The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Education Practices Commission should discipline the Respondent for statutory and rule violations alleged in the Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Peter Zanfagna, holds Florida Educator’s Certificate 1022509 covering the area of physical education, which is valid through June 30, 2017. In August 2013, the Respondent was hired as the physical education teacher for Westbrooke Elementary School in the Orange County School District. The Respondent’s classes combined two regular classrooms and consisted of approximately 42 to 70 children, depending on absences. Without a paraprofessional to assist him for the first two to three weeks of the school year, the Respondent made do with the assistance of a parent of a student and managed his classes well. He was widely considered to be a big improvement over his predecessor in the job. He had good lesson plans, followed his lesson plans and managed to maintain order. He received a good evaluation when his assistant principal, Carl Sousa, assessed him. Once, the school’s administration asked him to avoid using the playground when other classes were using it for recess, as he was doing on what he called “Fun Friday.” The Respondent immediately complied with the request. On Friday, October 11, the Respondent was attempting to supervise a large group of kindergarteners as they moved from the playground to a pavilion where lumber, some with nails sticking out, was stacked in preparation for its use in setting up for the school’s annual fall carnival scheduled for that weekend. Just before the maneuver began, the Respondent explained to the children his safety concerns about them having to walk past the lumber to get where they were going and told them he wanted them to walk in single file behind him. As he began walking along a sidewalk outside some classrooms, several students ran up beside him. Concerned for the students’ safety and upset that they ignored his instructions, the Respondent reprimanded them by yelling or screaming at them in a very loud voice. Two teachers were startled by the loud yelling or screaming. They looked out the window and saw it was the Respondent. One said the yelling or screaming was extreme and in a sharp, harsh tone. The other said the Respondent was pointing a finger six-to-eight inches from the face of one child. She heard him yelling or screaming at the child, “I told you to stay behind me, not in front of me, not next to me, but behind me.” Both thought the Respondent’s behavior was over-the-top, especially for children so young. Neither knew the reason for the Respondent’s behavior. One of the teachers who witnessed the incident said she heard children sobbing and screaming. The other said one child was crying and another was starting to cry. They believed the children were crying because of the Respondent’s loudness. The Respondent conceded that he yelled or screamed at the children to “stop” and “hold up.” He testified that his main concern during this incident, as always, was the safety of the children. He suggested the children’s crying may have been in reaction to his message to them that they could be seriously hurt if they ran into the lumber and nails. The Respondent also pointed out that he was saddled unfairly with the difficult task of supervising and monitoring a very large number of small children without adequate help. Even so, there was no evidence of any other similar incident. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent inappropriately disciplined students by requiring them to sit on concrete for entire class periods. When students were misbehaving so as to endanger other students or were not following the Respondent’s instructions, the Respondent would place the students in “timeout” by having them sit apart from the rest of the class for periods of time. Sometimes this occurred when the class was in the pavilion, which is where his classes gathered for attendance and for dismissal. The pavilion had a concrete floor and no walls but had a roof and was not an inappropriate place for students to be in time-out. Early in the school year, the Respondent sometimes left children in time-out for inappropriately long periods of time. When this was reported to administration, the Respondent was given a directive to limit time-out to ten minutes. The Respondent testified that he complied with that directive throughout the rest of the school year until he resigned, effective April 25, 2014. With one exception, there was no evidence that the Respondent failed to comply with this directive. On April 16, 2014, a school psychologist attempted to observe one of the Respondent’s kindergarten or first-grade students to help a school “staffing” determine if the child was autistic and eligible for special education. Near the beginning of the class, while the class was in the pavilion, the Respondent placed the child in time-out for not listening to instructions. The Respondent proceeded with his class, and the child remained in time-out for approximately 20 or more minutes. On that day, the Respondent had no assistant and was attempting to teach a class of 40 or more students by himself. The psychologist conceded that he might have lost track of time and left her “target” in time-out longer than intended. The Respondent did not recall the incident. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent inappropriately disciplined students by requiring them to do laps for entire class periods. First, the evidence was clear that the Respondent did not force his students to run laps. They always had the option of running or walking. Second, after attendance was taken in the pavilion, all classes began with stretching and warm-ups. Third, running or walking laps was sometimes a class activity, not discipline. Fourth, when laps were being run or walked, the duration of the activity or discipline could be determined by how well the students were performing; if they were not performing well, extra laps could be added to the activity or discipline. The charge that the Respondent made A.O., a twelve-year old fifth-grader, continue running after she complained of pain in her recently injured ankle arose from an incident on January 15, 2014. As to how recently A.O.’s ankle had been injured, her ankle was in a boot for about a month after the injury, and she had been out of the boot for about a week at the time in question. The evidentiary basis for the rest of the charge consisted of the written statements A.O. and the testimony of her and her mother. A.O. wrote an ambiguous statement the day after the incident. It started saying that the Respondent made the class run for the whole class period but then said he would let some people sit down and make others keep running. She stated her ankle started hurting after 20 minutes, so she asked if she could stop running, but he said to keep running. She did not state that she told the Respondent her ankle hurt. A.O. wrote another ambiguous statement for the Petitioner’s investigator in September 2014. In it, she said the Respondent did not make the class run the whole class period every day. She said, “[t]hat day we were walking and we were not running so he made us run the whole time.” Although “that day” was not specified, it reasonably can be inferred that the investigator was asking about January 15, 2014. In this statement, A.O. did not mention her own ankle hurting but stated another student claimed to have fallen and hurt his ankle, may or may not have told the Respondent about it, and seemed fine after the class. She also stated that when a student actually got hurt in class, the Respondent would send them to the clinic to get ice for the injury. At the hearing, counsel for the Petitioner had A.O. adopt her January statement and led her to testify that she told the Respondent that her ankle hurt, and asked him if she could stop running and sit down, and that he told her “no.” She then said she “kept walking.” Counsel then asked if the Respondent said, “no, keep running,” and she said, “yes.” She then said “no” to the suggestions that she was about to cry and was uncomfortable. She said she told her mother that evening that her ankle was hurting. On cross, she clarified that she “might have not been running as much as the other kids. I only said since it was hurting could I sit down. And you said, no, keep walking.” She then said she could not remember exactly what the Respondent said to her but only knew she asked to stop and sit down, and the Respondent said no, she had to keep going. On redirect, she agreed with counsel for the Petitioner that her memory of events would have been better at the time of her January statement than her September statement. A.O.’s mother testified that A.O. told her on the evening of January 15, 2014, that her ankle was hurting while running, that she asked the Respondent to stop, and that he said, no. She did not give any testimony on whether her daughter told the Respondent that her ankle was hurting. The Respondent denied that A.O. told him her ankle was hurting and that he refused to let her stop. He stood by his testimony that students always were given the option to walk and that he asked A.O. if she could walk slowly, she said she could, and she did. For that reason, he was not aware of any cause for concern. He testified persuasively, with strong corroboration from Robert Flynn, who was the Respondent’s teaching assistant for the last part of the Respondent’s tenure at Westbrooke and is the current physical education teacher there, and others, that the health and safety of the children was the Respondent’s number one priority, and that he would not have made any student run or walk if he thought there was a risk of injury. Taken together, the evidence was not clear and convincing that the Respondent made A.O. keep running after being told her ankle was hurting. The charge that the Respondent refused to allow A.L., a ten-year-old fourth-grader, to go to the clinic for an asthma treatment arose from an incident on April 18, 2014. The evidentiary basis for this charge consisted of two written statements by A.L. and the testimony of A.L. and her mother. A.L.’s first written statement was on April 21, 2014. It said she was in the Respondent’s class running at 12:15 p.m. when she had an asthma attack and went up to the Respondent to ask him if she could go to the nurse, “but before I can say anything he said no I can’t go to the nurse because I sometimes ask him if I can go to the nurse for my inhaler. Then I had to walk slow.” A.L. gave a second statement, this time to the Petitioner’s investigator, which was essentially consistent with the first one. Neither statement made it clear that A.L. told the Respondent she was having an asthma attack or that she needed her inhaler. At the hearing, she testified that she was running in class, felt an asthma attack, and asked the Respondent if she could go to the nurse to take her inhaler, and that he said, no, keep running. She then was led by counsel for the Petitioner to testify that she also told the Respondent she “couldn’t run and needed [her] inhaler.” Counsel for the Petitioner also led her to testify that she told her mother after school that she had gone to the Respondent and told “her [sic?]” that “[she] needed to see the nurse.” A.L.’s mother testified that her daughter had tears in her eyes when picked up after school. The mother could tell her daughter was having an asthma attack but no one else in the pickup area noticed. The mother took her daughter to the hospital, where it was determined that after a full medical workup that A.L. had walking pneumonia. A.L. spent a few days in the hospital and returned to school with a new medication for the pneumonia to take in addition to her inhaler. The Respondent denied that A.L. asked him to go to the clinic. He testified persuasively, with strong corroboration from Robert Flynn and others, that the health and safety of the children was the Respondent’s number one priority, and that he would not have refused to allow A.L. or any student go the clinic upon request for a medical reason. It appears from the greater weight of the evidence, including A.L.’s shy demeanor, and the number of children in the Respondent’s class, that A.L.’s medical request was not made known to the Respondent at the time. Taken together, the evidence was not clear and convincing that the Respondent refused to allow A.L. to go to the clinic for an asthma treatment. After A.L.’s parents reported to Westbrooke’s administration why A.L. was out of school, the school’s administration blamed the Respondent for refusing to allow A.L. to go to the clinic for an asthma treatment. This was the culmination of deteriorating relations between the Respondent and the school administration that began when the Respondent got his first paraprofessional assistant, Laura Fogarty. Ms. Fogarty was a private school physical education teacher, coach and athletic director in Chicago, who had moved to Orlando and took the paraprofessional job while she was awaiting her Florida certification. The Respondent felt she was undermining and disrespecting him and angling to replace him and felt that the school’s administration was siding with her when disagreements between them were presented to the school’s administration. The Respondent became increasingly antagonistic to Ms. Fogarty and the school’s administration. When the A.L. incident occurred, the school’s administration decided to ask the Respondent to resign or be fired. The Respondent chose to resign. After resigning, the Respondent was employed by a charter school in Manatee County as a physical education teacher, coach, and athletic director. He testified that he has been there for a year and a half with “zero problems.” On cross, it was brought out that the Respondent actually had been on administrative leave for about the last two weeks, apparently since counsel for the Petitioner questioned the charter school’s principal in preparation for the hearing and made the principal aware of the Petitioner’s investigation and disciplinary case against the Respondent’s state educator certificate. Cross-examination of the Respondent by counsel for the Petitioner also attempted to have the Respondent contradict his testimony regarding his positive teaching experiences at other Florida schools before he was hired by Westbrooke. Those attempts at impeachment were unsuccessful, and the Petitioner presented no evidence to contradict the Respondent’s testimony, which is accepted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order denying the Petitioner’s request for a five- year suspension and dismissing the charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2016.
The Issue By petition for the revocation of teacher's certificate dated August 5, 1980, the Professional practices Council alleged that respondent "violated Section 6B5.03(1)(a), Rules of the State Board of Education [RSBE], in that he failed to keep records"; "violated Section 6B5.03(2)(a) [RSBE], in that he failed to utilize available instructional materials and equipment necessary to accomplish the designated task"; "violated Section 6B5.05(1)(a) [RSBE], in that he failed to provide frequent and prompt feedback covering the success of learning and good achievement efforts"; "plead[ed] guilty to driving while intoxicated" on or about March 29, 1979; "plead[ed] no contest to driving while intoxicated" on or about August 19, 1974; "was found guilty of driving while intoxicated" on or about April 22, 1967; "committed personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the School Board, . . . committed acts which are not a proper example for students, and . . . failed[ed] to meet the minimum standard of competent professional performance"; "all in violation of Florida Statutes Section 231.28, Section 231.09 and Section 6B5."
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent holds Florida Teacher's Certificate No. 039140, Graduate, Rant III, in the areas of physical education and social studies, due to expire on June 30, 1982. In the fall of 1967, after obtaining the B.S. degree from Florida Memorial College in St. Augustine, respondent, who was 57 years old at the time of the hearing, began working for the Duval County School Board. He first taught American history at Standard Vocational High School. After two years at Standard Vocational, he began at Fort Caroline Junior High School in 1969, where he taught ninth grade civics for two months, then physical education, after which he left off teaching and worked as an administrative assistant, with responsibilities for discipline and supervision of students in the cafeteria and bus loading area. Respondent then worked at Darnell Cookman as an administrative assistant until that school closed, when he returned to Fort Caroline Junior High School, as an administrative assistant. In the fall of 1974, Mr. Richardson began as an administrative assistant at Andrew Jackson, a position he held through the end of the 1976-1977 school year. In the fall of 1977, he began teaching geography and American history at Landon Junior High School. The next school year Mr. Richardson received an unsatisfactory evaluation from his principal, the first such evaluation in his career. In accordance with school board policy in such circumstances, his request for a transfer was honored and he began teaching in the fall of 1979 at Oceanway Seventh Grade Center (hereinafter "Oceanway"). On June 8, 1974, a Saturday, respondent was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated. On his plea of nolo contendere, he was found guilty as charged on August 23, 1974. Respondent was again arrested on March 10, 1979, also a Saturday, and charged with driving while intoxicated. He was adjudicated guilty on his plea of guilty on March 20, 1979. Judith Poppell began as principal at Oceanway in the fall of 1979. Before she met respondent, she received a letter informing her that his work the preceding school year had been evaluated as unsatisfactory and asking her to evaluate respondent no later than October 31, 1979. At all pertinent times, only the Oceanway principal, the dean of boys, and the dean of girls had authority to administer corporal punishment. Any teacher, however, was authorized to use reasonable force to break up a fight or in self-defense. On the morning of September 26, 1979, Mr. Richardson had responsibility for supervising students in the area where they were disembarking from buses. He directed the students to stand clear of the bus ramp and placed his hand on a 15-year-old boy who hung back. The student called respondent a "motherfucker" and threw his books at Mr. Richardson, breaking his glasses. Respondent then pushed the student to the ground. Ms. Poppell asked respondent and the other teachers at Oceanway to furnish her copies of lesson plans weekly. Respondent furnished Ms. Poppell copies of lesson plans, but some were late or incomplete or, in Ms. Poppell's opinion, unrelated "to the minimum skill objectives." (T. 121) It appeared to her "that what in fact [respondent] was doing was going sequentially in the textbook" (T. 125) rather than teaching what would be tested on the minimum level skills test, a standardized achievement test administered county wide. On October 3, 1979, Ms. Poppell observed respondent teaching his Man and Society class at which time "the students were involved in a discussion of values and beliefs and needs, which is part of the course material." (T. 127) During this class, respondent lectured and, in Ms. Poppell's opinion, "did make some very good points" although eventually the students "began to get wiggly." (T. 127) On October 17, 1979, Ms. Poppell was in or near the gymnasium "getting together a candle order to be filled" (T. 128) when she heard respondent lecturing on softball to a physical education class which included "some children . . . who were disciplinary problems." (T. 129) While Ms. Poppell was listening, respondent shouted to a student, "Shut up. I'm not talking to you." (T. 129) During the 1979-1980 school year, Wade Randall Godfrey, a seventh grade student in Mr. Richardson's physical education class, complained to Joseph H. Fowler that Mr. Richardson had hit him with an aluminum baseball bat. After looking into this allegation, Mr. Fowler "could not find any evidence that [Godfrey] was actually struck by a baseball bat." )T. 43) Neither did the evidence adduced at hearing establish that respondent struck the student Godfrey with a baseball bat. On October 31, 1979, Ms. Poppell evaluated respondent's work as unsatisfactory based on her observations and those of Dr. Beyerle and Mr. Kitchens, which she related to respondent. At that time she suggested that respondent join ten other Oceanway teachers for an after school seminar (1.5 hours for each of six successive days) "designed to help teachers deal with disruptive students." (T. 130) Respondent did not avail himself of this opportunity because he coached soccer after school Respondent did attend two days of observation of physical education programs, at the behest of school administrators. Ms. Poppell asked the head of the social studies department at Oceanway, Mrs. Wiggins, to assist respondent in the preparation of lesson plans. At Mrs. Poppell's instance, Mrs. Wiggins spoke to respondent in November of 1979 about the failure of respondent's lesson plans to "follow the minimum level skills booklet." (T. 63) She began preparing respondent's lesson plans for him and continued preparing them for four or five weeks. In mid December, Mrs. Wiggins complained to the principal that a classroom she used the period after respondent had taught a class in it was littered with paper. Mrs. Poppell wrote respondent a note about the incident which Mrs. Wiggins took from respondent's mail box. Mrs. Wiggins meant to intercept the note to avoid hard feelings on respondent's part, but did not realize that respondent had already read and replaced it. After this episode, respondent prepared his own lesson plans, unassisted. While Mr. Richardson taught at Oceanway, Richard Edward Chandler was a student in his first semester Man and Society class. Mr. Richardson gave this class several tests. In one instance, he passed out only three to five copies of a test to the entire class. On that occasion, he instructed the recipients to pass the test copies on to other students after copying the test questions. As a result, the student Chandler did not have enough time to finish the test. According to respondent, he meant for the students to work in groups on the test, a technique he has concededly never used before or since. At the end of the first grading period in the fall of 1979, respondent was one of a number of teachers to whom John A. Beyerle sent messages because all of their students' grades had not been reported on time. Mr. Richardson was late with grades for eleven students, at the end of the first grading period. At the end of the second grading period, he was late with grades for seventeen students. James Kitchens, a physical education supervisor for the Duval County School Board, observed respondent teaching on two occasions. The first time was incidentally in October of 1979 when he was evaluating the physical education program at Oceanway as a whole. On one visit or another, Mr. Kitchens observed some students "running loose," (T. 173) and probably on the second visit, remarked the inefficient use of tumbling mats: single lines of students crossed mats longitudinally instead of double lines crossing the widths of the mats. Mr. Kitchens agreed that respondent had "some basic competence and skills in physical education management" (T. 180) but detected "some rustiness." (T. 180) On December 5, 10, and 11, 1979, Maurice Shuman, Duval County School Board's supervisor for social studies, observed respondents teaching his social studies classes. Mr. Shuman testified, "If I were going to evaluate Mr. Richardson certainly I would need, you know, a greater number of visits" (T. 197) and offered various suggestions and comments he felt would be helpful to respondent in his teaching. Dr. Beyerle observed respondent teaching two classes. On the first occasion, respondent spent the hour reviewing and, although Dr. Beyerle perceived certain "weaknesses," he really c[ould]n't say it was a bad lesson." (T 190) On the second occasion, respondent taught "a pretty good lesson." (T. 90) On at least one occasion, respondent failed to call the roll in a social studies class. At various times, respondent lectured, engaged students in "well paced" questions, used a globe, cassettes, and ditto sheets. Under the Duval County School Board's policies, no student could pass either the seventh grade geography or Man and Society courses, if he failed a standardized test administered at the end of the course, regardless of his performance in class or on other tests. In violation of this policy, respondent gave passing grades to two students, Carmella Scott and Anthony Watts, who had failed the minimum level skills test (MLST). Of approximately 36 students in respondent's first semester Man and Society class, eight failed the MLST, including students who had received "B"s for the 9- and 18-week grading periods and who had done well on a final exam respondent prepared.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner suspend respondent's teacher's certificate for one (1) year. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1981.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Harriett S. Parets, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, and dated July 27, 2004, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner filed his Administrative Complaint on July 27, 2004, alleging certain material allegations and Statutory and Rule violations and seeking an appropriate penalty pursuant to the authority provided to the Education Practices Commission in Sections 1012.795(1) and 1012.796(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent filed her Election of Rights and requested a formal hearing on August 23, 2004. The parties’ previous attempt at resolving this matter met without success, and a formal hearing was requested which was scheduled for March 1 and 2, 2006. 2. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent, Harriett Parets, was employed as an elementary school teacher in the Broward County School District. 3. Respondent holds Florida Educator’s Certificate Number 592721. Her certificate covers the areas of elementary education and English for Speakers of Other Languages. It is valid through June 30, 2008. 4. Prior to the incidents complained of in this cause, Respondent taught in the Broward County School District without discipline for six years. Respondent was in her seventh year with the system when the allegations of this case arose. 5. Respondent had no prior disciplinary concerns. 6. Respondent had received satisfactory evaluations every year. 7. Respondent had administered the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) on five prior occasions without incident. 8. During the 2002 school year Respondent was assigned to teach fourth grade at McNab Elementary School (McNab). Her class was scheduled to take the FCAT on March 11 through 13, 2003. 9. Prior to the dates of testing, teachers at McNab were instructed to view a resource video. The video instructed and directed the teachers in the administration of the FCAT. It included information not previously addressed by the video. 10. Additionally, teachers at McNab were provided testing procedures to guide the administration of the FCAT. Teachers were to follow specifically worded texts in the directions provided to their students. A verbatim reading of the text was required by the FCAT testing protocols. Additional comments outside the text were prohibited. 11. Teachers at McNab were advised on the importance of the FCAT results, the requirement of adhering to the testing protocols, and the opportunities available to the school should McNab students perform well on the FCAT. 12. In fact, as McNab had received an “A” rating in the past (following good FCAT results), the school had received special funding tied to that performance. 13. In connection with the FCAT testing at issue herein, McNab administrators took precautions to provide test administrators with the schedule of the exam dates, the materials needed to administer the test, and training in the proper administration of the FCAT. Testing protocols were reviewed. 14. Proctors also received training regarding the administration of the exam. Each class was assigned a proctor along with the teacher who was primarily responsible for the test administration. 15. In this case, the proctor and several students verified comments from Respondent that deviated from the scripted instructions. 16. Contrary to the scripted instructions Respondent looked at the students’ test booklets, told more than one student to re-examine their work for errors, and pointed out a wrong answer. Respondent announced to the class as a whole that she was “seeing a lot of wrong answers.” 17. The Respondent was not authorized to make comments during the administration of the test. More important, the Respondent was not permitted to assist by any means the students who were taking the FCAT. 18. Respondent admitted that she did not watch the FCAT training video (known in this record as the BECON video). Respondent knew or should have known that she had been directed to watch the video. 19. Respondent admitted that she made comments to students that were beyond the scripted instructions provided in the teacher’s testing manual. 20. The issues of Respondent’s comments to the class and the level of assistance she had provided to students came to light when a student told her mother of Respondent’s conduct. The mother then contacted a school administrator to make the alleged improprieties known. 21. After determining that Respondent had assisted students in her class, administrators invalidated the test results from Respondent’s class. 22. As a result of the invalidation, the school did not have a sufficient number of test results to qualify as an “A” performing school under the state guidelines. Had the results from Respondent’s class been included, the school might have qualified and received recognition as it had in the past. 23. Following a formal hearing on the identical facts, the school district suspended Respondent for thirty (30) days. 24. Respondent has proctored the FCAT every year since the incident, including this year, without problem. 25. The District found that a 30-day suspension plus training was sufficient discipline.
Conclusions Stipulated Conclusions. 26. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of these proceedings. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. 27. Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this case to establish the allegations in the Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner has met that burden. 28. Section 228.301, Florida Statutes, governs FCAT security and prohibits anyone from coaching students or assisting them in any manner in the administration of the exam. 29. Additionally, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A- 10.042 prohibits interfering “in any way” with persons who are taking the FCAT in order to assist their performance. Clearly, Respondent inappropriately assisted students in her classroom. Had she watched the BECON video or more closely read the FCAT manual, she would have known that the comments and actions she made were inappropriate. The importance of test security was well known to all teachers. 30. By deciding to only suspend Respondent (as opposed to dismissal), Petitioner has recognized her past contribution to the school district. That Respondent blames others for her violation of testing protocols is regrettable. Petitioner has established that Respondent violated testing protocols and should be disciplined. 31. Respondent has violated the statutory rule violations alleged in Counts 1 through 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Other Conclusions. 32. Section 1012.795(1), Florida Statutes, gives the Education Practices Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “EPC”) the power to suspend or revoke the teaching certificate of any person, either for a set period of time or permanently, or to impose any penalty provided by law, if he or she is guilty of certain acts specified in the statute. 33. The Commissioner has alleged in Count 1 of the Administrative Complaint that Respondent violated Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes; in Count 2, that Respondent violated Section 1012.795(10(f), Florida Statutes; and in Count 3, that Respondent violated Section 1012.795(1)(i), Florida Statutes. 34. Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that a teacher may be disciplined if he or she "[h]as been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude." 35. Section 1012.795(1)(f), Florida Statutes, provides that a teacher may be disciplined if he or she “has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces that person’s effectiveness as an employee of the district school board.” 36. Section 1012.795(1)(i), Florida Statutes, provides that a teacher may be disciplined if he or she “[h]as violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession prescribed by State Board of Education rules.” The Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Principles") are set out in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 6B-1.006. Having failed to reference any particular part of the Principles, it is assumed that the allegations of Count 4 are intended to refer to the actual portion of the Principles Respondent violated. Count 4 charges that Respondent violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a), which requires that teachers “make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student’s mental and/or physical health and/or safety.” 37. Given the parties’ stipulation that “Respondent has violated the statutory rule violations alleged in Counts 1 through 4 of the Administrative Complaint,” the only issue which remains to be decided in this case is the appropriate penalty. In recommending a penalty, however, the extent to which the facts stipulated to by the parties actually supports their stipulation as to the statutory and rule violations must be considered. In particular, the Commission should take into account that the facts actually do not support the conclusion that Respondent violated Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes, the basis for the alleged violation in Count 1. 38. The terms "gross immorality" and "an act involving moral turpitude" are not defined in Chapter 1012, Florida Statutes. See Sherburne v. School Board of Suwannee County, 455 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-4.009, which applies to dismissal actions initiated by school boards against instructional personnel, does, however, provide guidance as to the meaning of the terms as they are used in Section 1012.795, Florida Statutes. See Castor v. Lawless, 1992 WL 880829 *10 (EPC Final Order 1992). 39. Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-4.009(2) defines "immorality" as follows: Immorality is defined as conduct that is inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals. It is conduct sufficiently notorious to bring the individual concerned or the education profession into public disgrace or disrespect and impair the individual's service in the community. 40. "Gross immorality" has been defined by the courts as misconduct that is more egregious than mere "immorality": The term "gross" in conjunction with "immorality" has heretofore been found to mean "immorality which involves an act of misconduct that is serious, rather than minor in nature, and which constitutes a flagrant disregard of proper moral standards." Education Practices Commission v. Knox, 3 FALR 1373-A (Department of Education 1981). Frank T. Brogan v. Eston Mansfield, DOAH Case No. 96-0286 (EPC Final Order 1996). 41. Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-4.009(6) defines "moral turpitude" as follows: Moral turpitude is a crime that is evidenced by an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties, which, according to the accepted standards of the time a man owes to his or her fellow man or to society in general, and the doing of the act itself and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. 42. The court in State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 146 So. 660, 661 (1933), observed that moral turpitude: involves the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. . . . It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals, though it often involves the question of intent as when unintentionally committed through error of judgment when wrong was not contemplated. 43. In determining whether any teacher is guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude in violation of Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes, it must be remembered that "[b]y virtue of their leadership capacity, teachers are traditionally held to a high moral standard in a community." Adams v. Professional Practices Council, 406 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 44. The acts committed by Respondent in this case were not sufficiently egregious to constitute gross immorality or acts involving moral turpitude. Respondent’s conduct, while inconsistent with the conduct expected of a teacher administering the FCAT, does not constitute an act ". . . which constitutes a flagrant disregard of proper moral standards" or an act of "inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society." 45. As for the violation of Section 1012.795(1)(f), Florida Statutes, while the parties have stipulated that Respondent's conduct reduced her effectiveness as an employee of the School Board, the facts show that the School Board has considered Respondent's effectiveness as an employee adequate to continue her in its employment and to continue allowing her to administer the FCAT. 46. While clearly inappropriate conduct on the part of the Respondent, her conduct barely constitutes a violation of the other statutory violation alleged in Count 3. Recommended Penalty. 47. Section 1012.795(1), Florida Statutes, gives the EPC the following disciplinary authority: The Education Practices Commission may suspend the educator certificate of any person as defined in s. 1012.01(2) or (3) for a period of time not to exceed 5 years, thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students for that period of time, after which the holder may return to teaching as provided in subsection (4); may revoke the educator certificate of any person, thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students for a period of time not to exceed 10 years, with reinstatement subject to the provisions of subsection (4); may revoke permanently the educator certificate of any person thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students; may suspend the educator certificate, upon order of the court, of any person found to have a delinquent child support obligation; or may impose any other penalty provided by law, . . . provided it can be shown that the person [violated one of the subsections that follow]. 48. In its Proposed Recommended Order for Appropriate Penalty, Petitioner has requested that it be recommended that Respondent’s certificate be permanently revoked and that she be permanently barred from re-application. Respondent has requested that it be recommended that Respondent’s 30-day suspension by the Broward County School Board (hereinafter referred to as the “School Board”) serve as her penalty in this case. In the alternative, Respondent has suggested that a one- year period of probation be added to the already served suspension. 49. In deciding the appropriate penalty to recommend in this case, consideration has been given to Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-11.007(3), which provides aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered in determining the appropriate penalty in a case such as this: (3) Based upon consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors present in an individual case, the Commission may deviate from the penalties recommended in subsection (2). The Commission may consider the following as aggravating or mitigating factors: The severity of the offense; The danger to the public; The number of repetitions of offenses; The length of time since the violation; The number of times the educator has been previously disciplined by the Commission. The length of time the educator has practiced and the contribution as an educator; The actual damage, physical or otherwise, caused by the violation; The deterrent effect of the penalty imposed; The effect of the penalty upon the educator’s livelihood; Any effort of rehabilitation by the educator; The actual knowledge of the educator pertaining to the violation; Employment status; Attempts by the educator to correct or stop the violation or refusal by the licensee to correct or stop the violation; Related violations against the educator in another state including findings of guilt or innocence, penalties imposed and penalties served; Actual negligence of the educator pertaining to any violation; Penalties imposed for related offenses under subsection (2) above; Pecuniary benefit or self-gain inuring to the educator; Degree of physical and mental harm to a student or a child; Present status of physical and/or mental condition contributing to the violation including recovery from addiction; Any other relevant mitigating or aggravating factors under the circumstances. 50. Based upon the facts stipulated to by the parties, the following mitigating circumstances exist: the offense in this case is a single, isolated one; the actual danger to the public in this incident was minimal; it has been three years since the violation occurred (and in the interim, Respondent has continued to monitor the FCAT without incident); and Respondent has not been previously disciplined by the EPC. 51. The following aggravating circumstances have been shown to exist: Respondent actions deprived students of the educational process, likely resulting in the loss of school funding and hindering the school’s ratings; and a harsh penalty will send the message that Respondent’s conduct will not be tolerated. 52. Petitioner has argued that an additional aggravating circumstance is the failure of any evidence that Respondent has been rehabilitated. In particular, Petitioner has suggested that Respondent lacks any rehabilitation because she has “consistently accused other individuals, including the FCAT’s administrators and supervisors, for her misdeeds rather than accepting the blame.” Petitioner’s argument on this point must be rejected. First, there is no stipulated fact or any evidence that has been offered in this case to support Petitioner’s position. Secondly, Petitioner has failed to consider the fact that Respondent has agreed to the stipulated facts and law which form the basis of this Recommended Order. 53. Ultimately, in recommending a penalty in this case, the most important considerations in this matter should be the extent to which Respondent actually violated the provision alleged in the Administrative Complaint, which has been addressed, supra, and the action taken by Respondent’s employer, the School Board. 54. The extent to which Respondent actually violated the provisions alleged in the Administrative Complaint has been discussed, supra. 55. Just as significantly, the School Board, which, along with the parents and children it serves, suffered the actual harm of Respondent’s conduct, concluded that Respondent was adequately punished by a 30-day suspension rather than termination of her employment. The School Board, therefore, has indicated a willingness to continue to employ Respondent, something it will no longer be able to do if Petitioner’s recommended penalty is carried out. Nor will the School Board be able to continue Respondent’s employment if Petitioner were to suspend Respondent’s certificate for any period of time. 56. Given the School Board’s decision to continue to employ Respondent, any discipline taken by Petitioner should be limited to discipline which will not thwart the local government’s decision to continue to employ Respondent. A suspension of 30 days, considered already served at the time she served her School Board imposed suspension; five years probation; and a requirement that Respondent attend, at her own expense, any seminars or courses the EPC deems appropriate is an appropriate penalty in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered imposing the following penalty: (1) suspending her teaching certificate for 30 days, such suspension to be considered already served; (2) placing her on probation for five years subject to any conditions deemed appropriate by the EPC; and (3) requiring her to attend, at her own expense, any seminars or courses the EPC deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this day 4th day April of, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2006.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a psychologist should be approved, pursuant to Chapter 490, Florida Statutes. This proceeding arose as a result of Respondent's provisional denial of Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement as a psychologist under Chapter 490, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21U-11, Florida Administrative Code, based upon Respondent's determination that Petitioner did not hold a license in another state which was obtained by requirements substantially equivalent or more stringent to requirements for licensure as a psychologist in the State of Florida. At the commencement of the hearing, Petitioner was advised of his rights in administrative proceedings. He indicated his understanding of such rights and elected to represent himself at the hearing. Petitioner testified in his own behalf and submitted 4 exhibits in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Frank Biasco, a member of the Board of Psychological Examiners. Joint Exhibit 1 representing the application file of Petitioner was also received in evidence.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Henry S. Tugender, Morganville, New Jersey, filed an application for licensure by endorsement as a psychologist with Respondent Board of Psychological Examiners on February 22, 1982. By letter of November 4, 1982, the Board's executive director informed Petitioner that his application had been denied by the Board pursuant to Rule 21U-11.04, Florida Administrative Code, because he did not hold a license in another state obtained by requirements substantially equivalent or more stringent to requirements for licensure as a psychologist in the State of Florida. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing. (Testimony of Tugender, Joint Exhibit 1) Petitioner received a master's degree in clinical psychology from Long Island University in 1959. He pursued doctoral studies in the clinical psychology program of Arizona State University from 1962 to 1964. In 1970, he obtained a Doctor of Philosophy degree from East Coast University, Dade City Florida, with a major in psychology. He was in an "external" degree program that involved a minimum residency during two summers and and submission of a dissertation. The university was not accredited by the American Psychology Association (APA) and is no longer in existence. (Testimony of Tugender, Joint Exhibit 1, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Petitioner is licensed to practice psychology in three states and the District of Columbia. He was licensed in New Jersey in 1968, Illinois in 1971, Pennsylvania in 1975, and the District of Columbia in 1973. At the time of licensure, none of the three states or the District of Columbia required a doctoral degree to obtain a license. He qualified in each instance by having a master's degree, plus a varying number of years of experience. (Testimony of Petitioner, Joint Exhibit 1) At the time Petitioner was licensed in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois and the District of Columbia, the licensure requirements of those states were not substantially equivalent to or more stringent than those now contained in Chapter 490, Florida Statutes, in that they did not require a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a school with an APA approved program, or from a school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the APA or the doctoral psychology programs of the state universities. Rifle 21U-11.04(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, sets forth criteria that must be met in all respects in order to demonstrate that the doctoral program meets the comparability requirements established by the rule. Petitioner presented no evidence concerning the content of his doctoral program at East Coast University, but conceded at the hearing that the program did not meet a number of the requirements specified in the rule. (Testimony of Petitioner, Biasco) Petitioner seeks to relocate to Florida for professional and health reasons. He currently is in private practice in New Jersey. He specializes in hypnosis and has been active in that field over many years. At the time of hearing, he held a valid Florida Department of Education teacher's certificate in psychology. He is also a certified school psychologist in the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He is affiliated with a number of professional organizations and is listed in the National Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. In 1974-75, he served as a consultant to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, and in the Department of Corrections. (Testimony of Petitioner, Joint Exhibit 1, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-4)
Recommendation That Petitioner's application for licensure as a psychologist by endorsement be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jane Raker, Executive Director Board of Psychological Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Holland, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - 1601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Henry S. Tugender 35 Wickatunk Village Morganville, N.J. 07751
The Issue Whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment based on the determination by a licensed psychologist that Respondent was not fit to perform his duties as a classroom teacher.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner was the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the public schools in Broward County, Florida. Petitioner has continuously employed Respondent since 1998 as a classroom teacher. At the times material to this proceeding, Respondent has held a professional services contract. The School Board has adopted Policy 4004, which provides for mandatory physical and/or psychological examinations for employees, as follows: AT ANY TIME DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT WHEN IT SHALL BE DEEMED ADVISABLE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT/DESIGNEE, AN EMPLOYEE MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE A PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION. RULES The Board authorizes the Superintendent to establish procedures to carry out the intent of this policy. The affected employee shall select the name of a medical doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist from a list maintained by the Division of Personnel, Policies, Government and Community Relations. Where the employee is found to be unable to function satisfactorily, the Division of Personnel, Policies, Government and Community Relations shall take appropriate action. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Superintendent of Schools had in effect the following procedures (Policy 4004 procedures) relating to fitness for duty determinations: Fit for Duty Determination Procedures The Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit (SIU) receives request from a Principal/Administrator (includes District Administrators) or Superintendent/Designee. SIU notifies employee via certified mail that he/she must undergo a physical and/or psychological examination. A reassignment letter is prepared directing employee to remain at home or at an alternate site with pay, depending on circumstances (i.e. active case file/investigation). The affected employee shall select the name of a medical doctor psychologist or psychiatrist from a list maintained by the Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit, within 24 hours. SIU Administrator schedules within ten working days a medical appointment and follows-up in writing to the doctor’s office and to the employee of appointment confirmation. Letter is sent to the doctor explaining billing instructions, and ‘Fit for Duty Evaluation’ report of findings. The doctor as delineated in the policy will conduct Pre [sic] evaluation at District expense. Note: a 2nd Opinion will be at the employee’s expense if requested, with the employee selecting from the School Board approved list as delineated in the policy. [Emphasis is in the orginal.] A third evaluation will be mandated if previous two (Pre & 2nd Opinion) are contradicting and will be at District expense and will be binding by [sic] all parties. [Emphasis is in the original.] Doctor determines if employee is ‘Fit for Duty’ or [is] not [fit] for duty. Where the employee is found ‘unfit for duty’ the Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit shall take appropriate action per the recommendation of the doctor, subjecting employee to a Post-evaluation by the same doctor making the initial evaluation. The Post-evaluation ought to occur within 90 days of the initial evaluation. If a doctor determines that the employee is ‘Unfit for Duty’, an administrative reassignment letter is prepared changing the employee’s pay status to ‘at home without pay (PLV)’. The employee is given information to call the Leave Department to apply for any paid leave accrued, and/or any other leave types per SBBC Policies that they are eligible for. Also, a Formal Referral to EAP is prepared for follow-up. Based on the progress and/or compliance with EAP’s recommendations, a Post Evaluation is scheduled within the 90- day reassessment period. If employee is unfit to return to work in the Post Evaluation, then the employee is recommended for termination (School Board Agenda is prepared for the next Board Meeting). Note: 2nd Opinions on the Post evaluation will be at the employee’s expense, if requested. Third evaluation, if required will be at District expense and will be binding by [sic] all parties. [Emphasis is in the original.] Employee and school/work site are notified of doctor’s fit for duty status via certified mail. (Note: Confidential Doctor’s report will only be distributed to the employee). The immediate supervisor is notified as well. However if the doctor has follow-up recommendations, then a Formal Referral to Employee Assistant Program (EAP) is prepared by SIU (i.e. mental health follow-up or other referrals as appropriate. If employee is found Fit for Duty, a certified letter is sent to the employee with instructions to return to work. The immediate supervisor is notified as well. Respondent was employed as a science teacher at Piper High School (Piper High) from 1999 until September of 2003. After two of Respondent’s students alleged in September 2003 that Respondent had battered them, Petitioner’s Professional Standards and Special Investigative Unit (SIU) conducted an investigation of the alleged incident. Petitioner submitted the results of the investigation to a Probable Cause Committee, which, in March of 2004, found probable cause of battery. A Pre-Disciplinary Hearing was held on June 10, 2004. The Committee recommended that Respondent's employment be terminated. Subsequently, in July of 2004, after his review of Respondent’s case, Dr. Frank Till (the Superintendent of Schools), recommended to the School Board that Respondent be reprimanded and returned to his teaching duties. The School Board followed Dr. Till’s recommendation. Respondent was notified of Petitioner’s action and the fact that he would be returned to the classroom by letter dated July 12, 2004. The letter was signed by Dr. Melita. Respondent responded to the July 12, 2004, letter with a letter to Dr. Melita dated July 15, 2004 (Petitioner’s Exhibit 8). This letter was copied to then President Bush, then Governor Bush, then Commissioner of Education Horne, Dr. Till, members of the School Board, and others. The letter consisted of two paragraphs. The first paragraph, which inexplicably contains a complaint by Respondent that he was being returned to the classroom, is set forth below. The second paragraph is not reproduced here because it pertained to an alleged leak of the SIU report to a newspaper reporter. The entire letter should be read if there is a question as to the context of the statements. Due to the fact that the students deliberately deceived in their irrefutably asinine assertion of battery, because they were failing Mr. Black’s science class, indeed, Mr. Black was wrongfully removed from his teacher position at Piper High School in the first place. It is fiercely urgent that you, Dr. Melita, and the School Board of Broward County, Florida, be aware that the students’ sickening battery hoax, which has been wantonly compounded by the draconian intimidating threat to terminate Mr. Black, has unfortunately caused Mr. Black’s family and himself exceptionally grave pain and suffering. This horrific suffering Mr. Black has been unnecessarily forced to go through since October 3, 2003, has rendered him psychologically, emotionally, physically and professionally harmed. Mr. Black immutably practiced the highest professional and ethical standards in his committed teaching duties at Piper High. Now, it is egregiously unfair to negligently dump Mr. Black back in a teacher position after his character clearly has been irreparably defamed by the mendacious students and the unjust Professional Standards Committee. Respondent’s correspondence caused Dr. Melita to be concerned as to Respondent’s emotional and mental stability. Before the commencement of the next school year (2004- 2005), Petitioner transferred Respondent from Piper High to Boyd Anderson High School (Anderson High). Respondent strenuously objected to the transfer. The decision to transfer him was made by the appropriate area office, based on a determination that his return to Piper High might disrupt the instructional program. Respondent made his objections to the transfer known by writing letters to School Board supervisory level employees, and others. Frances Bolden, the area director, communicated with Respondent about his transfer to Anderson High, and explained that she would meet him at the school to help him get acclimated. On Tuesday, August 10, 2004, Respondent reported to Anderson High. He met with Principal Timothy Gadson and Ms. Bolden twice on that day, with a faculty meeting intervening between the two meetings. Ms. Bolden described Respondent as being very anxious and nervous, despite the fact that it was a planning day before the school year commenced and no students were on campus that day. Following their meetings with Respondent on August 10, 2004, Dr. Gadson and Ms. Bolden referred Mr. Black to SIU based on the following statements he made: He was not comfortable in teaching students; He feared for the safety of the students; He had a condition that prevented him from going in the classroom; He had been out of the classroom since October 2003; and If he were forced to go into the classroom, he would leave Boyd Anderson within one week. He could not teach as he was under a doctor's care through EAP; He could not be at this school; His doctor told him that he could not work with students; and He needed help. Based on these concerns, Dr. Melita required Respondent to submit to a fitness for duty assessment pursuant to Policy 4004. Respondent was provided with a copy of the policy and procedures.1 On August 23, 2004, Respondent selected and met with Dr. Mendoza, who was on the School Board approved list. Dr. Mendoza found that Respondent was not fit for duty at that time. Respondent was formally referred to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and advised to follow up with Dr. Mendoza within 90 days. Respondent returned for a follow-up evaluation with Dr. Mendoza on November 10, 2004, after which Dr. Mendoza recommended that he be returned to work "in low stress settings while continuing to receive therapeutic treatment." Respondent was returned to work effective November 22, 2004, but Petitioner transferred Respondent from Anderson High to Rickards Middle School, in an attempt to comply with Dr. Mendoza’s recommendation that he be placed in a low stress setting.2 Prior to December 8, 2004, the Florida Department of Education (DOE) started an investigation into the 2003 incident at Piper High. As a consequence of that investigation, Respondent hired certain college students who, along with Respondent and some others, reenacted Respondent’s version of the events that had led to the charges of battery. Respondent videotaped the reenactment and forwarded a copy of the videotape to the DOE investigator. The DOE investigator became concerned that Respondent may have violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession by using high school students as part of the reenactment. On or before December 8, 2004, the DOE investigator made contact with Respondent. Respondent became distraught after that contact. On December 8, 2004, a school based administrator from Rickards Middle School contacted SIU because of concerns about Respondent. Charles Rawls (a SIU supervisor) and Richard Mijon responded to Rickards Middle School and met with Respondent. Respondent admitted that he was concerned about a possible new investigation by DOE. Respondent stated that he was too upset to be at the school and too upset to be around children and he was sent home for the day. The next day, December 9, 2004, Dr. Melita requested a second fitness for duty assessment pursuant to Policy 4004. Again, Petitioner provided Respondent a copy of the pertinent policy and procedures. Of the School Board approved psychologists, Respondent chose Dr. Forman to provide his initial evaluation. On December 15, 2004, Respondent met with Dr. Forman for the initial evaluation. Dr. Forman prepared a report (Petitioner Exhibit 32) which, together with his testimony at the formal hearing, detailed the manner in which he conducted the evaluation, the tests he administered, the reasons he selected the tests he utilized, the results of the tests, and his interpretation of his results. Dr. Forman found that Respondent was not fit for duty. Respondent was again referred to the EAP and advised to follow up with Dr. Forman within 90 days. Respondent objected to Dr. Forman's initial evaluation because, Respondent alleged, Dr. Forman's behavior was inappropriate, and Respondent asked for a new evaluation. Respondent’s objections were made both orally and in writing. On December 15, 2004, Respondent wrote Mr. Mijon the following letter: As instructed by you I did in fact promptly report to my 1:00 p.m. appointment with [Dr. Forman] for the purpose of submitting to a Fit For Duty Psychological Exam. However, I quickly became extremely uncomfortable with Dr. Forman’s deportment when he began articulating extremely graphic and indecent profanity during his evaluation session with me. Dr. Forman even questioned whether or not racism was a motivating factor in my circumstances for being ordered to take the Fit For Duty Psychological Exam. I specifically told Dr. Forman that I did not feel comfortable with his conversation and kindly asked him to please change the subject. Dr. Forman continued the besetting conversation for a while longer. Considering Dr. Forman’s clearly inappropriate conduct unbecoming a psychologist, I understandably, feel highly uncomfortable entrusting the unwavering integrity and irrefutably unbiased interpretation of my Fit For Duty Psychological Exam results in Dr. Forman’s questionable care. Moreover, my vital employment wherewithal depends on the strict accuracy and reliability of the Fit For Duty Psychological Exam, which Dr. Forman administered with suspect. Naturally, due to the immensely inappropriate conditions in which I was unfairly subjected to take the required Fit For Duty Psychological Exam, which in and of it self [sic] in part of a terribly stressful 400-question test, I am certainly poised to vigorously challenge the exam results. As such, I respectfully request that you immediately abrogate Dr. Forman’s exam results and allow me a fair opportunity to select a professional and competent psychologist to properly administer the Fit For Duty Psychological Exam. Pursuant to the School Board's Policy 4004, Respondent was entitled to seek a second opinion by being evaluated by a separate School Board approved psychologist of his choosing, but at Respondent’s expense. Respondent chose psychologist Steven Shiendling, Ph.D., for the second opinion. Dr. Shiendling met with Respondent on March 14 and 15, 2005. His evaluation consisted of face-to-face interviews lasting a total of 2.5 hours. Dr. Shiendling did not administer any standardized testing in his evaluation. Dr. Shiendling found that Respondent was fit for duty. In accordance with Policy 4004, Dr. Hohnecker was selected to provide the third evaluation of Respondent (with Dr. Forman and Dr. Shiendling having provided the first two evaluations) at Petitioner’s expense. This evaluation occurred April 1, 2005. Dr. Hohnecker’s thorough report (Petitioner’s Exhibit 36) and her testimony at the formal hearing established that Respondent was not fit for duty as of the date of the evaluation "by reason of inappropriate outbursts of anger and intense anxiety." As of April 1, 2005, Respondent was not fit for duty as a classroom teacher. Dr. Hohnecker made recommendations that, if satisfied, would warrant Respondent’s return to work. Dr. Hohnecker further recommended that Respondent not be returned to Piper High School, which Respondent still wanted to do, until the students involved in the September 2003 incident had graduated. Respondent was, again, recommended to the Employee Assistance Program and advised to follow up with Dr. Forman. On April 20, 2005, John P. Molinari, a psychotherapist who worked with Respondent through Petitioner’s EAP, sent the following letter to Michelle Moore of Petitioner’s EAP: I met with Mr. Clinton Black today as part of our ongoing treatment. Mr. Black appears much less anxious with a high degree of motivation to return to work. In view of this, I recommend that Mr. Black return to Dr. Forman to be reevaluated for his fit for duty status. Mr. Mijon advised Respondent to report to Dr. Forman on May 12, 2005, for his reevaluation. Respondent objected to returning to Dr. Forman. On April 28, 2005, Mr. Mijon informed Respondent that he would be guilty of insubordination if he did not keep the appointment with Dr. Forman. Dr. Forman was selected to provide the reevaluation pursuant to the Policy 4004 procedures. Between Dr. Forman’s initial evaluation of Respondent and his reevaluation, Mr. Mijon told Dr. Forman that Respondent had lodged complaints about the manner in which the initial evaluation had been conducted. Mr. Mijon told Dr. Forman that Respondent considered the initial evaluation to have been unprofessional and invalid. Mr. Mijon did not go into the specifics of Respondent’s complaints. Mr. Mijon had also told Dr. Melita about the complaints Respondent had as to Dr. Forman’s initial evaluation. At some undetermined point, Respondent lodged complaints against Dr. Forman with the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Florida Department of Health, Board of Psychology (DOH). On May 4, 2005, Respondent hand delivered the following letter to Mr. Mijon with copies to Dr. Till, Dr. Melita, and Michelle Moore: Due to the egregious harassment and verbal abuse Dr. Bruce Forman wrongfully inflicted upon me during my initial fit for duty session, I respectfully urge you to immediately rescind your intimidating treat [sic] to terminate me should I not report to Dr. Forman, due to my resulting genuine fear and discomfort, for the second appointment you have scheduled for me on May 12, 2005. As I previously formally documented to you, Dr. Joe Melita, Mr. Charles Rawls and Ms. Michelle Moore via letter, I factually suffered excruciating and debilitating harassment and verbal abuse while under the care of Dr. Bruce Forman during my initial fit for duty assessment on December 15, 2004. However, my authentic complaint was apparently inappropriately ignored. Furthermore, due to the fact that I have appropriately filed two investigative complaints against Dr. Forman for the abject harassment and verbal abuse he inflicted upon me during my initial fit for duty exam, it clearly would be overwhelmingly inappropriate for me to return to Dr. Forman for a second fit for duty assessment under these brutal circumstances Dr. Forman has inappropriately forced upon me. Naturally, I feel extremely afraid and uncomfortable returning to Dr. Forman for a second fit for duty assessment under his inappropriate care and thus would be incapable of relaxing and focusing for proper testing as I rightfully deserve and should have the fair and equal opportunity to do so during a valid fit for duty exam. Therefore, I unambiguously urge you to withdraw at once your intimidating treat [sic] to terminate me and cancel your scheduled May 12, 2005 appointment for me with Dr. Forman due to the exceptionally grave harassment and verbal abuse Dr. Forman wrongfully inflicted upon me. Mr. Mijon ordered Respondent to be reevaluated by Dr. Forman because he believed that paragraph 12 of the Policy 4004 procedures provided no other option than to require Respondent to be re-evaluated by the same psychologist (Dr. Forman) who performed the initial evaluation. Dr. Melita interprets paragraph 12 more liberally than Mr. Mijon. Dr. Melita testified beginning at page 47 of Volume I of the Transcript as follows: Q. Were you made aware that Mr. Mijon was sending Mr. Black back to see Dr. Forman for re-evaluation? A. Yes. If I remember correctly, because I asked why, from what I understand it was that Mr. Black said it was okay. Q. Now, did you understand that Mr. Black initially refused to go back to see Dr. Forman? Were you made aware of that? A. Yes. Q. Were you aware that Mr. Mijon then told him that if he did not go back to see Dr. Forman that he would be terminated for insubordination? A. That’s not what I was aware of, because I questioned why he was going back to Forman if there was an issue. According to what I believe to be what Mr. Mijon told me was that that was Mr. Black’s decision. Q. So you think it was Mr. Black’s decision to go back to see Dr. Forman? A. Yes, as odd as I thought it was. Q. So if Mr. Black had, in fact, had some problem with Dr. Forman, from your perspective, he should have gone to see a different doctor other than Dr. Forman, correct? A. Yes. If I remember correctly, my normal process is, Why would he go back to somebody who he has an issue with? Mr. Mijon’s response, if I remember correctly, was that Mr. Black said he had no problems going back to Mr. Forman. That’s the best of recollection. Q. So if Mr. Mijon, in fact, threatened Mr. Black with termination if he refused to go back to see Dr. Forman, that would not be consistent with your view of what should happen? A. That’s absolutely correct. I would not like to see anybody threatened. Dr. Forman was unaware of the complaints Respondent had lodged with the APA or the DOH until after Petitioner took action to terminate Respondent’s employment. Consequently, these complaints had no influence on the report Dr. Forman filed following his May 12, 2005, evaluation of the Respondent.3 Respondent agreed, under protest, to be reevaluated by Dr. Forman, but only on the condition that Dr. Forman would allow him to record the session. Dr. Forman agreed to have the session recorded on the condition that Respondent would provide Petitioner with a copy of the taped session. Respondent agreed to that condition. Respondent recorded the reevaluation session of May 12, 2005. Despite numerous requests, no tape was ever provided. Respondent testified that the tape was destroyed during Hurricane Wilma, which, according to the National Hurricane website, hit South Florida in October 2005. Dr. Forman testified at the hearing as to both the evaluation and the reevaluation. Reports as to his evaluation and his reevaluation were admitted into evidence. Dr. Forman again found that Respondent was not fit for duty on his reevaluation. The undersigned finds Dr. Forman’s testimony to be clear, professional, and persuasive. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the complaints Respondent lodged against Dr. Forman to Mr. Mijon had any bearing on Dr. Forman’s reevaluation. There was also insufficient evidence to establish that Dr. Forman should have been disqualified from providing the reevaluation. Dr. Forman’s Reevaluation Report (Petitioner’s Exhibit 43), provides, in relevant part, a recap of Dr. Forman’s findings as follows: . . . As I expressed to you by phone, Mr. Black appears to have deteriorated emotionally over the past five months and I am concerned that Mr. Black may be acutely psychotic. I can say unequivocally that Mr. Black is not ready to return to the classroom at this time. He was not fit to return to teaching duties the first time I evaluated him and given that his current emotional state is worsened, he is less able to function in an instructional capacity. I also believe an effort should be made to get Mr. Black psychiatric care as I am concerned about his wellbeing. . . . Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was not fit for duty as a classroom teacher as of May 12, 2005. On June 10, 2005, Respondent was notified that he would be recommended for termination from employment based on the finding that he was not fit for duty as a teacher. At its June 21, 2005 meeting, the School Board voted to terminate Respondent's employment pursuant to Policy 4004. The action to terminate Respondent’s employment was part of the consent agenda.4 In accordance with paragraph 12 of Policy 4004 procedures, Respondent could have requested a second opinion, following the reevaluation by Dr. Forman. Respondent did not request another evaluation. He no longer trusted the process, and stated that he could not obtain another evaluation for financial reasons. Subsequent to the School Board’s vote in June 2005, Respondent went off of the School Board approved list, looked in the yellow pages, and retained some other therapists, psychologists and/or psychiatrists to perform evaluations. Those subsequent evaluations were not offered into evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order terminate Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Donald A. Moyant, Petitioner, operates a contractors' exam school in Brandon, Florida, at which he preps builders to take the CILB exam for licensure as contractors. Petitioner took the exam given in June 1985 and received a score of 58.60. A score of 70.00 is required to pass this examination. The only answer that Petitioner questions is the answer he supplied to question No. 2, which related to the number of reinforcing bars required in a concrete slab of given dimensions and spacings of the bars. In Petitioner's solution to the problem he dropped the fractional bar that resulted from dividing the length of the slab by the spacing between bars. The correct solution requires the addition of a bar for this fractional spare. Petitioner's purpose in pursuing this proceeding is to obtain information to use in his Contractors Exam School, Inc. Since he would not have passed the examination even if his solution to question No. 2 had been marked correct, Petitioner is without standing to bring this action because he is doing so on behalf of the school he runs and not to allow him to receive a passing grade.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a longtime Florida resident, having moved to the state when she was five, and thereafter was reared and educated in Dade County Florida. Petitioner received an AA degree from Dade County Junior College, a BA from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida, and a Masters Degree from Lone Mountain College in San Francisco, California via an external program based in the Miami/Dade area. In pursuit of a Ph.D. in psychology, Petitioner applied to Union was accepted and matriculated there from 1981 through 1953, and received her Ph.D. in psychology on June 29, 1953. Upon receipt of her Ph.D. degree in psychology, Petitioner was required to fulfill a one-year post-doctoral supervision prior to applying for certification to take the psychology licensure examination. Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1953). Petitioner satisfied this requirement from June 30, 1953 to June 30, 1954 by engaging in psychotherapy under the supervision of Dr. Ted Aidman. Petitioner then applied to the Board for certification to take the psychologist licensure examination. Petitioner applied to take the examination under the provisions of Section 490.OO5(1), Florida Statutes (1953) and in pertinent part is quoted below: Any person desiring to be licensed as a psychologist shall apply to the department to take the licensure examination. The department shall license each applicant who the board certifies has: * * * (b) Submitted proof satisfactory to the Board that he has received a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or that he has received a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to the standards of training of those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association or the doctoral psychology programs of the state universities. The Board adopted Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code, to implement Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1983) and essentially codified the criteria for American Psychological Association (APA) approved programs for the first time in this rule. The rule took effect on April 5, 1984. The pertinent part of the rule is quoted below: In order to be certified by the Board as eligible for examination pursuant to Section 490.005(1), Florida Statutes, an applicant must: * * * Submit proof of the completion of a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association. For the purpose of determining whether an applicant's doctoral degree in psychology was received from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association the Board will apply the following criteria: (emphasis supplied) Education and training in psychology must have been received in an institution of higher education accredited by one of the regional accrediting bodies recognized by the Counsel on Postsecondary Accreditation. * * * 5. The doctoral program must be an organized, integrated sequence of study designed by the psychology faculty responsible for the program. The American Psychological Association Accreditation Handbook, Criteria For Accreditation of Doctoral Training Program and Internship in Professional Psychology (Handbook), adopted in January 1979 and amended in January 1950, sets out criteria that the doctoral programs must meet to be eligible for accreditation by APA and in pertinent part are listed below: A. Training in professional psychology is doctoral training offered in an institution of higher education accredited by one of the six regional accrediting bodies recognized by the Council of Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA). * * * The faculty of the program must have clear authority and primary responsibility for all aspects of the program (even if the program cuts across institutional administrative lines). The program must include an integrated, organized plan of study and must ensure a breadth of exposure to the field of psychology. In the Introduction of A Handbook of Accreditation (Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 1) accreditation is defined as both a process and a result and in pertinent part is quoted below: As a process, it is a form of peer review in which educational institutions establish a set of criteria and procedures by which they and their fellows are judged. As a result, it is a form of certification by which the qualify of an educational institution, as defined by the accrediting body's criteria, is affirmed. The forms of Affiliations are discussed in A Handbook of Accreditation and in pertinent part quoted below: Postsecondary educational institutions may be affiliated with the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, and through it with the Association, in either two ways. One is membership, which is synonymous with accreditation; the other is candidacy, a preaccreditation status. [page 3] . . . an institution continues its candidacy for accreditation for a fixed period of time - usually no longer than six years - until it either fulfills the Criteria for Accreditation or has its affiliation with the Commission terminated. [page 3] . . . Candidacy indicates that an institution meets the Criteria for Candidacy for Accreditation and is progressing toward accreditation; it does not, however, auto- matically assure eventual accreditation . . . [page 3, 4] The North Central Association of Colleges and Schools' evaluative criteria for candidacy highlight that such standards differ from accreditation standards. A Handbook of Accreditation explains the second evaluation criteria as follows: This criteria differs from the second evaluative criterion for accreditation in that it speaks of a candidate's accomplishing its immediate purposes. The difference is meant to acknowledge that a candidate is not yet fully developed to the point at which it has the ability to accomplish all of its purposes. [page 19] The fourth criteria for candidacy status indicates that candidacy status is not equivalent to accreditation. The fourth evaluative criteria reads in pertinent part: 4. The institution has the potential to achieve accreditation within the candidacy period. In making this judgment, the candidate's present condition, its plans and its timetable for developing to the point where it meets the Criteria for Accreditation must be examined. Candidacy is of a limited duration, and the Commission seeks to determine through this criterion that the candidates current plans are likely to allow it to achieve accreditation within this limited period. [page 20] Union received formal accreditation on February 25, 1985 by the North Central Association for Colleges and Schools, Commission on Institution of Higher Education ("Commission"), a regional accrediting body recognized by the Counsel on Postsecondary Accreditation. During Petitioner's matriculation at Union, and at the time she graduated, Union was in a candidacy status or a preaccreditation status. Union was in candidacy status from 1979 to 1985, a period of six (6) years which is considered the maximum period without special Commission action for extension. Union had to satisfy all thirteen (13) general institutional requirements and all four (4) evaluative criteria to be granted candidacy status. To achieve accreditation, Union had to sustain and maintain the same thirteen (13) institutional requirements and satisfy a similar, but different group of four (4) evaluative criteria. The same general institutional requirements and basically the same evaluative criteria are required for both candidacy status and accreditation but candidacy and accreditation are not the same. In candidacy status the institution is trying to assure the Commission of its ability, financial and otherwise to maintain a viable program. In accreditation the certification has been affirmed. No evidence was presented to show that APA, in its approval process, would substitute candidacy status for accreditation status. In fact the evidence was conclusive that regional accreditation was an important standard and a reasonable criterion in the evaluation and approval of psychology programs by the APA. The evidence is clear that the accreditation requirement of the rule in question is comparable to the requirement of regional accreditation by APA in its approval process. To demonstrate that a program is able to produce qualified health professionals the APA requires that a program must articulate what the program is and what that program requires. A pertinent section in the Handbook under Training Models and Curricula, page 5, is quoted below: C. The foundation of professional practice in psychology is the evolving body of know- ledge in the discipline of psychology. While programs will vary in emphasis and in available resources, sound graduate education in general psychology is therefore essential in any program. The curriculum shall encompass the equivalent of a minimum of three academic years of full-time resident graduate study. Instruction in scientific and professional ethics and standards, research design and methodology, statistics, psychological measurement, and history and systems of psychology must be included in every doctoral program in professional psychology. . . (emphasis supplied) The requirement of a sequenced course of study is an important and essential criteria of the APA in the training of a psychologist. The evidence is clear that the requirements of Rule 21U- 11.06(1)(b)5., Florida Administrative Code, are comparable to the standards for APA approval of a doctoral program with regard to the design of study by the faculty even though the language "sequence of study" does not appear in the APA standards. Dr. Charles A. Brownfield graduated from Union, Antioch College receiving his Ph.D. in psychology on October 1, 1971 and was licensed by the Florida State Board of Examiners in 1973 under a statute with language similar to that of Section 490.005(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). The evidence is insufficient to show that APA was approving doctoral psychology programs in 1971 or, if it was, whether the standards used at that time were the same as those standards adopted by APA in 1979 and amended in 1980. The statute under which Dr. Brownfield was licensed was repealed, effective July 1, 1979, by Chapter 77-457, Section 1, Laws of Florida and he was then licensed by exception under the new statute in 1982. The evidence is insufficient to show that any person graduating from Union between 1979 when APA adopted its standards for approving doctoral psychology programs and the effective date of the rule on April 5, 1984 was permitted by the Board to take the examination for licensure.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds, and at all relevant times, held a valid Florida Educator’s Certificate. Respondent is and, at all relevant times, was a fifth- grade teacher at Avon Park Elementary School in Highlands County. Respondent has been an elementary school teacher for 19 years. She taught fourth and fifth grade at Zolfo Springs Elementary School in Hardee County from 1986 through the end of the 2000-01 school year. She started teaching at Avon Park Elementary School at the beginning of the 2001-02 school year. Respondent is currently on a year-to-year contract. Her contract was renewed for the 2003-04 and 2004-05 school years notwithstanding the allegations in this case, which occurred during the 2002-03 school year. Respondent has not had any disciplinary problems over the course of her career, and other than the allegations in this case, she has never been accused of any unethical or unprofessional conduct. Respondent has always received good annual performance evaluations. Respondent’s most recent performance evaluations - - for the 2002-03 and 2003-04 school years –- state that she “meets or exceeds expectations” in all categories, including the category that assesses whether Respondent “act[s] in a professional and ethical manner and adhere[s] to the Code and Principles of Professional Conduct.” Consistent with the information in Respondent’s annual performance evaluations, the principal at Avon Park Elementary School, who is Respondent’s current supervisor, testified that Respondent “does a good job” as a teacher and that she values Respondent quite highly as a teacher; the former principal at Zolfo Springs Elementary School, who was Respondent’s supervisor for approximately five of the years that Respondent taught at that school, testified that Respondent’s reputation for complying with the code of ethics is “excellent” and that Respondent always “monitored and cherished” her professionalism; one of Respondent’s co-workers at Avon Park Elementary School testified that Respondent is “a very effective and professional teacher”; and the students who testified at the hearing characterized Respondent as a good teacher. Respondent has administered the FCAT to her students since the test’s inception in the 1990s, and as a result, she is very familiar with what teachers can and cannot do when administering the test. Respondent and other teachers at Avon Park Elementary School received training on the administration of the 2003 FCAT, and as part of the training, Respondent received a copy of the Test Administration Manual for the 2003 FCAT. The Test Administration Manual is published by the state Department of Education (Department) and is distributed to teachers by the testing coordinators at each school. The school-level testing coordinators report to a testing coordinator at the school district level, who is ultimately responsible for the administration of the FCAT to the district’s students. The Test Administration Manual summarizes the “dos and don’ts” of test administration for the FCAT. It also includes a copy of the statute and rule governing test security, which for the 2003 FCAT were Section 228.301, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.042. On the issue of test security, the Test Administration Manual explains that: it is not appropriate to talk with [students] about any test item or to help them answer any test item. For example, if students finish the test before the allotted time for the session has elapsed, or have not attempted to complete a question, it would be appropriate to encourage them to go back and check their work. It is not acceptable to provide the students with any information that would allow them to infer the correct answer, such as suggesting that they might want to check their work on a specific question. (Emphasis in original). The FCAT is required by state law to be administered annually to public school students in the third through tenth grades to measure the students’ proficiency in reading, writing, science, and math. The FCAT measures the students’ performance against state standards. The Norm Referenced Test (NRT), which is administered in conjunction with the FCAT, measures the students’ performance in math and reading against national standards. The FCAT is an important test, both to students and the schools. The student’s promotion to the next grade and/or class placement is affected to some degree by his or her performance on the FCAT. The school’s grade, which has an impact on the funding that the school district receives from the state, is also affected to some degree by the students’ performance on the FCAT. The math and reading portions of the 2003 FCAT were administered to fifth graders on Monday through Wednesday, March 3-5, 2003. The science portion of the FCAT and the NRT were administered the following week, on Monday through Wednesday, March 10-12, 2003. Throughout the 2002-03 school year, Respondent “taught the FCAT” and gave her class practice FCAT questions. She used the questions as teaching tools and to help prepare her students for the actual FCAT. Respondent would sometimes explain the wording of the practice questions to her students and, as needed, she would provide the students other assistance, both individually and as a class, while they were working on the practice questions. On Friday, February 28, 2003, Respondent administered two practice tests to her students in which she tried to simulate the environment in which the students would be taking the actual FCAT the following week. For example, the tests were timed and Respondent walked around the room as she proctored the tests. Respondent helped the students during the practice tests as she had done with the practice questions administered throughout the year. At one point, she stopped the test and reviewed a math problem on the board with the class because she observed a number of students having problems with a particular question. Respondent administered the math and reading portions of the actual FCAT to 18 students in her homeroom class on March 3-5, 2003. None of those students were exceptional education students who were entitled to special accommodations. Respondent did a 15 to 20 minute “mini-review” each morning that the students were taking the actual FCAT during which she went over terminology and concepts that the students might see on the test that day. Respondent started the administration of the actual FCAT by reading the directions verbatim from the “scripts” in the Test Administration Manual. Once the students began taking the test, she monitored them from her desk and she also walked around the room on a periodic basis. Respondent also went to students’ desks when they raised their hands. The Test Administration Manual contemplates that students might raise their hands and ask questions during the test; indeed, the “scripts” that the teacher is required to read verbatim state more than once, “Please raise your hand if you have any questions.” Respondent denied giving the students any assistance in answering the test questions on the actual FCAT. According to Respondent, when a student asked her about a particular test question, she told the student that “I can’t help you,” “go back and re-read the directions,” “do the best you can,” or other words to that effect. The Department’s testing coordinator, Victoria Ash, testified that responses such as those are acceptable. Respondent also made a general statement to the class during the test reminding the students to go back and check their work if they finished the test before the allotted time expired. Ms. Ash testified that a general reminder such as that is “absolutely acceptable.” Respondent’s testimony was corroborated by student J.M., who credibly testified that he recalled more than once hearing Respondent tell other students that she could not help them during the actual FCAT. Several students testified that Respondent helped them during the actual FCAT by explaining words that they did not understand, explaining how to solve math problems, and/or by suggesting that they check their work on particular problems. That testimony was not persuasive because it lacked specificity and precision, and other than A.P., B.B. (boy), and K.J., the students testified that they were not certain that the help they remembered receiving was on the actual FCAT rather than on the practice tests that they were given by Respondent. With respect to B.B. (boy), the undersigned did not find his testimony persuasive because he also testified that Respondent helped the entire class with a math problem during the actual test, which contradicted the statements given by the other students and which suggests that he was recalling events from the practice test during which Respondent gave such help to the entire class. With respect to A.P. and K.J., the undersigned did not find them to be particularly credible witnesses based upon their demeanors while testifying. There were other inconsistencies in the students’ accounts of Respondent’s administration of the FCAT that make their testimony generally unpersuasive. For example, B.B. (girl) testified that Respondent played classical music during the actual test, which was not corroborated by any other student in the class and was contradicted by Respondent’s credible testimony that she played music during the practice tests to relax the students but that she and the other fifth-grade teachers at Avon Park Elementary School made a conscious decision not to play music during the actual FCAT. As a result of the students’ apparent confusion regarding events occurring during practice tests rather than the actual FCAT, the inconsistencies in the students’ accounts of the events during the administration of the test, the general lack of specificity and precision in the students’ accounts of the events, and Respondent’s credible denial of any wrongdoing, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish the truth of the allegations against Respondent. In making the foregoing finding, due consideration was given to the investigation undertaken by the district-level testing coordinator, Rebecca Fleck, at the time of the allegations against Respondent, and the materials generated through that investigation. The reason for the investigation was a phone call that Ms. Fleck received on Wednesday, March 5, 2003, from a Department employee who told Ms. Fleck that the Department had received an anonymous complaint about Respondent’s administration of the FCAT. Ms. Fleck went to Avon Park Elementary School on Friday, March 7, 2003, to investigate the complaint. On that date, she met with the school’s assistant principal and interviewed several of the students in Respondent’s class. She also spoke briefly with Respondent to “get her side of the story,” which consistent with her testimony at the hearing, was an unequivocal denial of any wrongdoing. Ms. Fleck decided, based upon the student interviews, that Respondent should not administer the science portion of the FCAT or the NRT the following week. As a result, Respondent was assigned to work at the school district office on March 10-12, 2003, while her students were taking the tests on those dates. Ms. Fleck also decided to interview and get statements from all of the students in Respondent’s class, which she did on the following Monday and Tuesday, March 10 and 11, 2003. On those days, the students were called to the principal’s office in groups of two or three and they were asked to fill out a questionnaire developed by Ms. Fleck. Pam Burnaham, the principal of Avon Park Elementary School, and Ms. Fleck supervised the students while they filled out the questionnaires. The students were not told that Ms. Fleck was investigating alleged wrongdoing by Respondent; they were told that the purpose of the questionnaire was to find out about their “FCAT experience.” Ms. Fleck testified that she was confident that the students understood that the questionnaire related only to the actual FCAT and not any of the practice tests administered by Respondent; however, Ms. Burnaham testified that she did not place any emphasis on the distinction, and as noted above, the students’ testimony at the hearing indicates that they may have been confused on this issue. Ms. Fleck concluded based upon the students’ responses on the questionnaires that Respondent “coached” the students during the administration of the actual FCAT. As a result, she invalidated the tests of all 18 students in Respondent’s class. Ms. Fleck’s decision to invalidate the students’ tests was not unreasonable based upon what she was told by the students, which she believed to be true; however, the invalidation of the tests is not sufficient in and of itself to impose discipline on Respondent because, as discussed above, the truth of the students’ allegations was not clearly and convincingly proven at the hearing. Several of the students gave written statements to a Department investigator in late May 2003 regarding the help that they recalled being given by Respondent on the FCAT. No weight is given to those statements because no credible evidence was presented regarding the circumstances under which the statements were made, the statements were made several months after the events described in the statements, and as was the case with the questionnaires the students filled out for Ms. Fleck, the undersigned is not persuaded that the students understood at the time they were giving the statements that they were describing events that occurred during the actual FCAT rather than the practice tests that they were given by Respondent. There is no persuasive evidence that any of the students in Respondent’s class whose tests were invalidated suffered any adverse educational consequences. Even though the school administrators did not have the benefit of the students’ FCAT scores for purposes of placement and/or developing a remediation plan, they had other information on which they could make those decisions, including the students’ scores on the NRT, which was administered the week after the FCAT and was not invalidated. Other than being reassigned to the school district office during the administration of the NRT, Respondent did not suffer any adverse employment consequences from the school district as a result of the students’ allegations and/or the invalidation of the students’ tests. To the contrary, Respondent continued to get good performance reviews and her contract has been renewed twice since the administration of the 2003 FCAT. Respondent did not administer the 2004 FCAT because this case was still pending. She was given other duties at Avon Park Elementary School while her students were taking the 2004 FCAT.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent is qualified to hold a certificate as a correctional officer in the State of Florida, by failure to successfully complete the required training, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on January 29, 1993, as a corrections officer, and was issued Certification Number 141634. On August 17, 1992 the Respondent signed up for and attended orientation for the Public Safety Recruit/Corrections course conducted by the Lake County Area Vo-Tech Center in Eustis, Florida. The contents of the Public Safety Recruit Manual was explained to the class and Respondent received a copy of the manual. The academic grading policy in the manual provides that the minimum passing grade that a student must achieve on each exam is a score of 75 percent. A student may fail only one exam and still remain in good standing at the academy. Respondent signed a Student Acknowledgment of School of Public Safety Requirements and Rules of Conduct. He acknowledged that he had read and understood them and agreed to comply with the standards. Respondent failed the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission defensive tactics practical examination with a score of 66. On October 27, 1992, Respondent was notified orally and in a written memorandum from the program coordinator that he had failed the examination. However, he was given until July 29, 1993 to remediate and requalify. Respondent did not take any steps to requalify in this area. On November 10, 1992, Respondent failed Block Test 1 with a score of 59. On November 13, 1992, Respondent was notified orally and in writing of his second examination failure. He was then advised that in accordance with the Master Plan of Instruction and the grading policy of the school that he was terminated from the program. Respondent's final grade for the Public Safety Program was listed as an Incomplete. Respondent was advised that he would be required to retake the entire recruit program in order for him to receive certification. A CJSTC 67 Training Report Form was completed by the Lake County Area Vo-Tech Center for the Public Safety Recruit/Corrections course sequence number 15-92-502-02 and was forwarded to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Standards and Training in Tallahassee. The Training Report form reflects that forty-six recruits attended the course. Thirty-nine were listed as having passed and seven were listed as failed or incomplete. Respondent was listed as having failed the program. The Training Report for Respondent's class was received by the Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Standards and Training on April 12,1993. Due to a programmer's error, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Standards and Training's Automated Training Management System (ATMS) computer system automatically generates a certificate and certificate number when an individual who is employed is entered into the system regardless of the grade achieved. The procedure in place at the time required a Department employee to visually scan the certificates being generated and remove the ones for those persons who had failed or did not complete the program. Respondent was employed at the time his name was entered into the ATMS. The ATMS generated a certificate with Respondent's name on it, Certificate Number 141634. Respondent was certified as a corrections officer as of January 29, 1993 and the certificate was forwarded to him. Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission in error and the certification should be revoked.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent has failed to complete a commission-approved basic recruit training program, as required by Subsection 943.13(9), Florida Statutes (1993), and that Respondent's certification must be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1 - 17 Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Karen Simmons, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John Dubose 242 West 6th Street Apopka, Florida 32702
