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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF WORKERS` COMPENSATION vs HERBERT GOLOFF, 93-004546 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 16, 1993 Number: 93-004546 Latest Update: Sep. 30, 1994

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Herbert Goloff, D.C., is a chiropractor licensed to practice in the State of Florida. From March 10, 1988, through September 3, 1991, Dr. Goloff treated Ruth Waddle, a Workers' Compensation patient, for lumbar myofascitis. Lumbar myofascitis is an inflammation of the muscle and the fascia in the lumbar spine. Lumbar myofascitis is indicated by the following objective findings: recurrent spasms, limitation of motion, tender nodules, trigger point tenderness in the muscles, and taut or sensitive skin. On June 14, 1988, the Respondent placed Ruth Waddle at maximum medical improvement (MMI). The Respondent treated Ruth Waddle 14 times before placing her at MMI. The Respondent treated Ruth Waddle a total of 171 times after MMI. The Respondent is required to maintain documentation substantiating the treatment and services he rendered to Ruth Waddle in order to receive reimbursement for those services. The Respondent is required to perform an initial history, make a diagnosis, and develop a plan of care and document his subjective and objective findings in his records. The Respondent is also required to keep notes reflecting his subjective and objective findings, his appraisal or assessment and his plan of action (SOAP notes) for the patient Ruth Waddle, in order to substantiate and justify that the medical treatment and services he renders are medically necessary. If a health care provider cannot document that this treatment and services are medically necessary, he is not entitled to receive reimbursement for his services. The Respondent's records indicate that there was unscheduled ongoing care of the patient after June 14, 1988. Whenever the patient was in pain she would come in to the Respondent's Office and ask for a treatment. Respondent was not practicing full time in 1988. The patient seldom scheduled an appointment. She frequently came in on a Tuesday, a day she knew that Respondent had office hours. The patient would describe her symptoms to Respondent and he would perform various therapies, including mild adjustments. Respondent would make minimum entries in the patient's progress notes. Respondent's treatment of the patient Ruth Waddle, after reaching MMI, for the temporary relief of pain was palliative care. The Respondent's records indicate that there was inadequate testing of the patient Ruth Waddle to substantiate the medical necessity of treatment after June 14, 1988. The Respondent's records do not contain a plan of care or treatment for Ruth Waddle. The Respondents records do not contain an initial history for Ruth Waddle. The Respondents records do not contain an evaluation of Ruth Waddle's physical condition at the time of MMI relative to muscle spasms and range of motion, as well as other neurological and orthopedic tests. Respondent failed to maintain SOAP notes for the patient Ruth Waddle. The Respondent's records do not contain objective medical findings to substantiate the medical necessity of services rendered to Ruth Waddle after June 14, 1988. The Respondent's records do not substantiate the medical necessity of the frequency and duration of the treatment provided to Ruth Waddle after June 14, 1988.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be determined to have failed to substantiate the treatment of Ruth Waddle after June 14, 1988. The Respondent be ordered to return the sum of $7,354.68 to the American States Insurance Company for the fees that the Respondent collected in treating Ruth Waddle after June 14, 1988, when the patient reached MMI. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4546 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-14. Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 2, 5(a), 5(b) (in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence: paragraph 4, 5(b) (in part), 5(c). COPIES FURNISHED: Michael G. Moore, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 William J. McCabe, Esquire Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley 1450 West S.R. 434, Suite 200 Longwood, Florida 32750 Shirley Gooding, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn, Esquire Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68440.13
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FFVA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 12-001065 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Mar. 21, 2012 Number: 12-001065 Latest Update: Sep. 06, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be required to pay $300 as workers' compensation reimbursement for medical services provided to a patient.

Findings Of Fact Raulerson is an acute care hospital in Okeechobee, Florida, owned by Okeechobee Hospital, Inc. Raulerson's licensed premises includes the acute care hospital building and an additional building that contains a physical therapy department and an outpatient clinic identified as "Company Care." Company Care provides occupational health and workers' compensation services to employees working for participating employers. The clinic operates as a department of the hospital and is staffed by salaried employees of the hospital. The ambulatory care services provided at the clinic are hospital services pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rules 59A- 3.065(4) and 59A-3.2085(7). The Patient suffered a compensable injury on August 4, 2011, and was treated on that date at the Raulerson emergency room. On August 8 and 15, 2011, the Patient went to the Raulerson outpatient clinic for evaluation and to have a non-surgical wound dressing changed or removed. Using a standard hospital billing form known as a UB-04, Raulerson submitted a single $400 bill to the Petitioner. The bill contained a separate $200 charge for each of the two outpatient service dates. The Florida workers' compensation program refers to the UB-04 form as a DFS-F5-DWC-90 form. Although the Petitioner attempted to assert at the hearing that the outpatient services had not been fully authorized, the stipulation filed by the parties prior to the hearing clearly stated that the services were authorized by the Petitioner and that there are no issues of medical necessity presented in this case. The Petitioner declined to pay the bill for the outpatient visits and issued an Explanation of Benefits Review (EOBR) form that provided the following coded explanation for its decision: 64-PAYMENT DISALLOWED: BILLING ERROR: SERVICE "NOT COVERED" UNDER APPLICABLE WORKERS' COMPENSATION REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL. * * * 5218-FACILITY CHARGE FOR TREATMENT ROOM OR CLINIC VISIT HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY BILLED PURSUANT TO NATIONAL UNIFORM BILLING MANUAL GUIDELINES. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED FOR FACILITY BASED PHYSICIAN ARE TO BE BILLED ON APPROPRIATE FORM. NO ADDITIONAL REIMBURSEMENT GRANTED FOR FACILITY FEE. The standard billing form used by health care professionals to file for reimbursement of medical claims is a CMS-1500 form (identified as the DFS-F5-DWC-9 form by the Florida workers' compensation program). Essentially, the Petitioner has asserted that Raulerson should have submitted bills for the outpatient services on a professional services billing form rather than on a hospital billing form. The apparent effect of submitting the charges on the hospital billing form rather than the professional services billing form was to increase the reimbursement rate paid for the services. There was no credible evidence that Raulerson's use of the hospital billing form violated any applicable requirements of the Florida workers' compensation program. The Petitioner has previously paid similar claims that were submitted on the UB-04 hospital billing form. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501 incorporates by reference, the Florida Workers' Compensation Manual for Hospitals (2006 Edition), which, states, in relevant part, as follows: Section X: Outpatient Reimbursement Reimbursement Amount Except as otherwise provided in this Section, hospital charges for services and supplies provided on an outpatient basis shall be reimbursed at seventy-five percent (75%) of usual and customary charges for medically necessary services and supplies, and shall be subject to verification and adjustment in accordance with Sections XI and XII of this manual. * * * Section XI: Disallowed, Denied and Disputed Charges * * * Physician Services The insurer shall not reimburse a hospital for physician services when billed by the hospital on the hospital billing form. Proper billing and reimbursement of physician services rendered in any location, including inside a hospital, shall be in accordance with the requirements of rules 69L-7.602 and 69L-7.020. Rule 69L-7.602 is the Florida Workers' Compensation Medical Services Billing, Filing and Reporting Rule. Rule 69L-7.602(4)(c) requires that hospitals submit bills using Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (the hospital billing form). Rule 69L-7.602(4)(b)4.b. states as follows: Outpatient billing--Hospitals shall in addition to filing a Form DFS-F5-DWC-90: Enter the CPT®, HCPCS or workers' compensation unique code and the applicable CPT® or HCPCS modifier code in Form Locator 44 on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, when required pursuant to the UB-04 Manual; and Make written entry "scheduled" or "non-scheduled" in Form Locator 80 of Form revision 2006--'Remarks' on the DFS-F5-DWC- 90, when billing outpatient surgery or outpatient surgical services; and Attach an itemized statement with charges based on the facility's Charge Master; and Submit all applicable documentation required pursuant to Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C.; Bill professional services provided by a physician or recognized practitioner on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-9, regardless of employment arrangement. (emphasis supplied). Rule 69L-7.602(1)(nn) sets forth the following relevant definition: "Recognized Practitioner" means a non- physician health care provider licensed by the Department of Health who works under the protocol of a physician or who, upon referral from a physician, can render direct billable services that are within the scope of their license, independent of the supervision of a physician. The services in this case were provided by an advanced registered nurse practitioner (ARNP), a recognized practitioner as defined by the rule. The coding on the bill submitted to the Petitioner by Raulerson indicated that the services were provided in a clinical setting (Revenue Code 510) by a recognized practitioner (CPT Code 99211). Review of the bill by the Department indicated that the charge for services attributed to "Revenue Code 510" was a "facility fee" rather than a professional services fee. Raulerson did not submit a bill for the professional services provided to the patient on August 8 and 15, 2011, by the ARNP. No specific charges for physician services were included on the bill at issue in this proceeding. Whether rendered on an inpatient or outpatient basis, the provision of hospital-based services routinely entails the services of medical professionals. The evidence failed to establish that Raulerson was legally required to submit a bill for professional services or that the bill at issue in this case should have been submitted on a professional services billing form.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order affirming the Reimbursement Dispute Determination dated January 20, 2012, wherein the Department directed FFVA Mutual Insurance Company to pay a $300 reimbursement claim filed by Raulerson Hospital. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Julie Lewis Hauf, Esquire Law Office of Julie Lewis Hauf, P.L. 15880 Summerlin Road, Suite 300 PMB 315 Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Mari H. McCully, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia and Purnell, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68440.13
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GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 09-006875 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 18, 2009 Number: 09-006875 Latest Update: Sep. 29, 2010

The Issue The issue is what is the correct amount of workers’ compensation reimbursement to Largo Medical Center for emergency services rendered to patient M.C. for a work-related injury?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Guarantee, is a carrier within the meaning of Subsections 440.02(4) and (38), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(w). Respondent, the Department, has exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to the reimbursement of health care providers by carriers for medical services rendered to injured workers. § 440.13(7) and (11)(c), Fla. Stat. Intervenor, Largo, is a health care provider within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Largo is an acute care hospital located in Largo, Pinellas County, Florida. On July 25, 2009, Largo provided emergency services to patient M.C., a 32-year-old female, who was injured at her place of work. M.C. was examined by Largo’s emergency department physician. She received two Computed Tomography (“CT”) scans without contrast dye, one of the brain and one of the cervical spine. She also received a pregnancy test and an X-ray of her lumbar spine. The results of these diagnostic tests were negative. M.C. was given a cervical collar to wear, and was discharged. Largo’s total charges for M.C.’s outpatient emergency services were $7,885.05. Largo submitted its claim for reimbursement using the standard “uniform billing” form, UB-04. The UB-04 sets out each service provided to M.C., the individual charge for each service, and the total charge. The individual services on the UB-04 submitted for patient M.C. are listed as follows: urine pregnancy test; X-ray; CT scan of the cervical spine; a three-dimensional rendering of the image and its interpretation; the CT of the brain; and the emergency department visit itself. Largo’s claim was received by MCMC, an organization described as a “third-party administrator,” and was referred in turn to Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix is a medical bill-review agent located in Portland, Oregon. Qmedtrix performs bill review by referral from carriers and third-party administrators, and performed a bill review for Guarantee of the bill submitted by Largo. For its compensation, Qmedtrix is paid a percentage of the difference, if any, between the amount billed by the facility and the amount paid by the carrier. Following Qmedtrix’ review, Largo received a check from Guarantee in the amount of $5,287.97, along with an “Explanation of Medical Benefits” review (EOBR), which is required to be sent along with the bill payment. For reasons that are not clear, there are two EOBRs in evidence for this claim. One (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) has the logo “MCMC” in the upper left hand corner and is substantially more formal. The other (Largo’s Exhibit 3) does not have any identifying logo, but the following statement appears on page two: “For questions regarding this review, please call MCMC at 1-888-350-1150.” It is not clear why MCMC would have generated two different EOBRs for the same claim, but, in any event, the allowed amounts for the six components of Largo’s charges and the total payment amount, $5,287.97, is the same on both EOBRs. The EOBR that is Largo’s Exhibit 3 sets out the six individual components of Largo’s claim, and indicates that the first five were approved for reimbursement at 75 percent of the charge billed by Largo. The sixth component is the charge for the emergency department visit itself. For that charge, Largo billed $1,365.38, of which 75 per cent would be $1,024.04. The EOBR indicates the corresponding 25 percent discount from billed charges ($341.35) under a column entitled “MRA,” and indicates further that an additional reduction of $625.81 was applied, leaving an approved payment of $398.22 for the emergency room component of the claim. The additional reduction of $625.81 is under a column entitled “Ntwk Redc,” and the narrative explanation under the total payment states, ”The network discount shown above is based on your contract with the network.” Guarantee conceded at hearing that there was no contract applicable to the claim. The EOBR also has references to “convalescent care” and “PIP days,” neither of which apply to Largo’s claim. The EOBR that is Guarantee’s Exhibit 4 has one column entitled “Qualify Code.” In completing an EOBR, insurers must select a code from a list of approximately 50 codes found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(o)2., which identifies the reason for the disallowance or adjustment. For the emergency room visit, the EOBR shows a code of 82, which is explained as follows: “Payment adjusted: Payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” Both EOBRs indicate a “procedure code” of 99283. The UB-04 submitted by Largo used code 99284. These codes are among five codes that are used by hospitals to bill emergency department visits based on “level” of intensity rendered. These codes are taken from the American Medical Association’s Current Procedural Terminology (or CPT), a coding system developed for physician billing, not for hospitals. Over the years, these CPT codes have been adopted by hospitals for billing emergency department visits. Emergency department services are billed with CPT codes 99281 through 99285. After receiving the payment and EOBR, Largo timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute, with attachments, to the Department. Largo alleged in its Petition that the correct reimbursement amount owed was $5,913.79, leaving an underpayment of $625.82. Qmedtrix, acting as Guarantee’s representative, then filed Guarantee’s Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute and attachments with the Department. Attached to the Response was a letter from R.W. von Sydow dated November 5, 2009. The letter asserted that the correct payment to the hospital (Largo) should be determined on an average of usual and customary charges for all providers in a given geographic area, rather than the hospital’s usual and customary charges. As authority, Mr. von Sydow cites the case of One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The letter also requested that the Department “scrutinize the bill in question in order to determine, first, whether the hospital in fact charged its usual charge for the services provided and, second, whether the billed charges are in line with the customary charges of other facilities in the community.” The letter further alleges that the hospital “upcoded” the emergency room visit, billing using CPT code 99284, asserting that the proper billing code should have been 99283. The letter concludes that the amount paid, $398.22, for the emergency department visit is closer to the “usual and customary” charges that Qmedtrix asserts, on behalf of Guarantee, is applicable to the claim. On November 13, 2009, the Department issued its Determination. The Determination states in pertinent part: The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges,” maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, and references a manual not incorporated by rule. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition does not conform to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Largo Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on July 25, 2009. Based upon the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $5,913.79 ($7,885.05 x 75% [Hospital Manual] = $5,913.79). The determination letter also informed Guarantee of its right to an administrative hearing. Guarantee timely filed a Request for Administrative Hearing, which gave rise to this proceeding. CODING FOR M.C.’S EMERGENCY SERVICES As mentioned above, Largo reported the emergency department visit using CPT Code 99284. No one from the hospital testified, but Largo’s expert, Allan W. March, M.D., reviewed Largo’s hospital record for M.C. Dr. March is a graduate of Dartmouth College and Johns Hopkins University Medical School. He has extensive experience in, among other things, hospital physician practice and utilization review. Dr. March describes utilization as the oversight of medical care to affirm that it is appropriate, cost-effective, and medically necessary. Dr. March has worked as an emergency department physician and has personally treated upwards of 5,000 workers’ compensation patients. Dr. March testified on behalf of Largo and the Department. Dr. March described M.C. and her injuries from the hospital record as follows: This is a 32-year-old female who had just slipped at her place of work prior to arrival at the emergency department and presented in moderate distress, with moderate pain in the head, neck, and lower back. And the patient displayed tenderness in the posterior neck area as well as in the right lower back. Dr. March reviewed Largo’s hospital record for M.C. to analyze whether Largo appropriately used CPT code 99284, or whether it should have used a lower CPT code. Largo’s coding for the emergency department visit is based on the American College of Emergency Physicians’ “ED Facility Level Coding Guidelines” (ACEP Guidelines). By using the ACEP Guidelines, Largo used a nationally recognized methodology in determining the level of service to which the hospital should bill. He noted that the hospital’s charge sheet indicated that the level of services was marked at a Level 4. Dr. March compared the hospital’s charge list with the ACEP Guidelines and found them to be essentially the same, and that the Level 4 marked on the charge sheet corresponded with CPT code 99284. Dr. March found that Largo used a nationally recognized methodology in determining the level of service to which the hospital should bill. In Dr. March’s opinion, Largo correctly assigned 99284 to M.C.’s emergency department visit, and that the assignment of 99284 is substantiated by the medical record. Under the ACEP guidelines, the CPT code level assigned is always the highest level at which a minimum of one “possible intervention” is found. In this case, Dr. March determined that two CT scans were ordered by the physician and performed by the hospital, which substantiates the use of a 99284 code under the ACEP Guidelines. Dr. March further explained that the coding level of a hospital does not correspond directly to the coding level assigned by the physician. The physician’s services are coded under the CPT-4 coding book. According to Dr. March, the CPT coding manual is applicable to facility coding only if the hospital chooses to use this manual as a basis in their methodology for coding. Further, Dr. March explained that the separate billing of the emergency department visit captures separate and distinct costs incurred by hospitals that are not included in line-items for procedures. The claim submitted by Largo was sent to Qmedtrix for a bill review. Its data elements were first entered into Qmedtrix’ proprietary bill-review software known as “BillChek.” The software placed Largo’s claim on hold for manual review. The claim was then manually reviewed by Mr. von Sydow, Director of National Dispute Resolution for Qmedtrix. Although his educational background is in law, Mr. von Sydow is a certified coder certified by the American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA). Mr. von Sydow determined in his bill review that Largo should have used code 99283 instead of 99284. Mr. von Sydow described what he considers to be inconsistencies between certain diagnosis codes under the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Edition (ICD-9) and the CPT codes used to classify the emergency department visit. He considers the ICD-9 codes on Largo’s claim (specifically 959.01 used to indicate “head injury, unspecified”) to be inconsistent with CPT code 99284. In his view, ICD-9 corresponds more closely with CPT code 99283. Moreover, Mr. von Sydow referenced a study by the American Hospital Association (AHA) and AHIMA, which suggests that hospitals should count the number and kind of interventions to approximate the CPT factors, but that a hospital should not include in this count interventions or procedures, such as CTs or X-rays, which the hospital bills separately. He further acknowledged that the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) allow hospitals to use their own methodology in applying the CPT codes. David Perlman, M.D., received his undergraduate degree from Brown University and his medical degree from the University of Oregon. He has considerable experience as an emergency room physician. For the past six years, he has worked for Qmedtrix initially doing utilization review and as its Medical Director since 2005. Dr. Perlman testified on behalf of Guarantee. Dr. Perlman is familiar with the ACEP guidelines relied upon by Dr. March and the AHA/AHIMA study relied upon by Mr. von Sydow. He is also familiar with the CPT code handbook. Dr. Perlman suggested that the use of the ACEP guidelines could result in reimbursement essentially already provided in a separate line-item. He agrees with the methodology recommended by the AMA/AHIMA study. That is, counting the number and kind of interventions or procedures to approximate the CPT book’s factors to consider in selecting the code billed for emergency department services, but not including in this count interventions or procedures, such as CTs or X-rays, which the hospital bills separately. In Dr. Perlman’s opinion, M.C.’s injuries supported assignment of CPT code 99283 rather than 99284. The fact that M.C. underwent CT scans did not alter this conclusion. According to Dr. Perlman, use of a CT scan in a patient’s emergency department treatment determines that the facility may assign a 99284 code under the ACEP guidelines. In his opinion, this does not necessarily reflect the severity of the illness or injury. Dr. Perlman acknowledged, however, that hospitals are free to use the ACEP guidelines and that many hospitals do so. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that there is no national, standardized methodology for the manner in which hospitals are to apply CPT codes 99281-99285 for facility billing. The preponderance of the evidence also establishes that, while there is a difference of opinion as to whether ACEP guidelines are the best method, it is a nationally recognized method used by many hospitals. Largo’s use of this methodology is supported by the weight of the evidence as appropriate. M.C.’s hospital record amply documents the interventions required for the assignment of CPT code 99284 under the ACEP guidelines. Dr. March’s opinion that the separate billing of the emergency department visit captures separate and distinct costs incurred by hospitals that are not included in line-items for procedures is accepted. It is concluded that the coding of M.C.’s emergency department visit as 99284 by Largo was appropriate. There is no dispute that Largo’s charges as represented on the UB-04 form conform to its internal charge master, or that the services represented were in fact provided, or that they were medically necessary.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a Final Order requiring Petitioner to remit payment to Largo consistent with the Determination Letter dated November 13, 2009, and Section 440.13(7)(c), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2010.

Florida Laws (7) 120.56120.569120.57440.02440.1390.70490.956 Florida Administrative Code (2) 69L-7.50169L-7.602
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LUIS APONTE, M.D. vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 19-002653 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida May 17, 2019 Number: 19-002653 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2019

The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether two Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute are entitled to be considered on the merits, or whether, instead, they should be dismissed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency with exclusive jurisdiction to resolve reimbursement disputes between health care providers and carriers under section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes (2019),2/ part of the Workers' Compensation Law. Dr. Aponte is a physician. As such, he is a health care provider, as defined in section 440.13(1)(g). Dr. Aponte operates a business called Body Contouring, Inc., at which he provides medical services to patients, including injured workers. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, The Hartford Medical Bill Processing Center, and Twin City Fire Insurance Company are carriers, as defined in section 440.13(1)(c). At issue in both cases are bills submitted by Dr. Aponte to one of the referenced carriers for services provided to injured workers, which were paid, in part, and adjusted by the carrier. In each case, Dr. Aponte was notified of the adjustments to each bill by means of an Explanation of Bill Review (EOBR) from the carrier explaining why his bill was not fully paid. If a health care provider such as Dr. Aponte is dissatisfied with a carrier's adjustment or disallowance of charges on a bill for services to an injured worker, the provider's recourse is to serve a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute on the Department within 45 days after the provider receives the EOBR. In both consolidated cases, Dr. Aponte seeks to contest certain carrier adjustments to bills submitted for services he rendered to injured workers. The specific adjustments he seeks to contest are reductions to his charges that were explained in EOBRs as being made pursuant to a contractual arrangement. Each EOBR making this adjustment identified a preferred provider organization (PPO) network--Coventry Pend and Transmit, or Coventry P&T--and each EOBR explained that the PPO reduction was made pursuant to the terms of Dr. Aponte's/Body Contouring, Inc.'s contract with Aetna. Dr. Aponte seeks to contest these PPO reductions because he claims that the contract with Aetna was terminated. The merits of the reimbursement disputes are not at issue, however. The sole issue presented is whether the Department should accept Dr. Aponte's petitions and proceed to resolve the reimbursement disputes presented. Case No. 19-1517 On May 2, 2018, an injured worker had a 15-minute outpatient office visit with Dr. Aponte at Body Contouring, Inc. Dr. Aponte submitted a bill for the 15-minute outpatient office visit to the employer's carrier. The billed amount was $125.00. The bill was adjusted by the carrier for two reasons explained in an EOBR issued on May 11, 2018. The carrier reduced the charge because it exceeded the fee schedule allowance in the Florida Workers Compensation Health Care Provider Reimbursement Manual (Provider Manual). The carrier also reduced the charge by an additional $25.37, based on a written contractual arrangement. The EOBR identified the "PPO Network" as Coventry Pend and Transmit, or Coventry P&T, and the explanatory notes indicated that the Coventry P&T PPO reduction was "in accordance with your Aetna contract." After the two adjustments, Dr. Aponte was paid $54.63. The May 11, 2018, EOBR included the notice required by the Department for carrier EOBR forms. The notice specified that the health care provider may elect to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment under section 440.13(7), and that such an election must be made by the provider within 45 days of receipt of the EOBR. Dr. Aponte did not timely serve a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute on the Department to contest the adjustments in the May 11, 2018, EOBR. Instead, he communicated directly with the carrier. Ultimately, on February 6, 2019, Dr. Aponte resubmitted the same bill to the carrier for the 15-minute outpatient office visit on May 2, 2018, with the same $125.00 charge, and asked the carrier to reconsider. That same day--February 6, 2019--the carrier issued a second EOBR. The EOBR indicated that payment of the resubmitted $125.00 bill was disallowed in its entirety, and gave the following explanation: "billing error: duplicate bill." Dr. Aponte prepared a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute on the form required by the Department (incorporated by reference in a rule), and served it on the Department on February 8, 2019. Dr. Aponte's petition asserted that the EOBR he was contesting was received on February 6, 2019, which was the date on which the second EOBR was issued. Dr. Aponte identified a single issue in dispute: whether the carrier improperly adjusted the charge by applying a PPO network reduction of $25.37. Dr. Aponte contended that "there is no contract between Luis Aponte, MD/Body Contouring[,] Inc.[,] and Coventry." However, the PPO network adjustment was not made in the February 6, 2019, EOBR. The adjustment Dr. Aponte wanted to contest was made in the May 11, 2018, EOBR. Dr. Aponte attached both the May 11, 2018, EOBR and the February 6, 2019, EOBR to his petition. He added the following explanation for attaching the two EOBRs: "A petition for resolution of reimbursement dispute was previously submitted to the FL Dept. Financial Services on 07/30/18 initiating this reimbursement dispute." The Department reviewed the petition and attachments to determine if the petition was timely served. Since the 45-day window to serve a petition begins to run upon receipt of the EOBR, the Department has a "computation of time" rule providing alternative ways for a provider to prove the date of EOBR receipt. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-31.008. One way is by showing a date stamp affixed by the provider to the EOBR on the date of receipt. Another way is through a verifiable login process. The third way is to show the postmark date on the envelope in which the EOBR was received, in which case five calendar days is added to the postmark date to allow for mail time. If the provider does not utilize one of these three methods to prove the date of receipt, the Department will use the "default" method in its rule, whereby the EOBR receipt date is deemed to be five calendar days after the date on which the EOBR was issued. Dr. Aponte did not utilize one of the three options in the Department's rule, which are set forth in the form petition, to prove the dates on which he received either EOBR. As noted above, he completed the petition by giving only the date on which he received the second EOBR. The Department applied the default method in its rule to determine the receipt date of the first EOBR, which is the EOBR that made the PPO reduction adjustment sought to be challenged. The Department determined that Petitioner was deemed to have received the first EOBR on May 16, 2018. Accordingly, the deadline for serving a petition to contest the adjustments in the May 11, 2018, EOBR was June 30, 2018, 45 calendar days after May 16, 2018. The Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute at issue in this case, served on the Department on February 8, 2019, was more than seven months too late.3/ Petitioner offered no evidence or argument to excuse his untimely submittal. Case No. 19-2653 Dr. Aponte provided services to an injured worker at Body Contouring, Inc., on October 10, 2018, and October 31, 2018, for which Dr. Aponte submitted bills to the employer's carrier. Bill for Services on October 10, 2018 On October 10, 2018, Dr. Aponte saw the patient for an outpatient office visit at Body Contouring, Inc., at which Dr. Aponte provided prolonged evaluation and management (E&M). Dr. Aponte's charges submitted to the carrier were $450.00 for the office visit and $220.00 for the prolonged E&M service. An EOBR was issued on November 16, 2018, adjusting both charges for two reasons explained in the EOBR. Both charges were reduced because they exceeded the fee schedule in the Provider Manual. Both charges were further reduced by a total of $79.91 pursuant to a written contractual arrangement. The EOBR explained these adjustments as Coventry P&T PPO reductions "in accordance with your Aetna contract." After the adjustments, Dr. Aponte was paid $260.09. The 45-day deadline to serve a petition on the Department to contest the adjustments explained in the November 16, 2018, EOBR was January 5, 2019 (using the default methodology to determine the EOBR receipt date in the absence of any other evidence). Dr. Aponte did not timely serve a Petition for Resolution of a Reimbursement Dispute on the Department to contest the adjustments in the November 16, 2018, EOBR. Instead, he communicated directly with the carrier and requested a re- evaluation of the bill. The carrier issued a second EOBR on December 31, 2018, disallowing payment of both line item charges on the resubmitted bill. The explanation in the EOBR for disallowing payment was "billing error: line item service previously billed and reimbursement decision previously rendered." Bill for Services on October 31, 2018 On October 31, 2018, Dr. Aponte saw the same injured worker for another outpatient office visit at Body Contouring, Inc., at which the patient received two injections. Dr. Aponte's charges submitted to the carrier were: $300.00 for the office visit; $330.00 for one injection; and $100.00 for the other injection. An EOBR was issued on November 21, 2018, adjusting the office visit charge and disallowing the two injection charges, for reasons explained in the EOBR. The $300.00 office visit charge was reduced because it exceeded the fee schedule allowance in the Provider Manual. The charge was further reduced by $48.16, pursuant to a written contractual arrangement. The EOBR explained the latter reduction as a Coventry P&T PPO reduction, "in accordance with your Aetna contract." The EOBR also explained that both injection charges were disallowed because the documentation did not substantiate that the services billed were rendered. After the adjustments and the disallowances, Dr. Aponte was paid $110.84. The 45-day deadline to serve a petition on the Department to contest the adjustments or disallowances in the November 21, 2018, EOBR was January 10, 2019 (using the default methodology to determine the EOBR receipt date in the absence of any other evidence). Dr. Aponte did not timely serve a petition for resolution of a reimbursement dispute on the Department to contest the adjustments in the November 21, 2018, EOBR. Instead, he communicated directly with the carrier and requested a re- evaluation of the bill. The carrier issued another EOBR on December 27, 2018, disallowing payment of the resubmitted bill for services rendered on October 31, 2018. The reason given for disallowing payment as to each of the three charges on the bill was "billing error: line item service previously billed and reimbursement decision previously rendered."4/ Dr. Aponte prepared a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute on the required form, seeking to contest the PPO adjustments made to the bills for services rendered to the same injured employee on October 10 and 31, 2018. He attached only the final re-evaluation EOBRs, issued December 31, 2018 (for the bill for services on October 10, 2018), and December 27, 2018 (for the bill for services on October 31, 2018). Dr. Aponte named the Petitioner as "Luis Aponte/Body Contouring, Inc." The instructions on the form specify that the named Petitioner must be a health care provider as defined in section 440.13(1)(b). Dr. Aponte gave a single date--January 7, 2019--as the EOBR receipt date. However, he did not select the method used to establish the EOBR receipt date, as provided in the form petition. The form instructs that if the EOBR receipt date is not established by one of the specified methods, then the EOBR receipt date will be deemed to be five days from the issue date on the EOBR. Dr. Aponte identified the issue in dispute as the PPO adjustments applied to the bills. However, neither of the re- evaluation EOBRs attached to the petition made any PPO adjustment. Dr. Aponte identified the disputed amount of the PPO adjustments as $162.69. That is the sum of the PPO adjustments made in the November 16, 2018, EOBR ($79.91), the November 21, 2018, EOBR ($48.16), and the December 7, 2018, EOBR ($34.62) (see endnote 4). Dr. Aponte did not attach any of the EOBRs that made the disputed PPO adjustments, but he did attach a letter that he identified and explained as follows: "A copy of the contract termination notice sent to Aetna has been provided."5/ The Department reviewed the petition for completeness. The Department evaluator noted that the attached EOBRs were identified as "Re-evaluation" EOBRs that did not make the disputed PPO adjustments. However, no timeliness determination could be made because the EOBRs that explained the PPO adjustments were not attached. In addition to failing to attach the relevant EOBRs, the petition was found to also be deficient in several other respects. The Department identified all perceived deficiencies in a Notice of Deficiency sent to Dr. Aponte by certified mail. He was instructed to correct all of the deficiencies within ten days after his receipt of the notice. Dr. Aponte timely responded, and cured all perceived deficiencies except one. The Department had found the petition deficient because it named as the petitioner "Luis Aponte/Body Contouring, Inc." However, the instructions on the form petition emphasize that the named petitioner had to be a "health care provider" as defined in section 440.13(1)(g). The Notice of Deficiency required a new form petition curing "Petitioner name and mailing address. This is the provider name, not the business name." The directive is not very clear. It could be interpreted as describing what is in the petition Dr. Aponte submitted ("This is"), instead of describing what should have been in the petition. Dr. Aponte's transmittal letter, listing the documents enclosed to cure the deficiencies, states that he provided a completed petition with the Petitioner's name and address. The transmittal letter was signed, with the following typed on two separate lines below the signature line: "Luis Aponte, MD" and "Body Contouring, Inc." The enclosed petition, however, named the Petitioner in the same manner as in the original petition: "Luis Aponte/Body Contouring, Inc." The undersigned appreciates the Department's concern that a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute must be submitted by a "health care provider" meeting the statutory definition. But in this instance, the Department was well aware that the health care provider was Luis Aponte, M.D., as were the carriers involved in reviewing and adjusting his bills, and issuing the EOBRs that Dr. Aponte is seeking to contest. Indeed, the Department's initial decision, set forth in a Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal, names the Petitioner as "Luis Aponte, M.D." The Department's Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal recites that Dr. Aponte failed to provide the curative documentation as required in the Notice of Deficiency. At hearing, the Department, through its evaluator who signed the Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal, testified that the sole deficiency not cured by Dr. Aponte was to name a petitioner that met the definition of a "health care provider." According to the Department, Dr. Aponte needed to add "M.D." after his name on the petition (as he did in the transmittal letter). The Department's evaluator also testified that since she determined that the petition had to be dismissed for failure to cure this deficiency, she did not go on to address the timeliness issue that could not be determined previously without the relevant EOBRs. Had the evaluator determined the deficiencies to be cured, she would have proceeded to assess the relevant EOBRs, which were provided by Dr. Aponte in response to the deficiency notice. She would have determined that the petition was not served on the Department within 45 days of receipt of the EOBRs that explained the contested PPO adjustments, and she would have dismissed the petition as untimely. Based on the Department's evidence and an independent assessment of the facts by which timeliness is determined, the undersigned finds that Dr. Aponte's petition, served on February 8, 2019, was not timely. The 45-day deadlines to serve petitions contesting the PPO adjustments explained in three different EOBRs were: January 5, 2019 (for the November 16, 2018, EOBR); January 10, 2019 (for the November 21, 2018, EOBR); and January 19, 2019 (for the December 7, 2018, EOBR). Dr. Aponte's petition was untimely, and not just by a day or two, but by at least 20 days. He offered no evidence or argument to excuse his untimely submittal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered in these consolidated cases by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, dismissing as untimely the Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute submitted by Petitioner, Luis Aponte, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2019.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68440.13 Florida Administrative Code (4) 69L-31.00869L-31.01269L-7.71069L-7.740 DOAH Case (2) 19-151719-2653
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