The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Assad F. Malaty, discriminated against Petitioners, Dr. James E. Townsend and his niece, Contessa Idleburg (formerly, Ms. Rogers), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the appropriate remedy therefor.
Findings Of Fact Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Dr. Townsend has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. He suffered a stroke in May 2014, upon which the requested modifications and accommodations were based. The stroke substantially limited one or more major life activities, given his need for using a wheelchair and walker. § 760.22(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Malaty conceded as much at the hearing.3/ Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Ms. Idleburg has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. She has a shunt to drain fluid from her brain, has received Supplemental Social Security Income since at least 2014, and also has used a walker. That said, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodations solely to assist Dr. Townsend after he suffered the stroke. Thus, Ms. Idleburg’s handicap is not relevant to the claims at issue. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Petitioners informed Mr. Malaty in May 2014 that Dr. Townsend suffered a stroke and requested that he make several modifications to the Unit, including handrails in the bathroom, and handrails and a ramp at the front door, and to accommodate them by assigning them a parking spot outside the Unit. There is no dispute that the requested modifications and accommodation were never made. Importantly, however, the evidence does not establish that Petitioners’ renewed those requests again before they filed complaints with the Department of Justice in late 2016 and HUD in early 2017.4/ Although Dr. Townsend reminded Mr. Malaty in a December 2016 letter that he had failed to make the requested the modifications, the undersigned finds that letter to be more in the nature of a response to Mr. Malaty’s threat of eviction rather than a renewed request to accommodate them. The weight of the credible evidence also confirms that Petitioners never offered to pay for the handrails, ramp, or signage for the requested parking spot. Indeed, Dr. Townsend testified that he believed Mr. Malaty was responsible for making such modifications as the owner of the Unit. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Malaty did not evict Petitioners because of their handicaps or their requests for modifications or an accommodation. Mr. Malaty initially threatened to evict them for failing to pay rent in January 2013, reducing their rent in September and December 2016, and failing to take care of the lawn as required in the lease. It had been three years since Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodation due to Dr. Townsend’s stroke and they did not re-raise those issues again until after Mr. Malaty threatened to evict them for failing to pay the rent. The evidence also is clear that Petitioners could have avoided eviction by paying the missed rent by December 29, 2016. But, they failed to do so and then did not pay their rent in January 2017, which ultimately led to Mr. Malaty filing the eviction action.
Conclusions For Petitioners: James E. Townsend, Sr., pro se Contessa Idleburg, pro se Apartment 2101 140 Aida Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 For Respondent: Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esquire Law Office of Charlann Jackson Sanders 2225 East Edgewood Drive, Suite 8 Lakeland, Florida 33803
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of unlawful discrimination against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling, in violation of section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been an individual with a disability because he is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He is required regularly to take medication to control the disease. At all material times, Respondent Scandinavian Properties, LLC (Respondent Scandinavian) has owned a small complex of rental units in Miami Beach consisting of one or more Airbnb units at the back of the property and two duplex units at the front of property in a two-story building. This case involves one of the two-bedroom, one-bath duplexes with the address of 7910 Byron Avenue, Unit 1 (Unit 1), which was the ground-floor duplex. At all material times, Respondent Renes has been a managing principal of Respondent Scandinavian, and Respondent Bourguigne has been an employee of a property management company retained by Respondent Scandinavian to manage the complex. In an effort to find a suitable rental unit, Petitioner employed the services of a real estate broker or associate, who contacted Respondent Renes to discuss the rental of Unit 1, which had just undergone extensive renovations of two years' duration. Petitioner was recovering from recent surgery, so, as a favor to the real estate agent, Respondent Renes agreed to rent Unit 1 to Petitioner with a background check, but not the customary face-to-face meeting that Respondent Renes required with prospective tenants. Thus, Respondent Renes had limited, if any, contact with Petitioner during the lease negotiations. Petitioner and Respondent Scandinavian entered into a 12-month lease commencing November 1, 2018 (Lease). The Lease prohibited keeping any pets, smoking "in the Premises," creating any "environmental hazards on or about the Premises," keeping any flammable items "that might increase the danger of fire or damage" on the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, destroying, defacing, damaging, impairing or removing any part of the premises belonging to Respondent Scandinavian, and making any alterations or improvements to the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, although Petitioner was allowed to hang pictures and install window treatments. The Lease required Petitioner to ensure that all persons on the premises acted in a manner that did not "unreasonably disturb any neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace" and permitted Respondent Scandinavian to adopt or modify rules for the use of the common areas and conduct on the premises. The Lease assigned to Petitioner the responsibility for maintaining smoke detectors, locks, keys, and any furniture in the unit. The Lease permitted "[o]ccasional overnight guests," who could occupy the premises for no more than seven nights per month, and required written approval for anyone else to occupy the premises. Among the rules of the complex was a prohibition against disabling smoke detectors. However, without reference to the Lease provision applicable to pets, one rule allowed one dog or one cat. Another rule assured that management would help tenants gain access to their units when locked out. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Lease, Petitioner's visitors violated two provisions of the Lease by smoking outside and allowing a dog to run loose in the common area. Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner of the violations, which do not appear to have resulted in any penalties. Admitting to the presence of the dog, Petitioner testified only that the video of the dog violation, if not also the smoking violation, led him to believe that he was being watched. Petitioner's complaint of individual surveillance became an ongoing issue--in his mind. The minimal staffing and small area occupied by the small complex, as a practical matter, both precluded individual operation of cameras to trace the movements of Petitioner and his visitors in the common area and facilitated the surveillance of all, or nearly all, of the common area with relatively few cameras. The evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the respondents at any time conducted video surveillance particularly of Petitioner or his visitors. Subsequently, Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner that someone had been shouting his name outside the gate of the complex during the evening hours. This incident is not prohibited by the Lease because the person, while perhaps acquainted with Petitioner, was not his invitee onto or about the premises. Nonetheless, Petitioner's sole reported reaction to this disturbance was to demand a copy of any video--and complain when the respondents failed to comply with his demand. Another of Petitioner's visitors parked a car outside the gate in a space reserved for occupants of the Airbnbs. When, evidently in the presence of Petitioner, Respondent Bourguigne confronted the visitor, the visitor replied that he had only been parked there for 20 minutes. Respondent Bourguigne stated that she had seen the car parked in the spot for 43 minutes. Again, Petitioner's sole response was not to deal with the violation, but to complain about surveillance, evidently of the parking area. The most serious violations of the Lease were discovered on January 28, 2019, when Respondent Renes conducted an inspection of Unit 1. Respondent Renes inspected all rental units of the complex every two or three months to check for safety issues that could imperil tenants or the complex itself. In her inspection, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had disconnected the smoke alarms and encased them in plastic tape to render them inoperative. She also found that Petitioner had crowded the unit with furniture to the point of impeding egress and constituting a fire hazard. Although not involving safety issues, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had attached screws to metal doors and kitchen cabinets, damaging these new fixtures. Additionally, Respondent Renes noted the presence of a cat. As noted above, the rules conflicted with the Lease as to the presence of a single dog or cat. In any event, by this time, the respondents were aware that the cat, as well as a human, routinely shared Unit 1 with Petitioner, and the respondents had impliedly consented to these cohabitations. Again, Petitioner's reaction to the Lease violations found by Respondent Renes on January 28 was not to address the problems. Instead, he objected to the inspection as singling him out. By letter delivered to Petitioner on February 14, 2019, Respondent Scandinavian advised that he was in violation of the Lease for allowing an unauthorized person and a cat to occupy the unit, for wrapping the smoke detectors in plastic, for damaging the unit's fixtures by attaching screws into the metal doors and kitchen cabinets, and by cluttering the interior of the unit so as to impede internal movement. The letter demands that Petitioner correct the violations within seven days, or else Respondent Scandinavian would terminate the lease. Respondent Bourguigne's main involvement with this case involves an incident that occurred on the evening of February 15, 2019, when Petitioner locked his keys in his unit and was unable to unlock the door or otherwise enter the unit. Petitioner called the office, but Respondent Bourguigne, who responds to such requests during her normal working hours of Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., did not receive the call until the following morning when she listened to messages. Respondent Bourguigne promptly called Respondent Renes for guidance, and Respondent Renes directed her to summon the complex's handyman, who, as soon as he could, which was 1:00 p.m. on February 16, drove to the complex and opened Unit 1 for Petitioner. Rather than call a locksmith when the respondents failed to respond immediately to his call to the office, Petitioner and a companion attempted to break into Unit 1 with a screwdriver at about 1:30 a.m. Although unaware of the lockout, Respondent Renes learned of the attempted break-in through an automated security system, so she called the police, who reported to the scene and, after briefly interrogating Petitioner, determined that no crime had taken place. Petitioner wrongly concluded that Respondent Renes had been watching him in real time and called the police, knowing that the apparent perpetrator was really Petitioner and no crime was taking place. While locked out of his unit, Petitioner had also sent emails to Respondent Renes. In one of them sent on February 16, Petitioner advised for the first time that he was diagnosed with HIV and dependent on medication that was locked in his unit. Respondent Renes testified that she did not see these emails until days later. At minimum, it is clear that, prior to February 16, no respondent was on notice of Petitioner's disability, so the seven-day notice letter delivered two days earlier could not have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Despite the seven-day deadline contained in the letter of February 14, by email or text dated February 21, Petitioner advised Respondent Renes that, by 2:00 p.m. on February 22, he "will have remedied each of the … listed [violations]." This was one day past the deadline. Because Petitioner failed timely to meet the conditions of the February 14 seven-day notice letter, Respondent Scandinavian commenced an eviction proceeding on February 22 and, after a hearing, obtained a judgment ordering the eviction of Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of any of the respondents in their dealings with him, any incidental discriminatory effect in their acts and omissions, or any failure or refusal to accommodate Petitioner's disability. To the contrary, as to discrimination, Respondent Renes chose to forego eviction and instead give Petitioner a chance timely to remedy the Lease violations; when Petitioner failed to do so, Respondent Scandinavian proceeded to evict Petitioner. Nor has any act or omission of any respondent had a discriminatory incidental effect on Petitioner. Lastly, the availability of Respondents Renes and Bourguigne or other employees of Respondent Scandinavian to open units to locked-out tenants and occupants was reasonable and in no way constituted a failure to accommodate Petitioner's disability, for which Petitioner never requested or, on these facts, needed an accommodation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the respondents not guilty of the charges set forth in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Philip Kim, Esquire Pensky & Kim, P.A. 12550 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 401 North Miami, Florida 33181 (eServed) Jack Wilson 17560 Atlantic Boulevard, Apartment 515 Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, two, whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to acts of coercion or retaliation as a result of Petitioner's exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maria Thornhill ("Thornhill") owns and lives in a unit in the Admiral Farragut Condominium Apartments. Respondent Admiral Farragut Condominium Association, Inc. ("AFCA"), manages the property of which Thornhill's condominium is a part. This case continues a dispute between Thornhill and AFCA which began in 1997, when Thornhill——without first securing AFCA's permission——installed three wooden steps leading from her rear balcony down to a patio located about 30 inches below. AFCA disapproved of the steps and directed Thornhill to remove them, which was done long ago. In the past, Thornhill has alleged, among other things, that AFCA and its individual directors unlawfully discriminated against her in denying her many requests to reinstall the steps, which she claims are needed as a reasonable accommodation for her handicap.2 Consequently, the parties have been pitted against each other for years in one legal proceeding after another, in various forums including DOAH. Thornhill has lost many battles in this protracted litigation——and consequently been ordered to pay tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions, court costs, and attorney's fees. Still, she presses on. In this case, Thornhill argues, as she has for more than a decade, that she needs to attach steps to her rear balcony because she is physically unable to traverse the 30 inches which separate the balcony from the ground and hence would be trapped if a fire were to block both of the unit's two doors to the outside. Not for the first time, Thornhill alleges here that AFCA discriminated against her on the basis of handicap when it denied her request(s), the most recent of which was made in January 2004, for approval of the steps. In addition to her claim involving the steps, Thornhill alleges that AFCA has discriminated or retaliated against her, in some unspecified way(s), in connection with a boat slip, which she is, evidently, "next in line" to rent, once the lease expires under which another unit owner currently enjoys the right to use the slip. Finally, Thornhill contends that, in its efforts to collect the various money judgments it has been awarded, AFCA has retaliated against her unlawfully. Determinations of Ultimate Fact With regard to the steps, Thornhill presented no evidence suggesting that such a modification is reasonable, nor any proof that installation of such steps is necessary to ameliorate the effects of her particular handicap. There is no evidence that any of AFCA's decisions concerning the boat slip were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Thornhill. There is likewise no evidence that AFCA ever undertook to execute or otherwise enforce the judgments it has obtained against Thornhill because of discriminatory animus. In sum, there is not a shred of competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination, coercion, or retaliation could possibly be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that AFCA did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AFCA not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Thornhill no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Based on the undisputed facts included in pleadings filed in this proceeding and on the documentary evidence attached to the Association's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 16, 1999, Ms. Thornhill filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in which she accused the Association of housing discrimination on the basis of handicap and coercion. The complaint was apparently based on the Association's attempts to make Ms. Thornhill remove a set of steps leading from the terrace of her apartment. In June 1999, the Association filed a civil lawsuit against Ms. Thornhill in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, styled Admiral Farragut Condominium Association v. Maria Thornhill, Case No. 99-15567 CA 22. On or about September 21, 1999, Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, filed Defendant, Maria Thornhill's Answer to Complaint. Included in the answer was a Counterclaim filed by Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, against the Association, in which she sought injunctive relief and damages against the Association pursuant to Section 760.35(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. 1/ She asserted in the Counterclaim that she had filed a discrimination complaint against the Association with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which had been referred to the Commission and that this complaint was still pending before the Commission. Ms. Thornhill alleged in the Counterclaim that the Association had engaged in housing discrimination against her on the basis of her handicap because it had refused to accommodate her disability by giving her permission to retain the steps she had installed leading from the terrace of her apartment. Ms. Thornhill also alleged that the Association had "authorized or acquiesced in a series of actions intended as harassment and retribution" against Ms. Thornhill for having filed a housing discrimination complaint. The factual and legal bases on which Ms. Thornhill requests relief in the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission and in the Counterclaim filed in circuit court are virtually identical.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint filed by Maria T. Thornhill to enforce rights granted by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.30 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2000.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 760.34, Florida Statutes, to consider Petitioner's Petition for Relief; and Whether Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Petitioner contracted to purchase a condominium, "unit 206 in Building 425 at Serravella at Spring Valley" from Respondent. For reasons not relevant to the issues presented for determination, closing was deferred; and on December 22, 2006, Petitioner signed and submitted an "Addendum to Contract" to Respondent that sought "to revise contract closing date to 2/28/2007." Sometime in late December 2006, a telephone conversation took place among Steve Myers, a realtor for Serra Villa, Petitioner, and Barefield. Barefield was in Alabama, and Myers and Petitioner were in Florida on a speakerphone. Barefield advised Petitioner that the addendum would not be accepted by Respondent. Barefield and Petitioner did not speak to each other after this December telephone conversation. All communication was accomplished through third parties. Subsequent to Respondent's refusal to accept Petitioner's addendum, there is lengthy correspondence and litigation involving the parties. For some time after Respondent rejected Petitioner's addendum, Petitioner desired to purchase the condominium and, apparently, indicated so in various offers communicated by his attorneys to Respondent. If an unlawful discriminatory act occurred, the determination of which is not an issue presented for determination, the act occurred in December 2006. Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint dated September 17, 2008, and signed by Petitioner on September 22, 2008, was filed with United States Department of Housing and Urban Development more than one year after the alleged act of discrimination. On November 6, 2008, Petitioner sent a four-page fax transmission to Lisa Sutherland, a FCHR employee, which included a Petition for Relief. On November 13, 2008, Petitioner sent a second fax transmission of seven pages to Lisa Sutherland. Apparently, this second transmission included a Petition for Relief. On December 4, 2008, Petitioner sent a third fax transmission addressed to "Mrs. Crawford/Lisa Sutherland." While the fax transmission cover sheet is dated "11-13-08," the report of transmission shows that this 11-page transmission was sent on "12/04 15:24." The Petition for Relief forwarded by FCHR to DOAH was date-stamped "2008 DEC-4 PM 3:25."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief as being time-barred as a result of the late filing of Petitioner, Ricardo Vega's, Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard S. Taylor, Jr., Esquire 531 Dog Track Road Longwood, Florida 32750-6547 Barbara Billiot-Stage, Esquire Law Offices of Barbara Billiot-Stage, PA 5401 South Kirkman Road, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32819
