The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful employment practice based on sex.
Findings Of Fact Since November 2006, Petitioner, Michael J. Pappas, was a male employee of Respondent, Bay County School Board. Initially, he was employed as a part-time substitute teacher at Patronis Elementary School (Patronis). Patronis has an “A” ranking under Florida’s school accountability program and was ranked as a Top 100 School in 2005. Eventually, Petitioner became a full-time para-professional (aide) assigned to work exclusively with an autistic child enrolled at the school. Ellie Spivey (female), the principal at Patronis, recommended Petitioner for the full-time position. Petitioner was hired under an annual contract. In addition to his employment with Respondent, Petitioner served as Captain of a Dolphin tour boat he operated out of Panama City. In his para-professional position, Petitioner worked with Art Beakley (male) and Mary Martin (female). Both were third grade teachers at Patronis. Mr. Beakley was Petitioner’s direct supervisor and, like Petitioner, had been recommended for his teaching position by Ellie Spivey. Petitioner’s performance as a para-professional was mixed. At best, both teachers indicated Petitioner’s performance was adequate, when he was present at the school. Often Petitioner was absent from school or left school early to go on dolphin tours. Petitioner often did not notify either teacher that he would be absent. Petitioner told Mr. Beakley that he could make more money as a boat captain on the dolphin tours. On the days Petitioner was absent, the autistic student’s mother would act as his caretaker during the day. Eventually, both teachers complained to the principal about Petitioner’s absences from school. The principal did not discipline Petitioner because the absences were taken on allowable personal leave days. However, Petitioner’s clear preference for working the dolphin tours as opposed to working at the school did not reflect well on his dedication or enthusiasm for a career at the school. Brooke Loyed, an Assistant Principal at Patronis, evaluated Petitioner’s employment based on her observations of Petitioner. She was unaware of Mr. Beakley’s and Ms. Martin’s complaints regarding Petitioner’s absences. On April 3, 2007, Petitioner received a good evaluation with no problems noted. However, funding for Petitioner’s para-professional position was not available for the next school term. In mid-to- late April 2007, Petitioner was advised his contract would not be renewed. That same month, after learning of the non-renewal, Petitioner asked Mr. Beakley and Ms. Martin for a letter of recommendation. Mr. Beakley reluctantly agreed to give Petitioner a letter of recommendation and drafted a letter highlighting Petitioner’s good-qualities. The letter did not mention Petitioner’s absences and lack of enthusiasm. Initially, Ms. Martin refused to sign the letter by making excuses about why she had not signed the letter drafted by Mr. Beakley. However, she finally signed the letter so that Petitioner would stop asking her to do so. Ms. Martin now regrets that she signed the letter. In May 2007, Ms. Spivey was developing classes and personnel pairings for the next school term. She asked Kara Powell, a teacher at Patronis, if she was willing to work with a full-time para-professional in her classroom. Ms. Spivey did not indicate to Ms. Powell who the para-professional would be. Ms. Powell was not aware that Petitioner’s contract would not be renewed for the next term. Ms. Powell told Ms. Spivey that she would not be interested in working with a para-professional in her classroom if that person was Petitioner. Ms. Powell told Ms. Spivey that Petitioner made her uncomfortable because he would sit very close to her in the lunchroom and that he sometimes made comments she did not care for. She also told Ms. Spivey that Petitioner had once invited her and some other female teachers to go on a dolphin tour in their bathing suits without their husbands. Ms. Powell felt the invitation was inappropriate and made for sexual purposes. The evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner invited the teachers to go on a dolphin tour for inappropriate reasons. From Petitioner’s point of view, the invitation was made to a group of teachers sitting as a group in the cafeteria during a light-hearted conversation at the table. He invited his co-workers because he thought they might enjoy going on a dolphin tour. He limited the invitation to his co-workers because his boat was not big enough to take spouses or boyfriends. On the other hand, other teachers confirmed Ms. Powell’s story, and also indicated that Mr. Powell made them feel uncomfortable. Since the school year was through and Petitioner’s contract was not going to be renewed, Ms. Spivey did not investigate further and did not take any formal action against Petitioner regarding the reports of these teachers. Eventually, due to the lack of funds, Petitioner’s contract expired and was not renewed. There was no evidence that demonstrated the non-renewal of Petitioner’s contract was based on Petitioner’s gender. In the summer of 2007, Patronis had several open teaching positions. Respondent advertised the positions for 5 days. Eventually, the District Office developed an applicant list for Patronis and forwarded it to the school. There were over 90 applicants on the list, of which almost 95 percent were female. A minimum of five applicants was required to be interviewed by the school with the same questions and scoring form used for each candidate. In June and July 2007, interviews for the open teaching positions were held at Patronis. Ms. Spivey and Ms. Loyed selected Petitioner for an interview. Other candidates were Sarah Patterson, Jessica Kelley, Debra Holbrook, Kim Rogers, Sasha Aufschieider and Jana Jackins. Petitioner did not have a good interview and did not promote himself or his qualifications during the interview. He was not particularly enthusiastic or upbeat about teaching. Other than his application, Petitioner did not bring any letters of recommendation or updated resume to the interview. He did not provide the Bleakley letter discussed earlier. He did not discuss current teaching methods or techniques even though the interview questions provided him an opportunity to do so. Importantly, Petitioner did not appear to be current with those methods. From his application, it was clear that he had received his teaching degree over 20 years ago and had had no full-time classroom teaching experience since that time. Petitioner refused to be considered for a special education teaching position. The refusal did not reflect well on his dedication or enthusiasm for teaching. Petitioner also had no “English as a second language (ESOL)” experience or certification. ESOL certification is a desirable skill for teachers today. Because of the poor interview and given the recent allegations that he made other teachers uncomfortable, Petitioner was not offered any of the open positions at Patronis. The evidence did not demonstrate that the reasons for not hiring Petitioner were invalid or a pretext to mask discriminatory action. The successful applicants for the open positions at Patronis were Sarah Patterson, Jessica Kelley, Debra Holbrook, Kim Rogers, Sasha Aufschieider and Jana Jackins. All of the candidates hired for the open positions were female. However, that fact alone is not demonstrative of discrimination given the fact that the applicant pool was almost 95 percent female. The evidence demonstrated that all of these candidates were more qualified for the open teaching positions than Petitioner. All of the applicants had better interviews. All showed more enthusiasm and dedication to teaching. All demonstrated that they had knowledge of the latest teaching methods and techniques. Finally, all scored higher in the interview. Kim Rogers had three years of teaching experience at a Title I school. Her Title I experience was a good indication that she had experience in teaching at-risk children. Sarah Patterson had a year of classroom experience and ESOL certification. She also was known to be a very hard worker at school. Jessica Kelley and Debra Holbrook were new teachers who had recently completed their teaching internship at Patronis. Both were current in the latest teaching methods and techniques and had demonstrated such during the interview. Both were highly thought of by their teaching peers. Sasha Aufschieider was ESOL-certified. She also was highly recommended by her peers. Likewise, Jana Jackins was highly recommended by her teaching peers. When Petitioner discovered that he would not be offered a position, he complained to Dr. Richardson at the District Office. At the time, he did not indicate that he thought he had been discriminated against based on his sex. Instead, he indicated that he thought he had been promised a position. Dr. Richardson determined that the District hiring policies had been followed. She offered to help Petitioner and contacted the principals at Cedar Grove Elementary School, a Title I school, and Surfside Middle School. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner interviewed at Cedar Grove Elementary for a position involving remediation of students who failed the FCAT. The school and the position required an enthusiastic and motivated person who could work with high-risk, failing students. The interview was conducted by the principal, Billy May (male). Petitioner performed adequately in his interview with Mr. May. Petitioner was not selected for the position. The successful candidate, Heather Six (female), was more qualified for the position. She scored higher and had ESOL certification. Indeed, there was no evidence that demonstrated Petitioner was discriminated against based on his sex when he was not hired for the Cedar Grove position. Similarly, Petitioner was not hired for the position at Surfside Middle School. The interview was conducted by the principal, Sue Harrell (female). Petitioner again did adequately in the interview. The successful candidate for the position was Kenneth Stem (male). As with Cedar Grove, there was no evidence of discrimination or pretext in the hiring of Mr. Stem over Petitioner and the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Pappas 6208 North Lagoon Drive Panama City Beach, Florida 32408 Robert C. Jackson, Esquire Harrison, Sale, McCloy, Duncan & Jackson, Chtd. 304 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Drawer 1579 Panama City, Florida 33402-1579
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination in employment based on age, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on December 11, 1951. She was employed by Respondent from 1977 until December 27, 1999, at which time Respondent terminated her. During the entire term of her employment, Petitioner has served as an outside sales representative. As an outside sales representative, Petitioner was typically assigned a territory within which she was to serve existing advertisers and develop new advertisers. Petitioner often helped customers prepare their advertisements and plan and budget their advertising campaigns. While employed with Respondent, Petitioner helped train Mr. Fine, who has been employed with Respondent for nearly 13 years. Mr. Fine is currently the National Advertising Director, but, during the time in question, served as the Broward Advertising Sales Manager, and, as such, he supervised Petitioner. He served as the Broward Advertising Sales Manager from September 1998 through February or March 2000. While Broward Advertising Sales Manager, Mr. Fine supervised eight sales representatives. Mr. Fine found that Petitioner was strong in persuasiveness, but weak at times when she displayed a negative attitude and sense of entitlement to her job and her way of doing her job. She also treated customers inconsistently. In February 1999, Mr. Fine disciplined Petitioner for her handling of an internal fax that the Broward office received from an employee of Respondent in another office. The fax was addressed to a member of management and contained salary information about five persons in the office. Petitioner happened to find the fax and revealed its contents to her coworkers before delivering it to the addressee. When Mr. Fine reprimanded Petitioner for her actions, she denied any wrongdoing. Next, Mr. Fine began receiving complaints from various of Petitioner's customers, mostly over a relatively short period of time. A marketing person at the Swap Shop complained that Petitioner was brusque in dealing with her. Another customer representative mentioned that Petitioner had criticized one of her coworkers in suggesting that the customer place all of its business with Petitioner. A similar situation arose with another customer, to whom Petitioner claimed that its outside sales representative handled only smaller accounts. A representative of the Florida Philharmonic Orchestra requested that Mr. Fine assign it a new outside sales representative because Petitioner raised her voice and talked down to its young, inexperienced marketing person. On June 29, 1999, Mr. Fine sent a memorandum to his supervisor, Donna Sasser, who was then Advertising Director. The memorandum describes Petitioner as "dynamite" and expresses concern as to when she "will blow and who she will hurt." At the time, Mr. Fine was concerned that Petitioner's actions might undermine morale among the other staff for whom he was responsible. Ms. Sasser advised Mr. Fine to communicate to Petitioner specific expectations in terms of job performance and customer interaction in particular. Mr. Fine met with Petitioner and detailed his problems with her job performance and his expectations for improvement. By memorandum dated July 30, 1999, Mr. Fine memorialized the meeting, including specific customer complaints, and warned that Petitioner's job "will end, even within the next few weeks, if you are unable to achieve the following: no additional customer complaints, monthly goals [met] on a consistent basis; positive, collaborative attitude with co-workers, customers, and managers; [and] acceptance of responsibility for what goes well and what does not go well." Petitioner resisted Mr. Fine's criticism. By memorandum dated August 22, 1999, she defended her actions by pointing to shortcomings elsewhere within Respondent. Significantly, the memorandum does not address the complaints about brusque, discourteous treatment of employees of customers. At this point, Mr. Fine, who was a young manager, was legitimately concerned about whether Petitioner's attitude would undermine his ability to do his job. Mr. Fine resolved to assess over the next three to six months whether Petitioner met the goals that he stated in the July 30 memorandum. In late October 1999, a representative of the Cleveland Clinic complained about Petitioner's handling of its account. The complaints included Petitioner's "flip attitude" and "lack of professionalism." Two months later, Mr. Fine received a more serious complaint because it involved a loss of revenue to Respondent and the advertiser. Due to some miscommunication, Respondent published the wrong advertisement for a customer. When the customer's representative telephoned Petitioner and complained, she blamed someone at the Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, who had supplied her the wrong advertisement for publication. When she did not call him back on the day that she had promised, the customer representative called Respondent, complained about the poor handling of the account, noted the reduction in advertising from his company over the past year as compared to the prior year, and requested a different outside sales representative. Mr. Fine consulted with Ms. Sasser and Janet Stone, the Human Relations specialist assigned to advertising. The three agreed that Respondent should terminate Petitioner. Their decision was submitted through four levels of management--up to the level of Publisher--and each level approved the decision before it was implemented. On December 27, 1999--six days after the receipt of the last complaint--Mr. Fine and Ms. Stone met with Petitioner and told her that she had been terminated. At the hearing, Petitioner presented evidence of a contemporaneous complaint about age discrimination that she had made to a Human Relations specialist who had since left the employment of Respondent. Respondent contested this assertion, but Petitioner's August 22 memorandum states that, as a "female over 40 I feel the harassment and stress that you have been putting on me is totally unnecessary." Although not a formal complaint concerning age discrimination, this memorandum is an early mention of Petitioner's age within the context of harassment. Based on the testimony of coworkers, Mr. Fine was a high-pressure manager, given to yelling, but he did not make age-related comments to Petitioner. Even if Petitioner had timely made comprehensive complaints about age discrimination, the record in this case does not support her claim that her termination was due to age discrimination. Mr. Fine hired two outside sales representatives over 40 years old, and the only other outside sales representative whom he fired was under 40 years old. More importantly, he treated employees the same without regard to age. Most importantly, Petitioner's job performance provided Mr. Fine with ample reason to fire her. Without regard to the quality of the support that Petitioner received, customer satisfaction is paramount in advertising. In a competitive environment, Mr. Fine justifiably sought satisfaction of all customers, not just favored customers. Mr. Fine could not reasonably allow Petitioner to continue to treat discourteously representatives of advertisers, regardless of the merits of her claims of inadequate support. Past evaluations suggest that interpersonal relations was never Petitioner's strength. Despite an obvious talent at advertising sales and considerable experience, Petitioner's frustrations with the perceived incompetence of her coworkers and customers' employees weakened her interpersonal skills beyond a critical point, so that her other strengths no longer offset this important deficit.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jan Hall-Szugye 3834 Panther Creek Road Clyde, North Carolina 28721 Ellen M. Leibovitch Adorno & Yoss, P.A. 700 South Federal Highway, Suite 200 Boca Raton, Florida 33432
The Issue Whether the Duval County School Board (Board) may terminate Respondent, Cleveland F. William, Jr.'s, employment as a teacher based upon incompetence under the Duval Country Teachers Tenure Act (the Act). This issue is dependent upon whether the Board showed Respondent to be incompetent and whether the Board complied with the procedural requirements of the Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first assigned to Fort Caroline Middle School during the academic year 2000-2001 to teach 6th grade science. Kathy Kassees was the principal at Fort Caroline Middle School during that school year. Respondent's brother was extremely ill and died during the school year. Respondent's performance evaluation for that school year was less than satisfactory. See Exhibit 2, 2000-2001 Performance Evaluation. Respondent concedes that his performance in 2000-2001 was less than satisfactory. See paragraph 56 of Respondent's Post-hearing Brief. When a tenured teacher in the Duval County system has a performance evaluation of less than satisfactory, the teacher may elect to transfer to another school, and Respondent exercised that option for the school year 2001-2002. Respondent was moved to Stillwell where he was assigned to teach 7th grade science. In addition, he was assigned for the first time to teach inclusion classes. Inclusion classes are made up of students who are exceptional education students who may have various exceptionalities. These exceptionalities may include disabilities such as deafness, emotional and behavioral problems, and developmental disabilities. Behavioral problems may include students diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity. Stillwell utilizes a program of instruction called the America's Choice Plan (ACP). The ACP is a comprehensive educational program which covers all aspects of instruction, organization of the classroom, and display of student materials in the classroom. ACP has its own vocabulary of terms to describe activities and things. For example, "artifacts" refers to student work and other materials posted in the classroom. It is expected that "artifacts" will be posted and changed periodically. Weekly meetings to discuss the system are called "Tending the Garden" meetings. ACP had been used at Stillwell previously and the returning faculty were familiar with it. Respondent had never worked with ACP before. Ms. Kassees had prepared a Success Plan for Respondent after he received his unsatisfactory evaluation to help him improve his deficiencies. Respondent took this plan with him to Stillwell, but the plan did not address ACP or inclusion classes. Mr. Marjenhoff, the principal at Stillwell, met with Respondent and discussed Marjenhoff's expectation of Respondent. They did not discuss any special requirements or changes necessitated by ACP or inclusion classes. Petitioner was unable to establish that it had prepared and delivered a new Success Plan to Petitioner at Stillwell. After his poor evaluation in February of 2002, Respondent asked Mr. Marjenhoff for a copy of the Success Plan and one was produced which was signed by Mr. Marjenhoff and dated August 6, 2001, and by Respondent on March 27, 2002. See Exhibit 13. Respondent did attend various ACP, "Tending the Garden" in-service educational classes presented by Dianne Rahn; Urban Systemic Initiative (USI) seminars presented by Rose Curry; and classes presented by his department head, Margarita Arroyo. His attendance and punctuality at these meetings was on par with his peers. The first indication of evaluative inspections came in a November 28, 2001, memo to Respondent from Marjenhoff stating that Dianne Dunn, a cadre member, would be contacting him about setting up a classroom visit. She did not conduct a visit until January 28, 2002. See Exhibit 11 and attachments. The annual evaluation of faculty occurs in February. Petitioner concedes that other than the cadre work by Dunn and some instruction on USI by Curry, little was done by way of individualized in-service training to address Respondent's shortcomings. Respondent was not afforded much in the way of unique, individualized oral counseling or critiques of his performance during the first part of the school year. See paragraphs 21 and 22 of Petitioner's Post-hearing Brief. A review of Curry's visits reflects she met with Respondent approximately once each month for a rough average of an hour, with the exception of the first meeting which was four hours. Curry's logs do not reflect the corrective actions taken with regard to Respondent's teaching. This hardly constitutes an accelerated effort to improve Respondents performance. See Exhibit 21. The dates of the various class visits and evaluations by Marjenhoff are in February and March. See Exhibits 12, 18 and 19. A review of the records of the in-class visits and commentaries by the observers reveal that too many general recommendations were made rather than specific, concrete changes to implement. For example, Darrell Perry visited Respondent's class and was concerned about its physical organization, i.e., where the television was located, the direction in which the seats were oriented, and where Respondent's desks was located. This was written up in March, which was late in the year to raise these issues, and Perry did not suggest or volunteer to help Respondent alter the room to meet Perry's expectations. Also see Exhibit 11 and attachments. In sum, there was too much jargon and too little performance-oriented, hands-on correction of Respondent. Memoranda relating to Respondent's performance all seem to be dated after January 2002. See Exhibits 16 and 17. The corrections that were made came too late to have a meaningful impact upon the improvement of Respondent's teaching performance.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board provide Respondent another year in which timely and appropriate in-service training is provided to correct his deficiencies in teaching. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Hertz, Esquire Duval Teachers United 1601 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Michael B. Wedner, Esquire City of Jacksonville 117 West Duval Street, Suite 480 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 John C. Fryer, Jr., Superintendent Duval County School Board 1701 Prudential Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8182 Honorable Charlie Crist Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on her disability and by retaliating against her, and if so, what, if any, relief is Petitioner entitled to receive.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Respondent's former employee who began working for Respondent in 1993. Petitioner was most recently assigned to the warehouse in eastern Jacksonville, Florida, where she worked from October 2000 until September 2007. When she first transferred to the warehouse, Petitioner worked as the Return-to-Vendor (“RTV”) Clerk. As the RTV Clerk, Petitioner was responsible for shipping out returned merchandise to vendors and shipping salvaged items to the salvage companies. In 2004, Petitioner transferred to the Receiving Clerk position. Petitioner remained in the Receiving Clerk position until September 19, 2007, when she began a medical leave of absence. Jason Zook became the manager of the warehouse in May 2005. As the Warehouse Manager, Mr. Zook is responsible for overseeing the entire warehouse, including the Receiving Department. Mr. Zook is familiar with the requirements of the Receiving Clerk position because he previously worked in that position at another warehouse. Michael Sinanian is one of the Assistant Warehouse Managers. Mr. Sinanian transferred to the warehouse as an Assistant Warehouse Manager in 2002. Prior to becoming an Assistant Warehouse Manager, Mr. Sinanian worked in the Receiving Department at other warehouses for a little over two and a half years. During that time, Mr. Sinanian worked as a Receiving Manager, a Receiving Supervisor, an RTV Clerk, and a Receiving Clerk. The Receiving Department is located at the back of the warehouse. The warehouse is approximately the length of a football field from front to back. At all times material here, the Receiving Department at the warehouse had four positions: Receiving Manager, Receiving Clerk, Receiving Secretary, and Forklift Driver. In 2007, Deborah Lenox was the Receiving Manager, an employee named Sonya was the Receiving Secretary, Petitioner was the Receiving Clerk, and an employee named Valdean was the Forklift Driver. The Receiving Secretary and the Receiving Clerk have different job responsibilities. The Receiving Secretary is responsible for answering the phone, making vendor appointments, logging the appointments, dealing with paperwork, creating and printing out receiving tags, and logging shipment information into Respondent's computer system. The Receiving Clerk is responsible for counting and checking merchandise against freight bills, opening boxes and cartons with a box knife to verify and count the product, stacking bed-loaded merchandise or merchandise from damaged or unacceptable pallets onto approved pallets, separating mixed items from pallets for checking, wrapping pallets with plastic wrap in preparation for movement onto the warehouse floor, loading merchandise and emptying pallets onto trucks using a manual pallet jack or hand cart, and cleaning and clearing the receiving dock of any debris and trip hazards. Each of these essential job functions requires standing, which is consistent with the job analysis for this position. Respondent has written job analyses, which identify the essential functions of each job and are used to assist the Company, the employee, and the employee’s doctor in determining if the employee can perform the essential functions of his/her job with or without reasonable accommodations. Respondent does not remove or eliminate essential job functions, but will sometimes modify the manner in which the function is to be completed. Respondent will not displace another employee from his position in order to accommodate a disabled employee. A pallet of merchandise can be as much as 60 inches high. A typical pallet coming in the warehouse is a 60-inch cube. An electric pallet jack is a double pallet jack and is approximately 18 feet long. In order to operate an electric pallet jack, an employee has to stand and lean in the direction that she wants the machine to go and turn the handle. There is no seat on an electric pallet jack. Petitioner’s original foot condition was due to osteomyelitis, an infection of the bone. Between 1998 and 1999, Petitioner had four surgeries to address her foot condition. A surgeon placed an artificial plastic bone in Petitioner's foot in July 1999. In September 1999, Petitioner returned to work with medical restrictions that prevented her from standing for long periods of time and from lifting more than 25 or 35 pounds. At some point thereafter, while Petitioner was working at one of Respondent’s warehouses in Memphis, Tennessee, her podiatrist changed her restrictions to add limitations against cashiering, stocking, and inventory. Petitioner understood that the reason for these additional restrictions was that she was not able to do these tasks to the extent they required her to stand for a prolonged period of time. Petitioner’s medical notes stated that she was able to use her discretion as to her limitations, which Petitioner understood to mean that she could sit and rest her foot as needed. Each of these restrictions was permanent. Mr. Zook, Ms. Lenox, and Mr. Sinanian were all aware that Petitioner had medical restrictions relating to her foot condition that prevented her from standing for prolonged periods of time. They were aware that Respondent had agreed to allow Petitioner to sit down when she felt it was necessary, without first having to ask for permission. Despite her restrictions, Petitioner is able to ride her bike, go the grocery store, and work out at the gym. During the relevant time period, Petitioner worked out at the gym approximately four days a week. Her work-out routine included warming up on an elliptical machine for approximately 15-to-20 minutes or walking approximately one mile on the treadmill and using a leg press machine. Respondent performs inventory twice a year. It takes an inventory at all warehouses in February and August. The inventory process begins on Friday night and continues until the following Wednesday. The back-stock is counted on Friday night after closing and the stock on the sales floor is counted on Saturday night after closing. The post- audit process begins on Sunday morning before the warehouse opens to its members and continues on Monday morning. The Saturday night inventory count is more labor- intensive and is considered “all hands on deck.” The Saturday night inventory requires the staff to count approximately $9 million worth of inventory during roughly a five-hour period. On Saturday, Respondent assigns two employees to count the items in each aisle at the same time. The employees double- check each other’s counts. If there is a discrepancy between the employees’ counts, both will recount the items until their counts agree. If there are discrepancies after the Saturday counts between the physical counts and the computer records, the items are recounted during the Sunday post-audit. If variances still remain after the three counts, then the variances are researched during the Monday post-audit. For the Monday post-audit, Respondent only focuses on the larger-quantity, higher-dollar discrepancies. When researching the discrepancies from the variance reports, employees have to perform the following tasks: (a) count items on the floor or up in the steel racks; (b) verify bin tags; (c) research billing, shipment, and return-to-vendor records on Respondent’s computer system; and (d) check the receiving paperwork in an effort to locate and correct the source of the discrepancy. Some items will have been sold between the Saturday night count and the Monday post-audit process. Therefore, the Monday post-audit team also may have to research the sales history on a computer and back out the Sunday sales from the total count. The variance reports reflect the aisle where the item is located, the item count from the inventory count, the computer system count, and the amount of the variance. Employees are typically assigned to work in one department of the warehouse, which may require them to walk from aisle to aisle within that department. In order to assist the Monday post-audit team, the team is permitted to use computers throughout the warehouse. Employees can sit down at the computers when they are researching the variances in item counts. It can take anywhere from 15-to-30 minutes to research one item. The duties involved in the inventory post-audit process are similar to the job duties of the Receiving Clerk position. However, the post-audit does not require as much standing and is less physically demanding because the focus during post-audit is on researching the sources of the variances, rather than simply receiving, counting, and checking- in shipments. In selecting employees to work on the Monday post- audit team, Respondent prefers to schedule people who are familiar with Respondent’s return-to-vendor and receiving processes. Respondent also selects employees who are knowledgeable about Respondent’s AS-400 computer system. In February 2007, Petitioner worked the Saturday night inventory. During that time, she counted the bread then worked at the control desk. Petitioner's job at the control desk was to key-in inventory count sheets into Respondent’s computer system. Petitioner did not view this assignment as inconsistent with her restrictions against working inventory because she was seated for most of the time. In August 2007, Mr. Sinanian was responsible for the post-audit processes, including the scheduling of employees to work post-audit. Due to the requirements of post-audit, Mr. Sinanian selected people who, like Petitioner, were familiar with Respondent’s AS-400 computer system. Approximately 20 employees worked during the Monday post-audit. Mr. Sinanian and Ms. Lenox knew that Petitioner could use her discretion to sit down whenever she felt it was necessary. They had no reason to believe that the post-audit process was inconsistent with Petitioner’s medical restrictions. Therefore, she was selected to work the Monday post-audit. On Saturday, August 25, 2007, Petitioner was again assigned to count bread and then assist with keying inventory count sheets into the system. Petitioner was able to sit down while she was working at the control desk keying the inventory count sheets. Petitioner did not consider her Saturday assignments inconsistent with her restrictions. Petitioner did not work or perform any inventory or post-audit, inventory-related duties on Sunday, August 26, 2007. On Monday, August 27, 2007, the post-audit process lasted from approximately 5:00 a.m. until 10:00 a.m. Petitioner’s shift began at 5:00 a.m. After Petitioner clocked in, she reported to the control desk, where Mr. Sinanian assigned her to check variances for approximately 6 items in Department 14, the sundries department. The sundries department runs along the back right side of the building near the Receiving Department. The sundries department includes items like paper towels, cleaning chemicals, laundry detergent, water, juice, and soda. Petitioner was assigned to research variances between the physical counts and the computer system’s counts for Swiffers, dog bones, dog beds, water, soda, and paper towels. During the August 2007 post-audit process there were at least 18 computers for the employees to use. The computers were located in the Receiving Department, the front office, at the membership desk, and at the podium on the front-end. Employees were free to use any available computer and were able to sit down at most of the computers while researching items. Petitioner never had to wait to use a computer. Petitioner went to whichever computer was closest to her at the time to verify items. After she finished researching all of the items on her variance sheet, Petitioner, like all of the other employees who worked post-audit, met with Mr. Sinanian at the control desk at the front of the store to explain her findings. There was a chair at the control desk for Petitioner to sit in while meeting with Sinanian. The process of meeting with Mr. Sinanian took anywhere from 10-to-30 minutes. Other than discussing her assignment for the day and the post-audit research results, Mr. Sinanian did not have any other discussions with Petitioner on August 27, 2007. Petitioner was able to use her discretion to sit down during post-audit. She was never told that she could not sit down nor was she reprimanded for sitting down. Petitioner admits that she used her discretion to sit down at least twice during post-audit and to kneel down a couple of times. Petitioner also took a 15-minute break during the post-audit process, during which she sat down. After Petitioner finished working post-audit at approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 27, 2007, she returned to the Receiving Department, but left shortly thereafter to take her lunch break. Petitioner’s lunch break lasted for approximately a half-hour. Petitioner walked from the back of the warehouse, where the Receiving Department is located, to the front of the warehouse, where the break room is located, to take her lunch and walked all the way back after the end of her break to return to work. After returning from lunch, Petitioner began working on the UPS shipment. It was a busy day in the Receiving Department, as the UPS shipment had arrived with approximately 72 packages stacked on one pallet that was taller than Petitioner. Because Petitioner felt unable to stand, she could not check in the entire UPS shipment. As a result, Petitioner took it upon herself to take the UPS invoices and input the invoices into Respondent’s computer system, which is one of the Receiving Secretary’s job responsibilities. At some point thereafter, Ms. Lenox asked Petitioner why she was logging in items into Respondent’s computer system, rather than receiving the UPS shipment. Petitioner told Ms. Lenox that her foot was hurting and that she could not stand. Ms. Lenox told Petitioner to take her break and, when she returned from break, they would see how Petitioner’s foot was feeling. Petitioner walked to the front of the warehouse, where she took her second 15-minute break in the break room. Petitioner was able to sit with her foot up during her break. After returning from her break, Petitioner reported to the Receiving Department and told Ms. Lenox that she did not feel she could not stand any longer that day. Petitioner asked if there was something she could do other than her receiving duties. Ms. Lenox told Petitioner that if she could not stand, then Ms. Lenox did not have any more work for her and told her that she should go home. Accordingly, Petitioner went home approximately one hour before her shift ended. Petitioner reported to work the following day, Tuesday, August 28, 2007, at 5:00 a.m. and worked her entire shift. At some point after her shift started that day, Petitioner told Mr. Sinanian that Ms. Lenox would not allow her to take a break during post-audit. Petitioner also told Mr. Sinanian that her foot was swollen and hurting. She took off her shoe to show him her foot. Mr. Sinanian did not see anything unusual about Petitioner’s foot. He did not see any swelling, graying, or a red bump. From the conversation with Petitioner, Mr. Sinanian did not understand that her foot was hurting due to a new injury. Therefore, Mr. Sinanian did not fill out an incident report. Petitioner’s and Mr. Sinanian’s conversation lasted approximately two minutes. At some point after speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Sinanian asked Ms. Lenox if, at any point during post-audit, she told Petitioner that Petitioner could not take a break. Ms. Lenox denied Petitioner’s allegation. Mr. Sinanian had no reason to doubt Ms. Lenox. Petitioner continued to work her job as Receiving Clerk after August 28, 2007. She continued to use her discretion to rest her foot on an as-needed basis. When possible she would sit in a chair to work. She used the electric pallet, letting her foot hang off the platform. Petitioner waited three weeks to seek medical treatment from her podiatrist in West Palm Beach, Florida. She finally saw her doctor on Monday, September 17, 2007. At her appointment, Petitioner’s podiatrist gave her a note that stated, “DUE TO ARTHRITIC CONDITION, CYNTHIA IS UNABLE TO STAND FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME AND IT IS MEDICALLY NECESSARY FOR HER TO BE OFF HER FOOT FOR 3 WEEKS. DUE TO THE FLARE UP.” Petitioner understood that her podiatrist wanted her to stay off her foot for a few weeks and to be in a sedentary position during that time. Petitioner also understood that these temporary restrictions were more limiting than her prior permanent restrictions. Petitioner reported to work on September 18, 2007, and told Ms. Lenox that her doctor did not want her standing. Ms. Lenox told Petitioner that they would need to speak with Mr. Zook about her restrictions when he arrived at work that day. In the meantime, Ms. Lenox permitted Petitioner to sit down and work on summary sheets. After returning from lunch, Petitioner met with Mr. Zook about her new temporary restrictions. The meeting lasted about an hour or more. Based on Mr. Zook’s prior experience working as a Receiving Clerk, his understanding of the essential job functions of that position, and Petitioner’s podiatrist’s statement that she needed to be off her foot for three weeks, he did not believe that Petitioner could perform the essential functions of that position without violating her doctor’s restrictions. Mr. Zook, nevertheless, asked Petitioner how she thought she could do her job from a seated position. Petitioner did not have any suggestions. There were no available sedentary positions in the warehouse at that time that could have accommodated Petitioner’s no-standing restrictions. As a result, Mr. Zook explained to Petitioner that based on her doctor’s restrictions, which required her to be in a sedentary position, he did not have any work for her at that time. Mr. Zook did not believe that Petitioner’s temporary no-standing restrictions prevented her from working in any capacity. Mr. Zook explained to Petitioner that she could take a leave of absence and return to work after her temporary restrictions expired. Because Petitioner’s restrictions were temporary, Mr. Zook did not contact Respondent’s Human Resources Department to schedule a job accommodation meeting. Despite Mr. Zook’s statement, Petitioner returned to work the following day and performed some work for a period of time. After Mr. Zook arrived at the warehouse, he went back to the Receiving Department and asked Petitioner why she was at work. Mr. Zook reminded Petitioner that he did not have any work for her to do at that time and that he could not allow her to work in violation of her doctor’s restrictions. After speaking with Mr. Zook, Petitioner clocked out, signed some paperwork, and left the building. Petitioner did not return to work after September 19, 2007. On October 15, 2007, Petitioner saw her podiatrist again. Petitioner’s podiatrist extended her temporary no- standing restriction for another six weeks. Petitioner understood, however, that her no-standing restrictions remained temporary at that time. Petitioner applied for and received short-term disability (“STD”) benefits beginning around the end of September 2007. Petitioner used paid time off until the STD period benefits began.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order dismissing the Petitions for Relief in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Hnin N. Khaing, Esquire Henrichsen Siegel, PLLC 1648 Osceola Street Jacksonville, Florida 32204 Kathleen Mones, Esquire Seyfarth Shaw LLP 1545 Peachtree Street Northeast, Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Polk County School Board (Petitioner) has just cause for terminating the employment of Respondent, David McCall.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner under a professional services contract as a classroom teacher at Lake Region High School, a unit of the Polk County Public School System. On Wednesday, October 3, 2007, a student entered the Respondent’s classroom approximately ten minutes after class had commenced. The student’s tardiness was apparently related to her participation as a donor in a blood drive occurring at the school on that date. At the time the student entered the classroom, the Respondent was engaged in administering a standard quiz, and the time allotted for the quiz was about to end. The Respondent directed the student to remain outside the classroom and take the quiz. The student advised the Respondent that she donated blood and, feeling dizzy, had hit her foot on a doorway. She told the Respondent that she injured her toe and requested that she be allowed to go to the school clinic. The Petitioner presented a statement allegedly written by the student asserting that her toe was bleeding at the time the Respondent observed the toe. The student did not testify, and the written statement is insufficient to establish that the toe was bleeding at the time she entered the classroom. The Respondent testified that he observed the toe and saw perhaps a minor abrasion but saw no evidence of serious injury. The Respondent declined to refer the student to the clinic and again instructed the student to remain outside the classroom and complete the quiz. The student remained outside the classroom and presumably began taking the quiz. Shortly thereafter, another teacher walking in the hallway observed the student sitting outside the Respondent’s classroom with a paper towel under her foot. The teacher observed the student shaking and blood on the towel and asked the student about the situation. The student advised the teacher of the circumstances, stating that she felt like she was going to “pass out.” The teacher, with the assistance of a third teacher, obtained a wheelchair, retrieved the student’s belongings from the Respondent’s classroom, and advised the Respondent that the student was being taken to the clinic. After the student was transported to the clinic, her mother was called. The mother came to the school and retrieved her daughter, observing that the toe was bloody and swollen. The mother subsequently took her daughter to a doctor and testified that the student was referred for x-rays of the injured toe. Later on October 3, 2007, the student’s mother contacted the school principal, Joel McGuire, to inquire as to the manner in which the matter had been handled by the Respondent. The principal advised the mother he would follow up on her inquiry. On Thursday morning, October 4, 2007, Principal McGuire sent an email to the Respondent and asked him to come to Principal McGuire’s office during a planning period or after 2:30 p.m. “to confirm some information” about the student. The Respondent did not respond to the email and did not comply with Principal McGuire’s request to meet at that time. After receiving no response from the Respondent, Principal McGuire left a copy of the email in the Respondent’s mailbox at approximately 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, October 4, 2007, with a handwritten note asking the Respondent to come to the principal’s office on the following Friday morning “before school.” The Respondent did not respond to the note left in the mailbox and did not appear at the principal’s office prior to the start of Friday classes. Based on the lack of response, Principal McGuire sent another email to the Respondent on Friday, October 5, 2007, and asked him to come to the principal’s office at 6:30 a.m. on Monday. The email advised that the meeting was “to discuss the situation which occurred on Wednesday, October 3rd” so that the principal could respond to the mother’s inquiry. Although the Respondent was routinely present on the school campus by 6:30 a.m. on school days, the Respondent replied to the principal and declined to meet at that time, stating that the “proposed meeting time is not within my contracted hours.” The principal thereafter emailed the Respondent and requested that he come to the principal’s office at 10:30 a.m. on Monday, October 8, 2007. The email stated as follows: Mother is really needing information concerning the situation which took place in your class. I do need to meet with you and provide a response to her. I believe 10:30 a.m. is during your planning period. Thanks for coming by my office. The principal received no response to this email and the October 8, 2007, meeting did not occur. The principal thereafter sent a letter to the Respondent dated October 12, 2007, which stated as follows: I am requesting a meeting with you Monday, October 15, 2007, at 8:00 a.m. I will provide a substitute in your classroom in order for you to meet with me. The meeting will be very brief. I need some information about [student], a student you had in 2nd period geometry, in order to inform her mother. This is the sixth request for a meeting. Failure to comply with my request will be deemed insubordination and will require additional actions. The Respondent attended the meeting, but refused to provide any information, stating, “I am not going to respond to you.” By letter dated October 22, 2007, the Respondent received a written reprimand for his “refusal to assist in the investigation of an incident involving [student] on October 3, 2007." The letter advised that the first step of progressive discipline, a verbal warning, was being omitted because of the “seriousness of your actions and the possible consequences.” In relevant part, the letter provided as follows: Attached to this letter is my memorandum setting forth the events and facts as I have best been able to determine. As indicated, you have been uncooperative in our effort to investigate the facts surrounding this incident. Most significantly, when we were finally able to meet in my office on October 15, 2007, you refused to discuss the circumstances surrounding [student’s] situation and you stated specifically, “I am not going to respond to you.” This situation involved an injured student and our school’s response to that incident. Your refusal to assist or participate in the investigation is contrary to your obligation as a teacher to respond suitably to issues of a student’s health and welfare, is adverse to the school’s obligation to address concerns of the parents, and is completely contrary to your obligations as an employee of the Polk County School Board. Please understand that this letter of reprimand is addressed solely to your refusal to participate, cooperate or assist in the investigation of this incident. Should the outcome of the investigation indicate that your conduct in dealing with the student was inappropriate, I am reserving the right to request further disciplinary action by the Superintendent. Please note that a suspension without pay is the next step in progressive discipline as set forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In conclusion, the letter directed the Respondent to prepare a signed “full written report” of the incident, including “your recollections and observation of the events and your justification for your actions you took in response to this incident.” The letter directed the Respondent to deliver the report within five days of the Respondent’s receipt of the letter and, further, stated that “refusal to take such action and to cooperate in the investigation may have serious consequences regarding your employment.” The memorandum attached to the letter provided a chronology of events identifying all participants and specifically referencing the principal’s multiple attempts to obtain information from the Respondent. The Respondent failed to provide the written statement as required by the October 22, 2007, letter of reprimand and failed to otherwise provide information to the Petitioner. By letter dated November 15, 2007, from Principal McGuire to Superintendent Dr. Gail McKinzie, the principal requested that the superintendent issue a five-day suspension without pay to the Respondent for “gross insubordination.” The letter misidentified the date of the incident as October 4, 2007. By letter dated November 29, 2007, the superintendent suspended the Respondent without pay for five days. The letter, repeating the misidentification of the date of the incident, stated in relevant part as follows: On October 4, 2007, you denied a student’s request to go to the school clinic. It was determined that the student had a broken toe. Your administrator, Joel McGuire, has made six verbal requests and two written requests for information on this incident. The last request was made on October 22, 2007, in a formal letter of reprimand which stated “your refusal to take such action and to cooperate in this investigation may have serious consequence for your employment. This recommendation for a five day suspension without pay is provided for in Article IV section 4.4-1 of the Teacher Collective Bargaining Agreement and is a result of your continued insubordination and refusal to follow the requests of your immediate supervisor. Please be advised that future incidents of this nature may result in additional disciplinary action. The letter of suspension advised the Respondent that the suspension would be in effect from December 5 through 7, 10, and 11, 2007, and that he should report back to work on December 12, 2007. The Respondent served the suspension without pay. In a letter dated December 13, 2007 (“Subject: October 4, 2007, incident”), from Principal McGuire, the Respondent was advised as follows: I have made repeated verbal and written requests from you for your explanation of the events in which you participated on October 4, 2007, involving a student requiring medical attention. This is my final request to you for a written explanation of those events. You are herby directed to report to my office at 10:30 a.m. on Monday, December 17, 2007, and you are instructed to have with you at that time a written explanation of the events in question. You shall also be prepared to answer any questions regarding what occurred on that day and the actions you took. You should not have any classes at that time, but I will provide coverage for you if for any reason that is required. Please understand that this is a very serious matter, and you have previously received a five day disciplinary suspension. The next step in progressive discipline is termination, and insubordination can be just cause for termination. I hope that you will conduct yourself appropriately, if you wish to remain an employee of the Polk County School Board. On December 17, 2007, the Respondent appeared at the principal’s office at the appointed time, but asserted that he had not been involved in any incident on October 4, 2007, and declined to otherwise provide any information. Although the date of the incident, October 3, 2007, had been misidentified as October 4, 2007, in the referenced series of letters, there is no evidence that the Respondent was unaware of the specific event about which the information was being sought. It is reasonable to presume that the Respondent was fully aware of the matter being reviewed by Principal McGuire. In response to the December 17, 2007, meeting, Principal McGuire issued a letter dated December 18, 2007 (“Subject: October 3, 2007, incident”), essentially identical in most respects to the December 13, 2007, letter and correcting the referenced date. The letter scheduled another meeting for 10:30 a.m. on December 19, 2007. On December 19, 2007, the Respondent appeared at the principal’s office at the appointed time and declined to answer any questions, stating that he was invoking his rights under the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States of America. By letter to Superintendent McKinzie dated January 2, 2008, Principal McGuire recommended termination of the Respondent’s employment. Principal McGuire restated the chronology of the October 3, 2007, incident and wrote as follows: I have made repeated verbal and written requests of Mr. McCall to provide an explanation of the circumstances in order to include them in our investigation of the events. He refused to comply with each of those requests. He received a formal letter of reprimand and a five-day suspension without pay for his gross insubordination. Since his suspension, I have made written requests of Mr. McCall to provide an explanation of those events, and he has blatantly refused to do so. By letter also dated January 2, 2008, Superintendent McKinzie notified the Respondent that he was being suspended with pay and that she would recommend to the full school board that his employment be terminated. The letter set forth the grounds for the termination as follows: Since the incident on October 3, 2007, you have refused repeated verbal and written requests by the school administration to provide an explanation of the events which occurred on that date or to otherwise participate in the investigation of those events. As a result of your refusal to provide an explanation or participate in the investigation, you have received a formal written reprimand and a five-day suspension without pay. Since your suspension, you have again refused specific requests by your principal to provide an explanation of these events. Based on these facts, it is my opinion that you have intentionally violated the Principles of Professional Conduct of the Education in Florida by failing to make reasonable efforts to protect a student from conditions harmful to learning and/or the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety (Rule 6B-1.006 FAC). Further you have engaged in ongoing, gross insubordination by repeatedly refusing to take certain actions which are a necessary and essential function of your position as a School Board employee. Progressive discipline, as specified in the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, has been followed in this case, and the next step of progressive discipline is termination. Therefore, it is my conclusion that "just cause" exists for your termination as an employee of the Polk County School Board. The Respondent requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge the termination, and the Petitioner referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to the instant hearing, the Respondent made no effort to provide any information to the Petitioner regarding the events of October 3, 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order terminating the employment of David McCall. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald H. Wilson, Jr., Esquire Boswell & Dunlap, LLP 245 South Central Avenue Post Office Drawer 30 Bartow, Florida 33831 David McCall 3036 Spirit Lake Drive Winter Haven, Florida 33880 Dr. Gail McKinzie, Superintendent Polk County School Board Post Office Box 391 Bartow, Florida 33831-0391 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is when the 97-day probationary employment period began to run for each of the Respondents, and whether their employment could be terminated without just cause.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the School Board of Polk County, the entity responsible for operating, monitoring, staffing, and maintaining the public schools of Polk County. The Board hired both Respondents, Diane O'Brien and Marcee Gunn, to fill positions within the Polk County School System. Prior to the 2003-2004 school year, Federal requirements under the "No Child Left Behind" ("NCLB") program mandated that by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, all teachers in core academic areas must be "highly qualified" as defined by Federal guidelines. The guidelines state that a teacher must possess a combination of both appropriate certification and documentation of subject area knowledge. The determination of whether a teacher had the requisite knowledge was done by way of a battery of tests in the subject areas. At the time the NCLB program was instituted, Polk County was experiencing a high level of growth and was hiring approximately 1,200 new teachers each year. The shortage of teachers who had obtained the highly qualified status resulted in the Board hiring a class of teachers who were not highly qualified, but under certain restrictions. These teachers were deemed D-1 provisional substitute teachers. The D-1 teachers were hired with the intention of allowing them to be employed as substitutes, pending their passage of the subject area tests. D-1 teachers were first hired by the Board to fill positions in the 2002-2004 school year. D-1 teachers were paid a daily rate of pay and received insurance and retirement benefits. If the teacher ultimately became highly qualified, they were to be given seniority consideration retroactive to the date of their hire.1 As substitutes, D-1 teachers were "at will" employees and were not contract employees. Their employment could be terminated with or without cause at any time. All D-1 positions were terminated at the end of the school year for which they were hired. If a teacher had not obtained highly qualified status, they could be hired as a D-1 teacher for the next school year. The D-1 program was eliminated, in whole, at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Diane O'Brien Respondent, Diane O'Brien, worked as a para-educator for 15 years before earning a degree in special education from Nova Southeastern University in 2006. O'Brien was hired by the Board to be a D-1 substitute teacher for handicapped students at Haines City High School for the 2007-2008 school year. At the time of her hire, O'Brien signed a Conditional Employment Agreement that refers to her as "Teacher." The agreement does, however, set forth certain requirements for becoming a regular teacher. O'Brien was assigned a full-time para-educator to assist her and was given a classroom for purposes of fulfilling her position. At all times during the school year, O'Brien acted as and considered herself to be the official teacher for the class. O'Brien was evaluated during the school year by the principal and the assistant principal. O'Brien attended the IEP meetings and was responsible for writing IEPs for her students. O'Brien was never referred to by staff or other teachers as a "substitute" teacher during that school year. Nonetheless, O'Brien signed a document entitled, "Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year" when she was hired. The document clearly indicates the requirements for a regular teacher and states that until such requirements are met, the teacher is considered a provisional D-1 substitute. O'Brien does not specifically remember signing this particular document; she said she signed many documents when hired, and none of them were explained to her. O'Brien did not meet the requirements to be a regular teacher at that time. During the 2007-2008 school year, O'Brien was paid as a D-1 substitute teacher, i.e., $115 per day, plus benefits. As early as August 2007 (the month classes began), O'Brien contacted a Ms. Capoziello requesting that her salary be changed to full-time teacher salary. She was advised that she had not yet met the requirements for a full-time teacher, because she had not yet met the "Certified, Qualified and Highly Qualified" requirements set forth in the Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers. In December 2007, O'Brien indicated in an email that she was working hard to pass the necessary tests, but had not yet done so. In January 2008, O'Brien contacted the human resource officer to inquire as to when her status would change. In response, she received the following explanation: Please refer to the individualized Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year that you signed on August 8, 2007. During New Educator Orientation, you were provided with the requirements necessary to attain "highly qualified" status for your ESE assignment. You are fully certified in ESE, but according to federal legislation, you are not considered "highly qualified" as defined in the law, because you have not "demonstrated subject matter competence" to teach ESE academic subjects. [F]or your current assignment, you need to pass the Elementary Education K-6 subject area exam to be deemed "highly qualified." After you have completed this requirement that was provided to you on August 8, 2007, then you will be eligible to transfer to B1 status as a regular teacher. (Emphasis in original.) After the end of the 2007-2008 school year, O'Brien passed the subject area exam necessary to achieve "highly qualified" status. She was then hired in the 2008-2009 school year as a regular teacher by the Board. O'Brien commenced work under her first annual contract with the Board as a regular teacher on or about August 11, 2008. On November 11, 2008, a memorandum was issued to O'Brien by the Board entitled, "Dismissal of Instructional Employee During 97-Day Probationary Period." O'Brien signed the memorandum, acknowledging receipt. The memorandum identifies O'Brien as "an initial annual contract teacher." The effect of the memorandum was termination of O'Brien's employment by the Board. O'Brien maintains that her period of teaching during the 2007-2008 school year was as a regular teacher. If that is the case, then she could not be terminated within the 97-day probationary period without the establishment of just cause. Marcee Gunn Respondent, Marcee Gunn, received her education at the University of Missouri at St. Louis. Gunn received her Florida teaching certification and was, in August of 2007, a certified teacher. Gunn was hired by the Board as a pilot D-1 substitute teacher for the 2007-2008 school year. A pilot substitute teacher fills in for absent teachers at one particular school, rather than going to various schools. In February 2008, Gunn was transferred from a pilot substitute to a permanent position as a kindergarten teacher at the School. The previous teacher had moved to another position, and Gunn was asked to fill the position through the end of the current school year. The permanent position was also classified as D-1 substitute, because Gunn had not yet become highly qualified. Gunn acted as, and considered herself to be, the full-time kindergarten teacher. She organized the classroom, prepared all student assignments, issued a monthly newsletter, and attended IEP meetings. Gunn was evaluated in her position by the principal and assistant principal. While Gunn was a pilot D-1 substitute, she received pay of $115 per day, plus benefits. At the time she became the permanent kindergarten teacher she received the same pay, but believed she would be receiving regular teacher pay. However, upon taking the kindergarten teacher position, Gunn signed a document entitled, "Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year." The document clearly indicates that Gunn was being hired as a D-1 substitute and sets forth the requirements for becoming a regular teacher, i.e., passing a test in the subject area to be taught. Gunn also acknowledges signing the document, but does not have any specific recollection of having seen it. She did know that the document required her to pass the K-12 subject area exam in order to be reclassified as a regular teacher. Gunn's position was terminated at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Gunn was re-hired by the Board for the 2008-2009 school year as a regular teacher for the same kindergarten class. (The evidence is not clear whether Gunn was hired in 2008-2009 as a D-1 substitute or a highly qualified teacher. The fact is not relevant, however, because even if she was a regular teacher, she would have been in her first year of an annual contract.) On November 14, 2008, a memorandum was issued to Gunn by the Board entitled, "Dismissal of Instructional Employee During 97-Day Probationary Period." Gunn signed the memorandum, acknowledging receipt. The memorandum identifies Gunn as "an initial annual contract teacher." The effect of the memorandum was termination of Gunn's employment by the Board. Gunn maintains that her period of teaching during the 2007-2008 school year (or at least a part of it) was as a regular teacher. If that is the case, then she could not be terminated within the 97-day probationary period without the establishment of just cause. There is no dispute by Respondents that the dismissal memoranda were issued within 97 days of their commencement of work during the 2008-2009 school year. Rather, each Respondent contends that their full-time, contracted employment with the Board commenced earlier than the 2008-2009 school year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Polk County School Board, terminating the employment of Respondents, Diane O'Brien and Marcee Gunn, effective as of the dates determined by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on March 26, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner first interviewed for the position of Assistant Manager Trainee with Respondent on March 17, 1999. Her first interview was with Traci Dickerson, Assistant Manager for Operations. Ms. Dickerson was impressed with Petitioner's presentation and recommended that she be interviewed a second time by Mitchell Day, District Manager. After the interview, Petitioner was offered a position as Assistant Manager Trainee to begin work at Wal-Mart Super Center on Apalachee Parkway in Tallahassee, Florida, on May 10, 1999. The Assistant Manager training program is a seventeen- week program conducted at selected Wal-Mart stores throughout the country. The Wal-Mart store in question in the present case is one of just a few stores in Florida that were utilized for this training program. Ms. Dickerson was the person responsible for administering the program in the store in question during the relevant time frame. Another Assistant Manager Trainee, Sean Mitchell, began the training program on the same date as Petitioner. Mark Whitmore, another Assistant Manager Trainee, began the training program sometime prior to Petitioner. Mr. Whitmore was a long- time employee of Wal-Mart who transferred from management in the home office into the retail sales side of the business. Because of his prior experience with Wal-Mart, his training program was handled differently from the training administered to Petitioner in that it was accelerated. Mr. Mitchell's training was the same type as Petitioner's although each trainee may have been given various assignments on different days and in different sequence. Sometime during the training process, certain members of management with Respondent became concerned about Petitioner's attitude toward the training program, her willingness to take constructive criticism, and her communication/people skills. Sometime around the second week of Petitioner's employment with Respondent, she was observed by Assistant Manager Wendy Rhodes, to be engaged in a conversation with Sean Mitchell during working hours. It appeared to Ms. Rhodes that the two individuals were socializing rather than working. Mr. Rhodes approached the two and instructed them to begin the workday. Later, Ms. Dickerson, in her role as the Program Supervisor, provided constructive criticism to Petitioner that she should concentrate on her work and not socialize during work hours. On or about May 29, 1999, while Petitioner was working in lay-away, she was asked to come to the front of the store to assist Brenda Meyers, a front-end manager, because of an increase of customers at the various cash registers. As an Assistant Manager Trainee, Petitioner was expected to "pitch in" and assist throughout the store where needed. Petitioner responded to Ms. Meyers' request by indicating that she was intending to go on her break and refused to come and assist at that time. Because of Petitioner's refusal, George Wilkins (a co-manager and directly below the store manager in the chain of command of the store) took a turn working at a cash register. Every manager at Wal-Mart is expected to be a team player and assist when the need arises. Mr. Wilkins arranged to meet with Petitioner to discuss the incident and general concerns he had as result of feedback he received from other members of management about her unwillingness to do certain tasks, and to give counseling advice on how to conduct herself as an Assistant Manager. Petitioner immediately became defensive and asserted that because she had a bachelor's degree, she did not have to "take this." Mr. Wilkins attempted to explain to Petitioner that her degree was important, but her attitude toward her work and her willingness to do her fair share were more important. Petitioner was not receptive to Mr. Wilkins' efforts to provide constructive criticism. Sometime in late-July 1999, Petitioner traveled with Mike Odum, an Assistant Manager and Lisa Green, who at the time was Personnel Manager at the store in question, to Georgia to attend a new store opening. On the return trip, Petitioner became upset because she was concerned that the group would not return to Tallahassee in time for her to pick up her child from daycare. She confronted Mr. Odum, very upset about the possibility of returning to Tallahassee after 5:00 p.m. However, he returned to Tallahassee prior to the time that Petitioner needed to be back in Tallahassee. On or about August 20, 1999, Petitioner was assigned to the 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift to assist the Customer Service Manager (CSM) in closing the store. The function of the "closing CSM" is important, and Petitioner was needed to assist in that regard. Because the store manager and other members of management were out of town at a meeting, Mr. Odum was in charge of the store. Instead of coming in at 2:00 p.m., Petitioner arrived at the store at 9:00 a.m. She clocked in on the time clock and proceeded to the break room where she warmed her meal and sat down to eat. After she completed her meal, she proceeded to the front of the store to assist the Customer Service Manager. Not long after Petitioner arrived at the store and assumed her position, she was called to the Manager's office to discuss her work schedule for the day. At that time, Mike Odum and Traci Dickerson (Ms. Dickerson participated by phone) reminded Petitioner that her scheduled shift was from 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The importance of this was that if she had worked too many hours without prior approval, she would have been in an unauthorized overtime situation. Additionally, it is important to have a "closing CSM" at the appropriate time. Petitioner left work to return in the afternoon as originally scheduled. Petitioner returned to work in the afternoon. She reported to the front temporarily but became frustrated with one of the assistant managers. Feeling that what she was doing was a waste of time, she proceeded to the training room where she reviewed her training materials. She was paged to the front of the store on numerous occasions but did not respond to the calls. Mike Odum went to the training room and told Petitioner to come to the front of the store to assist. Petitioner refused and stated that she would remain in the back of the store and continue reading her manual. When Petitioner refused, Mr. Odum instructed Petitioner to clock out and to come back when the District Manager would be available for a conference. Petitioner left the store shortly thereafter. Petitioner arranged to meet with Mitchell Day, the District Manager who oversees nine stores and approximately 4,800 employees, on August 25, 1999. Mr. Day understood the meeting to be for the purpose of resolving concerns about the issues involving Petitioner and giving Petitioner an opportunity to express her concerns. Management saw this meeting as an opportunity to "get everything out on the table" so that Petitioner could continue with her training program. Accordingly, Mr. Day scheduled the meeting with Todd Peterson, Store Manager; Mike Odum; George Wilkins and Traci Dickerson. All of these individuals expressed concern about Petitioner's performance, her attitude toward the training program, her willingness to accept constructive criticism, as well as their willingness to assist her in completing the training program. There is no evidence that Mr. Day or any other member of management intended that the meeting be conducted for the purpose of terminating Petitioner. Petitioner entered the room and walked past other members of management and approached Mr. Day in a confrontational manner. She was upset at the presence of the various members of management. Despite being asked to be seated, she refused to sit down and begin the meeting. Every participant in the meeting who testified at hearing gave consistent testimony that she raised her voice to an inappropriate level, was hostile and explosive. All recalled her using profanity, with the exception of Mr. Day who did not specifically recall her use of profanity. Every person in the room was stunned at her demeanor, in particular that it was addressed to an upper level management person. Based upon the unprofessionalism of this outburst, Mr. Day advised her that her employment was terminated. The formal reason given for her termination was insubordination. There is nothing in the evidence presented at final hearing to indicate that any of the actions taken by Respondent or members of Respondent's management were based on Petitioner's gender or on any other form of discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission for Human Relations enter a final order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2001.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of a handicap or disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner became employed on an annual non-renewing contract as a paraprofessional at Park Elementary School during the 1993-94 school year. The Petitioner was assigned to work in a classroom program for developmentally disabled preschool children. The children were three to four years of age and very active. There were between five to nine children in the classroom. The Petitioner was generally assigned to work with two children and was responsible for monitoring their activity. She was also responsible for physically controlling the children and changing diapers when required. The substantial part of the workday was spent standing, bending, lifting, and moving about with the children. The Petitioner continued her employment in the 1994-95 school year and received satisfactory evaluations. During the 1995-96 school year, the Petitioner continued her employment as a paraprofessional. Although there is evidence that the Petitioner's job performance was of some concern to the class teacher and to the school principal, the Petitioner was not formally evaluated because her employment was interrupted as set forth herein. There is no evidence that anyone discussed the concerns with her or that she had an opportunity to remedy any alleged deficit in her job performance. On January 2, 1996, the Petitioner was riding in a car being driven by her husband and was involved in an automobile accident when another driver struck the Petitioner's car. The Petitioner was injured in the accident and was taken to a hospital where she was treated and released. Subsequent to the accident, the Petitioner continued to have pain in her neck and sought treatment from a chiropractor. Eventually, the chiropractor referred the Petitioner to a neurologist in an attempt to determine the cause of the pain. The medical professionals determined that the Petitioner's injuries were not permanent. The Petitioner's chiropractor described the pain as a "typical soft tissue injury" and eventually stopped treating the pain because the pain did not improve and was not supported by diagnostic testing. The Petitioner's neurologist opined that the neck pain was not a "disability." The Petitioner returned to the school on February 14, 1996, and discussed her physical limitations with the school principal. She showed the principal a copy of a letter from her chiropractor to an insurer that stated that she was "able to work in a limited capacity . . . with a 15 pound limit" and that "she is to avoid excessive bending, stooping and standing." The Petitioner asserts that the school principal told her to go home and return a week later. The Respondent asserts that the Petitioner informed the Principal that she could do the job but only under the restrictions set forth in the chiropractor's letter. The evidence establishes that the discussion related to whether or not the Petitioner was able to return to work was centered on her ability to perform her responsibilities and that the Petitioner decided she was unable to return to work at that time and would return a week later. By letter dated February 15, 1996, the School Board's personnel coordinator advised the Petitioner that she had used all of her sick leave and would not receive any additional pay until she returned to work. The letter suggested that she request an official leave of absence effective January 2, 1996, in order to permit her retirement benefits to be maintained because "time spent on an official leave of absence can be bought back by the employee from the Division of Retirement." On February 21, 1996, the Petitioner contacted the school principal and informed him she would be unable to return on that day due to family matters. On February 22, 1996, the Petitioner returned to the campus and spoke with the principal. The Petitioner told the principal she did not feel physically capable of working as a paraprofessional in the preschool classroom and asked him to provide her with other employment. The principal told the Respondent he did not have any open positions at the school for which she would be physically suited. The principal was also concerned that because the Respondent was physically restricted from bending, stooping, and standing for an extended time, she would not be able to perform the responsibilities of her employment. There is no evidence that on February 22, 1996, or at any time during the remainder of the 1995-96 school year, there were jobs available at the school that did not require physical activity beyond the Petitioner's abilities. On February 26, 1996, the Petitioner contacted the school principal and said she wanted to take a leave of absence as suggested by the personnel coordinator. The principal believed there was a misunderstanding about the availability of the leave of absence to an annual contract employee and suggested that she speak to the personnel coordinator. The principal also called the coordinator and requested that he clarify the matter with the Petitioner. On February 27, 1996, the personnel coordinator telephoned the school principal and said that the Petitioner had been informed that she was not eligible for a leave of absence and said that the Petitioner had suggested she would resign her employment. On March 1, 1996, the Petitioner contacted the principal and said she wanted to apply for a leave of absence. The principal contacted the personnel coordinator who suggested that the Petitioner submit to the school superintendent a letter requesting the leave along with a copy of the chiropractor's letter and then let the superintendent decide whether or not he would recommend to the school board that her leave request be granted. The information was relayed to the Petitioner, who stated that she would submit the letter. By letter dated March 7, 1996, the Petitioner relayed the events to the superintendent and requested "any consideration you can give in resolving this matter." In the March 7 letter, the Petitioner writes, "[d]ue to the activeness of the children in this class the possibility of re-injuring myself is very high." She also advises that she informed the principal that the personnel coordinator suggested that she request the leave of absence and that the principal suggested that she write the letter to the superintendent. The Petitioner asserted that she would not resign from her position. Attached to the March 7 letter were past evaluations, a March 6 letter "to whom it may concern" from her chiropractor restating the symptoms of her injury, and the February 15 letter she received from the personnel coordinator suggesting the leave of absence. By letter dated March 19, 1996, the Petitioner referenced a March 15 meeting with the superintendent and states "[i]f there are no reasonable accommodations for a job replacement, I would like to request a medical leave of absence for the remainder of this year." She enclosed the letter from the chiropractor with the letter to the superintendent. There appears to have been no response from the superintendent to the Petitioner's request for a leave of absence. By letter dated June 4, 1996, the personnel coordinator responded to the request for leave of absence by stating that because the Petitioner was on an annual contract, the request for a leave of absence could not be granted. The letter also stated that due to a lack of funding, some employees would not be called back to work in the 1996-97 school year, and suggested that she should apply for a future vacant position "when you are again able " According to the leave policy set forth in the school board's employment handbook, any employee may request a leave of absence. Such requests must be made at least seven days prior to the requested leave period except in the case of emergency when the request must be made "as soon as possible." The policy requires that the leave application be made in writing and on the form provided for such requests. The policy provides that the School Board "may grant leave, with or without pay." The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner followed the school system policy in requesting a leave of absence after her accident. The Petitioner did not complete and sign a form requesting a leave of absence. The first written request to the school superintendent for a leave of absence was the letter of March 19, approximately 70 days after the accident. The first time the issue of a leave of absence was verbally addressed by the Petitioner was on February 26, 1996, approximately 50 days after the accident, when she told the school principal that she wanted to take a leave of absence as suggested by the personnel coordinator in his letter of February 15. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner has a handicap or disability as those terms are defined under applicable statutes and case law. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner in any employment decision on the basis of a handicap or disability. There is no credible evidence that the Petitioner filed a Request for Disability Accommodation at any time prior to the end of the 1995-96 school year. For the remainder of the 1995-96 school year, a substitute teacher filled in for the Petitioner. The job remained open and available to the Petitioner through the end of the school year. The position was not filled on a permanent basis because school officials were uncertain about whether the Petitioner would be able to return for work. Paraprofessional employees working for the Highlands County School System are employed as annual employees for the first three years. After successful completion of the third year, the paraprofessional becomes eligible for consideration for continuing contract employment. An employee under an annual contract has no automatic right to re-employment. Continuing contract employment provides increased job security to an employee because termination of employment must be for "just cause" or when required by a "reduction in force." Continuing contract employees also receive preference over non-contract employees when workers are recalled after a reduction in force. The successful completion of the third year does not guarantee that the paraprofessional will receive the continuing contract, but only provides that such employee is eligible to receive such a contract The Respondent requires that in order to work a "complete" year, an employee must work for at least 150 days in a school term. Because the Petitioner did not work for at least 150 days in the 1995-96 school term, she did not complete the third year of employment and is not currently eligible for a continuing contract as a paraprofessional employee. The Respondent may permit a paraprofessional employee to work a fourth year, after which the employee automatically receives a continuing contract. Because there were concerns related to the Petitioner's job performance in the 1995-96 school year, the principal of the school would not likely have recommended that a fourth year of employment (and a resulting automatic continuing contract) be permitted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Mary Ann Kerney. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Katherine B. Heyward, Esquire John K. McClure, P.A. 230 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, Mary Ann Florida Kerney 33870 4524 Elm Sebring, Avenue Florida 33870 Honorable Charlie Crist Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Wallace Cox, Superintendent Highlands County School Board 426 School Street Sebring, Florida 33870-4048
Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Credit Union, on account of her race or due to retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is African-American. There was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Respondent. However, given the testimony describing a large financial institution with multiple departments, including a data scanning department and a call center, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish an inference that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was first hired by Respondent on November 20, 2007. On February 2, 2008, she was transferred to the position of Courtesy Pay Credit Advisor (CPCA), a position held until her termination on March 21, 2014. From 2012 through the time of her termination, Jennifer Perez was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. Ms. Perez reported to Mr. Colson, who supervised the credit advisor department. Over the years, Petitioner received a number of certificates and awards for good performance in her position. CPCAs are responsible for collections on delinquent accounts of members by bringing the account to a positive balance within 60 days of delinquency. If a credit union member’s account is delinquent for more than 60 days, it must be written off, resulting in a loss to Respondent. Failure to timely write-off a negative account can subject Respondent to fines and negative audit ratings. A common way of bringing an account current is to arrange a loan with Respondent to pay the delinquent balance. Loan types include a “bounce-free” loan and a “work-out loan.” Both are designed to allow for payment of the negative account in installment payments. The bounce-free loan has only the negative account balance involved, while the work-out loan combines the negative balance with another existing loan. CPCAs receive additional compensation for such loans, known as “incentives,” of $10 to $15, though the record suggests that a dispute over an incentive of $40 was a triggering cause of the adverse employment action in this case. CPCAs are also responsible for “packing” loans, which includes taking the loan paperwork to the optical department to input and image the documents into Respondent’s system. The optical department periodically provides reports on loans for which documentation has not been submitted for input and imaging. Petitioner testified credibly that the optical department would occasionally neglect to scan loans that were submitted. However, there was no evidence to suggest that to be a frequent or pervasive problem. Respondent routinely employs one or two CPCAs at any given time. The CPCAs are assigned a “queue,” which is an alphabetical assignment of member accounts. The evidence suggests that Petitioner served as the CPCA for all delinquent member accounts for a period of almost one year, a practice that ended when Vikki Martello was hired as a CPCA on February 27, 2012. Upon her hiring, Ms. Martello was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters A through K, and Petitioner was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters L through Z. Ms. Martello was transferred to another position on July 11, 2013. Jennifer Munyan was hired as a CPCA on May 20, 2013, and was assigned the A through K queue. Since Petitioner’s termination, Ms. Munyan has handled all delinquent accounts. Petitioner mentioned several incidents over the course of her employment that she believed to be evidence of her poor treatment by Respondent. These incidents appear to have occurred more than one year before Petitioner filed her employment complaint of discrimination. They are cited here for purposes of background. Petitioner testified that starting in 2010 or 2011, Respondent began to hire younger credit advisors on the basis of their friendship with management. The new employees engaged in childish activities such as throwing paper clips and blowing bubbles. Petitioner indicated that they were “written up” for those activities. There was no suggestion that either the hiring or the write-ups were based on race. For a period of time, Petitioner was assigned what she believed to be a disproportionate share of holiday weekend shifts. Mr. Colson “corrected that and then that was okay.” There was no suggestion that the issues with scheduling were based on race. Shortly after Ms. Martello was hired on February 27, 2012, she was asked to accompany Mr. Colson and Ms. Perez to a branch office to train employees. Petitioner felt “that was not right,” and that she was being excluded from performing certain job tasks. She testified that Respondent’s assignment of training and other duties to persons other than herself led to a sympathetic nick-name of “invisible credit advisor.” Petitioner admitted that, in her opinion, Ms. Martello was an excellent employee. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner was not asked to assist in the new hire training since she was already behind on managing her accounts, and that “[t]here’s no compensation or award or anything for training another employee, it's just additional work.” There was no suggestion that the decision to have Ms. Martello assist with training was based on race. Petitioner alleged that despite her requests, she was not allowed to shadow other employees, particularly in the call center, so that she could learn the responsibilities of the member service representative position. She testified that in response to her requests, Ms. Perez would say “okay, we'll see about it, but nothing never happened. And I asked like three or four times and it was always we'll see about it.” Petitioner did not claim in her testimony that she was denied these opportunities because of her race. Petitioner generally claimed she was denied promotional opportunities because she was not allowed to train as a back-up. However, she failed to present any evidence of an open and available position for which she had applied, or for which she was denied. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that race played a role in any such denial. Respondent’s employees are informed of work performance issues in several ways, including informal discussions, e-mail communication, individual or group meetings, coaching reports, and annual evaluations. On March 19, 2012, Petitioner received her annual performance review. Although Respondent was complementary of Petitioner’s improvements in her work, and spoke favorably of her interpersonal relationships and work ethic, the review noted a number of “improvement opportunities and development areas” to be implemented over the course of the following year. Deficiencies in job performance included Petitioner’s practice of making initial contact with a delinquent member by letter, rather than the more effective practice of a phone call; the failure to provide sufficiently descriptive account notations; the failure to “charge off” loans correctly resulting in errors for others to correct; the failure to close checking accounts after workout options or loans were complete resulting in further delinquencies; and the failure to set up loan distributions correctly, resulting in unwarranted loan delinquencies and resultant customer complaints. The performance review also cited issues with Petitioner’s negative accounts extending beyond the required time frame, which was noted in Respondent’s quarterly audit report. The deficiencies noted in the performance review resulted in higher than normal charge-offs, and losses to Respondent. Petitioner improved her performance in some areas, but only for short periods of time. Mr. Colson did not issue Petitioner any coaching reports in 2012 because he believed that Petitioner’s mistakes were not intentional, that she had a positive attitude, that she had no attendance issues, and that “she seemed to like her job a lot.” It was Mr. Colson’s belief that with additional training and a cooperative approach, Petitioner’s performance issues could be corrected. On February 27, 2013, Petitioner received her next annual performance review. Petitioner was again complemented on her interaction with members, her teamwork, and her general positive work ethic. It was noted that Petitioner had responded well to coaching such that she rarely made mistakes in setting up automatic loan payments. The review noted, however, a number of areas for improvement, including some that had not been resolved from the previous year’s review. Of particular concern was the high number of missing loan packets, some of which were months past due; the failure to meet consecutive deadlines for submitting completed work; and the failure to begin work on accounts in an appropriate and timely manner. Petitioner was again instructed to make initial contact with delinquent members by phone or email, rather than by letter; and was advised of several of her accounts that were charged-off after missing the 60-day deadline. Finally, Petitioner was provided with a printout of the 142 overdrawn checking accounts in her queue, only 40 of which (28 percent), had been worked in the previous 60 days. Although some early-stage overdraft accounts carried a “high self-cure rate,” the low number of accounts worked was deemed unacceptably low. After receiving her 2013 performance review, Petitioner improved in some areas of her performance, but again only for a short period of time. Beginning on July 15, 2013, Petitioner, Ms. Martello (until she completed her transfer from the collections department), and Ms. Munyan (upon her assignment to the collections department) were provided with periodic email updates from Ms. Perez on the number of loan packets for which each was responsible that had not been submitted to the optical department. The updates and related correspondence between Petitioner and Ms. Perez revealed the following: July 15, 2013 Petitioner - 37 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 4 missing loan packets July 19, 2013 Petitioner - 36 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 6 missing loan packets July 30, 2013 Petitioner - 34 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 5 missing loan packets August 5, 2013 Petitioner - 29 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 2 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet August 14, 2013 Petitioner - 31 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets August 19, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets August 27, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets September 3, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 10, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 16, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets On September 18, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an email to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan advising them that credit union auditors were scheduled to arrive on September 30, 2013. Thus, Petitioner and Ms. Munyan were instructed to “[m]ake sure all of your loan packets are up to date, so that no one comes to us requesting something that cannot be located.” October 1, 2013 (for loan packets through September 27) Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 3 missing loan packets The October 1, 2013, update further advised Petitioner and Ms. Munyan that “[t]he auditors are here for the next three weeks. If they review any of these loans, it will be a problem that we do not have them scanned yet and if we are missing documents. Please get these turned in this week!” On October 12, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “I worked on some loan packets on 10/12. Please don’t send email until I turn my loan packets in on 10/16.” October 25, 2013 Petitioner - 20 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets November 4, 2013 Petitioner - 28 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets November 12, 2013 Petitioner - 33 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets On November 15, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “Optical have some loan packets that were turned in today, please don’t send out list until after 11/18/13.” November 22, 2013 Petitioner - 35 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets December 11, 2013 Petitioner - 41 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet December 18, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets On October 9, 2013, Mr. Colson met with Petitioner and Ms. Munyan to discuss the results of an attorney audit that was critical of several collections practices. In particular, too many accounts were not being worked until the later stage of delinquency; too much time was allowed to elapse between contacts with the members; and workflow notations were not properly completed. A spreadsheet provided during the October 9, 2013, meeting revealed that Petitioner had 92 accounts in her queue, 57 of which had never been worked. Ms. Munyan had 90 accounts in her queue, 25 of which had never been worked. In November of 2013, Petitioner spoke with Ms. Perez regarding an incident in which Petitioner alleged that Ms. Munyan claimed one of her incentive credits. Ms. Perez advised Petitioner to come back to her if it occurred again. Ms. Perez discussed the incentive issue with Mr. Colson. They determined that, due to a high volume of negative accounts anticipated over the upcoming holidays, and in recognition of the priority on not missing an opportunity to resolve negative accounts, a policy for incentives when a CPCA had to handle incoming calls and loan requests from members who were not in the CPCA’s queue was warranted. On November 19, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an e-mail to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan setting out the policy for handling calls when the other CPCA was not available. Outgoing calls and loan initiation were limited to customers within the CPCA’s queue. However, if a CPCA was not in the office or was unavailable to handle a customer request, the other CPCA was instructed to accept incoming calls from members not in their queue. The CPCA who first entered notes of a customer contact prior to a loan being booked was to receive the incentive. On December 9, 2013, Ms. Munyan received a communication from a member with a negative account, entered the first notes of contact with the member into the workflow history, and sent loan paperwork for a bounce-free loan to the member. On December 10, 2013, Petitioner spoke with the customer and took additional application information over the phone. Later that same day, Petitioner went to Mr. Colson to approve a refinance loan for the customer. Mr. Colson approved Petitioner to proceed with the refinance loan based on the customer’s income, but did not know at the time that Ms. Munyan had already started the loan process. Since Ms. Munyan made the first contact with the customer, the incentive was credited to Ms. Munyan. Petitioner proceeded to make several entries on the workflow history asserting her claim to the incentive. Petitioner apparently discussed the matter within the office, leading to her testimony that “[t]he department was upset about it because I showed it to them.” In December 2013, having been made aware of the workflow history comments regarding the disputed incentive; having received complaints regarding Petitioner from the manager of Respondent’s contact center; and having continuing issues with Petitioner’s failure to submit loan documents to the optical department, Mr. Colson prepared a series of coaching reports to individually address the issues. It was decided to issue separate coaching reports for each issue of concern, rather than a single lengthy report, in order to keep the issues separate. Respondent has previously issued multiple coaching reports to employees under comparable circumstances. On December 20, 2013, Petitioner was called into a meeting with Mr. Colson. She thought the meeting was to discuss the disputed incentive. Instead, she was presented with the coaching reports. The first coaching report was issued for Petitioner’s notations into the workflow system related to her intent to claim the disputed incentive credit. Petitioner had previously received training on the information to be entered in the workflow system. During the training sessions, which were conducted periodically, and which included the distribution of printed materials, it was stressed that the workflow notes should not be editorial or contain side comments. Mr. Colson explained that, in the event of a legal dispute with a member regarding their account, the collection record, including the notations entered into the workflow system, would be made part of a court record. As applied to Petitioner’s notations, Mr. Colson was concerned about having to testify about notations in the collection record regarding incentives or commissions for working on a work-out request. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Martello and other unidentified credit advisors made similar notations in the workflow system without being written up, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson knew of no other instance of a CPCA making notations in the workflow system related to an incentive dispute or other internal employee dispute. Mr. Colson believed that the notations made by Petitioner regarding the incentive dispute were not pertinent to the collection record, thus violating Respondent’s policy and warranting the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the first coaching report, with the comment that “I thought that I was doing the right thing on this acct.” The second coaching report addressed Petitioner’s act of taking a fee refund voucher to Respondent’s contact center department for approval. The contact center has staff on duty beyond Respondent’s normal 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. business hours. The fee refund had to be done on November 25, 2013, since that was the 60th day of the negative account, after which the account would have to be written off. The fee refund was for an amount that exceeded Petitioner’s approval authority. Despite the time frame involved, Petitioner did not get the fee refund voucher approved by the clerk of the collections department, which would be the normal course, before the 5:00 p.m. close of business. During the December 20, 2013, meeting, Mr. Colson discussed the practice of taking vouchers to the call center for processing after 5:00 p.m. Mr. Colson had been approached by the assistant vice president of the contact center regarding Petitioner’s multiple visits after 5:00 p.m. to his department “to have transactions done, fees refunded, things of that nature on members' accounts.” As a result, call center employees were being pulled away from their normal tasks to do transactions that were not a normal function of their job. Petitioner alleged that other credit advisors went to the call center to have such transactions processed, including Ms. Martello, Melonice Lindsey, and Howard Miller, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson had no knowledge of other credit advisors who engaged in this activity, or any other improprieties regarding the processing of fee refunds. The second coaching report addressed additional issues related to the November 25, 2013, fee refund transaction, including the fact that Petitioner did not work on the sixty-day negative account when she arrived to work that morning, and that she did not enter any notation in the workflow history regarding the fee refund. Mr. Colson believed that the issues regarding the fee refund transaction warranted the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the second coaching report, with the comment that “I didn’t do this intentionally. I forgot to get voucher back from Katie to give to [Mr. Colson] to sign.” The third coaching report addressed the ongoing problem of Petitioner’s failure to provide loan documentation to the optical department for input and scanning, the details of which are set forth in paragraph 22 above. Petitioner signed the report with the comment that “[s]ome of these loans have been turned into optical. I will review this matter.” Petitioner alleged that other employees had fallen behind on submitting paperwork, but were not written up or terminated. Petitioner did not identify, by name or race, any of the allegedly comparable employees, or establish that they had a comparable history of failing to submit loan documentation. The only evidence adduced at the hearing established that Ms. Martello and Ms. Munyan were not comparable to Petitioner in the number or frequency of late-submitted loan packets. Petitioner stated that she had previously advised Ms. Perez of her intent to work on Saturday, December 21, 2013, to catch up on her loan paperwork. Mr. Colson was not aware of Petitioner’s intent to do so but, given the length of time that the problem continued to exist, would still have issued the coaching report to Petitioner. At some point after January 2, 2014, during Mr. Colson’s daily review of compliance reports, he noted an account that was over 60 days, requiring that it be written off. The account was assigned to Petitioner, and Mr. Colson saw from the workflow history that Petitioner did not begin work on the account until it was 58 days past due. Working her accounts earlier in the delinquency stage had been previously addressed with Petitioner. On January 6, 2014, Petitioner was given a coaching report and placed on a 60-day probation for deficient work performance related to the written-off account. Petitioner signed the January 6, 2014, coaching report with the comment that “voucher was paperclip to another voucher by mistake. I usually check these daily.” Petitioner testified that other employees failed to timely charge-off accounts but were not counseled, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. The only comparator for whom evidence was received was Khrissy Adams, a Caucasian woman, who was given a coaching report and placed on a 30-day probation for failing to timely write-off an account. There was no evidence of Ms. Adams having received previous coaching reports so as to warrant a lengthier period of probation, as was given to Petitioner. As part of the process established after the December 20, 2013, meeting and coaching reports, Petitioner was to submit her loan packets to either Ms. Perez or Mr. Colson for review before they were sent to be scanned. That review revealed that a large number of the loan packets contained significant errors in the consumer lending plan, which is the contract a member signs to obtain a loan. Many of the consumer lending plans had missing signatures, and some packets had no consumer lending plan at all. Furthermore, Petitioner indicated that some members elected to purchase loan insurance when the member had, in fact, declined insurance, resulting in unapproved charges to a member. The errors noted by Respondent were serious, potentially resulting in the loan contracts being invalid and unenforceable. The errors could have been violative of Regulation Z, which governs fair lending practices and, if there were a sufficient number of instances, resulted in a class action lawsuit against Respondent, exposing it to considerable cost. Due to the ongoing performance issues, as well as the severity of the issues related to Petitioner’s completed loan packets, the decision was made that termination of Petitioner’s employment was appropriate. Petitioner was thereafter terminated from employment on March 21, 2014. Petitioner identified no instance of any racially- disparaging comments directed at herself or any other employee by anyone affiliated with Respondent. There was no non-hearsay evidence of any employee outside of Petitioner’s protected class who engaged in conduct similar to that of Petitioner, but without consequence, upon which to support a finding that the employee was treated more favorably. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner’s race had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment. Rather, Mr. Colson testified convincingly that the decision was based solely on Petitioner’s continuing and increasingly poor job performance. Mr. Colson felt Petitioner’s poor performance was not due to a lack of trying on Petitioner’s part; it was simply the result of a lack of ability on her part. Petitioner asserted that she was written up, placed on probation, and subsequently terminated from employment in retaliation for complaining that Ms. Munyan improperly claimed her incentive. In that regard, she testified that: I know that by me going to management . . . it really started all this, I think, because I’m thinking to myself, if I would have just kept my mouth shut, maybe I would have had my job, but other employees have went to Mr. Colson before with problems like that . . . . But my thing is, after I went to management I get written up out of retaliation. I got blind-sided. I didn’t know that was going to happen. And, to me, that’s retaliation. Petitioner does not claim that she was denied the incentive credit because or her race. Finally, Petitioner complained that some of her personal belonging were damaged or not returned to her after her employment was terminated, testifying that “[t]hey broke up all of my things and, to me, that was not right. To me, that was discriminative.” Even if there were some evidence that Petitioner’s belongings had been damaged on purpose -- which there was not -- there was no evidence that such damage was the result of racial animus. A review of the entire record of this proceeding reveals not a shred of evidence that any of the employment actions of which Petitioner complains were the result of racial bias or discrimination. The only testimony that can be reasonably read as suggesting some racial bias behind the employment actions at issue are Petitioner’s testimony as follows: and I know that discrimination do exist. I do know that’s a problem all across the board in America . . . [a]nd if I did not feel that I was discriminated against I would never have did all this . . . but my thing is I know there’s favorites at that credit union. I know that certain people get away with things. To me, I was discriminated against, I'm gonna say for the record, because of my race, because if I think that I know within my heart if the tables were turned, if I was white and went to management, I would still had a job because to me it just got blown out of proportion by me going to management. And as everyone can clearly see, it all started from there, because if it wasn't started from there, why would I have gotten written up in first place for my work that happened prior to, you know, that -- you know, that year? So, that's what started that. So my point is, is that if I wouldn't have never said anything, I would have probably still been working there. In the absence of some corroborative evidence, Petitioner’s statements alone cannot provide the support to sustain a charge of racial discrimination. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race. Rather, the decision was based on Petitioner’s performance in her job as reflected in the employee coaching reports. Furthermore, there was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that persons who were not African-American were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Rather, to the extent there was some retaliation involved, it was for bringing an internal employee complaint over a disputed incentive to management, a complaint that had no implication of race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Credit Union, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00645. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Sheila Annette Cunningham 1835 Northwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34475 Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Michelle Tatum, Esquire John E. Duvall, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
