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ROBERT H. RAINES vs CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, 08-002718 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jun. 09, 2008 Number: 08-002718 Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2019

The Issue Should Petitioner's application for a Certified Residential Contractor license be granted?

Findings Of Fact The Notice of Intent to Deny in this case listed the following reasons for denying Petitioner a Certified Residential Contractor license: (1) insufficient work experience as required by Section 489.111(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-15.001(3), in that Petitioner had only one-half year of experience when he needed one year; commission of crimes related to the practice of, or the ability to practice, contracting, which crimes are a basis for license denial under Sections 489.129(1)(b) and (c) and 455.227(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007); and failure to satisfy the requirement of good moral character, which is a basis for denial of a license according to Section 489.111(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (2007). In 1991, Petitioner was sentenced to probation for Attempted Capital Sexual Battery on a person under the age of twelve, per Section 794.011, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had exposed himself to his step-daughter. Due to the judge finding mitigation, Petitioner was placed on probation. In 1999, Petitioner was convicted under Section 827.071(5), Florida Statutes, for possession of photographs displaying sexual performances by children. He had stored over 90 images of child sexual acts (pornography) on his computer. His arrest therefor violated his probation for the prior offense, and he was sentenced concurrently to two years imprisonment and five years' probation, with psychosexual counseling and no unsupervised contact with minors. Petitioner’s child pornography possession occurred while Petitioner was on probation for his earlier offense. When questioned by the investigating officer, Petitioner initially was not forthcoming as to the amount of child pornography in his possession. Petitioner was released from prison one year early, presumably due to good behavior. Petitioner’s crimes/convictions are related to the practice of contracting, because a licensed residential contractor has greater access to private homes than laymen or many other professionals; because a licensed residential contractor is automatically extended a higher level of trust by consumers’ families than is a typical unlicensed construction worker; and because there is a substantial potential that homeowners will entrust a licensed residential contractor in their home and near their children, while expecting the licensee to oversee his on-premises staff. It is axiomatic that the crimes committed by Petitioner are among the most dangerous and threatening to children, a vulnerable segment of the population. The sentencing guidelines and the probationary requirement of no child contact and psychosexual counseling recognize the potential for future harm.1/ In 2006, Petitioner gained custody of his 16-year-old son, based entirely on the child's problems in school and the inability of the mother to resolve the son’s absentee and scholastic problems. For the last six years, Petitioner has been president of his own successful contracting business. He is financially stable, and has passed the requisite examination for the license for which he has applied. He claims to have two years of college credit, but that was not corroborated. Petitioner's work experience is construction-related, because he has experience drilling into foundation slabs, but he has no experience in actually pouring foundation slabs. Petitioner has experience drilling into masonry walls, but no independent experience constructing masonry walls. Petitioner has experience attaching clips to trusses for support, but no experience in the actual setting of trusses. Petitioner's experience in wood framing is limited to moving supports in walls. He takes out the frame, puts in a rod, and replaces the frame. Petitioner conceded that he has no experience in either column erection or structural reinforced concrete. Petitioner's relevant experience is apparently limited to that obtained working for family and friends, which experience he listed on his application. He testified that he has one year’s experience as a skilled worker; one year's experience as a foreman; and two years of college credit, but his testimony on this score was not corroborated either by affidavit, another witness’ testimony, or by any other reliable evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board deny Petitioner's application for Certified Residential Contractor's License. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2008.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57455.227489.111489.1195489.129794.011827.071 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61G4-15.001
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EARRON SHIELDS vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 19-000132 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Altamonte Springs, Florida Jan. 08, 2019 Number: 19-000132 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a real estate license should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny, dated November 2, 2018.

Findings Of Fact The Commission is the state agency charged with licensing real estate brokers and sales associates in Florida. See § 475.161, Fla. Stat. On August 17, 2018, Petitioner filed with the Commission an application for a Real Estate Broker License – Out of State Experience. According to his PRO, however, he is applying for a "real estate associate license." In conjunction with the application, a lengthy and somewhat confusing record of Petitioner's administrative and criminal history in New York and Minnesota between 1995 and 2018 has been compiled and is found in Commission Exhibit 11, consisting of approximately 300 pages. Besides holding an active Colorado real estate license, he also has a mortgage originator's license issued by the State of Minnesota in 2018. The application required Petitioner to provide answers to four background questions. In response to question 1, which asks the applicant if he has ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction, or is currently under criminal investigation, Petitioner answered yes. In his explanation to the question, Petitioner listed four arrests, discussed below, all occurring in the State of Minnesota. Although the Notice of Intent to Deny alleges that he was convicted of a felony, the Commission now concedes that all convictions are for misdemeanors. First, on July 1, 1997, Petitioner, then 22 years old, was arrested for one felony count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and two felony counts of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. In May 1998, he pled guilty to fifth degree sexual conduct, a gross misdemeanor, and was fined $900.00, sentenced to nine days in jail, placed on two years' probation, ordered to undergo sex offender treatment, and required to register as a sex offender for ten years in New York (where he had relocated temporarily) and Minnesota. Petitioner completed all conditions required by the court. In his application, Petitioner explained that the arrest and conviction were the result of "interactions with an underaged woman [a 15-year-old babysitter for his fiancee's child] that lied about her age." At hearing, he testified that he pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge because he did not have sufficient funds to continue to fight the original felony charges, and he "did not want to take the chances with the jury," even though the prosecutor admitted to the court the defendant's attorney "can kill our guys on cross-examination." He decided to "take the misdemeanor and get on with [his] life." Petitioner acknowledges that he pled guilty to a sexual offense, but it is fair to find that he wants the Commission to accept his version of events - that the girl fabricated the entire incident. Second, on July 10, 1997, Petitioner was arrested for disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, after an "[a]rgument with girlfriend and her brother." He was found guilty of the charge and paid a $150.00 fine. Third, in October 2008, while in a divorce proceeding with his then wife, Petitioner was charged with violation of an Order for Protection for "exchanging messages with my wife on childcare/exchange matters which were allowed according to the original order. She called in and filed a complaint." The application states that the charge was later dismissed. The Commission does not dispute this representation. Finally, in November 2008, Petitioner was arrested for gross misdemeanor domestic assault against his then wife. Petitioner explained that this incident occurred after an "argument with wife (she was heavily intoxicated) that escalated." He later pled guilty to disorderly conduct, paid a $300.00 fine, and was given one year of unsupervised probation. He successfully completed all conditions imposed by the court. Question 1 requires that an applicant also report traffic offenses other than parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signals. The Commission's PRO points out that Petitioner failed to disclose that in 1995, while a resident of the State of New York, he pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle (motorcycle) while impaired by drugs (marijuana). At hearing, Petitioner testified that he forgot about the traffic violation, as it occurred 24 years ago when he was only 20 years old. Even though the Notice of Intent to Deny does not allege that Petitioner failed to disclose his complete criminal record, the issue was tried by consent at hearing. However, Petitioner's omission of this minor item should have no bearing on whether to approve or deny the application. Question 4 asks the applicant to disclose whether he ever has had a license to practice any regulated profession revoked, annulled, suspended, relinquished, or otherwise disciplined in any jurisdiction. Petitioner answered yes. In explaining his answer to question 4, Petitioner stated that his Minnesota real estate broker license was revoked by the Department of Commerce in May 2018 for (a) failure to self-report a 2008 bankruptcy; (b) the denial in 2009 of his application for a residential general contractor's license; and a 2012 felony charge (domestic assault by strangulation of his ex-wife), which was dismissed later. The application added that due to the revocation of the Minnesota license, his Colorado realtor license "is currently in review." At hearing, however, Petitioner testified that Colorado is not taking any action on that license. The revocation order provided in part that Petitioner obtained his license by fraud and misrepresentation, he had a complete disregard for the law, and he could not be trusted to make material disclosures and otherwise comply with licensing requirements. See Comm. Ex. 11, p. 208. Obtaining a license by fraud and/or misrepresentation, and not being trusted to make material disclosures and comply with licensing requirements, are grounds for revoking or suspending a license in the state of Florida had Petitioner then been registered. At hearing, Petitioner testified that he actually had disclosed the bankruptcy and administrative action to the state when he submitted an application to transfer a brokerage license in 2009. Evidently, this contention was not accepted by the Department of Commerce. Petitioner says he "attempted" to appeal the revocation order, but the appeal was denied. In its PRO, the Commission alleges that Petitioner failed to disclose an enforcement action instituted by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (MDLI) in 2009, which resulted in him voluntarily consenting to the revocation of a residential building contractor license held by Vanquish Custom Homes, LLC, a company he controlled. Although this omission is not cited in the Notice of Intent to Deny, the issue was raised at hearing without objection by Petitioner. Petitioner's response to background question 3 acknowledges that his application for a "residential general contractor's license" was denied in 2009. Also, in a letter attached to the application, Petitioner made reference to that action, although in a somewhat confusing and incomplete manner. See Comm. Ex. 11, p. 187. The letter fails to disclose that the proceeding arose in the context of an enforcement action by MDLI, which alleged, among other things, that Petitioner was untrustworthy, incompetent, and unqualified to act as a licensee's qualifying owner. The letter and application also fail to disclose that MDLI issued a consent order revoking the license, imposing a $5,000.00 suspended civil fine, and ordering him to cease and desist from acting as a residential building contractor. Had Petitioner been registered in the state of Florida, these actions would have been grounds to suspend or revoke the license. At hearing, Petitioner explained that the license lapsed around 2007, he reapplied for licensure in 2008, but he withdrew the application after MDLI issued an intent to deny. He says he took this action because he "didn't need the contractor license, and it just wasn't worth spending the money to fight it." By consent of the parties, Petitioner acknowledged that he failed to disclose a consent order issued by MDLI in 2013, which determined that Vanquish Services Group, LLC, another company controlled by Mr. Shields, had violated the 2009 consent order. Petitioner was ordered to cease and desist from any further residential building contractor violations and to pay a $5,000.00 civil penalty, of which $4,500.00 was stayed. At hearing, Petitioner testified that in an effort to procure clients, his company incorrectly advertised four trades on Angie's List, when the company was allowed no more than three trades to be advertised. He admits this was a "mistake." Two character witnesses, Mr. Hartos and Ms. Anderson, both currently licensed as realtors in Minnesota, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Both testified that they are aware of his prior administrative and criminal history. Mr. Hartos is a long- time licensed broker, who has served on the Minnesota Association of Realtors Board of Professional Standards for more than 25 years, and was Petitioner's broker and "boss" for the last five years. The other is a former employee. Based on their work experience with Petitioner, they found him to be ethical, truthful, honest, and trustworthy, and not a danger to the public. Forty-three letters of recommendation, including those submitted by the two character witnesses, all hearsay in nature, corroborate this conclusion.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a real estate broker or sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2019.

Florida Laws (3) 475.161475.17475.25 DOAH Case (2) 08-271819-0132
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ROBERT JAMES KONING vs CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, 90-002154 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 05, 1990 Number: 90-002154 Latest Update: Sep. 12, 1990

The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be permitted to take the examination provided by Respondent to individuals seeking licensure as a certified residential contractor.

Findings Of Fact By certified mail letter dated September 8, 1989, Respondent's representative denied Petitioner's application to sitfor the residential contractor licensure examination. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Petitioner has been licensed by Respondent as a certified underground utility contractor; a certified building contractor; a certified general contractor; a certified roofing contractor; and a certified plumbing contractor. At the present time, Petitioner's licenses as an underground utility contractor and a general contractor are inactive. Petitioner derives 60 percent of his income from consulting services and service as an arbitrator in negotiation and settlement of contracting industry disputes. Petitioner maintains that his credibility as a consultant and expert witness will be bolstered as a result of completing the specific examination for licensure as a residential contractor. Further, he maintains that possibilities of his selection as a arbitrator will also be enhanced as the result of such examination and licensure. Petitioner is also an instructor for an examination preparation organization designed to prepare individuals to pass various state and local contractor examinations, including the examination required for licensure as a certified residential contractor. Respondent's denial of Petitioner's application was predicated upon Petitioner's existing licensure status as a building contractor, as defined in Section 489.105(3)(b), Florida Statutes. As stated by Respondent's representative in the September 8, 1989 letter, Petitioner's statutory scope of work asa licensed building contractor "includes and surpasses that of a residential contractor as defined by Section 489.105(3)(c), Florida Statutes" and therefore submittal of an application for a residential contractor license did not serve the purpose of determining Petitioner's qualification for that license. An applicant who successfully completes the examination offered by Respondent for licensure as a general contractor has essentially demonstrated competency in the areas covered by Respondent's examinations for builder and residential contractor licensure. Such an applicant may be considered to have completed the examinations for competency to hold those licenses. At the final hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent has reconsidered its denial, in part, and will issue a residential contractor license to Petitioner. While Petitioner will not be permitted to take the examination for residential contractor licensure, his previous test score from the general contractor examination will be used, by Respondent, to document Petitioner's competency as a residential contractor and to comply with statutory requirements 1/ for licensure that competency be ascertained by the applicant's completion of the appropriate examination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that upon issuance of a residential contractor's license to Petitioner, a final order be entered dismissing, as moot, any further proceedings in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1990.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57489.105489.111489.113
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ISIDORO CARRILLO vs CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, 92-006874 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:South Daytona, Florida Nov. 13, 1992 Number: 92-006874 Latest Update: May 16, 1994

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Isidoro Carrillo, sat for Part II of the residential contractors examination administered in June, 1992. The Petitioner received a raw score of 62 on Part II of this examination which was amended to a grade of 63. A minimum passing score is 70. Each correct answer was worth 4 points. The Petitioner originally challenged questions numbered 8, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 25 on the examination. At the hearing, the Petitioner conceded the Department's answer to questions no. 18 was correct. The Petitioner did not present any evidence with regard to questions numbered 8, 19, and 25 at the hearing. The Petitioner challenged questions numbered 11, 15, and 16. Questions numbered 11, 15, and 16 were labeled as the Hearing Officer's Exhibit and determined to be confidential pursuant to Section 455.229, Florida Statutes. A set of plans was introduced and labeled as Respondent's Exhibit 1. These plans are also determined to be confidential pursuant to Section 455.229, Florida Statutes. Question No. 11 required the computation of the square area of the foyer. The portion of the house to be included within the computation of the area of foyer was to include "all adjacent interior cased openings and door ways." Sheet 3 of 6 of the plans for the structure reveal notes relating to the foyer. The annotations regarding the foyer state: "See Note No. 18" and "See Note No. 19." Sheet 1 of 6 contains the specific notes relating to the plans. Note No. 18 states: "40 (width) x 68 (height) cased opening (See (Floor Plan)." Note No. 19 states, "58 (width) x 68 (height) cased opening (See Floor Plan)." The Petitioner failed to compute the correct answer for question No. 11 because he excluded from his computations the area between the foyer and the living room which was subject to note No. 19. The Petitioner's excluded this area from his calculation because the area between the foyer and living room lacks jams and is not a cased opening. The Petitioner and Respondent's expert both agreed that a cased opening was "Any opening finished with jams and trim, but without doors." A jam is defined as a vertical structure with depth. Referring to the plans in question, the opening between the foyer and the living room lacks jams. Respondent's expert explained that the area between the foyer and living room was included in the computation purely on the basis of Note 19, defining the area as a cased opening. Petitioner challenged question No. 15 which required the examinee to compute the amount of time required "to lift and place all single wood trusses with a span of 21' 4" given that the truck can lift and place one full-span, single, roof truss every 15 minutes. Sheet 5 of 6 of the plans depicts the roof truss layout for the house. On the plan, there are three single roof trusses with an overall length of 25' 4" and a span of 21' 4" and one gable end truss with a span of 21' 4" which is placed on top of and runs the length of the south wall of the building. This gable end truss has a span of 21' 4" but does not span any distance because it sits atop the wall. The response expected by the Respondent was one hour with the truck lifting four trusses: the three 25' 4" trusses plus the gable end truss. The Petitioner's answer was 45 minutes because he excluded the gable end truss which sits atop the wall and does not span any distance. The Petitioner challenges question No. 16 which asks the examinee to calculate the total cost for the pressure treated 4 x 8 and 2 x 6 lumber required to construct the wood deck, excluding wood rails, and given the price per 100 board feet of the 4 x 8 and the 2 x 6 pressure treated lumber. The expected response was answer A. The candidate's response was answer D because the candidate had included 4 x 8 beams running along and parallel to the wall of the house in his calculation of the cost figures. However, the detailed drawings of the wooden deck at the top of Sheet 3 of 6 and on Sheet 2 of 6 reveal that there are no 4 by 8 beams running along and parallel to the side of the house.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, the Hearing Officer concludes that the Petitioner was successful in challenging only one of three of the questions involved. The Petitioner's score of 67 points is insufficient for him to pass the examination. The Petitioner's records should be corrected; however, the Petitioner has not demonstrated a passing grade of 70, and therefore should not be licensed. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX A The Petitioner did not file proposed findings. The Respondent filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Respondent's Findings: Proposed Order: Paragraph 1-5 Paragraph 1-3 Paragraph 6 Paragraph 4-8 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 9,10 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Isidoro Carrillo Post Office Box 1896 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32170 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director DPR - Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57455.229
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs MARK P. STANISH, 95-004534 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crystal River, Florida Sep. 13, 1995 Number: 95-004534 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2013

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensing of contractors in Florida and regulating the practice of contracting of all types. Specifically, the Petitioner is responsible for enforcing law which prohibits unlicensed persons from engaging in the business of contracting, or advertising themselves or business organizations as available to engage in contracting, without proper licensure. The Respondent is a citizen of the State of Florida, who has embarked on a business of representing owners who desire to construct residences, acting as the agent of those owners in arranging for materials, labor, subcontractors, and the financing of construction. Upon the decision by the owner to construct a residence, the Respondent engages in drafting plans, to some extent, arranging for subcontractors, overseeing the details of the work and any changes or alterations in the work and plans as the project proceeds. The owner in this arrangement does not obtain workers' compensation coverage for the Respondent, as would be the case if the Respondent was an employee of the owner, nor does the owner withhold F.I.C.A. taxes from monies due the Respondent for his services. The Respondent is not licensed as a contractor in the State of Florida. On May 11, 1995, the Respondent signed a contract (hereinafter the "Kassiris Contract") with owner Gus Kassiris, to oversee the erection and construction of a new residence for Mr. Kassiris. The Respondent was to perform the following duties, pursuant to the Kassiris Contract: to make recommendations as to which subcontractor to hire; to inspect progress and review payments; consultations and solutions on construc- tion project; to engage in manpower tracking and coor- dination of resources; monitoring of contract compliance; to provide punch list services; and to engage in the preparation and de- fense of change orders, as well as cost accounting. The "punch list services" mean that the Respondent was to engage in insuring that no work was left undone or done incorrectly at the end of the project. The Respondent admitted that he conducted all inspections on the project and reviewed all requisitions for payment from the subcontractors. The amount he charged for his services was roughly equivalent to the amount a licensed contractor would charge for similar services. The Kassiris Contract did not meet the conditions for a homeowner's exemption, found in Section 489.103(7), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Kassiris Contract did not provide that the Respondent would work under the supervision of the homeowner. In fact, the Kassiris Contract provided that if the homeowner wanted changes made in the specifications, he could request a change order. The Kassiris Contract also did not provide that the homeowner would deduct F.I.C.A. and withholding taxes from the Respondent's fees or wages, as required in the homeowner's exemption standards. There was no provision requiring that the homeowner provide workers' compensation, as required by the statute, in order to make out the elements of the homeowner's exemption (from the requirement of having a contractor's license). The conditions for exemption from licensure were also not met in the implementation of the Kassiris Contract. Specifically, the homeowner did not act as his own contractor and provide all of the material supervision himself. Although he denies it, in fact, the Respondent negotiated the contracts with the subcontractors and, during the course of performance of the Kassiris Contract, the Respondent approved plan changes for the project, without the involvement or consultation of the owner. The Respondent acted in the capacity of a contractor in the implementation of the contract by overseeing most details of construction of the residence. He performed the on-site inspections, dealt with subcontractors, approved the manner in which work was being performed, approved payment of subcontractors, and, in general, closely managed all details of the contracting effort. Practically, the only involvement the owner had, other than being present on the site frequently, was that the owner actually wrote the checks to pay the subcontractors and delivered them to the Respondent, who, in turn, delivered them to the subcontractors. The owner obtained the building permit at the commencement of the project. The Respondent advertised in the Citrus County Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation, on or about June 25, 1995, that he offered services for hire as a construction consultant and for project management. On or about June 27, 1995, he entered into a contract with Paul and Valerie Stamper (hereinafter the "Stamper Contract"). The Respondent was thus charged with overseeing the erection and construction of a residence located at Lot 15 of Laurel Oak Estates Subdivision in Citrus County, Florida. He acted in the capacity of a contractor in the negotiation and formulation of this contract. According to the Stamper Contract, the Respondent's responsibilities were to include the following: make recommendations as to which subcon- tractor to hire; conduct progress inspections and payment reviews; consult concerning construction problems and arrive at solutions; engage in manpower and tracking and coor- dination of resources; monitor contract compliance; provide "punch list" services; prepare and defend any change orders; engage in cost accounting. The terms of the Stamper Contract indicate that the residence to be constructed was to be purveyed to the owner, rather than a case of the owner being the contractor actually creating the product. In order for the above- referenced exemption to apply, the homeowner must be the party functioning as a contractor on his own behalf. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Stampers gave the Respondent a $3,000.00 deposit. The Stampers later decided that they did not wish to proceed with the contract and requested return of that deposit. The Respondent refused to return the deposit money, although acknowledging that the Stamper Contract was no longer in effect. In his letter to the Stampers, responding to their request for return of the deposit, he proposed, instead, that they continue to proceed with the contract and the construction of the residence, which the Stampers no longer wished to own and occupy, in order that they could sell it. The intention to construct a residence for sale to another party directly belies the possibility that the homeowner can be his own contractor, constructing a residence for his own use in compliance with the homeowner-exemption law. It shows an intention to engage in contracting by the Respondent. The existence of facts supporting this exemption is also belied because the Respondent, in his contract with the Stampers, did not contract to have F.I.C.A. or income taxes withheld from any paychecks due him from the Stampers, nor did the Stampers contract to provide workers' compensation coverage for the Respondent. The contract also did not provide that the owners, the Stampers, would act as their own contractors and provide all material supervision themselves. In fact, the Respondent was to provide supervision. The Petitioner is responsible for enforcing the prohibition against unlicensed contracting in order to protect the public. There are frequent problems with unlicensed contractors in Florida in terms of their competence to provide quality work and their willingness to do so, as well as outright fraud and harm to the public. The contracts which unlicensed contractors enter into are illegal and unenforceable. Homeowners who contract with unlicensed contractors are not eligible for recovery under the Construction Industry Licensing Recovery Fund. On July 2, 1995, the Respondent again advertised in the Citrus County Chronicle, advertising himself as available to manage the construction of residences. Based upon this notice and other information, the Petitioner issued a Notice to Cease and Desist to the Respondent, ordering him to cease and desist the unlicensed practice of contracting. The Respondent contends that he is not a contractor and that he is, instead, a project manager or consultant and, therefore, not governed by the statutory provision authorizing the Notice to Cease and Desist.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00 against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-4534 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-9. Accepted. 10. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law. 11-14. Accepted. 15. Rejected, as being irrelevant. 16-17. Accepted. 18. Accepted, except for the next to the last sentence, which constitutes a conclusion of law. 19-20. Accepted. 21. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law. 22-31. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as contrary to the unrefuted evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not in accordance with the greater weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law, but to the extent it might be a proposed finding of fact, as not in accord with unrefuted evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not representative of the unrefuted evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not itself being dispositive of material issues. Rejected, as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as not being materially dispositive. Rejected, as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as, in part, being a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding of fact. 10-12. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna Bass, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Mr. Mark P. Stanish 6041 Town Court Springhill, FL 34606 Richard Hickok, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, FL 32211-7467 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (9) 120.57455.228489.103489.105489.127489.128489.141775.082775.083
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION vs RYAN D. KIRKLAND, A/K/A RYAN DEE LON KIRKLAND, 17-005781 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 18, 2017 Number: 17-005781 Latest Update: Mar. 01, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 489.13(1), Florida Statutes (2016)1/, by offering, contracting, or performing regulated construction services, for compensation, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the construction industry, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. On September 29, 2016, by letter, the Broward County Environment Protection and Growth Management Department forwarded a complaint to DBPR indicating the subject matter "appears to fall within your area of jurisdiction." The complaint alleged that Ryan D. Kirkland, d/b/a The Shining Light Construction, Inc., represented himself as a licensed contractor, provided a quote, and cashed the check from the victim, Rayon Richards ("Richards"). DBPR assigned Sonya Roa-Zaiter ("Roa-Zaiter"), investigator, to investigate the complaint. During the investigation, Roa-Zaiter interviewed individuals and reviewed several documents to determine Respondent's licensure status and relationship with Richards. Roa-Zaiter discovered that on July 20, 2016, Respondent presented Richards with a written proposal ("proposal") to perform construction work at Richard's rental property, located at 3234 Northwest 31st Terrace, Oakland Park, Florida 33309. In the proposal, Respondent offered to perform regulated services for compensation in the amount of $1,500.00. Specifically, Respondent offered to replace a kitchen faucet, remove a dishwasher, install a new water line and replace exhaust fans. Respondent's proposal listed the company as "State License Insured," but contained the license number CGC 1518408, which is a certified general contractor license number that belongs to Bernard Forges. Bernard Forges did not give Respondent permission to use his license number. Respondent is not licensed and has never been certified or registered as a construction contractor in the State of Florida. Additionally, at all times material to the allegations in this matter, The Shining Light Construction, Inc., has not been an entity properly qualified or licensed in the practice of construction in the State of Florida. Roa-Zaiter also discovered during the investigation that on or about July 22, 2016, Respondent accepted $750.00 as partial payment to perform the services listed in the proposal and cashed the check for the services without performing any of the work. After DBPR completed the investigation, it was determined that Respondent offered to perform a regulated service for compensation without a license contrary to Florida law. On November 1, 2016, DBPR issued Respondent a Notice to Cease and Desist, which notified Respondent that he "may be practicing as a CONTRACTOR (in any trade) without the professional license or certification required by Florida law." On April 25, 2017, DBPR issued an Administrative Complaint charging Respondent with violation of section 489.13(1) for offering to perform regulated construction contracting services for compensation without holding an active and valid certification or registration. Respondent contested the Administrative Complaint and requested a hearing. Roa-Zaiter spent 18 hours and four minutes investigating Respondent's case. DBPR incurred $624.78 for the investigation relating to Respondent's actions in this case, excluding costs relating to any attorney's time.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order: finding Respondent, Ryan D. Kirkland, a/k/a Ryan Dee Lon Kirkland, guilty of violating section 489.13(1), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $3,000.00; and assessing costs in the amount of $624.78. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2018.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57120.6820.165455.227455.228489.101489.105489.113489.13
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BLUE BROADWAY, LLC vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 17-003273BID (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 07, 2017 Number: 17-003273BID Latest Update: Nov. 27, 2017

The Issue Whether the intended decision of Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Respondent/Florida Housing) to fund the application of West River Phase 2, LP (West River/Intervenor), based on the scoring of its application, is contrary to Respondent’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or solicitation specifications.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida limited liability corporation based in Tampa, Florida, in the business of providing affordable housing. Intervenor is a Florida limited partnership based in Tampa, Florida, in the business of providing affordable housing. Respondent is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low-income housing tax credit program was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. These credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. This has the effect of reducing the amount that the developer would have to borrow otherwise. Because the total debt is lower, a tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the tax credits. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150, while a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. Florida Housing allocates housing tax credits and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation as authorized by section 420.507(48). Housing tax credits are made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of an RFA. An RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(4). The RFA at issue here is 2016-113, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties. The RFA was issued on October 28, 2016, a modification to the RFA was issued on November 10, 2016, and responses were due December 30, 2016. A challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of the RFA by parties not associated with the instant case, but that challenge was ultimately unsuccessful. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated $14,669,052 of housing tax credits to qualified applicants to provide affordable housing developments. A review committee made up of Florida Housing staff reviews and scores each application. These scores are presented in a public meeting and the committee ultimately makes a recommendation as to which projects should be funded. This recommendation is presented to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (Board) for final agency action. On May 5, 2017, Petitioner and all other participants in RFA 2016-113 received notice that the Board had determined which applications were eligible for consideration for funding and that certain applications were selected for awards of tax credits, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets, one listing the “eligible” and “ineligible” applications and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund. Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to seven developments, including Intervenor. Petitioner’s application was deemed eligible and scored the maximum number of points, but it was not selected for funding due to having a higher lottery number than Intervenor. If Intervenor’s application had been deemed ineligible, Petitioner’s would have been selected for funding. In this proceeding, Petitioner alleges that Intervenor’s application is ineligible for two reasons. First, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to include all “principals” for its designated developer entity as required by the RFA. Next, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to provide sufficient documentation to establish that its designated developer entity, and specifically the identified “principal” of the developer entity, had the requisite developer experience required by the RFA. Disclosure of the Principals of the Developer The RFA at section Four (A)(3)(d) requires the disclosure of information as follows: Principals Disclosure for the Applicant and for each Developer. The Application must include a properly completed Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Form Rev. 08- 16) (“Principals Disclosure Form”) that was uploaded as outlined in Section Three above. The Principals Disclosure form must identify the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) as of the Application Deadline and must include, for each applicable organizational structure, ONLY the types of Principals required by subsection 67-48.002(93), F.A.C. A Principals Disclosure Form that includes, for any organizational structure, any type of entity that is not specifically included in the Rule definition of Principals, will not be accepted by the Corporation to meet the Mandatory requirement to provide the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form. The term “principal” is defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(93)(b) with respect to a developer, and provides as follows when the developer entity is a limited liability company: A limited liability company, at the first principal disclosure level, any manager or member of the Developer limited liability company, and, with respect to any manager or member of the Developer limited liability company that is: A corporation, at the second principal disclosure level, any officer, director or shareholder of the corporation, A limited partnership, at the second principal disclosure level, any general partner or limited partner of the limited partnership, or A limited liability company, at the second principal disclosure level, any manager or member of the limited liability company. Florida Housing offers a pre-approval of the principals disclosure form to all potential applicants. The pre-approval process verifies that the disclosure form has been completed properly as to form. However, its purpose is not to determine the accuracy of the information provided by the applicant. Intervenor utilized the pre-approval process and its principal disclosure forms were pre-approved. In response to this RFA and rule requirement, Intervenor identified WRDG Boulevard, LLC, as its developer. On the principal disclosure form included within its application, Intervenor further identified Banc of America Community Development Corporation (BOACDC) as the “managing member” and the Housing Authority of the City of Tampa as “member” of WRDG Boulevard, LLC. The principal disclosure form submitted by Intervenor for its developer entity lists approximately 62 individuals that are principals of BOACDC and identifies them as officers, directors, and shareholders. However, two officers who met the definition of principal were omitted from Intervenor’s principals disclosure form for the developer entity. The evidence establishes that the annual report filed by BOACDC with the Florida Secretary of State’s office on March 31, 2016, lists four officers and directors for BOACDC. The listed officers and directors include Mr. Jason Pritchard as senior vice president and Mr. Nathan Barth as secretary. Neither Mr. Pritchard nor Mr. Barth is listed on the principals disclosure form submitted to Florida Housing by Intervenor. Intervenor concedes that the principals disclosure form is missing these two principals, but asserts that neither Mr. Barth nor Mr. Pritchard had actual authority to bind BOACDC or had any direct involvement with the proposed project. Intervenor further points out that neither Mr. Pritchard nor Mr. Barth is listed on Respondent’s past due report dated April 5, 2017, which was the most recently published past due report prior to the RFA review committee meeting on April 25, 2017. Intervenor also asserts that there is no specific language in the RFA that prohibits waiving this admitted deviation. Accordingly, Intervenor alleges that the failure to include these two principals should be waived as a minor irregularity. The RFA requires that principals be listed and does not include qualifiers or exemptions to these requirements in instances where the omitted principal is either not on the latest arrears list or does not have the authority to bind the designated entity. Mr. Reecy testified that while Respondent has waived other failures to submit certain information, it did so only when the missing information could be found elsewhere in the application. In the present case, there is no other place in the application where a list of the principals of the developer could be found. The evidence establishes that the accurate and complete disclosure of principals is important in the RFA process for several reasons. First, Respondent uses the disclosure of principals to determine if any individuals associated with a proposed development are in arrears or indebted to Florida Housing in connection with other developments previously funded by Florida Housing. A Florida Housing staff member, during the review process, checks each principal listed for arrearages and reports back to the review committee accordingly. Second, Respondent uses the information to determine if any principal associated with a proposed development is ineligible to participate in any Florida Housing program due to prior illegal acts or misconduct. Mr. Reecy testified as to several recent instances where individuals have been subject to “timeouts” due to misrepresentations made to Florida Housing. Mr. Reecy credibly testified that Florida Housing must know who it is dealing with for each applicant and developer entity, and that to not know this information would harm the basic structure of the RFA application process, which resultantly would adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing and the public. Developer Experience Chart Section Four, 4(a)(3) of the RFA provides, in part, as follows: General Development experience (5 Points): To be eligible to be awarded 5 points for General Development Experience, the Prior General Development Experience chart must meet the requirements of (a) below. At least one Principal, which must be a natural person, of the Developer entity, or if more than one Developer entity, at least one Principal, which must be a natural person, of at least one of the Developer entities, must meet the General Development Experience requirements in (i) and (ii) below. General Development Experience: A Principal, which must be a natural person, of each experienced Developer entity must have, since January 1, 1996, completed at least three (3) affordable rental housing developments, at least one (1) of which was a Housing Credit development completed since January 1, 2006. If the experience of a natural person Principal for a Developer entity listed in this Application was acquired from a previous affordable housing Developer entity, the natural person Principal must have also been a Principal of that previous Developer entity as the term Principal was defined by the Corporation at that time. Prior General Development Experience Chart: The Applicant must provide, as Attachment 4 to Exhibit A, a prior experience chart for each natural person Principal intending to meet the minimum general development experience reflecting the required information for the three (3) completed affordable rental housing developments, one (1) of which must be a Housing Credit development. The RFA requires that at least one principal of the designated developer entity have completed at least three affordable rental housing developments since January 1996. If the designated principal is using experience from a previous developer entity, the named principal must have been a principal of that entity as the term principal “was defined by the Corporation at that time.” Intervenor submitted a general development experience chart as part of its application in accordance with the RFA. This chart listed Eileen M. Pope as its principal with the required developer experience, and specified three developments for which Ms. Pope was identified as a principal of the developer. Based upon this chart, Intervenor was awarded five points by the scoring review committee. One of these developments was First Ward Place Phase I, which was listed as being completed in 1998. In 1998, Ms. Pope was employed as a regional property manager for the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA). She was not an officer, director, or shareholder of the CHA. The RFA in this case requires an applicant to state the name of each developer, including all co-developers. It is thus relatively easy for applications submitted to Florida Housing in 2017 to determine whether or not a particular entity is considered a “co-developer” of a project. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to make this determination with respect to developers of projects located in North Carolina in 1998. There is no evidence directly identifying CHA as a “co-developer” of First Ward Place Phase I. However, Ms. Pope identified it as such, and there is evidence in the record that the CHA was in partnership with NationsBank Community Development Corporation (NBCDC), and that NBCDC was the developer of the project. The available evidence does not demonstrate that the CHA should not be considered a co-developer of First Ward Place Phase I. Whether Ms. Pope should be considered a principal of a co-developer, however, is another matter. The evidence is uncontroverted that she was employed by the CHA as a regional property manager. The CHA was governed by a board of directors along with several officers (president, CEO, CFO), any of whom would have been considered a principal of the CHA. Ms. Pope was not a director, officer, or shareholder of the CHA; for the First Ward Place Phase I project, she “worked on the development team middle-to-back-end piece.” She considered herself a member of the “senior management” of the CHA and part of the “development team.” She testified that the CHA was, to some extent, a regulatory agency, and that part of her job was to oversee compliance issues and to track how certain funds were being spent. She testified that it was her understanding that a “principal” was “a person in authority” and, thus, she considered herself to be a “principal.” However, she also testified that she did not claim to be a principal: I disagree with your first part of the comment in that you said that I said I was a principal of the housing authority. I didn’t say I was a principal. I said there were no principals, and I was asked if I viewed myself as a principal, and I said I don’t understand what the definition of the principal would be, that a principal is somebody in authority. So, if you’re asking me that, yes, I would have viewed myself as a principal. I never claimed to be a principal of the housing authority. (Jt. Ex. 8, pg. 53) Mr. Reecy testified that Ms. Pope was “an employee, but not a principal in any way that Florida Housing has ever defined principal in any regard.” Mr. Reecy also testified that Florida Housing had never considered a person other than an officer, director, shareholder, or managing member to be a principal of either an applicant or a developer. In fact, Mr. Reecy compared Ms. Pope’s position with the CHA to his own position with Florida Housing, in that both had a high level of responsibility, and both were integral to the operation of the entity, but that neither could be considered a principal. As noted above, the RFA requires that in order to gain points for developer experience, the natural person principal must have also been a principal of that previous developer entity as the term principal was defined by the Florida Housing “at that time.” There is no dispute that Respondent’s rules in effect in 1998 did not explicitly define a principal of a developer. Both Florida Administrative Code Rules 9I-48.002(69) and 67-48.002(77) defined “principal” to include only officers, directors, shareholders or general partners, but these rules specifically applied only to applicants. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that it has been Respondent’s position and practice that a principal did not include all employees of an applicant or developer, even those in positions of authority, but instead, included only the officers, directors, shareholders, or general partners of an applicant or developer. The greater weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Pope had some degree of experience. As Mr. Reecy indicated, however, simply having experience is only part of the equation; Ms. Pope must also have been a principal. There is no evidence establishing that Ms. Pope was an officer, director, or shareholder of either NBCDC or the CHA in conjunction with the First Ward Place Phase I development. It is, therefore, found that Ms. Pope was not a principal of either entity, and the award to Intervenor of five points for its developer experience was clearly erroneous.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued finding that Florida Housing’s initial scoring decision regarding the West River application was erroneous, concluding that the West River application is ineligible for funding, and awarding funding to Blue Broadway. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2017.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68287.001287.012420.504420.507420.5099
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs JOSEPH MARCELIN, 96-006074 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 26, 1996 Number: 96-006074 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this complaint, the Respondent, Joseph Marcelin, was a certified residential contractor, license number CR C028352. Respondent’s place of business and residence are in Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and disciplining licensed contractors. On May 14, 1988, the Construction Industry Licensing Board entered a final order approving a settlement stipulation regarding Case no. 74860 against this Respondent. This final order directed Respondent to adhere to and abide by all of the terms and conditions of the stipulation. The stipulation required the Respondent to not violate the provisions in Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes, in the future; required Respondent to honor a settlement in a civil matter; required Respondent to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00; suspended Respondent’s license for thirty days; and required Respondent to affirmatively demonstrate compliance with the stipulation in order to have his license reinstated. A second final order entered by the Board on May 14, 1988, approved a settlement stipulation regarding Case no. 77499. This final order also directed Respondent to comply with the stipulation applicable to that case. In Case no. 77499, the stipulation required Respondent to abide by a civil settlement; imposed a fine in the amount of $500.00; suspended Respondent’s license for thirty days; and placed the burden on Respondent to demonstrate he had met the terms of the stipulation. As to both cases referenced above, Respondent admitted the allegations of the administrative complaints which, in pertinent part, claimed Respondent had assisted an unlicensed person or entity to perform contracting services thereby aiding and abetting an unlicensed person to evade the provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. On April 2, 1993, Respondent executed a certification change of status form which was submitted to the Department. Such form was completed for the purpose of qualifying as an individual for licensure and sought to reinstate a delinquent license or change from inactive to active. In the course of completing the change of status form Respondent was required to answer a series of questions by checking either the “yes” or “no” column. In response to the question as to whether Respondent had “been charged with or convicted of acting as a contractor without a license, or if licensed as a contractor in this state or any other state, had a disciplinary action (including probation, fine or reprimand) against such license by a state, county or municipality?,” he answered “no.” Such answer was false. Further such answer was made under with the following affirmation: I affirm that these statements are true and correct and I recognize that providing false information may result in a FINE, SUSPENSION, OR REVOCATION of my contractor’s license. [Emphasis in original.] Thereafter, the Department notified the Respondent that his license would not be issued as he had failed to demonstrate satisfaction of a civil judgment and had not submitted an explanation of the disciplinary action from 1988. Respondent eventually resolved issues of licensure with the Department and, on September 15, 1993, was authorized to practice contracting. Prior to his license being reinstated, Respondent performed the following: on April 7, 1993, Respondent obtained a building permit for construction work at the home of Eduardo Bovea. This permit, no. 93181501, indicated Respondent as the contractor of record for the project. On the permit application Respondent represented himself as the licensed building contractor for the Bovea project to the Metropolitan Dade County building and zoning department. Respondent did not have a contract with Bovea for the construction work to be performed on the Bovea home. In fact, the contract was between Bovea and Lou Greene Construction. The Boveas paid monies to Rodney Salnave, who claimed to be a representative for Lou Greene Construction. Rodney Salnave was not Respondent’s employee, and was not licensed as a contractor. The Respondent did not talk to the Boveas regarding the contract, the scope of the work to be done, or the contract price for the work. All discussions regarding the work at their home (and payments for same) were between Rodney Salnave and the Boveas. The permit for the Bovea project represented the amount of the work to be $2,000.00. In fact, the contract price for the work was $4,500.00. Respondent misrepresented the value of the work for the Bovea project. As of September 26, 1993, Respondent admitted he was involved with seventeen contracting jobs. Just eleven days after having his license reinstated, and while being employed in a full-time (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) job with Dade County, Respondent had contracting responsibility for seventeen jobs. In reality, Respondent had made a deal with an unlicensed person, Denis Joseph, to pull permits for him. The jobs were for persons who, in some instances, Respondent had never met. For example, Mr. Joseph pulled a permit for work to be performed on a home owned by Ed Davis. The contract for the work was between Mr. Davis and a Mr. Sutton, an unlicensed contractor, but with the approval of Respondent, Mr. Joseph obtained a permit for the Davis job. A second job was for Bertha Joseph. In this instance, Mr. Joseph completed the permit application which Respondent signed thereby allowing Mr. Joseph to obtain the permit for the project. By signing the permit, Respondent represented himself to be the contractor for the job. In truth, the homeowner had contracted with Denis Joseph for the work to be done, but the project was completed by Emanuel Gideon, an unlicensed contractor. Respondent admitted receiving payments from Denis Joseph. Respondent admitted he was not actively involved with the Bertha Joseph project. In September, 1993, Eric Wardle, an investigator with the Dade County building and zoning department, interviewed Respondent regarding claims that he was obtaining permits for unlicensed contractors. According to Mr. Wardle, Respondent admitted he pulled permits for unlicensed contractors after Hurricane Andrew because they were trying to make a living. At hearing Respondent disputed the accuracy of Mr. Wardle’s investigation but admitted he would have told him “anything just for him to get away from me.” Respondent’s explanation at hearing was not persuasive.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, enter a final order revoking Respondent’s contractor license and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $8,500.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce M. Pasternack, Esquire Raymond L. Robinson, P.A. 1501 Venera Avenue, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Joseph Marcelin 16561 Southwest 144th Court Miami, Florida 33177 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1997. Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation/CILB 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Northwood Centre Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (5) 120.5717.001455.227489.1195489.129 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61G4-17.002
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