The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“Respondent”), is entitled to a deduction of the retirement benefits to be paid to Aubrie-Elle Perez, and if Respondent is entitled to a deduction, whether the deduction should be in the amount of the gross disbursements of $19,833.21 or the net payments to Edward Perez (“Lt. Perez”) in the amount of $17,017.80.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. There are approximately 400,000 active members within the FRS. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In 1997, Lt. Perez began employment with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. For over 16 years, Lt. Perez served as a fire fighter with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department, his last position being a Lieutenant. Lt. Perez was a vested member of the FRS. Upon his initial employment and enrollment with the FRS in 1997, Lt. Perez entered the Investment Plan and made a retirement benefits election designating that if he died before his retirement and chose not to designate a beneficiary, retirement benefits would be paid in accordance with section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes. Lt. Perez chose not to designate a beneficiary. Thus, according to this statute, retirement benefits would first be paid to Lt. Perez’s spouse, and if no spouse, then to his only child, the Petitioner. Tragically, on April 7, 2013, Lt. Perez collapsed at the fire station. Subsequently, Lt. Perez was diagnosed with a grade-four malignant brain tumor known as a glioblastoma multi-forming--a very aggressive and generally terminal form of brain cancer. There is no cure and the median survival rate for adults with this form of brain cancer is 9 to 14 months. Due to his terminal brain cancer and the treatments he had undergone and was undergoing, Lt. Perez was unable to continue his duties with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. On February 19, 2014, a two-page FRS Investment Plan Application for Disability Retirement Form PR-13 (“application for disability retirement”), and an FRS Investment Option Selection Form PR-11o (“option selection form”), were submitted to Respondent for Lt. Perez. They were sent to Respondent by mail by Lt. Perez’s sister, Alecs Perez-Crespo. The effect of the application for disability retirement and the selection of Option 1 on the option selection form would be to transfer the monies from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan, and convert Lt. Perez’s accumulated Investment Plan retirement benefits to monthly disability retirement benefits during his lifetime. Then, upon his death, the monthly benefit payments would stop, and the beneficiary would receive only a relatively small amount, if any--a refund of contributions Lt. Perez had paid into the Investment Plan retirement account, which are in excess of the amount he received in benefits, not including the transferred Investment Plan account balance.2/ The two-page application for disability retirement was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. The option selection form was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Affirmative medical and factual evidence establishes, and rebuts any legal presumption to the contrary, that Lt. Perez was not mentally, physically, cognitively, or legally competent to execute the option selection form or the application for disability retirement in February 2014, or to understand their legal nature and effect. Nevertheless, Respondent processed the application for disability retirement and option selection form. As a result, Lt. Perez was deemed to have retired effective April 1, 2014, and he forfeited approximately $238,000, which was transferred from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Subsequently, two disability retirement benefit warrants were issued by the State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, to Lt. Perez, via the Pension Plan, in care of Alecs Perez-Crespo, POA. The dates of these warrants are April 30, 2014, and May 30, 2014. Both warrants were endorsed by Ms. Perez-Crespo, “POA For Edward Perez.” Respondent made these disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: April 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less deducted taxes of $413.20, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,537.43; May 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43.3/ A direct deposit authorization for electronic transfer of future retirement benefit warrants into a checking account solely in the name of Lt. Perez was signed by Alecs Perez Crespo, “POA for Edward Perez,” on May 9, 2014. Two additional disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez were sent to the checking account of Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: June 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43; July 31, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,981.32, less taxes of $417.81 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,177.51, bringing the total sum of the gross disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $19,833.21, and the total sum of the net disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $17,017.80. The net sum of $17,017.80 issued by the Pension Plan as disability retirement benefits to Lt. Perez was deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. Accordingly, $19,833.21 (gross)/ $17,017.80 (net), was received by Lt. Perez. Lt. Perez died on July 16, 2014, from the cancer. At the time of Lt. Perez’s death, Petitioner was, and remains, his sole surviving child (natural or adopted). Lt. Perez was not married at the time of his death and, thus, left no surviving spouse. Because of the receipt of the four payments during his lifetime, which are applied first to the personal contributions made by Lt. Perez into the Investment Plan during his lifetime, the amount of Lt. Perez’s small contributions into the plan were exhausted by the time of his death. Therefore, if the option selection form is valid, Petitioner, as the sole beneficiary and child of Lt. Perez, would receive nothing. Respondent concedes that notwithstanding the facial appearance of the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the documents are void and invalid because they failed to comply with the statutory, rule, and manual requirements applicable to properly effectuate the Option 1 selection, in that they were not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Respondent concedes that due to Lt. Perez lacking the mental, cognitive, physical, and legal capacity to understand the nature and legal effect of executing the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the purported execution by Lt. Perez of the option selection form and of the application for disability retirement are void and invalid. Respondent concedes that the option selection form is invalid and void ab initio, and Lt. Perez’s earlier selection in 1997, pursuant to section 121.091(8), should be reinstated under the FRS Investment Plan. Respondent concedes that with Lt. Perez having died in 2014 with no surviving spouse, and with Petitioner being his sole surviving child at the time of his death, that the full retirement benefits of $234,035.81, to which Lt. Perez was entitled under his Investment Plan designation of beneficiary should be paid directly to Petitioner. Respondent asserts, however, that the payment of the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled should be reduced by the amount of the four payments made by Respondent to Lt. Perez, which gross disbursements total $19,833.21, or net disbursements total $17,017.80, making the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled to be $214,202.60 or $217,018.01, not $234,035.81. Respondent’s position is correct because the gross benefits in the amount of $19,833.21 were received by Lt. Perez when the four payments, after applicable required deductions, were deposited into his personal checking account. At hearing, no persuasive and credible evidence was presented indicating whatever happened, if anything, to the net payments of $17,017.80 deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating whether any of the monies were withdrawn from the checking account before or after Lt. Perez’s death. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating that Ms. Perez-Crespo used, diverted, or withdrew any of the funds from the checking account. No bank statements were offered into evidence. Petitioner, who is the personal representative of the estate, did not testify. No accounting of the assets of Lt. Perez’s estate was presented. Even if any of the $17,017.80 was used or diverted by Ms. Perez-Crespo after being deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account, Petitioner, as personal representative of the estate of Lt. Perez, might have a remedy in another forum to recover such funds from Ms. Perez-Crespo. In any event, such a potential claim, not borne by the evidence presented in the instant proceeding, is beyond the scope of this administrative proceeding. Based on the evidence adduced at hearing and the stipulations of the parties, it is clear that $19,833.21 was received by Lt. Perez when $17,017.80 (after the required deductions) was deposited into his personal checking account. To require Respondent to pay the entire amount of $234,035.81 would result in overpayment of $19,833.21. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to a deduction in the amount of the gross disbursement of $19,833.21.4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order requiring that that the total sum of $214,202.60 be returned by Respondent to the FRS Investment Plan for the benefit of Lt. Perez, deceased, and that pursuant to section 121.091(8)(a), Florida Statutes, that Petitioner, Aubrie-Elle Perez, as the sole surviving child of and the sole beneficiary of Lt. Perez, immediately receive the amount of $214,202.60. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to address issues regarding Petitioner’s entitlement to, and the amount of, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2017.
The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to change his retirement to in-line-of-duty disability benefits pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 4.002(4).
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Retirement is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. On or about January 3, 1983, Gordon B. Williams began his employment as a Vocational Instructor III for the Florida Department of Corrections. By reason of his employment, Mr. Williams became a member of FRS. Over the course of his career, Mr. Williams suffered a number of on-the-job accidents which resulted in various bodily injuries. On or about February 4, 1998, a Form FR-13a, signed by Sherry Rogers, Personnel Technician I, at Lake Correctional Institution was completed on behalf of Mr. Williams. The form indicated "regular" disability. By letter dated August 27, 1998, Mr. Williams tendered his resignation from his employment. His employment with the State of Florida terminated effective on or about September 23, 1998. Mr. Williams resigned because he was unable to continue performing his duties in light of his physical disabilities. Mr. Williams earned approximately 15.75 years of service credit in the FRS. Mr. Williams called the Division of Retirement to discuss his retirement twice: on or about October 22, 1998, and November 4, 1998. On or about December 14, 1999, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Division an application for FRS early service retirement. His effective retirement date was November 1, 1998. However, the application received by the Department was not signed. On the unsigned form, immediately above where Petitioner should have signed the application, was the following statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (Bold in original.) On January 8, 1999, the Division of Retirement notified Petitioner that his application was not signed in the presence of a notary public, and provided another application for him to complete and have properly notarized. This letter also indicated, in all-cap, bold-face type, "Once you retire, you cannot add additional service or change options. Retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited!" On January 29, 1999, a second Application for Service Retirement was filed with the Division of Retirement, signed by Mr. Williams and notarized on January 18, 1999. This application bore the same statement regarding the applicant's understanding of the inability to change retirement options or type as that quoted in Finding of Fact 9. A third application was submitted in approximately February 1999, to correct a problem related to the notarization of Petitioner's signature. This third application also contained the same statement identified in Finding of Fact 9. On or about March 24, 1999, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Department a Health Insurance Subsidy Certificate and a withholding certificate for pension payments. Petitioner began receiving benefit payments in March 1999 and these payments were direct deposited to Petitioner's bank account. Petitioner did not apply for disability retirement prior to applying for service retirement. On or about December 28, 2007, a new Form FR-13a, signed by Luz Veintidos, Personnel Specialist, at the Department of Corrections Region III Personnel Office, was completed on behalf of Mr. Williams. This new Form FR-13a indicated "in-line- of-duty" disability. Attached to the new Form FR-13a was the original Form FR-13a completed in February 1998. On or about January 22, 2008, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Department an application for in-line-of-duty disability retirement, along with a letter requesting that his type of retirement be changed from service retirement to disability retirement. Respondent's records do not indicate and no competent testimony indicates that Respondent received any documents related to Petitioner's claim for disability retirement prior to January 2008. While Petitioner inquired about disability retirement, no application was filed requesting it until 2008. By letter dated February 8, 2008, the Division of Retirement advised Mr. Williams that a retired member could not change his type of retirement after a benefit payment has been cashed or deposited and therefore the Division of Retirement could not honor his request. By letter dated February 25, 2008, Mr. Williams contended that he was "following Division of Retirement instructions when he applied for early service retirement instead of disability retirement" and that his October 1998 telephone conversation with the Division "was, in effect, a denial of application for benefits." He could not, however, identify who he talked to at the Division of Retirement that instructed him regarding his choice to file for early retirement. Nor did he indicate that at any time he understood that an application for retirement could be processed by an individual agency as opposed to the Division of Retirement, or processed by telephone without a written application. By letter dated April 11, 2008, the Division advised Mr. Williams of its final decision to deny his request to change his type of retirement from service retirement to disability retirement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request to change his retirement status to in-line-of-duty disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Gordon B. Williams 19607 North Highway 27 Clermont, Florida 34715 Geoffrey Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.
Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Huldah C. Roach. At the time of her death, Mrs. Roach was a retired member of the Florida Retirement System, and was receiving retirement benefits pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, Division of Retirement, sent Mrs. Roach her retirement benefits for the month of June, 1977, at the end of that month. The warrant for the retirement benefit was received by the Petitioner on or about June 30, 1977, and was deposited by him in the joint account which he had shared with Mrs. Roach. On June 8, 1977, Mrs. Roach died. By letter dated July 4, 1977, the Petitioner advised the Respondent of his wife's death. He also advised the Respondent that he was holding the benefit warrant, but in a telephone conversation on August 22, 1977, he advised the Respondent that the warrant had been deposited in the joint account. By letter dated August 24, 1977, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that Mrs. Roach was entitled to retirement benefits only up to the date of her death, and that $330.81 of the June payment thus represented an overpayment. The letter included a demand for repayment of the asserted overpayment. The Respondent made no effort to collect the asserted overpayment between August 24, 1977, and December 5, 1979, when the Respondent, through counsel, forwarded a demand letter to the Petitioner. The petitioner was not able to identify what expenses he paid from the June, 1977, retirement benefit. Mrs. Roach received retirement benefits in excess of her total contributions to the Florida Retirement System, and under the retirement option that she selected, she was entitled to no additional benefits after the day of her death. The Respondent has consistently interpreted provisions of the Florida Retirement Law as allowing payment of retirement benefits only through the date of a retiree's death.
Findings Of Fact The parties entered into a stipulation, which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, but is quoted for the sake of clarity: Stipulated Facts Petitioner is Charles E. Kellum whose address is 10420 SW 119th Street, Miami, Florida. Petitioner is a forty-two (42) year-old male whose education consists of a graduate equivalency degree received while serving in the Air Force from 1954 through 1958. His Air Force work and training was as a fire fighter in the Crash Rescue and Fire Department of the United States Air Force. In 1959, Petitioner became employed with the Sheriff's Department of Dade County, Florida, as a motorcycle officer and first joined the Florida retirement system then in effect for county employees. Later, Petitioner changed to what is now known as the Florida Retirement System. While employed by Dade County, while on duty, and while a member of the Florida Retirement System or its predecessor, Petitioner was involved in four (4) accidents. The accidents and injuries sustained are as follows: In 1964, Petitioner was in a motorcycle accident for which he first received treatment from Dr. Samartino for abrasions and contusions; In a separate motorcycle accident, on February 16, 1965, Petitioner sustained a fractured radial head of the right elbow. In surgery that month the radial head was removed. In April, 1965, the end of the ulna was removed. In November, 1965, certain reconstructive surgery was attempted to increase the motion in his right arm. Subsequent reconstructive surgery was attempted in February, 1966. (Deposition of Dr. Samartino, pages 8 - 11); In an on-duty accident in March, 1970, Petitioner fell and injured his knee and underwent surgery on the knee in April of 1970. In May, 1974, Petitioner was involved in an accident wherein, while making an arrest, he fell on a rocky terrain and suffered re- injury to his arm and knee and injury to his back. (Deposition of Kellum, pages 4 - 5). That Petitioner was retired from Dade County for medical reasons in May, 1974. He has not been employed since, except for approximately one year he was operating a small lawn maintenance business with the help of his son and another helper. His activities are limited to driving a truck and soliciting business. Stipulated Evidence Exhibit 1 - The deposition of Charles Kellum, Petitioner Exhibit 2 - The application for retirement benefits filed December 9, 1974, and the employer's statement of disability dated December 6, 1974. Exhibit 3 - The reports of Dr. Toth dated December 9, 1974, and August 6, 1974. Exhibit 4 - The reports of Dr. Gilbert dated December 9, 1974, and October 30, 1974. Exhibit 5 - The reports and deposition of Dr. Samartino. Exhibit 6 - The reports and deposition of Dr. Jacobson. Exhibit 7 - The deposition of Harry Windler, pages 8 - 14 and pages 19 - 36. Exhibit 8 - The letter from the Director of Retirement dated April 10, 1975. Upon a consideration of the evidence further findings of fact are: The various in-line-of-duty injuries and back pain suffered by Petitioner caused his involuntary retirement from the Dade County Department of Public Safety in 1974, after an injury on May 4, 1974. Petitioner applied for work with the police department, and wants and has wanted to return to some kind of law enforcement or police work. Respondent through its administrator, as provided in Section 121.091(4), Florida Statutes, denied Petitioner Kellum's disability retirement benefits by letter dated April 10, 1975, a copy of which is marked Exhibit "A" and make a part hereof. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing in April of 1975. The Respondent denied the petition as being untimely but thereafter revoked the denial and requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to hold a hearing on the issues presented. The employer, Metropolitan Dade County Department of Public Safety, in its statement of disability stated that "physicians' statements indicate that this employee is unable to perform police duties." It also stated that no other jobs in the organization, suitable to the applicant's abilities, exist consistent with his classification. The departmental policy of the Metropolitan Dade County Department of Public Safety is to phase out employees who have become liabilities from an insurance risk management point of view. Because of the stringent minimum physical requirements imposed upon law enforcement officers in Dade County, Florida, Petitioner cannot perform his duties as a policeman or law enforcement officer and could not be re- employed in that position. There are no permanent sheltered positions for law enforcement personnel. Doctors Alex Toth and Robert G. Gilbert stated that Petitioner's condition is "prognosis guarded." They both stated that Petitioner was unable to perform regular duties. Dr. Toth stated Petitioner was "completely disabled," and Dr. Gilbert stated "for all intent and purposes, this patient is totally disabled." Dr. G. Thomas Samartino, in answer to the question, "At this time, in 1977, do you forecast any further degeneration in his health due to that particular diagnosis?" (degenerative arthrosis of the right elbow), answered "Yes." He further stated that he could not really forecast disability but that "it may stay pretty much the way it is or get a whole lot worse," and noted that there has been no improvement since 1966. He stated Petitioner suffered a 35 percent disability of the upper right extremity and a 30 percent disability of the body as a whole, which includes pain. All three physicians stated that they felt the Petitioner should not be employed as a policeman. Dr. Robert E. Jacobson, a neurologic surgeon, stated that from the functional standpoint the Petitioner would be unable to return to work as a combat policeman, although he could do other type of work. He also stated that the numerous injuries and back and neck complaints would add up to a more marked problem than any one would imply. Petitioner's training was as a fire fighter in the crash rescue fire department while in service of his country from 1954 to 1958. He joined the service immediately out of high school and, before his discharge, took the GED test to get a high school certificate. His employment and further training has been in police work, being employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Public Safety Department in October of 1959, a position he filled for fifteen, (15) years. His training after Air Force service consists of little more than on- the-job training for his employment as a motorcycle officer. Petitioner was self-employed, driving a truck and soliciting business together with two other persons in the yard maintenance work. He applied without success for at least two positions with private employers, but he has not applied for rehabilitative training. His remuneration from his self- employment was approximately $6,000.00 per year, substantially lower than he earned as a police officer, which pay classification is approximately $8,000.00 to $20,000.00. Petitioner is totally and permanently disabled from rendering useful and efficient service as an employee in police and law enforcement work, but he can perform a useful work service. Petitioner contends: That he is permanently and totally disabled from doing the police or law enforcement work for which he is trained and for which he had been employed for some fifteen (15) years, and that his disability arose from his work; That he is unable to perform materially or substantially all or any of the remunerative duties for which he is educated and trained, and which might permit him to be compensated at or near the compensable rate of a Dade County policeman; and That he is entitled to the disability benefits authorized by Section 121.091(4), inasmuch as he is totally and permanently disabled to perform duties as a police or law enforcement officer because of injuries he received while on such duty. Respondent contends: That Petitioner is not totally and permanently disabled hut only partially disabled, and can and does work and earn an income although he is disabled from performing the duties of his normal occupation; and That a showing that Petitioner is incapable of performing duties of his usual occupation is not sufficient to obtain disability retirement benefits under the statute.
Recommendation Grant Petitioner Charles E. Kellum disability retirement benefits. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Melvin R. Horne, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building A Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT CHARLES E. KELLUM, Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 77-465 DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to change the type of her retirement benefits from early service retirement to disability retirement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Nearly 1,000 public employers participate in the FRS, including state agencies, local governments, and district school boards. There are more than 600,000 individual active members in the FRS. Petitioner was an employee of the Pasco County School Board until she submitted her resignation on February 28, 2011, in order to retire. By reason of her employment with the Pasco County School Board, Petitioner is a member of the FRS. After Petitioner resigned, she met with Michael Hudson, the director of Employee Benefits for the Pasco County District School Board, on March 4, 2011, to complete the paperwork for her retirement. At the March 4, 2011, meeting, Petitioner completed and signed the form application for service retirement. The information filled out on the form in Petitioner's clear handwriting included her name, position, address, telephone number, social security number, birth date, and service termination date. The following statement appears on the application form immediately above Petitioner's notarized signature: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options, change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) or elect the Investment Plan once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (Bold in original). Petitioner also filled out the payment option selection form, selecting Option 1 as the option for how her retirement benefits are to be paid out. Immediately above Petitioner's signature on the option selection form is this statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins. (Bold in original). Petitioner was aware that she could seek to qualify for disability retirement benefits, but that in order to apply for disability retirement, she would have to submit certifications by two doctors that she was totally and permanently disabled, meaning that she was unable to work. Petitioner also knew that she could apply for early service retirement, which would not require proof of total, permanent disability. However, because Petitioner would be retiring early, her benefits would be discounted, so she would receive less. Petitioner understood, when she completed the application on March 4, 2011, that the type of retirement for which she applied was early service retirement. At retirement, she was 52 years and nine months old. In Petitioner's view, she was "forced" to retire. Petitioner had been employed as an adult education-health instructor at Marchman Technical Education Center, which she described as a stressful job. In 2010, she had to undergo three major abdominal and pelvic reconstructive surgeries. As she dealt with the challenges of complications and slow recoveries, she developed psychological issues that caused her to seek treatment from a psychiatrist. She was depressed and cried a lot, felt anxious and stressed, and experienced panic attacks. Petitioner took medication prescribed by her psychiatrist for her panic attacks and depression. She testified that the medication helped and that when she took her medication, she no longer cried all the time. However, she experienced side effects, including some drowsiness and difficulty processing information. By early 2011, Petitioner felt unable to return to her stressful job and had been attempting, without success, to find an appropriate job that she thought she could do with her limitations. She was worried and felt pressure, as a single mother who was supporting herself and her 17-year-old son, who lived with her. She was particularly concerned about ensuring a stream of income to pay for health insurance. Before Petitioner met with Mr. Hudson to apply for early service retirement, she discussed the different types of retirement with her good friend, Pat Beals. Ms. Beals had worked at Marchman Technical Education Center with Ms. Radicella. Both Petitioner and Ms. Beals testified that in discussing the different types of retirement, Petitioner believed at the time that she would not qualify for disability retirement. At the time in early 2011, Petitioner's belief was that she would be unable to obtain letters from two doctors who would render the opinion that Petitioner was unable to work. Ms. Beals apparently did not disagree with that opinion. Ms. Beals noted that Petitioner had been trying to get another job that she would be able to handle with her limitations. Ms. Beals said only that she thought Petitioner had tried to go back to work too soon, before she was fully healed. Petitioner went alone to her meeting with Mr. Hudson and did not ask any of her close friends or advisors, such as Ms. Beals or her neighbor, Mr. Edelman, to go with her. Petitioner testified that she had taken her medication to control her depression and her panic attacks that day. Petitioner was in good enough shape, mentally and physically, to safely drive herself to and from the school district administrative offices. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hudson explained Petitioner's choices to apply for early service retirement or to apply for disability retirement. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hudson explained that if she applied for disability retirement, two doctors would have to say she could never work again. This led Petitioner to choose early service retirement because, as she had discussed with Ms. Beals previously, she did not think two doctors would give the opinion that she was unable to work again. Moreover, at the time, Petitioner did not want to say that she would never work again. Petitioner found the meeting with Mr. Hudson to be very sad and embarrassing; she found the prospect of retirement itself to be very embarrassing, as she had always been independent and had always taken care of herself. Petitioner attempted to blame Mr. Hudson for the pressure she was feeling to make a choice and sign the paperwork presented to her, but Petitioner did not prove that Mr. Hudson was to blame for any pressure she felt. Petitioner failed to identify anything specific that Mr. Hudson said or did to create pressure, such as if he had told Petitioner she had to sign all of the paperwork then and there. Indeed, when asked if she felt pressured by Mr. Hudson, Petitioner's response was that "it was strictly business." Petitioner explained that she just "shut down," letting him give her papers, and she just signed them. Petitioner did not claim to misunderstand the different types of retirement benefits--early service retirement versus disability retirement--and indeed, expressed a very clear rationale for making the choice that she did. Petitioner had expressed that same rationale in conversations before March 4, 2011, with Ms. Beals. Petitioner testified that she did not understand the paperwork that Mr. Hudson presented her to sign and that she did not understand that she could not change the type of retirement from early service to disability retirement at a later date. Inconsistently, she testified that she understood that she would not be able to change her payment options after she cashed her first benefit check. That is part of the warning message appearing right above her signature. Petitioner did not credibly explain how she was able to understand that part of the warning message, while not understanding the other part of the warning message that she also could not "change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early)" after cashing her first benefit check. The notice appeared on both forms she signed that day in plain, clear language. Petitioner did not testify that she was given any misinformation or that she asked for explanations that were not forthcoming. Petitioner did not testify that she asked to delay signing the paperwork presented to her at the March 4, 2011, meeting, until she had had a chance to review it with one of her friends and advisors. Instead, Petitioner did not want to wait; she was in a hurry to sign the paperwork because the sooner she signed the paperwork, the sooner the payments would start. Petitioner attempted to disavow her March 4, 2011, early service retirement application on the theory that she lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of her actions that day. Petitioner offered no competent medical opinion testimony or medical records to support her claim. Petitioner's two friends tried to support her theory, but they lacked the medical expertise to offer an opinion that Petitioner did not understand the nature or consequences of her actions that day. To the contrary, their testimony tended to confirm that Petitioner not only understood what she did on March 4, 2011, but that she acted as she did for a very rational, logical reason. The evidence did not establish that Petitioner was impaired to any great extent because of her physical or mental conditions or because of her medication taken to control her conditions. Petitioner may lack confidence and doubt herself; she may seek out opinions of her close friends when making important decisions because she did not trust her own ability to make decisions. However, as she acknowledged and certainly exhibited at the hearing, she is intelligent and capable. Petitioner was capable of functioning independently, living alone with her 17-year-old son and taking care of him. Petitioner was able to drive alone and did so. Petitioner took care of her own paperwork, writing out checks, and paying her own bills. Petitioner was not hospitalized or adjudicated incompetent because of her mental condition, nor was there any suggestion that her psychiatrist or good friends thought such steps were necessary for Petitioner's competency to manage her own affairs. After Petitioner returned from her meeting with Mr. Hudson on March 4, 2011, she called Ms. Beals to tell her about the paperwork she completed in her meeting with Mr. Hudson. Ms. Beals testified that she could tell Petitioner was anxious, because she was talking very fast. Nonetheless, Petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her actions on March 4, 2011, well enough to tell Ms. Beals that she had applied for early service retirement benefits. Ms. Beals was concerned and said that she may have made a mistake by not applying for disability retirement. While Ms. Beals expressed surprise that Petitioner did not ask her to go with her on March 4, 2011, she admitted that they had talked about the retirement issue previously and that Petitioner's actions on March 4, 2011, were consistent with what they had previously discussed. Petitioner's neighbor, Alvin Ellenwood, also testified that Petitioner called him later on March 4, 2011, and reported to him that she had completed the paperwork for early service retirement benefits. Mr. Ellenwood testified that he, too, was concerned and told Ms. Radicella that she may have made a mistake by not applying for disability retirement. Despite the concerns of both Ms. Beals and Mr. Ellenwood, apparently no steps were taken in the days after March 4, 2011, to review the forms that Petitioner had signed or to seek out any information from the Division regarding whether Petitioner could try to change the type of retirement benefits from early service retirement to disability retirement. On March 9, 2011, the Division issued and transmitted to Petitioner the following documents related to her application: Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application (Acknowledgement); Estimate of Retirement Benefits (Estimate); an information sheet entitled, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose" (Option); and a FRS booklet published by the Division entitled, "Preparing to Retire" (Booklet). The Acknowledgement document confirmed receipt of Petitioner's service retirement application and repeated a similar warning as those appearing above Petitioner's signature on the forms she signed on March 4, 2011; this time, the notice was in all capital letters and in all bold print: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED." Detailed information was provided about FRS retirement in the 15-page Booklet. The Booklet's first four pages are devoted to information for contacting the Division, including how to access the Division's website, and how to contact individuals, via numerous toll-free telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, to ask questions. And yet another warning message appears on page 11 of the Booklet, set apart from the rest of the text by a bold text box: Remember, once you cash or deposit any benefit payment or after the first payment is credited during your DROP participation period, you cannot add service credit, change your retirement benefit option selection, change your type of retirement from early to normal or from service to disability retirement, transfer to the FRS Investment Plan or cancel your DROP participation. The two other documents sent on March 9, 2011, the Estimate and Option documents, specifically addressed the retirement payment option choice. These two documents warned that Petitioner had selected Option 1 and could not change that option after cashing or depositing her first benefit check. Petitioner did not say what she did upon receipt of March 9, 2011, package of materials, whether she reviewed the material or whether she asked her friends to review it. Had these documents been reviewed, it would have been clear that once Petitioner cashed or deposited the first benefit payment, she could no longer change the type of retirement from early service retirement to disability retirement.2/ At any point in time before Petitioner received and cashed or deposited her first retirement benefit check, she could have sought to change the type of retirement benefit from early service to disability retirement. However, no such steps were taken. As Petitioner testified and Ms. Beals acknowledged, Petitioner did not believe at that time that she would qualify for disability retirement. In any event, it would have taken longer to seek disability retirement benefits because of the need to obtain verification by two doctors that Petitioner was unable to work, and Petitioner did not want to wait. Petitioner received her first retirement benefit check at the end of March 2011, and the state warrant was paid (cashed or deposited) on April 8, 2011. As of the hearing date, Petitioner had received an additional nine monthly payments for her early service retirement benefit. For some reason, it was not until June 2011, after receiving and cashing or depositing three early service retirement benefit payments, that Petitioner decided to submit an application for disability retirement benefits. The parties stipulated that Petitioner's disability retirement application was mailed to the Division on June 14, 2011.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the request to change from early service retirement benefits to disability retirement benefits submitted by Petitioner, Reneé Radicella. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2012.
The Issue Should Petitioner Alma Slocum receive either the Option 3 or Option 4 retirement benefits retroactive to the death of Clyde Slocum in March 1975?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Clyde Slocum (Slocum), deceased, was a member of the State and County Officers Retirement System (SCOERS) under Chapter 122, Florida Statutes. Slocum was employed by the Suwannee County School Board as a school bus driver until he became physically unable to work in June 1970. Slocum married Alma Sanchez in October 1934, and was continuously married to her until his death on March 30. 1975. By letter dated May 6, 1968, Slocum made an inquiry to the Division regarding the benefits he would be eligible for if he retired from his employment as a school bus driver with the Suwannee County School Board. Slocum noted in the letter that he was not ready to quit work but wanted to know what benefits would be available, if and when he retired. The Division, by letter dated June 20, 1968, notified Slocum of the amount of his contributions on file and the benefits he would be eligible for under Options 1 through 4. It was pointed out that Options 3 and 4 would provide a smaller monthly benefit. However, these options would provide survivor benefits for his wife. It was also stated that proof of age for Slocum and his wife, Alma Slocum, would be required, if he selected Option 3 or 4. The following information was provided to Slocum: (a) Option 1 would provide $43.60 a month, but upon his death, no further benefits would be paid; (b) Option 2 would be 13 cents lower at $43.47, but in the event he died, his beneficiary would receive any balance of the amount of his contribution ($1,006.81) not paid; (c) Option 3 would provide a reduced monthly payment of $35.58 and one-half of that amount ($17.79) to his wife upon his death; and (d) Option 4 would provide for a payment of $30.08 and the same benefit to the wife upon his death. By letter dated August 5, 1970, Lavada Reuthinger, daughter of Slocum, sought information on the three different ways that Slocum could receive his retirement benefits. By letter dated August 7, 1970, Elizabeth Smith, Supervisor, Benefits Section, notified Slocum of the availability of an option election that would provide benefits for his wife after his death. The letter also notified Slocum that proof of his age was required, and if he chose benefits for his wife, then proof of her age was required as well. An estimate, dated September 22, 1970, of benefit amounts, similar to the estimate sent to Slocum in 1968, was prepared by the Division, and sent to Slocum. This estimate of benefits was for Options 1 an 2 only, and did not set forth a benefit amount for Options 3 and 4. The letter stated: "Only the first two options apply in your case." Apparently, the Division assumed that Slocum was retiring under disability. By letter dated October 2, 1970, the Division was notified by Dr. G. L. Emmel that Slocum was disabled and was not able to work. Elizabeth Smith notified Dr. Emmel of the statutory language requirement for an application for disability. Using a form provided by the Division, Slocum, on October 10. 1970, also under the assumption that he was retiring on disability, elected to receive benefits under Option 2. At this point, Slocum had been advised by the Division that neither Option 3 or Option 4 were available to him. Dr. Emmel provided the Department with the requested documentation that Slocum was permanently disabled. On October 26, 1970, Elizabeth Smith requested that Slocum submit proof of his age. By letter dated November 13, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he had failed to furnish proof of his age, but instead he had furnished his wife's birth certificate. Slocum's wife's birth certificate was returned by letter dated November 13, 1970. By letter dated November 21, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he could not retire under disability because he had reached normal retirement age, but that he could retire under Option 3 or Option 4 which would provide monthly payments to his wife upon his death, if he accepted a reduction in the amount of benefits. Smith further advised Slocum that he would need to furnish proof of his wife's age if he selected Option 3 or Option 4. Smith further stated that: "It was thought you were retiring under disability when proof [of your wife's age] was returned to you." Smith also advised Slocum that if he waited until June 30, 1970, he would receive the five-year average. The letter does not indicate what the payment amounts would be for the four different options, and the letter does not indicate that a option election form was included with the letter. Furthermore, the letter does not refer to the Option 2 selection form that Slocum had previously submitted to the Division. Slocum responded to Smith's letter on November 30, 1970, and enclosed a copy of his wife's birth certificate. Slocum also requested "the necessary forms concerning his retirement." Additionally, he notified the Division that since he had not worked since June 1970 he wanted retirement benefits to be paid as soon as possible. The Division did not comply with Slocum's request for the "necessary forms concerning his retirement." A warrant was mailed to Slocum on December 31, 1970, for retirement benefits from July 1, 1970, through December 31, 1970, at $59.17 a month. This benefit amount was the Option 2 retirement benefit amount furnished to Slocum on September 22, 1970, by the Division when it was assumed that he was retiring under disability. No explanation was given to Slocum if, or that, the Division was using Option 2 benefit selection that Slocum had signed and submitted to the Division on October 1970, prior to the time the Division had notified Slocum that he could choose Option 3 or Option 4. Slocum and his wife were both under the impression that since Slocum had furnished the Division a copy of his wife's birth certificate that she would receive retirement benefits after his death. Slocum died on March 30, 1975, five years after he retired. The Division advised Alma Slocum by letter dated May 19, 1975, that her husband had retired under Option 2 and, therefore, no benefits would be paid to her. A copy of his option election and the computation of his monthly benefits were enclosed in the May 19, 1975, letter from the Division. Thereafter, Petitioner repeatedly inquired of the Division why she was not entitled to retirement benefits as Slocum's widow. These inquires were made from the time of Slocum's death in 1975 through the present. In response to each inquiry the Division replied that Slocum had selected Option 2, and no benefits were payable to Petitioner under that option. In February 1999, Petitioner and her granddaughter, Theresa L. Crosby, visited the Division's office in Tallahassee, Florida and reviewed Slocum's file. After they reviewed the file, it was their position that Petitioner was entitled to receive survivor benefits and made a demand on the Division for Petitioner to receive those benefits. At no time prior to February 1999, had the Division advised Petitioner that she was entitled to a formal hearing on the matter. A final agency action letter dated March 26, 1999, was mailed to Petitioner which pointed out that her husband elected and received Option 2 benefits from 1970 until his death in March 1975 and there was no provision under SCOERS, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, to change the option choice at this time. This letter is the first written notice to Petitioner that she was entitled to request a formal hearing if she disagreed with the Division's decision. A Petition for Formal hearing contesting the Division's denial of a survivor's benefit for Petitioner was received by the Division on April 19, 1999. When Slocum made the selection for Option 2 retirement benefits he did so because he was advised by the Division that only Option 1 or Option 2 were available to him since he was retiring under disability. Once Slocum became aware that his wife could receive retirement benefits after his death, it is clear that he intended to select an option which would provide his wife with benefits after his death. Furthermore, after it was determined that he could not retire under disability, which had limited his options, the Division failed to give Clyde Slocum an opportunity to make a selection of the options offered for retirement benefits, either initially in writing or verbally by telephone with a follow-up written option, notwithstanding any testimony to the contrary which, lacks credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order finding Alma Slocum eligible to receive retirement benefits under Option 3 retroactive to Clyde Slocum's death on March 30, 1975, making adjustments for the higher rate paid Clyde Slocum during the years 1970 through his death in 1975, and any adjustments for interest that may be applicable to the benefits paid Clyde Slocum or those benefits that should have been paid to Alma Slocum. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra E. Allen, Esquire 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether deceased retiree's prior selection of Option One retirement benefit pay-out and his receipt and negotiation of retirement several checks should now be set aside, due to his wife's alleged forgery of her signature on the Spousal Acknowledgement (Form FR-11).
Findings Of Fact 1. Irvin M. Carpenter was born November 16, 1934, and died of cancer on November 18, 1997. Mr. Carpenter was employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer on September 10, 1984, and attained the rank of police sergeant at the time of his retirement. Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Florida Retirement System. 2. On January 20, 1991, Irvin M. Carpenter and Susan Ann Prescott were married. Susan Ann Carpenter is now, and has been at all time pertinent to these proceeding, employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer. Susan Carpenter is a member of the Florida Retirement System. 3. In October of 1996, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Carpenter separated and continued to live separately. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were initiated but was not finalized at the time of Irvin Carpenter's death in November 1997. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Ann Carpenter were husband and wife. 4. On July 8, 1997, Irvin Carpenter executed a Florida Retirement System form styled "Application for Service Retirement" (Form FR-11). This form provides the retiree with information pertaining to the four options by which his retirement benefits can be paid. One full page of the form provides an explanation of each option. By use of this form, Irvin Carpenter selected Option One retirement benefit payout plan. The explanation of Option One on Form FR-11 is as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. 5. The FR-11 also contained the following information in bold lettering: THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2 MARRIED YES[ ] NO [ ] IF YES, YOUR SPOUSE MUST SIGN BELOW: SPOUSAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : I, (Signature) Susan A. Carpenter,’ being the spouse of the above named member, acknowledges that the member has elected either Option 1 or 2. (Signature Irvin Carpenter 11-27-96 Signature of Spouse Date If your spouse does not sign, you must attach a signed statement explaining why your spouse did not acknowledge your selection. 6. The "yes" or "no" blocks requesting marriage status were blank on the FR-11 submitted by the retiree to the Agency. The Spousal Acknowledgement block contained the signature of "Susan Ann Carpenter." Susan Carpenter alleged this signature to be a forgery. 7. The form FPR-11 also contained the following statement in capital letters: I UNDERSTAND I MUST TERMINATE ALL EMPLOYMENT WITH FRS EMPLOYERS TO RECEIVE A RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER CHAPTER 121, FLORIDA STATUTES. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, OR CHANGE MY TYPE OF RETIREMENT (REGULAR, DISABILITY AND EARLY) ONCE MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL. MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. 8. Between the date of his retirement and the date of his death, Irvin Carpenter received, cashed, or deposited a minimum of three retirement checks from the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to his selection of Option One benefit payout plan. 9. After the death of Mr. Carpenter, the Agency, by letter dated November 24, 1997, addressed to: FAMILY OF IRVIN M. CARPENTER, 3602 W. Tampa Circle, Tampa, Florida 33629, informed the family of the retirement benefit due beneficiaries for November and the income tax deduction therefrom. 10. By letter to the Agency dated July 13, 2000, Susan Carpenter stated: My Husband, Irvin M. Carpenter, DOB 11/16/34, SSN 263-42-0146, retired from the Tampa International Airport Police Department on 07/31/1997. At the time of his retirement, we were separated but still Married. He passed away less than three months later in November 1997. I inquired as to any benefits and informed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, the parent organization of the Tampa International Airport Police Department, that he had changed his beneficiary to his daughter, Anita Carpenter. Just recently, I became aware of the Florida Retirement System provisions concerning retirement options. I ama police officer with the Tampa International Airport Police Department and these matters were covered in a pre-retirement briefing conducted by Human Resources. It is my understanding that if you are married and select option 1 or 2, the spouse must acknowledge that selection in writing. Since I had not signed any such acknowledgement, it occurred to me that my deceased husband's remaining options both provide for the joint annuitant. I posed this question to the HCAA Human Resources and was informed that my deceased husband did not retire. The Department announced his retirement, his name was added to the plaque listing retired officers and Department personnel files indicate a retirement date of 07/31/1999. I questioned my police captain and Chief of Police and both of them were emphatic that my husband retired on 07/31/1999. With my superiors providing information contrary to Human Resources, I have some doubt as to the status of my deceased husband with regards to the Florida Retirement System. Please confirm the status of Irvin M. Carpenter. Did he retire from FRS? If not, what was his status at the time he passed away? I am sure you understand the significance of my determining the correct status. Thank you for any assistance you can provide. 11. The Agency denied Susan Carpenter's request to void Irvin Carpenter's selection of Option One retirement pay-out. The Agency's letter of November 15, 2000, asserted the position that the selection cannot be changed since the retirement checks were cashed or deposited and cited the following portions of Section 121.091(6) (a), Florida Statutes: "The spouse of any member who elects to receive the benefit provided under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." The law does not require the spouse to agree with the members' retirement option selection. The Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement, submitted by Irvin Carpenter included Susan Carpenter's signature acknowledging that she was aware of the Option 1 selection. We receive numerous applications monthly and we do not investigate to determine if each signature is authentic. Although Mrs. Carpenter contends that her signature was forged, once a member cashes or deposits a check the option selection cannot be changed. The statutes do not require the spouse to agree with the members option selection, only to be made aware. Your request to void the Option 1 selection is denied. 12. Susan Carpenter denies having signed the Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement submitted by Irvin Carpenter. Susan Carpenter alleges that the signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," appearing on the Form FR-11 is a forgery. 13. During the final hearing and in the presence of the undersigned, Susan Carpenter signed "Susan A. Carpenter" three times, Petitioner's Exhibit F. At the request of the undersigned Susan Carpenter signed "Susan Ann Carpenter" once. A review of the four signature samples provided by Susan Carpenter, the sample signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," proved to the satisfaction of the undersigned evidence of the genuineness of the written signature in dispute. Accordingly, and as a finding of fact, the Form FR-11 signature "Susan Ann Carpenter" is not a forgery. 14. Susan Carpenter's assertion that the Agency is under legal obligation to contact each spouse or otherwise verify the signature of each spouse on the Form FR-11ls received in the Agency's normal course of business is without foundation in law and in fact. 15. Only the circuit court has jurisdiction and authority in dissolution of marriage cases to enter final orders determining property rights of marital assets. Petitioner proffered no such order as evidence. Accordingly, all testimony and evidence based on alleged spousal rights and entitlements pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, are not considered
Conclusions For Petitioner: Scott W. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Southeast Building, Suite 1500 St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building Cc 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact an Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Susan Carpenter's request to change the retirement option 13 selected by Mr. Irvin Carpenter, including benefits due, and denying all such other relief. lo& DONE AND ENTERED this = day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division _of Administrative Hearings this J2% day of July, 2001.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid $961.87 in 1975 when he received a refund of his retirement contributions, and, if so, whether Petitioner is required to refund that amount to the Division of Retirement before receiving any retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner is a law enforcement officer employed by the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP). Petitioner was first hired by FHP in August 1968. He left FHP on October 15, 1975, to pursue a private venture. Petitioner rejoined FHP in July 1981, and he is currently a member of the troop that patrols the Florida Turnpike. Between September 1968 and December 1974, Petitioner made monthly contributions to the FHP pension fund which, at the time, was administered by FHP. In 1970, when the Florida Retirement System (FRS) was created, Respondent took over the administration of the FHP pension fund, and Petitioner elected to participate in the FRS. The FRS was, and still is, administered by Respondent pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Prior to January 1, 1975, the FHP pension fund and the FRS were "contributory," meaning that the employee was required to contribute a percentage of his or her salary to the fund, and contributions were also made by the employer. Starting on January 1, 1975, the FRS became "non-contributory," meaning that the employer made all of the contributions. Petitioner's contributions to his FHP pension fund account were recorded on a four-column ledger sheet which showed the old balance, date of contribution, amount of the contribution, and the total balance. The ledger sheet was not computerized. The entries were manually typed onto the ledger sheet. Petitioner's account showed a total balance of $4,656.71 on December 31, 1974, and because the FRS was "non- contributory" after that date, the account had the same balance on October 15, 1975, when Petitioner left FHP. The total balance shown for Petitioner's account was incorrect as a result of a calculation error made when Petitioner's December 1968 contribution was entered onto the ledger sheet. Prior to that contribution, the old balance reflected on the ledger sheet was $108.89. Petitioner's December 1968 contribution was $37.45, so the total balance should have been $146.34. However, a calculation error was made and the total balance entered on the ledger sheet was $1,108.21. The effect of this error was that the balance shown in Petitioner's account was $961.87 (i.e., $1,108.21 minus $146.34) more than Petitioner had actually contributed. The error was carried forward to the following month when $1,108.21 was entered as the old balance, and all subsequent entries to Petitioner's account reflected the error. As a result, Petitioner's actual contributions as of December 31, 1974 (and, hence October 15, 1975, when he left FHP) were $3,694.84, not $4,656.71. The error was not discovered in October 1975 when Petitioner left FHP and requested a refund of his contributions. Apparently, the account was not audited prior to payment of the refund to Petitioner. In October 1975, Petitioner signed a card requesting a refund of his contributions. The address listed on the card corresponded to Petitioner's address at that time. The pertinent information from the card (i.e., the payee and the amount) was provided to the Comptroller by Respondent when a warrant was requested. The Comptroller prepared a warrant in the requested amount and returned it to Respondent along with a computer- printed label that contained Petitioner's name and social security number, the refunded amount ($4,656.71), warrant number (173213), and the date of the warrant (November 4, 1975). The label was affixed to the refund request card, and the warrant was mailed to Petitioner. The Comptroller's records show that warrant number 173213 was paid on November 21, 1975. The records do not show the payee of the warrant. Nor do the records show whether the warrant was deposited into a bank account or cashed. The cancelled warrant no longer exists. Petitioner did not recall receiving a warrant in the amount of $4,656.71. Petitioner and his wife both testified that they recalled receiving only $2,500.00. Petitioner produced a deposit slip dated November 15, 1975, showing a $2,500.00 deposit as well as bank records which showed that deposit as the only large deposit into Petitioner's account between November 1975 and February 1976. The source of the $2,500.00 check is not shown on the deposit slip. The Comptroller's records show no FRS warrants in that amount during the period of November 15, 1975, through November 21, 1975, when such a warrant would likely have been paid. Moreover, Petitioner conceded that he may have had another bank account at the time, although he could not locate any records for such an account. Petitioner received a statement of account from Respondent in June 1974 showing the balance of his account to be $4,220.47 at that time. Despite having that information and despite his financial circumstances being "tight" at the time, Petitioner did not make any inquiry to Respondent as to why he received only $2,500.00. This suggests that the $2,500.00 check was not the FRS warrant. The overpayment was first discovered in 2000 when Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's FRS account as part of its preparation of the member annual statement required by Section 121.136, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was first informed of the error and the 1975 overpayment in August 2001 when he received an unsolicited telephone call from Brenda Shiver, an employee of the Respondent, regarding his retirement plans and the cost of "buying back" his prior service with the FHP between 1968 and 1975. Petitioner has no current plans to retire. Nor does Petitioner have a current desire to "buy back" his prior service which would cost over $21,000, not including the amount at issue in this proceeding. The cost of the prior service is not at issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement issue a final order that increases the cost for Petitioner to "buy back" his prior service by $961.87 to reflect the 1975 refund overpayment, but eliminates the mandate that Petitioner pay that amount as a condition of receiving retirement benefits related to his current service. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Holland 17964 Lookout Hill Road Winter Garden, Florida 34787 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Fred E. Hild (Colonel Hild), a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System, was incapacitated at the time he selected his retirement option and through the time that his first benefits check was cashed and, if so, whether his retirement option should be amended retroactively to provide benefits for Petitioner, Lois Hild, his spouse.
Findings Of Fact Colonel Fred Hild, late husband of Lois Hild, served in the Air Force for 25 years before retiring from that service. After retirement from the Air Force and after Valencia Community College opened in Orlando, Florida, Colonel Hild joined the college staff, first as a teacher and then as an administrator. At the time of his retirement from the college, he was assistant to the provost. He worked at the college from 1978 until 1996. His employment at the college was covered by the Florida Retirement System (FRS). With the exception of a year's employment in her family's business, Mrs. Hild never worked outside of her home. She and Colonel Hild were married over 50 years and had a full, active life together. Colonel Hild provided the financial support for the family and, except for routine household expenses when he was away in the Air Force, he handled all of the family's financial affairs. Colonel Hild's family and co-workers acknowledge that he was a remarkable man in many ways, physically vigorous and mentally sharp. His work was always an important aspect of his life; he was well-respected and well-known on the college campus and, because of his long tenure, was very knowledgeable about the history and functioning of the college. As he aged, Colonel Hild slowed down a bit; he had days at work when he was sleepy or grumpy. Most days, though, he was quite normal and sharp. He knew all of the regulations for the college and always went by the rules. On October 12, 1995, at the age of 81 years, Colonel Hild suffered a major cerebrovascular accident (stroke) while at home. The stroke left lasting side effects. For a time after the stroke he lost all short-term memory and could neither read nor write. He became passive and frail. He underwent rehabilitation and improved quite a bit, according to Mrs. Hild, but he was never again the same man. Colonel Hild's son, David, who lived in California, sold his car and possessions and moved in with his parents to help Mrs. Hild provide the care Colonel Hild then required. This care included driving and assistance ambulating in the home neighborhood, where he would sometimes get lost. Colonel Hild was never again able to drive, as he lost part of his peripheral vision and would forget where he was going. He was unable at times to recognize friends or family members. He slept a lot and needed supervision in showering and dressing. He never again was able to assume responsibility for the financial affairs of the family. The Hild's son, Steve, an accountant in Miami, Florida, helped Mrs. Hild with financial planning and paperwork. Before his stroke Colonel Hild had made some plans for retirement. He spoke to co-workers of investments in stocks and bonds, and when the Air Force brought in a survivor's benefit program, he took advantage of that so that his wife would have some benefits when he died. He also spoke to Mrs. Hild of their having retirement benefits from Valencia for ten years. Still, before the stroke Colonel Hild worried about having enough for retirement and his worries increased after the stroke. He insisted on returning to work at the college after his rehabilitation and some recovery. Although they were worried about how he could function, Colonel Hild's wife and sons were reluctant to oppose him when he was so insistent. Dr. Collins, his personal physician for over 20 years, provided certificates authorizing Colonel Hild to return to the college part-time on April 8, 1996, and full time on June 1, 1996. Dr. Collins believed that the duties would be light and that the family and college staff would look out for Colonel Hild. Colonel Hild's son, David, drove him to and from work and made sure Colonel Hild got in the building. The first time they made the drive, Colonel Hild directed his son to the wrong campus of the college. Already thoroughly trained in the paperwork, the secretaries picked up much of the work that Colonel Hild had been doing. For example, they listened to students' problems and tried to work them out with the department chairpersons. For final decisions, the staff referred the problems to the provost, Dr. Kinzer. Colonel Hild's duties on his return to work were light. Because Colonel Hild was very organized and knew so much about the college, he was able to function with the help of his staff. He could review documents prepared for him and would initial or sign the documents, as appropriate, sometimes changing something if it had not been prepared correctly. Some days were better than others; he slept more than he did before his stroke and would sometimes get lost on campus. Because he was so well- known, someone would always help him back to his office. One of the annual responsibilities of Colonel Hild was organizing the graduation processions, making a list of the order of the march and placing posters or signs in the corridors for guidance. He performed this function without complaint in early May 1996. He refused assistance of his staff and, except for a couple of posters on the opposite wall, he managed to get everything done. At the actual graduation night, however, Colonel's Hild's, son, David, had to help him find his way at the end of the ceremony and recessional march. Colonel Hild retired from Valencia Community College on July 31, 1996. In preparation for that retirement he had several contacts with staff in the college's human resources office. Initially, Colonel Hild signed a form on May 30, 1996, applying for retirement and leaving blank the benefit option selection since he had not yet received an estimate of the amounts he would receive under each option. Vicki Nelson, a staff person in the human resources office, had approximately 4 or 5 contacts with Colonel Hild, face-to-face or over the telephone, while preparing paperwork for his retirement. At one point she was concerned that she was having to explain things over again and she suggested to Colonel Hild and to his secretary that maybe he should bring Mrs. Hild in with him. The issue she was trying to explain had something to do with the need to obtain Mrs. Hild's birth certificate if he selected either option 3 or 4. The suggestion was never followed up and ultimately Mrs. Hild's birth certificate was unnecessary. Michael Break is assistant vice-president of human resources at Valencia Community College. In his capacity as director of human resources Dr. Break was involved in preparing Colonel Hild's retirement documents. On June 19, 1996, Dr. Break, Vicki Nelson, and Colonel Hild met to discuss the benefit options and the monthly estimates of each amount. The FRS provides four benefit options to its retirees. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years. If the retiree dies before the end of 10 years, the benefit is paid to the survivor for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the member and beneficiary; Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3% upon the death of either. As explained to Colonel Hild, his monthly benefit under option 1 was $2,569.64; under option 2, his benefit was $1,692.72; under option 3 the benefit was $1,546.92; and under option 4, the benefit was $1,856.41, reduced to $1,237.61 upon the death of Colonel or Mrs. Hild. In his discussion with Colonel Hild, Dr. Break pointed out the implications of the various options, including the need to consider such factors as one's health and financial arrangements for a dependent spouse. In response, Colonel Hild mentioned that he had other financial means and this was not the only retirement that he depended on. Although Dr. Break was aware that some people were concerned about Colonel Hild's effectiveness after his return to work, nothing in Colonel Hild's responses to the discussion in the meeting raised red flags to alert Dr. Break that Colonel Hild did not understand. Colonel Hild expressed his opinion that the difference between benefits under option 1 and the remaining options was excessive. In Dr. Break's experience, and as he counsels pre- retirees, sometimes the selection of option 1, with the additional purchase of an annuity or life insurance policy, inures to the greater benefit of an individual's dependents than the other reduced-benefit options under the FRS. When a retiree selects option 1 or 2, there is a section on the option selection form for the spouse to sign in acknowledgment of the option. Colonel Hild brought the form home and gave it to Mrs. Hild to sign one morning before he left for work. When she signed it the form was blank. All she knew was what he told her, that the form was something she had to sign for his retirement. She did not question her husband or even read enough of the form to know that there were 4 options. Mary Ann Swenson has been employed at Valencia Community College for thirteen years, 8 of which have been in the human resources department. Ms. Swenson notarized Colonel Hild's signature on the benefits option form on June 24, 1996, and remembers the occasion. Colonel Hild came to the human resources office to meet with Vicki Nelson, who called Ms. Swenson. At the time that Colonel Hild signed the form, Mrs. Hild's signature was already on it, but her signature did not require a notary. Likewise, option 1 had been checked on the form and, in response to a question by Colonel Hild, Vicki Nelson showed him that he marked option 1 and said, "Yes, you have marked option 1." Colonel Hild signed the form and then Ms. Swenson notarized it. On June 24, 1996, during the approximately 10 minutes that Ms. Swenson spent with Colonel Hild and Vicki Nelson, she had no reason to believe that he was not in complete control of his mental facilities or that he failed to understand and recognize what he was signing. Colonel Hild retired, as planned, the end of July 1996, and his first retirement check arrived approximately August 30, 1996. Mrs. Hild saw the check and had her husband endorse it. She then cashed the check. She understood that by doing so, she was accepting the amount of the check. She saw no problem with this because she assumed that Colonel Hild had opted for what he and she had discussed as the "ten year" provision. Mrs. Hild assumed that the check reflected the number of years he was employed and the amount of money that he was making. The Hild's son, Steve, made the same assumption, as he and Colonel Hild had discussed retirement sometime in the early 1990's and Steve understood that his father would take the 10- year plan with Valencia. Neither Steve nor Mrs. Hild had requested any information from the college or Division of Retirement about the option selected by Colonel Hild or the amount of benefits he would receive once he retired. Colonel Hild died on September 28, 1997. He had received a total of approximately $37,000, or 14 months of benefits under FRS option 1 during his lifetime. Mrs. Hild and Colonel Hild's sons learned of the option 1 selection when the checks stopped coming after Colonel Hild's death and when Mrs. Hild called the college human resources office. It is necessary to glean Colonel Hild's mental capacity and state of mind from the circumstances described by the witnesses in this case, all of whom were candid and credible. From those circumstances it is impossible to find that Colonel Hild was incompetent to make the decision to chose option 1 for his FRS benefits. That decision was entirely consistent with his concern, described by his family and staff at the college, that there be enough money coming in when he retired. Although he plainly was concerned for making financial arrangements for his spouse, he had made some arrangements already with his Air Force retirement and with other assets or investments. Described as strong-willed, disciplined and well- organized, Colonel Hild, in spite of his diminished capacity after his stroke, convinced his family, the college and his long time physician that he should return to work. And he did function in that work prior to retirement, performing by habit those tasks that he had mastered in his long tenure. No one suggests that Colonel Hild was coerced, pressured or hurried into the decision he made. The various staff who met with him on several occasions regarding his retirement believed that he was capable of making his own decision and that he exercised the very option that he intended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: THAT the Florida Division of Retirement issue its final order denying the relief sought by Petitioner, Lois Hild. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Lewis, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Julia Smith, Esquire Amundsen and Moore 502 East Park Avenue Post Office Box 1759 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
