The Issue The issues for consideration in this hearing are whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner in employment because of his national origin, and whether Respondent unlawfully retaliated against Petitioner by discharging him from employment.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, CCCS, was a nonprofit charitable corporation engaged in providing personal financial and credit counseling in Tampa, affiliated with the United Way. It is an employer within the meaning of the Human Rights Act of 1977 and Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. CCCS has adopted, and had in effect at all times pertinent herein, a written policy of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. This policy is outlined in a personnel policy manual prepared by CCCS which is provided to all employees and which was provided to Petitioner. In August, 1991, CCCS management decided to hire an individual to fill the vacant accounts manager position. Initial screening of applicants was conducted by Gloria Jackson who interviewed several candidates, including Petitioner, and recommended three of these to the President, Diane Trithart. Petitioner, Emmanuel Ebeh, was one of the three recommended and was the successful candidate selected by Ms. Trithart. At the time, Petitioner, who is black and a native of Nigeria, was residing, with his family, at Metropolitan Ministries because he was unable to provide housing and sustenance for his family without employment. He had no experience in either personal financial management or employee supervision. Up until that time, he had worked as a cook, a kitchen helper, a mail room clerk, and a pipe-fitter's helper. However, even with his lack of supervisory experience and an absence of supervisory training, Ms. Trithart felt he should be afforded this opportunity. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Ms. Jackson. She assisted Petitioner and his family in their move into government assisted housing, even to the extent of having her husband rent a truck to help move Petitioner's personal belongings and the furniture donated by Metropolitan Ministries to their new home. Once installed in the job, Petitioner was provided with a six weeks training program, including a syllabus, to assist him in making the transition into his new position. Nonetheless, it appears that during his training period, Petitioner had difficulties accomplishing his job tasks. Within six weeks, Ms. Jackson met with him to discuss errors made in client deposit entries and at that time, provided him with written procedures to follow. She gave him a two week warning confirmed in a written memorandum dated September 17, 1991, the date of the counseling. On September 26, 1991, Ms. Jackson followed up the two week warning period with another memorandum which noted the continuation of existing problems in Petitioner's department and which extended the warning period to October 4, 1991. Mr. Ebeh continued to experience job difficulties. At first, one of his employees, Ms. Warhul, tried to cover for him, but was unable to continue to do both her own job and his. As a result, she contacted Ms. Jackson and described the situation as she saw it. Ms. Jackson then tried to discuss the matter with Mr. Ebeh. However, whenever she did, he would insist on speaking with Ms. Trithart about the issues, claiming he felt it necessary to resist Ms. Jackson's directions. Ms. Trithart promptly and explicitly explained to Mr. Ebeh that his unjustified resistance of Ms. Jackson's direction constituted insubordination and would not be tolerated. Nonetheless, he continued to resist any guidance from Ms. Jackson, whether in the form of direction or constructive correction, becoming defensive and contending that his intentions were good and he was being misunderstood. He claims that Ms. Jackson was always on his back. Petitioner's performance problems were not isolated however, nor were they restricted to incidents with Ms. Warhul. He frequently had problems with misplaced files, posting entries to wrong accounts and other errors of a similar nature which were observed by other CCCS employees. On one occasions, Ms. Jackson asked Petitioner to prepare a letter to creditors who had worked with CCCS in the past but who were not currently participating in their program. She specifically requested that Petitioner let her review a draft of the letter before it was dispatched. Notwithstanding that direction, Petitioner prepared a letter, dated March 4, 1992, which contained a number of grammatical errors and misstatements of procedure and policy, and dispatched it to approximately 2,500 creditors without allowing Ms. Jackson or anyone else in authority to review or approve it. He thereafter left a note on the desk of Mary Jennus, CCCS' education coordinator, advising her that Ms. Jackson and Ms. Trithart wanted her to make changes in the letter and enclosures. This was not so. On March 19, 1992, Ms. Trithart called a meeting with Petitioner, Ms. Jackson and Ms. Jennus to discuss this letter, and at which she orally reprimanded Petitioner both for sending it out without authority and for the inappropriate use of her name in giving false instructions to Ms. Jennus. This meeting was subsequently memorialized by memorandum. Though management contended Petitioner's letter adversely impacted on the agency's image, he asserts it had good results in that some income was realized. On March 30, 1992, Ms. Jackson prepared a written evaluation covering Petitioner's performance for the prior six months. This report indicated Petitioner had continuing problems in the performance of his duties and in his supervision skills. It also called for a further review in 90 days to assess his progress in meeting the requirements of his job. Petitioner refused to sign this evaluation and requested a meeting with Ms. Trithart. Though a note by Ms. Jackson on the evaluation indicates she would arrange that meeting, it cannot be determined if, in fact, such a meeting took place. However, on April 13, 1992, Petitioner prepared a memorandum to operations personnel in which he alludes to "miserable and harsh treatment from management and especially our boss." He also noted the possibility his employees might not be satisfied with his treatment of them and solicited their comments and complaints to him or to the assistant director. This memo discomfited at least one of his employees, Ms. Warhul, who took exception to it in writing. Ms. Mosley also disagreed with his conclusions regarding a harsh working environment and thought it inappropriate for him to send out such a memo without consulting the other employees in the department. He was the department head, however, and his memo, though it might be considered ill advised and somewhat inflammatory, was from him to the people in his department. He did not claim his conclusions were theirs nor did his comments accuse them of misconduct. A meeting of all operations personnel was called by Ms. Trithart for April 13, 1992, the date of that memo. All employees were given the opportunity to express their concerns and it became apparent that not all operations personnel agreed with Petitioner in his characterization of their work environment. The memorandum of that meeting indicates his subordinates see Petitioner as an individual who broods over situations and lets things build up to a point where he writes a memo rather than discussing the problem. An example of this is Petitioner's note on a memo dated April 13, 1992 encouraging all employees to take their lunch break and reminding them that only time before and after normal duty hours may be considered for compensatory time off. Petitioner describes this memo as "inconsiderate treatment" and concludes it was directed at him because he was not taking lunch breaks because he "was sad and depressed because of how [he] was constantly humiliated." After the meeting on April 13, 1992, Ms. Trithart again reviewed Petitioner's file and determined that in light of his most recent infractions, including the unauthorized creditors letter and the false instructions to Ms. Jennus, and his continuing performance mistakes, it would be best to terminate his employment. Her rationale was that he could not be an effective supervisor if he felt, as he clearly did, that he did not have the support of either his employees or his supervisors, and this was compounded by his insubordination which, she believed, undermined the morale in his department and Ms. Jackson's authority as his supervisor. He was, therefore, discharged on April 13, 1992. None of the employees who testified indicated, nor was there any other independent evidence to establish, that Petitioner had been treated any differently while employed by CCCS than any other employee. By the same token, save the personal impressions testified to by Petitioner, there was no indication that either race or national origin played any part in the decision to terminate his employment and it is found they did not. To the contrary, the evidence is clear that the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment with CCCS was based on his failure to meet required standards in the performance of his duties and nothing more. The same is true regarding his claim that his discharge was in retaliation to his complaint in his April 13, 1992 memo regarding what he perceived as the harsh working environment both he and his subordinates had to endure. In that regard, it is found that the memo in question is, in itself, insubordination and evidence of the improper work climate created by the Petitioner rather than his employers. Had he truly felt the treatment given him was harsh, miserable and unfair, the grievance procedures outlined in the personnel manual he had been given would have provided an appropriate avenue for adjustment as opposed to the inflammatory and insubordinate action he took. Petitioner claims his supervisors did not uniformly apply company standards. He asserts he has been treated differently from white employees who were treated with kindness and politeness and when found to have committed errors in their performance, were given time to improve. For example, he cites the case of a Ms. Sweeny who refused to sign an acknowledgment of error and who was merely demoted instead of discharged. In his case, he notes, he met with hostility. He claims no concern was given to the legal issues involved in his situation and he was discharged right away. This is, however, not the case. The evidence is quite clear that Petitioner was counselled on several occasions and evaluated formally during his period of employment with no discipline taken against him. Only when he published the insubordinate memo of April 13, 1993 was action taken. On the basis of that memo and the record of his substandard prior performance, Ms. Trithart decided to discharge him. Petitioner also claims that Ms. Warhul and others who testified against him were engaged in a conspiracy to hide the unhealthy atmosphere which existed. He asserts he was told by Ms. Warhul she would not support him when he wrote his memo because she was afraid of losing her job. It is his contention that she and he were previously close. In actuality, though she was under his supervision, she gave him much of the training he received. He believes that she and many other employees do not like Ms. Jackson but are afraid to say so. Petitioner offered no independent proof of this contention, however, and it is found to be unsupported. Petitioner also takes exception to the claim by CCCS's management that his English was hard to understand. He claims that during the entire 8 months he worked there, his English was never criticized until such time as the decision was made to discharge him. At that time, he contends, he was told that he did not project the proper image the company desired. Mr. Ebeh also notes that he was constantly confronted with a situation where his immediate supervisor would approve something he did and then deny it. Ms. Jackson would approve in advance something his department proposed and then, when it was not well received, deny approving it. Petitioner claims that because of the actions of CCCS's management, he has undergone great stress. When he applied for the position with the firm he and his family were homeless and he admits he was helped considerably by the job and the company personnel. However, he claims he did not get all the help for free and asserts he has paid back for what he received during those first few weeks. He also claims that he has been maligned by company personnel who reported to his job service counsellor that he was soliciting money from coworkers and that he had a bad body odor. These comments humiliated him and he notes that they did not come about until after he complained to Ms. Trithart. Petitioner has no job now and no income and claims to be suffering from health problems. As of April, 1993, a Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services physician noted that he is suffering from raised cholesterol which interferes with his employment "for the present." His total monthly income for himself, his wife and his four sons is $600.00, out of which he must pay approximately $300.00 in rent and $113.00 for utilities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing Emmanuel Ebeh's Petition for Relief from the alleged unlawful employment practices of discrimination based on race or national origin, and of retaliation filed against the Respondent CCCS. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Emmanuel B. Ebeh 4002 East Pocahontas, #110 Tampa, Florida 33610 James R. Freeman, Esquire Shear, Newman, Hahn & Rosenkranz, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4149
Findings Of Fact The Secretary of the Respondent, Department of Transportation, determined that the Department's Division of Construction and Division of Materials and Research were over-staffed within the Department's third district. The Secretary identified ninety-nine positions as being surplus, and initiated action to delete them. The procedures for accomplishing the layoffs and transfers that the Secretary's decision necessitated are set out at Section 110.227, Florida Statutes, and in rules of the Department of Administration ("DOA" hereafter), Chapter 22A-7, Florida Administrative Code. DOA rules set out standards whereby an employee laid off can accept a position at the same or lower classification within a designated competitive area, and in effect "bump" an employee who has fewer retention points under the DOA rules. DOA rules require that an agency seeking to implement a layoff obtain approval from DOA as to what classifications will be eligible to be bumped, and as to what the competitive for layoff purposes will be. The Department of Transportation requested approval for confining retention rights to its Division of Construction and its Division of Materials and Research within its third district, which covers north Florida counties. DOA approved limiting the retention rights to the designated division but designate the competitive area as Statewide rather district-wide. The Department of Transportation thereafter notified employees affected by the layoff, and advised them of available options for retention. The Department did not engage in rule-making procedures in implementing the layoff. The Petitioner Johnnie T. Groves has been employed with the Department of Transportation for twenty-two years. Prior to the instant layoff action, he was employed as an "Engineer I" in the Division of Construction in Jacksonville, Florida. He was advised by letter dated July 9, 1980, that his position had been identified as surplus. He thereafter received "layoff guidelines," from the Department. Under procedures followed by the Department, he was given the option of staying in Jacksonville but having to move back two positions to a position as "Engineering Technician III," or moving to Perry, Florida, to take another position as an "Engineer I." The option of staying in Jacksonville would result in the Petitioner making less money. Moving to Perry would cause him considerable inconvenience. He has resided in Jacksonville for some time and operates a farm there which supplements his income. The Petitioner D. J. Miller has been employed with the Department of Transportation for more than twenty years. Prior to the implementation of the layoff, Miller was employed by the Department in its Jacksonville office as an "Engineer I." He received the same notification that his position was scheduled to be deleted as did the Petitioner Groves. His options under the procedures followed by the Department were to stay in Jacksonville and to take a position as an "Engineer I" in the "pre-stress construction yard," or to move to Gainesville and take a position similar to the one that he had held in Jacksonville. The job in Jacksonville was at a lower rate of pay and, due to an eye problem and dust at the pre-stress construction yard, could cause the Petitioner some physical difficulties. The Petitioner is divorced and has a twelve-year-old son. He relies upon his parents, who reside in Jacksonville, to assist in caring for his son, and any move would impose a hardship upon him. The Petitioner C. R. Henderson has been employed by the Department of Transportation for twenty years. At the time that the layoff was announced, the Petitioner was employed in the Department's Construction Division in Jacksonville as an "Engineer I." The Petitioner received the same notification that his position was being deleted as had the Petitioners Groves and Miller. The Petitioner's options were to stay in Jacksonville and take a position in the pre-stress construction yard, or move to Lake City where he could take a position similar to the one that he had held in Jacksonville. He did not feel competent to take the position in the pre-stress construction yard. Taking the job in Lake City has created a hardship for the Petitioner. He operates a ranch to supplement his income near Jacksonville, Florida, and the new location is seventy-two miles from his home.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Jorge L. Garcia (Respondent) is entitled to elect to be exempt from the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees and corporate officers. An exemption is a method by which a corporate officer becomes exempt from the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirement of chapter 440. See § 440.05, Fla. Stat. The Department shall certify a corporate officer's election to be exempt from the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirement of chapter 440, if the election to be exempt meets the statutory criteria of section 440.05. See § 440.05, Fla. Stat. A corporate officer or director is ineligible for an exemption if he is affiliated with "a person who is delinquent in paying a stop-work order and penalty assessment order issued pursuant to s. 440.107, [Florida Statutes]." § 440.05(15), Fla. Stat. Respondent has been listed as a corporate officer of ACSOCF with the Division of Corporations in the annual reports filed on October 1, 2007, and thereafter. Tempmaster was incorporated in Florida on March 30, 1989. Tempmaster's Articles of Incorporation contain provisions whereby shareholders may remove directors. Respondent was listed as a director of Tempmaster in the Articles of Incorporation filed with the Division of Corporations on March 30, 1989, and on the annual corporation reports filed from February 5, 1990, through December 18, 2006. Tempmaster filed its last annual report with the Division of Corporations on December 18, 2006. No annual report or other documents identifying the company's directors were filed with the Division of Corporations after December 18, 2006. On February 5, 2007, the Department issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment (Division of Workers' Compensation Case No. 07-054-D4) on Tempmaster. On February 19, 2007, the Department issued the Amended Penalty Order on Tempmaster. The Amended Penalty Order assessed a total penalty of $6,332.42 on Tempmaster in Case No. 07-054-D4. The Stop-Work Order, penalty assessment, and reinstating orders were not served on Respondent and were not in effect against Respondent individually. On February 20, 2007, Respondent, on behalf of Tempmaster, executed a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty with the Department in Case No. 07—054-D4. On February 20, 2007, the Department served an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order to Respondent, as a director of Tempmaster in Case No. 07-054-D4. Tempmaster became delinquent in paying the penalty assessment order against it on October 1, 2008, when it ceased making payments in accordance with the Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty. Tempmaster, whose principal address was located at 199 North Goldenrod Road, Suite B, Orlando, Florida, 32807, was administratively dissolved by the Division of Corporations on September 14, 2007, and had ceased doing business and winding up its corporate affairs by the first quarter of 2009. In the first quarter of 2009, Respondent and John Saccone (Mr. Saccone), the only two shareholders of Tempmaster, agreed that the corporation would cease to exist; that they would cease being directors, officers, shareholders, and employees; and that their relationship to Tempmaster was ended. On April 13, 2011, Respondent filed an Election of Exemption with the Department as a corporate officer of ACSOCF. On April 20, 2011, the Department issued a Notice of Denial of Respondent's Election of Exemption, stating: . . . JORGE L GARCIA is an affiliated person of TEMPMASTER HEATING & COOLING INC against which a Stop-Work Order and an Order of Penalty Assessment was served and is still in effect. Accordingly, JORGE L GARCIA is ineligible for an election of exemption and the Notice of Election to be Exempt application for JORGE L GARCIA is hereby Denied. The Department provided no other basis for the denial of Respondent's exemption. On July 11, 2011, Respondent filed his officer/director and registered agent resignations from Tempmaster with the Division of Corporations. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent or anyone from Tempmaster disputed the Stop-Work Order when it was issued in 2007. In fact, Respondent, on behalf of Tempmaster, executed the payment plan to resolve the Stop-Work Order on February 20, 2007. On February 20, 2008, the Department reinstated Tempmaster's Stop-Work Order for failure to make its periodic payments. This Stop-Work Order was rescinded on March 25, 2008, when Tempmaster brought current its payments. On September 4, 2008, the Department again reinstated Tempmaster's Stop-Work Order for failure to make its periodic payments. This Stop-Work Order was rescinded on October 3, 2008, when Tempmaster brought current its payments. Although Respondent's Election of Exemption indicated that Tempmaster had ceased to exist as of the first quarter in 2009, no credible evidence or testimony was presented that the Department was notified at that time (2009) of this development. On June 3, 2009, the Department reinstated Tempmaster's Stop-Work Order for failure to make its periodic payments. However, following the June 2009 Stop-Work Order, no additional payments were received, and Tempmaster was in default of its obligation. At that time, Respondent remained an officer or director of Tempmaster, based on his own failure to take any steps to notify the Department of a change. As of June 3, 2009, the unpaid balance of the penalty assessment against Tempmaster was $3,732.76. This amount was due immediately when the June 2009 Stop-Work Order was issued. As of the date of this hearing, the balance remained unpaid. A corporate officer may elect to become exempt from the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of chapter 440 by complying with the election of exemption methodology set forth in section 440.05. If the election of exemption meets the criteria of section 440.05, then the Department is required to issue a certification of the election to be exempt to the officer. See § 440.05(3), Fla. Stat. No credible testimony or evidence was submitted (or stipulated to) that Tempmaster ever provided documentation or notification to the Department that it had ceased operations in the first quarter of 2009. Additionally, neither its officers nor directors notified the Department until April 2011 that Tempmaster was dissolved, and, then, it was only when Respondent filed his Election of Exemption for another entity and inserted a statement regarding Tempmaster. Respondent's April 2011 statement reads: I, Jorge Garcia, am not affiliated with Tempmaster Heating and Cooling, Inc., as shown by the attached Secretary of State record. Tempmaster Heating and Cooling, Inc., was dissolved on September 14, 2007, and has not been in existence since then. My affiliation with Tempmaster Heating and Cooling, Inc., ceased on September 14, 2007 when the corporation was dissolved. Therefore, I request the processing of my Notice of Election to be Exempt. Respondent apparently took the position that his affiliation with Tempmaster ended in September 2007. Yet he and the other shareholder, Mr. Saccone, met in early 2009 to dissolve the corporation.2/ Three months later, on July 11, 2011, Respondent submitted two resignations to the Division of Corporations: one as the registered agent for Tempmaster and the second as a director for Tempmaster. These actions ended Respondent's affiliation with Tempmaster. However, this actual cessation of Respondent's affiliation with Tempmaster was well after his April 13, 2011, Election of Exemption was filed with Department. Although there was some discussion about Respondent being granted two prior exemptions by the Department, one in 2007 and another in 2009, there was no credible testimony or evidence presented to establish the dates on which Respondent applied for those exemptions. If Tempmaster had been in compliance (or without a stop-work order) in 2007 when Respondent applied, there would be no bar to the Department granting the exemption. The same is true for the 2009 exemption. There was a period of time between January 2009 and June 3, 2009, when Tempmaster was in compliance. Thus, Respondent's posturing that he should be granted this exemption because he had two prior exemptions granted is baseless. The Department reviewed Respondent's Election of Exemption to determine his eligibility to elect the exemption. The Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) reflected that Respondent was an officer of a corporation that remained delinquent in paying a stop-work order and order of penalty assessment, which made him ineligible for the exemption. Further, no credible evidence was presented that reflected Respondent notified the Department of his cessation from Tempmaster, save for the documentation admitted at hearing, which was after the fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, finding that Jorge L. Garcia is ineligible for an election of exemption under section 440.05. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief should be dismissed as untimely because it was received by the Florida Commission on Human Relations more than 35 days after the date of the Commission's "no cause" determination.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the pleadings (as supplemented by Petitioner's response to the August 2, 2002, Order to Show Cause and his representations at the August 23, 2002, telephonic hearing), the following findings are made: On August 16, 2001, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination against Respondent with the Commission. The charge of discrimination alleged that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in September 2000 when it fired Petitioner based upon his race.1 The address for the Commission listed on the charge of discrimination form was 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240, Building F, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The charge of discrimination was investigated by the Commission staff, and based upon the results of the investigation, the Executive Director of the Commission determined that "there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The date of the determination was May 8, 2002. On that same date, notice of the determination (Notice) was provided to Petitioner by U.S. Mail. The Notice stated: NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Determination has been made in the above-referenced complaint that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. A copy of the Determination is attached. [Petitioner] may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. * * * If [Petitioner] fails to request an administrative hearing within 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). (Emphasis supplied). Petitioner received the Notice four or five days after it was mailed, which would have been May 13, 2002, at the latest. The address for the Commission listed on the Notice was 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. Included with the Notice was a blank petition for relief form. Petitioner filled out the form and mailed it to the Commission. Consistent with the charge of discrimination, the Petition alleges that Petitioner was fired by Respondent based upon his race and that the reasons asserted by Respondent for his firing were pretextual. The Petition was post-marked in Orlando on June 13, 2002 (36 days after the Notice, and at least 31 days after Petitioner's receipt of the Notice). Petitioner's delay in completing and mailing the Petition was due to his "inability to obtain counsel." Despite the Commission's new address being printed at the top of the Notice, Petitioner mailed the Petition to the Commission at its old address on John Knox Road. The Petition was not received by the Commission until July 9, 20022 (62 days after the Notice, and at least 57 days after Petitioner's receipt of the Notice). The envelope in which the Petition was received by the Commission includes a forwarding sticker affixed by the postal service. Thus, it appears that the 26 days that it took for the postal service to deliver the Petition from Orlando to Tallahassee is attributable to the postal service's mail forwarding process.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2002.
The Issue The dispute in this case arises out of Petitioner's termination of Respondent's Employment with the Monroe County School District.
Findings Of Fact Having determined, for the reasons detailed below, that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacks jurisdiction in this cause, the undersigned declines to make findings of fact, as such would be a nullity.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner dismiss Respondent's request for an administrative hearing for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2010.
The Issue Whether Fantastic Construction of Daytona, Inc. (“Respondent”), failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for its employees; and, if so, whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (“Petitioner” or “Department”), correctly calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent is a corporation engaged in the construction industry with headquarters in Daytona Beach, Florida. On November 19, 2015, the Department’s compliance investigator, Scott Mohan, observed five individuals framing a single-family house at 173 Botefuhr Avenue in Daytona, Florida. Mr. Mohan interviewed the individuals he observed working at the jobsite and found they were working for Respondent on lease from Convergence Leasing (“Convergence”). Mr. Mohan contacted Convergence and found that all of the workers on the jobsite were employees of Convergence, except Scott Barenfanger. Mr. Mohan also confirmed that the workers’ compensation policy for Convergence employees was in effect. Mr. Mohan reviewed information in the Coverage and Compliance Automated System, or CCAS, for Respondent. CCAS indicated Respondent’s workers were covered for workers’ compensation by Convergence and that Respondent’s contract with Convergence was active. Mr. Mohan also confirmed, through CCAS, that Foster Coleman, Respondent’s president, had previously obtained an exemption from the workers’ compensation requirement, but that his exemption expired on July 18, 2015. Mr. Mohan then contacted Mr. Coleman via telephone and informed him that one of the workers on the jobsite was not on the active employee roster for Convergence, thus Respondent was not in compliance with the requirement to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. Mr. Coleman reported to the jobsite in response to Mr. Mohan’s phone call. Mr. Coleman admitted that Mr. Barenfanger was not on the Convergence employee leasing roster. Mr. Coleman subsequently obtained an application from Convergence for Mr. Barenfanger and delivered it to his residence. Mr. Mohan served Mr. Coleman at the jobsite with a Stop-Work Order and a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (“BRR”). In response to the BRR, Respondent provided to the Department business bank statements, check stubs, copies of checks, certificates of liability insurance for various suppliers and subcontractors, and an employee leasing roster for most of the audit period from November 20, 2013, to November 19, 2015.1/ Respondent did not produce any check stubs for November and December 2013. Mr. Coleman testified, credibly, that his bookkeeper during that time period did not keep accurate records. Mr. Coleman did produce his business bank statements and other records for that time period. Based on the review of initial records received, the Department calculated a penalty of $17,119.80 and issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in that amount on February 18, 2016. On March 17, 2016, Respondent supplied the Department with additional records. Altogether, Respondent submitted over 400 pages of records to the Department. The majority of the records are copies of check stubs for checks issued on Respondent’s business bank account. The check stubs are in numerical order from 1349 to 1879, and none are missing. The check stubs were hand written by Mr. Coleman, who is 78 years old. Some of his writing on the check stubs is difficult to discern. On April 4, 2016, following review of additional records received, the Department issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $9,629.36. The Department assigned penalty auditor Sarah Beal to calculate the penalty assessed against Respondent. Identification of Employees Ms. Beal reviewed the business records produced by Respondent and identified Respondent’s uninsured employees first by filtering out payments made to compliant individuals and businesses, and payments made for non-labor costs. However, the evidence demonstrated that the Department included on its penalty calculation worksheet (“worksheet”) payments made to individuals who were not Respondent’s employees. Neal Noonan is an automobile mechanic. Mr. Noonan was neither an employee of, nor a subcontractor for, Respondent for any work performed by Respondent during the audit period. Mr. Noonan performed repairs on Mr. Coleman’s personal vehicles during the audit period. Checks issued to Mr. Noonan during the audit period were for work performed on Mr. Coleman’s personal vehicles. The Department’s worksheet included a “David Locte” with a period of noncompliance from June 19, 2014, through December 31, 2014. The basis for including Mr. Locte as an employee was a check stub written on December 10, 2014, to a business name that is almost indiscernible, but closely resembles “Liete & Locke” in the amount of $100. The memo reflects that the check was written for “architect plans.” Mr. Coleman recognized the worksheet entry of David Locte as pertaining to David Leete, an architect in Daytona. Mr. Leete has provided architectural services to Respondent off and on for roughly five years. Mr. Leete signs and seals plans for, among others, a draftsman named Dan Langley. Mr. Langley provides drawings and plans for Respondent’s projects. When Respondent submits plans to a local governing body which requires architectural drawings to accompany permit applications, Mr. Leete reviews and signs the plans. Mr. Leete was neither an employee of, nor a subcontractor for, Respondent during the audit period. The single payment made to Mr. Leete by Respondent during the audit period was for professional architectural services rendered. Mr. Langley was neither an employee of, nor a subcontractor for, Respondent during the audit period. Payments made to Mr. Langley during the audit period were for professional drafting services rendered. Among the names on the Department’s worksheet is R.W. Kicklighter. Mr. Kicklighter is an energy consultant whose office is located in the same building with Mr. Leete. Mr. Kicklighter prepares energy calculations, based on construction plans, to determine the capacity of heating and air-conditioning systems needed to serve the planned construction. Mr. Kicklighter was neither an employee of, nor a subcontractor for, Respondent during the audit period. Payments made to Mr. Kicklighter during the audit period were for professional services rendered. Respondent made a payment of $125 on September 15, 2014, to an entity known as Set Material. Set Material is a company that rents dumpsters for collection of concrete at demolition and reconstruction sites. Removal and disposal of the concrete from the jobsite is included within the rental price of the dumpster. The Department included on the worksheet an entry for “Let Malereal.” The evidence revealed the correct name is Set Material and no evidence was introduced regarding the existence of a person or entity known as Let Malereal. Set Material was neither an employee of, nor a subcontractor for, Respondent during the audit period. The single payment made to Set Material during the audit period was for dumpster rental. The Department’s worksheet contains an entry for “CTC” for the penalty period of January 1, 2014, through May 1, 2014. Respondent made a payment to “CTC” on April 11, 2014, in connection with a job referred to as “964 clubhouse.” The records show Respondent made payments to Gulfeagle Supply, Vern’s Insulation, John Wood, Bruce Bennett, and Ron Whaley in connection with the same job. At final hearing, Mr. Coleman had no recollection what CTC referred to. Mr. Coleman’s testimony was the only evidence introduced regarding identification of CTC. CTC could have been a vendor of equipment or supplies for the job, just as easily as an employee. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that CTC was an employee of, or a subcontractor for, Respondent during the audit period. The check stub for check 1685 does not indicate to whom the $60 payment was made. The stub reads “yo for Doug.” The Department listed “Doug” as an employee on its worksheet and included the $60 as wages to “Doug” for purposes of calculating workers’ compensation premiums owed. At hearing, Mr. Coleman was unable to recall ever having employed anyone named Doug, and had no recollection regarding the January 7, 2015, payment. The evidence was insufficient to establish that “Doug” was either Respondent’s employee or subcontractor during the audit period. Ken’s Heating and Air was not an employee of, nor a subcontractor to, Respondent for any work undertaken by Respondent during the audit period. Ken’s Heating and Air conducted repairs on, and maintenance of, Mr. Coleman’s personal residence during the audit period. Checks issued to Ken’s Heating and Air during the audit period were payments for work performed at Mr. Coleman’s personal residence. Barry Smith is an electrical contractor. Mr. Smith was neither an employee of, nor subcontractor to, Respondent for any work performed by Respondent during the audit period. Mr. Smith did make repairs to the electrical system at Mr. Coleman’s personal residence during the audit period. Checks issued to Mr. Smith during the audit period were payments for work performed at Mr. Coleman’s personal residence. The remaining names listed on the Department’s penalty calculation worksheet were accurately included as Respondent’s employees.2/ Calculation of Payroll Mr. Coleman’s exemption certificate expired on July 18, 2015, approximately four months shy of the end of the audit period. Payments made by Respondent to Mr. Coleman during the time period for which he did not have a valid exemption (the penalty period) were deemed by the Department as wages paid to Mr. Coleman by Respondent. Respondent’s business records show seven checks written either to Mr. Coleman or to cash during that time period in the total amount of $3,116.52. The Department included that amount on the worksheet as wages paid to Mr. Coleman. Check 1873 was written to cash, but the check stub notes that the payment of $1,035.69 was made to Compliance Matters, Respondent’s payroll company. Check 1875 was written to cash, but the check stub notes that the payment of $500 was made to Daytona Landscaping. The evidence does not support a finding that checks 1873 and 1875 represented wages paid to Mr. Coleman. The correct amount attributable as wages paid to Mr. Coleman during the penalty period is $1,796.52. Respondent’s employees Tyler Eubler, Brian Karchalla, Keith Walsh, and John Strobel, were periodically paid by Respondent during the audit period in addition to their paychecks from Convergence. Mr. Coleman testified that the payments were advances on their wages. He explained that when working on a job out of town, the crew would arrive after Convergence had closed for the day, and Mr. Coleman would pay them cash and allow them to reimburse him from their paychecks the following day. Unfortunately for Respondent, the evidence did not support a finding that these employees reimbursed Mr. Coleman for the advances made. The Department correctly determined the payroll amount attributable to these employees. The Department attributed $945 in payroll to “James Sharer.” The Department offered no evidence regarding how they arrived at the name of James Sharer as Respondent’s employee or the basis for the payroll amount. James Shores worked off-and-on for Respondent. Mr. Coleman recognized the worksheet entry of “James Sharer” as a misspelling of Mr. Shores’ name. Respondent’s records show payments totaling $535 to Mr. Shores during the audit period. The correct amount of payroll attributable to Mr. Shores from Respondent during the audit period is $535. The Department included wages totaling $10,098.84 to Mr. Barenfanger during the period of noncompliance from November 20, 2013, to December 31, 2013. The Department imputed the average weekly wage to Mr. Barenfanger for that period because, in the Department’s estimation, Respondent did not produce records sufficient to establish payroll for those two months in 2013. See § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. The voluminous records produced by Respondent evidenced not a single payment made to Mr. Barenfanger between January 2014, and November 19, 2015. Even if Mr. Coleman had not testified that he did not know or employ Mr. Barenfanger before November 19, 2015, it would be ludicrous to find that he worked weekly for Respondent during the last two months of 2013. Mr. Coleman testified, credibly, that Mr. Barenfanger worked the jobsite for Respondent on November 18 and 19, 2015, but not prior to those dates. The evidence does not support a finding that the worksheet entry for Mr. Barenfanger in the amount of $10,098.84 accurately represents wages attributable to Mr. Barenfanger during the period of noncompliance. The Department’s worksheet includes an employee by the name of Ren W. Raly for the period of noncompliance from January 1, 2014, through May 1, 2014, and a Ronnie Whaley for the period of noncompliance from June 19, 2014 through December 31, 2014. Mr. Coleman testified that he never had an employee by the name of Raly and he assumed the first entry was a misspelling of Ronnie Whaley’s name. Mr. Coleman testified that Ronnie Whaley was a concrete finisher and brick layer who did work for Respondent. Mr. Coleman testified that he submitted to the Department a copy of Mr. Whaley’s “workers’ comp exempt,” but that they must not have accepted it. The records submitted to the Department by Respondent do not contain any exemption certificate for Ronnie Whaley. However, in the records submitted to the Department from Respondent is a certificate of liability insurance dated February 25, 2014, showing workers’ compensation and liability coverage issued to Direct HR Services, Inc., from Alliance Insurance Solutions, LLC. The certificate plainly states that coverage is provided for “all leased employees, but not subcontractors, of Ronald Whaley Masonry.” The certificate shows coverage in effect from February 1, 2013, through February 1, 2015. Petitioner did not challenge the reliability of the certificate or otherwise object to its admissibility.3/ In fact, the document was moved into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit P1. Petitioner offered no testimony regarding whether the certificate was insufficient proof of coverage for Mr. Whaley during the periods of noncompliance listed on the worksheet. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Whaley was an uninsured individual during the periods of noncompliance. Thus, the wages attributed to Mr. Whaley by the Department were incorrect. Ms. Beal assigned the class code 5645—Carpentry to the individuals correctly identified as Respondent’s uninsured employees because this code matched the description of the job being performed by the workers on the jobsite the day of the inspection. Ms. Beal correctly utilized the corresponding approved manual rates for the carpentry classification code and the related periods of noncompliance to determine the gross payroll to the individuals correctly included as Respondent’s uninsured employees. Calculation of Penalty For the employees correctly included as uninsured employees, Ms. Beal applied the correct approved manual rates and correctly utilized the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69L-6.027 and 69L-6.028 to determine the penalty to be imposed. For the individuals correctly included as uninsured employees, and for whom the correct payroll was calculated, the correct penalty amount is $2,590.06. The correct penalty for payments made to Mr. Coleman during the penalty period is $571.81. The correct penalty for payments made to James Shores is $170.24. The correct total penalty to be assessed against Respondent is $3,332.11. The Department demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was engaged in the construction industry in Florida during the audit period and that Respondent failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees at times during the audit period as required by Florida’s workers’ compensation law. The Department demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent employed the employees named on the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, with the exception of Ken’s Heating and Air, CTC, Don Langly, Ren W. Raly, R.W. Kicklighter, Dave Locte, Let Malereal, Ronnie Whaley, and “Doug.” The Department did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it correctly calculated the gross payroll attributable to Mr. Coleman and Mr. Shores. The Department demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Beal correctly utilized the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. to determine the appropriate penalty for each of Respondent’s uninsured employees. The Department did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the correct penalty is $9,629.36. The evidence demonstrated that the correct penalty to be assessed against Respondent for failure to provide workers’ compensation insurance for its employees during the audit period is $3,332.11.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, finding that Fantastic Construction of Daytona, Inc., violated the workers’ compensation insurance law and assessing a penalty of $3,332.11. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2016.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a salary overpayment at the time of her separation from employment with Respondent to which she was not entitled, as set forth in correspondence dated February 5, 2016; and, if so, whether Respondent is entitled to a repayment for the salary overpayment made to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jasminne Myles, was hired as a career service employee of the Department in the position of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I in the Office of Economic Self Sufficiency, with an effective appointment date of May 22, 2015, which included a 12-month probationary status. Petitioner resigned from her employment with the Department effective January 21, 2016. At that point, she had been employed with the Department for eight months, placing her squarely within the 12-month probationary period. Petitioner’s supervisor submitted her approved, accurate time record 26 minutes late on February 3, 2016, which resulted in Petitioner being paid for 80 hours for the month, rather than for the 40 hours to which she was entitled to be paid during her last pay period. Petitioner testified that she was told by various supervisory employees of the Department who ranked above her and upon whose statements she believed she could rely, that she was entitled to her entire amount of unused annual leave. She believed her final paycheck in the amount she usually received, was the one to which she was entitled. Unfortunately for Petitioner, any information she received or believes she received from her supervisors in this regard, was incorrect. The Department is bound by statute and rule as to how its employees are paid, including the handling of leave pay-outs for employees during their probationary periods. Petitioner believed she had been properly compensated until she was contacted by Susan Monick, who informed her of the overpayment. She was told that, because she had not been employed by the Department for 12 months, she was not allowed to take her unused vacation time. While Petitioner did not recall receiving or reading the employee handbook given to her by the Department outlining CFOP 60-1, which mirrors the applicable Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-34.0041(6)(a), she acknowledged that the language put before her at the hearing supported the Department’s position regarding her entitlement to the leave pay-out. Ms. Monick testified that she has been employed by the Department for 33 years and that she sent Petitioner a letter notifying her of the overpayment in the amount of $408.46 on February 5, 2016. She acknowledged Petitioner’s service of eight months and the fact that the paycheck had been automatically generated due to the barely late filing of Petitioner’s termination paperwork. She also told Petitioner that she must repay the full $408.86, the overpayment amount. Ms. Monick stated that if Petitioner had extended her separation date by one week and used her annual leave, she would not have been overpaid and would have been entitled to the full amount of the paycheck.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order requiring Petitioner to repay the salary overpayment in the amount of $408.86. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Jane Almy-Loewinger, Esquire Department of Children and Families 210 North Palmetto Avenue, Suite 447 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 (eServed) Paul Sexton, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Jasminne Myles 222 Ontario Court Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Mike Carroll, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Rebecca Kapusta, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Respondent, PPC Products Corporation (PPC), manufactures power transistors, recitifers, diodes, and semiconductors. Approximately 80 percent of its business deals with government contracts. Petitioner is Sandra Boatwright, a black female, who worked for PPC for sixteen years. During her career with PPC she received good evaluations. In September 1989, Ms. Boatwright was working in the marking section of the production department. Her duties included putting product units in an oven and removing the units at the end of the baking period. She was a line leader with two to three employees reporting to her. Ms. Boatwright's immediate supervisor was Blynn Gause, the manager of the production department. Stringent government requirements called for the brands on the products to be permanent. During the summer of 1989, a problem had developed concerning the permanency of the marking or branding of the units. Some of the brandings were coming off prematurely. Mr. Gause asked Dolf Storz an employee in the engineering section to find a solution. In order to eliminate possible causes of the problem, Mr. Storz instituted the use of a logbook in the marking section to record the time the units went in and came out of the oven. Logbooks were a common requirement by the engineering section as a means of gathering data. In September 1989, Mr. Storz took the logbook to the marking section and requested the employees, including Ms. Boatwright, to use it. Ms. Boatwright admitted that, contrary to her initial charge, Mr. Storz was never her supervisor. In the latter part of September 1989, after Mr. Gause had returned from a vacation, Ms. Boatwright complained to him that Mr. Storz had been "acting like a king" while Mr. Gause had been away and requested a meeting to discuss the matter. On October 3 Ms. Boatwright, Mr. Gause, and Mr. Storz met in Mr. Gause's office. The discussion centered around the logbook, which the marking section had not been using. Ms. Boatwright did not feel that it was necessary to use the logbook because the marking section was already using an informal logbook to track the units in production. Mr. Storz's position was that the logbook was required by the production specifications and the informal logbook did not record the times the units went in and came out of the oven. Mr. Gause resolved the issue by requiring Ms. Boatwright and the other employees in the marking section to use the engineering log book. Ms. Boatwright thereafter used the engineering log book. On October 3, 1989, the process specification for the marking process, Device Branding Process Specification No. 200-140 was changed to require that the oven data be recorded in a logbook. This change was called Revision J. Ms. Boatwright signed off on this change. Race had nothing to do with the requirement that a marking logbook be maintained. Mr. Gause never advised Ms. Boatwright that he treated whites better than blacks. There was no disparate treatment of Ms. Boatwright in the terms and conditions of Ms. Boatwright's employment with PPC. In mid September 1989, a vacant position in the Lorlin automatic test area of the quality control department was posted. Ms. Boatwright had previously worked in the quality control department. Some time during late September or early October 1989, Ms. Boatwright approached Marleen Williams Coker (Ms. Williams), the quality manager, and asked to be transferred to that position. Ms. Boatwright knew the position was not a supervisory position. Ms. Williams told her she would agree to the transfer but Ms. Boatwright would have to talk to Mr. Gause about the transfer. Ms. Boatwright told Mr. Gause that she wanted to transfer to the quality control department. Mr. Gause, Ms. Williams, and Mindy Hill, the general manager of PPC, discussed the transfer. Although such a transfer was not common in the company due to the necessity for retraining the transferring employee, they agreed to approve the transfer due to Ms. Boatwright's long-term employment with the company. Although the position in quality control was a lower position than her position in production, Ms. Boatwright's pay was not cut. The transfer was approved in early October with an effective date of October 24, 1989. After the approval was given, applications were discontinued for the posted position, a decision was made to combine two other sections with the marking section, a new position with different tasks and responsibilities was created to oversee the merged sections, and the engineering section was contacted to move an engineering employee to the new position. Sometime between the approval and the effective date of the transfer, Ms. Boatwright changed her mind about wanting to transfer. Mr. Gause, Ms. Williams and Mindy Hill met to discuss Ms. Boatwright's change-of-mind. Ms. Hill decided not to reverse the transfer because of the changes that were being made to accommodate the transfer. Race played no part in the decision to allow the transfer or in the decision not to reverse the transfer. Ms. Boatwright's transfer from production to quality was not involuntary. Ms. Boatwright began working in the testing area of the quality control section on October 24, 1989. There were two other employees in that section, Steve Matthey and Mary Lou Rouse, who was the line leader for that section. Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey reported to Ms. Rouse, and Ms. Rouse reported to Ms. Williams. In January 1990, Ms. Boatwright received a good performance evaluation from Ms. Williams. On February 10, 1990, Ms. Boatwright received a pay increase. On March 14, 1990, Ms. Boatwright filed an employment discrimination charge against PPC, alleging that she had been discriminated against based on race in the terms and conditions of her employment. Specifically, she alleged that in the middle of 1989, that all the white line leaders were promoted to supervisory positions and that she, a black, was not promoted. At the hearing Ms. Boatwright stated this allegation was incorrect and should be for the years 1984 through 1990. She alleged that she received increased scrutiny on her work, and her non-black coworkers did not. She charged that Mr. Gause had told her that he treated whites better than blacks. Her complaint stated that she had inquired about a transfer and later informed Mr. Gause she was not interested in the transfer, but was transferred anyway, resulting in a loss of job responsibilities and supervisory promotional opportunities. Each PPC employee is issued an employee handbook, which contains information on various employment related topics, including promotional opportunities. If an employee was interested in an opening, the employee was to contact his supervisor to make sure he was considered and if an employee was interested in advancing to another position, the employee was to discuss it with his supervisor to determine what additional skills or education might be needed to qualify for the position. Ms. Boatwright never discussed supervisory promotional opportunities with Mr. Gause or Ms. Williams, and never inquired of them what education or skills she might need to qualify for a supervisor position. No evidence was presented to show that Ms. Boatwright ever applied for a promotional opening. The employee handbook states that the final decision to promote would be based on the employee's demonstrated skills and capabilities, the employee's experience, education and service with PPC. One of the biggest factors to be considered is the employee's past work performance. In order to qualify for a supervisor position an employee would have to have knowledge of the area that the employee would be supervising, including the equipment and process specifications, to be able to supervise personnel, including disciplining personnel, and to be able to generate reports. Based on Mr. Gause's observations of Ms. Boatwright's past performance in dealing with personnel, she would not be qualified to handle disciplinary matters. As a line leader, Ms. Boatwright brought all personnel problems to Mr. Gause for him to resolve. In 1989 and 1990 there were no promotions from line leader to supervisor at PPC. No evidence was presented to show whether there were promotions from line leader to supervisor during the years 1984 through 1988. Race played no part in Petitioner's lack of promotion in marking and production. PPC maintains an affirmative action plan and annually files an Equal Employment Opportunity Employer Information Report EEO-1. The affirmative action plan, which is updated annually, sets forth PPC's policy with respect to equal opportunity for all employees in hiring, employment practices, recruiting, training, terms and conditions of employment, and compensation. Ms. Boatwright was in Production I job classification for purposes of PPC's Equal Employment Opportunity reports. From 1987 through 1992, the statistics collected by PPC indicate that PPC utilized more minorities and females in Ms. Boatwright's job classification than were available in the general work force in Palm Beach County. The employee handbook states that leaving early is the same as being absent. Before leaving early, an employee must have prior approval from his supervisor, preferably a day in advance. On April 2, 1990, Ms. Williams fired Audrey Shanahan, a white female, for leaving work without informing her supervisor or department manager. The employee handbook states that if work is not available in the employee's area the employee may be assigned another task. The handbook provides for immediate discharge for insubordination. Each employee is expected to follow the work instructions of his immediate supervisor or any other person having the authority of supervisor. If the employee does not think that the instructions are legitimate, the handbook tells the employee to do the work instructed and then take up his complaint with the appropriate person in authority. Bobby Mills was a quality manager at PPC in 1990. He and Ms. Williams were of equal rank, but supervised different sections. Both reported to Mindy Hill, the general manager. When Ms. Williams was absent from work, Mr. Mills would supervise her section as well as his own. When Ms. Williams was present on the job, Ms. Rouse, as line leader, would relay employee requests for permission to go home early to Ms. Williams for a final decision. Ms. Rouse would then relay Ms. Williams' decision to the employees requesting to leave early. On May 2, 1990, Ms. Williams was absent from work, and Mr. Mills filled in for her. Work in the Lorlin testing area was slow on that day, although work was expected to come later in the day. Ms. Boatwright had asked her line leader, Ms. Rouse, for permission to go home at lunch because of the lack of work. Ms. Rouse, believing that she had the authority to grant the permission in Ms. Williams absence, told Ms. Boatwright that she could go home early. Mr. Mills, observing that Ms. Boatwright, Mr. Matthey, and Ms. Rouse were not working, inquired of them why they were not working. Ms. Boatwright told Mr. Mills that she was going to go home at lunch. Mr. Mills informed the group that they could work in another area or go home then. Ms. Rouse told him she could not afford to go home early and she went to another area to work. Mr. Mills left and came back a few minutes later and told both Mr. Matthey and Ms. Boatwright to go to the back to work. Both indicated that they were going to go home early, which they did. To Mr. Mills, their leaving constituted a refusal to follow orders and was therefore insubordination. Although Mr. Mills had the authority to fire employees under his supervision without consulting the general manager, he did discuss the incident with Mindy Hill because Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey were in Ms. Williams' section. He recommended dismissal; however, he was unaware at that time that Ms. Boatwright had filed a discrimination complaint. His recommendation for dismissal of Ms. Boatwright was not racially motivated. Mindy Hill made the final decision to dismiss Mr. Matthey and Ms. Boatwright for insubordination for leaving the workplace when requested to work. No evidence was presented to show that either race or retaliation played a part in her decision to terminate Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey. Mr. Matthey learned of his termination when he spoke to Mr. Mills by telephone on the same day. Ms. Boatwright was verbally advised of her termination when she returned to work the next day. On February 26, 1991, Ms. Boatwright amended her discrimination charge to include her termination from employment with PPC. She alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for having filed a charge of unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The statistics collected by PPC for its affirmative action plans show that for the year October 1, 1989 through September 1990, thirty-four Caucasians and eighteen blacks were terminated. For the previous year, thirty-two Caucasians and twenty-four blacks were terminated. On October 8, 1992, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a Determination of No Cause relating to Ms. Boatwright's charges. The Florida Commission on Human Relations conducted a substantial weight review and issued a Redetermination: No Cause on April 8, 1993, adopting the October 8, 1992 determination of the EEOC. Ms. Boatwright filed a Petition for Relief on May 6, 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2647 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 2 and 3 - Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 4 - First, third, and fifth sentences accepted in substance. Second and fourth sentences rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 5 and 6 - Accepted. Paragraph 7 - First and second sentences accepted in substance. Third sentence rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that there was no evidence to show that Ms. Rouse on prior occasions had given employees permission to leave early without getting approval from her superiors. Paragraph 8 - First, third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner did leave early but rejected to the extent that she left immediately after the conversation with Mr. Mills at which Ms. Rouse was present. Paragraph 9 - Accepted. Paragraph 10 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraphs 11 and 12 - Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Accepted. Paragraph 2 - Accepted except as to the date of hire. The evidence shows Ms. Boatwright began her employment on 2-8-74. Paragraphs 3 and 4 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 6 - Accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 9 - Accepted. Paragraph 10 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17 -Accepted. Paragraphs 18-22 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23 - The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 24 - Accepted. Paragraph 25 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26 - The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 27, and 28 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29 - To the extent that the first sentence infers that Revision J was in operation prior to 10-3-89, it is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Storz testified Revision J instituted the logbook requirement and was not signed off until 10-3-89. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 30 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and 40 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41 - The first sentence is rejected to the extent that it infers that Revision J was in effect prior to 10-3-89. The remainder of the sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 42 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 43 - Accepted. Paragraphs 44, 45, 46 and 47 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48 - The third sentence is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 49, 50, 51. and 52 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 53 - Accepted Paragraph 54 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 55, 56, and 57 - Rejected as subordinate. Paragraph 58 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 59 - The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that the term "personnel" included. Ms. Rouse, Ms. Boatwright, and Mr. Matthey. The greater weight of the evidence shows that those three persons did not understand that Mr. Mills was their supervisor. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 60 - Accepted. Paragraphs 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 66 - The last sentence is rejected to the extent that Mr. Mills instructed Ms. Rouse to go to the back upon his return. Ms. Rouse left before Mr. Mills returned. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 67 - Accepted in substance to the extent that Ms. Rouse complied with his instructions prior to Mr. Mills leaving the testing area to inquire if there was work in another area. Paragraphs 68 and 69 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 70 - The first and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 71 and 72 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 73 - The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that Mr. Mills clearly revoked Ms. Rouse's permission. It is obvious that it was not clear to Ms. Boatwright, Ms. Rouse, and Mr. Matthey. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 74 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 75 - Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. Paragraph 76 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 77 and 78 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 79 - The first sentence is accepted in substance and the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 80 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 81 - Accepted. Paragraph 82 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 83 - Accepted. Paragraphs 84 and 85 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 86 and 87 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 88 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89 - Accepted. Paragraph 90 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 91 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 92 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 93 and 94 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 95 - Accepted. Paragraph 96 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97 - Accepted. Paragraph 98 - Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Sandra Boatwright 390 West 33rd Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404-33036 Terry E. Lewis, Esquire Robert P. Diffenderfer, Esquire Suite 900 2000 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
