The Issue Whether Petitioners were subject to discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, based on their race or familial status, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Rolstan and Leticia Hodge, are African- American and currently reside in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Petitioners have six children. Respondent, Watson Realty Corp.,1/ is a real estate and property management company with offices throughout the state of Florida and an office in Georgia. Wendell Davis is the company’s Executive Vice President in charge of Watson Realty Management Division, including its Jacksonville office located at 4456 Sunbeam Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257. On June 3, 2013, Petitioners completed applications to rent a property from Respondent located at 2314 Creekfront Drive in Green Cove Springs, Florida (the Property). Petitioners’ applications were taken by Gayle Aljets, Secretary at Respondent’s Westside office. Ms. Aljets sent, via facsimile transmission, Petitioners’ applications, along with copies of their photo identification, social security cards, and proof of income, to Anne Fletchall, Application Specialist in Respondent’s Sunbeam office.2/ Ms. Fletchall entered pertinent information from Petitioners’ applications, including personal identification and income information, into a system run by LexisNexis, a company with which Respondent contracted to conduct background, criminal, and financial screening of applicants.3/ LexisNexis screens applicants based on criteria selected by Respondent. For example, Respondent requires applicants to establish income of three times the rental amount, applies the combined income of multiple applicants for the same property (roommates), and requires criminal background checks on applicants 18 years of age and older. On debt issues, Respondent screens applicants for legal debts (e.g., judgments) of $1,000 or more within the most recent 48 months; as well as tax liens, landlord debt, and utility debt within the most recent 24 months. The screening system allows for exceptions, or “overrides,” on negative results for specified criteria. For example, if an applicant has a legal debt of $1,000 or more in the most recent 48 months, or a tax lien, landlord debt, or utility debt within the most recent 24 months, the system will return an override code of “800,” allowing approval of the applicant with a co-signor, or guarantor. The override determinations were made by Respondent at the time Respondent contracted with LexisNexis. Ms. Fletchall entered Petitioners’ information separately as two roommates applying for the Property. LexisNexis reported to Ms. Fletchall that Mr. Hodge had a legal debt of $1,000 or more within the last 48 months, thus failing one of the screening criteria. However, the program assigned an override code of “800,” meaning the application could be approved if Mr. Hodge obtained a guarantor. Mrs. Hodge passed all the LexisNexis screening criteria. LexisNexis further reported Petitioners’ rent-to- income ratio as 24.73 percent, based on a monthly rent of $1,195.00 and a combined income of $5,055.00. According to the criteria established by Respondent when setting up the screening process, a guarantor must establish an income of three and one-half times the amount of the monthly rent. Mrs. Hodge’s individual verified income was approximately $1,400.00, less than three and one-half times the monthly rental amount. Ms. Fletchall sent an email to Heather Cornett, property manager in the Westside office, informing her that Mr. Hodge was approved conditioned upon obtaining a guarantor. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge by phone that he would need a guarantor in order to qualify to rent the Property. Mr. Hodge asked why a guarantor would be required, but Ms. Cornett was unable to explain. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge that he would receive a letter from the third-party screening company that explained the details. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Hodge requested a telephone number for LexisNexis. Ms. Cornett did not have the LexisNexis telephone number and informed Mr. Hodge she would have to call him back with the number. Ms. Cornett obtained the number and made a return call to Mr. Hodge with the telephone number the same day. Through contact with LexisNexis, Mr. Hodge learned that a judgment against him by Freedom Furniture and Electronics had caused him to fail the applicable screening criteria, thus triggering the need for a guarantor. Mr. Hodge contacted Ms. Cornett and informed her that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett asked Mr. Hodge to obtain a letter from the debtor on the debtor’s letterhead verifying the debt had been satisfied. Mr. Hodge subsequently met with Ms. Cornett in her office and presented a letter from Freedom Furniture and Electronics. The letter represented that Mr. Hodge had entered into a payment agreement to satisfy the debt and that, thus far, payments had been made on time. Ms. Cornett faxed the letter to Ms. Fletchall to submit to LexisNexis as additional information. Ms. Fletchall called Ms. Cornett and told her the letter was only proof that payments were being made on the debt, not that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett called Mr. Hodge and informed him that the letter did not change the status of his application, and a guarantor was still required. Mr. Hodge requested Ms. Cornett submit the matter to a manager for review. Ms. Cornett took the Hodge’s applications, the letter, and the LexisNexis report to Terri Brown, Respondent’s Regional Manager. Ms. Cornett spoke to Ms. Brown via telephone, who confirmed that a guarantor would still be required for approval. Ms. Cornett again called Mr. Hodge with this information. Mr. Hodge did not obtain a guarantor and did not make another application, or otherwise arrange with Respondent to rent the Property. On June 10, 2013, Respondent received an application from a different set of applicants to rent the Property. The applicants were white and listed on their application that they had three children.4/ Ms. Fletchall processed two separate applications for the applicants as roommates, just as she did with Petitioners’ applications. The LexisNexis report showed that the male applicant failed three of the screening criteria, while the female applicant passed all the criteria. The system assigned an override code of “800” for the male applicant’s prior landlord debt, triggering the requirement for a guarantor. The system also assigned an override code of “920” based on the male applicant’s prior issue with a personal check, triggering a requirement that the male applicant pay monthly rent by certified funds. On June 21, 2013, the new applicants entered into a lease for the Property. The tenants obtained a guarantor who signed a lease guarantee which was incorporated into the lease.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014H0082. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Bosshardt Property Management, LLC (“Bosshardt”), violated the Fair Housing Act as alleged in the Housing Charge of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing. Ms. Rabalais is the owner of Lot 198 at Salt Springs Resort, a Florida recreational vehicle condominium established pursuant to chapter 718, Florida Statutes. As an owner of a lot in Salt Springs Resort, she is a member of SSRA, the homeowner’s association. Bosshardt is a Florida corporation providing community association management services and was the Community Association Manager (“CAM”) for SSRA from September 2013 until August 31, 2019. Bosshardt acted as the agent, and at the direction of SSRA, managed the business related to the property, including enforcement of SSRA rules and decisions of the Board of Directors. The CAM is the general point of contact for the association. The CAM would collect on bills and collect payments for assessment and manage the property. Petitioner contends Respondent subjected her to retaliation beginning after the filing of Petitioner’s HUD complaint. In support of her position, Petitioner points to alleged harassment by Ms. Noble, the failure to maintain her lawn and repaint her lot number, and removal of one of her posts from the townhall webpage. Throughout the hearing, Ms. Rabalais raised allegations about incidents that occurred before December 20, 2018, which is 365 days prior to the filing of her Complaint of Discrimination dated December 20, 2019. However, some of the facts will be discussed herein to help supplement and explain the alleged continued discrimination and to provide a more detailed record of Ms. Rabalais’s complaints. Golf Cart Incident Petitioner alleges that Bosshardt was responsible for housing discrimination and harassment arising out of an April 17, 2018, confrontation between Petitioner and Sharon Noble, a lot owner and former SSRA board member. Ms. Rabalais identified Ms. Noble as one of the worst of her neighbors who disliked her. At some point before Ms. Rabalais filed the complaint of discrimination, Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais were good friends. While there is a dispute regarding the nature of the relationship, at some point the friendship deteriorated. In 2016, a dispute arose between Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble over Ms. Rabalais’s intent to file a lawsuit against SSRA and Ms. Noble’s refusal to assist her. The dispute was referenced in emails between Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble and through Ms. Noble’s testimony at hearing. Ms. Noble acknowledged at the hearing that she and Ms. Rabalais were no longer friends. On April 17, 2018, Sharon Noble was driving her golf cart on the road in front of Ms. Rabalais’s lot. She stopped her cart to send a text message to someone. At around the same time, Ms. Rabalais attempted to enter her drive way. Ms. Rabalais was unable to enter the drive way as two carts could not drive on the road side by side. Ms. Rabalais began to blow her horn so Ms. Noble circled around behind Ms. Rabalais’s golf cart to allow her to drive pass her. Ms. Noble then finished her text message and left the area. Ms. Noble credibly testified that she did not attempt to intimidate Ms. Rabalais. Ms. Noble believed the incident was intentional and as a result, she wrote an incident report documenting the incident. Ms. Noble reported the incident to the SSRA. Jane Jorden was in Ms. Rabalais’s golf cart and witnessed the incident. She recalled that Ms. Noble was recording Ms. Rabalais’s lot and blocking the driveway with her golf cart. Ms. Rabalais became upset after Ms. Noble drove her cart behind her. Ms. Rabalais went to the guard gate to report the incident and call the police. Tom, one of the employees working at the guard gate, completed a report regarding the incident. Tom did not testify at the hearing and, thus, his statement about the incident is not relied upon for a finding of fact. It is simply used to supplement the testimony offered at the hearing. Tom did not observe the incident but rather reported that the police were called and took statements from Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais. SSRA sent Ms. Rabalais a letter advising her to contact the police if she is concerned about her safety. While Ms. Rabalais believes that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation by Respondent by way of the actions of Ms. Noble, the fact is that Ms. Noble, and more importantly Bosshardt, was in no position to deny Ms. Rabalais access to common services and facilities under SSRA’s control. To the extent Ms. Rabalais believed her fellow neighbors disliked her or were not nice to her, that activity is not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the incident with Ms. Noble was a personal dispute that was not due to housing discrimination facilitated at the direction of Bosshardt. Lost Assessment Payment Between July 1, 2018, and October 1, 2018, a quarterly assessment accrued. Ms. Rabalais’s check with a send date of September 28, 2018, was mailed to Bosshardt using an address that was previously known to be Bosshardt’s address. However, the assessment check payment was returned and the label affixed to the envelope indicated that the mail was returned to sender, was not deliverable as addressed, and was unable to be forwarded. In order to qualify as a candidate for a position on the SSRA Board of Directors, all assessments must be paid before a designated date. As a result of the assessment check not being delivered before the deadline to declare candidacy, Ms. Rabalais did not meet the criteria to run for the Board. Ms. Rabalais alleges in her complaint that Bosshardt engaged in a discriminatory act by not accepting her payment so she could not run for the Board of Directors. There is no sufficient evidence to support this allegation. Although there was testimony from Ms. Nelson that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding delivery of the check, the evidence offered at hearing does not demonstrate that Bosshardt engaged in nefarious or discriminatory actions regarding the assessment payment. The greater weight of the evidence, however, established that the check was returned undelivered. Failure to Maintain Property and Paint Lot Number Ms. Rabalais alleged in her Complaint that Respondent failed to maintain her lawn and failed to repaint her lot number as it did for other lot owners. There was no clear indication that the conduct occurred on or after December 20, 2018. Generally, all lot owners received basic services. An exception would be if the lot owner has a “no trespassing” sign on the property. Diane Suchy worked as the designated CAM for SSRA. She testified that maintenance staff were employees of SSRA and worked at the direction of Bosshardt. They maintained common areas and the lawns of individual lot owners. The maintenance team also repaints the lot numbers as needed. Gary Gensberg, the maintenance supervisor, testified that he maintained Ms. Rabalais's lawn and conducted weed maintenance as needed. He also recalled that Ms. Rabalais did not have a large area that required maintenance. Regarding the lot numbers, they would be repainted if it was not visible. Ms. Rabalais's lot number was visible at the time in question. Mr. Gensberg credibly testified that he was never given instructions to not maintain Ms. Rabalais's lot. Despite the maintenance team maintaining Ms. Rabalais property as needed, the evidence established that Ms. Rabalais posted no trespassing signs on her property for an unknown period of time. Furthermore, there was no evidence to support a finding that if Ms. Rabalais’s lawn was not maintained or her lot number was not repainted, it was result of discrimination based on disability or retaliation. Townhall Facebook Group Page Gary Griffith, the Bosshardt president at the time of the allegations alleged in the Complaint, testified about the lot owners’ Facebook group page. Mr. Griffith testified that Bosshardt did not manage the Facebook group page. Rather, Mr. Foster, Brenda Harvey, and other lot owners, were administrators on the account. Thus, Bosshardt made no determination regarding who could post or remove posts from the account. The page had rules for posting including, the exclusion of posts that were argumentative, contained unfounded allegations, or attacked the Board of Directors. On February 4, 2019, Ms. Rabalais posted a message about her experience with litigation with SSRA and Bosshardt. At the end of that message she wrote, “SSRA/Bosshardt has caused a homeowner to kill himself and ruined many owners’ lives ….” The administrators determined the post was unsubstantiated and threatening and failed to comply with the guidelines established for the page. As a result, the post was removed. Based on the evidence offered at hearing, Bosshardt was not involved with removal of Ms. Rabalais’s February 4, 2019, post. Therefore, there was no evidence to establish that Bosshardt discriminated against Ms. Rabalais when her post was removed from the Town Hall page. Expert Testimony Petitioner offered the testimony of Gary Solomon, Ph.D., as an expert regarding HOA syndrome. He works as a professor at the College of Southern Nevada. HOA syndrome is not a recognized clinical disorder, and there are no peer-reviewed articles offered to support Dr. Solomon’s opinion. Despite his purported knowledge about HOA syndrome, he was unable to provide a basis for his conclusions. Dr. Solomon had not read the SSRA rules or policies and procedures; and he had no understanding of Florida condominium law. He was also unable to provide an opinion regarding whether Ms. Rabalais had suffered from HOA syndrome. Based on the evidence offered at hearing, Dr. Solomon was not accepted as an expert in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 John McDonough, Esquire Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, O'Dell & Harvey Suite 2000 260 Wekiva Springs Road Longwood, Florida 32779 Scarlett Rabalais Post Office Box 5224 Salt Springs, Florida 32134 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner formerly resided in Montrose Apartments at 563 West Montrose Street, Apartment 18, Clermont, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he is a handicapped/disabled person by virtue of a mental disability, who was "illegally" evicted from Montrose Apartments because of his handicap/disability. At all times relevant to this proceeding Francisco Guzman, Jr., owned and managed Montrose Apartments. Mr. Guzman was unaware of Petitioner's alleged handicap/disability. At no time during Petitioner's tenancy at Montrose Apartments did Petitioner notify management of the apartment complex that he had a handicap/disability. Furthermore, Petitioner never provided management with documentation verifying that he had a handicap/disability. Petitioner alleged that in early 2009, he requested that Respondent make plumbing repairs in his apartment unit and that Respondent refused to comply with those requests. He further alleged that Respondent did not take his maintenance requests seriously and treated other tenants at Montrose Apartments more favorably than he was treated. Petitioner admitted that he did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009. According to Petitioner, he withheld the rent because Respondent failed to make the requested plumbing repairs. In correspondence from him to a "Ms. Smith," Mr. Guzman indicated that on "Sunday [March] 22, 2009," he had posted a three-day notice on Petitioner's apartment, because he had not paid his March 2009 rent. Also, Mr. Guzman acknowledged that he had not been able to repair Petitioner's bathroom sink because he had been unable to gain access to Petitioner's apartment. Finally, Mr. Guzman indicated that he believed Petitioner was "avoiding [him] since he is unable to pay the rent." Petitioner did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009, even after Respondent notified him several times that the rent was past due and should be paid. Respondent began eviction proceedings against Petitioner in or about late April or early May 2009, by filing a Complaint for Eviction ("Eviction Complaint") with the County Court of Lake County, Florida. The Eviction Complaint was assigned Case No. 2009-CC001534. Respondent filed the Eviction Complaint against Petitioner after, and because, he did not pay the March and April 2009 rent for his Montrose Apartment unit. On May 5, 2009, a Final Judgment for Possession and Writ of Possession were entered against Petitioner. The Writ of Possession was served on Petitioner and enforced. On or about May 8, 2009, the apartment unit previously rented to Petitioner was turned over to Mr. Guzman. Petitioner alleges and asserts that: (1) he is disabled/handicapped due to a mental disability; (2) he was evicted because of his handicap/disability; and (3) Respondent knew Petitioner was handicapped/disabled. Nevertheless, Petitioner presented no competent evidence to support his claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Luis Bermudez' Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2010.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race, or retaliated against them for exercising a protected right, or both, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was admitted into the record at the final hearing, the undersigned cannot make any findings of fact. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (“Findings of fact shall be based … exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.”).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Petitioners no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Carraway Whang Carraway 1406 Southwest Osprey Cove Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 (eServed) Jillian Sidisky, Esquire Stefanie S. Copelow, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed discriminatory housing practices against Petitioners based on their familial status.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners appeared but presented no evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Center Lake Owner's Association, Inc. ("Center Lake"), discriminated against Petitioner, James Schweim ("Schweim"), on the basis of his purported disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Schweim is a white male who at all times material hereto resided at Center Lake. Schweim provided some evidence of his medical condition at final hearing, but did not affirmatively establish a disability, per se. Notwithstanding that fact, a review of the facts will be made concerning the merits of Schweim's claim. Center Lake is the homeowner's association for the Center Lake subdivision located in Manatee County. The association has been in existence since 1986. The subdivision is subject to various deed restrictions as set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Centre1/ Lake, recorded at O.R. Book 1168, Page 1508, in the public records of Manatee County, Florida. Of significance to this proceeding, Section 11 of the deed restrictions is relevant. Section 11, as it will be referred to herein, states in whole: Vehicles. No vehicle of a subdivision resident shall be parked in the subdivision except on a paved driveway, or inside a garage. No vehicle shall at anytime be parked on grass or other vegetation. No trucks or vehicles which are used for commercial purposes, other than those present on business, nor any trailers, may be parked in the subdivision unless inside a garage and concealed from public view. Boats, boat trailers, campers, vans, motorcycles and other recreational vehicles and any vehicle not in operable condition or validly licensed shall be permitted in the subdivision only if parked inside a garage and concealed from public view. No maintenance or repair of any boat or vehicle shall be permitted upon any Lot except within an enclosed garage. Beginning some time in 2004, Schweim and Center Lake commenced a dispute concerning Schweim's alleged violation of the provisions of Section 11. Specifically, Schweim was accused of parking a recreational vehicle (the "RV") on his property in violation of the deed restriction. There is no dispute between the parties that Schweim owns a 23-foot recreational vehicle, which is kept on his property (at 3550 65th Avenue Circle East). As a result of the 2004 dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation signed by Center Lake and its attorneys on December 6 and 7, 2004, respectively. Schweim's attorney signed the document on November 24, 2004; Schweim and his wife signed on that same date. The Settlement Stipulation was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Schweim asserted that the version of the Settlement Stipulation entered into evidence was not the version he signed, but the most persuasive evidence is that it is the same version. Schweim does not agree that all the terms and conditions in the Settlement Stipulation were extant at the time he signed, but he could not produce a copy of any other version of the document for comparison. In the Settlement Stipulation, Schweim agreed to move the RV from his property and not to bring it onto the property except for loading or unloading. In exchange, Center Lake agreed to voluntarily dismiss its then-pending lawsuit against Schweim. Despite the resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit, Schweim did not remove his RV from his property. Instead, Schweim kept the RV on the property and, ultimately, filed a discrimination action against Center Lake because of their efforts to have him remove the RV. That action is the subject of the instant proceeding. Schweim does not dispute that he is keeping the RV on his property in violation of the deed restrictions. Rather, Schweim suggests that he should be allowed to do so on three bases: One, that he is proposing a fence on his property that will cover the RV and make it hidden from view from the street; Two, that there are other residents of the subdivision who are also in violation of the deed restrictions; and, three, that he is disabled and needs the RV parked on his property to accommodate his disability. As to his first reason, Schweim's proposal is simply that, a proposal. There is no evidence that the fence proposed by Schweim would satisfy the requirements of the deed restriction. Further, Center Lake has no confidence, based on its history with Schweim, that he would follow through with the proposal. There is some evidence that other residents in the area appear to be in violation of the deed restrictions. However, there was no evidence presented at final hearing that those residents had refused to move their vehicles upon filing of a complaint. That is, the homeowner's association tends not to take any action unless a homeowner files a formal complaint concerning a violation. In Schweim's case, several complaints were filed as to his RV. There was also some discussion at final hearing as to the appropriate licensure for the RV. Any vehicle not properly licensed is not allowed to be parked in the subdivision based on the deed restrictions. However, Schweim says the license is currently up-to-date and that is no longer an issue. Concerning Schweim's disability, he presented the following facts: At age 23, Schweim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen, causing long-term damage; In 1991, Schweim had a ruptured disc; Surgical fusion of his disc was performed in 2002 and again in 2004; In 2009, Schweim underwent a lumbar fusion. As a result of those events, Schweim has what he describes as an acute medical condition limiting his ambulatory abilities. At the final hearing, Schweim negotiated the hearing room slowly and with some difficulty. Judy Schweim, a nurse, testified that she transports Schweim to doctor's appointments and other medical situations. At times, Schweim's back will "go out," and she is responsible for getting him to medical treatment as soon as possible. Schweim produced evidence that he has received a Florida parking permit for disabled persons. The application for the permit indicates his condition as "severe limitation in a person's ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." A doctor's order dated May 6, 2004, indicates that it is "medically necessary for [Schweim] to have ready access to a walk-in vehicle to accommodate his disability." An August 19, 2010, memo from Dr. Tally at the Neuro Spinal Associates, P.A., and a September 27, 2010, memo from the Dolphin Medical Group, state essentially the same thing. None of the hearsay documents were sufficient to establish a disability, per se. Schweim says that his disability makes it necessary for him to have the RV parked in his yard so that, when necessary, he can use it to get medical treatment. Schweim says that when his back goes out, he needs a vehicle that he can walk into while standing up. He cannot sit down into an automobile at those times. The incidences of Schweim's debilitating back pain only occur every couple of years. When not experiencing that pain, Schweim is able to drive his red car, described by neighbors as a "hot rod," without any problem. Schweim drove a motorcycle for years, but says he has not driven it for quite some time. Schweim said that an ambulance was not a viable option for him when he has the back pain, because the ambulance will not take him where he needs to go, i.e., straight to a particular doctor, rather than the emergency room. There is no competent evidence to support that contention. Schweim candidly admits that the only time he needs the RV is when he has an episode with his back and that such episodes are few and far between. And while it is true that an episode may occur at any time, there is insufficient evidence to support Schweim's claim that the RV is integral to him receiving prompt and appropriate medical care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, James Schweim, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents committed a housing discriminatory practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about January 20, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by the Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found the Respondents had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondents for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. The Division of Administrative Hearings issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. No party appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Leaford Green Danett Green 3758 Southwest Findlay Street Port St. Lucie, Florida 34953 Paula Adams Post Office Box 1665 Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact In June 2016, Gaudina and Grand Lifestyle executed a document, entitled “GLC III/LLLP Lease – Basic Rental Agreement or Residential Lease” (lease), in which Gaudina leased from Grand Lifestyle a residence at 3346 East Dale Street, Leesburg, Florida, in the Lakeside Village mobile home park (premises). The lease provided that Gaudina pay to Grand Lifestyle $656.00 per month to lease the premises. The lease further provided that at the end of three consecutive years of living at the premises, Grand Lifestyle would provide Gaudina the option of purchasing the premises for $1,000.00. Gaudina testified that his primary residence is in Colorado, but that he wished to lease the premises so that he had a residence when he visited his wife, who lived nearby in Lake County, Florida. As he did not reside permanently at the premises in Leesburg, Gaudina subleased the premises to another individual, possibly in violation of the lease. That individual reported to Gaudina numerous issues with the premises, which Gaudina testified he brought to the attention of Grand Lifestyle.2/ Both parties testified that they sought various remedies in other courts concerning these issues. The undersigned finds that these issues are not relevant to Gaudina’s allegations concerning discrimination under the Florida FHA. Gaudina testified that he possesses a disability that requires use of an emotional support animal. The only evidence Gaudina submitted in support of this contention was a letter, dated February 24, 2015, from Emilia Ripoll, M.D. (Ripoll), located in Boulder, Colorado, and a “Health Care Provider Pet Accomodation Form,” also from Ripoll. This letter states: Mr. Jan Gaudina is currently my patient and has been under my care since 1998. I am intimately familiar with his history and with the functional limitations imposed by his medical condition. Due to his diagnosis of bladder cancer and bilateral ureter cancer, Jan has certain emotional limitations including stress which may cause his cancer to recur. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his ability to cope and live independently, I have prescribed Jan to obtain his pet for emotional support. The presence of this animal is necessary for the mental health of Jan. The Health Care Accomodation Form prescribed the use of Gaudina’s dog, a golden retriever, as an emotional support animal. Gaudina did not present the testimony of Ripoll or any other health care provider concerning his alleged disability. The letter and form, which are inadmissible hearsay that Gaudina failed to corroborate with admissible non-hearsay evidence, attempt to establish that Gaudina required an emotional support animal to prevent a recurrence of cancer. The undersigned cannot consider these documents to support a finding that Gaudina is disabled and in need of an emotional support animal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.213(3).3/ Therefore, the undersigned finds that Gaudina has failed to establish that he suffers from a disability that requires the accommodation of his golden retriever as an emotional support animal. Principe, the owner of Grand Lifestyle, testified that the prospectus for the premises restricted pet ownership to pets that weigh less than 20 pounds. The parties acknowledged that a golden retriever weighs in excess of 20 pounds. Principe testified that, during a telephone conversation, Gaudina asked whether he could bring his golden retriever to the premises, but never mentioned his alleged disability. Principe also testified that he asked Gaudina whether Gaudina’s golden retriever was a trained service dog. Gaudina testified that his golden retriever was not a “service dog,” as defined under section 413.08, Florida Statutes.4/ Principe further testified that Gaudina rarely visited the premises. Gaudina testified that, in total, he visited the premises in Leesburg three or four times over the period of approximately one year. Gaudina presented no credible evidence that he qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Further, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Jan Gaudina, did not prove that Respondent, Grand Lifestyle Communities III/IV, LLLP, committed discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2019.
