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JEFFREY C. BARNES vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 07-004522 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 01, 2007 Number: 07-004522 Latest Update: May 29, 2008

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate broker should be approved or denied.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Jeffrey C. Barnes, is a 60-year-old male who maintains a residence in Illinois and is currently a licensed realtor in Illinois and Wisconsin. On April 9, 2007, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation received the Petitioner’s application to become a licensed real estate broker in Florida. The Petitioner responded affirmatively to a question on the application form which asked, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) . . ., even if you received a withhold of adjudication?” The Petitioner’s reported criminal history began with an incident on November 19, 1985, when the Illinois police stopped him for driving 53 M.P.H. in a 40 M.P.H. zone. Upon discovering that the Petitioner was driving with a suspended license, the police arrested him and found a small glass bottle containing cocaine on his person. The police also found 23 individually-wrapped packets of cocaine in the Petitioner’s vehicle. Because of this incident, the Illinois authorities charged the Petitioner with unlawfully possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver more than 30 grams. On February 18, 1986, an Illinois police officer witnessed the Petitioner driving erratically and pulled his car over. While asking for the Petitioner’s license, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from the car. Upon looking into the car, the officer saw a bottle containing cocaine hanging from one of the Petitioner’s pockets. During a subsequent search of the Petitioner and his car, the police discovered drug paraphernalia and more cocaine. The police also administered a sobriety test which the Petitioner failed. The Petitioner was 38 years old during the incidents described above. Ultimately, the Petitioner was convicted on two counts of manufacturing and delivering a controlled substance, one count of possessing cannabis, and one count of possessing a controlled substance (i.e., cocaine). The Petitioner was released in 1990 after serving four years in prison. The Commission considered the Petitioner’s licensure application on July 18, 2007 during a regularly-scheduled meeting in Orlando, Florida. The Petitioner was present, but he was not represented by an attorney. During the aforementioned meeting, the Commission made the following findings of fact: (a) “[a]pplicant’s criminal record is as revealed in [his] application; (b) “[a]pplicant’s testimony or evidence in explanation/mitigation was unpersuasive;” and (c) “[a]pplicant’s criminal history is recent in time.”2/ Based on the findings of fact described above, the Commission concluded the Petitioner had “engaged in conduct or practices which would have been grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license.” The Commission also concluded the Petitioner had been “[c]onvicted or found guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere to, . . . a crime which directly relates to activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing.” Ultimately, the Commission elected to deny the Petitioner’s application by concluding “it would be a breach of its duty to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public to license this applicant and thereby provide him easy access to the homes, families or personal belongings of the citizens of Florida.” The Commission’s decision was memorialized in a “Notice of Intent to Deny” rendered on August 8, 2007. The Petitioner responded by filing a petition disputing the facts on which the Commission’s decision was based. Specifically, due to the lapse of time since his convictions and subsequent good conduct, the Petitioner asserted he satisfied the criteria for licensure set forth in Section 475.17(1)(a), Florida Statutes. During the December 11, 2007 formal hearing, the Petitioner testified on his own behalf and described how he has worked in the information technology field for over 35 years. In addition, the Petitioner described his charitable and civic activities in considerable detail. The Petitioner attributed his convictions to a serious cocaine addiction. While incarcerated, he participated in substance abuse programs and describes his time in prison as a blessing. The Petitioner testified that he has had no further involvement with illegal drugs since his release from prison. During his testimony at hearing, the Petitioner revealed that he had sold 3.5 grams of cocaine to a friend in the presence of an undercover police officer, a crime not disclosed to the Commission in his licensure application. The Petitioner was not specific about when this crime occurred, but he believed that he was 25 or 30 years old at the time. While it is uncertain whether the Petitioner’s sale of cocaine actually resulted in a conviction which had to be expressly disclosed to the Commission in his licensure application, his claim that this crime was fully disclosed casts doubt on his credibility. In addition to his own testimony, the Petitioner offered the testimony of his brother, Pastor Christopher Barnes. When asked about the Petitioner’s character, Pastor Barnes expressed his opinion that the Petitioner’s arrest and convictions were responsible for the turn-around in the Petitioner’s life and present day exemplary good character. The Petitioner also offered the testimony of his wife, Ms. Janet Victoria. They met in late 1991 or early 1992 and have been married since 1997. Ms. Victoria works as a real estate broker in Illinois, and the Petitioner began working for her in 2004. Reverend James Dean Millar also testified on the Petitioner’s behalf that he and the Petitioner met in 2003, that the Petitioner has been involved in charitable endeavors and that the Petitioner regularly attends church services. All of the Petitioner’s witnesses responded affirmatively when asked if they knew the Petitioner to be honest, truthful, trustworthy, and a person of good character. They also responded affirmatively when asked if they knew whether the Petitioner had a good reputation for fair dealing. However, their statements were more in the nature of conclusions, lacking any specific detail to support their opinions. No specific instances were related where the Petitioner demonstrated honesty, morality, or ethical behavior. Also, none of the witnesses can be considered “disinterested.” The testimony and evidence indicated the Petitioner is accomplished in the fields of information technology and real estate sales.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2008.

Florida Laws (6) 112.011475.001475.01475.17475.181475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs JOHN WILSON CLAFFEY, 92-004947 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Aug. 14, 1992 Number: 92-004947 Latest Update: Mar. 29, 1993

The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in acts and/or conduct amounting to fraud, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction for which his real estate license should be disciplined.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints filed pursuant to, inter alia, Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, John Wilson Claffey, is now and was at times material hereto, a licensed real estate salesperson in Florida, having been issued licensed number 0419730. The last license issued was as a salesperson, c/o Venice Properties and Investments, Inc., 628 Cypress Avenue, Venice, Florida. During 1985, Respondent and Mary Lou Retty (Retty), while Respondent was acting as the licensed general contractor in the employ of Venice Construction Management, Inc., entered into a verbal agreement to build five commercial structures (for Retty) in Venice, Florida. The agreement provided that Respondent would charge Retty actual costs plus a supervisory fee for each building. Respondent built the first two buildings as agreed in keeping with the projections he provided Retty. However, a dispute later arose between Respondent and Retty during construction of the third building about some of the billings and other accounting practices with the end result that Retty suspected that Respondent was overcharging by falsifying invoices and purchasing materials which were used for other projects, but were charged to the building he was erecting for Retty. During 1986, Retty filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit for Sarasota County, Florida. Retty's object was to recover monies that she suspected Respondent had misappropriated and wrongfully charged to her project. On April 25, 1990 and June 28, 1990, Retty obtained two final judgments. The first judgment ordered Respondent to pay Retty $40,263.47 and the second final judgment ordered him to pay her the sum of $10,263.47 for civil theft, attorney fees and court costs. The interest rate for both judgments was 12% per annum. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1-4.) During counsel's preparation and discovery for trial, it became evident that Respondent altered several billing invoices which he sought to collect from Retty. Respondent submitted falsified invoices and charged Retty for materials that he used on other projects. Respondent unsuccessfully appealed the final judgments. To date, Respondent has not paid any of the monies he was ordered to pay in the final judgments referenced herein.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Respondent engaged in proscribed conduct as alleged and that his real estate license be suspended for seven (7) years. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent Claffey pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the entry of its Final Order. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney DPR- Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John Wilson Claffey 312 Venice Avenue East #126 Venice, Florida 34292 Darlene F. Keller/Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Hurston Building-North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 1772 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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STEPHEN P. MCCRADY vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 88-004377 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004377 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 1989

The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Petitioner meets the qualifications for licensure as a real estate salesman.

Findings Of Fact On June 13, 1988, Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a real estate salesman. In responding to question 14(a) of the application, Petitioner answered that his license, as a real estate broker, had been revoked for non-payment of an administrative fine. (Respondent's exhibit 1). Petitioner attached to his application a copy of a transcript of an administrative hearing held in DOAH Case No. 84-0981. A final order was entered in that case based on a stipulation wherein Petitioner agreed to pay an administrative fine of $500 within 30 days of entry of the final order. Petitioner has not paid the administrative fine as he agreed. Petitioner admitted during hearing that he had not paid the fine and made an offer during the hearing herein to pay that fine in as much as he failed to pay it earlier since he did not have the wherewithal to pay the fine. Petitioner is now employed as a sales representative with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 1/ Petitioner's license as a real estate broker was revoked by Respondent based on his failure to pay an administrative fine imposed in an earlier case (DOAH Case No. 86-145, Respondent's exhibit 2).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman be DENIED. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this of 27th day of January, 1989. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.17
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CARL D. HILL vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 84-003058 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003058 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 1985

Findings Of Fact Carl D. Hill, Petitioner, applied for licensure to the Florida Real Estate Commission, Respondent, on or about October 19, 1983, and subsequently received a letter of denial dated December 6, 1983. The denial was based upon Sections 475.17(1) and 475.25, F.S., and specifically cited Petitioner's prior arrest in 1980 and criminal record. By Order of the Circuit Court dated June 12, 1984, the record of Petitioner's prior arrest and plea of guilty was expunged and sealed. Petitioner had originally been placed on probation for five years, but that probation was terminated early for good behavior after three years, on or about April 16, 1984. Petitioner has not been arrested for any offense since 1980, and has at all times been employed. His reputation in the community is very good. Petitioner is currently co-owner of Interstate Mobile Homes and handles sales, service and set-up of mobile homes. His partner is a licensed real estate broker who also operates Sun American Realty in the same building. There is no evidence in the record which would indicate that Petitioner has at any time engaged in activities which would require a real estate salesman's license. All such activities are handled by his partner and co-owner who is licensed as a real estate broker. Petitioner held a real estate salesman's license from November 1981 until January 18, 1983. Petitioner's previous license was revoked pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(m), F.S., but he was not precluded from reapplying for reinstatement.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson be APPROVED. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of February, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack W. Crooks, Esquire Crooks, Vetter, Cuellar and Blau, P.A. 4202 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 Ralph Armstead, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 212 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Harold R. Huff, Director Dept. of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Dept. of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.001475.17475.25
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MARINA PADRO CINTRON vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 92-007368 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 10, 1992 Number: 92-007368 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1993

The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at final hearing was whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be approved.

Findings Of Fact In October 1992, Petitioner filed an application with Respondent for licensure as a real estate salesperson, together with the required fee. The application asked several questions, including in pertinent part: Question 9: if Petitioner had been "convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld," and Question 13: if Petitioner had had a license to practice any regulated profession revoked upon grounds of fraudulent or dishonest dealing or violations of law. Petitioner responded in the affirmative to both questions and provided written documentation and statements regarding the questions. Petitioner attached to her October 1992 application for licensure various letters to support her application. The letters included one from her probation officer indicating her compliance with her probation; from the local board of realtors indicating that no complaints had been registered against Petitioner during her membership with them, which was from 1979 to 1982 and 1990 to 1992; and from her present employer who is a licensed real estate agent and has employed Petitioner since 1989. On October 21, 1992, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. The denial was based upon her response to questions 9 and 13 on the application, specifically her 1991 conviction and sentence and the 1992 revocation of her real estate salesperson license. On May 29, 1991, Petitioner plead nolo contendere to three felony counts of grand theft in the third degree. She was placed on probation for five years with special conditions, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. The special conditions of Petitioner's probation were that she would make restitution in the amount of $19,864.52, that she would perform 500 hours of community service, that she would fully cooperate with the State Attorney's Office in the investigation of the criminal activity in which she was involved, and that the probation may be terminated, upon motion, after 30 months. The theft involved a scheme devised by Petitioner's "boss" to obtain funds, beyond entitlement, from the City of Miami. Petitioner was employed as a bookkeeper by an elderly center from 1986 to 1988, which provided transportation, lunches and recreational activities for senior citizens. The center received funds from the City of Miami to operate by being reimbursed for monies paid to vendors. From 1986 to 1988, the center was performing poorly economically. In order to obtain additional monies, the invoices of vendors who did business with the center were inflated or increased and submitted by the center to the City of Miami for reimbursement. As bookkeeper, Petitioner was instrumental in the scheme. The difference between the actual cost and the inflated cost was retained by Petitioner and her boss and distributed at the end of the year to the center's employees, including Petitioner and her boss. Petitioner and her boss controlled the illegally obtained funds. At the end of the center's budget year, which was June 30th of each year, the center was withholding back payments to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), using the funds held to pay salaries. As a result, a debt to IRS was created, and when IRS attempted to collect on the debt in 1988, the scheme was discovered and stopped. Petitioner cooperated fully with the State Attorney's Office. At the time of her conviction, Petitioner was licensed by Respondent as a real estate salesperson. Less than a month after her plea of nolo contendere to the grand theft charge and sentence, in June 1991 Petitioner notified Respondent of her conviction and sentence in accordance with statutory provisions regulating the practice of her profession as a licensed real estate salesperson. No evidence of any other conviction was presented. Subsequently, on or about October 30, 1991, an administrative complaint was filed by Respondent against Petitioner based upon her conviction. Petitioner admitted the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. She saw no need to deny the allegations, since she had reported the incident to Respondent. To Petitioner's shock and surprise, in a Final Order dated February 14, 1992, Petitioner's license as a real estate salesperson was revoked by Respondent. Petitioner had been licensed for 13 years without a complaint being filed against her. On February 13, 1992, Petitioner's probationary terms were modified by the court due to her inability to pay the $19,864.52 restitution. The modification included, among other things, that Petitioner was only required to pay monthly the restitution to individuals, which totaled $1,700, that the restitution to the City of Miami could be paid through community service at $10.00 per hour for each month that Petitioner was unable to pay, and that probation could be terminated early after 30 months if restitution was paid in full. By March 9, 1993, Petitioner had completed 500 hours of community service in accordance with the original court order, and for compliance with the modified court order, she had completed 235 hours of community service and paid $125.00 restitution to individuals. Prior to her conviction and license revocation, in 1989. Petitioner was employed with a real estate broker at Allied Associates of the South, Inc. (Allied Associates), in Miami Springs, Florida, as a sales associate, and continued in that position until sometime in 1991 when, due to economic constraints on Allied Associates, the broker cut her staff, choosing a more experienced salesperson over Petitioner. During her employment as a sales associate, no complaints were received by Allied Associates against Petitioner, and no money which was entrusted to her was reported missing. Allied Associates received many complimentary remarks from clients and real estate brokers alike. Subsequently, in November 1991, the broker re-employed Petitioner as a sales manager at Allied Associates. Petitioner informed the broker of her conviction and the circumstances of her conviction. The broker has allowed Petitioner to manage the financial books of the business with no problems. And Respondent has audited Allied Associates' financial books without citing a problem. Furthermore, Petitioner has handled escrow deposits and cash without any problems. Since October 1992, Petitioner has been working with Allied Associates as a sales manager on a part-time basis due to financial constraints experienced by Allied Associates. She has continued to handle escrow deposits and cash without any problems. Moreover, the broker/owner of Allied Associates has no hesitation in putting Petitioner in a position of trust. Further, Petitioner has assisted in the guidance of Allied Associates' sales associates.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order allowing Petitioner to take the real estate salesperson's examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of October 1993. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-7368 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact consists of one paragraph with several sentences. 1. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 2, 4, 5, and 7-14; but rejected, regarding the second sentence, as unnecessary to the determination of the issues of this case and rejected, regarding the sixth sentence, as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 1. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 10. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 10. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 11. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9; but rejected, regarding notice and failure of Petitioner to appear at the informal hearing, as unnecessary to the determination of the issues of this case. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 5; but rejected, regarding the first sentence, as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of testimony and rejected, regarding the last sentence which indicates that only Petitioner received and used the monies, as contrary to the evidence present. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 8. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 12-14. Note: Respondent proposed finding of fact is very close to constituting recitation of testimony. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 13. Note: Respondent proposed finding of fact is very close to and constituting recitation of testimony. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Marina P. Cintron 151 Fairway Drive #2301 Miami Springs, Florida 33166 Manuel E. Oliver Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 107 South Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.01475.17475.25
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WILLIAM PETER MOUFLOUZE vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 06-003038 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 18, 2006 Number: 06-003038 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner a real estate broker license.

Findings Of Fact Mr. Mouflouze has held real estate licenses in New Hampshire and Maine for about 28 years. He lives in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which abuts the Maine border. It was because he lives in close proximity to Maine, that he maintained a license there, also. The Commission, pursuant to Chapter 475, regulates real estate brokers and sales associates. The Commission accomplishes this regulation through the Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Mr. Mouflouze currently holds a broker's and salesperson's license in New Hampshire. He has not experienced any disciplinary action in that state. These licenses have an expiration date of April 1, 2008. From 1982 until 2004, Mr. Mouflouze held a designated broker's license in Maine. Prior to February 19, 2004, Mr. Mouflouze failed to complete the required hours of continuing education in Maine, according to the Maine Real Estate Commission (Maine Commission). He disagreed with this conclusion. He attended a hearing before the Maine Commission and after the hearing the Maine Commission ordered him to pay a fine of $900 and to complete six hours of continuing education. Mr. Mouflouze refused to pay the fine or otherwise obey the order. As a result, the Maine Commission had another hearing in his case on August 19, 2004, based on his failure to comply with its order. As a result of that hearing, his designated broker license was revoked effective the date of the hearing. As of the date of the hearing in this case, his license in Maine had not been reinstated. Mr. Mouflouze is a person who is regarded as a highly qualified and ethical real estate broker. He is reputed to be honest and hard-working.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission deny William Peter Mouflouze's application for licensure as a real estate broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Claudel Pressa, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William Peter Mouflouze Bill Mouflouze Real Estate Post Office Box 6541 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802-6541 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.60475.17475.180475.181475.25475.42
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MICHAEL JOSEPH SIKORSKI vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 05-001137 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 28, 2005 Number: 05-001137 Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2006

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny an application for a real estate broker's license on the grounds that the applicant pled nolo contendere to a crime involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), was adjudicated guilty of the crime, and has not been rehabilitated.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate brokers and sales persons in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent has licensed Petitioner as a real estate sales person since July 1, 1996. Petitioner has also been licensed in the state as a mortgage broker since September 1, 1993. On June 25, 2004, Petitioner applied for a license as a real estate broker. On December 1, 2004, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial. The Notice of Denial proposes to deny the license application on specific grounds. The Notice limits the grounds for denial to those included in the following statement: The Florida Real Estate Commission has determined that the Applicant has been adjudicated guilty of crimes relating to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate, and crimes of moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Specifically it has found that the applicant . . . has been convicted of or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere to: Contributing To The Delinquency of A Minor, 2001 During the hearing, Respondent stipulated that it does not seek denial of the application on the grounds that the alleged crimes relate to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or to fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Respondent relies solely on allegations that Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the misdemeanor charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; that the crime involved moral turpitude; and that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and has not been rehabilitated.1 It is undisputed that Petitioner pled nolo contendere in 2001 to a first-degree misdemeanor in the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, Florida, for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The factual allegations in the criminal proceeding were that Petitioner solicited a 13-year-old female (minor female) to pose topless or nude on August 2, 2001, when Petitioner was approximately 38 years old. It is undisputed that the minor female did not pose for Petitioner. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and withheld sentencing. Petitioner paid $353 in costs, served 75 hours of community service, and successfully completed probation of 12 months. The Notice of Denial does not allege that Petitioner actually committed the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Nor does the applicable statute require proof that Petitioner committed the acts alleged in the criminal proceeding as a prerequisite for denial in this proceeding.2 It is legally unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner is guilty of the crime to which he pled nolo contendere. The entry of the plea, by itself, is a sufficient statutory ground for the proposed denial. The plea does not operate statutorily as conclusive evidence that Petitioner committed the crime to which he pled nolo contendere.3 No finding is made in this proceeding that Petitioner either did or did not solicit the minor female. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty, and this Recommended Order refers to the solicitation as the adjudicated solicitation. The threshold factual issue in this proceeding is whether the adjudicated solicitation involved moral turpitude. If so, it must be determined whether there is a rational connection between the moral turpitude and Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. If the requisite connection exists, it must be determined whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated and is not a "danger to the public." The adjudicated solicitation involved an act of moral turpitude. Solicitation of a 13-year-old female to pose topless or nude was a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct acceptable in the community, violated the duties owed to society, and was an inherently base or depraved act.4 The base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation did not arise from a desire for monetary gain, as the motive typically is in other crimes, such as grand theft or the intent to sell controlled substances, that have been held to involve moral turpitude.5 Rather, the base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation arose from an attempt to coerce the involuntary compliance of a minor female by exploiting her vulnerability; exploiting a financial relationship over which Petitioner enjoyed financial control; and exploiting a quasi- familial relationship in which Petitioner was imbued with the advantage of an authority figure.6 A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such conduct would encourage delinquency and that disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from an appropriate standard of conduct. At age 13, the minor female was nowhere near the 18 years of age required for legal majority. That vulnerability was accentuated during the adjudicated solicitation by Petitioner's age of 38. The minor female was also financially dependent on Petitioner for income as the family babysitter. Petitioner enjoyed the advantage of financial control of that relationship and possessed the power to terminate the relationship. Petitioner also enjoyed the benefit of an authority figure in a quasi-familial relationship. The minor female is the daughter of the brother of Petitioner's wife. The minor female is not legally the niece of Petitioner because the brother never married the mother of the minor female. The minor female is also a long-time friend of Petitioner's daughter. There is no direct evidence of actual intent to exploit the vulnerability of the minor female and any existing relationship. However, Petitioner should have known that the minor female was in a position of vulnerability and that the adjudicated solicitation necessarily exploited her vulnerability and the advantages he enjoyed in their relationship. A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the solicitation would tend to cause or encourage delinquency. The risk was of such a nature and degree that Petitioner's adjudicated disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the appropriate standard of conduct.7 The moral turpitude evidenced by the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 is not rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to engage in the real estate business. Respondent admits that the adjudicated solicitation is not related to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate and does not involve fraudulent or dishonest dealing. It is undisputed that the adjudicated solicitation did not impugn Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. From July 1, 1996, through the date of hearing, Petitioner has functioned as a licensed real estate sales person with no harm to the public before or after the adjudicated solicitation. Petitioner disclosed the adjudicated solicitation to Respondent sometime after June 25, 2004. Respondent did not prevent Petitioner from engaging in the real estate business as a sales person. Respondent cited no evidence or authority to support a finding or conclusion that the misdemeanor disqualifies Petitioner from performing the functions of a real estate broker, but does not disqualify Petitioner from performing the duties and responsibilities of a real estate sales person. As a mortgage broker, Petitioner maintains trust accounts and transfers client deposits to third parties, including surveyors and credit reporting agencies. The absence of a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice real estate imbues the allegation of moral turpitude with the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the license application.8 The potential for selective enforcement should be avoided. The issue of whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated is moot in the absence of a rational connection between an act of moral turpitude and the fitness to engage in the real estate business. If it were determined that a rational connection existed between the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 and the fitness of Petitioner to engage in the real estate business, Petitioner has been rehabilitated.9 Petitioner paid the required court costs, served the community service, and completed his probation. Petitioner is a father of three children, has been married for more than 16 years, is a licensed real estate sales person, a licensed mortgage broker, and has not exhibited a pattern or practice of violations before or after the incident on August 2, 2001. Rather, the incident in 2001 stands alone as the only blemish on an otherwise flawless professional record as a real estate agent and a mortgage broker. The issuance of a broker's license to Petitioner does not frustrate legislative intent. The issuance of a license does not expose the public to a dishonest real estate broker that engages in fraudulent practices. The crime for which Petitioner was adjudicated guilty does not impugn the honesty of Petitioner or his ability to deal fairly with the public in the real estate business.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2005. 1/ Transcript at pages 44-45. 2/ The last sentence in Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), states that the court record of conviction is prima facie evidence of guilt. However, the statutory language preceding the last sentence does not expressly require proof of guilt as a prerequisite for denial. The last sentence appears to be a vestige from former statutory language that required a plea of nolo contendere to be treated as a conviction. The legislature deleted the former statutory language from the current statute, but, so far, has not deleted the remaining vestige of the former statute. The issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. If proof of guilt were a statutory prerequisite for denial, evidence Petitioner submitted to overcome the prima facie showing of guilt or to mitigate the prima facie showing of guilt is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The relevant evidence consists of Petitioner's own testimony and hearsay statements that the testimony attributes to the minor female, members of her family, and others. The hearsay did not supplement or explain competent and substantial evidence within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). 3/ Cf. McNair v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, 518 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(plea is not statutorily evaluated as conclusive evidence of the commission of wrongdoing but is, by itself, statutorily sufficient for disciplinary action). This issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 4/ Neither party cited an applicable statute or rule that defines moral turpitude. Judicial decisions generally hold that moral turpitude involves: . . . the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. (citations omitted) It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. . . . State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth et al., 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, 611 (Fla. 1933). 5/ Judicial decisions finding moral turpitude in the exploitation of others for monetary gain are discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 6/ Judicial decisions discussing exploitation of vulnerable persons in professional relationships are discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 7/ Culpable knowledge is an element in the judicial definition of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v. Shamrani, 370 So. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (Fla. 1979); Kito v. State, 888 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 8/ By analogy, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a rational connection to an applicant's fitness to practice law must be applied to the requirement for good moral character or the requirement could become "a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law." Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458-459 (Fla. 1978). 9/ Counsel for Respondent questioned Petitioner in an unsuccessful attempt to show that Petitioner currently lacks veracity and is therefore dishonest. Counsel stipulated that the grounds for denial do not include dishonesty or fraudulent practices. The attempt to show current dishonesty is relevant only to the issue of rehabilitation. See Transcript at pages 36-51. 10/ The agency action in McNair was mandatory but is discretionary in this proceeding. The substantially affected party in McNair pled nolo contendere to a felony while Petitioner entered a similar plea to a misdemeanor. However, those factual distinctions are not material to the absence in the applicable statute of the former statutory infirmity that spawned the requirement of proof of guilt in Ayala and Son. 11/ Unlike the facts in the instant case, the holding in some of the cited cases are arguably ambiguous in that the allegations recite all of the grounds in the applicable statute, and it is not clear in every case whether the decision is restricted to allegations of moral turpitude. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Guy Sanchez, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs GLORIA CORSORO AND ORANGE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 95-000334 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Jan. 27, 1995 Number: 95-000334 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro, has been a licensed real estate broker. She is the qualifying broker for the company known as Orange Management Corp. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating real estate licensees in the State of Florida. On or about July 20, 1994, the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of unlawful use of a notary. As a result, the Respondent was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation for a period of six months, and required to make payments and serve community service as directed by the court order. The plea and conviction stemmed from Respondent's conduct in connection with a warranty deed (the deed) which was recorded in the public record for Indian River County, Florida, on October 12, 1993. The deed conveyed a condominium unit from Leon R. Leavitt to the G. Corsoro Family Trust. The deed, notarized on October 1, 1989, purportedly bore the signatures of Leon R. Leavitt, the grantor; Mamie Cellura, a witness; Marie Copley, a witness; and Joseph Cellura, the notary before whom the document was executed. In fact, the document was not signed by Marie Copley or Leon R. Leavitt. At the time of the hearing, Mamie Cellura and Joseph Cellura were deceased. They were the parents of Marie Copley and her sister, the Respondent. At the time the deed was executed, Respondent signed Mr. Leavitt's name under a power of attorney he had reportedly given to her. Respondent further claims that Mamie Cellura signed for herself as a witness, signed for Marie Copley as a witness, and signed her husband's name with him (he had Parkinson's disease) as the notary. All this was completed, according to Respondent, Marie Copley, and Leon R. Leavitt, with everyone's full consent and knowledge. Marie Copley and Leon R. Leavitt were not present when the document was executed. Since they claim Respondent was authorized to execute the document, they are not concerned as to who signed the document but believe Mamie Cellura and Respondent signed as represented by Respondent. According to Nicholas Burczyk, the Respondent signed the document for all signatories on the instrument. Even by Respondent's account, the named parties did not execute the deed as presented on the face of the document. Respondent was originally charged with uttering a forged instrument and forgery. She chose to enter the plea as to the misdemeanor charge of unlawful use of a notary because she was "financially unable to pay to go to trial."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, through the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order determining the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro violated Section 475.25(f), Florida Statutes, and imposing a reprimand together with an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0334 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is accepted as stated in findings of fact paragraphs 6 through 14 above; otherwise rejected as incomplete statement of fact. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. Respondent's assessment of the charges against Respondent together with the argument has been considered in the preparation of the foregoing. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Michael F. Berry MICHAEL F. BERRY, P.A. 2145-15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960

Florida Laws (2) 475.25475.42 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JOHN L. NUCCITELLI, 81-002591 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002591 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1983

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, John L. Nuccitelli, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued License Number 0064764, and he was so licensed at all times material to the issue in this proceeding. On August 20, 1979, an arrest warrant was issued in Lancaster County, South Carolina, directing that the Respondent be arrested on the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in that he flew into the Lancaster County Airport in a Douglas DC4 four engine aircraft with approximately 131 bales of marijuana. The Respondent was subsequently indicted for this offense, and on December 4, 1979, he was found guilty in the Court of General Sessions in and for Lancaster County, South Carolina, of the crime as charged. Thereafter, the Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years, and a fine of $5,000, with the provision that the prison term would be reduced to probation for five years upon payment of the $5,000 fine. On July 29, 1982, the Respondent having paid the fine imposed and having fulfilled the conditions of his probation, the Court entered its Order relieving the Respondent from the sentence previously imposed, and discharging him from further probation. The Respondent had not been involved with the law prior to the incident in question, and has not been so involved since this incident. He realizes that he made a serious mistake, one which has adversely affected both himself and his family. He is the sole support of his wife and five children, and he has only done work in the real estate field since leaving the Air Force. The Respondent and his wife have been married eight years. They have two children of their own, and three children by a prior marriage. The Respondent is a caring husband and father. He is trusted by those persons in the community who know him.

Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that License No. 0064764 held by the Respondent, John L. Nuccitelli, be REVOKED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 1st day of November, 1982. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Richard J.R. Parkinson, Esquire 603 East Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32801 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MARLENE MONTENEGRO TOIRAC AND HOME CENTER INTERNATIONAL CORP., 05-001654 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 09, 2005 Number: 05-001654 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2019

The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are: (1) whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed within a reasonable time to satisfy a civil judgment relating to a real estate commission; (2) whether Respondents failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; and (3) whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them, if Petitioner proves one or more of the violations charged in its Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Veloso Judgment Toirac and Elena Veloso ("Veloso") did business together and wound up as opponents in court. Veloso got the better of Toirac, obtaining, on June 5, 2001, a judgment in the amount of $4,437.60 against her and HCIC from the Dade County Court. The judgment liquidated a real estate commission that Veloso claimed the defendants owed her. On June 12, 2001, Toirac filed a Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment, wherein she asked the county court to (a) vacate its judgment in favor of Veloso, on the ground that the defendants had not been served with process and (b) consolidate Veloso's county-court proceeding with an action then pending in circuit court, which Toirac had brought against Veloso.1 As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac's motion, after four years, had not been heard or decided. As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac had not satisfied the judgment in favor of Veloso. The Escrow Account Shortfall On January 24, 2002, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt, on or about June 20, 2001, of a complaint from Veloso.) Pursuant to the audit, Ms. Morales determined that the balance in Toirac's escrow account was $4,961.05. Ms. Morales determined further that Toirac's trust liability, i.e. the total amount of money that she should have been holding in escrow on her clients' behalf, was $12,242.00. Thus, there existed a shortfall of $7,280.95 in Toirac's escrow account. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to explain the shortfall. A few weeks later, however, by letter dated February 13, 2002, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that the shortfall had been caused by the issuance, "in error," of a check in the amount of $7,345.00, which was drawn on HCIC's escrow account and payable (evidently) to HCIC; HCIC had deposited the funds into its operating account, thereby creating, according to Toirac, an "overage" of $7,345.00 in the latter. To correct the problem, Toirac had arranged for the transfer of $7,345.00 from HCIC's operating account to its escrow account, which was accomplished on or about February 1, 2002. The Charges In counts I and IV, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.2 Petitioner's position is that Respondents failed within a reasonable time to satisfy the county-court judgment in favor of Veloso. In counts III and V, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that the escrow account shortfall identified on January 24, 2002, is proof that funds held in escrow had been disbursed without proper authorization. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no dispute (for Toirac admitted at final hearing) that the judgment debt owed by Respondents to Veloso relates to a real estate commission. It is also undisputed that, as of the final hearing, the county-court judgment had not been satisfied. The undersigned determines that Respondents have failed to satisfy the civil judgment in Veloso's favor within a reasonable time.3 Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.4 It is determined that the erroneous transfer, via check, of funds from HCIC's escrow account to its operating account constituted an unauthorized disbursement of funds entrusted to Toirac by others who had dealt with her as a broker. While this might have resulted from the simple mistake of an incompetent bookkeeper, as Toirac maintains, nevertheless the disbursement was unauthorized and substantial——amounting to approximately 60 percent of Toirac's total trust liability. Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has established the charges set forth in counts I, III, IV, and V of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents guilty as charged in counts I, III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint; (b) suspends Respondents' respective real estate licenses for 90 days; and (c) imposes an administrative fine of $2,500 against Respondents, jointly and severally; and (d) places Respondents on probation for a period of at least 3 years, subject to such lawful conditions as the Commission may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68475.25961.05
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