The Issue The issues in this case are: a) whether White Construction Company, Inc. timely filed its requests for hearing with the Department of Transportation in response to notices of intent to suspend White's certificate of qualification because of alleged delinquencies on State Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306 and; (b) if not, whether the doctrine of equitable tolling, waiver, estoppel or other legal or equitable principles apply under the facts of this case such that White is entitled to a formal hearing on the merits of the department's determination of delinquency.
Findings Of Fact White Construction Company, Inc. (White) is a contractor prequalified to bid on Department of Transportation (Department) construction projects in excess of $250,000. It was incorporated in 1951 and maintains a home office in Chiefland, Florida. White was the successful bidder on three projects that are included within the Department's Seminole Expressway Project in Seminole County which is being funded and supervised by the Department's Turnpike Office. The projects are three contiguous segments and are identified as State Project Nos. 97770-3304, 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. The Seminole Expressway Project consists of twelve separate projects. HNTB Corporation is the Department's Resident Engineer for Project Nos. 97770-3304 and 97770-3306 and maintains an office at 2927 US 17-92 in Sanford. ICF Kaiser Engineers is the Resident Engineer for Project No. 97770-3305 and maintains an office in a trailer at the job site. The Resident Engineers are the main liaison between White and the Department on the Project. The Department's Turnpike Office maintains a local office at 112 Beider Avenue in Casselberry. The Resident Engineers are supervised from that location by Mr. Gary Geddes, the Department's Program Manager, in conjunction with Mr. Ray Daniel, an Area Engineer who is employed by Post, Buckley, Schuh and Jernigan, which is under contract with the Department. The Resident Engineers, though employed by private consultants, serve as the Department's representatives and are delegated the title of Engineer of the Project for the Department. On July 30, 1993, the Department issued notices of intent to suspend White's certificate of qualification because of alleged delinquencies in White's performance on State Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. The Department's notices of intent to suspend were received by White at its Chiefland offices on August 3, 1993. Each notice contained the following language: Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-23 and in accordance with this determination, we intend to suspend your Certificate of Qualification and those of your affiliates. This suspension will become conclusive final agency action unless you request an Administrative Hearing within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Your request for a hearing shall be in writing and shall be filed with the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, Mail Station 58, Haydon Burns Building, 605 Suwanee Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 within ten days of receipt of this notice. A copy of the request for hearing shall also be provided to the State Construction Engineer, Mail Station 31, Haydon Burns Building, 605 Suwanee Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450. The request for hearing shall include: The name and address of the party making the request; A statement that the party is requesting a formal or informal proceeding; and All specific facts and circumstances which the Contractor believes legally excuses the unsatisfactory progress on the project. A request for hearing is filed when it is delivered to and received by the Clerk of Agency Proceedings. If a hearing is timely requested after the receipt of the notice of the intent, the hearing shall be held within 30 days after receipt by the Hearing Officer of the request for hearing in accordance with 337.16 of the Florida Statutes. In addition to a request for an Administrative Hearing and in accordance with Article 8-8.2 of the Special Provisions of this project, you are hereby given opportunity to request an extension of allowable contract time in an amount of cause progress on this contract to be acceptable or to submit other information to show that progress of work is not delinquent. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7, emphasis added) White forwarded the two Notices of Intent to its attorneys, Cummings, Lawrence and Vezina, P.A. On August 11, White's attorneys sent to Mr. Burney Keen of White Construction, via Federal Express Priority Morning Delivery, a package containing originals and copies of requests for formal hearing and for contract time extensions for both projects, with written instructions to have the requests executed and delivered to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings and James Lairscey, via Federal Express, and to hand deliver copies to the Project Engineers no later than August 13. The package from White's attorneys did not arrive at White's offices until late in the afternoon on August 12, when Mr. Keen was no longer in the office. Mr. Keen did not receive the package from White's counsel until the morning of August 13. Notwithstanding the Priority Delivery designation, Federal Express delivery to White's Chiefland office occurred between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. Mr. Keen instructed his secretary, Patti Cook, to have the documents executed by an officer of White, and to have them hand-delivered to the Department's Resident Engineers and delivered to the Department's Tallahassee offices by Federal Express, in accordance with counsel's instructions. On Friday afternoon, August 13, 1993, White hand-delivered its request for hearing, along with its requests for contract time extension, to the Department's two Resident Engineers. On that same day, White sent out a package containing copies of these documents by Federal Express addressed to Mr. J. Lairscey, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. Mr. Keen and Ms. Cook both believed that J. Lairscey was the Clerk of Agency Proceedings. This is not surprising since at his deposition, J. Lairscey, who is the State Construction Engineer for the Department, did not know who the Clerk of Agency Proceedings was either. Standard operating procedure for the Project established by the Department at the preconstruction conference required that all correspondence from White be sent to the Department's Resident Engineers. Mr. Keen believed it to be of utmost importance to timely hand-deliver the requests for formal hearing to the Department's Resident Engineers. Although White had filed notices or requests with the Department Clerk in the past, this was Mr. Keen's first experience with the delinquency filing procedures. The package arrived at the Department's offices in Tallahassee on Saturday, August 14, 1993, and was delivered to Mr. Lairscey's office, MS 31, and not MS 58 (which is the Clerk of Agency Proceedings' Mail Station and office) on the morning of August 16, 1994. The package delivered to ICF Kaiser contained an original letter from White addressed to Michael Landry, which requested an extension of time on Project No. 97770-3305 and referred to an enclosed request for hearing. The package also contained an original letter addressed to: Clerk of Agency Proceedings, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The letter to the Clerk requested a formal hearing in response to the Department's July 30th Notice of Intent and referred to three large appendices which were enclosed. Upon its receipt on August 13, 1993, a secretary and the office engineer at ICF Kaiser's office recognized that they received misdirected originals of important legal documents. The office engineer and secretary telephoned Ray Daniel, the Department's Area Engineer, at the Department's office in Casselberry and told him that they had received from White what looked like an original legal document, which they did not think they were supposed to have. They questioned whether the documents should be redirected to the Department. Mr. Daniel instructed them not to send the documents to him. Mr. Daniel knew that requests for hearing should be sent to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings in Tallahassee, but was not sure that a mistake was made and took no action regarding the request for hearing. The documents were filed away at ICF Kaiser until August 27, 1993, when Michael Landry followed up an inquiry from Ray Daniel and had the originals forwarded to the Turnpike's Casselberry office. The package delivered to HNTB Corporation also on August 13 contained an original letter from White addressed to Ralph Burrington which requested an extension of time on Project No. 97770-3306 and referred to an enclosed request for hearing. Like its counterpart, this package also contained an original letter addressed to: Clerk of Agency Proceedings, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The letter to the Clerk requested a formal hearing in response to the Department's July 30th Notice of Intent and referred to three large appendices which were enclosed. The Resident Engineer at HNTB, Mr. Ralph Burrington, did not note that the documents were originals and filed them away. Mr. Burrington's normal procedure is to forward such documentation by facsimile to the Department's Casselberry office, but in this instance he feels he made a mistake. The package delivered to the Department's Tallahassee offices on Saturday, August 14, 1993, contained one signed photocopy of the requests for formal hearing for Project No. 97770-3305 addressed to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, unsigned copies of the requests for formal hearing in Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306 addressed to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, as well as copies of the request for time extension for Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306 and appendices. The documents were received by J. Lairscey on Monday, August 16, 1993, and were filed away until they were inspected on August 27, 1993, as a result of an inquiry by Ava Parker, a Department attorney. Sometime before August 27, 1993, Ava Parker, as a result of an inquiry from Gary Geddes, the Department's Program Manager, began to investigate whether White had filed its requests for hearing. Ms. Parker first checked with the Clerk of Agency Proceedings and was informed that nothing had been filed at that location. Ms. Parker then contacted Charles Peterson, the Department's Area Construction Engineer, to discern whether White had filed a request for hearing. Mr. Peterson searched his files and the Department's central files; he questioned various people in the Department's Tallahassee office and telephoned Ray Daniel in the Department's Casselberry office. Ray Daniel told Mr. Peterson that he had no knowledge concerning White's requests for hearing and no idea where they were. Mr. Daniel in fact knew at that time that White had delivered its requests for hearings to both Resident Engineers on August 13, based upon previous conversations with the Department's Resident Engineers and office staff. Mr. Peterson later discovered from Jimmy Lairscey that Mr. Lairscey had received the requests for hearing but they had been filed away. On Friday, August 27, 1993, Joe Lawrence, counsel for White, telephoned Ava Parker to discuss consolidation of the hearings and discovery. Ms. Parker advised White's counsel that no requests for hearing had been filed with the Clerk in response to the two Notices of Intent. Ms. Parker knew prior to her conversation with counsel for White that the requests had not been filed with the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, yet made no attempt to contact White or its counsel to notify them that the Clerk had not received the request. On Monday, August 30, 1993, copies of the requests for hearing were delivered to the Department's Tallahassee offices from counsel for White, via Federal Express addressed to Ava Parker and Clerk of Agency Proceedings, Florida Department of Transportation, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Haydon Burns Building, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450. The documents were received by Ms. Parker who delivered the requests for hearing to the Clerk and they were stamped in by the Clerk of Agency Proceedings on that same date. The Clerk of Agency Proceedings' function is to docket and maintain a record of documents and to send a copy of any requests for hearing in contractor suspension cases to the legal section and to Jimmy Lairscey. The Department's standard procedure after receipt of requests for hearing and contract time extension is to have the documents reviewed by Jimmy Lairscey and the Project Resident Engineer to determine whether the time extension should be granted. The legal section then determines whether to send the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department's purpose in soliciting a request for contract time extension in conjunction with its Notice of Intent to Suspend is to afford the contractor the opportunity to cure the delinquency. The Department, prior to taking action on the request for hearing, reviews the time extension request to determine whether it may obviate the need for further delinquency proceedings. The Department's Resident Engineers are primarily responsible for evaluating and making recommendations concerning time extension requests. It is generally after the Department makes a determination concerning the appropriateness of the request for contract time that it proceeds to act upon the request for hearing. The Department did not deny White's request for contract time extension until August 30, 1993, the same date that White's requests for hearing were docketed in by the Clerk. The Department's review, analysis and decision can take up to five months. The delay in docketing the requests for hearing did not, therefore, delay the process. There was no prejudice to the Department by White's delivery of its requests for hearing to the Department's Resident Engineers on August 13, 1993, rather than to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings. There was no harm to the Department by Jimmy Lairscey's receipt of White's requests for hearing on Monday August 16, 1993, rather than the Clerk receiving it on Friday, August 13, 1993. The Department was aware, prior to and on August 13, 1993, that White disputed the Department's determination of delinquency on State Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. The Department expected White to file requests for formal hearing challenging the Department's determination of delinquency on State Project No. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. White had verbally notified the Department prior to August 13 that it was challenging the delinquency notices. No evidence established any prejudice or harm to the Department from the Clerk's receipt of White's requests for hearing on August 30, 1993 rather than August 13, 1993. White will be severely prejudiced if not afforded a hearing, and therefore automatically declared delinquent, because it will be precluded from bidding and acquiring much needed additional work. White's work is primarily for the Department, in all phases of highway construction. At the time of hearing White had Department contracts of approximately $100 million, which contracts carry over a several year period, and it employed approximately 500 people. No culpability or blame can be ascribed to either party in the series of gaffes surrounding the filing of White's requests for hearing. Mr. Keen, a novice to the process, thought he was doing the right thing by assuring timely filing with the Resident Engineers, who had always received other correspondence related to the Project. Mr. Daniel, who was immediately informed that the original documents were filed in the wrong place, did nothing to correct the error, but neither did he deliberately frustrate the process (as argued by White) since the message he received about some original legal documents was ambiguous. Mr. Lairscey had no idea that his packet was intended for the Agency Clerk; moreover, he had no idea who the agency clerk was. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any more than mere inconvenience to the Department, it is patently unfair to deny White its hearing on the merits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its final order granting a formal hearing to White Construction Co., Inc. on the substantive issue of whether it should lose its qualification to bid. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. - 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2; otherwise rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 10; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 30. Adopted in paragraph 4. Except as to the conclusion that the notice was not filed with the clerk on August 13, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the testimony of Keen in its entirety. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 5, 8, 9, 10 and 12. Rejected as argument and conjective unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. Adopted in part in paragraphs 6-9, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 9; otherwise rejected as statement of testimony or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. 16.-18. Adopted in paragraphs 14 and 19; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 22. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 18. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. Adopted in part in paragraphs 23-26; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 27 and 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 27.-28. Adopted in part in paragraph 36; otherwise rejected as argument or unnecessary. White clearly proved it will be severely prejudiced, even if it is not "put out of business". 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (as to prejudice to the agency). 30.-31. Rejected as unnecessary. 32. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence; more commonly, the agency rules on the extension request first. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 14. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. Rejected as unnecessary. 19. Adopted in paragraph 18. 20. Adopted in paragraph 19. 21.-22. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. 23. Adopted in paragraph 21. 24. Adopted in paragraph 22. 25. Adopted in paragraph 23. 26. Adopted in paragraph 24. 27. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 28. Adopted in paragraph 26. 29. Adopted in paragraph 27. 30. Adopted in paragraph 28. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 29. Adopted in part in paragraph 30; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (as to being a "paper shuffler"). 34.-38. Adopted in paragraph 31. 39.-40. Adopted in paragraph 32. 41.-42. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 35. Adopted in paragraph 36, except that the implication that the company will absolutely go out of business is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Cummings, Lawrence and Vezina, P.A. 1600 S.E. 17th Street, Suite 304 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts On or about May 14, 2007, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint alleging that Respondents in the merits case held themselves out as interior designers. On or about August 15, 2007, Braxton filed an Election of Rights requesting a formal hearing. On October 15, 2007, Braxton filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. On or about October 18, 2007, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss Formal Hearing based on the parties’ agreement that the case would be resubmitted to the Probable Cause Panel with the recommendation of dismissal. On or about October 19, 2007, the Division of Administrative Hearings entered an Order Closing File. On or about November 5, 2007, the case was presented to the Probable Cause Panel and a Closing Order was entered. On or about December 18, 2007, a letter was sent to Braxton’s attorney indicating the matter was closed and no further action was required. However, the letter did not enclose a copy of the Probable Cause Panel Closing Order. On March 3, 2008, Braxton sent a letter to the Department’s counsel asking for a copy of “any final action taken by the Probable Cause Panel.” On or about March 7, 2008, a copy of the closing order was faxed to counsel for Braxton. On or about April 7, 2008, Braxton filed a Supplemental Motion of Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Facts Based Upon the Evidence of Record In the Motion and Supplemental Motion, Braxton seeks relief under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. There is no dispute that Braxton is a small business party for purposes of Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes. There is no dispute that Braxton is the prevailing party in the underlying merits case. There is no dispute that the fees and costs set forth in the April 7, 2008, affidavit filed with the Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs are reasonable. The undersigned has reviewed the Supplemental Affidavit as to Attorney’s Fees and Costs filed on October 27, 2008, and the Second Supplemental Affidavit as to Attorney’s Fees and Costs filed on December 10, 2008, and finds the fees and costs contained therein to be reasonable. Dwight Chastain is an investigator for the Department and, while employed by a private law firm, investigates complaints concerning the Board of Architecture and Interior Design. In December 2006, Mr. Chastain received a complaint letter regarding Petitioner herein, Sheryl Lyn Braxton. The complaint letter was addressed to the law firm for which Mr. Chastain is employed. The letter alleged that Ms. Braxton represented herself to the public as an interior designer, and that the complainant could find no evidence that she held a license “specifically that of an interior designer as represented in attached CBS website, is held either by her personally or her company “Braxton Designs.” Attached to the complaint letter is a page purportedly from the website, CBS.com, specifically a link from the television show, “Big Brother 2.” Additionally, the complaint letter alleged that Ms. Braxton had verbally represented to "many individuals" that she had performed interior design work for Ivana and Donald Trump at the Plaza Hotel in Manhattan. While the letter contains a signature, it is impossible to decipher the writer’s last name, and Mr. Chastain considered the signature to be illegible. Further, the letter did not contain a return address or a telephone number. Because the writer’s name is illegible and there was no contact information in the letter, the complaint letter is essentially anonymous. The printed page attached to the complaint letter from the CBS website identifies a participant on the show as “Sheryl,” with no last name mentioned, from Ponte Vedre Beach, Florida. Under the heading “personal profile,” her occupation is listed as interior designer. The copyright date at the bottom of the page is “MMIII,” which is 2003, although Ms. Braxton participated in the Big Brother show in 2001. The name “Braxton Interiors” does not appear on the printout from the CBS website. Also attached to the complaint letter is a page purportedly from the myflorida.com website showing that Sheryl Lyn Braxton held a current real estate license and was employed by Florida Network LLC, a real estate corporation. Mr. Chastain could not decipher the signature on the letter and, therefore, did not attempt to contact the complainant. He did a fictitious name search of and did not find anything under the name of Braxton Designs, Braxton Designers or Sheryl Lyn Braxton. Mr. Chastain searched the Department's database and found that Sheryl Lyn Braxton was not licensed by the Board of Architecture and Interior Design. Mr. Chastain also went to the CBS website and found the page referencing “Sheryl” more fully described above in paragraph 18. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Chastain called CBS to seek any information which Ms. Braxton submitted to CBS about herself, i.e., whether she actually held herself out to be an interior designer to CBS. Mr. Chastain acknowledged at hearing that in his computer searches of Ms. Braxton’s name and “Braxton Designs,” he found nothing indicating that Ms. Braxton held herself out to anyone as an interior designer. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Chastain spoke to anyone who confirmed the allegations in the complaint letter that Ms. Braxton verbally held herself out to anyone that she was an interior designer. On January 5, 2007, Mr. Chastain wrote a letter to Ms. Braxton informing her that the Board of Architecture and Interior Design had initiated a complaint investigation as to allegations that she was using the title “interior designer," or words to that effect, without a valid license. The letter also informs her that “[y]ou have 20 days to respond in writing or you may contact me at (850) 402-1570. My email address is dwightc@stslaw.com.” Ms. Braxton called Mr. Chastain’s office and left two voice mail messages for him, neither of which he received. Regardless of the circumstances of Ms. Braxton’s response to the letter, Mr. Chastain proceeded with the belief that she had not responded to his letter.3/ Mr. Chastain wrote an Investigative Report which was provided to the Probable Cause Panel. The report read in pertinent part: Alleged Violation: FS481.223(1)(c) use of the name or title “interior designer”, or words to that effect, without a valid state license. Synopsis: This investigation was based on a consumer complaint in which it is alleged that subject appeared on the CBS television show Big Brother Show link, identifies her as an interior designer. Complainant alleges subject does business under the name Braxton Design and that she has verbally represented herself to “many individuals” that she has been involved in the interior design of many high-profile residential and commercial buildings. (Exhibit 1) Subject is not licensed as an interior designer in Florida, but is licensed as a real estate sales associate. Braxton design is not a registered corporation or fictitious name with the Florida Secretary of State. (Exhibit 2) Subject was notified of this investigation by letter dated January 5, 2007, but failed to respond. The letter was not returned undelivered. (Exhibit 3) Meeting of Probable Cause Panel The Probable Cause Panel met on May 14, 2007, during which the Braxton case was considered. The packet of materials which the panel members received regarding the Braxton case consists of a memorandum to the panel members from the prosecuting attorney regarding the case; another memorandum from the prosecuting attorney to someone named Emory Johnson regarding the case; a draft administrative complaint; a draft Notice and Order to Cease and Desist; the investigative report written by Mr. Chastain with three attachments: the complaint letter with the page from the CBS website and printout showing Ms. Braxton’s real estate licensure status; copies of licensing and corporate registration information found by Mr. Chastain; and the letter written by Mr. Chastain to Ms. Braxton notifying her of the complaint. The transcript of the Probable Cause Panel concerning the Braxton case reads as follows: MR. MINACCI: Tab A-6, Sheryl Lyn Braxton, Case Number 2007-000968. The subject is unlicensed and held herself out as an interior designer on the CBS television show “Big Brother.” The subject failed to respond to the investigation. Recommendation, notice of order to cease and desist, one count Administrative Complaint for using the title “interior designer” without a license. MR. WIRTZ: Motion to accept counsel’s recommendation for one count. THE CHAIR: Second. Discussion. Hearing none, all those in favor of the motion, signify by saying aye. (so signified by aye.) THE CHAIR: Opposed, like sign. (No response.) THE CHAIR: Hearing none, the motion carries unanimously. MR. WIRTZ: She’s a big star. She can afford 5,000 for the count plus costs. THE CHAIR: Second. Recommendation has been made and seconded. Discussion? Hearing none, all those in favor of the recommendation, signify by saying aye. (So signified by aye.) THE CHAIR: Opposed, like sign. (No response.) THE CHAIR: Hearing none, the recommendation carries. MR. HALL: Shall we send a copy of the complaint to CBS? THE CHAIR: If you would like to. THE [sic] HALL: We certainly can. MR. Wirtz: I think we should. An Administrative Complaint was filed against Sheryl Lyn Braxton and Braxton Designers with the Department’s clerk on May 21, 2007, which began the underlying merits case.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of marital status.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Julie Wallace. She was employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson from the last week of June, 1987, until September 12, 1988. Respondent is an automobile dealership, Heartland Pontiac-Buick- Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. Its corporate president at the time of Petitioner's employment termination was Nancy Cosgrove. Respondent hired Petitioner on June 18, 1987. Respondent's corporate president at that time was Steven Cosgrove, then husband to Nancy Cosgrove. Petitioner and her husband were married in July, 1987, shortly after she began her employment with Respondent. At the time, Petitioner's husband was also employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson. The wedding ceremony took place at the Cosgrove home. Respondent does not have a work practice prohibiting nepotism and there are several examples of Respondent's employment of married couples, as well as employment of other multiple members of individual families. Petitioner fared well in Respondent's employment initially. She was recognized by the dealership as the "salesperson of the month" in August, 1987. She was awarded a trip to the "Indy 500" in May, 1988. In spite of Petitioner's productivity during the first year of her employment, Respondent lost a great amount of money for a period of approximately 14 months prior to terminationof Petitioner's employment. Respondent's financial losses resulted from insufficient sales overall in the dealership during that period of time. The separation and subsequent divorce of the Cosgroves coincided with Ms. Cosgrove's assumption of the presidency of Respondent. Ms. Cosgrove took over the dealership in order to prevent it from collapsing financially. For approximately two to four weeks prior to termination of Petitioner, sales records were abysmal for the entire sales force. Further, morale of the sales force was poor as the result of management changes and efforts to cut unnecessary expenses. In conjunction with management attempts to strengthen the dealership's dwindling finances, traditional assignment of demonstrator automobiles to salespeople were eliminated a few days prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment. The elimination of the demonstrator automobiles, coupled with the change in management from Mr. Cosgrove to Ms. Cosgrove, resulted in a verbal altercation between Petitioner's husband and Ms. Cosgrove on September 12, 1988. The upshot of that confrontation was the firing of Petitioner's husband by Ms. Cosgrove. A short time, perhaps an hour later, the sales manager employed by Ms. Cosgrove requested to see Petitioner. He asked Petitioner whether she might prefer to resign in theaftermath of her husband's termination. Petitioner said she did not wish to leave her employment. After Petitioner and Respondent's sales manager concluded their discussion, the sales manager returned later in the day and explained that Petitioner's employment was terminated in view of Petitioner's lack of production or automobile sales. Later, Respondent's sales manager provided Petitioner with a letter erroneously stating that Petitioner had been employed by Respondent for two years. The letter correctly stated that Petitioner was always in the top one third of the sales force in her performance, but did not elaborate on the extent to which performance of all members of the sales staff had plummeted prior to Petitioner's termination. At the time of Petitioner's employment termination, there was only one other salesperson, in addition to the sales manager, remaining on Respondent's sales staff. Through attrition and previous terminations, Ms. Cosgrove had virtually eliminated the sales force inherited from her ex-husband's management by the time of Petitioner's termination. The world of automotive salespersons is extremely competitive and pressurized. Individuals are constantly urged to produce or seek other employment. The fact of previous sales accomplishments provides salespersons no cushion for future periods of sale failures. As stated by Ms. Cosgrove, in a somewhat cold and dispassionate manner, at the final hearing, "you're either a hero or a zero." The discharge of sales personnel after a change of management and an extended period of financial non-profitability is not unusual in the automobile dealership business. Such a movement on the part of Ms. Cosgrove was also motivated by a desire to increase sales and improve morale with salespersons of her own choosing. Salespeople, such as Petitioner, working at Respondent's dealership are "at will" employees, possessing no employment contracts of a specified term, or conditions governing the termination of their employment. Sales employees at the dealership did have a payment plan or agreement with Respondent. The plan in effect during Petitioner's employment permitted her to draw a salary against commissions, provided she had accumulated commissions in-house and elected to utilize this draw procedure versus direct commission payment. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had no accumulations against which to draw a salary. The payment plan did not provide a set term of employment or address standards for employment termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX It should be noted that both parties incorrectly filed their proposed findings with the Commission On Human Relations as opposed to the Division Of Administrative Hearings. Upon discovery of the error, the parties were permitted to have the proposed findings forwarded to the abovesigned by Commission personnel. Upon review of the proposed findings, it was noted that neither party's proposal is presented in the form of separately numbered paragraphs which would permit a referenced comment or ruling on each proposed finding. Each party's proposed findings have been reviewed and addressed to the extent possible by the foregoing findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Julie Wallace 1406 Chloe Terrace Sebring, FL 33870 E. Mark Breed III, Esq. 335 South Commerce Sebring, FL 33870 Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact 15. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on November 18, 2008, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on January 16, 2009, and the 2™4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on May 21, 2009 which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Orders of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 08-385-1A, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On November 18, 2008, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 08-385-1A to M & M Roofing, LLC. 2. On December 8, 2008, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on M & M Roofing, LLC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On January 16, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 08-385-1A to M & M Roofing, LLC which assessed a total penalty of $153,187.40 against M & M Roofing, LLC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 4. On May 21, 2009, the Department issued a 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 08-385-1A to M & M-Roofing, LLC which assessed a total penalty of $153,556.44 against M & M Roofing, LLC. A copy of the 2° Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. The Employer timely requested a Formal Hearing on or about February 27, 2009. A copy. of the Request for Hearing is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On March 23, 2009, the request for formal hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law judge for a formal hearing. The matter was assigned to Judge Cleavinger and assigned case number 09-1578. 7. A formal hearing was scheduled for May 27, 2009, in Pensacola, Florida. A copy of the Notice of Hearing is attached hereto as “Exhibit E”. 8. A Motion to Continue Hearing was filed by the Department on April 30, 2009. 9. An Amended Motion to Continue Hearing was filed by the Department on May 5, 2009. The motion stated that Petitioner had been contacted and did not oppose the Motion. 10. An Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing was entered on May 18, 2009. The hearing was re-scheduled for June 30, 2009, in Pensacola, Florida. A copy of the Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing is attached as “Exhibit F”. 11.. A Letter of Request for Continuance was filed by M & M Roofing, LLC on June 22, 2009. 12. The Request for Continuance was denied on June 23, 2009. The Order Denying Continuance of Final Hearing is attached as “Exhibit G”. 13. A final hearing was held on June 30, 2009. M & M Roofing, LLC failed to appear at the hearing. 14. An Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File was entered on July 2, 2009. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached as “Exhibit H”. |
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing Files and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Jessica E. Varn an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the Respondent’s withdrawal of intent to relocate Ocean Cadillac, Inc., copies of which are attached and incorporated by reference in this order. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. DONE AND ORDERED this |! ) day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Filed in the official records of the Division of ice ix Motorist Services this day of June, Bureau of Issuance Oversight 2014. Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and _ D le Motor Vehicles Tobin: Grroyel COTES Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Nalini Vinayak, Dealer License Administrator Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed June 19, 2014 7:35 AM Division of Administrative Hearings Copies furnished to: Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Section R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Brandes, LLP 105 West Sth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 cspickard@kb-attorneys.com C. Gregory Feil Ocean Cadillac, Inc. 1000 Kane Concourse Miami, Florida 33154 John Martin General Motors, LLC Mail Code 482-A82-A16-C66 100 GM Renaissance Center Detroit, Michigan 48265 Jessica E. Varn Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the regulation of workers’ compensation insurance in the State of Florida. The Department issued a Stop Work Order to Petitioner on June 6, 2006. On June 27, 2006, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, assessing $272,948.96 in penalties against Petitioner. Petitioner timely challenged the Stop Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and requested an administrative hearing. A formal hearing was held on October 5, 2006. The Recommended Order, which was entered on November 28, 2006, recommended that the Department enter a final order rescinding the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and the Stop Work Order. On February 23, 2007, a Final Order was issued by the Agency adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the Recommended Order. On March 30, 2007, Petitioner filed the Petition with a supporting affidavit and fee statement which initiated the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner seeks relief under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. There is no dispute that Petitioner is the prevailing party in the underlying case. Petitioner seeks attorney's fees in the amount of $20,197.50. There is no dispute as to the reasonableness of the fees sought. At the time the underlying action was initiated, Petitioner was a sole proprietor located in Jacksonville, Florida, which engaged in the business of cutting trees. There is no dispute that Petitioner is a small business party for purposes of Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes. On June 6, 2006, the Department’s investigator, Michael Robinson, conducted a site visit at a job site where he observed five individuals, four of whom were involved in tree cutting activities. During his June 6, 2006, site visit, Robinson interviewed the four individuals and recorded their responses on a field interview worksheet. The workers identified Nolan as their employer, and answered Mr. Robinson’s questions regarding how long they had been employed by Nolan, and their basis of pay. One of the workers informed Mr. Robinson that he had been employed by Nolan for two weeks; a second worker informed him that he had worked for Nolan for three weeks. Both of these workers informed Mr. Robinson that they were paid on a daily basis. A third worker informed Mr. Robinson that he was paid by the job. The workers were compliant and responsive to Mr. Robinson’s inquiries. Mr. Nolan was not at the jobsite at the time of Mr. Robinson’s site visit, but Mr. Robinson obtained his phone number, called, and left a message. Mr. Nolan promptly returned the call. Mr. Nolan was also compliant and responsive to Mr. Robinson’s questions. Mr. Nolan acknowledged to Mr. Robinson that the four individuals interviewed by Mr. Robinson were his employees and that he had no workers’ compensation insurance. Mr. Nolan also informed Mr. Robinson that his business was a non-construction business entity and was not required to carry workers’ compensation insurance. Mr. Robinson told Mr. Nolan that he was required to have workers’ compensation insurance. Mr. Robinson also searched the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) and found no proof of coverage nor an exemption for Nolan. The Stop Work Order On the same day as the site visit, Mr. Robinson conferred with his supervisor, Robert Lambert, to discuss the issuance of a stop work order. Mr. Robinson conveyed to Mr. Lambert that Nolan had four employees who were non- construction workers, and that there was no workers’ compensation coverage. Mr. Robinson did not convey the short duration of employment of two employees or that they were paid daily or by the job. Based upon this information, Mr. Lambert immediately approved a Stop Work Order, which was issued that day. Mr. Robinson also issued a request for business records to Nolan for the purpose of calculating a penalty for lack of coverage. Paragraphs 12 through 24 of the Recommended Order, adopted within the Final Order, found that Mr. Nolan started the business, Great Southern Tree Service, in February or March 2005, as a sole proprietor; that he did not employ anyone in 2003 or 2004; that the nature of the tree trimming business is seasonal and sporadic; that Nolan had fewer than four employees during 2005; and that the only time Nolan had four employees was from May 2006 until June 6, 2006, when two workers worked occasionally for Nolan due to tree damage in the Jacksonville area from a storm. Nolan did not produce business records as requested by the Department because there were no such records to produce. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment On June 27, 2006, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (Amended Order) was issued to Nolan in the amount of $272,948.96, for the time period June 6, 2003 to June 6, 2006. Attached to the Amended Order is a worksheet with the names of the four workers interviewed by Mr. Robinson on June 6, 2006. Using a statutory formula, Mr. Robinson imputed a penalty for the period October 1, 2003 to June 6, 2006, and a penalty of $100 per day for the time period between June 6, 2003 and September 30, 2003. At the time of the issuance of the Stop Work Order and the Order of Penalty Assessment, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Lambert were aware of the statutory requirement that to be considered an employer under the workers’ compensation law, four or more persons must be employed by the same private non-construction employer. However, neither Mr. Robinson nor Mr. Lambert was aware of well-established case law holding that the elements of regularity, continuity, common employment, and duration, should be considered in determining the applicability of the law, and that an occasional increase in the number of workers for some unusual occasion does not automatically result in application of the workers' compensation law.2/
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is entitled to recover from Respondent his attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On October 24, 2007, Respondent Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, received a complaint against Petitioner Elbert Cecil Wright, III, a certified residential appraiser holding license numbered 219. The complaint was assigned to an investigator, Judy S. Smith, who has some level of training regarding real estate appraisals but no personal experience or licensure in the field. The complaint letter was written by Kathleen Tesi, who lives in Virginia and represents herself to have no expertise in real estate appraisal. At the urging of a personal friend in 2005, she purchased a vacant lot, sight unseen, in Bella Collina West, Montverde, Florida, for $655,900. Tesi understood that she would be buying the lot with her friend with the expectation that they would hold title for some time period and then sell it for a profit. The two of them had done this together in the past. The entire transaction, including the closing, was done by mail, and multiple documents and multiple versions of those documents were exchanged. It appears that Tesi and her friend are both named on the mortgage, although Tesi questions her friend's signature. The mortgage note, however, was executed only by Tesi. The contract for purchase of the lot, however, was in the name of her friend and a third party, whom Tesi does not know, and Tesi is not reflected as a purchaser of the lot. Respondent's investigative file does not contain a copy of the deed to the lot, so it is unknown whether Tesi has an ownership interest in the lot or just the financial obligation to pay for it. Tesi's potential mortgage company, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., contracted with Petitioner to prepare an appraisal of the property for SunTrust. Petitioner prepared and submitted an appraisal to SunTrust, his client, which reflected that the property was valued at the purchase price. In 2007, when property values fell sharply and Tesi's friend advised her that she would no longer help Tesi with the mortgage payments, Tesi began seeking and gathering copies of the purchase agreement and closing documents from the title company and SunTrust. She then filed a complaint with the Georgia Banking Commission against SunTrust for, essentially, loaning her more money than she could pay back; against the title company for, essentially, inconsistent names throughout the paperwork involved in the closing and transfer of title; and the complaint with Respondent against Petitioner for producing an inferior appraisal. Her complaint regarding Petitioner's appraisal of the property raises three concerns: Petitioner did not use appropriate comparables, Petitioner overvalued her property, and Petitioner misrepresented the size of the lot. In her complaint to the Georgia Banking Commission, she suggests that the incorrect lot size on Petitioner's appraisal should invalidate the appraisal and, therefore, invalidate the loan she obtained from SunTrust. Smith forwarded Tesi's complaint to Petitioner, who responded by letter dated November 30, 2007. He explained that at the time of his appraisal, Lake County had not yet uploaded records on the new subdivision Bella Collina West concerning plats or sales. He, therefore, obtained such information from the on-site sales staff and named the sales manager who advised him that there were not yet any closed sales in the subdivision and who gave Petitioner the dimensions of Tesi's lot. The letter explained in detail why Petitioner chose comparables in the earlier-developed phase of Bella Collina and how he made adjustments in value for those recent closed sales of much- larger lot sizes because they were not on the golf course as was Tesi's lot. Investigator Smith interviewed Petitioner on January 31, 2008. He explained to her again why he chose the comparables that he chose, how he computed the value of the lot in question, and that he obtained the lot dimensions from the on-site sales staff for the subdivision. Smith also interviewed a sales person at the developer's sales office at the subdivision. He explained to her that the lots in the subdivision were in such high demand in 2005 that the developer resorted to a lottery system to determine who would even be able to buy a lot. Smith did not speak to the sales person Petitioner said he had obtained information from when he prepared his appraisal of Tesi's lot. Smith went to Bella Collina West and Bella Collina, an earlier phase of the development. She saw that the comparables utilized by Petitioner were much-larger lots than Tesi's but that Tesi's was on the golf course. She did no further investigation. Specifically, she did nothing to verify the information Petitioner gave her relating to the issues raised by Tesi. For example, she did not verify Petitioner's statements to her that there were 14 sales of vacant lots the same size as Tesi's lot that sold for the same price as Tesi's at the same time. She did not consult with an expert to determine if there were any statutory violations committed by Petitioner regarding that appraisal or if there were professional standards violated. Smith completed her investigative report which, basically, included Tesi's complaint and Petitioner's response. That report was forwarded to the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board, along with a draft administrative complaint. The report contains no explanation concerning the professional standards or statutes Petitioner allegedly violated. The report simply recites what each of the three individuals Smith interviewed said to her. The Probable Cause Panel of the Board considered the investigative report on April 9, 2008. The Transcript of the meeting reflects the presence of 12 persons, only two of whom were members of the probable cause panel. The remainder of those present were attorneys or staff members for the Board or the Department. Of the two probable cause panel members, Michael Rogers was physically present, and Clay Ketcham attended the meeting by telephone. No evidence was offered in this proceeding as to whether they were licensees of the Board or lay persons, although Respondent's attorney asserted during argument in this proceeding that both gentlemen are state certified general appraisers. The entire consideration of the charges against Petitioner is less than three transcript pages long. First, the prosecutor erroneously described the size of Tesi's vacant lot, the date of the appraisal, and the county in which the lot was located. She then mentioned that the comparables Petitioner used were larger, and he made adjustments for size, location, and view. She then advised that Petitioner had two prior disciplinary actions and recommended the Board approve the draft six-count administrative complaint. Panel member Ketcham asked whether prior disciplinary action could constitute a charge in an administrative complaint. His question was answered, and the two panel members then found probable cause to file the administrative complaint. There was no discussion regarding any of Tesi's allegations, the explanations Petitioner had given, why Petitioner's choice of comparables or the offset he used were incorrect, the alleged statutory violations Petitioner was charged with committing, or the professional standards Petitioner was charged with violating. It is clear that the two panel members simply "rubber-stamped" the prosecutor's recommendation. After the administrative complaint was issued, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 08-4720PL. The final hearing in that case, the underlying proceeding, was conducted on January 22, 2009. At the final hearing, the Department's only expert to testify agreed with Petitioner that the erroneous lot size Petitioner used in his appraisal had no impact on the value of the lot. Although the Department's expert disagreed with the comparables used and the adjustments in value Petitioner made, there was no suggestion as to what the "correct" appraised value of the lot should have been. On April 1, 2009, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order finding that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, had failed to prove any of the six counts contained in the administrative complaint and recommending that a final order be entered finding Petitioner not guilty and dismissing the administrative complaint. On September 18, 2009, the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board entered a Final Order adopting that Recommended Order and dismissing the administrative complaint against Petitioner. On November 16, 2009, Petitioner filed his motion for attorney's fees and costs, seeking to be reimbursed for those amounts expended in defending the underlying action. His motion was assigned DOAH Case No. 09-6338F. That motion seeks an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $9,720.00 and costs in the amount of $1,206.95, for a total of $10,926.95. Petitioner prevailed in the underlying proceeding and is a small business party. His net worth, including both personal and business investments, is less than $2,000,000. Respondent was not substantially justified in initiating the underlying proceeding against Petitioner.
