The Issue Whether Respondent, a corrections officer, has failed to maintain the qualification to have good moral character, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 19, 1993, as a Corrections Officer, Certification Number 136191. Respondent’s certification is active. At all times relevant, the Respondent was employed as a corrections officer with the Central Florida Reception Center. On November 5, 1994, Karen Mills was employed as a law enforcement officer with the Seminole County Sheriff’s office. At the time of the event, Officer Mills had been working under cover for five years with the City/County Investigative Bureau. Officer Mills was working undercover at one o’clock on a Saturday morning posing as a prostitute on the sidewalk and parking lot located at State Road 427 and Pomosa in Sanford, Florida. On November 5, 1994, Mills approached a black male driving a Toyota car, later identified as the Respondent, Travis Long, when he stopped for a traffic light at the corner of State Road 427 and Pomosa. After idle conversation, the Respondent asked what she was doing. She advised that she was trying to make some money. He asked her if she would “take it up the ass?” She took that to mean that he wanted anal intercourse. Mills said yes and asked him how much money he was willing to pay. Respondent said $25.00. Mills said she wanted $40.00. Respondent agreed but stated that he would have to go get the money from an ATM and also that he wanted to get something to eat. He asked Mills if she wanted to go with him to get something to eat. Mills declined. Mills did not immediately arrest Respondent because she wanted to see the money to confirm that he was there to buy sex. Respondent left the area and returned 20 minutes later. Upon his return, Respondent asked Mills if she was a cop and asked her to pull up her shirt to prove that she was not carrying a recording device (a wire). Mills asked Respondent if he was a cop. He said no, and ultimately exposed his penis as a way to prove it to her. Mills asked Respondent to show her the money and kept encouraging him to do so, by saying, “You ain’t gonna pay me . . . You ain’t got no money. I just want to be sure I’m gonna get paid.” Respondent finally showed Mills the money and mouthed, without speaking, “I will pay you.” As soon as she saw the money, Mills, who was wearing a wire, gave the predetermined code. Respondent began to pull away in his vehicle but other officers pulled him over and arrested him. Respondent plead Nolo Contendere to the charge of Lewd and Lascivious Behavior, a second degree misdemeanor, in the County Court for Seminole County, Florida, on January 5, 1995. Respondent was adjudicated guilty, and a $100 fine was imposed. Respondent’s testimony that, although he conducted himself as above stated, he did not have the intent to solicit for prostitution on the night of November 5, 1994, is not credible. Respondent was an energetic, hard-working individual. Respondent had no prior criminal or employment discipline problems prior to this incident. Respondent has continued in his current position as a corrections officer in the three years since the incident and has received above-average ratings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993). Respondent's certification be SUSPENDED for a period of six months and that the Commission impose such conditions on his reinstatement as it deems reasonable and necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy Bardill, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, William E. Ford, Jr., was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on May 20, 1976, and was issued Certificate Number 02-16845. After Harry L. Harper, a felony prosecutor in the office of the State Attorney for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, had known respondent, who worked as a deputy in the Bay County Sheriff's office, for about a year, it fell to him to draw and sign the information charging respondent and his wife Barbara with conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The jury who heard the case found respondent Ford guilty of conspiracy to deliver cocaine. On April 18, 1986, after the jury returned its verdict, the Honorable Don T. Sirmons entered an order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing respondent on probation on conditions which included 60 days in jail. State v. Ford No. 85- 1938 AG (14th Cir.1986). Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1.
The Issue The issue presented here concerns the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to be granted certification as a law enforcement officer under the provisions of Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 11B-16, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the matter to be determined deals with the propriety of the denial of certification in the face of an arrest and conviction of Petitioner for a felony offense, which allegedly would cause the Petitioner to be rejected as an applicant for certification. The denial of licensure is purportedly in keeping with the dictates of Subsection 943.13(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner had made application to be certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, in keeping with the terms and conditions of Subsection 943.13, Florida Statutes. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has completed all administrative requirements for such licensure; however, he has been denied licensure based upon his arrest, a finding of guilt and judgment and sentence related to a charge of conspiracy to transport a stolen vehicle in Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce from New York, New York, to Miami, Florida, and from Miami, Florida, to Havana, Cuba, knowing that the motor vehicle had been stolen. This offense related to Title XVIII, Sections 2312 and 2371, U.S.C., in an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 8519-M-CR. For these matters the Petitioner was imprisoned for a period of two (2) years on two (2) counts of the indictment, Counts 3 and 6. The sentence in those counts was to run concurrently. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has had his civil rights restored in the State of Florida, together with his rights to own, possess and use a firearm. Federal firearms disability arising from the felony conviction have also been set aside. See Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 3, respectively, admitted into evidence.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO or Petitioner) properly terminated Christopher Hamilton (Respondent) from his employment as a deputy sheriff for engaging in conduct prohibited in Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulations 3.4(d) and 5.21, and General Order Section 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for providing law enforcement and corrections in Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to these cases, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff. Respondent does not dispute that his conduct violated Petitioner’s rules and regulations. Respondent alleges that the penalty of termination is excessive, inconsistent with the progressive discipline policy, and, therefore, disparate. General Order 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.4(d), relates to “Performance of Duty.” The cited provisions require that “All members will be efficient and effective in their assigned duties, performing them in a competent, proficient and capable manner.” For convenience, the cited provisions are referred to as Rule 3.4(d). The evidence shows that from March 2004 through August 8, 2008, Respondent demonstrated a pattern and practice of violating Rule 3.4(d). The individual violations are undisputed, and it is undisputed that the violations arose from Respondent’s inability to complete required reports, to do so in a timely manner, and to be punctual in attendance. It is also undisputed that the violations arose from events in Respondent’s personal life, which included a divorce and custody battle that precipitated a financial crisis for Respondent and the death of Respondent’s father. Finally, Respondent acknowledged during cross-examination that Petitioner attempted to “work with” Respondent during his personal crises. Petitioner first disciplined Respondent for violating Rule 3.4(d) in March 2004. In January 2005, Petitioner issued a formal reprimand for a second violation. Petitioner issued a second formal reprimand for the third violation in February 2005. In May 2007, Petitioner issued a third formal reprimand for a fourth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On December 6, 2007, Petitioner issued a written reprimand to Respondent for a fifth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On April 10, 2008, Petitioner found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender, as defined hereinafter, and suspended Respondent for seven days for violation of Rule 3.4(d). In June of 2008, Respondent again violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to complete and submit reports within the required timeframe. Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d) on May 27, 2008, and again on June 24, 2008. Petitioner notified Respondent that he was required to attend a Vehicle Crash Review Board (VCRB) on May 27, 2008. However, Respondent failed to attend the VCRB. Petitioner re-scheduled the VCRB for June 24, 2008, and notified Respondent that he was required to attend that VCRB. Respondent failed to attend the VCRB on June 24, 2008. General Order 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17, relates to “Timeliness.” The cited provisions state that “Members shall not be late to work without valid reason or authorization,” The cited provisions are referred to for convenience as Rule 2.17. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work on February 28 and March 8, 2008. Petitioner disciplined Respondent for both offenses in a single written reprimand. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work again sometime between June 18 and July 2, 2008. On or about August 8, 2008, Respondent reported to work approximately 30 minutes late in violation of Rule 2.17, and this proceeding began. On September 11, 2008, Petitioner conducted an Administrative Review Board (ARB) meeting at which Respondent testified. The ARB concluded that Respondent had violated Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17 and found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender of both rules. General Order 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.21 (Rule 5.21), defines “Chronic Offender” as a member of the PCSO who violates the same rule or regulation three or more times within an 18-month period. Respondent is a Chronic Offender of Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17. Respondent violated each rule three or more times within an 18-month period. The progressive discipline policy treats Chronic Offender violations as a more severe “Level Five” violation. Petitioner has issued written guidelines that are followed during the disciplinary process and are contained within General Order 10-2. The goal of General Order 10-2 is to standardize the disciplinary process and make the process fair and consistent in application. Consistency is important to ensure fairness for the member being disciplined and for maintaining accountability throughout the agency. General Order 10-2 sets forth a procedure for assigning points for sustained violations based on their severity level. The points range from Level Five to Level One. Level Five violations result in the most serious discipline. The total of points to be assigned in these cases is determined by considering Respondent’s prior disciplinary record. Additional points are assigned for disciplinary violations within the recent past. Total disciplinary points are comprised of points for the current offense, plus carryover points for recent discipline against Respondent. The range of discipline that is appropriate in these cases is based upon the total number of disciplinary points accumulated. The highest or most severe discipline applies because Respondent accumulated more than 100 discipline points. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4823 is 108.3 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4824 is 116 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Termination of employment is reasonable in this proceeding. Termination of employment does not impose disparate discipline on Respondent. From 2005 through the date of the final hearing, nine members of the PCSO have been disciplined within the same discipline range as Respondent. Petitioner terminated the employment of seven of those nine members of the PCSO. Four of Respondent’s exhibits are excerpts of the case files of other PCSO members charged with violating Rule 5.21 as was Respondent. In each case, the alleged violation of the Level Five Chronic Offender rule was based upon repeated violations of Level Three rules. Respondent’s Exhibits 2 and 3 each show a member who violated the Level 3 rule, pertaining to abuse of sick leave a sufficient number of times to be considered a Chronic Offender in violation of Rule 5.21. In both cases, it was the member’s first Chronic Offender violation. Authorized discipline ranged from a suspension to termination of employment. In each case, the member received the minimum length of suspension, which is the minimum discipline in General Order 10-2. This is comparable to and consistent with the seven-day suspension Petitioner imposed against Respondent for his first violation of the Chronic Offender rule. The remaining proposed comparator introduced as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 relates to an agency member disciplined for being a Chronic Offender based on repeated violations of Rule 3.4(d). This was the member’s first violation as a Chronic Offender in Rule 5.21. Like Respondent’s seven-day suspension for his first offense as a Chronic Offender, the member in Respondent’s Exhibit 1 received a suspension corresponding to the bottom of the disciplinary range under the disciplinary policy. Prior to Respondent, no other agency member had been found to have violated the Chronic Offender rule a second time. However, Petitioner’s Exhibit 5 shows that subsequent to Respondent’s discipline, the member referenced by Respondent’s Exhibit 2 was disciplined for violating Rule 5.21 a second time. In similar fashion to Respondent, this member was disciplined as a Chronic Offender for the second time with respect to accumulated violations of the same Level Three rule as the first time he was found to be a Chronic Offender. Like Respondent, this member received the minimum suspension for the first violation of Rule 5.21 and was terminated for the second.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Afienko, Esquire Kenneth J. Afienko, P.A. 560 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Sherwood S. Coleman, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 James L. Bennett, County Attorney Office of County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Respondent, a teacher employed by Petitioner, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, which is a first degree felony pursuant to Section 825.103, Florida Statutes. At the same time, Respondent also entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit theft over $100.00, which is a first degree misdemeanor. In entering these pleas, Respondent advised the court, pursuant to Rule 3.172(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that she believed the pleas were in her best interest and that she was maintaining her innocence to the charges. The court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, adjudicated her guilty of petit theft, sentenced her to one day of time served, placed her on probation for 20 years, and required that she pay restitution to the Estate of Lillie Keller in the amount of $52,000.00. 1/ By letter dated October 21, 1997, Petitioner reassigned Respondent to a position with no direct contact with children pending the outcome of the criminal charges. Following an investigation, the superintendent of schools recommended to the school board that Respondent's employment be suspended without pay and terminated. On October 7, 1998, the school board voted to adopt that recommendation. The recommendation and the subsequent vote to adopt the recommendation were based on Respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person. Petitioner followed its procedural rules in investigating this matter and in voting to terminate Respondent's employment. As of October 7, 1998, Respondent held a professional services contract and had been employed by Petitioner for approximately 13 years as a teacher. Section 231.02(1), Florida Statutes, requires school board employees to be of good moral character. Respondent, as a teacher, is required by Section 231.02(2), Florida Statutes, to be fingerprinted and screened by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (v) Section 825.103, relating to exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult, if the offense was a felony. Petitioner's Rule 3.12, pertaining to criminal background checks of current and prospective employees, has been duly enacted and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: * * * b. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. * * * 3. A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Section M of the collective bargaining agreement between the Petitioner and the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers' Association provides for progressive discipline of covered employees such as Respondent. Section M provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 7. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With a Written Notation. . . . Written Reprimand. . . . Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay may be issued to an employee when appropriate, in keeping with the provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. ... Dismissal. An employee may be dismissed (employment contract terminated or non-renewed) when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, requires an employing agency, such as the Petitioner, to take the following action when an employee has failed to meet the requirements of Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes: The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, and if so, whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. Petitioner is a 38-year-old female who seeks to qualify for employment in a position of special trust with Success for All of Florida, Inc., a service provider regulated by the Agency. Because she wishes to work as a direct service provider, Petitioner was required to undergo a background screening. The results of that screening identified a history of criminal offenses, including a disqualifying offense in 2003. Accordingly, Petitioner filed a request for exemption from disqualification, which triggered the instant proceeding. In a letter dated July 27, 2015, the Agency's Director, Barbara Palmer, notified Petitioner that after reviewing all information that led to her disqualification, her exemption request was denied. The letter advised Petitioner that this decision was based upon Petitioner's failure to "submit clear and convincing evidence of [her] rehabilitation." Resp. Ex. C. Before Director Palmer made her decision, Petitioner's request for an exemption was reviewed by a Department of Children and Families screener who compiled a 34-page report entitled "Exemption Review" dated June 10, 2015. See Resp. Ex. B. The packet of information contains Petitioner’s Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, various criminal records, and two character references. The Exemption Review did not make a recommendation one way or the other, but simply compiled all relevant information that would assist the Director in making her decision. The report was first given to the Agency Regional Operations Manager in Orlando, who reviewed it and then made a preliminary recommendation to the Director. In 2003, Petitioner had a disqualifying offense, Grand Theft, a third-degree felony, which automatically disqualified her from employment in a position of special trust. Around the same time, she committed a second-degree misdemeanor, Trespassing in a Structure or Conveyance, a non-disqualifying offense. Both offenses occurred at a JC Penney store in Lakeland. Petitioner pled guilty to both offenses and was adjudicated guilty. For the felony conviction, she was placed on probation for 25 months, given credit for time served in jail, and ordered to pay various fines and costs. Petitioner was then 26 years old. Petitioner's account of her disqualifying offense differs in several respects from the account memorialized in the Lakeland Police Department reports and is inconsistent with her plea of guilty. In her Exemption Questionnaire, she stated that the criminal offense was actually committed by her younger sister and not her. She wrote that "I didn't tell on my sister because she was only 16 at the time so I took the charge for her." Resp. Ex. A, p. 3. This version of events was never presented to the court. At hearing, she also stated that she pled no contest to the crime, but court records indicate she pled guilty. In January 2004, while on probation for the Grand Theft charge, Petitioner violated her probation by committing a non- disqualifying offense and was sentenced to 60 days in jail. In November 2005, Petitioner violated her probation a second time by testing positive for cocaine during a probationary drug screening. The record is unclear if Petitioner served any jail time for this violation. In September 2012, or approximately three years ago, Petitioner committed the non-disqualifying offense of Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a first-degree misdemeanor. She pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation for 12 months, and ordered to pay various fines and costs. At hearing, Petitioner blamed her cousin for the arrest and stated that she was unaware her purse contained drug paraphernalia (a straw and cocaine residue), as she had not used cocaine since 2005. In any event, she stated that her drug of choice was previously ecstasy and not cocaine, and admitted that she had used that drug while working at Success for All in Florida, Inc., from 2001 until around 2005. Between 2006 and 2014, Petitioner was employed as a warehouse worker by Publix. Along with five other workers, she was terminated by Publix in 2014 for improperly accepting damaged merchandise from a co-worker. There is no record of any employment since that time. Petitioner blamed her criminal arrests on stress in her life, mainly due to a lack of family support and raising two children as a single parent, and being just "plain stupid" while she was young. She expressed remorse for her mistakes and now wishes to help others as a direct service provider. Three witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf. They described her as being a good worker, a caring individual, dependable, and very determined to improve her life. The Agency's rationale for denying the application is Petitioner's failure to take responsibility for her actions, that is, blaming her arrests on others, and a failure to provide a truthful and full account of the circumstances surrounding her disqualifying offense. The Agency also expressed concerns over Petitioner's lack of specificity regarding her criminal background, and the short period of time (three years) since her latest arrest, albeit for a non-disqualifying offense. Finally, the Agency noted that Petitioner has never had counseling, she lacks any specialized training, and there is no record of employment since being terminated by Publix more than a year ago.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. De La Paz, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) LaShae Thomas 3217 Julia Court Lakeland, Florida 33810-5510 Michael Sauve, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 430 Orlando, Florida 32801-1764 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
