The Issue Whether Respondent properly secured the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage, as delineated by Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if not, what penalty for such failure is warranted. Whether Respondent conducted business operations in violation of a stop-work order, and, if so, what is the correct penalty for such violation, pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Respondent is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the business of roofing, which is a construction activity. On December 21, 2004, Petitioner's investigator, Hector Vega, visited 951 North Park Avenue, Apopka, Florida, the site of a church, on a referral from his supervisor. Five men were observed engaged in roofing work. William Sims, Respondent's president, agreed to meet at the worksite. Sims, upon inquiry, informed Petitioner's investigator that he had not secured the payment of workers' compensation for the workers. However, Sims testified that for Respondent to re-roof the Apopka Church of God, Sims had to calculate the amount of roofing shingles needed, which proved to be difficult due to the architecture of the church's specialty roof. The amount of shingles needed for the job was overestimated in order to avoid running out of shingles during the job. As of December 21, 2004, the Apopka Church of God roofing job was done, so Respondent sold the extra, unused shingles to D&L Trucking, owned and operated by David Lorenzo, who was paying the five men found working on the roof on December 21, 2004. A check of Petitioner's Compliance and Coverage Automated System ("CCAS") database, which contains information on all workers' compensation insurance policy information from the carrier to an insured, determined that Respondent did not have a State of Florida workers' compensation insurance policy to provide workers' compensation coverage of the five workers. Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, allows an individual to apply for an election to be exempt from workers' compensation benefits. Only the named individual on the application is exempt from carrying workers' compensation insurance coverage. Petitioner, which maintains a database of all workers' compensation exemptions in the State of Florida, found a current, valid exemption only for William R. Sims in December 2004. On December 21, 2004, Petitioner issued and served on Respondent a stop-work order for failing to obtain coverage that meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Insurance Code. Also at that time, a Request for Production of Business Records was issued to Respondent. Employers employing workers on job sites in Florida are required to keep business records that enable Petitioner to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. At the time the Stop Work Order was issued, and pursuant to Subsection 440.107(5), Florida Statutes, Petitioner had in effect Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015, which requires employers to maintain certain business records. Respondent failed to comply with the Request for Production. Florida law requires that an employer who has employees engaged in work in Florida must obtain a Florida workers' compensation policy or endorsement for such employees which utilizes Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals that are in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, as well as the Florida Insurance Code. See § 440.10(1)(g), Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.019(2) requires that in order for an employer to comply with Subsections 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Florida Statutes, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove the fact of workers' compensation coverage for employees engaged in Florida work must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. 12. Subsections 440.107(3) and 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes, authorize Petitioner to issue stop-work orders to employers unable to provide proof of workers' compensation coverage. Failure to provide such proof is deemed "an immediate serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare " § 440.107(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Following the follow-up efforts by Sims that extended until February 2005, Respondent believed that the Stop Work Order had been lifted by February 2005. Later in 2005, after Sims understood the Stop Work Order to be lifted, he pulled some permits from Orange County. The permits were called "a permit to work" and this supported, in Sims' mind, the conclusion that the Stop Work Order had been lifted. On November 1, 2005, Petitioner received a referral to investigate Respondent. Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's worksite on November 1, 2005, and observed six men engaged in roofing work. Sims, upon inquiry, informed the investigator that he secured the payment of workers' compensation coverage for the workers through Emerald Staffing Services, an employee leasing company. Chapter 468, Part XI, Florida Statutes, governs employee leasing companies. Respondent contracted with Emerald Staffing for its services in October 2005 and became the client company of Emerald Staffing. Respondent paid invoices for its employees, thus indicating that it was engaged in business activities in October 2005 and November 2005. On November 2, 2005, Petitioner issued a Request for Production of Business Records to Respondent. The request was for business records from December 21, 2004, through November 2, 2005. Respondent remained under the belief that the Stop Work Order had been lifted until Sims was approached by Petitioner's inspector, Robert Cerrone, on November 4 or 5, 2005, and was told by Cerrone that Respondent was still under the Stop Work Order. Respondent thereafter stopped working at Cerrone's request. Although Respondent asserts it did not know the Stop Work Order was in place between December 21, 2004, and December 19, 2005, and therefore Respondent believed it appropriate to continue working during that time, Sims testified there was a health problem in his immediate family that slowed down his business from working in 2005. His wife was diagnosed with cancer, and this made him very distracted from work. Although Sims pulled a few permits in 2005, he reviewed all those permits in his testimony, and it became clear to him that all those permits were for work previously done during the hectic clean-up from the hurricanes. This testimony is not credible. Respondent acknowledges the issuance and receipt of the Stop Work Order, but alleges in its petition that the Stop Work Order should never have been issued because the men at the worksite were not performing roofing work. On November 10, 2005, however, Sims provided a statement to Petitioner's investigator wherein he admitted to having employed four individuals on December 21, 2004, without securing the payment of workers' compensation for any of them. However, Respondent admitted, through its president, by letter, dated November 10, 2005, and signed in the presence of Cerrone that four of the persons observed on the Apopka Church of God work site on December 21, 2004, were Petitioner's employees and they were not covered by workers' compensation insurance. Sims' testimony that he was forced to sign the letter or that he was tricked or mislead into signing it, is not credible. From the evidence presented, the four identified men found on the roof of the Apopka Church of God on December 21, 2004, were the employees of Respondent, and Respondent had not complied with the requirements of the workers' compensation law. Therefore, the Stop Work Order was not erroneously issued against Respondent on December 21, 2004. After learning from Cerrone that the Stop Work Order was in place, Respondent worked with Petitioner to come into compliance and agreed to the Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order that Cerrone signed on December 19, 2005, under it, Respondent has been making payments to Petitioner to satisfy the penalty Petitioner has levied against Respondent. On November 16, 2005, Petitioner issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment, in which Petitioner requested business records from Respondent for the period of December 21, 2001, through December 21, 2004. Respondent complied with the records requests and provided Petitioner with tax ledgers and documents for the years 2002 through 2004, along with permits. Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes, provides: "The department shall assess a penalty of $1,000 per day against an employer for each day that the employer conducts business operations that are in violation of a stop-work order." Documentation specifically showed Respondent was engaged in business activities after December 21, 2004. The Orange County building department records indicate that a number of roofing permits that had been pulled by Respondent after December 21, 2004, the date the Stop Work Order was issued. Sims also stated that he was aware of the need to pull permits as part of his job as a roofer in Orange County, Florida. He alluded at the hearing that Orange County should have informed him of the existing Stop Work Order. Darlene Elaine Talley, contractor certification coordinator with the Orange County building department, testified that Respondent, through Sims, pulled a number of permits after December 21, 2004. Some of the permits were pulled for work performed prior to December 21, 2004. Although Respondent alleges that much of the actual roofing work was done prior to pulling permits and, thus, prior to the issuance of the Stop Work Order, the act of pulling a permit is considered "conducting business operations," which is prohibited by Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes, when a stop-work order is in effect. A-1 Construction ("A-1"), a Georgia company, performed roofing services for Respondent in Orlando, Florida, from September 2004 to November 2004, and was paid remuneration for those services. Although Respondent sought to prove that A-1 had Florida workers' compensation coverage through its Georgia workers' compensation and should not be included in the penalty calculation, the credible evidence showed that Georgia workers' compensation coverage, with Key Risk, did not extend to Florida, nor did A-1 purchase extra Florida coverage. Subsection 440.10(1)(c), Florida Statutes, states, "A contractor shall require a subcontractor to provide evidence of workers' compensation insurance." Respondent did not request evidence of workers' compensation coverage from A-1, and Respondent was not aware whether A-1's Florida workers' compensation coverage was purchased or not. Under the Workers' Compensation Law in effect during the penalty period, a subcontractor becomes an "employee" if the subcontractor has not validly elected an exemption as permitted by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, or has not otherwise secured the payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor. § 440.02(15)(c)2., Fla. Stat. The entities listed on the Amended Order's penalty worksheet, including the employees of A-1, were Respondent's employees during the relevant period, all of whom Respondent paid, and all of whom had neither valid workers' compensation exemptions nor workers' compensation coverage. To determine the number of days that Respondent was in violation of the Stop Work Order, the payroll records for Respondent were obtained from Emerald Staffing, and the permits pulled by Respondent were gathered. The investigator further discussed the matter with Respondent to determine the number of days Respondent worked in violation of the Stop Work Order. It is determined that Respondent worked for 10 days in violation of the Stop Work Order. Utilizing the records provided, in evidence, the penalty is calculated for Respondent by assigning a class code to the type of work utilizing the SCOPES Manual, multiplying the class code's assigned approved manual rate with the wages paid to the employee per one hundred dollars, and then multiplying all by 1.5. The penalty for violation of the Stop Work Order is $1,000.00 per day for each day of violation, which for 10 days amounts to $10,000.00. The Amended Order, which assessed a penalty of $49,413.18, was personally served on Respondent on December 19, 2005. Sims was not personally calculated into the penalty because he had a current valid workers' compensation exemption. On December 19, 2005, Respondent entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty and was issued an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order by Petitioner. Respondent made a down payment of 10 percent of the assessed penalty; provided proof of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by securing the payment of workers' compensation through Emerald Staffing; and agreed to pay the remaining penalty in 60 equal monthly payment installments.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and that assesses a penalty of $49,413.18. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th of November, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Graham is employed by USF as a police officer at the Tampa campus and was so employed on December 18, 1976, at 1:30 a.m. On that date it was the policy of the campus police department that prior authorization be obtained from immediate supervisors prior to the taking of any time off from scheduled duties. Graham was fully aware of this policy. Graham was scheduled to appear for duty at 1:30 a.m., on December 18, 1976. At 8:46 p.m., December 17, 1976, Graham telephoned the dispatcher on duty and advised him to relate to Graham's supervisor that he would not be in for work at 1:30 a.m., the following day. Graham then failed to appear at the appointed hour and performed no duties during that scheduled shift. During his employment with USF, Graham has been disciplined five (5) previous times for being absent without authorized leave.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jerry O. Bryan began working for the State Road Department in 1968. In 1983, he started his most recent assignment with the agency, now called the Florida Department of Transportation, as an engineering technician III, in a career service position. An employee handbook respondent was furnished in 1983 had this to say about "JOB ABANDONMENT": After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, at page 43. Perhaps with this in mind, respondent requested leave without pay when he learned he faced six months' incarceration, as a result of his criminal conviction for cultivating marijuana on federal property. Respondent's supervisor, Robert Edward Minchin, Jr. denied his request for leave without pay, in accordance with a DOT policy against granting leave to DOT employees who are incarcerated. Mr. Bryan did not request annual leave, although some 220 hours' entitlement had accumulated. Asked whether he would have granted Mr. Bryan's leave request absent "a policy of not authorizing leave while someone was incarcerated," Mr. Minchin answered in the negative, saying Mr. Bryan "was going to be needed during ... [the time] he would be out. T.22. At no time did petitioner ever take disciplinary action against respondent, who received satisfactory or higher job performance ratings, the whole time he worked for petitioner. Aware that Mr. Bryan did not desire or intend to resign, relinquish or abandon his career service position, Mr. Minchin took steps to remove him from the payroll solely on grounds that he was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reinstate respondent and award back pay, but without prejudice to instituting any appropriate proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry O. Bryan Federal Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542-7606 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Robert Scanlon, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment filed October 17, 2008, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Valou Enterprises is a Florida corporation located in Miami, Florida, which does business under the fictitious name of "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" ("Mr. Rooter"). Leslie McMillan is part- owner and the President of Valou Enterprises. Pedro Rolle is part-owner and the Treasurer of Valou Enterprises, and he is responsible for the business's day-to-day management. Welthial McMillan is part-owner and the Secretary of Valou Enterprises. Mr. Rooter is a franchise that engages in the business of providing plumbing services and repairs. According to franchise documents, among the services offered by Mr. Rooter are HydroScrubbing™ sewer lines to remove blockages; water heater installation; kitchen and bath installation and repairs, including faucets, sinks, tubs and toilets; and leak detection and water line repair and installation.2 On its website, Valou Enterprises advertises that Mr. Rooter provides full-service plumbing, including bath sinks, bathtubs and showers, drain pipes, faucets, floor drains, gas meters, gas vents, kitchen sinks, pipe repair, sewer lines, and water softeners.3 Mr. McMillan is a Florida-certified plumbing contractor, and he is the qualifier for Mr. Rooter. Mr. and Mrs. McMillan and Mr. Rolle, have elected, as officers of a corporation engaged in the construction industry, to be exempt from Florida's workers' compensation law, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 440.02(15)(b)2. and 440.05(3), Florida Statutes. Valou Enterprises hires plumbing technicians to provide plumbing services to Mr. Rooter's customers. These plumbing technicians are not licensed; rather, they work under Mr. McMillan's plumbing contractor's license. They do not receive a salary and do not have regular hours during which they must be at the Mr. Rooter office or at a jobsite. The plumbing technicians are paid commissions based on the work they perform, and they are required to supply their own tools. The plumbing technicians are on-call with Mr. Rooter at all times, but they only perform services for Mr. Rooter when actually dispatched to a job. When a plumbing technician is called and notified of a job, he is free either to accept or to reject the job. Mr. Rooter also dispatches plumbing helpers when a plumbing technician needs assistance. Valou Enterprises employs Catia Duque, who takes calls and dispatches plumbing technicians to Mr. Rooter jobs. Kenneth Mecure runs errands for Valou Enterprises part-time when needed, on a part-time basis. Late in the afternoon on Friday, June 27, 2008, a compliance investigator working for the Division of Workers' Compensation stopped at the Mr. Rooter office, which was located in a warehouse district. The visit was random, initiated when the investigator saw white vans parked in front of the office, with the name "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" and logo on the sides of the vans. When the investigator entered the office, she observed four men wearing shirts with the "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" logo. When the investigator requested information about Valou Enterprises's workers' compensation insurance coverage, Mr. Rolle referred her to Ms. Duque. Ms. Duque told the investigator that she would send whatever information she had regarding workers' compensation insurance coverage by facsimile transmittal, but the investigator did not receive any information from Ms. Duque. After her visit on June 27, 2008, the compliance investigator conducted research through the Coverage and Compliance Automated System database, which provides information on workers' compensation insurance coverage and exemptions. The investigator's research revealed that Mr. McMillan, Mrs. McMillan, and Mr. Rolle had exemptions from the workers' compensation law as officers of a corporation engaged in the construction industry and that none of the persons she observed in the Mr. Rooter office on June 27, 2008, were covered by a workers' compensation insurance policy. The investigator confirmed the lack of workers' compensation insurance coverage by consulting the website for the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. ("NCCI"). The compliance investigator returned to the Mr. Rooter office on Monday, July 1, 2008, and spoke with Mr. McMillan. Mr. McMillan was unable to provide her with proof that Valou Enterprises had workers' compensation insurance coverage. The investigator then prepared a Stop-Work Order and an Order of Penalty Assessment, which she hand-delivered to Mr. McMillan on July 2, 2008, and posted at the Mr. Rooter office. At the same time, the investigator served Mr. McMillan with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations. The Stop-Work Order required Valou Enterprises to "cease all business operations for all worksites in the state." An Order of Penalty Assessment was included in the Stop-Work Order, in which Valou Enterprises was advised that a penalty would be assessed in an amount [e]qual to 1.5 times the amount the employer would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll during periods for which it failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation required by this chapter within the preceding 3-year period, or $1,000, whichever is greater. Section 440.107(7)(d), F.S. In addition, the Order of Penalty Assessment also advised Valou Enterprises that a penalty of "[u]p to $5,000 for each employee who the Employer misclassified as an independent contractor" would be imposed pursuant to Sections 440.10(1)(f) and 440.107(7)(f), Florida Statutes. On July 3, 2008, the compliance investigator returned to the Mr. Rooter office. The office was closed, but she observed a white van turning out of the office parking lot. The van had the "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" name and logo on the side, and it was driven by Michael Dassell, a plumbing technician the investigator had met during her visit to the Mr. Rooter office on July 27, 2008. The investigator questioned Mr. Dassell, who told her that he was on-call that day. Mr. Dassell had not been dispatched on a job or called into the office but had gone to the office to pick up a commission check. Mr. Dassell had not been told that the Mr. Rooter office was closed on July 3, 2008. Mr. McMillan provided the compliance investigator the payroll and other records requested in the business records request. Based on these records, the compliance investigator calculated the penalty to be imposed on Valou Enterprises for its failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage in the amount of $59,652.93. The investigator also imposed a penalty of $1,000.00 for a one-day violation of the Stop-Work Order and a penalty of $35,000.00 for "misrepresenting the status of the employee(s) as an independent contractor(s)." The total penalty of $95,652.93 was set forth in an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment that the investigator hand-delivered the order to Mr. McMillan on July 9, 2008. Valou Enterprises obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage effective July 4, 2008, and, on July 9, 2008, Mr. McMillan entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty, remitting at the time a down payment of 10 percent of the penalty, or $9,566.00. As a result, an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order was entered on July 9, 2008. The compliance investigator subsequently recalculated the penalty assessment and prepared a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated October 17, 2008. The $35,000.00 penalty assessed for misclassifying employees as independent contractors was deleted for lack of evidence, and the final penalty assessment was in the amount of $60,652.93, which consisted of a $59,652.93 penalty for failure to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for Valou Enterprises employees and a $1,000.00 penalty for violating the Stop-Work Order.4 The compliance investigator looked to the NCCI SCOPES Basic Manual of Classifications ("SCOPES Manual") for classification codes attributable to the various workplace operations of the persons working for Valou Enterprises. The classification code assigned by the compliance investigator to the plumbing technicians and plumbing helpers performing work for Valou Enterprises was Code 5183.5 According to the SCOPES Manual and to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021(1)(r), Code 5183 is a code applicable to the construction industry and covers "Plumbing NOC and Drivers." The description of the scope of Code 5183 is stated in the SCOPES Manual in pertinent part as follows: Applicable to gas, steam, hot water or other types of pipe fitting. Includes house connections and shop operations. * * * Code 5183 is applicable to plumbing operations provided that the work performed is "not otherwise classified" (NOC). Insureds contemplated by Code 5183 may install, remove, or repair equipment that is used to direct gas or water supplies to a destination. This equipment includes but is not limited to piping and related fixtures, appliances, and accessories. No limits have been established as to the size of the pipe being repaired or installed. The operations contemplated by Code 5183 also include "the cleaning of building sewer connections using portable equipment" and "the installation or service of domestic water softener systems." The approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2006, for Code 5183 was $10.04 per $100.00 of payroll; the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2007, for Code 5183 was $8.13 per $100.00 of payroll; and the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2008, for Code 5183 was $6.75 per $100.00 of payroll.6 The classification code found in the SCOPES Manual assigned to Ms. Duque and to Paul Anderson, who was a clerical worker in the Valou Enterprises office in 2006, was Code 8810. According to the SCOPES Manual, Code 8810 covers "Clerical Office Employees."7 The description of the scope of Code 8810 is stated in the SCOPES Manual in pertinent part as follows: "The duties of a clerical office employee include . . . telephone duties." The approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2006, for Code 8810 was $.58 per $100.00 of payroll; the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2007, for Code 8810 was $.48 per $100.00 of payroll; and the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2008, for Code 8810 was $.37 per $100.00 of payroll.8 The classification code assigned by the compliance investigator to Kevin Mecure, a part-time employee who ran errands for Valou Enterprises, was Code 7380.9 According to the SCOPES Manual, Code 7380 covers "Drivers, Chauffeurs & Their Helpers NOC - Commercial." The description of the scope of Code 7380 is stated in the SCOPES Manual in pertinent part as follows: "The term "drivers" refers to employees who engage in duties on or in connection with vehicles " The approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2006, for Code 7380 was $12.20 per $100.00 of payroll; the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2007, for Code 7380 was $10.18 per $100.00 of payroll; and the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2008, for Code 7380 was $8.74 per $100.00 of payroll.10 The compliance investigator calculated the total penalty attributable to Valou Enterprises's failure to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for the plumbing technicians, clerical workers, and drivers using the Department's Penalty Worksheet. She obtained the names of each of the individuals included in her calculations and the amount of the gross payroll for each individual from the payroll information provided by Mr. McMillan in response to the business records request. The compliance investigator calculated the penalty as follows: She listed Valou Enterprises's employees on the Penalty Worksheet; assigned each employee a classification code based on the definitions of workplace operations that most closely described the work they performed for Valou Enterprises; set out the dates during which Valou Enterprises did not provide workers' compensation insurance coverage11; entered the annual or pro-rated gross payroll for each employee during the period of non-compliance; divided the gross payroll for each employee by 100; set out the approved manual rate for each employee during the period of non-compliance in accordance with his or her classification code; determined the premium that Valou Enterprises would have paid for workers' compensation insurance coverage for each employee during the period of non-compliance by multiplying the approved manual rate and one one-hundredth of the gross payroll for each employee; calculated the penalty attributable to each employee during the period of non- compliance by multiplying the premium for each employee by 1.5; and, finally, calculated the total penalty owed by Valou Enterprises attributable to its failure to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding that Valou Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Mr. Rooter Plumbing, failed to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees in violation of Section 440.38(1), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty in the amount of $59,652.93 for the failure to provide the required workers' compensation insurance coverage. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2009.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners' layoffs from employment by the Respondent were lawful and if not, what remedies should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 2, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that their positions were recommended for transfer from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. On July 1, 2001, the Petitioners' positions were transferred from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. Prior to Special Legislative Session C of 2001, the Department's Office of Prevention and Victim Services consisted of 94 positions, organized into four bureaus: the Office of Victim Services; the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services; the Prevention Office; and the Intensive Learning Alternative Program. During Special Legislative Session C, the Florida Legislature passed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2-C, which reduced appropriations for state government for fiscal year 2001-2002. This special appropriations bill was approved by the Governor on December 13, 2001, and was published as Chapter 2001- 367, Laws of Florida. As a result of Chapter 2001-367, 77 positions were cut from the Office of Prevention and Victim Services budget entity. The appropriations detail for the reduction from the legislative appropriations system database showed that the reduction of positions was to be accomplished by eliminating the Intensive Learning Alternative Program, which consisted of 19 positions; eliminating the Office of Victim Services, which consisted of 15 positions; eliminating the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services, which consisted of 23 positions; and by cutting 20 positions from the Office of Prevention. Seventeen positions remained. Immediately after conclusion of the Special Session, the Department began the process of identifying which positions would be cut. A workforce transition team was named and a workforce transition plan developed to implement the workforce reduction. The workforce reduction plan included a communications plan for dealing with employees; an assessment of the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the residual program; a plan for assessment of employees, in terms of comparative merit; and a placement strategy for affected employees. Gloria Preston, Stephen Reid and Carol Wells were Operations and Management Consultant II's and worked in the Partnership and Volunteer Services Division. According to the budget detail from Special Session C, all of the positions in this unit were eliminated. Titus Tillman was an Operations and Management Consultant II and worked in the Prevention and Monitoring division. According to the budget detail provided from Special Session C, 20 of the positions in this unit were eliminated. On December 7, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that effective January 4, 2002, each of their positions were eliminated due to the Florida Legislature's reduction of staffing in a number of Department program areas during the special session. Petitioners were provided with information regarding what type of assistance the Department would provide. Specifically, the notices stated that the employees would be entitled to the right of a first interview with any state agency for a vacancy to which they may apply, provided they are qualified for the position; and that they could seek placement through the Agency for Workforce Innovation. The notice also provided information regarding leave and insurance benefits, and identified resources for affected employees to seek more clarification or assistance. At the time Petitioners were notified that their positions were being eliminated, Florida Administrative Code Rules 60K-17.001 through 60K-17.004 remained in effect. These rules required agencies to determine the order of layoff by calculating retention points, based upon the number of months of continuous employment in a career service position, with some identified modifications. However, by the express terms of the "Service First" Legislation passed in the regular session of 2001, the career service rules identified above were to be repealed January 1, 2002, unless otherwise readopted. § 42, Ch. 2001-43, Laws of Fla. Consistent with the legislative directive new rules had been noticed and were in the adoption process. On January 4, 2002, each of the Petitioners were laid off due to the elimination of their positions. At the time the layoff became effective, new rules regarding workforce reductions had been adopted. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60K-33, effective January 2, 2002, did not allow for the "bumping" procedure outlined in Rule 60K-17.004. Instead, it required the Department to appoint a workforce transition team for overseeing and administering the workforce reduction; assess the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the remaining program after the deletion of positions; identify the employees and programs or services that would be affected by the workforce reduction and identify the knowledge, skills and abilities that employees would need to carry out the remaining program. The workforce transition team was required under one of the new rules to consider the comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience of each employee, and consider which employees would best enable the agency to advance its mission. Although the Department created a workforce reduction plan and Career Service Comparative Merit Checklist, it did not complete a checklist for any of the Petitioners because it had previously reclassified their positions as Selected Exempt Service. No checklist is expressly required under Rule 60L-33. While no checklist was completed on the Selected Exempt Service employees, each employee in the Office of Prevention and Victim Services was assessed based on the positions remaining and the mission of the Department in order to determine which employees to keep and which to lay off. Of the 17 remaining positions, the Department considered the legislative intent with respect to the elimination of programs and the individuals currently performing the job duties that were left. It also evaluated the responsibilities remaining, which included overseeing the funding of statewide contracts and grants. The Department also considered which employees should be retained based upon their ability to absorb the workload, their geographic location, and their skill set. The Department determined that the employees selected for the remaining positions were the strongest in their field, had fiscal management and programmatic experience, and were best equipped to undertake the workload. At the time of the layoff, Petitioners were each long- serving, well-qualified and highly rated employees of the State of Florida. Each was prepared to move in order to retain employment. In April 2002, AFSCME Florida Public Employees 79, AFL- CIO (AFSCME), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) against the Departments of Management Services and Juvenile Justice. AFSCME alleged that the Department failed to bargain in good faith over the layoff of Department employees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, effective June 28, 2002. The settlement agreement required the Department to provide timely notice to AFSCME of impending layoffs, bargain over the impact of workforce reductions, and provide assistance for employees who were laid off between December 31, 2001, and January 4, 2002, but who had not attained other full-time Career Service employment. There is no evidence the Petitioners in this case were members of AFSCME. Nor is there any evidence that the Department failed to assist Petitioners in seeking new employment. In July of 2003, the First District Court of Appeal decided the case of Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), wherein the court held that employees whose employee classifications were changed from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service must be afforded a clear point of entry to challenge the reclassification of their positions. The Department notified those persons, including Petitioners, whose Career Service positions had been reclassified to Selected Exempt Service, that they had a right to challenge the reclassification. Each of the Petitioners filed a request for hearing regarding their reclassifications, which was filed with the Agency Clerk in August of 2003. However, the petitions were not forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings until May 2007. All four cases were settled with an agreement that their positions were reclassified as Selected Exempt Service positions in error, and that they should have been considered Career Service employees at the time their positions were eliminated. Petitioners and the Department also agreed that any challenge by Petitioners to the layoffs would be forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Gloria Preston began work for the State of Florida in 1975. Her evaluations showed that she continuously exceeded performance standards, and she had training and experience in managing and monitoring grants and contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, and it is unclear whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Stephen Reid began work for the State of Florida in 1977. He left state government for a short time and returned in 1984. With the exception of his initial evaluation with the Department of Corrections, he has received "outstanding" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Reid has experience in contract creation and management. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Carol Wells began employment with the State of Florida in 1975. Similar to Mr. Reid, all of her evaluations save her first one were at the "exceeds" performance level, and she has experience in writing and managing contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Titus Tillman began employment with the State of Florida in 1993. He was subject to a Corrective Action Plan in May 2000, but received "above average" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Like the other Petitioners, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Likewise, no evidence was presented regarding the retention points that were earned by any of the people who were retained by the Department to fill the remaining positions. No evidence was presented regarding the qualifications of those retained employees, in terms of their comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience in the program areas the Department would continue to implement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the petitions for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-100 Lezlie A. Griffin, Esquire Melissa Ann Horwitz, Esquire AFSCME Council 79 3064 Highland Oaks Terrace Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Manny Anon, Jr., Esquire AFSCME Council 79 99 Northwest 183rd Street, Suite 224 North Miami, Florida 33169 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background This case involves a claim by petitioner, Robert Jones (Jones or petitioner), that he was denied employment by respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES), on account of his handicap. It is undisputed that Jones has diabetes, he is insulin-dependent, and he has had at least one toe amputated because of the disability. As such, he does not enjoy, in some measure, the full and normal use of his physical facilities, and he is accordingly deemed to be a handicapped person within the meaning of the law. The parties also agree that DLES is an employer subject to the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, which governs this dispute. DLES denies it acted in a discriminatory manner and contends generally that (a) the handicap played no role in its employment decision since it was unaware that Jones was a disabled person when the employment decision was made, and (b) a more qualified person was hired for both positions sought by Jones. A preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Since October 3, 1982, petitioner has been employed as an investigator specialist II at the Commission. He also worked for DLES from May 1980 until October 1981, and at the Florida State Employment Service from October 1981 until April 1982. Prior to working with the state, Jones served in the U. S. Marine Corps from which he was honorably discharged with a medical disability in 1977. He is a graduate of Florida State University having received a degree in political science in December 1985. Between 1982 and 1991, respondent made application for employment at DLES on at least four or five occasions but was never hired. On July 16, 1991, he wrote a letter to the agency head, then Frank Scruggs, complaining about his inability to get a job, advising that he was a disabled veteran, and asking for a "fair shake" on his applications. Later that year, he applied for the positions of management review specialist and senior management analyst II. Although he was interviewed for one of the two positions, he was not selected for either job. In his application filed with DLES, Jones described his health as "excellent." Attached to his application papers was a certification from the Veterans Administration indicating he had a service-related disability rated at 30 percent or more. Also, he included a handwritten statement that he was a "veteran with a compensable service-connected disability." There was no indication, however, as to the nature of the disability. After receiving two rejection letters from DLES on February 10, 1992, regarding his job application, Jones filed a complaint of discrimination with the Commission on July 23, 1992, alleging he had "been discriminated against because of (his) Handicap, Diabetes." He later filed a petition for relief in which he charged that DLES' employment decision was based not only on his handicap, but also on account of his "gender, race, veteran status or any other unlawful reason." As to the grounds raised after the Commission had concluded its initial investigation, they have been disregarded as being untimely. Senior Management Analyst II Position On January 9, 1992, respondent published a job opportunity announcement for the position of senior management analyst II in the office of civil rights and minority affairs. The position had been created to assist the director of that office, Deidre Kyle, in her day-to-day responsibilities. Kyle was also the individual responsible for the hiring decision. The advertised position required as minimum qualifications that the applicant have "a bachelor's degree and four years of professional experience in systems administrative work, employment and training, employment security, grants management, education, vocational counseling, vocational placement, occupational analysis, employment selection and referral activities, program planning, program evaluation or program monitoring." Petitioner met the minimum qualifications. Besides Jones, approximately fifty persons applied for the position of senior management analyst II, including Carolyn W. Franklin, a non-handicapped African-American female then working under Kyle's supervision and filling an Other Personal Services (OPS) slot as a civil rights specialist III in Kyle's office since September 1991. Franklin had previously worked for over twelve years in the Governor's Office, principally as a governmental analyst in the Citizens Assistance Office, and mostly under the direct supervision of Shirley Gooding, who later served as inspector general, and then assistant secretary, and finally as secretary of DLES in July 1992. She had also served as the affirmative action officer for the Governor's Office for four years. Except for these latter duties, Franklin had no experience in equal employment or civil rights. Out of the fifty applicants, only four were selected for an interview with Kyle, and none was handicapped. Jones was not selected for an interview. In choosing the top candidates for an interview, Kyle relied upon the duties and responsibilities contained in the career service system position description as well as certain review criteria which she had prepared. The review criteria were: (a) extensive knowledge of equal employment and affirmative action rules and regulations, (b) thorough knowledge of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, (c) knowledge of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (d) experience in conducting federal program compliance reviews, (e) familiarity with American Standards Institute standards, (f) effective oral and written communication skills, and (g) personal computer experience (Word Perfect and/or Lotus Preferred). The qualifications of the three individuals other than Franklin selected for the final interview are not of record. Also, the record does not show how Jones' qualifications compared with those of the final candidates (other than Franklin). Thus, there is no way to determine if Jones was more or less qualified than the others on the final list, or whether he ranked fifth or even fiftieth out of all of the candidates filing applications. Kyle made no effort to determine whether any of the applicants, including petitioner, had a handicap. Therefore, when she made the decision to reject Jones and the other forty-five candidates through the initial screening process, she was unaware of the fact that he had diabetes. Indeed, she did not learn of this fact until Jones filed his complaint. The position sought by Jones was ultimately filled by Franklin. In selecting Franklin, Kyle noted that Franklin had served in an OPS position with "similar" job responsibilities, she had worked under Kyle's direct supervision for the preceding four months, and she had working knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the position "that would allow her to begin work immediately." Contrary to petitioner's assertion, Kyle was not told by her superiors to hire Franklin. She concedes, however, that there were "suggestions" by then inspector general Gooding to hire Franklin, a former colleague of Gooding at the Governor's Office. In considering DLES' assertion that the reason for hiring Franklin was that she was the most qualified person, it is noted that earlier that year Franklin had applied for a lower-graded career service position in Kyle's office but was rejected because Kyle was unimpressed with Franklin's "communicative skills." After her rejection, Gooding "suggested" that Kyle hire Franklin for the OPS slot, a suggestion which Kyle followed. Based on these facts, it may be reasonably inferred that Kyle's true motive in hiring Franklin was to satisfy, albeit reluctantly, the wishes of her superior, Gooding, who wanted to place her friend in the agency, rather than hiring the best qualified person for the job. While friendship or even cronyism was the decisive factor in Franklin getting the job, there is insufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would support an inference that petitioner's handicap was the reason why he was not selected. Indeed, there is no evidence to support a finding that Jones would even have made the short list had Franklin not applied for the job, or would have been considered if Kyle had rejected the suggestions of her superior. Therefore, while the final employment decision may not have been fair, it is found that there was no discriminatory animus in DLES' employment decision to reject Jones. Management Review Specialist Positions On October 17, 1991, respondent published a job opportunity announcement for two management review specialists (position numbers 1158 and 5420) in its office of inspector general, then run by inspector general Gooding. At that time, the office had two sections: management review and investigations. When the announcement was published, the office was unsure whether both positions would be used for management reviews or whether one would be management review and the other for investigations. The minimum qualifications for the positions were a bachelor's degree and 4 years of professional experience in systems analysis, management analysis, program planning, program research, program evaluation, engineering or administrative work. Petitioner met the minimum qualification requirements. The management review slot required the successful applicant to be experienced in management reviews, which are very comprehensive and involve an evaluation of the following management functions: planning, organization, staffing, directing and controlling. The specialist is also required to prepare rather comprehensive reports. On the other hand, the specialist in the investigative section performs more traditional investigative duties with a much more narrow focus than management review. The record shows that Jones was not fully qualified to fill a slot in the management section since his main experience had been investigating discrimination complaints for the Commission for the preceding ten years. Jones and some ninety other persons filed applications for these positions. A preliminary screening process of all applications was conducted by Kitty J. Convertino, who headed the management review section, and Gary Sanford, who headed the investigation section. Because of his investigative experience with the Commission, Jones was placed on the list of some fifteen to seventeen persons to be initially interviewed. It was contemplated that after these initial interviews were conducted, a short list of five candidates would be picked from those interviewed, and they would be invited back for a second interview. Although Convertino ostensibly had authority to make a hiring decision, the final say-so rested with her superior, inspector general Gooding. During the initial interview, each candidate was asked "interview questions" from a list prepared by Convertino. Among other subjects, the applicants were asked about their computer skills since specialists were required to prepare much of their own work. Although Jones says he uses a microcomputer in his present work, his computer skills did not meet Convertino's expectations. At the conclusion of the interview, Jones was asked to provide a writing sample, and he later funished a copy of an investigative report he had written for the Commission in 1986. This writing sample reinforced Convertino's opinion that Jones was more qualified for the investigation section than the management review section. During the selection process, a member of Convertino's management review team was transferred from her team to Sanford's investigation team. When this occurred, the management review specialist vacancy on Sanford's investigation team was eliminated leaving both vacancies in the management review section. The decision to transfer the position was made by inspector general Gooding. Because no position was open in the investigation section, and the qualifications of the chosen candidates for the management section exceeded those of petitioner, Jones was not invited back for a second interview. There is no evidence to support a finding that the transfer was made to prevent petitioner from being considered for the vacant position in the investigative section. Among the candidates for the two management review positions was Jane Steele, a former collegue of Gooding at the Governor's Office, who had performed administrative work for the City of Altamonte Springs for some eighteen months prior to seeking employment with DLES, and who had prior stints with the Department of Insurance, Department of Transportation, and Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting. When Steele's qualifications did not initially comply with the job description for position 5920, the job description was rewritten midway through the evaluation process so that Steele could satisfy the qualifications. Whether this change was made at the behest of Gooding is not of record. In any event, there is no evidence to show that this manipulation in the qualification process was for an unlawful discriminatory purpose. Steele was ultimately selected to fill one of the two management review specialist positions. According to Convertino, Steele was selected because of her prior experience in performing compliance audits for a state agency and writing audit reports. In addition, she was computer literate, was a "good" writer, having published several articles, and had a masters degree in public administration. Although Steele once worked with Gooding at the Governor's Office, there is no evidence that Convertino consulted with Gooding prior to making her employment decision. Indeed, Convertino flatly denied that any conversations took place. Ronald J. Rigby, an African-American who also has diabetes and is hearing impaired, was selected for position 1158. He had previously performed compliance reviews for DLES in the Job Training Partnership Act program, which experience Convertino believed would be compatible with the work required of position 1158. Although Rigby was placed under investigation by the State Controller in mid-January 1992 for "wage claim discrepancies," and this prevented him from assuming the job for several months, the matter was resolved sometime after April 10, 1992, and he was then allowed to report to work. When the decision to hire Rigby was made, Convertino did not know that Rigby had diabetes, although she knew that he was hearing impaired. Jones says his medical condition was discussed during the interview process, and he advised the interviewers that the disability was controlled by medication. Neither Convertino nor Sanford recalled any such discussion, and Convertino says she was unware of Jones' condition until the complaint was filed. In any event, there is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would support a finding that Jones' handicap played any part in the employment decision. While the investigative slot may have been filled through a transfer on account of friendship or cronyism, that decision was not predicated on a desire to keep a handicapped person from being considered for the job. Moreover, the evidence shows that both Steele and Rigby had more experience in performing compliance audits than did Jones, and thus they were the more qualified individuals to fill those positions. Miscellaneous Employment records received in evidence show that petitioner's annual pay was $22,000 at the time his application was filed in October 1991. His salary since that time is not of record. The position of management review specialist paid in the range of $2,407.49 to $4,056.63 per month while the position of senior management analyst II paid in the range of $2,740.51 to $4,653.39 per month. Respondent apparently did not document, nor could it produce, the written basis for its hiring decisions, as required by its own personnel manual. Even so, this lack of documentation is insufficient to raise an inference that an unlawful discriminatory animus motivated DLES in its employment decisions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2754 Petitioner: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 4. Rejected as being unnecessary. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 10. Rejected as being unnecessary. 11. Rejected as being cumulative. 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 14-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 17-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 20-21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 25. Rejected as being unnecessary. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 27-28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 30-34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 35-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 40. Rejected as being unnecessary. 41-44. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. 46. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 47. Rejected as being unnecessary. 48-55. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 57-59. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 60-61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 62-63. Rejected as being unnecessary. 64-67. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 68. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 69. Rejected as being unnecessary. 70. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 71. Rejected as being unnecessary. 72-73. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 74-77. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 78. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 79-81. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 82. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 83-84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 85-87. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 88. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 89-90. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 91-92. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as being unnecessary. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. 97-98. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5-7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18 and 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the unused part has been rejected as being unnecessary to reach a resolution of the issues, irrelevant, cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Minnick, Esquire Pamela H. Page, Esquire Post Office Box 11127 Tallahassee, FL 32302-3127 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), for the period September 1, 1998, through and including September 30, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former employee of the School Board of Miami-Dade County (School Board) and is a retired member of FRS. In September 1998, Petitioner became eligible to participate in DROP by virtue of reaching 30 years of service with the School Board. In September 1998, Petitioner asked Respondent for an estimate of her retirement benefits. In January 1999, the estimate of Petitioner's retirement benefits was prepared by Respondent and mailed to Petitioner. During the 1998-99 school year, Petitioner had difficulties in her dealings with a new school principal. 1/ Petitioner testified that she delayed applying for DROP because she believed that her relationship with her employer would improve and she could continue to work as a teacher. Petitioner also testified that School Board administrators gave her erroneous information and misled her as to their intention to permit her to continue to teach. Petitioner argues that she would have elected to participate in DROP beginning September 1, 1998, had her employer told her the truth about her employment status. In this proceeding, Petitioner argues that she be permitted to participate in DROP effective September 1, 1998, on equitable grounds, without specifying the equitable principles upon which she relies. On October 27, 1999, Petitioner completed her application to participate in DROP and filed the application with the School Board's personnel office. Respondent received the completed application via facsimile on November 3, 1999. The first application sent in by Petitioner requested that her DROP participation start retroactive to September 1, 1998. Respondent, through its staff, denied that request and informed Petitioner that she would have to submit a second application, referred to by staff as a corrected application, requesting a start date of October 1, 1999. Pursuant to those instructions, Petitioner submitted a second application requesting that her start date be October 1, 1999. Petitioner's challenge to Respondent's denial of her request to accept her participation in DROP retroactive to September 1, 1998, was timely. Petitioner was later terminated from her position with the School Board. 2/ Respondent has been paid her drop benefits for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending when the School Board terminated her employment. Petitioner has not been employed by a FRS employer since the School Board terminated her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under DROP for the period September 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2001
Findings Of Fact The Respondent YWCA is a nonprofit corporation that sponsors educational, social, and recreational programs. The YWCA's purpose states that it is a "movement rooted in the Christian faith"; however, expressed belief in Christianity is not required for membership in the YWCA or for employment by the YWCA. Its membership is comprised of adult women seventeen years of age and older. The personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action will be applied in recruitment, hiring, compensation, fringe benefits, staff development, and training, promotion, and any other condition of employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, age, national origin, or any other nonperformance factors." (Emphasis added.) Regarding termination, the personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Reasons for staff termination must be carefully documented. They should be based upon objective performance appraisals, which in turn are based upon job descriptions, work plans, and performance standards. Except in cases of reorganization/retrenchment or termination for cause, a probationary period for work improvement must be provided, followed by another performance appraisal." The YWCA of West Palm Beach operates three facilities: Central and Residence, the Mamie Adair Branch, and the Recreation Center. The Mamie Adair Branch primarily serves the black community in West Palm Beach and includes a day-care facility. The Petitioner, Davis, was hired as the Branch Executive of the Mamie Adair Branch of the YWCA, effective July 21, 1980, at a starting salary of $12,000.00. The Petitioner was given copies of the YWCA's personnel policy, affirmative action plan, and job description. She was not given notice of particular standards of behavior to which she was required to conform away from the job. As branch Executive she was supervised by the Executive Director, Jo Prout. The Petitioner successfully completed her initial 90-day probationary period, and her annual salary was increased by five percent to $12,600.00. In October 1981, however, the Petitioner received her annual evaluation and was again placed on three months probations due primarily to an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Branch Committee. The Petitioner had a bad attitude and was antagonistic. The Petitioner became pregnant but did not immediately disclose the fact of her pregnancy. In approximately December, 1981, the Petitioner confided to a coworker that she was pregnant and the coworker, in turn, told the YWCA's Executive Director, Jo Prout, that the Petitioner was pregnant. The YWCA's Executive Director was concerned that the Petitioner's relationship with the Branch Committee would be severely adversely affected if the Committee found out the Petitioner was pregnant and unmarried. Because of this concern, the Executive Director removed the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, effective December 31, 1981. The Petitioner would not have been removed from her position on December 31, 1981, but for the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried. Prior to removing the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, the Executive Director did not attempt less drastic alternatives such as asking the Petitioner not to discuss or disclose her marital status or asking the Petitioner to take a leave of absence. Prior to her removal, the Petitioner had not discussed the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried with members of the Branch Committee or with the YWCA membership in general. At no time had the Petitioner advocated unwed motherhood as an alternative life- style or otherwise advocated or espoused principles contrary to her understanding of Christianity. In the past, certain employees of the YWCA whose on-the-job behavior was contrary to Christian principles received job discipline but were not removed from their positions. A desk clerk at the YWCA's residence, for example, who was found to have stolen property from residence guests was not discharged. The removal of the Petitioner from her position by the YWCA because she was pregnant and unmarried was not justified by the business necessity rule because: A requirement to conduct one's life, including one's off-the-job activities, according to Christian principles, was not disclosed to the Petitioner or to other employees; The YWCA did not discipline or discharge other employees for conduct which conflicted with the YWCA's alleged requirement to conduct one's life by Christian principles; and The YWCA did not show that a requirement of all employees to conduct their lives by Christian principles has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Then the Petitioner was removed from the Branch Executive position, she was transferred to the position of center consultant for gymnastics. The position of the center consultant for gymnastics to which the Petitioner was transferred was a demotion in that the Petitioner went from an administrative to a non-administrative position. The transfer also changed the Petitioner's employment status from full-time employee to part-time employee with a 25 percent decrease in earned income and a lunch "hour" reduced to 30 minutes. The petitioner's new position as center consultant was a temporary one designated to last no longer than five months. Petitioner was removed from probationary status as a result of the transfer. The position of center consultant to which the Petitioner was transferred was not a legitimate position. The position did not exist prior to December 31, 1981, the date the Petitioner was transferred. No job description was ever written for this position, despite the fact that the YWCA personnel policy required job descriptions. The Petitioner was verbally assigned job tasks inconsistent with her title of center consultant, including cleaning toilets at the gymnastics center. The position was eliminated on February 16, 1982, approximately six weeks after it was created, allegedly due to financial streamlining. The YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, discriminating against her on the basis of sex and marital status by removing her from her position as Branch Executive because she was pregnant and unmarried. Moreover, this transfer was not justified by business necessity. Because the YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, the Petitioner could be entitled to be reinstated to her former position or to a comparable position and could also be entitled to recover lost wages and fringe benefits, plus interest thereon, from the date of the wrongful act, December 31, 1981, to November 31, 1982, the date she was hired by the Lutheran Ministries, set off by any interim earnings and reduced by the Petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits plus her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Regarding reinstatement, the Petitioner has been and is now willing and able to be reinstated to her former position as Branch Executive or to a comparable administrative position. The employer's argument that the Petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement because she was an unsatisfactory employee is rejected for the following reasons: The employer's allegations that the Petitioner will not satisfactorily perform her job if reinstated are too speculative and any doubts about the Petitioner's entitlement to reinstatement should be resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination; and In the event that the Petitioner's job performance upon reinstatement is not satisfactory, the employer may avail itself of the procedures set forth in its personnel policy to improve the Petitioner's performance or discharge her for unsatisfactory job performance. However, reinstatement may not be feasible in this case due to the fact that another employee has been placed in the Petitioner's former position. If the Petitioner is not reinstated to a comparable administrative position, then she should be compensated by the award of six months front pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Petitioner is entitled to damages in the amount of $13,551, which represents a back pay award of $11,000 plus 10 percent interest, six months front pay in the amount of $6,000, minus $1,575 for salary paid from January 1, 1982 - February 16, 1982, including two weeks severance pay and $2,974 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs of $232.65 and attorneys fees totaling $5,000.
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner abandoned an employment position with the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, and whether she was properly separated from employment with the Commission based upon abandonment. Petitioner contends that her failure to report for work with the Commission did not constitute an abandonment because the Commission's offer of employment was presented in such a manner as to make it impossible for the Petitioner to appear for work. The Commission contends that the Petitioner failed to report for work with the Commission for three consecutive workdays, that her failure to report was not authorized, and that she therefore abandoned her position with the Commission.
Findings Of Fact Prior to 1980, Petitioner had been employed with the Florida Parole and Probation Commission at its Pensacola office as a Parole Agent. Her employment was terminated, and she pursued a proceeding before the Florida Career Service Commission. The Career Service Commission ordered that the Parole and Probation Commission reinstate her to her former position and that she receive back pay and benefits. The Petitioner had moved to Tallahassee, and the Commission sought to accommodate her by offering her a position in Tallahassee. There were no immediate vacancies. The Petitioner was offered a position as Administrative Assistant to the Chairperson of the Commission. The position was at a lower pay grade than Petitioner had been in, and she declined the position. The Commission considered itself to be under an obligation to place Petitioner in a position similar to the one she had held previously. The 1980 session of the Florida Legislature authorized ten new positions to the Commission. Although the effective date of the authorization was July 1, 1980, the positions were only funded to commence in October, 1980, and to run through the remainder of the fiscal year. The Commission concluded that an emergency existed for filling two of the authorized positions. The Commission decided to take steps to fill a "Parole Examiner I" position and, a "Revocation Specialist" position immediately, rather than to wait until October In order to accommodate the immediate filling of those positions, the filling of other newly authorized positions would be delayed until subsequent to October. The Commission advertised for the Parole Examiner I and Revocation Specialist, positions by Job Opportunity Announcements dated July 7, 1980. The application deadline was July 18, 1980. These were the first professional level vacancies that the Commission had had in its staff other than the Administrative Assistant position since the time that the Career Service Commission ordered that Petitioner be reinstated. Commission personnel commenced to interview qualified applicants after July 18. At some point, consideration was given to offering one or both of the positions to the Petitioner. Commission personnel contacted Petitioner on July 28, 1980, and offered her the Parole Examiner I position. Petitioner was also advised that she could be considered for the Revocation Specialist position, which was at a higher pay grade than the position that Petitioner previously held. A letter confirming this was sent by the Commission to the Petitioner. The letter was dated July 28, 1980. By letter dated August 1, Petitioner stated that she would like to be considered for the Revocation Specialist position. On Wednesday, August 6, 1980, the Commission's Personnel Manager advised Petitioner that she was being offered the Revocation Specialist position and that she would be expected to report to her supervisor the following Monday, August 11, 1980, at 8:00 A.M. A letter confirming the offer and the conditions, dated August 6, 1980, was delivered to Petitioner by hand delivery on August 7. These letters formally confirmed conversations that had taken place among Petitioner and various employees of the Commission. On August 8, 1980, the Petitioner contacted the Commission's Personnel Manager and expressed a desire to take annual leave so that she could report to work in the new position subsequent to August 11. The Personnel Manager informed Petitioner that she would need to make her leave request directly to Harry P. Dodd, the Commission's Revocation Administrator, who would be Petitioner's supervisor. The Petitioner was able to contact Mr. Dodd in Starke, Florida, where he was performing Commission duties. She initially indicated that she would like to take two weeks' annual leave commencing on August 11. During the conversation, she scaled this request down to three days. Mr. Dodd was unclear as to the extent of his authority to grant or deny the leave request. He contacted the Commission's Personnel Manager and legal counsel and was advised that the decision of whether to grant or deny the leave request should be made by Mr. Dodd as a management decision. Mr. Dodd concluded that the leave request should be denied, and he contacted the Petitioner by telephone and advised her of that. Petitioner did not at that time advise Mr. Dodd that she would not report for work on August 11. By letter dated August 8, 1980, Petitioner advised the Chairperson of the Commission that she would not be able to report on August 11. She did not state her intentions to report at any future date. Petitioner did not report for work on August 11, 12, or 13, 1980. By letter dated August 13, the Commission advised Petitioner that it regarded her failure to report on August 11 as a refusal of the position. Thereafter, by letter dated October 15, 1980, the Commission advised Petitioner that if she were considered an employee rather than a prospective employee in view of the Career Service Commission's reinstatement order, that she had been absent without authorized leave for three days, and deemed to have abandoned her position. She was advised of her right to seek review of that decision through a petition to the Department of Administration. Petitioner filed such a petition, and this proceeding ensued. During July and August, 1980, the petitioner was employed on a part- time basis with the Federal Public Defender's Office in Tallahassee. Petitioner did not take any steps to advise anyone at her office as to the possibility of her accepting a position with the Parole and Probation Commission. While Petitioner testified that it would have been appropriate for her to give at least two weeks' notice before leaving the Federal Public Defender's Office, it does not appear from the evidence that her failure to give such notice would have unduly burdened her employer. Furthermore, if Petitioner had immediately advised her employer when she became aware that she may obtain full-time employment with the Commission, adequate notice could have been given. Petitioner and her husband had planned a vacation for August 11 and 12, 1980. While reporting to work on August 11 would have frustrated those plans, it does not appear that Petitioner would have incurred any significant expense or unhappiness from frustration of the vacation plans other than disappointment. It would have been difficult for the Petitioner to make arrangements for day care for her children in order to report for full-time employment with the Commission on August 11. It does not appear that those difficulties were insurmountable, however, and Petitioner could, albeit with difficulty, have made such arrangements. It was not impossible for the Petitioner to report for work with the Commission on August 11, 1980. The Commission's Revocations Section was severely understaffed during the summer of 1980. Legislation had been enacted which dramatically increased the number of parole revocations, and the Commission's staff had not been increased to handle the increase. During July and August, the Revocations Section had a severe backlog. It is for this reason that the Commission decided to take immediate steps to fill a newly authorized Revocation Specialist position. In addition to the increased workload and backlog, the Revocations Section had some peculiar personnel difficulties which increased the need to immediately fill the newly authorized position. One of the Revocation Specialists was seriously ill and frequently absent. Another was scheduled for military leave, which was not discretionary. Mr. Dodd had made plans to be on annual leave which could not be changed because he was using the leave to close a real estate transaction. In view of these difficulties, Mr. Dodd's refusal to grant the Petitioner's annual leave request was justified. It does not appear that the refusal of the leave request was made on any basis other than a sound management decision. After the Petitioner failed to report for work by August 13, the Commission took immediate steps to fill the Revocation Specialist position. While there were unexplained delays in accomplishing that, the position was filled effective August 26, 1980. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that the Commission's offer of the Revocation Specialist position to the Petitioner was other than a bona fide offer. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that any of the persons involved in offering the position to Petitioner felt any ill will toward her. The denial of the Petitioner's request that she not be required to report on August 11, as she had been directed, was based on a sound management decision. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that the denial was generated by any ill feeling toward Petitioner or any desire that she not take the position. Taking the position on such short notice undoubtedly would have caused the Petitioner some inconvenience in leaving the position that she had held with the Federal Public Defender's Office and arranging child care. The frustration of vacation plans would have been disappointing. These factors do not, however, justify the Petitioner's failure to report as directed, nor could it be concluded that it was impossible for the Petitioner to report as directed. In view of the fact that the petitioner was offered the Revocation Specialist position in order that the Commission could comply with its responsibility to reinstate the Petitioner and the fact that the Petitioner was receiving back pay from the Commission, the Petitioner should be viewed as having been employed by the Commission. Her failure to report for work for three consecutive days as she had been directed to do constitutes an abandonment of her position with the Commission.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Patricia Fountain, was employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as a Direct Services Aide working with the District Four Children, Youth, and Families (CYF) Services. For some time prior to July 24, 1987, the Petitioner was under medical treatment and had been absent from work on one form or another of approved leave. On July 24, 1987, the Petitioner's physician released her from medical treatment to return to light duty. The physician's release was subsequently amended to effect the Petitioner's release to return to work on July 27, 1987. The Petitioner's supervisor, in consultation with the Petitioner's physician, arranged a schedule of light duty work for the Petitioner to perform during the week beginning July 27, 1987. On July 27, 1987, the Petitioner reported to work as scheduled and submitted a written statement from a physical therapist to the effect that it would be in the Petitioner's best interest to have a leave of absence from work. The Petitioner was advised that the statement from the physical therapist was insufficient, and that the Petitioner would be expected to perform her duties. On July 28, 1987, the Petitioner resubmitted the statement from the physical therapist with some additional information added to the statement. On that same day, the Petitioner left a written request for leave without pay on the program administrator's desk and, without anyone's knowledge, left work without authorization. The Petitioner did not thereafter return to work. Her request for leave without pay was never approved. The Petitioner's supervisor made several unsuccessful efforts to have the Petitioner attend a conference to discuss her unauthorized absence. On August 4, 1987, the Petitioner was contacted at home and served written notice that her absence was unauthorized and that she was expected to return to work on August 5, 1987. The Petitioner did not report to work on August 5, 6, or 7, 1987, nor did she report thereafter. The Petitioner did not contact her supervisor on August 5, 6, or 7, 1987, to explain her absence. A letter was mailed to the Petitioner advising her that by reason of her failure to report to work on August 5, 6, and 7, 1987, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service, effective 5:00 p.m. on August 7, 1987. During August of 1987, the Petitioner did not have any sick leave or annual leave balance.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order concluding that the Petitioner, Patricia Fountain, was properly terminated for abandonment in accordance with Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 5920 Arlington Expressway Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Ms. Patricia Fountain 2533 Wilmot Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Pamela Miles, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
