Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This controversy began on July 9, 1990, when petitioners, David and Victoria Page, filed an application with the district office of respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER), seeking the issuance of a permit authorizing certain construction activities (including the erection of a seawall) on their residential lot located at 3108 Gulfwinds Circle, Hernando Beach, Florida. The property faces west on the Gulf of Mexico, a water body designated as a Class III water in the State. The application was eventually deemed to be complete on October 24, 1990. After conducting a review of the application and an on-site inspection of the property, on January 18, 1991, DER issued its notice of permit denial. The notice identified the reasons for the denial as being petitioners' failure to give reasonable assurances that water quality standards would not be violated and that the project would be in the public interest. Also, DER cited expected adverse cumulative impacts if the application was granted. The notice provided further that if petitioners agreed to locate their seawall landward of the jurisdictional line, the project would be approved. In July 1991, petitioners amended their application to propose that the seawall be constructed even further seaward of the jurisdictional line. When efforts to resolve the case were unsuccessful, petitioners requested a formal hearing on January 17, 1992, to contest the agency's decision. Petitioners purchased their property in 1989. It lies within Unit 2 of Gulf Coast Retreats, a residential subdivision in Hernando Beach, Florida. The property is identified as lot 20 on Gulfwinds Circle and fronts the Little Pine Island Bay (Bay), which is a part of the Gulf of Mexico. Access to the Gulf is provided by a channel (six feet in depth) in the Bay in front of lot 20 and which eventually runs into the Gulf several miles south of petitioners' lot. It is undisputed that in 1985 Hurricane Elena passed offshore causing erosion to lot 20 and other adjacent lots. Consequently, the upland portion of the lot is now smaller than before the hurricane. However, petitioners purchased their property in that state of condition. Lots 19 and 21 are on the south and north sides of petitioners' property and are owned by the Steins and Budricks, respectively. Both neighbors have constructed vertical concrete seawalls in front of their homes. Budrick was issued a permit to construct a seawall on December 28, 1989, while Stein constructed his without a permit. However, Stein has subsequently filed an after-the-fact permit application and was recently advised by DER that the application was complete. At hearing, a DER representative expressed the view that the Stein application will probably be approved since his wall is landward of the DER jurisdictional line. It is noted that the Stein and Budrick seawalls sit back from the original property lines because of the erosion suffered during the 1985 hurricane and correspond to the jurisdictional line established by DER on their property. Another application for a permit to construct a seawall was filed by the owner of lot 18 in March 1992. Like Stein and Budrick, that owner proposed to construct his wall on the landward side of the jurisdictional line. Petitioners, who live in Kansas, desire to construct a home on their lot. They have proposed to place one hundred cubic yards of fill (limerock) on 1,065 square feet of intertidal wetlands on the western end of their lot and construct a 110-foot vertical seawall up to thirty feet seaward of the jurisdictional line. Thus, there will be dredge and filling activities in the Gulf of Mexico, a class III water of the state, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of DER. By law, DER is required to establish a jurisdictional line to show the landward extent of waters of this state, including the Gulf of Mexico. Such extent is normally defined by species of plants or soils which are characteristic of those areas subject to regular and periodic inundation by the waters of the state. As a general practice, using a prescribed plant or species indicator list, DER makes an on-site inspection of the property to determine what vegetation, if any, is found on the property and is subject to regular and periodic inundation by the waters. In this case, the dominant vegetation found on lot 20 was paspalum distichum, a plant on the species list subject to regular and periodic inundation by the Gulf waters. Accordingly, DER observed where the vegetation ended and used that point for the placement of the jurisdictional line. As a cross check, DER also noted the rack line, which is indicative of the landward extent to which the high tides rise, and found it to correspond to the vegetation line. It should be noted that the jurisdictional line established on petitioners' property corresponds with the line drawn on lots 18, 19 and 21, and if that line is used to construct the seawall on lot 20, the seawalls on all four lots would run in a straight line. Although petitioners objected to the jurisdictional line as established by DER, they offered no credible evidence to show that it was improper or should have been placed at a different location. On January 9 and 15, 1991, Richard W. Pugh, a DER field environmental specialist, conducted an on-site inspection of the property and adjacent waters. He also was responsible for establishing the jurisdictional line. Finding numerous adverse environmental effects that would occur if the permit was granted as proposed, Pugh recommended that the application be denied. This recommendation was accepted by the deputy assistant secretary for DER's Southwest District Office and a notice of permit denial was accordingly issued. The bases for the denial were that (a) reasonable assurances had not been given by petitioners that water quality standards would be satisfied; (b) a cumulative adverse impact on the area would occur if the permit was approved, and (c) petitioners had failed to give reasonable assurances that the project was in the public interest. In order to prove entitlement to a permit, petitioners must give reasonable assurance that water quality standards will not be violated and that the project is in the public interest. In this respect, they offered no evidence to provide these assurances. This in itself supports a finding that no entitlement to a permit has been shown. Even so, the agency elected to present evidence on these issues after petitioners' case-in-chief was concluded. Findings of fact drawn from that evidence are set forth below. On April 6, 1992, a DER marine biologist, Dr. George H. Farrell, visited the site and conducted a biological evaluation of the composition of the benthic community in the intertidal and subtidal wetlands which would be impacted by the project. Based on his tests and observations, Dr. Farrell concluded that the project as proposed would have an adverse impact on marine and wildlife resources in the area. This is because the area has very good water quality, contains a high species diversity, performs an integral part in the food web, and serves a valuable nursery function for estuarine dependent juvenile fish species and a corridor function for migrating estuarine dependent fish species. This testimony was not challenged by petitioners and is hereby accepted. 1/ In granting or denying a water resource permit, DER is also required to consider certain statutory criteria found in Subsection 403.918(2), Florida Statutes, to determine whether a project is in the public interest. Although petitioners did not address these criteria, and thus failed to give any assurances that the project is in the public interest as required by law, testimony adduced by DER established that under petitioners' proposal, there will be a permanent loss of 1,065 square feet of intertidal wetlands due to filling activities. These wetlands are now used by fish and wildlife habitat and will no longer be available for use. In addition, the same area is used as a nursery area by a variety of fish species. As such, the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife and their habitats and will adversely affect the fishing values and marine productivity in the vicinity. Second, because petitioners' proposed seawall will jut out from their neighbors' walls by as much as thirty feet, and the corners of the seawall in that configuration will result in erosion or shoaling depending on whether the waters are moving north or south, the project will cause harmful erosion or shoaling. Third, because the wall is being constructed of concrete and steel and is not temporary, the project will be of a permanent nature and thus have a permanent adverse impact. Finally, the ecological functions being performed in the immediate vicinity of the project are extremely important and the elimination of this zone will significantly impair those functions. Collectively, these considerations support a finding that the project is not in the public interest. DER has a policy of not granting a permit if adverse cumulative impacts may be expected as a result of granting that permit. This policy is derived from a statute (s. 403.919, F.S.) requiring such impacts to be considered in the permitting process. In the case at bar, DER reasonably predicts that if it granted petitioners' application and authorized them to construct a seawall which jutted out up to thirty feet beyond their neighbors' walls, it would be obligated to grant similar permits to property owners on adjacent lots. Because petitioners' application will have an adverse impact on the water quality and is contrary to the public interest, the granting of additional permits would exacerbate those impacts. When an applicant proposes to fill (destroy) wetlands, and the applicant is unable to meet the public interest criteria set forth in subsection 403.918(2), DER shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to mitigate the adverse effects caused by the project. In this case, no mitigative measures were proposed by petitioners. At hearing, petitioners' representative asserted that in June 1991, the Cabinet (presumably sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund) implemented a new "policy" which allows property owners to "recover and bulkhead" land previously lost due to avulsion and erosion. He further represented that such requests were to be filed within five years after the event (hurricane). Although petitioners were not the property owners when the event occurred, and more than five years has elapsed, in July 1991 petitioners filed a request with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to reclaim and bulkhead their property and that request remained pending as of the date of hearing. A copy of the policy itself (or rule, if any, implementing the policy) was not made a part of this record. Even so, there was no evidence to establish that the granting of that application would require DER to grant a water resource permit, and DER takes the position that the request has no bearing on the issue of whether a water resource permit should be issued to petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioners' application for a water resource permit. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, David E. Musselman, is the owner of Lot 23, Block 22, Cudjoe Gardens Eighth Addition, Cudjoe Key, Monroe County, Florida. The lot measures 127 feet along its front and rear property line, 135 feet along its side property lines and, similar to adjacent lots, its rear property line abuts an artificially created waterway. Currently, most of petitioner's lot enjoys an elevation of six feet; however, from the edge of the waterway landward a distance of approximately 20 feet [to what has been referred to as the "toe of the existing slope" in these proceedings] the surface consists of exposed caprock at an elevation of approximately four inches above mean high water. It is petitioner's desire to construct a single family residence upon such lot and, incident to such construction, to erect a seawall along the edge of the waterway such that the elevation at the waterway will be increased by two feet, and to backfill from the seawall to his home. Such backfilling would require the deposition of approximately 3,540 square feet of fill within the Department's jurisdiction, which was shown to extend from the edge of the waterway to the toe of the existing slope, and would raise the elevation in such area two feet above existing grade. On December 16, 1991, petitioner filed an application with respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (Department), for an exemption from the Department's wetland permitting requirements. If approved, such exemption would allow petitioner to construct the vertical seawall along the waterway, and backfill from the seawall to his proposed home. By notice of agency action dated February 14, 1992, the Department proposed to deny petitioner's application predicated on its conclusion that his proposal did not meet the exemption criteria established by Rule 17- 312.050(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner filed a timely protest to contest the Department's conclusion. The exemption Pertinent to this case, Rule 17-312.050(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code, exempts from permitting the following activities: (g) Construction of seawalls or riprap, including only that backfilling needed to level the land behind the seawalls or riprap, in artificially created waterways where such construction will not violate existing water quality standards, impede navigation or adversely affect flood control. An artificially created waterway shall be defined as a body of water that has been totally dredged or excavated and which does not overlap natural surface waters of the state. For the purpose of this exemption, artificially created waterways shall also include existing residential canal systems . . . . At hearing, the parties stipulated that the waterway which abuts the rear property line of petitioner's lot is an artificially created waterway, as well as an existing residential canal, and that the proposed project will not violate existing water quality standards, impede navigation, or adversely affect flood control. Notwithstanding, the Department contends that petitioner's application should be denied because no need has been demonstrated that would support the construction of the seawall along the edge of the waterway, as opposed to locating it further inland, and therefore the amount of backfill, with its attendant loss of wetlands, is excessive. For the reasons set forth in the conclusions of law, the Department's position is untenable as a matter of law. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving petitioner's application for an exemption to construct a seawall, and to backfill from such seawall to his proposed home, as applied for. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of June 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June 1992.
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, Dog Island Company, is entitled to the grant of a default permit from the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, premised upon a violation on the part of the Respondent of the conditions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, for the alleged failure on the part of the Respondent to respond to the application within the prescribed period of time in the above referenced section, thereby entitling the Petitioner to the grant of the requested permit without further justification on its part. Whether or not on the facts and evidence in this cause, the Petitioner, Dog Island Company, is entitled to the requested permit, which is the subject of this controversy.
Findings Of Fact This case concerns the application of Dog Island Company, Petitioner, to excavate a canal on Dog Island, a barrier island off the coast of Florida. This canal would be approximately 825 feet long, 85 feet wide, and 4 feet deep. At present the canal is partially completed. The initial application permit filed with the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, was made on December 10, 1976, and the terms and conditions of that application may be found in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. This application is by the "short-form" method; however, it was later determined that the application needed to be filed on the "long form," in view of the amount of material to be dredged and filled. Consequently, on June 6, 1977, the Petitioner filed its reapplication and that reapplication may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. The Petitioner by its action raises two points. The first point considers the Petitioner's contention that the Respondent must issue a default permit to the Petitioner in view of the Respondent's alleged violation of the conditions of Section 120.60(2) Florida Statutes. More particularly, the Petitioner asserts that the Respondent violated the conditions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, when it, the Respondent, stated to the Petitioner that the Petitioner must fulfill the requirements of Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, as a necessary prerequisite to the granting of an application for a dredge and fill permit. The second point of the petition is a prayer that the permit he granted on the merits of the request, if it is determined that the Petitioner is not entitled to a default permit. Turning to a consideration of the initial point raised by the petition, it may be further categorized as one, a general attack on the Respondent's treatment of the Petitioner's application and reapplication permit, in the context of the requirements of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes; and, two, the Respondent's alleged disallowance of the permit premised upon the belief that Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, would not allow the permit to be granted until the conditions of that portion of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, had been complied with. The questioned provision of Chapter 120, i.e., Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part: 120.60 Licensing.- * * * (2) When an application for a license is made as required by law, the agency shall conduct the proceedings required with reason- able dispatch and with due regard to the rights and privileges of all affected parties or aggrieved persons. Within 30 days after receipt of an application for a license, the agency shall examine the appli- cation, notify the applicant of any apparent errors or omissions, and request any addi- tional information the agency is permitted by law to require. Failure to correct an error or omission or to supply additional information shall not be grounds for denial of the license unless the agency timely notified the applicant within this 30-day period. The agency shall notify the applicant if the activity for which he seeks a license is exempt from the licensing requirement and return any tendered application fee within 30 days after receipt of the original appli- cation or within 10 days after receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. Every application for license shall be approved or denied within 90 days after receipt of the original application or receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. . . . By its argument herein, the Petitioner is convinced that the Respondent failed to notify the Petitioner within thirty (30) days after receipt of the initial application, of any apparent errors or omissions or to request any additional information the agency is permitted by law to require, again within the thirty (30) day period. This has a direct bearing in the mind of the Petitioner on the effective date of the license permit approval or denial, in relationship to the requirement that the license/permit be granted within ninety (90) days after the receipt of the original permit or receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. Factually, we have the initial application of the Petitioner which was filed on December 10, 1976, and received that same date. This was responded to by two items of correspondence. One, dated January 6, 1976, from the Panama City District Office of the Respondent, that being reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence; and a second exhibit, which is a January 10, 1977, correspondence from the central office of the Respondent, this item being found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 notifies the Petitioner that his application is on the wrong form. The proper form should have been the "long form." (The initial application had been submitted on the "short form.") Therefore, on that basis alone, the ninety day requirement for issuance of the application was tolled. Subsequent to being informed by the Respondent that the application must be filed on the "long form," the Petitioner hired the firm of Barrett, Daffin and Figg, Architects, Engineers, Planners, Inc., to assist in the formulation of a reapplication. This document was filed June 6, 1977, and in the body of the document it is represented that this matter is a reapplication. A copy of this reapplication started the thirty-day clock for the Respondent to notify the applicant of apparent errors or omissions and request additional information permitted by the law, and it ran from June 6, 1977. The additional effect of the reapplication was to start a new ninety-day clock for approving or denying the permit and this clock was running from June 6, 1977, or from receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. On July 11, 1977, an employee of the Respondent filed what purports to be additional requests for information addressed to the Petitioner. The contents of this request may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10 and Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. This request is clearly outside the thirty day limitation set forth in Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, pertaining to the right of an agency to request additional information founded upon any apparent errors or omissions on behalf of the Petitioner, or any additional information the Respondent is permitted by law to require. Nonetheless, the Petitioner met with the Respondent to address the questions raised by the July 11, 1977, correspondence. This meeting was held on July 21, 1977, and out of this meeting the Petitioner, through its agent, responded in writing to the completeness summary of July 11, 1977. This response was dated July 25, 1977, and may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14 admitted into evidence. These responses were acknowledged by the Respondent on a copy of its July 11, 1977, completeness summary, this being Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. These acknowledgments show the date, July 26, 1977, and create the requirement on the part of the Respondent that it approve or deny the application within ninety days of the date of July 26, 1977. Within ninety days of that date, specifically on October 14, 1977, the Respondent issued the letter of intent to deny the permit; a copy of this letter of intent to deny may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 11 admitted into evidence. By its actions of responding to the July 11, 1977, completeness summary, the Petitioner has acquiesced in the right of the Respondent to make such request, notwithstanding the fact that the request had been made thirty days after the June 6, 1977, reapplication had been filed. The October 14, 1977, letter of intent to deny the permit application was timely and no default permit should be issued under the terms and conditions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner raises the additional point that Respondent was denying the permit application solely on the basis of the Respondent's contention that Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, had not been complied with. This impression on the part of the Petitioner came about after it had requested issuance of a default permit on November 17, 1977, under the belief that Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, required the permit to be issued. The Respondent, in the person of its secretary, issued a letter of November 29, 1977, in which document the secretary states that the permit cannot be granted because Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, has not been complied with in that proof of payment for state- owned dredge material is not reflected. Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, has the following language: 253.77 State lands; state agency authoriza- tion for use prohibited without consent of agency in which title vested.- No department, including any division, bureau, section, or other subdivision thereof, or any other agency of the state possessing regulatory powers involving the issuance of permits shall issue any permit, license, or other evidence of authority involving the use of sovereignty or other lands of the state, title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under chapter 253, until the applicant for such permit, license, or other evidence of permission shall have received from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, ease- ment, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use and exhibited it to such agency or department or subdivision thereof having regulatory power to permit such use. This act shall not apply to any permit, license, or other form of consent to take the regulated action which gas issued and outstanding on June 23, 1976. It can be seen by an examination of that section that it does not require payment for state-owned dredge material. It simply requires that the applicant have permission of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, in the person of the Department of Natural Resources. Moreover, there are no regulations existing which require that proof of payment be a precondition to any issuance of a dredge and fill permit by the Respondent. Nevertheless, the October 14, 1977, letter of intent to deny was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, and obviated the necessity to Issue a dredge and fill permit on a default basis. The issue in this cause should therefore be considered on its merits, and if the Petitioner prevails on the merits, then the permit should be granted conditioned upon the necessary approval of the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources, on the question of payment for the fill material. This opinion is held because an examination of all the testimony and other items of evidence in this case leads to the conclusion that the land waterward of the mean high water line, at the mouth of the proposed canal, belongs to the State of Florida. (The land above the mean high water line at the site of the proposed canal is land which is owned by the Petitioner.) What then is the determination to be reached on the merits? The initial question that should be addressed on the issue of the merits of the case, is the question of what class of waters is found in the St. George Sound, which is the body of water that is fronted by the mouth of the proposed canal. The argument between the parties is on the issue of whether the waters are Class II or Class III waters. The significance of the difference between the classification is the fact that Class II waters require a more careful consideration of the environmental issues, as stated in Rule 17-4.28(8), Florida Administrative Code. The parties offered certain maps for consideration on the question of whether the waters were in fact Class II or Class III. These maps may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 23, and Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 13 and 15 admitted into evidence. The real question, however, is whether or not the area in dispute meets the criteria for classification as a Class II body of water. That criteria pertains to the inquiry whether the site, either actually or potentially, has the capability of supporting recreational commercial shellfish propagation and harvesting. From the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, it is evident that the eventuality and potential does exist as outlined in Rule 17-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. It exists because of the existence of fish, oysters and shrimp in the immediate vicinity of the proposed canal. As a consequence, the Petitioner must have a plan of procedure which adequately protects the project area and areas in the vicinity of the project from significant damage of the site as a source of commercial or recreational shellfish harvesting and as a nursery area for fish and shellfish. This particular requirement for dealing with Class II waters only has importance because it creates a responsibility on the part of the applicant to adequately address the question of the marine life for the reasons stated above. In fact, the Petitioner has offered its explanation of how it intends to protect the marine life in these Class II waters at a time when the project is being constructed and subsequent to the construction. However, this effort at explanation of its protection of the shellfish and other related marine life found in the Class II waters is not convincing. If the canal is completed, certain forms of marsh grasses and attendant habitat will be removed, thus interfering with the function of the detrital food chain and associated food webs which are found near the proposed open end of the canal. This would result in the diminution of the marine resources. This can be seen by an examination of the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 16, which is a series of photographs of the area and part of the Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, which contain further photographs of the area. Both of these sets of photographs have been admitted into evidence. Effectively, what exists at the site is a marsh area at the end of the canal nearest the sound, and a type of pond at the closed end of the canal. Furthermore, the removal of this marsh area will have no positive benefit to the public at large. This can be seen by a comparison of the proposed canal and an existing canal which is located in the immediate vicinity. There is a marked similarity between the length, width and depth of the proposed canal and the existing canal. In addition, the existing canal is a dead-end canal. In the existing canal, there is a substantial buildup of anaerobic muck at the closed end of the canal due to poor circulation and flushing by action of the tides. The water quality in the existing canal is also very poor in the measure of the dissolved oxygen count and this condition is not conducive to the survival of marine live. Although there is a worse condition, when speaking of anaerobic muck, that has built up in the proposed canal due to less circulation, there is no reason to believe that there will be any positive flushing effect to the proposed canal by completing the proposed canal and removing the marsh area. There is also a legitimate concern of possible salt water intrusion into the fresh water lens which serves as a potable water supply for residents of the island. Additionally, the experience in the existing canal has shown a development of shoaling at the open end of the existing canal and it is reasonable to expect the same type of effect in the proposed canal. This would further diminish the flushing of the waters in the canal and cause an unsatisfactory concentration of dissolved oxygen, bringing about problems such as the anaerobic muck and resulting difficulty for marine life. For the reasons stated above, the Respondent is justified in denying the reapplication for permit made by the Petitioner to excavate a dead-end canal of 825 feet long and 85 to 90 feet wide by 4 feet deep at the mean low water mark. The Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the parties have been examined, and where appropriate have been incorporated in this order. Those that do not comport with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the undersigned are rejected.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for permit to excavate a dead-end canal as set forth in the reapplication of the Petitioner be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire 424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Alfred W. Clark, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Ben A. Posdal is the owner of property commonly known as 166 Brightwater Drive, in the City of Clearwater, Florida. On August 7, 1986, he applied for variances to construct two wooden decks on his property, located at the above address. The property which is the subject of the variance request is a building which contains four apartments, which are rented by Ben A. Posdal to various tenants. On August 28, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board (DCAB) denied the variance requested by Mr. Posdal on the grounds that he had not demonstrated a hardship and that he had not demonstrated that the requested variance would not violate the general spirit and intent of the Clearwater Land Development Code. On September 9, 1986, an appeal was filed by Ben A. Posdal from the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board. The appeal alleges that the DCAB decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable on the following grounds: Other properties allegedly are in violation of the back line setback regulations; The DCAB failed to give enough evidentiary weight to photographs he submitted; and Appellant allegedly is being deprived of the beneficial use of the property in a manner commensurate with the community. There are no physical conditions which are unique to the property. There is no particular physical surroundings, shape or topographical condition that would result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Appellant. Failure to obtain a variance would not impinge upon Appellant's use of the property in any way. The record on appeal contains competent, substantial evidence to support the DCAB decision. Nonconforming uses in the area of the subject property are legal nonconforming uses.
Findings Of Fact The first of these difficulties bears primarily on my rulings on the exceptions to the findings of fact. The petitioners urge that they need not attach a transcript to support their exceptions to the findings. The petitioners' assertion is unsound as a general proposition. The law is clear that without a transcript there is no basis for overturning a hearing officer's findings. The Department cannot substitute its interpretation of the facts unless a review of the whole record shows that the findings made by the hearing officer are not supported by competent and substantial evidence. See, e.g., Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 495 So.2d 790, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. denied, 504 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1987). Moreover, Rule 17-103.200(l) of the Florida Administrative Code specifically requires that ?[a]ny exception disputing a finding of fact . . . be accompanied by a complete transcript of the hearing." The Department therefore must "reject exceptions not supported by a complete transcript." Chipola Basin Protective Group, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 11 F.A.L.R. 467, 470-71 (Fla. DER 1988); see Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 415 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (upholding nonrule policy of the Department that exceptions not accompanied by complete transcript must be dismissed). In contrast to the facts in Chipola Basin, there is no transcript independently available to the Department to obviate the effect of the failure of the petitioners to file one. Thus, the rule against overturning findings without a transcript compels me to As for the late filing of two sets of exceptions and the propriety of the filing of the third set of exceptions, I shall rule on those legal issues in the rulings on exceptions to conclusions of law, below. EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW First, I must reject two sets of the petitioners' exceptions in their entirety for untimely filing. Rule 17-103.200(I) of the Florida Administrative Code requires the rejection of any exceptions "not filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel within the 15 days" after the "the date of filing of a Recommended Order with the Clerk of DOAH," the Division of Administrative Hearings. The hearing officer filed the recommended order in this proceeding with the Clerk of DOAH on August 5, 1991. August 20, 1991, was the deadline for filing exceptions. Petitioner Hobdy filed his exceptions a day later. Petitioner Winselmann also filed his exceptions a day late. The language of the rule is specific, clear, and mandatory. I therefore reject the exceptions of Hobdy and Winselmann for failure to comply with this rule. The exceptions filed by a law firm for Residents were timely but are subject to a motion filed by the Applicant to strike all of the petitioners' exceptions. The motion rests on two grounds, the lack of a transcript and the filing of three sets of exceptions (rather than two) by the petitioners. The lack of a transcript is grounds for rejecting exceptions to findings of fact, but not for striking exceptions to conclusions of law. Since the exceptions for Residents except only to conclusions of law, they cannot be struck on this first ground. As to the exceptions of Hobdy and Winselmann, this ground for the motion is moot, because their exceptions have been rejected for late filing. As for the second ground of the motion, the filing of three sets of exceptions, the Applicant has no objection to the filing of exceptions by Hobdy (for himself) or Winselmann (for Residents, the motion alleges) but does object to the additional filing of exceptions for Residents by a law firm that made no previous appearance in this proceeding. I note that Winselmann was not a separate party to this proceeding. He never filed a petition for a hearing in his own name. Instead, he was a member of Residents whom the hearing officer permitted to appear at the hearing "pro se" and who later filed a proposed recommended order noting that he and Petitioner Hobdy had appeared pro se "on behalf of the residents." Petitioner Winselmann filed his exceptions in his own name but wrote them as though representing Residents as a group, referring to "[o]ur property," "[o]ur navigational abilities," "[o]ur recreational values," and "[o]ur canal," repeatedly speaking for the residents as "we." The record does not show whether the hearing officer ever conducted the inquiry required under rule 221-6.008 to determine the adequacy of the qualifications of Winselmann to represent Petitioner Residents. The recommended order refers to Winselmann's appearance only as "pro se," as though he represented only himself. In the absence of the hearing officer's express approval of Winselmann as a qualified representative of Residents, I must conclude that, whatever his subjective intent might be, Winselmann did not legally represent Residents at the hearing or in filing the exceptions. I therefore deny the motion to strike the petitioners' exceptions. In passing, I also note that because no "attorney or other qualified representative (approved by the presiding officer)" previously represented Residents, there was no need for the law firm filing the exceptions for Residents to file a prior notice of appearance. Rule 17-103.020(5) requires such a filing only by a "successor or associated attorney or other qualified representative." Rule 17-103.020(4) makes the filing of the first pleading the notice of appearance, in effect, for the first such representative. Accordingly, I must rule on Residents' exceptions to the conclusions of law. Those exceptions focus on the issue whether the hearing officer erred by recommending an award of attorney's fees against the petitioners. Residents asserts that the hearing officer used the wrong standard in reaching that recommendation. Urging that the correct standard is participation in the proceeding "for an improper purpose," under section 120.59(6) of the Florida Statutes, Residents objects to the hearing officer's reliance on the language in section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes that makes the lack of a justiciable issue of law or fact the basis for an award of attorney's fees. Residents argues that the record evinces at most incompetent representation, rather than any improper purpose, that its members believed in good faith that the project would affect navigation, and that this question of the project's impact on navigation was a justiciable issue of fact, even if the applicable standard for an award of fees is the absence of such an issue of fact or law. Respondent Dolphins Plus has responded to this set of exceptions. The response equates the standard of frivolous participation with that of the lack of any justiciable issue of law or fact, asserts that impact on navigation was not an issue because no evidence was ever presented tending to prove such an impact, and summarizes events at the hearing, including the hearing officer's patient attempts to explain procedural rules and otherwise guide the petitioners. In the absence of a transcript, of course, such a summary of the hearing is simply outside the record before me, and I cannot consider it. The question of the appropriate standard for an award of attorney's fees under section 120.59(6) is not difficult. The statute makes such an award depend on the nonprevailing party's participation in the proceeding for an improper purpose. Section 120.59(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). The statutory definition of "improper purpose" lists four meanings, including "frivolous purpose." This phrase employs words of plain meaning, requiring no special rules of statutory construction to resolve an ambiguity. Although the entry for "frivolous" in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary includes the subjective definitions "lacking in seriousness: irresponsibly self-indulgent," and "marked by unbecoming levity," the settled meaning of "frivolous" in the law is the third definition given, that "of little weight or importance." See Webster's New Colleciate Dictionary 461 (1977 ed.); Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979); cf. Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So.2d 926, 930 (Fla. 1978) (to determine plain meaning of constitutional provision, court begins with dictionary definitions but ultimately chooses meaning for each "term in light of the primary purpose for which it has been adopted"). This third definition is the meaning that the court accepted for "frivolous" in Mercedes Lighting & Electrical Supply, Inc. v. State Department of General Services, 560 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), construing section 120.59(6) of the Florida Statutes. Indeed, numerous cases in Florida have used interchangably the terms "frivolous" and "lacking any justiciable issue of law or fact." See, e.q., Marexcelso Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Florida National Bank, 533 So.2d 805, 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Schwartz v. W-K Partners, 530 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Thus, the hearing officer did not err by equating frivolousness with a lack of any justiciable issue of law or fact. Yet these same cases and others clarify that the frivolousness that will justify an award of fees must mark the claim from its inception. A court will not award fees against a litigant whose initial (or amended) claim was nonfrivolous, "even though at some point in the course of litigation it becomes apparent that there no longer remains any justiciable issue of law or fact." Id.; see also State Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Thompson, 552 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Marexcelso, 533 So.2d at 805; Schatz v. Wenaas, 510 So.2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Thus, the crux of the issue is not solely whether the petitioners failed to present any evidence at the hearing so as to show any justiciable issue of law or fact, but whether such failure was accompanied by a failure to raise such an issue in the first place. Despite the hearing officer's "finding" here that "there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact," the question of justiciability is one of law, and the purported finding is really a conclusion of law. Under section 120.57(1)(b)10 of the Florida Statutes, I may reject or modify such a conclusion. Having reviewed the two petitions and the photographs attached to the petition for Residents, I must conclude that, however unartfully, both petitions raised at least one justiciable issue of fact, concerning the putative effect of the project on navigation, under section 403.918(2) of the Florida Statutes. In pertinent part, the petition for Residents alleges that the fence would "severely impact [the petitioner residents') use of the canal" because its removal of part of "the canal turning basin" would restrict them to using only "small boats which can turn around within the canal itself." Petition of Residents para. 3. Although it is true that "navigation" as used in section 403.918(2) "is primarily associated with the use of publicly used shipping lanes or channels," Clarke v. Melton, 12 F.A.L.R. 4946, 4952 (Fla. DER 1990), the Department does consider the impacts of small structures such as docks on the navigability of small boats, in weighing the impact on navigation of projects under section 403.918(2). See Riverside Club Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adventure Construction & Canvas, Inc., 9 F.A.L.R. 6207 (Fla. DER 1987); Ryan v. Spang, 8 F.A.L.R. 4288 (Fla. DER 1986). The petition for Hobdy raises this same issue, though described only as an effect on Hobdy's own use of his boat. In addition, Hobdy's petition questions whether the housing of large mammals in the stranding pen would adversely affect water quality in the canal. These two questions are "not so free of doubt as to render [each] . . . claim frivolous," for purposes of awarding a fee. See Scott v. Durlinc, 471 So.2d 658, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA (1985). Under Schwartz and other cases cited above, the failure of Residents to support this allegation at the hearing, at least on the basis of the record before me, does not warrant an award of fees. Reinforcing this conclusion is an earlier ruling of the hearing officer that excluded evidence on this very issue. His order granting the motion to limit issues eliminated the question of impact on navigation before the hearing. His ruling therefore may have contributed to the failure of these petitioners, obviously not expert in administrative procedure, to present competent substantial evidence at the the hearing. Cf. Harbor Estates v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 12 F.A.L.R. 2392 (Fla. DER 1990) (failure of hearing officer to issue subpoenas contributed to failure of petitioners to produce witnesses at hearing and undercut recommendation to award fees). At the same time, neither of the respondents ever sought to strike the petitions as being filed for an improper purpose (because allegedly lacking any justiciable issue), and the hearing officer never ordered the dismissal of either of the petitions on such basis. For "the orderly conduct of proceedings," the court in Mercedes Lichting suggested such an order "at the earliest stage at which a violation of the statute can be determined," for an award of fees under section 120.57(1)(b)5 (providing for awards of fees for filing any pleading or other paper for an improper purpose). See Mercedes Lighting 560 So.2d at 279. There is no reason not to apply the same general principle to awards under section 120.59(6). Cf. Harvey v. Trans Pac, Inc., 12 F.A.L.R. 4378, 4379 (Fla. DER 1990) (reading the two statutes together in light of this guidance from the court in Mercedes Lighting. That this matter went to hearing without such a motion or order leads me to conclude that the parties and the hearing officer at first thought that one or more of the issues raised in the petitions were justiciable. Despite the apparent ineptness of the petitioners' representation here, there is no direct evidence of improper purpose for the participation of the petitioners. The hearing officer emphasized the petitioners' failure to understand "the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence." Recommended Order at 15. Petitioners attempted to present evidence at the hearing, including the testimony of witnesses, but the hearing officer found none of the evidence relevant or material. The Florida Administrative Procedure Act liberally expands public access to agency action, taking the risk that lay representation will not always be effective. See The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1980). Although section 120.59(6) sets a limit on such access, it is far from clear that mere ignorance or ineffective representation is tantamount to participation for an improper purpose. See Harvey, 12 F.A.L.R. at 4379-80. In this context, and in the absence of direct evidence of an improper purpose, I am reluctant to make "the legal inference that would supply the connection between acts demonstrating incompetent representation by a party's lay representative and a finding of participation by that party for an improper purpose within the meaning of Section 120.59(6), Florida Statutes." See Harbor Estates, 12 F.A.L.R. at 2398. In accordance with section 120.57(1)(b)10 of the Florida Statutes, I accept the hearing officer's findings of fact in this matter, except for the conclusion of law (mislabeled a finding) that there was no justiciable issue of law or fact. For all the reasons given above, I reject that conclusion and the recommendation of an award of fees and costs to Respondent Dolphins Plus. As for the motion by Petitioner Hobdy for attorney's fees costs, on the ground that the attorney for Dolphins Plus presented a frivolous case and filed a frivolous motion for attorney's fees, Dolphins Plus is the prevailing party in these proceedings. Its case was not frivolous. Although it did not prevail in moving for fees and costs, its motion for such fees was not frivolous. The hearing officer recommended an award of such fees, and the issue merited serious consideration in this final order. The motion by Hobdy for fees is without merit. MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLEMENTARY RULINGS On two occasions, October 7 and October 8, 1991, the Department received correspondence from Petitioner Winselmann purporting to offer further argument in regard to the issues before me. These ex parte communications have been disregarded in the preparation of this Final Order, and to the extent they could be viewed as unauthorized further exceptions or responses to exceptions, they are sua sponte stricken.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the Merits denying Petitioners' protest of the permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. Jurisdiction over the issue of the amount of attorney's fees is retained and shall be determined in a separate formal hearing to be conducted only in the event the parties are unable to agree on the amount of attorney's fees that is reasonable. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of August, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent owns property in Lake County, Florida which adjoins North Lake Holly. North Lake Holly is a fresh water lake. On an undetermined date between December, 1975 and September, 1976, the Respondent caused a horseshoe-shaped basin to be dredged along the shoreline of North Lake Holly adjoining his property. The fill material taken from the dredged area was deposited along the shore of the lake to farm a beach. The basin is approximately 90' long, 50' wide, and 6' deep. The Respondent has erected a dwelling house on his property, and it appears that the dredging was done in order to transform the shoreline of the lake from a vegetated littoral zone to a beach and boat basin. The Department confirmed the violations in December, 1976, and sought to negotiate a restoration plan with the Respondent. The formal Notice of Violation was issued an November 17, 1977. The dredged area was previously a shallow littoral zone dominated by wetlands vegetation. The most prevalent vegetation was sawgrass, but there were also abundant quantities of cattails, maidencane, arrowhead, and willows. The dredging activity relates to only a small portion of the shoreline of North Lake Holly. The activity nonetheless has resulted in the alteration of the characteristics of the lake. The marsh area which fringes the lake serves as habitat for fish and other wildlife, and also serves to filter runoff which enters the lake from the uplands. The Respondent's activities have obliterated a portion of the wildlife habitat, and provide an avenue for some uplands runoff to be discharged directly into North Lake Holly without the benefit of being filtered through wetlands vegetation. The quality of waters in central Florida lakes is related directly to the amount of development along the shoreline. The greater degree of alteration of the shoreline, the greater degree of deterioration of water quality, and the greater the deterioration of wildlife habitat. A project of the magnitude of that accomplished by the Respondent may have no clearly measurable impact upon water quality and wildlife habitat since the rest of North Lake Holly is surrounded by a broad littoral zone. The only impact that the project can have is, nonetheless, adverse. If a project such as the Respondent's is approved, the Department could not, consonant with due process and equal protection concepts prohibit further such alterations of the shoreline. It is likely that some aquatic vegetation will reestablish itself along the shoreline of the dredged area. Such a natural restoration will not, however, alleviate the negative impacts of the Respondent's dredging. The steep inclines of the dredged area will allow only a very narrow rim of vegetation, which cannot be expected to provide habitat and protect water quality to remotely the extent of the, previous undisturbed broad littoral zone. Furthermore, in the time since the project was completed, no significant vegetative zone has reestablished itself. It is possible for the Respondent to gain access to the lake for boating and other recreational purposes without totally obliterating the littoral zone that was in the area. The Department has offered a restoration plan which would accomplish this result. The Respondent undertook the dredge and fill activity without seeking a permit from the Department, and he continues to operate what amounts to a stationary installation which will serve as a source of pollutants to North Lake Holly without any valid permit issued by the Department. The Department has spent $229.41 in assessable costs in investigating and attempting to rectify the illegal dredge and fill activity undertaken by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner and developer of a parcel of land located on the eastern side of the northern end of Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. Located in the middle of that parcel is a dead-end east-west canal approximately two feet deep at its eastern end where it opens to the Atlantic Ocean and approximately twenty feet deep at its western dead-end. The canal is approximately fifty feet wide. A plug at the mouth of the canal previously prevented boat traffic from entering and exiting the canal. Petitioner's predecessor in title permitted the plug to partially erode, and Petitioner's president had some of the boulders which helped form the plug removed. The digging of the canal, the placement of the plug, and the partial removal of the plug were performed without benefit of state and federal permits. Petitioner's development plan is that twenty single-family homes will surround the canal, with each home being serviced by a septic tank and a boat dock. On the oceanside of the partial plug is a small depressed area which was dredged at the same time that the canal itself was dredged. Surrounding that depressed area is very shallow water. Petitioner proposes to remove the plug from the existing canal and shallow the canal to a uniform depth of -10 feet and two years later to a uniform depth of -6 feet. Petitioner further proposes to dredge an access channel from the mouth of the canal northward for a distance of approximately 480 feet where it would join with an existing channel. The access channel proposed to be dredged would be approximately fifty feet wide and six feet deep at low tide. The area to be dredged to create the access channel is classified as Class III waters, is within the Florida Keys Special Waters, and is also classified as Outstanding Florida Waters. The waters outside the existing canal where Petitioner proposes to dredge the access channel are also located within John Pennekamp State Park, the site of a natural coral reef. Due to the disparity in depths between the shallow waters outside the existing canal which are only one or two feet deep and the depth of the existing canal which is as deep as twenty feet, the canal itself experiences a very long flushing time. The lengthy flushing time causes the waters in the existing canal to fall below minimum state water quality standards The area proposed to be dredged for the navigational access channel is thickly vegetated by a productive seagrass and algae community. The area is in excellent condition, and the seagrass and algae community is very healthy. The seagrass and algae communities serve as habitat for thousands of organisms, including juvenile lobster and other small plants and animals; serve as a food source for animals; stabilize sediments through their root structures; reduce pollution by filtering pollutants from the water; are a natural feature of the John Pennekamp State Park, and are part of the ecological unit that is important for the survival of reef corals. The proposed dredging of the access channel would destroy an area of approximately one-half acre. Excessive turbidity is often a problem with dredge and fill activities, and reef coral need clear water for survival. Once dredged, the proposed access channel would not be expected to revegetate. Further, the proposed dredged channel will violate state water quality standards for dissolved oxygen. The proposed navigational access channel would connect the mouth of the existing canal with the Post channel to the north of Petitioner's property. The Post channel dug in approximately 1971 is also six feet deep, violates state water quality standards for dissolved oxygen, and has never revegetated even though replanting of vegetation has been attempted. The destruction of the one-half acre area of healthy productive habitat would adversely affect fish and other marine wildlife, resulting in a decrease in fishery production and marine productivity. The residential subdivision will be a source of pollutants from, among other things, septic tanks, fertilizers, stormwater run-off from paved areas, boats, and boat engines, into the existing canal in violation of state water quality standards for Class III waters and would lower the ambient water quality of the adjacent Outstanding Florida Waters. The long flushing time of the canal, even if shallowed as proposed, will result in the waters of the canal failing to meet state water quality standards. Any pollutants or organic material entering or blown into the canal will remain in the canal to be broken down by bacteria which consume oxygen, resulting in low dissolved oxygen in violation of state water quality standards. Further, pollutants will be exported periodically into the receding waters outside the canal, resulting in degradation of those Outstanding Florida Waters. The project is not in the public interest since the project will result in water quality violations and in the destruction of an area of highly productive shallow water habitat. The adverse cumulative impacts of allowing riparian landowners along the Florida Keys to dredge access channels are overwhelming.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Denying Petitioner's application for a permit for its proposed project, and Dismissing Intervenor Izaak Walton League, Mangrove Chapter, as a party to this proceeding. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of November, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 88-1813 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 2(a) have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2(b) and 2(d) have been rejected as not being Supported by the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 2(c) has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-10 and 12-22 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 1- 13, 16, 18, 20, and 21 have been adopted either verbatim or in Substance in this Recommended Order. Intervenor's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Intervenor's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela P. Garvin, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cayetano F. Alfonso, President Sunland Estates, Inc. 17400 Northwest 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33056 Maureen B. Harwitz, Esquire 2390 Bayview Lane North Miami, Florida 33181 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Jack E. Moore is the owner of real property in Fort Myers Beach known as Lot 9 of Indian Bayou, a subdivision in Section 33, Township 46 South, Range 24 East, Lee County, Florida. Moore's property is bordered on the north by the waters of Indian Bayou and Estero Bay. The northern portions of Moore's property are vegetated by juvenile and mature red and black mangroves. Red and black mangrove are the dominant species of vegetation on the northernmost portions of the property, waterward of the fill pad on which Moore's house is built. Sometimes during July, 1982, Moore used a shovel to excavate a channel from the open waters of Estero Bay to a dock existing at the edge of the fill pad. Approximately 48 cubic yards of excavated material was piled up along the banks of the channel. The channel measured approximately 1.5 feet deep (at low tide) by 9 feet wide by 70 feet long. The channel was dug so that Moore could got his boat in and out from the dock at medium tide. The passage to the deck was already possible at high tide, as Moore had a shallow draft pontoon boat. In July, 1981, Moore constructed a rip-rap revetment with backfill the northern side of his house fill pad. The back fill area contains approximately 160 cubic yards of fill, and is approximately 10 feet wide by 110 feet long. Red mangrove and black mangrove are and were the dominant vegetational species in the area where the channel was dug, where the excavated material was placed, and where the revetment and fill was constructed. The area of dominant mangrove vegetation extends from the work areas to the open waters of Estero Bay. Moore did not apply for or receive a permit from DER prior to undertaking the work referenced above. Upon discovery of the work in September, 1982, DER notified Moore that a permit was needed for the excavation and filling he conducted. In October, 1982, Moore agreed to fill in the channel and remove all unauthorized fill by January 19, 1983. Inspection by DER on January 26, 1983, showed that restoration had not been started, and in fact more work had been done on the channel. DER issued a Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action (NOV) to Respondent on March 29, 1003, alleging violations of Chapter 403, Florida Statute's, and DER rules and requiring restoration of the areas dredged and filled. Upon service of the Notice of Violation by the Sheriff, Respondent petitioned for this hearing. DER incurred costs of 5101.88 in investigating the violations alleged in the NOV. As of the date of the hearing, restoration work still had not been performed. Although the spoil piles alongside the channel are now diminished, the channel itself was deep as it previously had been and the rip-rap revetment and backfill had not been removed.
Findings Of Fact On March 12, 1985, Applicant filed a request with the Department for a permit to construct a marina in a manmade basin (Captain's Cove) located on Lower Matecumbe Key, Monroe County, Florida. The permit sought by the Applicant, as modified, would allow it to construct a 52-slip docking facility consisting of two 5' x 248' docks, each with fourteen 3' x 40' finger piers and twelve associated mooring piles; and, approximately 590 linear feet of riprap revertment requiring the disposition of approximately 300 cubic yards of rock boulders landward and waterward of mean high water (MHW). All docks and finger piers would be constructed of prestressed concrete supported by concrete piles; mooring piles would be pressure treated wood. The Applicant proposes to organize the facility as a condominium development; however, live-aboard use will be prohibited. A manager's quarters, office, restrooms and a parking area will be provided on the adjacent uplands. The Department's October 3, 1985, notice of intent to issue, proposed to issue the requested permit subject to the following condition: The permittee is hereby advised that Florida law states: "No person shall commence any excavation, construction, or other activ- ity involving the use of sovereign or other lands of the state, title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under Chapter 253, until such person has received from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use." If such work is done without consent, a fine for each offense in an amount of up to $10,000 may be imposed. Turbidity screens shall be utilized and properly maintained during the permitted construction and shall remain in place until any generated turbidity subsides. Only non-commercial, recreational boats shall be allowed to use the proposed marina. The applicant shall incorporate this condition into the condominium document for the proposed marina and supply the Department with a copy of the document prior to any sales of the condominium. No live-aboard boats shall be allowed in the marina. This condition shall also be placed in the condominium document. A portable sewage pumpout wagon shall be provided at the marina. Pumpout effluent shall be properly disposed of by methods acceptable to the department; these methods and locations shall be approved by the department prior to construction. A supply of oil absorbent materials, designed to clean up small oil spills, shall be maintained at the marina office. At least sixty (60) days prior to construction, the applicant shall submit to the Punta Gorda DER office for review, a detailed list of equip- ment to be permanently maintained on site. This list of equipment shall be modified as necessary and approved by the department prior to construction. The uplands on the permittee's property shall be graded to direct stormwater away from the edge of the boat basin. No fuel facilities nor storage shall be allowed at the project. Only clean rock boulders free from attached sediments or other deleterious compounds, and of a minimum diameter of 2' or greater shall be installed as riprap. 1O. The Marathon Department of Environmen- tal Regulation office shall be notified 48 hours prior to commencement of work. "IDLE SPEED-NO WAKE" signs shall be placed at conspicuous locations at the docking facility with additional language that "this precaution exists throughout the length of the canal channel during ingress and egress". At least two trash receptacles shall be provided on each of the two main walkway piers: these receptacles shall be routinely maintained and emptied. Prior to dockage use by boats, marker buoys shall be established around all vege- tated shallow zones within the limits of the submerged property limits with signs advising boaters of "SHALLOW WATERS-NO ENTRY". Prior to construction, the applicant and the Mara- thon DER office shall meet to discuss accept- able locations for these markers. The project shall comply with applic- able State Water Quality Standards, namely: 17-3.051 - Minimum Criteria for All Waters at All Times and All Places. 17-3.061 - Surface Waters: General Criteria 17-3.121 - Criteria - Class III Waters - Recreation, Propagation and Management of Fish and Wildlife: Surface Waters. The Applicant has agreed to comply with all conditions established by the Department. The Marina Site Captain's Cove is a manmade navigable lagoon with access to Florida Bay through a 2,500' long by 100' wide canal located opposite the project site. The waters of Captain's Cove and the canal are designated Class III surface waters, and those of Florida Bay as Outstanding Florida Waters. The controlling depth for access to the proposed marina is found at the mouth of the canal, where Florida Bay is approximately 6' mean low water (MLW). Depths within the canal are typically 1' or 2' deeper than the controlling depth at the mouth. Captain's Cove is roughly rectangular in shape. It measures 1,400' northeast to southwest, and up to 500' northwest to southeast. In the vicinity of the Applicant's property, which is located in the northeast fifth of the cove, the cove measures 350' wide. The bottom depth of the cove is variable. The southwestern four-fifths of the cove was typically dredged to a depth of 25' MLW. Within the northeast fifth of the cove (the basin), a gradation in depths is experienced. The northwest portion of the basin, located outside the project site, is typically 5' - 6' MLW, and heavily vegetated by sea grasses (turtle grass, manatee grass, and Cuban shoalweed). The southeast portion of the basin, which abuts the Applicant's property, consists of a shallow shelf 10' - 20' in width. Beyond this shelf, the bottom drops off steeply to a depth of 20' MLW. The shelf abutting the Applicant's property is sparsely vegetated with mangroves, and provides limited habitat for aquatic fauna such as domingo mussels and paper oysters. Replacement of these mangroves and other shoreline vegetation with riprap would not significantly affect the biological balance within the cove and would provide suitable habitat for existing species. The waters within the cove are quite clear, and meet the Department's water quality standards except for a thin layer at the deepest part of the cove where dissolved oxygen violations were noted. The proposed marina is, however, to be located in the northeast fifth of the cove, opposite the access canal, where the waters are more shallow and water circulation more prevelant. As sited, the proposed marina will not exacerbate or contribute to a violation of the Department's water quality criteria. Areas of Concern During construction of the marina elevated turbidity may be expected by disruption of the basin sediments caused by installation of the facility's pilings. This can be adequately controlled, however, by the use of turbidity curtains during construction. Shading of the benthic environment is a long term impact associated with marinas. Since the boat slips will be located in the deeper 20' MLW depth of the basin, where seagrasses are not present, sunlight will be permitted to reach the productive areas of the basin lying at 5' - 6' MLW and no adverse impact from shading will be experienced. Boats by their very existence and operation present potential negative short term and long term impacts to the environment. Potential damage to the seagrass beds in the northwest portion of the basin will be eliminated or minimized by the planned installation of buoys and/or signs prohibiting navigation in that area. Potential damage from wave action generated by boat operation will be eliminated or minimized by designating and posting the marina and access channel as an "idle speed-no wake" zone.[footnote 1] [footnote 1: Intervenors raised some concern regarding possible impact to the Florida manatee. While manatee have been sighted in the access channel, their occurrence is infrequent. Marking the shallow areas and designating the area as an "idle speed-no wake" zone will provide reasonable assurances that the manatee will not be adversely affected by the proposed marina.] The fueling of boats, hull maintenance, boat cleaning (detergents), and sewage discharge are additional pollution sources associated with marinas. While the proposed marina will have no fueling facilities and no live-aboards will be allowed at the marina, additional conditions must be attached to the permit to eliminate or minimize potential impacts from these potential pollution sources. In addition to the conditions established by the Department, the following conditions are necessary: All craft docked at the marina shall be prohibited from pumping sewage into the waters of the cove. Use of the boat slips shall be limited to those person(s) who own the slip. Leasing of boat slips shall be prohibited. Living aboard any boat docked at the marina is prohibited at all times.[footnote 2] [footnote 2: During hearing some concern was raised regarding the definition of live- aboard. The Department's intent in specifying no live-aboards was that no person(s) stay overnight on any boat moored at the marina. The purpose of this condition is to clarify that intent.] No boat cleaning, hull maintenance, nor fish cleaning shall be allowed at the permitted facility. Limiting use of the boat slips to owners will provide reasonable assurances that the conditions imposed on the requested permit will be complied with. Prohibiting live- aboards, the pumping of sewage, fish cleaning, boat cleaning and hull maintenance, will provide reasonable assurances that Department standards for bacteriological and water quality will not be violated.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Clifford O. Hunter, is the owner of real property located at Dekle Beach, Taylor County, Florida. Mr. Hunter's property is located at lot 53, Front Street, Dekle Beach, within section 22, township 7 south, range 7 east, Taylor County. Respondent, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida with responsibility for, among other things, dredge and fill permits involving Florida waters. Mr. Hunter lived in a home on his Dekle Beach property until a storm in March of 1993 destroyed the home. Mr. Hunter's Application for Permit. On or about June 2, 1993, Mr. Hunter applied for a wetland resource permit to rebuild his home, construct a bulkhead and fill 1750 square feet of salt marsh. The permit was designated No. 62-232123-2 by the Department. Mr. Hunter also sought approval for the construction of a dock. The dock, however, is exempt from the permitting requirements of Rule 17- 312.050(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code. On July 21, 1993, the Department issued a Notice of Permit Denial. The Notice of Permit Denial was received by Mr. Hunter. On August 13, 1993, Mr. Hunter filed a Request for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department contesting the denial of his permit application. The Department's Jurisdiction Over the Proposed Project. The proposed project involves dredging and filling in the waters of the State of Florida. A wetland resource permit is, therefore, required. Wetland jurisdiction of the State of Florida extends to the eastern edge of an existing concrete slab on Mr. Hunter's property from a canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's northern boundary. The canal connects with the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico surrounding Dekle Beach, except for an area extending 500 feet outward from the town limits of Dekle Beach, is within the Big Bend Seagrasses Aquatic Preserve. The preserve is an Outstanding Florida Water (hereinafter referred to as an "OFW"). The evidence presented by the Department to support findings of fact 9, 10 and 11 was uncontroverted by Mr. Hunter. Impact on Water Quality Standards. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Mr. Hunter has provided reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not lower the existing ambient water quality of waters of the State of Florida. The evidence presented by the Department concerning adverse impacts of the proposed project on water quality standards was uncontroverted by Mr. Hunter. Approval of Mr. Hunter's proposed project would allow the placing of fill in an intertidal area and the elimination of the portion of the intertidal area filled. Intertidal areas help maintain water quality by acting as a filter for water bodies. Mr. Hunter has obtained a variance from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which will allow him to place a septic tank on his property if the permit is granted. The septic tank will leach pollutants. Those pollutants will include nutrients, viruses and bacteria. Because the soil around the septic tank is very saturated, filtering of the pollutants will be low. Pollutants will, therefore, leach into the waters of the State of Florida and adversely impact water quality standards of the canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's property. Under such circumstances, Mr. Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the project will not lower existing ambient water quality of waters of the State of Florida. Public Interest Test. Mr. Hunter failed to present evidence to support a conclusion that the proposed project will not be adverse to the public interest. Rather, the unrebutted evidence presented by the Department supports a finding that Mr. Hunter's proposed project will not be in the public interest, especially when the cumulative impacts of the proposed project, discussed, infra, are considered. Possible adverse impacts to the public interest include the following: The septic tank which Mr. Hunter will place in the 1750 square feet of filled area will allow fecal coliform, viruses and pathogens to leach into the waters of the canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's property. Anyone who enters the canal could be infected from bacteria and viruses leaching from the septic tank. The conservation of fish and wildlife would also be adversely affected by the adverse impact on water quality and by the elimination of intertidal area. Recreational value of the canal would be reduced because of the adverse impact on water quality. The proposed project is for a permanent structure. Cumulative Impact. There are a number of applications for permits similar to the application filed by Mr. Hunter which have been filed by property owners of Dekle Beach whose homes were also destroyed by the March 1993 storm. If Mr. Hunter's permit application is granted, the Department will have to also grant most, if not all, of the other similar permit applications. Approximately 20 to 30 other applications involve similar requests which will allow the placement of fill and the installation of septic tanks. The resulting fill and use of septic tanks will have a significant cumulative adverse impact on the waters of the State of Florida. The cumulative impact from leaching effluent from the septic tanks on the waters of the State could be substantial. In addition to the impact on the canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's property, there will a cumulative negative impact on the ambient water quality of approximately 20 septic tanks on the canals and on the OFW. Errors in the Department's Notice of Permit Denial. The Notice of Permit Denial issued by the Department contained the following errors: An incorrect description of Mr. Hunter's lot number and section number; An incorrect statement that the amount of Mr. Hunter's proposed fill would eliminate 3,200 square feet of marsh; An incorrect statement that Mr. Hunter proposed to fill his lot for a distance of 64 feet waterward. The errors contained in the Notice of Permit Denial did not form any basis for the Department's denial of Mr. Hunter's application. The errors were typographical/word-processing errors. Several notices were being prepared at the same time as the Notice of Permit Denial pertaining to Mr. Hunter. The incorrect information contained in Mr. Hunter's Notice of Permit Denial was information which applied to the other notices. Other than the errors set out in finding of fact 23, the Notice of Permit Denial was accurate. Among other things, it was properly addressed to Mr. Hunter, it contained the project number assigned by the Department to Mr. Hunter's proposed project and it accurately reflected the Department's decision to deny Mr. Hunter's permit application. Mr. Hunter responded to the Notice of Permit Denial by requesting a formal administrative hearing to contest the Department's denial of his application. On December 20, 1993, Mr. Hunter received a letter from the Department which corrected the errors contained in the Notice of Permit Denial. The corrections were also contained in a Notice of Correction filed in this case by the Department on December 20, 1993. The Notice of Permit Denial was received by Mr. Hunter within 90 days after his application was filed. The corrections to the Notice of Permit Denial was received by Mr. Hunter more than 90 days after his application was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order dismissing the petition in this case and denying the issuance of permit number 62-232123-2 to Clifford O. Hunter. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Hunter's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1 and 3. Accepted in 2. Accepted in 4. Although Ernest Frey, Director of District Management, Northeast District Office of the Department, did ask Mr. Hunter whether he wanted to sell his property to the State, the evidence failed to prove why Mr. Frey asked this question, that Mr. Frey asked the question in his official capacity with the Department, or that Mr. Frey made the inquiry at the direction or on behalf of the Department or the State. More importantly, the evidence failed to prove that the Department denied the permit sought by Mr. Hunter because of any interest the State may have in purchasing Mr. Hunter's property. See 4. 6-8 No relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 6, 23, 28 and 30. Not a proposed finding of fact. See 8. The "aerial photo, Petitioner's exhibit 6, does not show "No vegetation behind the slab, nearly to the Mean High Water Line . . . ." Respondent's exhibit 3 does, however, show vegetation as testified to by Department witnesses. 13-14 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not a proposed finding of fact. Generally correct. Mr. Hunter was not properly put on notice of "alternatives" by the Notice of Permit Denial, as corrected, issued by the Department. Summation: Mr. Hunter's Summation was considered argument and was considered in this case. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1 and 3. Accepted in 2. Accepted in 1 and 4-5. Accepted 6-7. Accepted in 8. 6-9 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 19. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 15. 17-18 Accepted in 15 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 15 and 20-21. Accepted in 10. Accepted in 22. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 22. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 15-16. Accepted in 17 and 21. 27-28 Accepted in 17. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 16. 32-33 The Notice of Permit Denial, as corrected, did not put Mr. Hunter on notice that the alternatives raised by the Department at the final hearing would be an issue in this case. Those alternatives should not, therefore, form any basis for the Department's final decision. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 25. Accepted in 24 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 26. COPIES FURNISHED: Clifford O. Hunter 1410 Ruby Street Live Oak, Florida 32060 Beth Gammie Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9730 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
