The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated June 2, 1998, alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his age and in retaliation for opposing illegal behavior. FCHR received the Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1998. For purposes of this Recommended Order of Dismissal, it is assumed that the Charge of Discrimination was timely filed with FCHR. As of December 15, 1998, 180 days after Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, FCHR had not assigned an investigator to investigate Petitioner's complaint or taken any other action related to the complaint. As of January 19, 1999, 35 days after December 15, 1998, Petitioner had not requested an administrative hearing. By letter dated June 2, 1999, Petitioner requested FCHR to forward his complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings. FCHR received the request for an administrative hearing on June 7, 1999. This request was filed 354 days after June 18, 1998, 174 days after December 15, 1998, and 139 days after January 19, 1999. Petitioner does not argue or present any facts to support a finding that the doctrines of equitable tolling or excusable neglect apply in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on April 22, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male who was employed by Respondent from August 2008 until his termination on or about January 9, 2009. Respondent, Arena Sports Café (Arena), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Arena is a restaurant/night club which offers the viewing of televised sporting events, and is generally known as a sports bar. Arena is adjacent to The Coliseum, another establishment with the same owners, Trisha Lawrence and Randy Berner. The owners are Caucasian. The Coliseum is an entertainment venue with live and recorded music, dancing, and stage acts. The Coliseum does not serve food, and does not have a kitchen. When hired in August 2008, Petitioner worked as a prep cook as part of the kitchen staff. He performed various duties including preparation of meals in the kitchen as well as preparing food for Respondent’s large salad bar. Petitioner holds a Food Handling Certificate and a Safe Serve Certificate, which he attained through a local college. Petitioner was paid $12.00 per hour, and generally worked a 40-hour work week. At the time Petitioner was hired, the Arena was brand new and very popular. When the Arena opened in August 2008, it featured lunch and dinner seven days per week. Weekends were particularly busy because college and pro football games were televised in the fall. However, the Arena saw a drop in demand for weekday lunches. During the fall of 2008, Anthony Cyr, a Caucasian, was employed by Arena as its general manager. Petitioner was already employed by Respondent when Mr. Cyr began employment there. According to Petitioner, Mr. Cyr used the word “nigger” (the "N" word) in the context of telling a joke on three occasions in October and November 2008. Mr. Cyr used this word in the presence of the kitchen staff, including Petitioner. Petitioner informed Mr. Cyr that this was offensive and objected. Mr. Cyr did not use the "N" word other than these three occasions, and did not use it again after Petitioner objected. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone, including the owners of Arena. As one of the owners of Arena, Ms. Lawrence would sometimes eat meals at Arena. At some point in January 2009, she voiced her displeasure to Mr. Cyr as to meals which she believed to have been prepared by Petitioner. She was never made aware of Petitioner’s allegations regarding the use of racial slurs by Mr. Cyr. According to Ms. Lawrence, she instructed Mr. Cyr to terminate Petitioner from employment because of his cooking abilities. Mr. Cyr informed Petitioner that his employment was terminated, and informed him that it was due to his job performance. Mr. Cyr also informed Petitioner that the decision to terminate Petitioner was Ms. Lawrence’s, not his. Mr. Cyr’s testimony regarding using the “N” word contradicts Petitioner’s testimony, and is somewhat inconsistent with Ms. Lawrence’s testimony regarding the reason Petitioner was fired. That is, Mr. Cyr denies using the “N” word in front of Petitioner. As for the reason he fired Petitioner, Mr. Cyr testified that it was due to a reduction in business following football season. There is no dispute, however, that Ms. Lawrence was the decisionmaker regarding the decision to fire Petitioner. Regarding the conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Cyr used the “N” word, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s testimony in this regard to be credible and more persuasive. That is, the undersigned finds that Mr. Cyr did use the “N” word in front of Petitioner in the workplace. As for the reason Petitioner was fired, Ms. Lawrence did acknowledge that business slowed down at Arena around the time she instructed Mr. Cyr to fire Petitioner, and that the salad bar was phased out the month after Petitioner was terminated. However, she insists that she instructed Mr. Cyr to fire Petitioner because of the quality of his cooking. In any event, there does not appear to be a dispute that Mr. Cyr told Petitioner that he was being fired due to job performance issues. At some time after Petitioner was terminated, Mr. Cyr was terminated from Arena because, in Ms. Lawrence’s words, he “was not that great.” When Petitioner was terminated, two Caucasian cooks remained employed at Arena. While Petitioner was not actually replaced, his duties were assumed by the remaining Caucasian staff. Since his termination, Petitioner has worked for approximately three weeks at another eating establishment. Otherwise, he has been unsuccessful finding employment despite his efforts. Respondent employs minorities and non-minorities in positions with both Arena and The Coliseum. The undersigned has reviewed the evidence of record, oral and written, as to the number of minority and non-minority employees and as to whether Respondent hired primarily non-minority persons in the better paying positions. The evidence of record is insufficient to support a finding that Respondent engaged in racially motivated hiring practices. There is no evidence that Petitioner complained to Ms. Lawrence or the other owner of Arena that he was being discriminated against on the basis of race. When he complained to Mr. Cyr, the offending remarks stopped. There was no competent evidence presented that Ms. Lawrence knew of the racial slur used by Mr. Cyr in the workplace in Petitioner’s presence. There is no evidence that Ms. Lawrence’s decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was related in any way to any racial remark used by Mr. Cyr.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: David Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Steven deLaroche, Esquire 1005 South Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10 et. seq., Florida Statutes, as set forth in Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) on October 29, 2001, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner presented no evidence in support of his allegation that Respondent discriminated against him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Seipp, Jr., Esquire Bonnie S. Crouch, Esquire Seipp, Flick and Kissane, P.A. 2450 Sun Trust International Center 1 Southeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Brian D. Albert, Esquire 2450 Northeast Miami Gardens Drive Miami, Florida 33180 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice by Respondent based on disability.
Findings Of Fact On February 7, 2011, an Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing was entered setting the day, time, and location of the final hearing in this case. The Order was mailed to the last known, valid address of the Petitioner. The Order was not returned. On February 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a letter in this case indicating she was aware of the date, time, and location of the rescheduled final hearing. This cause came on for hearing as noticed. After waiting more than 15 minutes, Petitioner failed to appear to prosecute her claim. There has been no communication from the Petitioner indicating that she would not be attending the final hearing. Petitioner has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a violation of chapter 760. In this case, Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing after proper notice of the hearing was issued. Because Petitioner failed to appear, no evidence that Respondent violated chapter 760 was presented. Absent such evidence, Petitioner has not carried her burden of proof in this matter and the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold R. Mardenborough, Esquire Carr Allison 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joyce Herring 501 South Main Street Havana, Florida 32333 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Notice of Hearing in these consolidated cases was issued on November 17, 2010, setting the hearing for January 24 and 25, 2011, in Tallahassee, Florida. The hearing was scheduled to commence at 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2011. Also on November 17, 2010, an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions was entered. Neither the Notice of Hearing nor the Order of Pre- hearing Instructions was returned as undeliverable to Petitioner. On January 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a letter at the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting that the hearing be delayed until after February 18, 2011, due to various appointments she had made that conflicted with the hearing dates. This letter indicated that Petitioner was aware of the scheduled hearing dates. By order dated January 20, 2011, the undersigned declined Petitioner's request for failure to state grounds sufficient to warrant a continuance over the objection of Respondent. Several attempts to reach Petitioner by telephone were unavailing. At 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2011, counsel and witnesses for Respondent were present and prepared to go forward with the hearing. Petitioner was not present. The undersigned delayed the commencement of the hearing by fifteen minutes, but Petitioner still did not appear. The hearing was called to order at 9:45 a.m. Counsel for Respondent entered her appearance and requested the entry of a recommended order of dismissal. The hearing was then adjourned. As of the date of this recommended order, Petitioner has not contacted the Division of Administrative Hearings, in writing or by telephone, to explain her failure to appear at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitions for Relief in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly D. Dotson 825 Briandav Street Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Kim M. Fluharty-Denson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary Kowalski Department of Financial Services Human Resource 200 East Gaines Street, Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, timely filed a Petition for Relief regarding her charge of discrimination against the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, applied for and received employment with the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc. The Petitioner's initial employment with the company ended on March 8, 2001, as she resigned her job on or about February 26, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent. Again, the Petitioner resigned her job and left employment on April 27, 2002. The exact reasons the Petitioner began employment, left employment, returned to employment, and again left employment with the Respondent are immaterial to the findings dispositive of this case. Suffice it to say the Petitioner ultimately filed a claim of discrimination with the FCHR against the Respondent. The Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination naming the Respondent was dated March 21, 2003, and noted April 27, 2002, as the date the most recent discrimination had taken place. Based upon its investigation of the allegations, the FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause on September 23, 2003. The Determination: No Cause provided, in pertinent part, ". . . it is my determination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The Notice of Determination: No Cause, provided: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial for Complainant to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an administrative hearing with [sic] 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). The Petition for Relief was filed approximately 159 days after the FCHR issued its determination in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Petition for Relief as it was not timely filed and is, therefore, barred as a matter of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Aplachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Giardino, Esquire Davis & Giardino, P.A. 201 Arkona Court West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Stephanie Walker 1808 Northwest 52nd Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment discrimination practices alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. At all times pertinent to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as an equipment operator in the golf course maintenance department. Respondent has been employed by Respondent for approximately 20 years. Respondent is a golf and country club.1/ Respondent's employment policies are contained in its "Employee Handbook."2/ The Employee Handbook provides that a "[v]iolation of any of the rules or policies set forth in this Handbook may lead to discipline, up to and including immediate discharge." Respondent's Employee Handbook contains a section on absenteeism and tardiness, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Excessive absenteeism or tardiness can result in discipline up to and including discharge. If you are going to be late or absent from work for any reason, you must personally notify your Supervisor as far in advance as possible (but no later than 2 hours before your scheduled start time) so proper arrangements can be made to handle your work during your absence. Of course, some situations may arise in which prior notice cannot be given. In those cases we expect you to notify your Supervisor as soon as possible. Leaving a message, sending a text, or having someone else call on your behalf, does not qualify as notifying your Supervisor- you must personally contact your Supervisor. If you are required to leave work early, you must also personally contact your Supervisor and obtain his/her permission. Absences of more than one day should be reported daily, unless you have made other arrangements with your Supervisor or the Human Resources Office. (emphasis in original). * * * Although an employee may be terminated at any time for failing to report to work without contacting the Club, if an employee fails to report for work or call in for three (3) consecutive calendar days they will be considered to have abandoned their job and will be terminated. Respondent's Employee Handbook also contains a provision concerning workplace violence. Employees are notified that, "[v]iolations of this policy may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment." The workplace violence policy provides in pertinent part: The Club has a zero tolerance policy regarding violent acts or threats of violence against our employees, applicants, members, vendors, or other third parties. We do not allow fighting or threatening words or conduct. We also do not allow the possession of weapons of any kind on the Club's premises, except as required by law. No employee should commit or threaten to commit any violent act against a co-worker, applicant, member, vendor, or other third party. This includes discussions of the use of the dangerous weapons, even in a joking manner. May 3, 2013, Incident On May 3, 2013, Petitioner was not at work, but rather, performing work for a resident in the community. Petitioner's vehicle was apparently parked on the wrong side of the road. Mike Jones, a security guard, advised Petitioner to move his vehicle or he was going to receive a ticket. Petitioner informed Mr. Jones that he was not going to receive a ticket, and followed Mr. Jones back to the guard gate. Thereafter, Petitioner and Mr. Jones became engaged in "some words." According to Petitioner, after the verbal altercation he left the guard gate. On May 4, 2013, Petitioner presented to work and performed his duties. The following day, May 5, 2013, Petitioner was arrested for the May 3, 2013, incident and charged with battery on a security officer. Petitioner testified that the arrest occurred in Mike Ballard's office.3/ Mr. Ballard was Petitioner's superintendent at some point in his employment. Beth Sandham, Respondent's Human Resources Director, was not present at the time of arrest. Petitioner remained in custody throughout May 6, 2013. When Petitioner did not appear for work on May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that the Human Resources department, as well as his supervisors, attempted to contact Petitioner. After several attempts to reach him by phone, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner via Federal Express.4/ Petitioner testified that he contacted his supervisor on May 6, 2013, and was advised that he had been terminated. Petitioner contends that his termination was racial in origin because Respondent did not obtain his account of the altercation prior to his termination. On this point, Petitioner testified as follows: That why I say this is a racist thing because they listen to what their two security guards say, but they never gave me the chance to explain myself. On May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham terminated Petitioner's employment on the grounds of failing to report to work and the alleged violent behavior. As an additional basis for alleging racial discrimination, Petitioner testified that Mike Ballard was a racist. Specifically, Petitioner testified that on one occasion he overheard Mr. Ballard advise another employee, Jeff Beneclas, to "[t]ell that nigger mind his own f***en business." Petitioner explained that Mr. Ballard was referring to him. Mr. Beneclas was terminated on June 25, 2010. Addressing this allegation, Ms. Sandham explained that, if the alleged statement had been made over Respondent's radio system, said statement would have been heard by the tennis department, the golf professionals, facilities maintenance, the superintendents, and golf course maintenance. Ms. Sandham credibly testified that neither Petitioner nor any other employee notified her of such a statement or made a complaint. Additionally, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that Petitioner never made a complaint to her regarding Mr. Ballard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief against Wycliffe Golf and Country Club. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2015.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, based upon her complaints about a coworker’s conduct perceived by Petitioner to be sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, a female, was employed as a server with Respondent from May 6, 2011, through September 29, 2012. Respondent, Stavro's Pizza, Inc., is a restaurant located in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 individuals at any given time and therefore is subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. §§ 760.01-760.l1, Fla. Stat. Early on the morning of Friday, September 27, 2012, it was reported to Martha Trimble, long-time General Manager of Respondent, that a "weird conversation" took place between Petitioner and another employee, Brian Hayes, the previous evening.2/ During this conversation, Mr. Hayes allegedly told Petitioner that “he knew everything about her, including where she lived, and that her favorite color was blue.” Mr. Hayes also allegedly told Petitioner that he was soon to be the new manager of the restaurant. Ms. Trimble approached Petitioner later that day about the alleged incident with Mr. Hayes, and while Petitioner admitted she had had a strange conversation with Mr. Hayes, she denied that she was upset by it. Nonetheless, Ms. Trimble told Petitioner she would investigate the matter and that she took it seriously. Later that same day Ms. Trimble also questioned Mr. Hayes, who denied making the reported comments. And while Ms. Trimble was aware that Petitioner had voluntarily given Mr. Hayes her address,3/ out of caution, Ms. Trimble placed Mr. Hayes on leave while she continued her investigation. The following day, Saturday, September 28, 2012, there was a mandatory meeting for all employees of Respondent. The meeting was mandatory because Ms. Trimble had been made aware of horseplay among some employees, and was concerned that staff training had been inadequate. Notice of the meeting was conspicuously posted in the restaurant for two weeks prior to the meeting. The notice explained that the meeting was mandatory and that all employees were to attend unless they contacted Ms. Trimble prior to the meeting to be excused. Petitioner did not attend the Saturday meeting and was not excused in advance. Four other employees contacted Ms. Trimble ahead of time and explained that they would be unable to attend due to schedule conflicts. Those employees were excused. When Ms. Trimble contacted Petitioner later in the day, Petitioner told Ms. Trimble that she had been ill, and in bed all day. That evening Ms. Trimble also reviewed the security camera video of the one hour period the previous Thursday during which Petitioner and Mr. Hayes had been alone in the restaurant, and during which the suspect comments had reportedly been made. In reviewing the video, Ms. Trimble specifically watched for physical contact, lingering conversations, and body language. At hearing, Ms. Trimble related her observations from the restaurant video as follows: So I watched the tape. Brian basically stayed back in the kitchen. Uh, we have side work we do. We make garlic bread. We make boxes. We do little oil containers for to-go salads. And Brian was back doing that almost the entire time. Once I saw him go up to the waitress station and get a beverage and bring it back. Amanda basically was at the register. She would come back every once in a while, hang a ticket, kind of stand there and chitchat until, uh – until, uh, a salad was given to her or something like that. So, um, but mainly they were both in their own areas. I did not see anything that indicated that there was anything improper going on. Following her review of the surveillance video Ms. Trimble concluded that there was no basis to believe that Mr. Hayes had engaged in any form of sexual harassment against Petitioner. The following day, Sunday, September 29, 2012, Ms. Trimble met with Petitioner regarding her absence from the mandatory meeting the day before. At this meeting Ms. Trimble informed Petitioner that because she failed to attend the mandatory meeting without being excused, and had failed to even call Ms. Trimble to explain she was ill and would be unable to attend, her employment was terminated. A former employee of Respondent, Lindsey Yauch, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Ms. Yauch testified that she had once missed a mandatory meeting called by Ms. Trimble but had not been fired as a result. However, on cross-examination Ms. Yauch could not remember the purpose, date, or any other details surrounding the meeting. Ms. Trimble’s testimony regarding the meeting that Ms. Yauch missed was more precise. Ms. Trimble recalled that it was a “safe-staff meeting”, which is a food-handler’s course that all employees must take. Because all 27 of Respondent’s employees were required to take the class, it was offered on two separate dates, and employees were permitted to choose which session they would attend. Ms. Yaugh had chosen to attend the first session, but overslept and missed the class as a result. Since a second class offering was still available, Ms. Yaugh was permitted to attend the second session, which she did. There is no credible evidence in this record that Petitioner was treated differently than other similarly situated employees when she was terminated for missing a mandatory meeting. At hearing Ms. Trimble testified that Petitioner's termination had nothing to do with her gender or the alleged comments made by Brian Hayes. Rather, Petitioner’s termination was the result of her missing a mandatory staff meeting without excuse. This testimony is credible. To his credit, in his closing statement counsel for Petitioner candidly acknowledged that, even if true, the comments made by Mr. Hayes would not constitute sexual harassment.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Meals on Wheels, Etc., Inc., on account of his race and disability, as a result of Respondent's maintenance of a hostile work environment, or as retaliation to his opposition to an unlawful employment practice, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact As its name implies, Respondent is a non-profit charitable organization engaged in the business of providing free meals, transportation services, and related assistance to senior citizens in the Sanford, Florida, area. Petitioner is a 64-year-old black male of Jamaican origin. He worked as a driver for Respondent from August 13, 2012, until October 23, 2014, when he was discharged for violating a company policy. As a condition of employment as a driver, Petitioner was required to submit a medical fitness form regarding his current medical condition. In the form filed on July 30, 2012, he denied having any medical issues except non-insulin dependent diabetes, which is controlled by diet. See Ex. 21. An updated form was submitted on August 25, 2014, reflecting no change in his medical condition. Id. No other medical records were submitted to substantiate any other medical condition. When he interviewed for the position, Petitioner did not tell Respondent that he needed an accommodation for his diabetes or that he had any work restrictions. As such, management never considered Petitioner to have a disability. Petitioner also provided a post-employment medical questionnaire on August 8, 2012, which stated that he had diabetes but that it was controlled by diet. Id. No other injuries, illnesses, or health abnormalities were reported. As a driver, Petitioner was expected to adhere to Respondent's safety rules. To ensure compliance with the rules, shortly after being hired, Petitioner was required to read, and then sign a statement acknowledging that he understood, the organization's General Policies. See Ex. 1, p. 4. He was also required to acknowledge receipt of its Employee Handbook containing the Safety Policies and Procedures. See Ex. 3. In addition, Respondent's Transportation Coordinator, Mark Taylor, conducted periodic refresher training sessions with all drivers, including Respondent. One of Respondent's most significant safety rules, if not the most significant, is a rule that requires drivers to provide door-to-door service. It provides in relevant part that "[u]pon arrival at a client's home, [a driver must] go to [the] door and knock. If the client needs help, you will be right there to assist." Ex. 1, p. 1, ¶ 6. This rule is intended to promote client safety and to ensure, to the extent possible, that Respondent will not face legal exposure because, for example, a client falls down while walking unassisted to or from the vehicle. To comply with the above rule, drivers are required to get out of the van, go to the front door, knock, and then assist the client walking to the van. This is because the clients are elderly, some use walkers, and they need assistance from the driver while getting to and from the van. On August 21, 2014, Petitioner signed another statement acknowledging that he understood the policy, he agreed to follow it at all times, and he understood that "[t]ermination will result in not following this important safety rule." Ex. 7. As a corollary to the above safety rule, drivers are instructed that they should never honk the vehicle's horn when they arrive at a client's home. Instead, they should get out of the vehicle and go to the front door of the residence. Petitioner was specifically told about the no-honking rule at two safety meetings. The incident underlying Petitioner's discharge occurred on the morning of October 23, 2014. Petitioner was told to pick up Angelo Rosario and transport him to an appointment. The client is in his 80s, suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and uses a walker. He resides in a mobile home-type community with his daughter; and the driveway in front of the mobile home is unpaved with exposed roots making it easy to trip or fall. Although Mr. Rosario was not one of his regular clients, Petitioner had picked him up at least 12 times in the previous 30 days and was familiar with his condition and the area in which he lived. The testimony describing the incident is conflicting. However, the accepted testimony shows that Petitioner arrived at the Rosario residence while Petitioner was on a personal cell phone call to his sister. When he finished the call, Petitioner blew the horn to alert the client that he was there. The honking was loud enough to annoy Rosario's neighbor who approached Petitioner's vehicle complaining about the noise. Suspecting that the neighbor's concern might cause a problem, Petitioner immediately telephoned Mr. Taylor and told him that he had blown the horn and anticipated that someone might be calling him with a complaint. Mr. Taylor told Petitioner that honking the horn was inappropriate, it violated an important safety rule, and he could not just sit in the van waiting for the client. Petitioner admits that during the telephone call, he shouted at Mr. Taylor and claimed he was unaware of the rule. After Mr. Taylor instructed Petitioner to go to the front door to pick up the client, Petitioner exited the vehicle and escorted the client to the van. After speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Taylor immediately telephoned the client's daughter to get her version of events. Mr. Taylor learned that honking had recently occurred rather frequently at the client's home, and he believed that Petitioner was the responsible driver, as Petitioner had transported the client at least 12 times during the previous 30 days. Mr. Taylor immediately reported the incident to the Executive Director, Sherry Fincher, who evaluated the matter, and then decided to terminate Petitioner for violating the organization's most important safety rule. Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim to the contrary, it is the Executive Director alone, and not Mr. Taylor, who makes the decision to terminate an employee. A memorandum was prepared by Ms. Fincher that day indicating that Petitioner was being terminated "due to not following agency policies regarding door-to-door pick up of clients[,] . . . one of the most important policies to ensure the safety of all clients." Ex. 20. This was consistent with Respondent's policy, and one that Petitioner clearly understood. Petitioner's race and diabetic condition played no role in the decision. Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination was filed one month later. Prior to that time, there is no competent evidence that Petitioner had ever complained to Taylor or Fincher about any discriminatory practices by the organization. Since the inception of this case, Petitioner has contended that he has a disability within the meaning of the law. At hearing, however, he acknowledged that his diabetic condition does not affect any major life activity. To support his disability discrimination claim, he testified that on an undisclosed date in 2014, he asked Mr. Taylor if he could eat meals or snacks at designated times because of his diabetic condition but was told he could not. The accepted testimony shows, however, that Mr. Taylor advised him that he could eat whenever necessary, as lunch and break hours are not set in stone. To avoid a drop in his blood sugar, Petitioner was told that he was free to eat or drink something at any time, or even bring a bag lunch with him while driving his routes. Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner had a disability, which he does not, the contention that a disability formed the basis for an unlawful employment practice must fail. Petitioner also contended that Belinda Stum, a white female lead driver, was treated differently than he and was given more "leeway" when she violated a rule. However, the only evidence concerning a rule violation by Ms. Stum involved a different rule. After a client accidentally slipped while being assisted out of the van, Ms. Stum immediately reported the incident to Mr. Taylor and then filed a completed incident report. Other than Ms. Stum, Petitioner was unable to specifically identify any other similarly-situated employees outside his protected class (or even ones within his own class) who were allegedly treated differently than he. Although a client testified at hearing that on several occasions she had observed Ms. Stum sitting in her van when picking up clients, even if this is true, the client admitted that she never reported this to anyone at Respondent's organization so that the alleged violation could be investigated and disciplinary action taken, if appropriate. Petitioner also contends he was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his race and disability. He claimed that Mr. Taylor, a white male, called him "boy," required him to answer "yes sir," and would gesture a "cut throat" sign towards him, threatening him to keep his mouth shut. This assertion was not corroborated by any other evidence, and Mr. Taylor denied the charge. The testimony of Mr. Taylor is accepted as being more credible on this issue. Assuming arguendo that he had a disability, there is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his diabetic condition. Finally, there is no evidence regarding the charge that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Indeed, Petitioner submitted no credible proof that he complained to management regarding any discriminatory practices that precipitated the alleged retaliation, other than "standing up for his rights" on the day he was terminated, and Taylor and Fincher credibly testified that they were unaware of any such complaints. Complaints made at hearing that he is still owed money and was never paid for training are not germane to this dispute. Petitioner is now working part-time as a driver for a retirement center in the Sanford area. He says he is also employed as a substitute teacher for the Seminole County School Board. Both jobs equate to full-time employment. According to evaluations and testimony at hearing, Petitioner was considered a "good worker," "likeable," and someone who "did a pretty good job." While his evaluations showed he met expectations, his last evaluation noted that he needed improvement in following orders. Except for being "written up" one time for being late to work, Petitioner had no other disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2015.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Clifford McCullough (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Nesco Resources (Respondent) in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2015)1/.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a company that refers pre-screened job candidates to employers upon request by an employer seeking to fill a specific position. The Petitioner is an African-American male, born in 1959, who sought employment through the Respondent. The Respondent does not make the hiring decision. The actual decision is made by the employer requesting referrals from the Respondent. The Respondent is compensated by the employer if and when the employer hires an applicant referred by the Respondent. On occasion, the Respondent publishes advertisements seeking applications to fill specific positions, such as “forklift drivers.” The fact that the Respondent seeks applications for specific positions does not mean that an employer has contacted the Respondent seeking referrals for such positions. The advertisements are used by the Respondent to create an inventory of applicants who can be referred to employers. On December 20, 2013, the Petitioner submitted a job application to the Respondent seeking a “forklift driver” position. At that time, the Petitioner indicated to the Respondent that he was available to perform “warehouse, packing, production, shipping and receiving tasks.” Several weeks prior to the Petitioner’s application, the Respondent had referred job candidates to an employer seeking to fill an available forklift driver position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African-American male born in 1961 who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. As of December 20, 2013, the Respondent had no pending employer requests seeking referrals to fill forklift driver positions. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent had any employer requests at that time which were consistent with the Petitioner’s skills. The Respondent’s general practice when contacted by a prospective employer is to recommend applicants who have maintained ongoing contact with the Respondent’s staff after the submission of an application. There was minimal contact between the Petitioner and the Respondent after the Petitioner submitted his application in December 2013. The Respondent presumes that some people who submit applications subsequently relocate or obtain employment elsewhere. Accordingly, the Respondent requires that previous applicants periodically submit new employment applications so that the Respondent’s inventory includes only active job seekers. On April 8, 2014, the Petitioner submitted another application to the Respondent. Also in April 2014, an employer contacted the Respondent to obtain referrals to fill another forklift driving position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African- American male born in 1964, who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. Prior to his referral for the forklift driver position, the successful applicant routinely contacted the Respondent’s staff, in person and by telephone, regarding available employment opportunities. The evidence fails to establish whether the Respondent was included within the applicants who were referred to the requesting employer. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s referral process reflected factors related to any applicant’s race, color, sex, or age. The Petitioner has also asserted that his application should have been referred to an employer who, on one occasion, was seeking to fill an available cleaning position. The position was a part-time job paying an hourly wage of $10. The Petitioner had not submitted an application for such a position. Nothing in the information provided by the Petitioner to the Respondent indicated that the Petitioner was interested in such employment. Through the Respondent’s referrals, the employer filled the cleaning position by hiring an African-American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2016.
