline Cockerham.4 However, Petitioner's personal issues were affecting her ability to meet the sensitive deadlines placed upon her in the mayor's office. The mayor needed more reliable support in his office, and Petitioner needed a less stressful work environment. Therefore, Mayor Grant believed the move would benefit everyone involved. Mayor Grant denied that Petitioner's skin color or age had anything to do with her transfer to the post office. Petitioner was replaced in her administrative assistant position by Ms. Cockerham, a light-skinned African- American woman born on October 17, 1961. She was 46 years of age at the time of the hearing. Documents introduced by the Town at the hearing indicate the decision to hire Ms. Cockerham was made on March 26, 2008. Ms. Williams testified that she conducted the interview of Ms. Cockerham, along with a special assistant to the mayor, Kevin Bodley, who no longer works for the Town. Both Ms. Williams and Mayor Grant testified that the mayor did not meet Ms. Cockerham until the day she began work in his office. Petitioner testified that she knew the mayor had met Ms. Cockerham before she was hired by the Town, because Mayor Grant had instructed Petitioner to set up a meeting with Ms. Cockerham while Petitioner was still working in the mayor's office. Mayor Grant flatly denied having any knowledge of Ms. Cockerham prior to the time of her hiring. On this point, Mayor Grant's testimony, as supported by that of Ms. Williams, is credited. To support her allegation that Mayor Grant preferred employees with light skin, Petitioner cited his preferential treatment of an employee named Cherone Fort. Petitioner claimed that Mayor Grant required her to make a wake-up call to Ms. Fort every morning, because Ms. Fort had problems getting to work on time. Ms. Fort was a light-skinned African-American woman. Under cross-examination, Petitioner conceded that Mayor Grant and Ms. Fort were friends, and that his favoritism toward her may have had nothing to do with her skin color. Petitioner claimed that there were other examples of the mayor's "color struck" favoritism toward lighter-skinned employees, but she declined to provide specifics.5 She admitted that several dark-skinned persons worked for the Town, but countered that those persons do not work in close proximity to the mayor. As to her age discrimination claim, Petitioner testified that a persistent theme of her conversations with Mayor Grant was his general desire for a younger staff, because younger people were fresher and more creative. The mayor's expressed preference was always a concern to Petitioner. Petitioner testified that she felt degraded, demeaned and humiliated by the transfer to the post office. She has worked as an executive assistant for her entire professional career, including positions for the city manager of Gainesville and the head of pediatric genetics at the University of Florida. She believed herself unsuited to a clerical position in the post office, and viewed her transfer as punitive. In April 2008, Petitioner was transferred from the post office to a position as assistant to the town planner. Within days of this second transfer, Petitioner resigned her position as an employee of the Town. At the time of her resignation, Petitioner was being paid $15.23 per hour. Petitioner is now working for Rollins College in a position she feels is more suitable to her skills. She makes about $14.00 per hour. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that there was a personality conflict between Petitioner and Mayor Grant. Neither Petitioner nor Mayor Grant was especially forthcoming regarding the details of their working relationship, especially the cause of the friction that developed in August 2007. Neither witness was entirely credible in describing the other's actions or motivations. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's claims that Mayor Grant ranted, yelled, and was "very, very nasty" in his dealings with Petitioner.6 No other witness corroborated Mayor Grant's claim that Petitioner was under stress due to some unnamed family situation. The working relationship between Mayor Grant and Petitioner was certainly volatile, but the evidence is insufficient to permit more than speculation as to the cause of that volatility. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, due to this personality conflict, Mayor Grant wanted Petitioner transferred out of his office. He may even have used the subterfuge of a "temporary" transfer to exact Petitioner's compliance with the move. However, the purpose of this proceeding is not to pass judgment on Mayor Grant's honesty or skills as an administrator. Aside from Petitioner's suspicions, there is no solid evidence that Mayor Grant was motivated by anything other than a desire to have his office run more smoothly and efficiently. Petitioner's assertion that the mayor's preference for lighter-skinned employees was common knowledge cannot be credited without evidentiary support. Petitioner's age discrimination claim is supported only by Petitioner's recollection of conversations with Mayor Grant in which he expressed a general desire for a younger, fresher, more creative staff. Given that both Petitioner and Ms. Cockerham were experienced, middle-aged professionals, and given that Mayor Grant had nothing to do with the hiring of either employee, the five-year age difference between them does not constitute evidence of discrimination on the part of the mayor or the Town. Petitioner was not discharged from employment. Though Petitioner perceived it as a demotion, the transfer to the post office was a lateral transfer within the Town's employment hierarchy. Petitioner was paid the same salary and received the same benefits she received as an administrative assistant to the mayor. A reasonably objective observer would not consider working as a clerk in a post office to be demeaning or degrading.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Town of Eatonville did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2009.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.02760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.216
# 9
ADRIAN RICO vs DILLARD'S, 17-001550 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 14, 2017 Number: 17-001550 Latest Update: Apr. 12, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s (“Dillard’s”), discriminated against Petitioner based upon his national origin or disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).2/

Findings Of Fact Dillard’s is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Dillard’s is a department store chain. Petitioner, a Mexican male, was hired as a sales associate in the men’s department of Dillard’s store at Tallahassee’s Governor’s Square Mall on May 13, 2014. Petitioner’s job was to sell men’s fragrances directly to customers at the store. Allen Gustason was manager of the Dillard’s store at Governor’s Square Mall during the time Petitioner was employed there. Dee Thomas was the assistant store manager. Mark Kronenberger, who testified at the final hearing, was the men’s department sales manager and was Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the entire time that Petitioner worked at Dillard’s. Petitioner started at a salary of $12.00 per hour as a sales associate. His job performance and pay increases were assessed primarily on the basis of sales. On January 6, 2015, Petitioner received a raise to $12.60 per hour. On April 14, 2015, Petitioner was promoted to the position of fragrance specialist and received a raise to $14.50 per hour. Petitioner’s promotion did not change his basic duties, i.e., direct sales to customers. Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s ended on November 28, 2015. Dillard’s did not dispute Petitioner’s testimony that he was a good and effective salesperson. Petitioner developed a regular clientele of Spanish-speaking customers who liked his ability to communicate with them in their native language. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received, read, and agreed to abide by Dillard’s Associate Work Rules and General Policies, which among other things forbade insubordination by sales associates. “Insubordination” was defined to include failure to follow lawful instructions from a supervisor and engaging in contemptuous or taunting conduct that undermines the authority of management. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Petitioner claims that he is a Mexican male with a disability. The claimed disability is the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Dillard’s did not dispute that Petitioner has HIV. Petitioner claims that he was harassed by fellow employees because of his Mexican national origin. Petitioner claims that he complained to his supervisors, Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Gustason, about the harassment. Petitioner claims that no effective action was taken to curb the harassment. Petitioner described a pervasive sense of discrimination at Dillard’s of which he became conscious only after about a year of working there. He testified that he is from California and had no real concept of being discriminated against because of his Mexican heritage. It took some time for him to realize and acknowledge to himself that it was happening. However, Petitioner was unable to describe many specific instances of discriminatory behavior by fellow employees. People were “mean,” or “picked on me,” or “didn’t like me,” but few of Petitioner’s complaints pointed toward racial discrimination as opposed to personal dislike. He complained that co-workers planned parties and get-togethers away from work but never asked him along, even for Mr. Kronenberger’s birthday party, but could only speculate as to the reason for his exclusion. Petitioner testified that he was an aggressive and successful salesperson. While its salespeople are assigned to specific departments, Dillard’s allows them to cross-sell in other departments. Several of the incidents described by Petitioner began when he took customers to other departments to sell them something. The undersigned infers that at least some of the bad feelings toward Petitioner were due to his perceived “poaching” of sales from other sections of the store. Petitioner testified that an employee named Carol would yell at him, apparently without provocation, so consistently that he went out of his way to avoid crossing her path. Petitioner stated that one day Carol screamed that he was good-for-nothing and was a “damn Mexican,” in front of customers and co-workers. Petitioner testified that he had no idea why she did this because he had done nothing to provoke her. He walked away, covering his ears from her abuse. Petitioner testified that he went upstairs and spoke to Mr. Gustason about the incident but that nothing was done. Petitioner stated that he returned to the sales floor. Other employees told him that Carol had worked for Dillard’s for many years and was a friend of Mr. Gustason and that he should not expect anything to be done about her behavior. Petitioner testified that an employee named Eric, who worked in the men’s department, made fun of his accent, particularly Petitioner’s difficulty in pronouncing “Saturday.” Petitioner testified that another fellow employee, a white woman named Amber who also worked in fragrance, was constantly rude and mean to him. In front of customers, Amber would say that she did not know why Petitioner was there, that he was only good for cleaning the counters. Petitioner repeatedly complained to Mr. Kronenberger about Amber. Mr. Kronenberger told him to continue doing a good job and not to focus on Amber. Petitioner stated that Mr. Kronenberger directed Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter, but she ignored the order and continued to harass him. Petitioner stated that matters came to a head when he was helping some female customers and went to Amber’s counter one day. He reached behind her to get the fragrance the customers wanted and Amber struck him with her elbow. The customers were aghast and complained to Dillard’s management despite Petitioner’s entreaties that they let the matter drop. Petitioner and Amber were called to the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Yami Yao, the manager of women’s cosmetics. Amber denied everything. The supervisors told Petitioner and Amber to get along. They told Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter. Petitioner testified that Amber ignored the instruction and continued to harass him. Petitioner testified that on another day he was approached by a customer who wanted to pay Petitioner for a pair of shoes. Petitioner testified that he asked Mr. Kronenberger about it, because he did not want to steal a sale or anger anyone. Mr. Kronenberger told him that he was there to sell and that cross-selling was fine. As Petitioner was completing the sale, an older white man working in the shoe department threw a shoe at Petitioner and said, “You damn Mexican, I’m going to raise hell against you.” Petitioner testified about an altercation with Risa Autrey, a fragrance model who worked in Dillard’s and who Petitioner stated was another longtime friend of Mr. Gustason. One day, Ms. Autrey approached Petitioner--again, with zero provocation, according to Petitioner--and began berating him, saying that she had no idea why Dillard’s kept Petitioner around. This occurred in front of co-workers and customers. The customers went upstairs and complained to Mr. Gustason, who followed up by admonishing Petitioner to stop telling people to complain to him because nothing was going to come of it. Petitioner testified that a day or so after the incident with Ms. Autrey, he met with Mr. Gustason and Mr. Thomas.4/ During the course of this meeting, Petitioner disclosed his HIV status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Gustason’s attitude towards him changed immediately, and that Mr. Gustason had him fired two weeks later on a pretextual charge of stealing and insubordination. Petitioner testified that he got sick a few days before Black Friday, which in 2015 was on November 27. When he returned to work on November 25, he attempted to give Mr. Gustason a doctor’s note that would have entitled Petitioner to paid leave, but Mr. Gustason would not talk to him. Petitioner worked a long shift on Black Friday. On Saturday, November 28, 2015, he was called to Mr. Thomas’s office about an altercation he had on November 25 with Ms. Yao, the woman’s cosmetics manager. Mr. Kronenberger was also in the office. Petitioner testified that Mr. Thomas accused him of stealing, as well as insubordination to Ms. Yao, and fired him. Two mall security officers, the Dillard’s security officer, and Mr. Kronenberger escorted Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner testified that he was given no paperwork to memorialize his firing or the reasons therefor. Mr. Kronenberger testified at the final hearing. He testified that Petitioner constantly complained about someone not liking him or picking on him. Petitioner never gave him specifics as to what happened. Mr. Kronenberger stated that Petitioner never complained about racial slurs or that any of his alleged mistreatment had a discriminatory element. It was always, “This person doesn’t like me.” Petitioner had issues with tardiness and absenteeism throughout his employment with Dillard’s. Mr. Kronenberger testified that there would be days when Petitioner simply would not show up for work, or would send a text message to Mr. Kronenberger saying that he had things to do or someone he had to meet. Employment records submitted by Dillard’s supported the contention that Petitioner was frequently late for, or absent from, work. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner was erratic in his communications. Petitioner would send a text message saying he could not come in. Then he would send a text telling Mr. Kronenberger how happy he was to have the job. Mr. Kronenberger recalled once receiving a text from Petitioner at midnight that read, “I know I’ve been bad.” In November 2015, Petitioner had six unexcused absences, including four consecutive days from November 21 through 24. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner finally admitted that he needed to cut his hours in order to qualify for some form of public assistance. Mr. Gustason told Petitioner that something could be worked out to cut his hours, but that just not showing up for work was unfair to Mr. Kronenberger and the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Dillard’s would normally terminate an employee with six unexcused absences in one month under the heading of job abandonment. He stated that Mr. Gustason bent over backward to work with Petitioner and keep him on the job. When Petitioner was absent, Mr. Gustason would leave messages for him, asking him to call and let him know what was going on. During the string of November absences, Mr. Kronenberger phoned Petitioner, who said that he was afraid to come into work for fear that Mr. Gustason would fire him. Mr. Kronenberger assured Petitioner that Mr. Gustason had no such intent, but that in any event no one would have to fire him because he had not been to work in a week. Petitioner was effectively “firing himself” by abandoning his position. Petitioner showed up for work on November 25, 2015, at 4:50 p.m. He had been scheduled to come in at 9:45 a.m. Mr. Kronenberger testified that he was not present for Petitioner’s altercation with Ms. Yao, but that Ms. Yao reported she had attempted to counsel Petitioner about gifts with purchases. The promotional gifts were to be given away only with the purchase of certain items, but Petitioner was apparently disregarding that restriction and giving the gifts with non-qualifying purchases. Ms. Yao told Mr. Kronenberger that Petitioner quickly escalated the counseling into a shouting match in front of customers and co-workers. He yelled, “You’re not going to talk to me that way.” Ms. Yao told Petitioner that she worked in another department and did not have to deal with his antics. She told him that she was going to report the matter to Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas.5/ Mr. Kronenberger testified that his conversation with Ms. Yao was brief because there was no need to give many particulars. He was used to getting reports of employee run-ins with Petitioner and did not need much explanation to get the gist of what had happened. Mr. Kronenberger decided not to raise the issue with Petitioner on Black Friday, the busiest day of the year at the store. On the next day, November 28, Petitioner was called into the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas. Mr. Kronenberger testified that this meeting was not just about the incident with Ms. Yao but also Petitioner’s absences. In Mr. Kronenberger’s words, “[I]t was to follow up with the incident with Yami, and it was to follow up with, ‘Hey, you’ve just missed a week, you’ve been back a day, and you’re having this blow-up with a manager on the floor.’ Like, ‘What’s going on?’” Mr. Kronenberger testified that neither he nor Mr. Thomas went into this meeting with any intention of terminating Petitioner’s employment. However, two minutes into the conversation, Petitioner was on his feet, pointing fingers, and shouting that he knew what they were trying to do and he was not going to let them do it. He was quitting. Petitioner walked out of the office. Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Kronenberger to walk Petitioner out of the store so that there would be no incidents on the floor with the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger accompanied Petitioner to the fragrance area, where Petitioner retrieved some personal items, then walked him to the door. They shook hands and Petitioner left the store. Mr. Kronenberger was firm in his testimony that no security personnel were involved in removing Petitioner from the store. Petitioner was not accused of stealing. His parting with Mr. Kronenberger was as cordial as it could have been under the circumstances.6/ After Petitioner left his office, Mr. Thomas prepared a “Separation Data Form” confirming Petitioner’s dismissal for “violation of company work rules.” The specific ground stated for Petitioner’s dismissal was violation of the Associate Work Rule forbidding insubordination. Mr. Kronenberger testified that in his mind the “insubordination” included not just the scene with Ms. Yao, but the explosion Petitioner had in the meeting with Mr. Thomas. At the time of Petitioner’s dismissal, Mr. Kronenberger was unaware of Petitioner’s HIV status. Mr. Kronenberger credibly testified that Petitioner’s HIV status had nothing to do with his dismissal from employment at Dillard’s. Mr. Gustason, who apparently was aware of Petitioner’s HIV status, was not at work on November 28, 2015, and was not involved in the events leading to Petitioner’s dismissal. Mr. Thomas, the assistant store manager, made the decision to treat Petitioner’s situation as a dismissal for cause.7/ Mr. Kronenberger’s testimony is credited regarding the circumstances of Petitioner’s dismissal and as to the general tenor of Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s. Petitioner was constantly in the middle of conflicts, but never alleged until after his termination that these conflicts were due to his national origin or disability. Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was extremely emotional. He cried frequently and seemed baffled that Mr. Kronenberger was disputing his testimony. The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s version of events was genuine in the sense that it conveyed Petitioner’s subjective experience of his employment as he recollected it. However, the undersigned must also find that Petitioner’s subjective experience did not conform to objective reality. However, Petitioner internalized the experiences, it is not plausible that Dillard’s employees were yelling at Petitioner without provocation, hitting him, throwing shoes at him, and calling him a “damn Mexican” in front of customers. It is not plausible that Petitioner’s superiors would ignore such flagrant discriminatory behavior when it was brought to their attention. Petitioner’s feelings about the motives of his co-workers and superiors cannot substitute for tangible evidence of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner offered the testimony of two Dillard’s customers, neither of whom saw behavior from Petitioner’s co- workers that could be attributed to anything beyond personal dislike or sales poaching. Santiago Garcia testified that he noted other Dillard’s employees rolling their eyes at Petitioner, but he thought the reason might be that Petitioner talked too loud. Mr. Garcia also saw “bad looks” from other employees and believed that the atmosphere among Dillard’s employees was “tense,” but did not offer a reason for the tension. Claudia Pimentel testified, through a Spanish language interpreter, that she always went directly to Petitioner because she speaks only Spanish and Petitioner was able to help her. Ms. Pimentel noted that a female Dillard’s employee got mad at Petitioner because he sold Ms. Pimentel a cream from her counter. During the years 2015 and 2016, the Dillard’s store in Governor’s Square Mall terminated two other sales associates for insubordination. Neither of these sales associates was Mexican. One was a black female and the other was a black male. Neither of these sales associates had a known disability at the time of termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by Dillard’s for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s national origin or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s discriminated against him because of his national origin or his disability in violation of section 760.10.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s, did not commit any unlawful employment practices, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.02760.10760.50
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer