The Issue Whether Respondent, L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products purchased by Respondent Wroten from the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., is a Florida corporation and a licensed dealer in agricultural products. During times material, Respondent Wroten possessed a surety bond issued through Respondent, Cincinnati Insurance Company. During times material, Respondent Wroten employed Grady Smith as a field representative, who is authorized to and on numerous occasions, purchased watermelons on Respondent Wroten's behalf. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products, specifically watermelons. Petitioner has been a producer of melons for approximately 30 years. Petitioner has known Grady Smith, Respondent Wroten's representative, in excess of ten years and has had business dealings with Smith as a representative of Respondent Wroten on several occasions during 1991 and 1992. During May and June 1992, Petitioner sold five (5) loads of watermelons to Respondent Wroten. At issue here is the fifth load Petitioner sold to Respondent Wroten on June 6, 1992. All five loads of melons sold by Petitioner to Respondent Wroten were loaded and shipped over a short period of time, to wit, May 30-June 6, 1992. All of the melons came from the same field. On June 6, 1992, Grady Smith, acting as a representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to purchase a load of royal sweet watermelons from Petitioner at 4 per pound. The load of "royal sweets" consisted of the following melons: Load #6138 57,700 pounds x 4 cents = $2,308.00. Beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1992, Petitioner and Smith, acting on Respondent's behalf, agreed to the sale of melons under an understanding that the sale and purchase was F.O.B. at Coleman, Florida, acceptance final at shipping point. The agreement also included an understanding that the Respondent would provide the trailers and pay all transportation charges for the melons. Pursuant to the agreement, payment for the melons was due "when they moved over the scale", i.e., as soon as the trucks were loaded and weighed or within the following day. Finally, the agreement between the parties was that title and risk of loss to the melons passed to Respondent Wroten at the time of shipment. Respondent Wroten 's representative Smith offered other producers and growers in the area identical terms under which they conducted their business with Respondent Wroten. On June 6, 1992, the "royal sweet" melons in question were loaded on trailers provided by Respondent Wroten. Respondent Wroten's representative Smith was present in the field as the truck was loaded and he inspected and "graded" the melons as they were loaded. Any melons which were not deemed acceptable to Smith were taken from the conveyor belt so that they would not be loaded. When the trailer was loaded, representative Smith accepted the load and indicated that the melons "looked good to him". Respondent Wroten has not paid Petitioner any of the amount claimed to be due for the melons in question. Respondent Wroten contended that the melons were "overripe" when they reached their ultimate destination on June 9, 1992. 1/ There is an industry practice whereby the producer or seller agrees to accept the risk of loss until the produce reaches its final destination and the products are sold. This practice is referred to as offering "protection" or "ride-the-load". Petitioner did not offer to Respondent, in this instance, any protection or otherwise "ride-the-load".
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department enter a final order requiring Respondent L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., be ordered to pay Petitioner the sum of $2,308.00. In the event that Respondent L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner as ordered, that Respondent Cincinnati Insurance Company be ordered to pay the Department the sum of $2,308.00 as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes and that the Department reimburse Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1993.
The Issue Whether Respondent Southeast Grove Management, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $39,167.58 for mangoes grown by Petitioner and picked and sold by Respondent southeast
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Marcus D. Alston d/b/a Alston Groves is a grower of mangoes in Goulds, Florida. Respondent Southeast Grove Management, Inc., (hereinafter "Southeast") goes to individual groves and picks the mangoes, then takes them to the packing house where they are graded, sized, and shipped to be sold at prices according to size. When the recipient of the mangoes pays Southeast after receipt of the mangoes, Southeast ascertain's what prices were paid for the mangoes and then calculates its costs and pays the grower the difference. Between June 24 and August 9, 1988, Southeast sold 3,861.2 bushels of mangoes grown by Petitioner. There is no dispute as to the number of bushels of Petitioner's mangoes sold by Southeast. Petitioner disputes Southeast's calculations as to the price which Southeast received for the mangoes, the percentage of the mangoes sold by Southeast which "graded out" for sale, and the amount of picking and inspection fees charged by Southeast. Although Petitioner claims he had a verbal contract whereby Southeast agreed to pay him a flat rate of $20 per bushel minus picking charges, his Complaint seeks payment based on prices ranging from $6 to $20 per bushel which he also alleges were the market prices quoted to him by Southeast. At final hearing, Petitioner took the position that he is not seeking reimbursement of $20 per bushel but for only the lesser per bushel prices. No competent, substantial evidence was offered to prove that the prices Southeast received for the mangoes were higher than those reflected in Southeast's records. Petitioner claims that 100% of each picking was high quality, saleable fruit. No competent, substantial evidence was offered to justify Petitioner's selection of 100% for all pickings. The 100% figure selected by Petitioner allows for no differences in the amount of marketable mangoes from each picking, and there is no evidence to support the proposition that no matter when during the season the mangoes were picked exactly 100% of them were marketable as top grade mangoes. Further, during final hearing, Petitioner testified regarding his low cull rate, thereby admitting he knew that his mangoes were not 100% marketable. Although Southeast's records erroneously reflect inspection fees paid by Southeast to be deducted by Southeast from the sale price of the mangoes, no inspection fees were actually paid by Southeast, and Southeast has not deducted any inspection fees from Petitioner's account in calculating the net amounts to be paid to Petitioner by Southeast. The parties have stipulated that Southeast is not entitled to deduct picking fees for those batches of mangoes which Petitioner picked himself and delivered to Southeast. Southeast's records reflect that no picking fees were charged to Petitioner for the mangoes grown by Petitioner and sold by Southeast relating to 19 of the 48 tickets at issue in this proceeding. As to the mangoes reflected in 13 additional tickets, at the conclusion of the final hearing the parties requested and were afforded additional time to jointly review the actual picking tickets (not offered in evidence) for the name of the picker on each ticket to ascertain if the picker was a member of Petitioner's crew, thereby entitling Southeast to no picking fee, or a member of Southeast's crew, thereby entitling Southeast to collect a picking fee. The parties were to then file a statement regarding which additional batches of mangoes were picked by Petitioner's own employees. The parties have failed to do so, and Petitioner offered no evidence regarding this point on which a Finding of Fact can be made. Southeast's accounting sheet contains a column entitled "Net Actual" which sets forth the figures Southeast claims it owes Petitioner for the mangoes represented by each picking ticket. The total for that column equals $35,874.68, the total figure which Southeast claims it owes Petitioner. Southeast has paid Petitioner a total of $28,888.51 for his mangoes. Therefore, Southeast owes Petitioner the additional amount of $6,986.17.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Southeast Grove Management, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner Marcus D. Alston d/b/a Alston Groves in the amount of $6,986.17 and that such monies should be paid to him within fifteen days from the entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31 day of January, 1990. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31 day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Cliff Willis Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 1850 Old Dixie Highway Homestead, Florida 33033 Don Reynolds c/o Aaron Thomas, Inc. 11010 North Kendall Drive, Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33176 Marcus D. Alston Alston Groves 14100 Southwest 232nd Street Goulds, Florida 33110 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Benjamin S. Schwartz, Esquire #1 CenTrust Financial Center 36th Floor 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Mallory Horne, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact From before January 1, 1974, until the time of the final hearing in this matter, petitioner owned a DC-6 airplane, During the calendar year 1974, this airplane was leased to Surinam Air Cargo for approximately a half dozen flights. Petitioner's employees, Messrs. Goodman, Davis and Williams, crewed the airplane back and forth between Miami and Surinam, in accordance with the unwritten agreement between petitioner and Surinam Air Cargo. On some or all of these flights, petitioner transported its own goods as well as Surinam Air Cargo's. The parties stipulated that the purchases listed in schedule B attached to joint exhibit No. 1 were made for the flights back and forth to Surinam. In September of 1975, petitioner entered into agreements with Paul H. Jones & Co., Inc., to lease the DC-6 for approximately four flights, some of which were agreed upon orally; the others were the subject of written agreements. All of the agreements contemplated that petitioner would furnish the airplane crew and petitioner's employees, Messrs. Goodman, Davis and Wright, did in fact operate the DC-6 while it was leased to Paul H. Jones & Co., Inc. Miami International Hatcheries, Inc. (MIH) deals in hatching eggs. CWT Farms of Gainesville, Georgia, is a principal supplier of eggs to MIH and has been for some time. Until the fall of 1975, MIH regularly shipped eggs it received from CWT Farms to Kingston, Jamaica, using the facilities of Pan American Airways or Air Jamaica, which are common carriers. On October 13, 1975, however, petitioner entered into a contract with CWT Farms, which was evidenced by two writings, joint exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. Joint exhibit No. 2 sets up a "proposed flight schedule every Monday and Thursday," requires petitioner "to arrange and pay for cargo insurance" and specifies the manner and amount of CWT Farms' payment to petitioner; payments (covering "all operational costs") vary with the weight of the cargo and are "due and payable at the completion of each flight." Joint exhibit No. 4 is a writing evidencing an extension of the original agreement to a date beyond December 31, 1976. Joint exhibit 3 contains, inter alia, a provision which recites "that the person responsible for the operational control of this aircraft during the term of this lease shall be CWT Farms." The provisions of joint exhibits Nos. 3 and 4 notwithstanding, there was from the beginning a clear understanding between Mr. Goodman, on behalf of petitioner, and Raymond H. Burch, on behalf of CWT Farms, that petitioner would hire the crew and that it was petitioner's "responsibility to take care of the crew and to fly the plane." Petitioner's exhibit No. 5, p. 12. Petitioner's employees, ordinarily Messrs. Goodman, Davis and Wright, did in fact fly the DC-6 twice a week from Miami to Kingston, Jamaica, and back. These employees looked for payment of their salaries to petitioner rather than to CWT Farms or to any predecessor lessee. Occasionally, petitioner transported to Jamaica goods belonging to firms other than CWT Farms, but petitioner did not transport its own cargo on the flights to Jamaica. In aviation jargon, a dry lease is an agreement, analogous to a bareboat charter in maritime law, under which the lessee of aircraft undertakes to furnish the crew and gasoline, takes responsibility for maintenance and pays a pro-rata fee for engine time. A wet lease, in contrast, is an agreement under which the lessor furnishes the crew and gasoline and takes responsibility for maintenance; there is no provision for engine time and no penalty for a failed engine. The Federal Aviation Administration imposes more stringent safety regulations on wet lessors of aircraft than on dry lessors. In February of 1977, the Federal Aviation Administration began an investigation of petitioner which resulted in the filing of a complaint against petitioner and others on April 15, 1977, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. United States of America v. Kimex, Inc., et al., No. 77-1267-CIV-JE. This proceeding eventuated in a stipulation of dismissal in which petitioner agreed to a civil penalty (partially suspended) of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) and admitted that, under the agreement with CWT Farms, it had "engaged in the carriage of property for compensation or hire in air commerce as a private carrier" and that the leases to CWT Farms "were 'wet leases'." During the period of the lease between petitioner and CWT Farms, MIH was normally in debt to CWT Farms because MIH did not pay in advance for the eggs it received from CWT Farms. At CWT Farms' behest, MIH paid petitioner moneys due petitioner from CWT Farms, in partial discharge of MIH's own obligations to CWT Farms. A practice developed under which MIH drew and delivered four checks to petitioner's employees before each flight, which, in the aggregate, constituted CWT Farms' payment to petitioner for the preceding flight. H. Goodman was the payee on one check, in the amount of one hundred seventy-five dollars ($175.00), C. Wright was the payee on one check in the amount of one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00), R. Davis was the payee on one check, in the amount of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00). These checks also operated to discharge part of petitioner's salary obligations to these employees. Kimex, Inc. was the payee on the fourth check, the amount of which varied, depending on the weight of the cargo petitioner had transported on the previous flight. In calculating the amount of the fourth check, the amount CWT Farms owed petitioner was first computed, and four hundred fifty dollars ($450.00) was then subtracted. Before each flight, MIH delivered eggs in cases, which weighed fifty-two (52) pounds each, to a freight loading company at Miami International Airport. Because MIH kept track of the number of cases it delivered, it was a simple matter to compute CWT Farms' obligation to petitioner, as specified in the lease, viz., "16 per pound for the minimum weight of 26,000 pounds to 30,000 pounds and 15 per pound from 30,001 pounds to 32,000 pounds." Joint exhibit 2. From this figure was subtracted the sum of the checks drawn in favor of petitioner's employees. This procedure obtained until some time after December 31, 1976. By the time of the hearing, however, petitioner's employees were paid with weekly pay checks which petitioner itself drew in their favor; and petitioner received lease payment checks which were not reduced by four hundred fifty dollars ($450.00). Before the change to the practice in effect at the time of the hearing, MIH caused Internal Revenue Service Forms 1099 to be prepared to reflect the total MIH payments to petitioner's employees for each year involved. Petitioner prepared W-2 Forms to reflect the salary moneys it paid to its employees directly for each year involved.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent reduce its proposed assessment to four percent of the total dollar cost of the items listed on schedule B attached to the notice of proposed assessment, together with applicable penalties and interest, if any. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Paragraphs one, two, four through thirteen, fifteen and sixteen of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance. Paragraph three of petitioner's proposed findings of fact recites that petitioner's lease to Jones & Co. was oral whereas the evidence was that the agreements with Jones & Co. with respect to some of the flights were reduced to writing. Paragraph fourteen of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, assuming that "direction or control" is intended to mean responsibility or authority for navigation of the aircraft. Paragraph one of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as unsupported by or contrary to the evidence. Petitioner employs Messrs. Goodman, Davis and Wright, Miss Goodman and several mechanics. Mr. Goodman, Mr. Davis and Miss Goodman are petitioner's corporate officers. Petitioner's stockholders are Mr. Davis, Mr. and Mrs. Goodman. The evidence did not establish who petitioner's directors are. Although the evidence showed that petitioner owned a DC-6 airplane based in Miami, it was not proven that petitioner had no other assets. Paragraph two of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been adopted in substance, insofar as relevant, except that there was no evidence that petitioner was exporting its own goods on the flights made pursuant to its agreements with Paul H. Jones & Co. Paragraphs three, four, five and six of respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance, insofar as relevant. The final paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact lacks support in the evidence. For a given flight, CWT Farms would owe petitioner at least the agreed price for shipping 26,000 pounds of eggs, regardless of how few eggs were in fact shipped. On a given flight, CWT Farms could ship up to 32,000 pounds, but, if CWT Farms shipped less, petitioner sometimes transported eggs for other firms. The semiweekly flight schedule was set by mutual agreement between petitioner and CWT Farms. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Norman S. Segall, Esquire Suite 607, 100 Biscayne Tower 100 North Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33132 Mr. Michael A. Rubin, Esquire Suite 4-B 420 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Mr. Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondents (“Dobson’s” and “Western Surety”) should be required to pay an outstanding amount owed to Petitioner, Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc. (“Lancaster Farms”).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Oden Hardy was the general contractor for a project in Apopka, Florida, known as the Space Box project. Dobson’s, a subcontractor on the Space Box project, contracted to purchase 269 trees (including Live Oaks, Crape Myrtles, Elms, and Magnolias) for $53,245.00 from Lancaster Farms. Dobson’s supplied Lancaster Farms with all the information needed to file a “notice to owner” as authorized by section 713.06, Florida Statutes. A truck from Dobson’s picked up the trees and transported them to the site of the Space Box project. Upon arriving with the trees, Dobson’s discovered that there was no means by which the trees could be watered at the site. Rather than attempting to jury rig some manner of watering system as requested by Oden Hardy, Dobson’s transported the trees to its place of business, and the trees remain there. The parties have stipulated that Dobson’s has paid all of the invoices except for Invoice No. 5810, totaling $12,580.00. There is no dispute that the trees at issue are “agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(1). There is also no dispute that Dobson’s is a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc., against Dobson’s Woods and Water, Inc., in the amount of $12,630.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry K. Dobson Dobson's Woods and Water, Inc. 851 Maguire Road Ocoee, Florida 34761-2915 Kelly Lancaster Doug Lancaster Farms, Inc. 3364 East County Road 48 Center Hill, Florida 33514 Western Surety Company Post Office Box 5077 Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117-5077 Kristopher Vanderlaan, Esquire Vanderlaan & Vanderlaan, P.A. 507 Northeast 8th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34470 (eServed) Steven Hall, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Honorable Nicole “Nikki” Fried Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 (eServed)
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Raysbrook Sod, Inc. (Respondent), is indebted to Florida Sod, Inc. (Petitioner), related to the sale and purchase of sod, and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of harvesting sod. Petitioner is located in LaBelle, Florida. Respondent is a corporation located in Riverview, Florida, and is also engaged in the sod business. In September 2007, Respondent was interested in purchasing some sod in order to satisfy a customer's needs. Respondent's regional supervisor, Gabriel Monsivais, approached a gentleman by the name of Trampis Dowdle about purchasing sod. Monsivais had never met Dowdle and, in fact, knew him only as "Mr. Trampis." Dowdle represented that he could obtain sod from Petitioner, and a deal was struck. There was no written contract between Monsivais and Dowdle, nor--quite interestingly- -between Petitioner and Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent had its drivers go to Petitioner's sod field and begin loading sod for Respondent's use. In all, approximately 1,700 pallets of sod were acquired from Petitioner's field by Respondent. Each time a load of pallets was taken, a Load Sheet was created to show the number of pallets, the location of the field, and the name of the person taking the sod. The driver of the truck was expected to sign the Load Sheet, indicating that the sod had indeed been received. There is no dispute between the parties about the number of pallets taken by Respondent's drivers.1 As sod was taken by Respondent, Petitioner would issue an invoice reflecting the amount of sod and the price to be paid. The invoices were sent to Respondent via U.S. Mail. The total amount billed for the sod was $42,559.16. Respondent issued a check (No. 8899) in the amount of $1,271.16, made payable to Petitioner on November 30, 2007, in payment of the first invoice from Petitioner. No further checks from Respondent were received by Petitioner, leaving a balance due of $41,288.00.2 Respondent, however, did attempt to make payments for the sod it purchased. Respondent wrote checks to Dowdle based on Dowdle's representations that he either owned Petitioner's company or was working for Petitioner. In fact, Dowdle neither owned nor was in any way affiliated with Petitioner. Dowdle was apparently defrauding Respondent (and possibly Petitioner as well). Respondent's representative, Joseph Bushong, and Petitioner's representative, Jake Alderman, had never met prior to the day of the final hearing in this matter. There was no written contract between the parties. The entire business relationship between the parties was done orally, based on conversations between Monsivais and Dowdle. Nonetheless, Respondent did obtain over $42,000.00 worth of sod from Petitioner. Respondent does not contest this fact. Respondent's actions indicate acknowledgement of the presumed relationship between the parties. Respondent submitted a credit application to Petitioner with references and credit information to be used by Petitioner in extending credit to Respondent for the sod it was purchasing. Respondent issued at least one check directly to Petitioner for payment of the sod in response to an invoice issued by Petitioner. The check was made payable to "Florida Sod" in the amount of $1,271.16. That check directly corresponds to the amount in Invoice No. 1697 from Petitioner dated October 8, 2007. Respondent did receive additional invoices from Petitioner for the sod Respondent had purchased and received. Clearly, there was an understanding between the two companies that a business relationship existed. After making its first payment to Petitioner, Respondent's subsequent payments for the sod were made directly to Dowdle and his companies. One such payment, made by way of a credit card, was actually applied to a restaurant with which Dowdle apparently had some business connection. Other payments were made via checks made payable to other Dowdle interests. Respondent made payments to Dowdle in the mistaken belief that Dowdle was the agent of or employed by Petitioner. In fact, Dowdle has never been affiliated with Petitioner. Petitioner did not receive any of the payments made by Respondent to Dowdle. Petitioner and Dowdle are not related or affiliated in any fashion (other than a prior arm's-length sod purchase between the two). It is clear that Dowdle received the payments intended for Petitioner in payment for the sod purchased by Respondent. Dowdle, whose whereabouts are unknown by the parties, did not provide Petitioner with the payments. Rather, from the evidence, it appears that Dowdle kept the payments, thereby committing a fraud on both Petitioner and Respondent. Though both parties are somewhat at fault in this matter for failure to utilize normal and acceptable business practices, one or the other party must necessarily bear the burden of payment. The evidence supports Petitioner in this regard because it best followed normal business procedures. Had Respondent made its remittance checks payable to Petitioner (who had issued the invoices), Dowdle would not have been able to abscond with the money. Had Respondent obtained some affirmative proof that Dowdle was an agent of Petitioner, Respondent would have known better than to provide money to Dowdle. Had Respondent contacted Petitioner directly instead of relying on third parties (its foreman and Dowdle), the deception would have been uncovered. However, the facts of this case support the proposition that Petitioner made a valid sale of sod to Respondent, and Respondent did not pay Petitioner for the sod.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $41,288.00 within 30 days of entry of a final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2008.
The Issue Respondent seeks by a two count administrative complaint to discipline Respondent's license. By Count I, Respondent is charged, under Section 489.129(1)(c) Florida Statutes, with violation of Section 455.227(1)(a) Florida Statutes by allegedly making misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations in the practice of his profession. By Count II, Respondent is charged, under Section 489.129 (l)(d) Florida Statutes with willful or deliberate disregard in violation of the applicable building codes or laws of the state or of any municipalities or counties thereof by noncompliance with the escrow requirements of Section 501.1375(2) Florida Statutes and thereby violating Section 489.129(1)(m) Florida Statutes in that same constituted gross negligence, incompetence, of misconduct in the practice of contracting.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed contractor having been issued license number RB 0024983. Respondent is both qualifying agent and president of Pearson Construction Company, Port Charlotte, Florida. At all times material to the administrative complaint, Jack R. Malone was the sales manager for Pearson Construction Company. The complainant herein, John R. Vlasek was a salesman of Pearson Construction Company and had actual knowledge of the authority and duties of the various other employees of Pearson Construction Company at the time that the contract hereafter described was entered into and at all pertinent times thereafter. On or about April 12, 1984 John R. Vlasek was employed as a commission salesman for Pearson Construction Company. Vlaseck's responsibilities included the sale of model homes. He, like John R. Malone, was paid on a purely commission basis. Vlasek was employed with Pearson Construction Company until approximately June 1, 1984. On April 12, 1984 John and Marilyn Vlasek contracted with Peasrson Construction Company for the purchase of a home in Port charlotte, Florida. At the time the contract was entered into the home was approximately 75 percent complete. The contract specified a $2,000 escrow deposit on the purchase price of $68,500. On April 12, 1984, the Vlaseks provided Pearson Construction Company with a check in the amount of $1,800 toward the escrow deposit. The contract specified the deposit was to be held in escrow pending closing of the transaction. The Pearson Construction Company sales agent/sales manager, Jack R. Malone, negotiated and drew up this contract. The contract resulted from Mr. Malone filling in various blanks on a form he had obtained from a local stationary store. The original closing date of the transaction was projected as June 12, 1984. The contract referred to above was not contingent on the buyer obtaining financing. Pearson Construction Company also received from the Vlaseks a warranty deed for a lot in Port Charlotte Subdivision. In return, the Vlaseks received an allowance of $9,400 toward the purchase price of the home. Jack Malone negotiated and prepared the contract. However, Respondent also reviewed and signed the contract. In the course of negotiating the contract, John Vlasek understood that the $2,000 deposit would be maintained in escrow. However, the deposit was not placed in escrow as specified in the contract and as required under the terms of the contract. Instead, it was used by the Respondent in purchasing lighting fixtures, carpeting, tiling, and other accouterments in colors and styles selected by John R. Vlasek. Vlasek was to finance the purchase of the home by assuming an existing construction loan. The construction loan originated from First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Charlotte County and was in the name of Pearson Construction. On April 23, 1984, the Vlaseks executed the loan transfer commitment. The loan commitment was valid only for 45 days and expressly provided, "time is of the essence." By interpretation, this `.ould mean that the loan commitment from First Federal would be valid only until and including June 7, 1984. The loan balance was approximately $52,000 payable at an interest rate of 11.5 percent. After executing the loan transfer commitment, Vlasek realized that the commitment would expire prior to the June 12, 1984 closing date. Vlasek then notified Pearson Construction Company of the discrepancy between the expiration date of the loan commitment and the actual closing date. Upon being informed of the discrepancy, Jack R. Malone agreed to modify the closing date. Malone expressly modified the contract by changing the closing date from June 12 to June 1, 1984. Malone initialed the change on the Vlaseks' copy of the original contract. Although Respondent was not present at the time the contract was expressly modified, Vlasek subsequently informed the Respondent of the change of the closing date. When informed of the change, Respondent indicated the home would be substantially completed by June 1, 1984. Respondent and Jack Malone both testified with some elaboration that Jack Malone had no specific authority from Respondent or on behalf of Pearson Construction Company to make such contract modifications and that Vlasek had every reason to know that Jack Malone was without such specific authority. Vlasek testified that in addition to Malone being designated as sales manager for Pearson Construction Company, he personally observed Malone operating as manager and sales agent and that Malone had held himself out to be an officer of the corporation in his discussions with Vlasek. Malone was never an officer of Pearson Construction Company. Although there is some confusion in Respondent's mind as to when he was made aware that Malone had re-negotiated the contract, and although Respondent never formally executed or acknowledged an acceptance of the new contract terms, Respondent admits that before the change in the contract he told Vlasek that "I'd take care of it." He also admits telling Vlasek that he would get an extension on Vlasek's loan commitment and that such was a normal procedure. He admits making a phone call to the bank and states that he received a written letter extending Vlasek's loan commitment for 30 days. Jack Malone testified that the saw this letter signed by Tom Hannon, whom he knew to be an officer of the bank. Malone testified that he felt certain that Vlasek saw this letter while it was on his desk in the sales office. There is no credible explanation by anyone as to what became of this letter if it ever existed. Vlasek testified that he personally approached the bank concerning getting an extension but was informed that he would not get one. Vlasek testified that his loan commitment was never extended by the bank. There is no corroboration for these statements. Petitioner argues that Respondent only received an extension on the original construction loan to Pearson Construction Company, however that allegation or suggestion is also nowhere supported in the record. Without an extension, the original loan commitment would have expired on June 7, 1984 and the projected closing date remained at June 12, 1984. Vlasek knew this. Vlasek became concerned and made numerous attempts to obtain reassurance from Pearson Construction Company personnel that his home would be completed by the new closing date of June 1, 1984. Vlasek was repeatedly assured by Malone and other members of the construction team (not Pearson) that the home would be completed by June 2, 1984. Vlasek requested in mid May 1984 that the contract be rescinded. His reasons for doing so are part of the controversy. Vlasek testified that he wished the contract rescinded because he felt certain that the home would not be completed by the projected closing date of June 2, 1984. Malone and Respondent testified that Vlasek's dissatisfaction with the home under construction found its origin in his disappointment over Respondent's refusal to construct a home for Vlasek's daughter which would match Vlasek's specifications while not rendering Respondent a profit. There is considerable discrepancy in the testimony of the various witnesses concerning the condition of the house covered by the contract under consideration on June 1, 1985. For reasons relating to the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the credibility and weight of their respective versions of the house's condition it is found that the house was not fully completed by June 1, 1984. According to Vlasek, as of June 1, the following items remaining to be completed were: the septic tank was not installed; the plumbing and lighting fixtures were not installed and the lot was neither sodded nor graded. This analysis is bolstered by the fact that on June 11, 1984 Pearson Construction Company contracted to sell the home to Mr. John Thompson. The contract price of $68,500 included an escrow deposit of $6,400. The closing date of this sale was July 11, 1984. The contract form utilized in this sale is identical to the contract form previously utilized with regard to Mr. Vlasek. On June 1, 1984, Vlasek met with Jack Malone after inspecting the construction site and requested the contract be rescinded because of Respondent's failure to timely complete the home. Malone fired Vlasek upon being informed of this request. The eventual sale to Mr. Thompson suggests the Vlasek contract was rescinded. Pearson Construction Company, Inc. and William P. Pearson constructed a total of 8, possibly 9, houses during the calendar year 1984. In most previous years he has constructed in excess of 20 houses per year. Respondent returned the unrecorded deed for the Vlaseks' $9,400 lot to them.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order assessing Respondent an administrative fine in the amount of $500 and suspending his contracting license for one year; provided however, the period of suspension shall be terminated upon the submission to the Board by Respondent of competent and substantial evidence that restitution of $2,000 has been made to John and Madilyn Vlasek. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted Accepted first sentence Accepted second sentence rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. Accepted. Sentences 1 and 2 are accepted. Sentence 3 is rejected as not supported by the credible competent substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Sentence 4 is accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Sentence 1 and 2 are rejected as not supported by the credible competent substantial evidence in the record as a whole Sentence 3 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph are accepted but rephrased and elaborated upon Sentence 1 is rejected as not supported by the credible competent substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Sentence 2 is accepted. Sentence 3 is rejected as not supported by he credible competent substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Sentence 1 is accepted. Sentence 2 is rejected as cumulative. Sentence 3 is accepted. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted but the portions not specifically adopted are deemed subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the credible competent, substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Sentence 1 is accepted. Sentence 2 is accepted but not adopted as not dispositive of any issue at bar. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. This proposal constitutes a conclusion of law and as such requires no ruling. This proposal constitutes a conclusion of law and as such requires no ruling. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John C. Heekin, Esquire C-2 Olean Plaza 21202 Olean Boulevard Port Charlotte, Florida 33952 James Linnan, Executive Director P. O. Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
The Issue Did Respondent Williams fail to make an accounting for and payment to Petitioner for the proceeds of agricultural products purchased by Ray Gene Williams d/b/a Williams Produce Company?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Six L's grows watermelons in Collier County, Florida. It is therefore a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Respondent Ray Gene Williams d/b/a Williams Produce Company is a dealer in agricultural products who engages in business in Florida. Respondent Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company is the surety for a bond posted by Respondent Williams to insure compliance with Section 604.20, Florida Statutes (1979). On May 26, 1980, Six L's sold 46,700 pounds of field run, crimson sweet, watermelons to Respondent Williams at a price of 5 1/2 cents per pound for a total cost of $2,568.50. The sale was negotiated between Mr. Charles Weisinger, a salesman for Six L's, and Mr. Larry DiMaria. Mr. DiMaria at that time was a purchasing agent for Respondent Williams. They agreed that the sale would be F.O.B. at Immokalee, Florida. On May 26, 1980 a truck under contract to Respondent Williams was loaded with 46,700 pounds of crimson sweet field run watermelons from the farm of Petitioner Six L's. The weight was verified by the Immokalee State Farmer's Market at 6:59 p.m., May 26, 1980. At that time Mr. DiMaria inspected the watermelons and accepted them on behalf of Respondent Williams. On the following day, May 27, 1980, Mr. DiMaria made payment for the watermelons by issuing check #465 drawn on the account of Williams Farms in the amount of $2,568.50, payable to Six L's Packing Company. Before Six L's could collect on the check, payment was stopped by Respondent Williams, and no payment for the watermelons has since been made by either Respondent. The final hearing in this case was initially noticed for December 4, 1980. At the request of Respondent Williams and with the agreement of Six L's it was continued to a later date. The final hearing was rescheduled for May 11, 1981 in Fort Myers, Florida at 10:00 a.m. At that time neither Respondent made an appearance. In order to give them time to appear the hearing was recessed until 10:30 a.m. At that time it resumed and was concluded at 11:30 a.m. with still no appearance by either Respondent. To the knowledge of the undersigned no attempt was made by the Respondents to request a continuance or otherwise explain their failure to appear.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding Ray Gene Williams d/b/a Williams Produce Company indebted to Six L's Packing Company, Inc. in the amount of $2,568.50. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Robert J. Walsh and Company, Inc. has been in the business of selling agricultural products since 1962. It is a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in s. 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1985). It is not a "producer" as defined in s. 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985). Walsh's modus operandi which it has used for many years is to have its salesmen call on landscapers, nurseries and other customers for trees, plants and other agricultural products to determine their needs. These salesmen have the prices of products and their availability from producers and the salesmen take orders from these purchasers. This order is sent to the producer who delivers the product to the purchaser and sends Walsh a copy of the delivery ticket. Walsh bills the customer for the product delivered and the producer bills Walsh for the consumer-cost of the product less a 20-25 percent discount from which Walsh derives its profit from the sale. The producer relies solely on Walsh for payment for the product it produces and delivers to the customer. Walsh has no authority to sell the product at a price other than that set by the producer. In any event, the producer bills Walsh for the product delivered at the producer's established price less the discount it gives Walsh for acting as intermediary in the sale. If products are damaged in transit, the producer's driver will make any necessary adjustment with the customer or return the damaged plant for replacement by the producer. Walsh does not represent the grower if such a situation develops. Similarly, if the product is rejected by the purchaser for not meeting quality standards, that issue is resolved between the grower and the customer without input from Walsh. Whatever agreement is reached between the grower and the customer is reflected on the invoice signed by the customer and forwarded to Walsh who has the responsibility of collecting from the customer. The grower bills Walsh for the cost of the product less Walsh's commission. The sales forming the bases for the complaints filed by Walsh with Respondent involve sales to Paul Pent, d/b/a Paul Pent Landscape Company, Dean Pent and J & W Landscape. On January 31, 1985, Walsh sold Pent three laurel oaks grown by Stewart Tree Service for a total price of $467.46 including sales tax (Ex. 2). On March 27, 1985, Walsh sold various trees and plants grown by Goochland Nurseries to J & W Landscape for a total price of $403.98 (Ex. 3). On April 22, 1985, Walsh sold two live oaks grown by Stewart Tree Service to Pent Landscape Company for a total price of $336.00 (Ex. 4). On July 3, 1985, Walsh sold various plants grown by Goochland Nurseries to J & W Landscape for a total price of $564.96 (Ex. 5). On all of these sales the producers billed Walsh for the product and were paid by Walsh. Walsh billed the customers who did not pay and Walsh filed the complaints (Ex. 8, 9 and 10), denied by Respondent on grounds Walsh was not an agent or representative of the producers. In 1976, Petitioner filed a complaint against the bond of the Ernest Corporation, a licensed dealer in agricultural products and received $5,589.20 from Respondent who recovered from the bonding company. In the complaint Walsh alleged that it was agent for Southeast Growers, Inc., selling their nursery stock throughout Florida. Respondent's witnesses could not recall what additional evidence they saw to conclude that Walsh was, in fact, an agent for the producer. However, these witnesses all testified that had they then believed Walsh was solely responsible to the producer for payment for the products sold they would not have concluded Walsh was the agent or representative of the producer. The bond on which Petitioner is attempting to recover provides that if the principal "shall faithfully and truly account for and make payment to producers, their agents or representatives, as required by Sections 604.15 - 604.30, Florida Statutes, that this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect." (Ex. 11 and 12)
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of these proceedings. Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985) provides in pertinent part: Any person claiming himself to be damaged by any breach of the conditions of a bond or certificate of deposit, assignment or agreement given by a licensed dealer in agricultural products as herein before provided may enter complaints thereof against the dealer and against the surety, if any, to the department, which complaint shall be a written statement of the facts constituting the complaint. Section 604.15(1) , Florida Statutes (1985) provides: "Dealers in agricultural products" means any person, whether itinerant or domiciled within this state, engaged within this state in the business of purchasing, receiving, or soliciting agricultural products from the producer or his agent or representative for resale or processing for sale; acting as an agent for such producer in the sale of agricultural products for the account of the producer on a net return basis; or acting as a negotiating broker between the producer or his agent or representative and the buyer. (emphasis supplied) One of the complexities of this case which leads to some confusion is the fact that both Pent and Walsh were dealers in agricultural products as above defined. Walsh fits into the category of a person claiming himself to be damaged by a breach of any condition of the bond of Pent. However, he has the burden of showing that he is a person covered by the bond. According to the terms of the bond, coverage is provided only for "producers, their agents or representatives." Walsh is clearly not a producer in this case but claims coverage as an agent or representative. In construing "agent" or "representative" the legislative intent should be considered. The purpose of these provisions of the statute requiring licensing and bonding of dealers in agricultural products, as expressed in Section 604.151, Florida Statutes, is to protect producers from economic harm. Economic harm sustained by an agent or representative is imputed back to the principals, which in this case are the producers. An agency may be defined as a contract either expressed or implied upon a consideration, or a gratuitous undertaking, by which one of the parties confides to the other the management of some business to be transacted in the former's name or on his account, and by which the latter assumes to do the business and render an account of it. 2 Fl. Jur. 2d "Agency," Section 1. Here, Walsh was selling agricultural products on its own account, which products it was purchasing from the producers. The producer sold its product to Walsh and delivered it to the address Walsh indicated. The customer receipted for the product and the producer billed Walsh for the total cost, including transportation, to the ultimate buyer, less the 20-25 percent commission Walsh received. Walsh paid the producer and billed the customer. Whether or not Walsh collected from the customer had no bearing on the debt Walsh owed the producer for the product. It could be said that the producer was the agent for Walsh in delivering the product to the user. Even though Walsh never had actual possession of the product the sale to Walsh was complete when the producer delivered the product to the user. The entire transaction clearly is a buy-and-sell operation by Walsh and not Walsh acting as an agent for the producer. The fact that Walsh sells the producer's product does not make Walsh the agent or representative of the producer, when the producer holds only Walsh responsible to pay for the product. Nor was Walsh a representative of the producers. Representative is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977 Ed.) as: "standing or acting for another esp. through delegated authority." Walsh had no delegation of authority to act for the producer. Walsh had no authority to modify the price, settle disputes, or any other function normally performed by a representative. The above interpretation of those having standing to file a complaint against a dealer in agricultural products is the same interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions that is made by Respondent. As stated in Natelson v. Dept. of Insurance, 454 So.2d 31 (Fl 1st DCA 1984): Agencies are afforded a wide discretion in the interpretation of a statute which it [sic] administers and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. The reviewing court will defer to any interpretation within the range of possible interpretations. (citations omitted). This interpretation limiting recovery on an agricultural bond to producers and their agents or representatives is certainly within the range of possible interpretations, especially considering the purpose of these statutory provisions to be the protection of the economic well being of the producer. From the foregoing, it is concluded that Robert J. Walsh & Company, Inc. was not the agent or representative of Goochland Nurseries and Stewart Tree Service and does not have standing to file a complaint against Dean Pent, d/b/a Pent Landscape Company, and Paul Pent, d/b/a Paul Pent Landscape Company, and their surety, Transamerica Insurance Company.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition as contained in Petitioner's letter dated March 24, 1986. ENTERED this 14th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas M. Egan, Esquire Phillip Kuhn, Esquire Post Office Box 7323 Winter Haven, Florida 33883 Ronnie H. Weaver, Esquire Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Right Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products (watermelons) purchased by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is a licensed dealer in agricultural products. During times relevant, Respondent had a bond posted through Cincinnati Insurance Company as surety. During times material, Respondent employed Grady Smith as a field representative. As such, Smith had authority to, and on numerous occasions, purchased watermelons on behalf of Respondent. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products, specifically watermelons. Petitioner has been growing melons for approximately 30 years. Petitioner has known Smith for the duration of his production of agricultural products and has had business dealings with Smith as a representative of Respondent Wroten on numerous occasions during the past two years. During May and June of 1992, Petitioner sold 21 loads of melons to Respondent Wroten. Four of those loads are at issue in this case. (The remaining 17 loads Smith purchased from Petitioner as representative of Respondent, are not at issue herein.) On June 11 and 12, 1992, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to buy the loads of melons in controversy here. Smith purchased Sangria watermelons at four and one-half cents per pound. When the loads were loaded, graded and weighed, Smith was on hand and the totals were as follows: Load #6149 44,460 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,000.70 Load #6351 43,870 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,974.15 Load #5898 49,140 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,211.30 Load #5900 43,660 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,964.70 The total agreed price for the melons at issue was $8,150.85. Respondent Wroten has previously paid Petitioner $4,456.13 of the amount due which, when deducted from the amount claimed together with $45.71 in melon promotion fees, leaves a balance claimed by Petitioner in the amount of $3,649.01. Beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1992, Petitioner and Smith, as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to the sale of melons under an understanding that the transaction was F.O.B. at Coleman, Florida, acceptance final at shipping point. This agreement included an understanding that Respondent would provide a trailer to haul the melons and would pay all transportation charges. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, payment for the melons was due "when they moved over the scales", i.e., as soon as the trucks were loaded and weighed or on the following day. Finally, the understanding and agreement between the parties was that the title and risk of loss to the melons passed to Respondent Wroten on the day of shipment. The growers receipt submitted in evidence clearly showed the essential terms of the agreement and contained no language which would indicate that the sale was conditioned in any manner respecting Respondent Wroten's claim that Petitioner agreed to "ride the load". The admitted growers receipts and other testimony supports Petitioner's claim that Respondent's representative Smith offered the same terms to other producers and growers in the area. The referenced understanding/agreement was the focal point of the terms under which Petitioner conducted business with representative Smith. Although the growers receipt did not contain a price for the melons, Petitioner's president, Greg Bigham, credibly testified that the agreed price between Bigham and Smith was 4 1/2 cents per pound. Further, Respondent offered no testimony and presented no documentary evidence establishing that the price was other than as stated by Bigham. Respondent Wroten contests that it owes the sum claimed by Petitioner based on a phone conversation allegedly had between Lee Wroten and Greg Bigham in which it is contended that Bigham agreed to bear the risk of loss of the melons to their ultimate destination. This method of sale in the industry is known as offering "protection" or "riding-the-load". Bigham acknowledged a phone conversation respecting loads of royal sweet melons which had been previously rejected by Respondent Wroten, however he did not agree to offer "protection" or otherwise "ride-the-load" as to the Sangria melons questioned here. Likewise, Smith could not remember telling Bigham that the terms of sale had changed nor did he attempt to confirm that Petitioner was required to assume the risk of loss for the Sangria melons. Likewise, the growers receipts issued thereafter to Petitioner contained no changed conditions or restrictions respecting the terms of sale. Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner offered protection or otherwise agreed to "ride the load", Respondent offered no credible evidence to establish that the melons were either defective or that there was any other fault with the melons when shipped or upon arrival at destination which would somehow require that a set off be issued to Respondent. As stated, Smith was present on June 11 and 12, 1992 and witnessed the loading and graded the melons as they were being placed on the trailers provided by Respondent Wroten. Smith, while inspecting and grading the melons, eliminated those melons which were not acceptable to him. After the melons were loaded, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent, accepted the load and observed the weighing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order requiring that: Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,649.01. In the event that Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner the sum of $3649.01 as ordered, that the Respondent Cincinnati Insurance, as surety, be ordered to pay the Department a like sum as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes and that the Department timely reimburse Petitioner in accordance with that subsection. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 6, adopted in part, Paragraph 9, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Marchbanks, Esquire MARCHBANKS DAIELLO & LEIDER 4800 North Federal Highway #101-E Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Don Davis L.A. Wroten Company, Inc. Post Office Box 2437 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810
