Findings Of Fact The petitioners, Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, are husband and wife. They have been members of the Florida retirement System (FRS) since their transfer on January 1, 1979. Previously, the petitioners were members of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) Plan D. In order to transfer to FRS, they moved from TRS Plan D, to TRS Plan E, on December 31, 1978, and then into FRS on January 1, 1979. In transferring from TRS to FRS, a member is entitled to a refund of excess TRS contributions. In early 1979, Mr. Price received refund warrants totalling $16,060.61 which represented TRS contributions of $10,138.73 and accrued interest of $5,921.88. In early 1979, Mrs. Price received refund warrants totalling $17,515.03 which represented TRS contributions of $11,383.91 and accrued interest of $6,131.12. The petitioners failed to cash these refund warrants and to date have not negotiated them. In November, 1979, the petitioners visited the Division of Retirement and discussed the cashing of these warrants based on questions of taxation. This discussion was followed by a letter dated December 30, 1979, to A. J. McMullian III, State Retirement Director, in which the petitioners again discussed the taxation questions and advised the respondent that they had not cashed the warrants. They asked that new warrants be issued and that they be paid interest on the amount of the warrants for the period of time from the issuance to the cashing of the warrants. By letter dated January 25, 1980, Mr. McMullian advised the petitioners to cash the warrants and further told petitioners that interest could not be paid. In their petition for an administrative hearing, the petitioners alleged that they were under-refunded; however, at the hearing the parties stipulated that only two issues are presented for resolution: Whether the petitioners are entitled to interest on their contributions from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, and Whether the petitioners are entitled to interest on the total amount of the uncashed warrants from the date of issuance to the present. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, Section 238.10, Florida Statutes, has consistently been construed as providing for the payment of interest on contributions based on a fiscal year. The fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30. On June 30 of each year, interest is calculated on the total accumulated contributions then on deposit. If no contributions are on deposit on June 30, no interest is credited for this fiscal year. Since the petitioners received refunds of excess accumulated contributions on December 31, 1978, no interest was paid for the 1978-79 fiscal year because no contributions were on deposit on June 30, 1979. At the time that refund warrants are issued, the funds backing the warrants are transferred from the retirement system trust fund to the Treasurer's Office and the Division earns no more interest on these funds. The petitioners contend that they were advised by Leon Burnett of the Division of Retirement not to cash the warrants in their possession pending the outcome of this case. Ruth Sansom testified that it is standard practice to advise members not to cash benefit warrants if the amount of the benefit is in question, but that refund warrants may be cashed and adjustments made in the future. In a separate case (Case No. 80-1029), Mr. Price is challenging the amount of his benefit warrants. However, at the hearing in this case the petitioners did not understand the difference between a refund warrant and a benefit warrant, although this subject was discussed at their November, 1979, meeting with Mr. Burnett, and Mr. Price had in his possession both refund warrants and benefit warrants which had not been cashed.
Recommendation BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, seeking interest on their contributions for the period of time from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of the petitioners, Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, for interest on the total amount of their uncashed warrants from the date of issuance, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-1779 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price 1000 N.E. 96th Street Miami, Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Cedars Executive Center Suite 207C, Box 81 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent's Florida real estate license should be disciplined upon charges that: (1) Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and (2) Respondent is guilty of having had a registration suspended, revoked, or otherwise acted against in any jurisdiction in violation of Section 475.225(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count II of the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Washington Moises Quinones, is and was at all times material to the Administrative Complaint a licensed Florida real estate salesperson, issued license number 0650737 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Washington Moises Quinones, was also a member of the Florida Bar. On or about August 29, 1997, the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for an emergency suspension of Respondent's bar license. The petition filed with the Florida Supreme Court reflects that Respondent's "trust records reveal losses which approximate $350,000.00." On or about September 11, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court granted the petition for emergency suspension of Respondent's bar license, and suspended Respondent from the practice of law for the reasons set forth in the Petition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violation Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that Respondent's real estate license be revoked in accordance with Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RICHARD A. HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Washington Moises Quinones 5119 Agora Street Sebring, Florida 33872 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner violated Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes (2007),1 and, if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for the benefit of their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Martinez Construction is a construction business. On June 15, 2005, the Department issued Stop-Work Order No. 05-325- 1A. On June 20, 2005, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued against Martinez Construction assessing a penalty of $23,472.57. On June 21, 2005, Martinez Construction and the Department entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty in which Martinez Construction agreed to pay the Department a lump sum of $5,000.00 and to make 24 monthly payments of $769.69. On June 21, 2005, the Department entered an Order of Conditional Release from Stop- Work Order (Conditional Release), which conditionally released the Stop-Work Order that was issued on June 15, 2005. The Conditional Release provided: Until such time as the employer has paid the total assessed penalty of $23,472.57 in full, if the employer fails to comply with the terms and conditions of the Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty attached hereto as Exhibit “A,” the Stop-Work Order to which this order applies will be immediately reinstated, and the unpaid balance of the total penalty to be paid by the employer shall become immediately due. The Conditional Release listed Martinez Construction’s address as 1905 Michigan Avenue, Panama City, Florida. Martinez Construction made payments until July 2006, when it stopped making payments. The unpaid balance on the assessed penalty was $10,008.98. By letter dated May 24, 2007, the Department wrote Martinez Construction advising that it was issuing an Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order because of the failure to make payments as required by the payment schedule to which the parties had agreed. A copy of the Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order was enclosed with the letter and ordered: The Stop-Work Order issued to Employer on June 15, 2005, is immediately reinstated, and pursuant to such immediate reinstatement, the provisions of said Stop- Work Order are in full force and effect. The unpaid balance of the penalty in the amount of $10,008.98 is due pursuant to such immediate reinstatement. Pursuant to such immediate reinstatement, Employer shall cease all business operations in the State of Florida until the DEPARTMENT issues an Order releasing the reinstated Stop-Work Order upon a finding by the DEPARTMENT that Employer has come into compliance with coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and has paid the entire unpaid balance of the penalty assessed as specified in (7) above [$10,008.98]. The letter and Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order were sent to Martinez Construction by certified mail to its Michigan Avenue address. The letter and order were returned to the Department as undeliverable. In early January 2006, Hector Martinez (Mr. Martinez) and his family moved from 1905 Michigan Avenue, Panama City, Florida, to 1304 Delaware Avenue, Lynn Haven, Florida. They remained at that address until January 2008. Mr. Martinez was the manager and registered agent for Martinez Construction. The records of the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, show that on February 2, 2006, the principal address and mailing address for Martinez Construction was changed to 1304 Delaware Avenue, Lynn Haven, Florida, and that the address for the registered agent was also changed to the 1304 Delaware Avenue address. The Department resent the May 24, 2007, letter and Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order by certified mail to Martinez Construction. The return receipt from the United States Postal Service shows that the documents were delivered to the 1304 Delaware Avenue address on June 1, 2007. The receipt bore a signature stating Luisa Martinez. On June 1, 2007, Mr. Martinez was married to Luisa Alvarez Diaz. Mr. Martinez claims that his wife did not sign the receipt for the certified mail and that he did not receive the documents. According to Mr. Martinez, his wife does not use his surname, but goes by the name of Luisa Alvarez. Mr. Martinez’s testimony is not credible. The letter and Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order were delivered to the 1304 Delaware Avenue address on June 1, 2007. On August 24, 2007, Robert Borden (Mr. Borden), an investigator for the Department, was conducting a random compliance investigation and found a crew working on a jobsite. When Mr. Borden questioned the crew concerning the name of their employer, they replied that they worked for Martinez Construction. Mr. Borden checked the Department’s Coverage Compliance Automated Systems database and discovered that an Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order had been issued to Martinez Construction. Mr. Borden checked with the employee leasing company which Martinez Construction used and found that Martinez Construction had been employing crews for 70 days since the issuance of the Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order. On August 28, 2007, Martinez Construction was issued and personally served an Order Assessing Penalty for Working in Violation of Reinstated Stop-Work Order, assessing a $70,000.00 penalty which represented a penalty of $1,000.00 per day for the 70 days of violation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order finding that Petitioner violated Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes, and assessing a penalty of $70,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2008.
Findings Of Fact On October 14, 1985, Petitioner, Nicholas Cozzo, entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement for the sale of sixty (60) shares of the issued and outstanding capital stock of C & S Deli Sandwich and Fish, Inc., a Florida corporation, (the Company) to Robert A. Krueger and Joe Ellen Krueger (collectively, the Kruegers). As a result of the sale, Petitioner retained ownership of no further stock of the Company. (Exhibit A) On October 14, 1985, the Kruegers executed two (2) promissory notes in the amounts of $53,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively, to Petitioner and a Security Agreement securing payment of the notes. (Composite Exhibit B and Exhibit C) On October 14, 1985, Petitioner tendered his resignation as Director, President and Treasurer of the Company. (Exhibit D) Petitioner's security interest to the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, equipment and inventory of the Company (the "collateral") was duly perfected by the filing of a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement with the Uniform Commercial Code Bureau, Florida Department of State, on October 21, 1985. (Exhibit E) A Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement was recorded by the Petitioner in the Public Records of Pasco County, State of Florida, on October 15, 1985, in Official Records Book 1451, page 0493. (Exhibit F) In early 1987, the Kruegers defaulted under the terms of the promissory notes. Prior to April 24, 1987, Petitioner repossessed the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, equipment and inventory of the Company. No consideration was paid by Petitioner to the Company or the Kruegers upon his repossession of the foregoing described collateral. At no time did ownership of any of the capital stock of the Company revert back to Petitioner. On May 5, 1987, Petitioner by private sale disposed of the collateral to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. (Exhibits G, H, and I) No surplus funds resulted from the sale of the repossessed collateral by Petitioner to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. At no time material hereto did the Florida Department of Revenue issue a tax warrant against the Company respecting any unpaid sales tax. On or about May 6, 1987, Petitioner paid under protest to the Respondent Department of Revenue the delinquent unpaid sales tax of the Company in the amount of $1392.53. The Department is still attempting to verify that amount at this date. The Petitioner maintains he paid the amount in order for the Department to issue a sales tax certificate and number to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. The Department maintains its procedure at the time was to issue a sales tax number to the new owners and then proceed against them under Section 212.10, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the Respondent that the Petitioner's repossession of the collateral constituted a sale within the purview of Section 212.10(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 12A-1.055, Florida Administrative Code, which places tax liability on the successor of a business whose previous owner has not satisfied outstanding sales tax obligations. Respondent further notes that the case Petitioner relies on, General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Tom Norton Motor Corp., 366 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) was issued on January 10, 1979, while Section 679.105(5), Florida Statutes, which upholds tax laws when in conflict with security agreements, took effect January 1, 1980. Petitioner on the other hand claims that a lawful repossession of collateral under Florida's Uniform Commercial Code, Section 679.504, Florida Statutes (1985), does not constitute a "sale" of a business making him liable for the Company's unpaid sales tax. Petitioner continues to rely on GMAC, supra, and notes that it was cited by American Bank v. Con's Cycle Center, 466 So.2d 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A refund application was submitted by Petitioner to the Department of Revenue on June 10, 1987. This application was denied by the Department of Revenue by letter dated January 28, 1988. (Exhibit J)
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was operating its restaurant business in violation of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, by failing to have required workers' compensation coverage. The related issues are whether the Department should therefore issue a Stop Work Order, whether a penalty should be imposed for so operating and what the correct penalty should be.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an Agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the statutory requirement, specifically Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, which mandates that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage for the benefit of employees. The Petitioner is a restaurant operating in the vicinity of Crystal River, Florida, which opened for business sometime in the year 2005. At certain times during its operation, which are those times relevant to this proceeding, the restaurant had four or more employees, and was thus subject to the requirement to secure payment of workers' compensation for those employees. Wanda Rivera is an investigator for the Division's Bureau of Compliance. On January 12, 2007, she was referred to investigate a restaurant in Crystal River, Florida. There was another restaurant nearby, the La Paz Mexican Grill, the Petitioner's business. Because she was in the area she made a routine visit to that restaurant as well. When Ms. Rivera entered the restaurant she saw two waitresses as well as another employee and the owner of the restaurant. She made a report of her visit as well as other events and observed facts from her investigation and included them as part of a narrative in her initial investigative report. Ms. Rivera checked the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) data base by first looking up the name La Paz Mexican Grill. She spoke to the restaurant's owner, Aswaldo Vazquez, and learned that the actual corporate name was 2 Friends, Inc. She researched that name in the Division's data base and found no indication of workers' compensation coverage for that corporation. She also interviewed workers present at the restaurant. Mr. Vazquez told Ms. Rivera that there were five employees and that the restaurant did not have workers' compensation coverage. Ms. Rivera also checked the CCAS data base, as well as the Department of State, Division of Corporation's data base. She thereby discovered that Mr. Vazquez was an officer of the corporation, but that he did not have an exemption from workers' compensation coverage which corporate officers may apply for and obtain. Ms. Rivera presented her investigative findings to her supervisor and after having done so issued a Stop Work Order, Number 07-012-D3, and served it upon Mr. Vazquez. She hand wrote the Stop Work Order Number on that form, having received that number from her supervisor. She served it on Mr. Vazquez personally on that same day, January 12, 2007. Part of her training as an investigator had emphasized serving documents personally on employers. The Stop Work Order was a three part form; she gave the yellow carbon copy of the Stop Work Order to Mr. Vazquez by hand delivery and, in checking her official file in the case in preparation for hearing, she found that her file contained no yellow copy of the Stop Work Order Form, corroborating her testimony that she had personally served the yellow copy of the Stop Work Order on Mr. Vazquez on January 12, 2007. The Stop Work Order specifically stated that all business operations had to cease immediately and could not resume until the Department issued an order releasing the Stop Work Order. The Order also stated that a penalty of $1,000.00 a day would be assessed the employer who conducted business operations in violation of the Stop Work Order. Ms. Rivera and Mr. Vazquez are fluent Spanish speakers. Ms. Rivera therefore conducted her interview with Mr. Vazquez in Spanish to assure that he understood all facets of the Division's position in his situation. She answered his questions and explained to him that the Stop Work Order was to take effect immediately and that there would be a $1,000.00 dollar per day fine for working in violation of the Stop Work Order. She also issued and served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. The records were to be produced within five business days. Two types of records were requested: those that would show how much payroll the establishment had paid over the previous three years and those that would show exemptions. The request for records allows the employer five days to provide the documents; if no records were received within 15 days of the request, the Department could impute the gross payroll. Three weeks after serving the request on Mr. Vazquez, Ms. Rivera received some records by mail on February 2, 2007. They were insufficient for her investigation. Thus, not having received records from which she could calculate payroll and determine when the restaurant had four or more employees, Ms. Rivera, in accordance with statute, imputed the payroll and thereupon calculated a penalty of $34,240.30 based upon the imputed amount. She issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to that effect on February 5, 2007, and it was served by certified mail on Mr. Vazquez on February 7, 2007. It was also served by a process server on February 13, 2007. That Amended Order of Penalty Assessment did not reference the Stop Work Order Number nor did it reflect the date it was issued. Ms. Rivera forgot to include this information when she filled out the Order. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment did, however, have the following language: The Stop Work Order issued in this case shall remain in effect until either (a) the Division issues an order releasing the Stop Work Order upon finding that the employer has come into compliance with the coverage requirements of the workers' compensation law and pays the total penalty in full, or (b) the Division issues an Order of Conditional Release from Stop Work Order pursuant to the employer coming into compliance with the coverage requirements of the workers' compensation law and entering into a payment agreement schedule for periodic payment of penalty. On February 7, 2007, Mr. Vazquez phoned Ms. Rivera asking why his penalty was that high, stating that his accountant could provide additional records. Ms. Rivera had telephone contact at least twice with Mr. Vazquez between February 7, and March 29, 2007. When she contacted him at the restaurant, a voice would answer, "La Paz Mexican Restaurant, how may I help you?" She asked Mr. Vazquez if the restaurant was actually operating, and told him that he could not open for business while a Stop Work Order was in effect. She was assured that the restaurant was not working. Mr. Vazquez also told her that more records would be produced. On March 29, 2007, however, Ms. Rivera had not received any new records, so she visited the restaurant and found that it was open for business in violation of the Stop Work Order. Because the restaurant is open seven days a week, Ms. Rivera assessed an additional penalty of $1,000.00 per day since the Stop Work Order had been issued. She thus issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment for the sum of $110,240.30. The Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment referred to Stop Work Order Number 07-012-D3, stating that the Stop Work Order had been filed on January 12, 2007, and noting that the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was dated February 5, 2007, and the Order showed an issuance date of March 29, 2007. On the next day, March 30, 2007, Ms. Rivera received more business records, from which she could calculate a penalty without imputing the payroll. Ms. Rivera calculated the new penalty at $79,690.36. Before she could issue a new penalty order, however, Mr. Vazquez contacted her and said that his restaurant had been closed for several days while he was traveling. He subsequently provided documents to Ms. Rivera that showed that he was out of the country for nine days. While 76 days had elapsed between the date the Stop Work Order was issued and the date Ms. Rivera found the restaurant had been open, Ms. Rivera determined that she would assess the penalty for only 67 days of that period. This decision was based upon Mr. Vazquez's documentation and her giving him the benefit of the doubt in accepting his representation that he had been out of the country for nine days and not operating. She then re-calculated the penalty as being $70,060.36 and issued a Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to that effect. The Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment made reference to Stop Work Order Number 07-012-D3, and notes that the Stop Work Order was issued on January 12, 2007. The Third Amended Order has "February 5, 2007," in the line on the order for "issuance date." The entry for "issuance date" on the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is incorrect and it should have been April 3, 2007, the date the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued. The penalty worksheet for the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment shows that there was $25,793.55 in payroll for the relevant portions of 2005; $8,635.30 for relevant portions of 2006 during which times the restaurant had four employees. There was $1,370.21 in payroll for the relevant first 12 days of 2007, which was up until the time the Stop Work Order was issued. Ms. Rivera did not include the payroll for periods of time when the record showed the restaurant did not have four employees and her work papers so reflect. The payroll was calculated from 2005 forward because the business opened that year. On April 4, 2007, Mr. Vazquez brought his restaurant into compliance by reducing his staff to less than four employees and he entered into an agreement with the Department whereby he would pay down 10 percent of the penalty and agree to pay the remainder in 60 interest free monthly payments. Mr. Vazquez, in effect, does not contest the Division's position that he was required to carry workers' compensation coverage during the pertinent time periods and that he did not have such coverage. In actuality he disputes the amount of the penalty because he maintains that he did not receive the Stop Work Order until March 29, 2007. Mr. Vazquez is the president of the 2 Friends, Inc., Corporation. He speaks English and opined during his testimony that he reads 60 to 70 percent of English text. He knows people who are fluent in English and has people to whom he can show documents written in English if he does not understand any part of such.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services finding that the Petitioner, 2 Friends Inc., d/b/a/ La Paz Mexican Grill, has failed to secure required workers' compensation coverage for its employees in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes (2007), and that a penalty against that entity be accessed in the amount of $70,060.36, and that said final order provide for an acceptable installment payment arrangement whereby the amount may be paid over a period of at least 60 months at no interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Leon M. Boyajan, II, Esquire Leon M. Boyajan, II, P.A. 2303 West Highway 44 Inverness, Florida 34453-3809 Thomas H. Duffy, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street, 6th Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Alex Sinks Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology that Respondent uses to determine the amounts payable to pharmacies for prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that the methodology in question, which is incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.250, enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program in which Florida participates in partnership with the national government. Medicaid provides medically necessary health care—— including, relevantly, prescription drugs——to lower income persons. In addition to shouldering administrative and regulatory responsibilities, Florida partially funds the Florida Medicaid Program, contributing about 42 percent of the money budgeted for the program's operation in this state. Federal funds make up the balance. Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration (the "Agency") is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid Program in Florida. (At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, known collectively as "CMS," is the agency authorized to administer Medicaid.) Among other things, the Agency is responsible for reimbursing Medicaid providers in accordance with state and federal law, subject to specific appropriations. In this connection, the Agency is authorized and required to prescribe, by rule, reimbursement methodologies. The Agency is permitted to publish such methodologies in policy manuals and handbooks, provided the latter are incorporated by reference in duly promulgated rules. Petitioner, The Florida Retail Federation, Inc. (the "Federation"), is a trade association whose members include all or most of the major drugstore chains doing business in Florida. These drugstore chains, which include Walgreen's, CVS, Eckerd's, Albertson's, Publix, Winn-Dixie, Target, and Wal-Mart, participate in the Federation's Chain Drugstore Council, which is the only organization in this state representing the interests of drugstore chains. Members of the Federation's Chain Drugstore Council operate more than 2,500 separate pharmacies, each of which is an enrolled Medicaid provider of prescription drugs. Given that there are approximately 4,000 pharmacy-providers participating in the Florida Medicaid Program, the Federation represents a significant percentage of the enrolled pharmacies. The Federation advocates on behalf of its members before the Florida Legislature and the state regulatory agencies. Medicaid funding is one of the organization's top priorities. The Federation brought the instant proceeding because it believes that the Medicaid Program has been under- reimbursing its members based on a methodology that contravenes the applicable Florida statutes. The Disputed Rule The Medicaid reimbursement methodology for prescribed drugs is set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drugs Services Coverage, Limitations, and Reimbursement Handbook, July 2001 (the "Handbook), which Handbook was incorporated by reference in, and hence adopted via Section 120.54(1)(i)1., Florida Statutes, as, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G- 4.250. The methodology, which will be referred to hereafter as the "Reimbursement Rule," limits the amount that the Medicaid Program will pay for prescription drugs, as follows: Reimbursement for covered drugs dispensed by a licensed pharmacy that has been approved to be an eligible provider, or a physician filling his own prescriptions if there is no licensed pharmacy within a ten mile radius of his office, shall not exceed the lowest of: Average Wholesale Price (AWP) minus 13.25 per cent of the drug, (also known as the Estimated Acquisition Cost or EAC) plus the dispensing fee; Wholesaler Acquisition Cost (WAC) plus 7 per cent plus the dispensing fee; Federal Upper Limit (FUL) price plus the dispensing fee; The State Maximum Allowable Cost (SMAC) plus a dispensing fee established by the state on certain categories of drugs not reviewed by CMS (formerly HCFA); or Amount billed by the pharmacy, which cannot exceed the pharmacy’s average charge to the public (non-Medicaid) in any calendar quarter, for the same drug, quality, and strength. This average is known as the pharmacy’s usual and customary charge for the prescription. By its plain terms, the Reimbursement Rule (a) requires that five separate methods for determining reimbursement be applied with respect to each prescription and (b) mandates that the maximum allowable payment for each prescription be the lowest dollar amount resulting from the application of these five methods to the claim at hand.1 For ease of reference, the five separate methods enumerated in the Reimbursement Rule will be referred to collectively as the "Limits." Individually, the Limits will be called the "First Limit," "Second Limit," etc., with the numerical adjective corresponding to the order in which the Reimbursement Rule lists the respective Limits. (Thus, for example, the First Limit is the one based on average wholesale price; the Fourth Limit references the state maximum allowable cost.)2 The Reimbursement Rule was promulgated to implement two statutes in particular. One of these was Section 409.908, Florida Statutes, which provided in pertinent part as follows: A provider of prescribed drugs shall be reimbursed the least of the amount billed by the provider, the provider's usual and customary charge, or the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency, plus a dispensing fee. § 409.908(14), Fla. Stat. (2003). The other was Section 409.912, Florida Statute, which directed, in relevant part, that "[r]eimbursement to pharmacies for Medicaid prescribed drugs shall be set at the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent." § 409.912(40)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2003). The Challenge The Federation filed its Petition for Invalidity of Rule ("Petition") on May 19, 2004, initiating the instant proceeding. The Petition describes a straightforward objection to the Reimbursement Rule, namely that the prescribed Limits include methods for determining reimbursement in addition to "average wholesale cost less 13.25 percent," which latter, according to the Petition, constitutes the exclusive method for reimbursing pharmacies, pursuant to Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003). Thus, the Federation alleged, only the First Limit is permissible; the rest are unauthorized, and the Reimbursement Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes Section 409.912(40)(a)2. for using them, making the Reimbursement Rule an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes. As this proceeding progressed, the Federation's position became a bit more complicated. Forced to deal with Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003), which was not mentioned in the Petition, the Federation effectively conceded (assuming it ever disputed) that "amount billed" and "usual and customary charge" are statutorily authorized methods for calculating reimbursement, in addition to discounted average wholesale price. Unable as a result to argue that the Fifth Limit should be rejected in toto, the Federation claimed instead that the Reimbursement Rule's definition of "usual and customary charge" enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the use of that term in Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003). On this point, the Federation presented expert testimony at hearing that "usual and customary charge" is a term of art used in the industry to mean the amount a pharmacy charges cash paying customers who have no insurance coverage for the prescription in question. The Reimbursement Rule's definition, in contrast, does not restrict the scope of "usual and customary charge" to uninsured customers, but rather requires that charges to all non-Medicaid customers be taken into account in determining the average charge that equals "usual and customary charge." Because private insurers and HMOs typically negotiate discounts not available to uninsured consumers, the inclusion of amounts charged to insured customers in the equation for calculating "usual and customary charge," à la the Reimbursement Rule, is likely to produce, in most instances, a lower "usual and customary charge" than would obtain were charges to insured customers excluded from the calculation. The Federation argues that the legislature intended "usual and customary charge" to have the more generous technical meaning that the industry ascribes to it, and therefore that the Reimbursement Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific law implemented by giving the term a different, more parsimonious meaning. Confronting Section 409.908(14) also compelled the Federation to argue that, while the section imposes (and hence enables the Agency to implement) limits on reimbursement in addition to discounted average wholesale price, the reference therein to "the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency" as an alternative reimbursement limit nevertheless cannot be construed as authority for the adoption of a methodology that would result in reimbursement at less than the least of (a) the amount billed by the provider, (b) the provider's "usual and customary charge" (as the Federation would define that term), or (c) average wholesale cost less 13.25 percent. In this regard, the Federation asserts that Section 409.908(14) and Section 409.912(40)(a)2.——which might at first blush appear to be inconsistent with one another——can easily be harmonized by construing "Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency" to mean "average wholesale price less 13.25 percent." The Agency's Defense of Reimbursement Rule The Agency's arguments in support of the Reimbursement Rule can be reduced to two principal propositions. First, the Agency insists that if it were to reimburse pharmacies for all prescribed drugs at average wholesale price less 13.25 percent, the resulting payments, in the aggregate, would exceed federal limits on reimbursement, for reasons that need not detain us here. Exceeding federal limits, the Agency asserts, could cause CMS to take adverse action against the Florida Medicaid Program, perhaps putting at risk Florida's continued receipt of federal matching funds. Second, the Agency contends that Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003), which requires that reimbursement be set at the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent, does not establish a floor (as the Federation maintains) but rather, when read in conjunction with Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003), prescribes another potential ceiling in addition to the pharmacy's actual charge, "usual and customary charge," and "the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency," which are the other potential ceilings pursuant to Section 409.908(14). Under this interpretation of the statutes, application of the Reimbursement Rule always produces the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the Agency——a statutorily authorized limit——and if that fee happens in a given situation to be less than the discounted average wholesale price, so be it. The New Statutory Methodology The 2004 Legislature amended Sections 409.908(14) and 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003), enacting a bill (House Bill No. 1843) that was signed by the governor while this case was pending, on May 28, 2004. See Laws of Florida, Ch. 2004-270, §§ 12 and 17. The relevant statutory amendments took effect on July 1, 2004, id. at § 25, which was shortly after the final hearing in this case——and prior to the date of this Final Order. As amended, Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2004), reads in relevant part as follows, with the recently added language underlined: A provider of prescribed drugs shall be reimbursed the least of the amount billed by the provider, the provider's usual and customary charge, or the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency, plus a dispensing fee. The Medicaid maximum allowable fee for ingredient cost will be based upon the lower of: average wholesale price (AWP) minus 15.4 percent, wholesaler acquisition cost (WAC) plus 5.75 percent, the federal upper limit (FUL), the state maximum allowable cost (SMAC), or the usual and customary (UAC) charge billed by the provider. As amended, Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004), provides in pertinent part as follows, with the newly added language underlined and recently deleted language stricken through: Reimbursement to pharmacies for Medicaid prescribed drugs shall be set at the lesser of: the average wholesale price (AWP) minus 15.4 percent, the wholesaler acquisition cost (WAC) plus 5.75 percent, the federal upper limit (FUL), the state maximum allowable cost (SMAC), or the usual and customary (UAC) charge billed by the provider the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent. Collectively, Sections 409.908(4) and 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004), will be referred to hereafter as the "New Statutory Methodology."
Findings Of Fact At all times material, the Respondent was licensed as a general contractor, holding license number CG C003564, qualifying WSCON Corporation. On or about September 27, 1990, the Respondent, acting on behalf of WSCON Corporation, entered into a contract with Emilio and Jennie Delgado to build an addition to the Delgado's residence at 13562 Southwest 286th Terrace, Miami, Florida, for a price of $12,756.00. On or about January 5, 1991, the parties to the contract agreed to a change order which increased the contract price by $1,248.00, to a total of $14,004.00. The Respondent obtained a building permit for the job from Dade County and the Respondent began work on the job about a month after signing the contract. The Delgados made payments to the Respondent pursuant to the contract in the total amount of $10,500.00. The final payment was due upon completion of the job. The Delgados never made the final payment because the Respondent never finished the job. After about September or October of 1991, the Respondent performed no further work under the contract. At that time, the Respondent had completed the majority of the work, but there was still some work that remained to be completed. 1/ The Respondent discontinued performing work called for by the contract because of financial problems he was having due to his not having received certain funds owed to him by Dade County. He offered to continue working on the job if the Delgados would advance him sums under the contract that were not yet due, but the Delgados refused to do so. The Delgados never discharged the Respondent. The Delgados completed the job themselves, paying a total of $6,046.21 to various suppliers of labor and materials other than the Respondent. 2/
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charges alleged in Counts II and III of the Administrative Complaint; Finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing the following penalty: an administrative fine in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and a one year period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June 1994.
The Issue The issues presented concern the question of the entitlement of the Petitioner, Elizabeth A. Atkinson, to be licensed as a real estate salesman in the state of Florida, as contemplated by Chapter 475, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner made application with the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, to be licensed as a real estate salesman. This application was received on July 15, 1986, by the Florida Real Estate Commission. A copy of that application form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. Question 6 in the application states: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" Petitioner answered this question in the affirmative, and in response to instructions in that questionnaire undertook to make explanation of her criminal record. That explanation was to this effect: I was convicted in 1972 of Fraudulent Use of Credit Card this was a credit card that was mine during my marriage [sic] and I used this during our separation [sic] and my ex-husband pressed charges. Then I was also convicted of worthless check charges these were my own and restitution has been made. In the face of this revelation by the Petitioner concerning her criminal background and having ascertained what it believed to be a more comprehensive explanation of the Petitioner's involvement in criminal activities, the Florida Real Estate Commission determined to deny the application for licensure. Respondent's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence is a copy of a letter from counsel for the Respondent to Petitioner identifying what the Respondent perceived to be a depiction of the criminal activities of the Petitioner. When confronted with a denial of her request for licensure Petitioner timely sought a formal hearing to prove her entitlement to licensure. The case was assigned to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the hearing date of March 27, 1987, was established. Notwithstanding the provision of notice and the remarks by Petitioner to Respondent's counsel which created the impression that the Petitioner would appear at the hearing session, Petitioner did not attend the hearing and was not represented at the hearing. In addition to the previous exhibits which Respondent offered and which have been addressed in the fact finding, Respondent offered, and it was admitted into evidence, a third exhibit, correspondence from the petitioner to a Ms. Clayton. This correspondence appears to be a further attempt on the part of the Petitioner to explain the circumstance of her criminal activity. In accordance with Rule 1.370, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 22I-2.12(1)(h), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent made request for admissions from the Petitioner on February 16, 1987. The request for admissions document instructed the Petitioner in the following fashion: Pursuant to the Rules cited above, you are hereby required to specifically admit or deny the following facts in writing. If objection is made to any of the following, then you are required to state in writing your reasons therefor. You are further required to submit the original and one copy of this document, when completed, to the Hearing Officer in this cause, and one copy to the attorney for the Respondent, within 30 days. In substance, it was requested of the Petitioner that she admit: On or about January 12, 1973, Petitioner was charged with issuing a worthless check. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for one year. On or about May 17, 1973, Petitioner was charged with two counts of worthless checks and probation violation. On or about September 5, 1973, Petitioner was charged with two counts of worthless checks, contempt of court, and probation violation. On or about October 16, 1973, Petitioner was charged wish fraudulent and illegal use of credit cards and probation violation. On or about April 7, 1975 and April 17, 1975, Petitioner was arrested on worthless check charges. On or about June 1, 1975, Petitioner was arrested for inmate of a house where drugs are used, worthless checks, contempt, and failure to appear charges. On or about February 17, 1978, Petitioner was arrested on worthless check charges and adjudicated guilty of said charges. Petitioner was sentenced to five years of state prison and three years of probation; 56 months of the prison sentence were suspended. On or about June 2, 1978, Petitioner was charged with worthless check charges and adjudicated guilty of said charges, and sentenced to 30 days of jail time. On or about September 7, 1978, Petitioner was charged with issuing a worthless check. On May 13, 1985, Petitioner was charged with a probation violation and issuing a worthless check. Respondent's counsel stated in the course of the final hearing that the Petitioner had promised responses to the request for admissions but had not made those available prior to the final hearing. Under the circumstances, Respondent's counsel asked that the hearing officer deem those matters set forth in the request for admissions established as fact. The request was granted, and the request for admissions was deemed established and provided a basis for fact finding. On March 27, 1987, at 11:32 a.m., the office of the Division of Administrative Hearings received the Petitioner's response to the request for admissions. That document is being transmitted with this recommended order. In her response, the Petitioner acknowledges the factual accuracy of all paragraphs, save numbers 6 and 10. In paragraph 6, she denies that she was arrested as being an inmate of a house where drugs are used and appears to emphasize an acknowledgment of the arrest for worthless checks dating from June 1, 1975. In responding to paragraph 10 of the request for admissions which concerns charges against the Petitioner for probation violation and issuing a worthless check dating from May 13, 1985, Petitioner states: "This was not a new charge but a formality to have the judge terminate the probation period which I had to have been terminated several years prior to this date."
