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NICHOLAS J. SCHUR AND LISA S. SCHUR, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF NICHOLAS ERWIN SCHUR, DECEASED vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 00-005054N (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Dec. 13, 2000 Number: 00-005054N Latest Update: Jan. 17, 2003

The Issue Whether birth-related neurological injuries which result in death during the neonatal period2 are covered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan) and, if so, whether Nicholas Erwin Schur, a deceased minor, otherwise qualifies for coverage under the Plan. Whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve or, alternatively, must preliminarily resolve, whether there is "clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property" before a claimant may elect (under the provisions of Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes) to reject Plan coverage and pursue such a civil suit. What effect, if any, the claimants' settlement with the birthing hospital has on the availability of benefits under the Plan. Whether the participating physician's corporate employers have standing to participate in this proceeding.

Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Nicholas J. Schur and Lisa Schur, are the parents and natural guardians of Nicholas Erwin Schur (Nicholas), a deceased minor, and co-personal representatives of their deceased son's estate. Nicholas was born September 20, 1998, at Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches, Inc. (Baptist Medical Center), a hospital located in Jacksonville Beach, Duval County, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Nicholas died on September 24, 1998, during the neonatal period at Baptist Medical Center.4 The physician providing obstetrical services during Nicholas' birth was Marijane Q. Boyd, M.D., who was at all times material hereto a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, NICA has concluded, and the parties have stipulated, that Nicholas suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," as defined by the Plan. Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, NICA is of the view that, under the provisions of the Plan, the claim is compensable. NICA's conclusion is grossly consistent with the proof and is, therefore, approved.5 Notice of Plan participation While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity by contending that the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at birth (Dr. Marijane Boyd) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. As for Baptist Medical Center, the parties have stipulated that it provided timely pre-delivery notice as envisioned by the Plan. Consequently, it is only necessary to resolve whether, as alleged by the health care providers, the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied by or on behalf of Dr. Boyd. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), and University of Miami v. M.A., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1473a (Fla. 3d DCA June 13, 2001). Pertinent to the notice issue, the proof demonstrates that on or about January 27, 1998, Mrs. Schur sought prenatal care from her existing provider, Cleveland W. Randolph, Jr., M.D., a physician who, together with Samuel A. Christian, M.D., maintained an office for the practice of obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) known as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division I, at 1375 Roberts Drive, Suite 205, Jacksonville Beach, Florida. At the time, Drs. Randolph and Christian, like approximately 40 other obstetricians practicing in the Jacksonville area, were employees/shareholders of North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. Notably, all obstetricians employed by North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were "participating physicians" in the Plan. Consistent with that relationship, Mrs. Schur was offered and accepted a "Contract for Obstetrical Services" (on January 27, 1998) which identified North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., as the entity through which Dr. Randolph would be providing obstetrical and post partum care. That agreement provided, inter alia, as follows: North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., provides total obstetrical and post partum care. This includes a physical examination and prenatal care, delivery of the infant and post partum care. Prenatal care includes all office visits and routine lab evaluation related to the pregnancy. Post partum care includes care for problems relating to the pregnancy or delivery and routine examinations, following the delivery up to 12 weeks. North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., agrees to provide availability of a licensed obstetrician on call 24 hours a day in case of emergency. The agreement further established a fee schedule for basic comprehensive obstetrical care, cesarean section, and other obstetrical services. On March 15, 1998, Dr. Randolph notified Mrs. Schur, as well as his other obstetrical patients, that he would no longer deliver babies, and that his "partner, Dr. Sam Christian," would provide that service. Thereafter, on March 23, 1998, Mrs. Schur had a prenatal visit with Dr. Christian (to decide whether she would accept him as her obstetrician) and decided not to continue her care with Dr. Christian (due to his increased patient load). Effective May 19, 1998, Mrs. Schur elected to transfer her obstetrical and post partum care to the offices of Drs. Rebecca Moorhead, Patricia Schroeder, and Marijane Q. Boyd, another small group practice affiliated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. That office, known as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II, was located in a professional office building adjacent to the building occupied by Doctors Randolph and Christian. While the group practice of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd was affiliated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. (North Florida), and they held themselves out to the public as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II, as discussed more fully infra, the principles structured their business relationship through two separate professional associations. Regarding those associations, the proof demonstrated that Doctors Moorhead and Schroeder were employees of North Florida and Dr. Boyd was an employee (the sole employee) of Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc. (Beaches OB/GYN).6 Under the terms of a Management Services Agreement, effective August 1, 1997, North Florida (Drs. Moorhead and Schroeder/Beaches-Division II) and Beaches OB/GYN (Dr. Boyd) outlined the manner in which the group practice of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd would be conducted, as well as how expenses and revenues would be shared. As structured, North Florida agreed to provide billing, administrative and other support services for Beaches OB/GYN (Dr. Boyd) and Beaches OB/GYN agreed that Dr. Boyd would provide her professional services. As compensation for North Florida's services, Beaches OB/GYN agreed to pay what was essentially one-third of the direct operating expenses incurred by North Florida in the operation of the group practice. As for revenue sharing, the agreement contemplated that North Florida and Beaches OB/GYN would receive a share of professional fees received based on the actual professional services provided by North Florida physicians (Drs. Moorhead and Schroeder) and Beaches OB/GYN's provider (Dr. Boyd). While Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd elected to structure their group practice through two professional associations, they otherwise did business as, and held themselves out to the public as, North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II. Notably, the signage on the front door so identified their practice, followed by the names of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd; and, all paperwork of note likewise identified their practice as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II. Indeed, Mrs. Schur was, at the time, unaware of any entity known as Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc.7 Finally, with regard to the manner in which the group practiced, the proof demonstrated that Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd, like many group practices, shared patients, with each patient (including Mrs. Schur) rotating her prenatal care through all three physicians, and shared calls, with each physician on call every third day and every third weekend. With such an arrangement, it was strictly a matter of chance which of the physicians (Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, or Boyd), all of whom were participating physicians in the Plan, would deliver a patient's child. Regarding the notice issue, it is resolved that Mrs. Schur was provided timely notice that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were participating physicians in the Plan, together with notice as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries provided by the Plan. Such conclusion is based on the more credible proof which demonstrates that on June 15, 1998, when Mrs. Schur presented to the offices of Drs. Moorhead, Schoder, and Boyd, that they had an established routine whereby on a patient's first office visit she would be provided the notice contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. Here, consistent with that routine, the proof demonstrates that on such date, when she presented for her first office visit, Mrs. Schur was given a form titled NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT, which provided: I have been furnished information by North Florida Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that North Florida Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. is a participating practice in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), Barnett Bank Building, 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 312, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, (904) 488-8191. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. Dated this day of , 19 . Signature (NAME OF PATIENT) Social Security No.: Attest: (Nurse or Physician) Date: Rather than sign the form, Mrs. Schur wrote across it the words "received at Dr. Randolph's." At hearing, Mrs. Schur testified that, although she does not recall the incident, the best explanation she could offer for writing "received at Dr. Randolph's" instead of signing the form was that "someone would have had to tell me to do that . . . [since] I would not have known to write that on there." Such explanation is logical and credible; however, having accepted the explanation for why the entry was made, instead of signing the form, does not detract from the strong inference to be drawn from the entry. Indeed, having written the words "received at Dr. Randolph's" across the form is compelling evidence that, at the time, Mrs. Schur had a clear recollection that, during the period she was under the care of Dr. Randolph, she received notice that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were participating physicians in the Plan, as well as a copy of the NICA brochure that described the NICA program.8 As further evidence that notice was given, it is observed that established routine at the offices of Drs. Moorhead, Schoder, and Boyd also mandated that when notice was given an item titled "NICA ", and contained within a checklist (titled Plans/Education) on a patient's prenatal record, receive a "?" in the space following the acronym NICA. Notably, at or about the same time Mrs. Schur wrote across the notice "received at Dr. Randolph's" the space following the acronym NICA was annotated to read "? c Dr. Randolph." Given Mrs. Schur's entry on the notice form ("received at Dr. Randolph's"), as well as the established routine, it is reasonable to conclude that such annotation was intended to reflect that Mrs. Schur had received NICA notice when she was a patient of Dr. Randolph.9 While the proof demonstrated that Mrs. Schur received notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, Inc., were participants in the Plan, it likewise demonstrated that no separate notice was provided that Dr. Boyd, either individually or as an employee of Beaches Obstetrical & Gynecological Practice, Inc., was a participant in the Plan. However, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, such failure was harmless. The settlement agreement with Baptist Medical Center On June 20, 2001, Nicholas J. Schur and Lisa S. Schur, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Nicholas Erwin Schur (Claimants) and Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches, Inc., formally resolved all claims or potential claims of the Claimants against Baptist Medical Center and North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., including those matters relating to the pending civil action in the Circuit Court, Duval County, Florida, Case No. 00-01458-CA, Division CV- C; however, the Claimants reserved all claims they had against Marijane Q. Boyd and Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc. As consideration for that settlement, the Claimants received the sum of $87,500 and the release and discharge of all claims Baptist Medical Center had against the Claimants arising from the care provided to Nicholas or Mrs. Schur.

Florida Laws (13) 120.68395.002766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311766.313766.314766.316 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.216
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ROBERT SIRAVO AND MAURO SIRAVO, O/B/O BRIAN SIRAVO vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 93-002975N (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 02, 1993 Number: 93-002975N Latest Update: Mar. 27, 1996

The Issue Whether Bryan Siravo has suffered an injury for which compensation should be awarded under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as alleged in the claim for compensation.

Findings Of Fact Bryan Siravo (Bryan) is the natural son of Robert and Mauro Siravo. He was born a live infant on March 13, 1990, at Plantation General Hospital in Broward County, Florida, and his birth weight was in excess of 2500 grams. The physician delivering obstetrical services during the birth of Bryan was Edward Buonopane, M.D., who was, at all times material hereto, a participating physician in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Bryan Siravo was delivered by cesarean section because of a breach presentation and maternal obesity. The delivery was without complications and Bryan presented with Apgar scores of 8 at one minute and 9 at five minutes. Resuscitation was not required in the immediate postdelivery period, and there was no evidence of fetal distress. After birth, Bryan was transported to the regular or newborn nursery and was found in a cyanotic state approximately three hours after birth. Bryan was subsequently transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit where he was intubated after about one hour. Bryan's condition continued to deteriorate over the next 24 hours and an echocardiogram revealed the presence of a large patent ductus arteriosus and heart valve insufficiency. Due to the continued deterioration of his condition, Bryan was transferred to Miami Children's Hospital on March 15, 1990. At Miami Children's Hospital, Bryan was diagnosed with respiratory distress syndrome type I, severe; a condition which impairs the ability to breath, and which arises after birth when the infant is required to breath outside the womb. Bryan also underwent multiple ultrasound and CT scans of the brain. These neuroimaging studies revealed the presence of a Grade IV intraventricular hemorrhage. Based on the credible proof of record, it is concluded that Bryan suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Such injury did not, however, occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. Rather, the proof demonstrated that the origins of Bryan's hemorrhage and his resultant neurologic injury were a combination of respiratory distress syndrome and patent ductive arteriosus, which began to operate after his delivery. Such mechanism, acting in consort, increased, over time, the pressure in the draining veins from Bryan's brain and, therefore, the pressure in his brain, with the consequent hemorrhage.

Florida Laws (12) 120.68766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311766.313766.314766.316
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MARY LOU BEHAN AND GERALD BEHAN, O/B/O KATHLEEN BEHAN vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 93-002972N (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 02, 1993 Number: 93-002972N Latest Update: Jun. 07, 2003

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the July 14, 1993, Division-conducted hearing in this case, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Kathleen Behan is the natural daughter of Mary Lou and Gerald Behan. She was born on November 30, 1989, at Plantation General Hospital in Broward County, Florida. Her birth weight was in excess of 2500 grams. Kathleen was delivered by caesarian section performed by the family's obstetrician, Mariano J. Rodriguez, Jr., M.D., after her mother had experienced a spontaneous rupture of the fetal membrane. At the time of Kathleen's birth, Dr. Rodriguez was a participant in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. Kathleen had an Apgar score of 6 one minute after birth and an Apgar score of 9 five minutes after birth. Apgar scores reflect the attending physician's or nurse's assessment of the newborn infant's well-being based upon clinical observations regarding the infant's heart rate, respiratory effort, color, muscle tone, and reflexes. The higher the score, the greater the state of well being. The highest score attainable is a 10. Apgar scores are commonly used to determine if a newborn infant has suffered a neurological injury of a substantial and permanent nature during labor or delivery or in the immediate post-delivery process. Kathleen's Apgar scores are not consistent with her having suffered such a birth-related injury. After her condition was evaluated, Kathleen was taken from the delivery room to Plantation's "well-baby" nursery. She remained there without incident until December 2, 1989, when she was found asystolic in her crib after having experienced an acute life-threatening event or ALTE. Kathleen was resuscitated and survived the incident. She, however, has neurological impairment. The neurological impairment from which she now suffers was not the product of oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury that occurred during labor or delivery or in the immediate post-delivery period.

Florida Laws (12) 120.68766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311766.313766.314766.316
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MIGUEL HERNANDEZ AND LYNN HENANDEZ, ON BEHALF OF AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF CHRISTIAN M. HERNANDEZ, A MINOR vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 08-003097N (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 24, 2008 Number: 08-003097N Latest Update: Mar. 23, 2009

The Issue At issue is whether Christian M. Hernandez, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).

Findings Of Fact Preliminary findings related to compensability Miguel Hernandez and Lynn Hernandez, are the parents and natural guardians of Christian M. Hernandez, a minor. Christian was born a live infant on March 28, 2005, at Mount Sinai Medical Center, a hospital located in Miami Beach, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Obstetrical services were delivered at Christian's birth by Melvin E. Castillo, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."1 § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, Petitioners and NICA are of the view that Christian did not suffer such an injury, whereas Intervenors hold a contrary view. Whether Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" To address whether Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," the parties offered the Mount Sinai Medical Center records associated with Christian's birth and immediate newborn course, March 28, 2005, to April 2, 2005 (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2), as well as the Miami Children's Hospital medical records associated with his subsequent care, April 2, 2005, to May 11, 2005 (Joint Exhibit 3). The parties also offered the deposition testimony of Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, and Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, electroencephalography, and neurophysiology. (Joint Exhibits 4 and 5). Dr. Willis reviewed the medical records related to Christian's birth and subsequent development, and accurately summarized his history, as follows: . . . The mother, Lynn Hernandez, was a 36 year old G3 P2 admitted at term in early labor. Her cervix was dilated 2 cms. She was taking Synthroid for hypothyroidism and had a previous Cesarean delivery. Meconium was identified with rupture of the membranes. Ampicillin was given during labor. The fetal heart rate pattern on admission had a normal baseline and was reactive. Variable decelerations, to about 90 bpm, developed during the second stage of labor and vacuum assisted delivery was done for this indication. Vacuum was applied and the baby was delivered on the first pull. Delivery was complicated by a tight nuchal cord and mild shoulder dystocia. McRoberts maneuver was required for delivery of the shoulders. Birth weight was 4,180 grams or 9 lbs 3 ozs. No meconium was identified below the vocal cords by neonatal evaluation. Apgar scores were 7/9/9. The baby was floppy at birth, but responded to resuscitation. From the delivery room, the baby was taken to the NICU for possible sepsis and respiratory distress. Retractions and a rapid respiratory rate were present. Neurologic exam was normal. Oxygen saturation was in the 90's on admission, but the baby was unable to maintain adequate oxygenation with hood oxygen. Oxygen saturation dropped to the 50's and intubation and mechanical ventilation was required shortly after being admitted to the NICU (about one hour). Respiratory distress continued with progressively increasing ventilator settings required to maintain adequate oxygenation. The baby was transferred to Miami Children's Hospital for possible ECMO. Diagnoses included meconium aspiration syndrome, suspected viral pneumonia and significant pulmonary hypertension. Chest tubes were placed for pneumothorax. Respiratory distress worsened and ECMO was started. Head ultrasound was done before ECMO and was normal. The baby suffered an intracranial hemorrhage while on ECMO, which required discontinuation of ECMO. The baby was on ECMO for 32 hours. Serial CT scans showed an evolving intracranial hemorrhage with eventual development of a porencephalic cyst. The baby was discharged home on day 43 of life. (Joint Exhibit 4; See also Joint Exhibit 1; Joint Exhibit 2, Discharge Summary; Joint Exhibit 3, Discharge Summary). Based on his evaluation of the medical records, it was Dr. Willis' opinion that Christian did not suffer a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period, and that the intracranial hemorrhage he suffered while on ECMO, was a complication of the blood thinner (anti-coagulant) required for ECMO therapy.2 (Joint Exhibit 4, pp. 13, 14, and 22). Compare, Orlando Regional Health Care System, Inc. v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)(Where infant found to have suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" when it was shown that the infant required active resuscitation from birth until he was placed on ECMO bypass hours after his birth, and that the infant suffered a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired, between the time of birth and the time of being placed on ECMO.). Notably, it was not shown through Dr. Willis' testimony or otherwise that Christian's intracranial hemorrhage was caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, and Dr. Willis offered no opinion regarding the significance of, or any sequelae caused by, the brain injury Christian suffered while on ECMO. (Joint Exhibit 4, p. 14). Dr. Duchowny evaluated Christian on September 28, 2007. Based on his evaluation, as well as his review of the medical records, Dr. Duchowny was of the opinion that Christian's impairments were, more likely than not, the result of a developmentally based brain disorder, as opposed to a brain injury. Dr. Duchowny was also of the opinion that Christian does not have a substantial physical impairment. Rather his motor function is essentially appropriate for age and he does not currently demonstrate, and is unlikely to demonstrate in the future, a substantial mental impairment. (Joint Exhibit 5). When, as here, the medical condition is not readily observable, issues of causation are essentially medical questions, requiring expert medical evidence. See, e.g., Vero Beach Care Center v. Ricks, 476 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("[L]ay testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where the medical condition involved is not readily observable."); Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("The determination of the cause of a non-observable medical condition, such as a psychiatric illness, is essentially a medical question."); Wausau Insurance Company v. Tillman, 765 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("Because the medical conditions which the claimant alleged had resulted from the workplace incident were not readily observable, he was obligated to present expert medical evidence establishing that causal connection."). Here, the opinions of Doctors Willis and Duchowny were not controverted or shown to lack credibility. Consequently, it must be resolved that the cause of Christian's impairments was most likely a developmentally based brain abnormality, as opposed to a "birth- related neurological injury," and, regardless of the etiology of his impairments, he is not permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. See Thomas v. Salvation Army, 562 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("In evaluating medical evidence, a judge of compensation claims may not reject uncontroverted medical testimony without a reasonable explanation.").

Florida Laws (10) 120.68766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311766.313
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