The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1996)1 by allowing a greyhound with a drug, medication, stimulant, depressant, hypnotic, narcotic, or local anesthetic, in its system to enter and complete a race and, if so, what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's pari-mutuel wagering occupational and business licenses.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the pari-mutuel industry in the state, including the regulation and discipline of licensees such as Respondent. Respondent holds an Unrestricted "U1 " Professional individual pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, number 0526562-1081, and a business occupational pari-mutuel wagering license, number 1364008-1080, for Ron Runge Kennel. Respondent is the trainer of record for Prunella Scales ("Prunella"), a greyhound. On February 22, 1997, the Respondent entered Prunella in the thirteenth race at Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club (the "race") and allowed Prunella to complete the race. Prior to the start of the race, urine sample number 267912 was taken from Prunella. The urine analysis conducted by the Bureau of Laboratory Services revealed the presence of ecgonine methyl ester in sample number 267912. Ecgonine methyl ester is a metabolite of cocaine. Cocaine is a topical anesthetic and a class 1 drug. Respondent violated Section 550.2415(1)(a) by entering Prunella in the race with an impermissible drug in its system and allowing Prunella to complete the race in such a condition. As the trainer of record, Respondent is responsible for of the condition of a greyhound that he or she enters in a race. Respondent has an extensive disciplinary history. In August 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent $25.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug and redistributed the purse money. In September 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent a total of $50.00 for racing two greyhounds on an impermissible drug. In one instance, Petitioner redistributed the purse money. In November 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent $25.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug. Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license was suspended until he paid the fine. In September 1995, Petitioner fined Respondent a total of $50.00 for racing two greyhounds on an impermissible drug. In one instance, the purse money was redistributed. In January 1996, Petitioner fined Respondent $100.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug and suspended Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license until Respondent paid the fine. In March 1996, Petitioner fined Respondent $50.00 for racing a greyhound on procaine, an impermissible substance. In March 1997, Petitioner summarily suspended Respondent's licenses and denied Respondent all access to pari-mutuel grounds during the period of suspension. In addition to the foregoing drug violations, Respondent was found guilty of improperly using rabbits in the training of racing greyhounds in November 1991. He was fined $250.00 for that violation. On March 11, 1995, Respondent was fined $50.00 for presenting the wrong greyhound at the weigh-in, and on July 30, 1996, he was fined $50.00 for failure to present the proper greyhound at the weigh-in. Prior disciplinary action has been ineffective in rehabilitating Respondent. Respondent persists in the prohibited practice of racing animals on impermissible substances. License suspension and fines have no deterrent effect on Respondent. Respondent is not a viable candidate for rehabilitation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order and therein find Respondent guilty of violating Section 550.2415(1)(a) by racing an animal with an impermissible drug in its system and revoke Respondent's licenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 9th day of January, 1998.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Letter of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached, and incorporated by reference, in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Larkin Motorworks, LLC d/b/a St. Pete Scooter, be granted a license to sell motorcycles manufactured by Guangdong Qingxin Liantong Industry Co. Ltd. (QNGX) at 3029 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Street North, St. Petersburg Filed November 28, 2012 4:25 PM Division of Administrative Hearings (Pinellas County), Florida 33704, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. DONE AND ORDERED this Aq day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Bur€éau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this a! I day of November, 2012. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JBijc Copies furnished: Ronald Larkin Larkin Motorworks, LLC 3029 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Brett Moorer Parallel Intelligent Transportation, Inc. 6950 Central Highway Pennsauken, New Jersey 08109 Peter M. Spoto Worldwide Scooters, Inc. 457 Highland Avenue Dunedin, Florida 34698 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application to relocate B.O.O., Inc., d/b/a Acura of South Florida (Acura of South Florida) from its current location in Hollywood, Florida, to its proposed location in Pembroke Pines, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Parties American Honda is a licensee and manufacturer as defined by Section 320.60(8) and (9), Florida Statutes. Acura of South Florida and Case Acura are motor vehicle dealers as defined by Section 320.60(11)(a)1., Florida Statutes. At all relevant times, Acura of South Florida's principal is Craig Zinn (Mr. Zinn); Case Acura's principals are Rick and Rita Case (Mr. Case and Mrs. Case, respectively, and collectively, the Cases). Notice and Standing With respect to notice and standing, the parties have stipulated as follows: On October 15, 2004, notice of American Honda's intent to relocate Acura of South Florida (proposed relocation) to Pembroke Pines from its current location in Hollywood was duly-noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Case Acura has standing to protest the proposed relocation, and timely filed its protest. The Community or Territory The parties have stipulated that the Community or Territory (generally referred to in the industry as a "comm/terr" ) relevant to this proceeding is the area defined by American Honda as the Pembroke Pines comm/terr (Pembroke Pines comm/terr or comm/terr). Both Acura of South Florida and Case Acura are located within the comm/terr, as is the proposed relocation site. The proposed relocation site is located west of both Acura of South Florida and of Case Acura. The Proposed Relocation and Related Market Studies Case Acura is, at all relevant times, centrally located in Ft. Lauderdale in Broward County, Florida. Major Broward County traffic arteries provide ready access to Case Acura from the north, south, east and west within the comm/terr. Acura of South Florida is located south of Case Acura, and just north of the Broward County line. Unlike Case Acura, Acura of South Florida does not offer customers ready access from any direction within the comm/terr. Both Case Acura and Acura of South Florida are located well east of the proposed location. From time to time, as circumstances warrant, American Honda evaluates specific existing or proposed comm/terrs, including the Pembroke Pines comm/terr, by performing a so-called market study. American Honda's market studies are an integral part of the company's strategic and long-range planning process. American Honda's market studies are conducted by teams of experienced and appropriately credentialed experts (market study team(s)). With reference to this case, market studies in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr were conducted in 1997 and again in 2003. The proposed relocation grew out of the results and recommendations of the 1997 market study team. The same results and recommendations were reached again by the 2003 market study team, based upon updated information concerning relevant data which emerged between the two market studies. Both studies documented that Broward County's population had been and would continue for the foreseeable future to "trend west" within the comm/terr. This westward population trend has been and is predicted to continue and to be particularly pronounced among affluent households. Because American Honda manufactures luxury vehicles under the Acura brand, American Honda and its dealers seek to "capture" or "conquer," i.e. attract the business, of such households, while maintaining their existing customer base of affluent households. The teams which conducted both market studies determined that the present configuration of Acura dealers within the comm/terr (dealer network) did not provide adequate representation for American Honda's Acura brand (adequate representation). The lack of adequate representation was a function of the westward population trend. To remedy the situation, and in accordance with Florida law concerning dealer relocation, both market study teams reasonably recommended that Acura of South Florida be relocated to western Broward County. The recommendation was not implemented following the 1997 market study; at that time, and for some years before and after, the owners of Acura of South Florida (Mr. Zinn's predecessors) were beset by illness and management difficulties, and not in a position to undertake the recommended relocation. Likewise American Honda was not in a position to force a relocation upon Acura of South Florida, because it had neither contractual rights nor statutory rights to do so. The 2003 market study team revisited the comm/terr in order to verify or refute the conclusions and recommendations of the 1997 study team in light of all that had transpired since 1997. Upon careful consideration of updated data, the 2003 study team reasonably concluded that the dealer network as it was then configured still failed to afford adequate representation. American Honda's market study teams, as a matter of course, conduct informal interviews with all dealers in the comm/terr when assembling market study data. The 1997 and 2003 market study teams followed this practice. During the 2003 interview with him, Mr. Case was asked whether he would like to move his dealership. Mr. Case replied unambiguously that he was well-satisfied with his present location, where he had become one of Acura's most successful dealers. It is noted that Acura dealers are permitted to market and to sell Acuras anywhere, both within and without the comm/terr in which they are located. The Cases have taken particular advantage of this opportunity, a factor which contributes to Case Acura's significant profitability. Dealer input, and the present success or lack thereof of dealers within a comm/terr, are data considered by market study teams in the context of all the other data. Upon consideration of all relevant data, including the input of the dealers within the Pembroke Pines comm/terr, the 2003 market study team adhered to the conclusion of the 1997 team and recommended implementation of the relocation of Acura of South Florida as proposed in 1997. As Acura of South Florida and American Honda set out to implement the relocation recommendation, Mr. Case had a change of heart and came forward to insist that he was entitled to be the dealer to be relocated. He also insisted that Acura of South Florida remain where it was. In support of these late- asserted demands, Mr. Case testified that he had previously been informed by the "zone manager" for the comm/terr, one Ray Mikiciuk (Mr. Mikiciuk) that Case Acura (and not Acura of South Florida) would be relocated. According to Mr. Case, Mr. Mikiciuk was authorized by American Honda to so advise Mr. Case on American Honda's behalf. Mr. Case also claims that Case Acura would have been the dealership relocated but for a threat by Mr. Zinn to sue American Honda should Case Acura be relocated. Contrary to Mr. Case's testimony regarding the foregoing, the persuasive evidence established that since 1997, American Honda executives supported the market study recommendations for the Pembroke Pines comm/terr, including the proposed relocation. Mr. Mikiciuk is a low level employee; there is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Mikiciuk ever had authority to speak for American Honda with reference to dealer relocations, let alone to bind the company. These facts were well known to Mr. Case. Mr. Case had unfettered access to the highest level American Honda executives over decades of mutually lucrative dealings with American Honda and related subsidiaries. Mr. Case had no reluctance to use these open lines of communication with regard to matters of minor as well as major importance to Case Acura. Yet, he now posits that American Honda, speaking through zone manager Mikiciuk, intended to overrule its 1997 and 2003 market study teams and relocate Case Acura, and reneged only because of Mr. Zinn's threat to litigate. The foregoing scenario is charitably described as counterintuitive. No corroborating evidence was provided. Mr. Case's testimony concerning his dealings with American Honda in regard to the proposed relocation is uncorroborated, unbelievable, and not credited by the fact-finder. Mr. Zinn initiated his purchase of Acura of South Florida in the spring of 2003. By the time the transaction was finalized in December 2003, anticipated future change(s)-- including the westward population trend identified in the 1997 market study--had become substantially more pronounced. Other changes had developed, or were reasonably anticipated to develop in the foreseeable future. For example, Acura of South Florida is presently and permanently foreclosed from providing customers and staff even the basic amenity of on-site parking, inasmuch as the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken by condemnation a 23-foot strip along the entire dealership frontage. Thirty parking places have been lost. Signage advising the public that they had reached Acura of South Florida is no longer permitted. At its present location, it is impossible for Acura of South Florida to be brought into compliance with Acura's so-called Design Image Standards (DIS) because the dealership property is too small to allow for the expansion required by DIS. American Honda and its network of dealers deem implementation of DIS at every dealership to be crucial to Acura's future success or failure in the marketplace. Additionally, the dealership is a prime candidate to be declared a "non-conforming use" by local zoning authorities. Such designation would render it impossible to obtain necessary permits to make needed improvements in the future. An Objective, Reasonable Standard In order to assess the adequacy of representation afforded by the existing dealer network in the comm/terr and to measure the level of opportunity available in the market, it is necessary to develop an objective, reasonable standard against which to compare the actual market penetration achieved by the existing dealer network, which includes, in this case, Acura of South Florida and Case Acura. A standard is a measure of the level of performance a brand can reasonably expect to achieve in the market with an adequately performing dealer network; that is, an adequate number of dealers performing competitively. The most objective data available for measuring the performance of a dealer network is market penetration data. Market penetration is the ratio of a brand's performance against the competitive industry. Market penetration is a direct measure of both inter-brand and intra-brand competition. Intra- brand competition is competition between competitors of the same brand. Inter-brand refers to competitors of different brands. The first step in developing a reasonable standard is to select a suitable comparison area. When choosing a comparison area, it is essential to select an area that is itself adequately represented. In determining whether a proposed comparison area is adequately represented, national average market penetration is an extremely conservative benchmark, because it includes all of the adequately represented, inadequately represented, and unrepresented areas within the United States. By contrast, the State of Florida is not an appropriate standard comparison area against which to judge the performance of Acura in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr because at relevant times the brand performs below national average in Florida. This is so because Florida has a disproportionate number of areas in which Acura has no dealer representation as well as a disproportionate share of underperforming dealers. National average market penetration is, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the appropriate starting point for developing a reasonable standard for the Acura brand. The national average must be adjusted, however, to take into account unique consumer preferences over which the dealer network has no control, which can affect market share. Unique consumer preferences in the local market can be accounted for through a process called segmentation analysis. In this process, groups of vehicles in the segments to be analyzed are far more comparable with each other than with other vehicles not in the segments. Consequently, segments contain a group of similar vehicles that, by their design and physical characteristics, meet a certain set of consumer transportation needs. American Honda arranges its Acura vehicles into seven segments: small sporty, sporty luxury coupe, mid-size luxury sedan, full size luxury sedan, near luxury, exotic, and mid- luxury. The segmentation analysis process employed by American Honda accurately reflects the demographic features--including age, income, and education--of consumers who have actually purchased the vehicles in Acura's seven segments. In addition, the segmentation analysis employed by American Honda takes into account other factors which are unrelated to any particular consumer. Such factors include the state of the economy, product quality, and design features. Under all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record, the national average performance for Acura as adjusted for local consumer preferences in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr (the expected standard) is the appropriate standard for measuring the adequacy of representation being provided by existing Acura dealer networks and for establishing the level of opportunity available to Acura dealers in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr. At all relevant times, national average penetration, adjusted for local consumer preferences, produces an expected standard in the comm/terr of 10.58 percent, while the comm/terr is 10.3 percent of the retail industry segments in which Acura competes. For the year 2005 through June 30, the expected standard for the Pembroke Pines comm/terr is 11.37 percent while the Pembroke Pines comm/terr is 10.92 percent of the retail industry segments in which Acura competes. The reasonableness of the expected standard is confirmed by the fact that Acura has achieved or exceeded the standard in the recent past or currently meets or exceeds the standard in several markets in Florida; a sixth market in recent years has missed the standard only once, by four-tenths of a point in 2004. The persuasive data established that the expected standard is reasonable and can be achieved in the comm/terr if the Acura brand is adequately represented. Taking the foregoing factors into account, national average, adjusted for local consumer preferences, is the appropriate standard by which to judge the adequacy of representation being provided by the existing Acura dealer network and the level of opportunity available in the comm/terr. Impact on Manufacturer American Honda's Acura brand is, at relevant times, losing available sales in the comm/terr due to the inability of the existing Acura dealer network to penetrate the comm/terr at reasonably expected levels in light of the opportunity available. The persuasive evidence established that the gap between reasonably expected levels of penetration and the actual dealer network performance will grow. Taking reasonably anticipated future changes into account, the evidence of record established that the manufacturer will enjoy increased sales and overall increased customer convenience as a result of the proposed relocation. Investment of and Potential Impact Upon Existing Dealers Mr. Zinn and the Cases have invested significant dollar amounts to perform their obligations under their respective American Honda/Acura franchise agreements. They have likewise invested significant sweat equity, and expect to continue to manage their dealerships in a hands-on manner. The Cases contend that their investment in their Acura dealership will be at risk should the proposed relocation proceed. There was no persuasive evidence to support this contention. Rather, Case Acura is well positioned; well capitalized; and highly likely to respond positively to inter-brand competition arising from the proposed relocation. The Cases are aggressive and highly experienced dealers. It is reasonable to anticipate that the Cases will not lose sales; profit; reasonable opportunity for growth; or growth in the value of their multi-million dollar investment in Case Acura. Likewise, other existing dealers in the comm/terr are reasonably expected to grow and to maintain the value of their investments if the proposed relocation goes forward. Additionally and more specifically, the evidence is sufficient to establish that existing dealers in the comm/terr will be positively impacted by increased sales and service opportunities if the proposed relocation goes forward. Based upon the foregoing, the evidence is sufficient to establish that the proposed relocation is warranted and justified based on economic and marketing conditions, including future changes and present, accelerating trends in the comm/terr, which continues to grow rapidly in terms of population and of affluent households, which factors present increased sales and service opportunity for dealers. These opportunities are likely to be captured if the proposed relocation goes forward, and unlikely to be captured if it does not. Coercion of Existing Dealers There have been no efforts by American Honda to coerce any existing dealer to consent to the proposed relocation. Protesting Dealer Compliance with Dealer Agreement Case Acura is at all relevant times in compliance with the terms of its dealer agreement. Distance and Accessibility Congested traffic conditions in the western portion of the comm/terr militate heavily in favor of the proposed relocation. The proposed relocation will provide consumers with an increased level of convenience, and stimulate inter-brand competition. The market studies and common sense demonstrate that affluent consumers will not travel substantial distances to purchase an Acura when a variety of other luxury cars are more conveniently available. Other luxury vehicle dealers have taken note of the rapid growth of affluent homes in west Broward, and have provided and continue to provide improved accessibility. Acura's current dealer network in the comm/terr has not kept pace with American Honda's need to offer its existing and prospective customers an adequate level of accessibility, convenience and service. Benefits to Consumers Obtained by Geographic or Demographic Changes The evidence is sufficient to establish that consumer benefits will occur as a result of the relocation of Acura of South Florida. Such benefits cannot be obtained by expected demographic or geographic changes in the comm/terr. Adequacy of Interbrand and Intrabrand Competition and Consumer Care The evidence is sufficient to establish that the performance of Acura in the comm/terr is below reasonable levels under the appropriate standard, thereby reflecting inadequacy of inter-brand and intra-brand competition. With regard to consumer convenience, the evidence is sufficient to establish that it is necessary to locate a dealership within in the western portion of the comm/terr, where existing and potential Acura customers have moved and continue to move in large numbers, in order to provide them adequate customer care, including sales and service facilities. Relocation Justification Based on Economic and Marketing Conditions The evidence is sufficient to establish that the proposed relocation is warranted and justified based on economic and marketing conditions, including future changes. Western Broward County continues to grow at a rapid rate in terms of affluent population, households, and increased sales and service opportunities which are likely to be captured if the proposed relocation goes forward. Volume of Existing Dealers Registrations and Service Business The evidence is sufficient to establish that the volume of registrations and service business is hindered by the present configuration of the dealer network in the comm/terr, and that the volume of registrations and service business by existing Acura dealers in the comm/terr will improve if the proposed relocation goes forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issue a final order approving American Honda's application to relocate Acura of South Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Adams, Quinton & Paretti, P.A. 80 Southwest 8th Street, Suite 2150 Miami, Florida 33130 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Alan N. Jockers, Esquire Craig Zinn Automotive Group Corporate Offices 2300 North State Road 7 Hollywood, Florida 33021 Dean Bunch, Esquire Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312-1267 Fred O. Dickinson, III, Executive Director Department of Highway, Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Judson M. Chapman, General Counsel Department of Highway, Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by June C. McKinney, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s letter of withdrawal of protest of the establishment of AutoNation Dodge of Pembroke Pines, Inc., a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, AutoNation Dodge of Pembroke Pines, Inc. be granted a license for the sale and service of Jeepr passenger cars and light trucks manufactured by Chrysler (JEEP) 13601 Pines Boulevard, Pembroke Pines (Broward County), Filed January 27, 2012 3:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Florida 33027 upon compliance with all applicable requirements of section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. DONE AND ORDERED this A‘! day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. skill, Assistant Deputy Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this | __ day of January, 2012. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Ycense Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. MDM/jde Copies furnished: Thomas H. Yardley, Esquire Law Office of Thomas H. Yardley 1970 Michigan Avenue, Building D Cocoa, Florida 32922 Phil Langley Chrysler Motors, LLC 10300 Boggy Creek Road Orlando, Florida 32824 R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dean Bunch, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS MASSEY-YARDLEY CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., Petitioner, vs. Case No. 11-6492 CHRYSLER GROUP CARCO, LLC, AND AUTONATION DODGE OF PEMBROKE PINES, INC., Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Broward County and Broward County Board of County Commissioners is a Public Employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2), F.S. (stipulation of parties). The Teamsters Local Union #769, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10), F.S. (stipulation of parties). In January, 1974, thirty three airport security police employees of the Respondent who worked at the Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood International Airport and North Perry Airport signed cards authorizing Teamsters Local Union #769 (hereinafter "Union") to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining with the Respondent (Complainant's Exhibit 6, testimony of Mr. Sack). By letter of January 7, 1974, to Mr. Robert R. Kauth, Broward County Administrator, the Union advised that it represented the airport security employees police and requested that the Respondent recognize the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees and enter into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining a collective bargaining agreement. The Union further offered to demonstrate evidence that it represented the aforesaid employees (Complainant's Exhibit 7, testimony of Mr. Sack). Mr. Kauth responded in a letter dated January 28, 1974, and advised the Union that its letter had been referred to the Board of County Commissioners, but in view of "existing state law", the Commission was unable to and could not recognize the Union as the collective bargaining representative of the airport employees in question (Complainant's exhibit 8). The Union responded by a letter of January 30, 1974, requesting that Mr. Kauth identify the "existing state law" referred to in his letter and advised that the International Union's Constitution specified that the Union did not assert the right to strike amoung employees in the public sector. It also informed Mr. Kauth that the Florida Constitution and statutes guarantee public employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively through a representative of their choice (Complainant's Exhibit 9). Receiving no further response from the Respondent, the Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief and mandatory injunction in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for Broward County requesting the Court declare that the Union be recognized by the Respondent as the collective bargaining representative for the airport security police employees who had designated the union to represent them, and directing and requiring the Respondent to enter into collective bargaining with the Union as required by Art. 1, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution, and Section 839.221(2), F.S. On July 29, 1974, the Court entered a final decree requiring Respondent to grant recognition to the Union pursuant to Art. 1 Section 6 of the Florida Constitution "as the collective bargaining representative or agent of those airport security police officers employed by the Defendants at the Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport and North Perry Airport, who, are members and who remain members of the Plaintiff or who have freely and expressly given their consent to the Plaintiff labor organization to act as their collective bargaining agent" (Complainant's Composite Exhibit 11). As a result of the court order, the parties began bargaining, and proposals and counter-proposals were exchanged during the period commencing August, 1974 (Complainant's Exhibit 13, testimony of Mr. Sacks). At one of the negotiating sessions in October, the Respondent gave the Union its proposal for a recognition clause in the eventual agreement, which provided that the Respondent recognized the Union as the collective bargaining representative for those employees who were and would remain members of the Union, and that it would continue recognition after January 1, 1975 for the term of the agreement provided that the Union complied with all state requirements pertaining to recognition as contained in Chapter 447, F.S., and that otherwise recognition and the agreement would cease forthwith (Complainant's Exhibit 14, testimony of Mr. Elster). The Union thereupon filed a motion in the Broward County Circuit Court to hold the Respondent in contempt for violation of the previous final decree. The court, on October 30, 1974, citing Sections 447.009 and .022, F.S., found that the Respondent's proposal as to recognition was not a proper subject of collective bargaining at that time and ordered that it be stricken as a proposal (Complainant's Exhibit 15). At the twelfth negotiation session held on January 8, 1975, the parties reached a proposed collective bargaining agreement, with representatives placing their initials on a rough-draft (Complainant's exhibit 16). Counsel for Respondent agreed to provide a final draft in one week which thereafter was to be submitted to the county commission and the Union membership for approval and ratification. On January 17, the employees in the unit voted to accept the, agreement and new authorization cards were executed by the employees. At this time there were 49 employees in the unit and 46 authorization cards were signed at this time (Complainant's Exhibit 18). Further correspondence and discussions ensued, resulting in agreement on a final draft of the proposed agreement (Complainant's Exhibits 17-21). Article 1 of the proposed agreement concerning recognition provided that the county recognized the Union as the collective bargaining representative of all airport security officers employed by the county at the airports in question "who are members and who remain members of the union, or who have freely and expressly given their consent to the Union to act as their collective bargaining agent". The draft was approved by telegram from the Union's Counsel on February 20th, A except for failure to put the effective date of the agreement, i.e., January 8, 1975 in the draft (Complainant's Exhibit 22). Upon request of the Union, the matter was placed on the agenda of the Board of County Commissioners for its March 4th meeting. By letter to the County Administrator, dated February 28, Respondent's counsel advised that the original recognition had been by court order to recognize the Union "for members only"; that new state labor legislation required that a labor organization register with and be certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission as the majority representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit before a legal obligation by a public employer to recognize and bargain with the Union is established; that the Union had not met the registration and certification requirements and that the County was currently appealing in the Fourth District Court of Appeals the order of the lower court which had stricken one of the Respondent's contract proposals during negotiations. He therefore stated that it would be appropriate for the County Commission to consider the appeal before rendering a decision on the proposed agreement (Complainant's exhibit 23). The County Commission, at its meeting, deferred action on the agreement because the Union had not been registered nor certified under current law, and directed its counsel to request an advisory opinion from PERC on the status of the Union in reference to the state statute (Respondent's Exhibit 2). By letter, dated March 12, counsel for the Respondent sought such an advisory opinion from PERC (Respondent's Exhibit 13). Notwithstanding the lack of action by the County Commission, Respondent's Director of the Division of Airports determined to observe the terms of the proposed contract as to various working conditions (Complainant's Exhibit 24). The Union had made an abortive attempt to register with PERC on June 28, 1974, but this was before PERC had been organized and apparently the request was never received (Complainant's Exhibit 12, testimony of Mr. Sack and Mr. Elster). On March 10, 1975, the Union again submitted registration materials to PERC and, by letter of March 25, 1975, the Commission advised the Union that it had met the registration requirements of the statute (Complainant's Exhibit 28). On April 18, 1975, the Union filed a Recognition - Certification petition with PERC seeking certification of the airport security police personnel (Complainant's Exhibit 30), and on May 8, 1975, the Union filed the unfair labor charge against the Respondent alleging that it had violated Section 447.016(1)(a)(c), F.S., by attempting to withdraw recognition that was previously established between the parties and by refusing to sign a final agreement which had been agreed upon on January 8, 1975, (Complainant's Exhibit 1). On or about May 16, 1975, the Union filed with PERC a Motion to Waive the Posting Requirements of Recognition Acknowledgement and Motion to Expedite Processing of Unfair Labor Practice Charges (Complainant's Exhibit 31). In this motion, the Union requested that the posting requirements of recognition acknowledgement under PERC Rule 8H-200.4 (now 8H-2.04) be waived and certification issued based on the fact that it would be inequitable and against the intent and purposes of the statute to deny certification under Section 447.009(1) because recognition had been obtained by court order and the Union represented a majority of the employees in the unit. However, the petition for Recognition - Certification was withdrawn by the Union on June 3, and by letter of June 10, PERC advised it that the withdrawal request had been approved (Complainant's Exhibit 32). The record does not disclose that PERC took any action on the Union's aforesaid motion to waive the posting requirements of recognition-acknowledgment. In April and early May, the parties met and negotiated over a "wage reopener" provision contained in the proposed collective bargaining agreement. However, on May 19, Respondent's Counsel declined to grant a request for a further meeting stating that since the Union had rejected counter-proposals of the Respondent's negotiating team on April 21, it was felt that further meetings would be unproductive (Complainant's Exhibit 25-27). On July 31, 1975, the Union filed an amended unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent and, on August 8, the Acting General Counsel of PERC issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing which alleged unfair labor practices in violation of Section 447.501(1)(a) and (c) by reason of Respondent's refusal to execute the agreed upon contract and by unilaterally terminating negotiations with the Union thus having failed and refused to bargain in good faith (Complainant's Exhibit 1). On September 12, 1975, subsequent to the hearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered an opinion that the points on appeal were moot and that jurisdiction of the issues involved between the parties is in PERC pursuant to Section 447, F.S., and dismissed the appeal of Respondent concerning its proposed recognition clause (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1).
Recommendation It is recommended that the Public Employees Relations Commission, pursuant to Section 447.503(4)(b) issue an order dismissing the charges. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Allen M. Elster, Esquire MAMBER, GOPMAN, EPSTEIN & FOOSANER 16870 Northeast 19th Avenue North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Thomas W. Burke, Esquire 2005 Apalachee Parkway Suite 105 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph A. Caldwell, Sr., Esquire Suite 600, 100 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami, Florida 33132
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc., operated a specialty tire and wheel assembly facility in Plant City, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Tredit at that facility. On October 10, 1995, Ronald Pike, Tredit’s vice- president for operations, paid a routine visit to Tredit’s Plant City facility. Somewhat concerned over the apparent inadequate level of production and higher costs being experienced there, Mr. Pike called a meeting of the entire 15-member staff. During the course of the meeting, in an attempt to determine, if possible, the reason for the deficiency, Mr. Pike asked questions of each member of the staff. Mr. Lee, who recalls he had nothing to say at the time, claims Pike’s insistence on his participation in the discussion constituted "picking on him." Mr. Pike denies picking on Petitioner. He contends he was trying to get some input from the hourly employees, and insists he questioned all of them even-handedly. He asked each for input, indicating their jobs would not be jeopardized by their answers. During the meeting Pike advised the associates that both their attitudes and their production must improve. Though Petitioner denies it, Mr. Pike indicated that Petitioner claimed at that time there was not enough work to give him a 40-hour week, and he was stretching out his jobs in order to make them take long enough to ensure he could work a 40-hour work week. Mr. Bauer, also a Tredit executive, is of the opinion this manipulation is neither necessary nor possible, considering the facility’s work practices. Tredit creates wheel assemblies for specialty vehicles, utilizing tires and wheels manufactured by others. Though its Florida business is high volume, due to the nature of the product and the intense competition, the profit margin is low, and the company has to react to order cycles which require immediate response. However, Mr. Bauer opined there was always enough to do to make sure the hourly employees were always productively employed. No independent evidence was presented in support of the position taken by either party on this point, however. Once the meeting was completed, Mr. Pike and Mr. Bauer left. The facility was being managed at the time by Carol Suggs. At the end of the day after Mr. Pike held his meeting with the staff, Ms. Suggs called for Petitioner to meet with her. The request was communicated through Mr. Longo. According to Ms. Suggs, Petitioner was admonished about his working habits and warned regarding his attitude on the job. She claims he then became disrespectful and quit. A short while later, a payroll accounting document was prepared reflecting Petitioner had been discharged on the day of the conference with Ms. Suggs. Petitioner categorically denies having quit the job as Ms. Suggs indicates in her sworn affidavit of August 22, 1996. He claims to have taken pride in his work and to have been so upset by his termination that he actually cried as a result. Ms. Suggs, on the other hand, contends that Petitioner did not put forth appropriate effort on the job. She claims that not only were the hourly employees getting a full 40-hour week, but also performing overtime, and yet the required amount of material was not being produced. Petitioner rebuts this contention, claiming adequate inventory was prepared. Nonetheless, as a result of what she perceived as Petitioner’s attitude and performance shortcomings, on October 11, 1995, at her meeting with Petitioner the day after Mr. Pike’s visit, Ms. Suggs gave him a written employee warning notice. Petitioner admits to having signed this notice as indication he received it, but denies he agreed with its contents. No other notice of dismissal action was executed by Ms. Suggs except the payroll change notice reflecting Petitioner’s dismissal on October 13, 1995, two days following the meeting she had with Petitioner. Because this earlier action, the warning, does not reflect Petitioner was terminated, but within two days thereof he was taken off the payroll, and because Ms. Suggs’ testimony was credible, it is found that Petitioner’s reaction to the warning was as described by her and was the basis for his dismissal. Tredit had 15 employees at the Plant City facility when Petitioner was employed there. Of this number, four were female and eleven were male. Two of the males were black. After Petitioner was terminated, the employee census was the same except for one fewer black employee. At the time of the hearing, Tredit employed four individuals in the Plant City facility’s office, all of whom were white; and nine warehouse employees, of whom four were white, one black, and two Hispanic. No evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent was the result of his race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Raymond T. Lee’s Petition for Relief filed against Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ramon T. Lee, pro se 832 Augusta Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 Antonio Faga, Esquire 375 Twelfth Avenue South Naples, Florida 34102 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent materially understated payroll and thus should be deemed to have failed to secure payment of workers' compensation, which is a sanctionable offense.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Department of Financial Services ("Department") is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. Respondent Bicon, Inc. ("Bicon") is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the business of hauling construction debris, which is considered a non-construction activity for the purposes of workers' compensation coverage requirements. Bicon's workers' compensation carrier from October 1, 2003 to May 4, 2005 (the "Focal Period") was Bridgefield Employers Insurance Company ("Bridgefield"). Bridgefield's Policy Number 830-29266 (the "Policy") initially covered Bicon for the period from May 11, 2002 to May 11, 2003. Bridgefield renewed the Policy twice, each time for a one-year period. The premium for the Policy was based on Bicon's payroll. Before the beginning of each policy period, Bicon provided Bridgefield an estimate of its payroll for the upcoming period.2 Bridgefield then established an estimated premium for the period, which Bicon was expected to pay in installments. After the policy period had ended, Bridgefield audited Bicon's records to determine actual exposures. Once the audit had been completed, the estimated premium was adjusted as necessary, upward or downward, to reflect actual exposures for the policy period. The audit covering the first renewal period (May 11, 2003 to May 11, 2004) caused Bridgefield to conclude that there existed a premium shortfall of $274,281.66, for which sum Bridgefield billed Bicon on May 2, 2005.3 Given that the estimated premium for the period had been $22,634.44,4 this was a significant upward adjustment. The premium increase was attributed to exposure arising from Bicon's use of an alleged uninsured subcontractor, which exposure Bridgefield's auditor valued at $816,231.00. Bridgefield's Audit Summary Sheet contains the following instructions pertaining to uninsured subcontractors: If no evidence of coverage is submitted to the insured for a subcontractor and only labor is provided, the auditor must include either payroll of the subcontractor's employees or the Total Contract Price. If the labor and material portions of the contract are not broken down in the Insured's records, the auditor must include the Total Contract Cost prorated according to manual rules. No persuasive or convincing evidence was offered establishing whether the auditor calculated the subcontractor exposure for the first renewal period based on the subcontractor's payroll or, alternatively, on the contract price. Bicon paid $53,091.40 against the audit adjustment, leaving a balance of $221,190.26, which remained outstanding as of the final hearing. Bicon has disputed the findings of Bridgefield's audit, but the record does not disclose the nature and grounds of its objections. The estimated premium for the second renewal period (May 11, 2004 to May 11, 2005)——which had been calculated in March 2004, apparently before the findings from the audit of the first renewal period were available——was $20,097.48.5 The retrospective audit convinced Bridgefield that the estimated premium had fallen short by the amount of $186,653.88, for which Bridgefield billed Bicon on September 13, 2005. This shortfall was attributed to Bicon's use of five alleged uninsured subcontractors, which the insurer claimed gave rise to an exposure appraised at $718,462.00. No persuasive or convincing evidence was offered to establish whether the auditor calculated this exposure based on the subcontractors' respective payrolls or, alternatively, on the contract prices. Bicon disputed these audit findings, and as of the final hearing had not paid any part of the audit adjustment. The record does not disclose the nature and grounds of Bicon's objections to this audit. The Department's case against Bicon is premised on the liability for workers' compensation that attaches to a contractor who engages a subcontractor to perform any part of the contractor's contractual obligations to a third party. In such a situation, if the subcontractor is uninsured, then the contractor is obligated to provide workers' compensation to all of the subcontractor's employees. The Department alleges that, during the Focal Period, Bicon sublet work to the following uninsured subcontractors: Precision Equipment Fabricators & Repair, Inc.; S&S National Waste, Inc.; Mickelson Enterprises, Inc.; and Wheeler Employee Leasing, Inc. The Department alleges further that, in its dealings with Bridgefield, Bicon materially understated the amounts of its uninsured subcontractors' payrolls——a practice that, the Department contends, is deemed by statute to constitute a failure to secure the payment of workers' compensation. Despite these allegations, the Department did not elicit any direct evidence that Bicon's alleged subcontractors were performing jobs or providing services that Bicon was contractually obligated to carry out for third parties. Rather, in this regard, the Department's investigator testified (via affidavit) as follows: [T]he vast majority of the work being performed [by Bicon's alleged subcontractors] was the hauling of debris by truck drivers, which is a non-construction activity. However, the duties performed by the employees of Precision Equipment Fabricators & Repair Inc., were construction in nature, specifically, the installing/erecting of debris chutes at construction sites. Aff. of J. Turner at 3. Notably absent from the investigator's account is any testimony that the alleged subcontractors were performing Bicon's contract work. There is, however, some circumstantial evidence that Bicon sublet part of its contract work to other entities. In its application for workers' compensation insurance, for example, Bicon described its business operations as follows: "haul[ing] clean recyclable construction materials (sand, gravel, concrete, wood) from construction sites to waste management locations." The Department accepts this description, for in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department requested a finding that "Respondent is . . . engaged in the business of hauling construction debris, which is a non-construction activity." The undersigned so found above. It is reasonable to infer, from the basic undisputed facts about Bicon's business, that Bicon provided hauling services to third parties (its clients or customers) to whom it was contractually bound. The inference is sufficiently strong that the undersigned is convinced, and finds, that such was the case. The evidence shows that Bicon considered various entities, including S&S National Waste, Inc. ("S&S"); Mickelson Enterprises, Inc. ("Mickelson"); and Wheeler Employee Leasing, Inc. ("Wheeler"), to be its "subcontractors." Indeed, at the Department's request, Bicon produced one of its subcontracts, which is in evidence, wherein Mickelson was designated the "subcontractor." The undersigned is convinced, and finds, that Bicon did, in fact, enter into subcontracts, express or implied, with S&S, Mickelson, and Wheeler. It is undisputed, moreover, that these three companies——S&S, Mickelson, and Wheeler——performed the work of hauling construction debris, which happens to be Bicon's core business. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer, and the undersigned finds, that, to some extent, S&S, Mickelson, and Wheeler provided hauling services to Bicon's customers. None of the aforementioned subcontractors had workers' compensation insurance in place during the Focal Period. The evidence is insufficient to prove that Precision Equipment Fabricators & Repair, Inc. ("Precision") was a subcontractor of Bicon that performed Bicon's contract work. On the contrary, Mr. Turner's testimony, which was not contradicted, shows that Precision was engaged in a different business from Bicon's——one involving construction activities (i.e. installing debris chutes) as opposed to the non- construction work of hauling. There is no persuasive or convincing evidence in the record establishing that Bicon was contractually obligated to anyone to perform such construction services. There is no persuasive or convincing direct evidence that Bicon ever understated the payroll of S&S, Mickelson, or Wheeler in communicating with Bridgefield. There is, indeed, no evidence in the record of any statement made by or on behalf of Bicon, to Bridgefield, concerning either the subcontractors' payrolls or the amounts that Bicon had paid, expected to pay, or owed its subcontractors pursuant to the subcontracts that it had made with them.6 The Department's theory, which is implicit (though unstated) in its litigating position, is that Bicon must have understated the subcontractors' payrolls because: (a) during the audits following the first and second renewal periods, Bridgefield picked up additional exposure, which it attributed to uninsured subcontractors; and (b) no other explanation accounts for the large discrepancies between the estimated premiums and the audited premiums.7 The flaw in this theory is that the incriminating fact which the Department urges be inferred (material understatement of payroll) is plainly not the only possible cause of the known effect (audit findings relating to uninsured subcontractors). Without being creative, the following possibilities, all of which are reasonable and consistent with the proved facts of this case, spring readily to mind: Estimating its anticipated exposures, Bicon told Bridgefield that it estimated its payments to uninsured subcontractors would be $X, and in fact, Bicon had estimated that it would pay uninsured subcontractors $Y——a materially greater sum than $X. Or: in fact, Bicon truly had estimated that its payments to uninsured subcontractors would total $X, but its estimate turned out to be low, and the actual aggregate of such payments was $Y, a materially greater sum. Bicon said nothing to Bridgefield about its payments to uninsured subcontractors until the audits because: prior to the audits, Bridgefield had never asked Bicon to disclose such information. Or: prior to the audits, Bridgefield had asked Bicon an ambiguous question about its estimated payroll exposures, which Bicon reasonably had understood as not inquiring about payments to uninsured subcontractors. Or: although, prior to the audits, Bridgefield had asked Bicon a clear and unambiguous question calling for Bicon to disclose such information, Bicon had remained silent on the issue. Bicon told Bridgefield about its payments to uninsured subcontractors, but Bridgefield, which knew that the actual amount of such exposure would be included at audit in determining the final premium, declined to use the information in calculating the estimated premium. The Department failed to prove, by any standard, that something like 1.a. occurred in fact. Further, the Department failed to exclude numerous hypotheses of innocence——such as 2.a., 2.b., and 3.——which are reasonable and consistent with the evidence. Accordingly, the undersigned declines to infer, from the proved facts, that, in its communications with Bridgefield, (the existence of which must be inferred, for there is no direct evidence of such communications), Bicon materially understated either the amounts of its subcontractors' payrolls or the amounts Bicon paid or owed to its subcontractors for the work they performed for Bicon's customers pursuant to subcontracts. Consequently, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Bicon is not guilty of materially understating payroll——and hence failing to secure payment of workers' compensation——as charged under Section 440.107(2), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order rescinding the Stop Work Order and exonerating Bicon of the charge of failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation by materially understating payroll. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2006.
The Issue Whether Ed Morse Chevrolet should be granted a license to establish a new Chevrolet dealership in Seminole, Florida. If existing Chevrolet dealers are not providing adequate representation in the relevant territory or community the application should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Morse's application seeks a motor vehicle license for a new Chevrolet dealership at 8350 Park Boulevard, Seminole, Pinellas County, Florida. Quinlan and Ross, each a licensed dealer at the time of the filing of the application, separately filed letters of protest to the application and the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing. When Ross was purchased by Mahan, that protest was dropped. The Tampa Bay area is a Multiple Dealer Area (MDA) with each of the existing eight Chevrolet dealers/franchises covering all of Pinellas County and large portions of Hillsborough and Pasco Counties. Four of these dealers, Quinlan, Ross (now Maher), Tarpon and Dimitt are located on U.S. 19 in Pinellas County. Tarpon is located at approximately 21.8 miles north, Dimitt is located approximately 12.4 miles north, Quinlan is located approximately 6.4 miles north, and Maher is located approximately 7 miles southeast, respectively, of the proposed Morse location. It is appropriate to consider the contractual area assigned to multiple dealers, the Tampa MDA, in determining which area they should attempt to service. Since no one from GM ever informed any representative of these dealerships that they would be judged by looking at an area smaller than the Tampa MDA, Respondent contends it would now be unfair to consider other than the entire area in which they contracted to serve to determine whether GM was being adequately represented. GM, on the other hand, points out that dealers surrounding the Tampa MDA are not included within any homogeneous, interconnected shopping area within the Chevrolet, Tampa MDA and are not part of the relevant community or territory. Further, in the Tampa MDA, a natural barrier, Tampa Bay, separates Hillsborough County from Pinellas County and there is little cross-shopping for automobiles between dealers in the areas on opposite sides of Tampa Bay. The Tampa MDA is broken down into Areas of Geographic Sales and Services Advantage, (AGSSA) each representing an area where a dealer enjoys a competitive advantage over other dealers of the same line-make due to geographic locations, viz. proximity to the dealer. AGSSA 1 is the northern part of Clearwater, plus eastern Pinellas and Hernando Counties, in the area of Dimitt Chevrolet. AGSSA 2 is the southern part of Clearwater in the area of Quinlan Chevrolet. AGSSA 3 is the Seminole area of Pinellas County in the area of the proposed Morse dealership. AGSSA 4 is the southern part of Pinellas County, including St. Petersburg, in the area of Maher Chevrolet. AGSSA's 5, 6, 7, and 10 are generally located in Hillsborough County. AGSSA 8 is northern Pinellas and southern Pasco County in the area of Tarpon Chevrolet. AGSSA 9 is northern Pasco County and includes Harbor Chevrolet in Hudson. AGSSA's 3 and 10 are currently open points. AGSSA's are comprised of census tracts or, where census tracts cannot be used, other geographic descriptions, such as zip codes, C-towns and NTC's. Based on customer buying patterns, there are three separate market areas within the Chevrolet Tampa MDA. AGSSA's 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 (St. Petersburg, Clearwater, Tarpon Springs (on the west side of Tampa Bay) is one distinct market while AGSSA's 5, 6, 7 and 10 (Tampa and Brandon) constitute a separate area. AGSSA 9 (Hudson) constitute a separate but less distinct area than the other two larger areas. GM concedes that Quinlan Chevrolet and the other Chevrolet dealers in Pinellas County have complied with terms of their dealership agreement with GM; that these dealers' sales and service facilities comply with the minimum standards established by GM; and that each is adequately representing the AGSSA in which it is located. The three dealerships closest to the proposed site were each rated effective dealers by GM in 1987. Respondent contends that no "identified plot not yet cultivated" exists in AGSSA 3. To support this position is the fact that only one other AGSSA in the Tampa MDA (AGSSA 7) outperformed AGSSA 3 in 1987; Chevrolet registrations in AGSSA 3 (where no dealer is located) were better than in AGSSA 2 and 4 (where Quinlan and Maher are located); and were better than the Tampa MDA rate. Yet the buy-rate analysis, which refers to the number of households in an area divided by the number of registrations in that area, for AGSSA 3 shows that it takes 131 households before one Chevrolet retail registration occurs, while the buy-rate for the Tampa MDA is 113.89. This fact supports GM's position that the area (AGSSA 3) is underrepresented rather than the populace does not buy as many cars per household or that households in AGSSA 3 are adverse to buying Chevrolet automobiles. Of the five AGSSA'S in Pinellas community or territory, Chevrolet is represented by a dealer located in all but AGSSA 3. Vehicle registration data compiled by R.L. Polk was used by GM and Quinlan in their respective analyses and is accepted as an authoritative source of such data within the automobile industry. The evidence here submitted clearly proves the proposition that statisticians and economists can, by selecting from the same pool of data, arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions and opine that their determination is the only appropriate conclusion to reach. GM contends that the national average retail market penetration is the proper standard by which to compare the penetration in AGSSA 3, while Quinlan contends the Tampa MDA penetration rate is the proper standard. Without detailing the extensive testimony presented to support the opinion of the respective experts, it is sufficient to say the national penetration standard is accepted as the appropriate standard. Chevrolet market penetration for both cars and trucks, for the Pinellas community or territory and the Tampa MDA has been substantially lower than the national average since 1986. In comparison to all other Florida markets, both the Pinellas community or territory and the Tampa MDA are generally in the bottom third of all markets while over 40 markets for cars and over 35 for trucks in Florida equal or exceed the national average penetration for Chevrolet. As a general rule, penetration rates are higher in single dealer areas than in multiple dealer areas. Considerable evidence was submitted that Chevrolet sales, i.e. penetration, was higher in inland areas than in coastal areas where foreign imports have had the greatest impact on car sales. Since Tampa MDA is a coastal area, Quinlan contends that the penetration rate in the Tampa MDA and AGSSA 3 should be compared with other coastal areas. Quinlan selected 6 MDA's, of the 11 having the lowest penetration rates by Chevrolet in the entire United States, to prove that the penetration rate in the Tampa MDA and AGSSA 3 is well above the average of those 6 selected and, therefore, AGSSA 3 is not underrepresented. GM, on the other hand, offered the comparison of the Chevrolet penetration rate in Pensacola, which is well above the national average, to the Tampa MDA and AGSSA 3 penetration rates to show AGSSA 3 is underrepresented. Both of these examples represent extremes and confirm the validity of the national average penetration as the appropriate norm. Using this norm, Chevrolet is underrepresented in AGSSA 3. GM presented evidence showing product popularity, age and income statistics of the Pinellas community compared to the nation. By dividing automobiles into five groups comprising subcompact, compact, mid-size, regular and high group, GM presented statistical evidence showing that the differences between the sales of these classes of vehicles in the Pinellas community and nationwide was small during the years 1986, 1987 and the first six months of 1988. Similar evidence was presented regarding truck sales. Respondent points out that the disparity in price of vehicles within each class casts doubt upon the validity of these classifications. For example, expensive sports cars are frequently classed as compact or subcompact, whereas their retail price exceeds the price of many vehicles included in the high group. Statistical evidence was presented by GM comparing the age of residents of the Pinellas community and AGSSA 3 with the population age nationwide to determine if these differences could account for the low penetration of Chevrolet products in the area in question. Again, no statistical difference in resident's ages was found to account for the low penetration rate compared to the national average. Respondent contends these comparisons are invalid and irrelevant because nationwide Chevrolet sales are higher in the 16-24 and 25-34 age groups which age groups are vastly underrepresented in AGSSA 3. GM also presented statistical evidence comparing the income of the residents of the Pinellas community and AGSSA 3 with the national average income. These comparisons are sufficiently close that the low penetration rate in Pinellas County compared to national average cannot be explained by income characteristics. However, those with annual income below $15,000 were omitted in the comparison. Respondent points out that many elderly residents of Pinellas County with incomes less than $15,000 annually could well have substantial savings and be economically capable of purchasing a new automobile. Neither party presented hard evidence to support their opinions regarding the validity of not including those with annual incomes of less than $15,000. However, it is noted that elderly people with substantial assets have some, if not most, of those assets producing income which, when added to social security benefits, could easily exceed $15,000 annually. Between 1970 and 1988, the population of the Pinellas community comprising AGSSA's 1-4 and 8 has increased from 582,232 to 910,310. During the same period, households increased from 222,827 to 417,202. Since 1970, the number of Chevrolet dealers in this area has held steady at four. The growth of these five AGSSA's have leveled off during the past few years and the area is no longer a rapid population growth area. Respondent submitted evidence that AGSSA's 2 and 4, those closest to the proposed new dealer location, have reached a near saturation point in population. However, these were opinions of individuals residing in the area and were not supported by numbers of building permits issued, changes in telephone and cable TV subscribers, etc. Automobile buyers today shop competitively to obtain the best price for a specific car. A 1983 survey by J.D. Power nationwide shows some 58 percent of Chevrolet buyers visited at least one dealer of another brand before buying a Chevrolet. Existing dealers in the Tampa MDA who testified in these proceedings were unanimous that there is keen competition among dealers for the new car buyer and that most buyers visit several dealers looking for the best price for the car they ultimately buy. An additional dealer will, to some extent, increase this competition between dealers. However, this competition is not just between the same line-make dealers. It is between all dealers selling cars in the price range in which the buyer is looking. It is not inconceivable that GM is looking to recapture some of the market share it lost to foreign imports during the last twenty years. By consolidating some of their operations with Japanese car makers, purchasing Japanese developed engines for some GM cars, and manufacturing components overseas for GM cars assembled in this country, GM has positioned itself to compete more effectively against foreign imports. AGSSA 3 is one location that could contribute to this endeavor. Respondent contends the appropriate way to measure the Tampa MDA Chevrolet dealers' performance is to compare their performance, in terms of penetration rates, against other similar MDA's. This is done through regression analysis. The regression analysis performed by Respondent's expert used penetration rates in 158 MDA's nationwide. By selecting MDA's from this group and labeling them comparable to the Tampa MDA, a reasonable penetration rate for the Tampa MDA was found to be 8.51 percent in 1987 and 8.60 percent for the first six months in 1988. Selecting different "comparables" would have resulted in a different "reasonable" penetration rate. By carefully selecting the MDA's to be used as comparables almost any "reasonable" penetration rate can be found. Respondent also challenges GM's use of six months registration data through June of 1988 alleging that it is flawed because seasonal factors were not considered which might influence or alter the penetration rates actually obtained by GM for the entire 1988. While this is true, no evidence was submitted to establish a seasonal pattern of car registrations in the Tampa MDA which would indicate inaccuracy in the use of such six months data. Respondent contends GM should compare penetration rates in Tampa MDA with other coastal MDAs where Chevrolet penetration rates are below the national average and to correct for the penetration rates and markets where GM has manufacturing/assembly facilities for that line-make where the penetration rates are high. If this line of reasoning is followed, GM would never be able to demonstrate need for a new dealer. Respondent attributed road construction along U.S. 19 to loss of business for Quinlan for the past two years this widening of U.S. 19 has been ongoing. While this widening of U.S. 19 undoubtedly disrupted customers coming to Quinlan's showrooms, the construction also affected the other dealers along U.S. 19. No evidence was presented to show the dollar value lost to Quinlan, or the sales drop for new Chevrolets during this construction work. The fact that this road construction slowed and inconvenienced vehicular traffic on U.S. 19 in Pinellas County is not disputed.
Recommendation It is Recommended that the application of Morse Chevrolet, Inc., to establish a Chevrolet dealership at 8350 Park Boulevard, Seminole, Pinellas County, Florida, be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX Treatment accorded Petitioner's proposed findings. 1-2. Included H.O.#s 1, 2. 3. Included in Preliminary Statement. 4-6. Included in H.O.#4. 7-8. Included in H.O.# 5. Included in H.O.# 6. Included in H.O.# 7. 11-12. Included in H.O.#8. Included in H.O.#9. Accepted. Included in H.O.#12. Included in H.O.#13. 17-18. Included in H.O.#16. Accepted. Included in H.O.#16. 21-22. Included in H.O.#20. 24. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.#20. 25-26. See H.O.# 14 otherwise included in H.O.# 21. Included in H.O.# 22. Included in H.O.#15. Accepted. Included in H.O.# 16. Included in H.O.# 16. Included in H.O.# 16. Included in H.O.# 15. Accepted that one track in AGSSA 3 exceeding national average is near Quinlan location. Accepted. Accepted. 37. See H.O.# 14. Included in H.O.# 19. Accepted. 40-42. Included in H.O.# 23. 43. Accepted. 44. See H.O.# 14. Included in H.O.# 25. Accepted. Included in H.O.# 23. 48-49. Included in H.O.# 24A. 50. See H.O.# 26. 51-52. See H.O.# 14. 53. See H.O.# 14. 54. See H.O.#s 25-26. 55.-57. Accepted. Included in H.O.# 15. Rejected as mere testimony of witness. Included in H.O.# 5. Included in H.O.# 16. Included in H.O.# 5. Included in H.O.# 18. 64-65. Included in H.O.# 28. 66. Included in H.O.# 29. 67. See H.O.# 14. 68. See H.O.# 14. Included in H.O.# 28. Included in H.O.# 28. Included in H.O.# 21. Rejected as recitation of witness testimony. Included in H.O.# 22. Rejected as recitation of witness testimony. 75-76. Rejected as irrelevant. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings Included in H.O.# 4. Included in H.O.# 3. Accepted as grammatically correct. Rejected as opinion. Accepted. Rejected. 9-10. Rejected. Rejected. See H.O.# 11. Included in H.O.# 11. Included except for last sentence which is rejected. Rejected. Included in H.O.# 11. Rejected. 17-18. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.# 24. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected. Rejected. Accepted as testimony of witness. 23-24. Included in H.O.# 25. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.# 26. Rejected as immaterial. Included in H.O.# 10. Irrelevant. Included in H.O.# 4. 32-33. Irrelevant. Included in H.O.# 10. Accepted. Accepted. See H.O.#10. Rejected. 38-47. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.# 20, 21 and 22. Rejected. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O.#s 20, 21 and 22. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.# 21, otherwise rejected. Rejected. 52-53. Rejected. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O.# 22. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. 62. See H.O.# 14. 63. Rejected. 64. See H.O.# 14. 65. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. 66. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. Accepted except for last sentence. 70-71. Included in H.O.# 3. 72. Accepted. 73 Accepted. Rejected. Rejected. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Rejected. 81. See H.O.# 14. 82. See H.O.# 14. Accepted that market share fluctuations are due to many factors. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. 91-92. Rejected as argument - not fact. Rejected. Rejected. 9 5. Rejected. Rejected. Accepted. 98. See H.O.# 14. Included in H.O.# 18. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. 104-105. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O.# 29. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.# 19. Accepted insofar as included in H.O.# 19. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. Rejected. See H.O.# 14. 113-116. Rejected. See H.O.# 31. 117. Accepted. 118-121. Rejected as irrelevant. 122. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean Bunch, Esquire 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Vasilis C. Kastafanas, Esquire P. O. Box 1873 Orlando, FL 32802 William J. Whalen, Esquire New Center One Building 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Joseph H. Letzer, Esquire Robert H. Rutherford, Esquire 3000 South Trust Tower Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 =================================================================
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department), is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility of regulating the practice of contracting and electrical contracting pursuant to Chapters 20, 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaints, Antoney Manning was not licensed nor had he ever been licensed to engage in contracting as a State Registered or State Certified Contractor in the State of Florida and was not licensed, registered, or certified to practice electrical contracting. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaints, Manning Builders did not hold a Certificate of Authority as a Contractor Qualified Business in the State of Florida and was not licensed, registered, or certified to practice electrical contracting. Respondent, Antoney Manning, was at all times material to this proceeding, the owner/operator of Manning Builders. Respondent is in the business of framing which includes framing, drywall, tile, trim work, and painting. A document which is in evidence purports to be a contract dated September 5, 2004, between Manning Builders and Ms. Gwendolyn Parker, for the construction of a 14-foot by 14- foot addition in the rear corner of Ms. Parker's house located at 8496 Southern Park Drive in Tallahassee, Florida. The contract identifies Manning Builders as the "contractor." The contract price is $15,000. Unfortunately, only the first page of the contract is in evidence. However, Respondent acknowledges that he and Ms. Parker entered into a contract regarding the 14-foot by 14-foot addition to Ms. Parker's home. Respondent insists that he informed Ms. Parker that he was not a certified general contractor, but that he could find a general contractor for her. When that did not work out, Respondent told Ms. Parker that she would have to "pull" her own permits and that he could do the framing. He also told her that he would assist her in finding the appropriate contractors to do the electrical work, plumbing, and roofing. Ms. Parker did not testify at the hearing. On September 7, 2005, Respondent signed a receipt for $7,500 for a "deposit on addition (14 x 14)." The receipt identifies Ms. Gwendolyn Parker as the person from whom the money was received by Respondent. Respondent acknowledges finding an electrical contractor to perform the electrical work on the addition. However, he insists that he did not hire the electrical contractor but found one for Ms. Parker to hire. He gave the name to Ms. Parker but she apparently did not contact him. In any event, the electrical work was never done on the addition. Respondent completed the framework on the addition. Respondent did not build the roof, as he was aware that would require a roofing contractor. Work on the project ceased before the addition was finished. Ms. Parker's home suffered rain damage as a result of the roof not being completed. There is nothing in the record establishing the dollar amount of damage to her home. The total investigative costs to the Department, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, was $360.59 regarding the allegations relating to Case No. 06- 0601, which charged Respondent with the unlicensed practice of contracting. The total investigative costs, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, was $140.63 regarding the allegations relating to Case No. 06-0602, which charged Respondent with the unlicensed practice of electrical contracting.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order imposing a fine of $1,000 for a violation of Section 489.127(1); requiring Respondent to pay $360.59 in costs of investigation and prosecution of DOAH Case No. 06-0601, and dismissing DOAH Case No. 06-0602. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian A. Higgins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Antoney Manning 11865 Register Farm Road Tallahassee, Florida 32305 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
