Findings Of Fact On October 14, 1985, Petitioner, Nicholas Cozzo, entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement for the sale of sixty (60) shares of the issued and outstanding capital stock of C & S Deli Sandwich and Fish, Inc., a Florida corporation, (the Company) to Robert A. Krueger and Joe Ellen Krueger (collectively, the Kruegers). As a result of the sale, Petitioner retained ownership of no further stock of the Company. (Exhibit A) On October 14, 1985, the Kruegers executed two (2) promissory notes in the amounts of $53,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively, to Petitioner and a Security Agreement securing payment of the notes. (Composite Exhibit B and Exhibit C) On October 14, 1985, Petitioner tendered his resignation as Director, President and Treasurer of the Company. (Exhibit D) Petitioner's security interest to the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, equipment and inventory of the Company (the "collateral") was duly perfected by the filing of a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement with the Uniform Commercial Code Bureau, Florida Department of State, on October 21, 1985. (Exhibit E) A Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement was recorded by the Petitioner in the Public Records of Pasco County, State of Florida, on October 15, 1985, in Official Records Book 1451, page 0493. (Exhibit F) In early 1987, the Kruegers defaulted under the terms of the promissory notes. Prior to April 24, 1987, Petitioner repossessed the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, equipment and inventory of the Company. No consideration was paid by Petitioner to the Company or the Kruegers upon his repossession of the foregoing described collateral. At no time did ownership of any of the capital stock of the Company revert back to Petitioner. On May 5, 1987, Petitioner by private sale disposed of the collateral to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. (Exhibits G, H, and I) No surplus funds resulted from the sale of the repossessed collateral by Petitioner to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. At no time material hereto did the Florida Department of Revenue issue a tax warrant against the Company respecting any unpaid sales tax. On or about May 6, 1987, Petitioner paid under protest to the Respondent Department of Revenue the delinquent unpaid sales tax of the Company in the amount of $1392.53. The Department is still attempting to verify that amount at this date. The Petitioner maintains he paid the amount in order for the Department to issue a sales tax certificate and number to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. The Department maintains its procedure at the time was to issue a sales tax number to the new owners and then proceed against them under Section 212.10, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the Respondent that the Petitioner's repossession of the collateral constituted a sale within the purview of Section 212.10(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 12A-1.055, Florida Administrative Code, which places tax liability on the successor of a business whose previous owner has not satisfied outstanding sales tax obligations. Respondent further notes that the case Petitioner relies on, General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Tom Norton Motor Corp., 366 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) was issued on January 10, 1979, while Section 679.105(5), Florida Statutes, which upholds tax laws when in conflict with security agreements, took effect January 1, 1980. Petitioner on the other hand claims that a lawful repossession of collateral under Florida's Uniform Commercial Code, Section 679.504, Florida Statutes (1985), does not constitute a "sale" of a business making him liable for the Company's unpaid sales tax. Petitioner continues to rely on GMAC, supra, and notes that it was cited by American Bank v. Con's Cycle Center, 466 So.2d 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A refund application was submitted by Petitioner to the Department of Revenue on June 10, 1987. This application was denied by the Department of Revenue by letter dated January 28, 1988. (Exhibit J)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Central Phosphates, Inc. ("CPI"), a Delaware corporation, engaged in the business of processing phosphate and manufacturing phosphate fertilizer. Petitioner rents and operates a phosphate fertilizer processing plant which is located in the vicinity of Plant City, Florida (the "Plant"). At issue in this proceeding is whether a sales tax under Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), is due on the rental of the Plant. The Plant was constructed in 1974. The construction was financed in an arrangement involving CF Realty, a sister company of CPI which is wholly owned along with CPI by CF Industries, Inc. CF Realty originally purchased the equipment and other personal property that constitute the Plant from certain contractors. CF Realty then sold the Plant to Plantlease Corporation ("Plantlease"), a New York for profit corporation. Plantlease is a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Guarantee Company, a New York lending institution. Plantlease was organized solely and specifically to acquire title to the Plant and to lease the Plant back to CPI, which would operate the Plant. Plantlease paid for the Plant by assuming CF Realty's indebtedness on the construction loan and by paying some additional cash. Plantlease then leased the Plant to CPI for an initial term of 15 years. At the end of this initial term CPI has the right to elect to extend the lease for an additional two years or it may elect to purchase the Plant from Plantlease. At the end of the first extended term, CPI has the option of renewing the lease for a second renewal term of two years, or purchasing the Plant. If the lease is extended to the full 19 years, CPI is entitled to purchase the Plant at the end of that term. CPI makes quarterly rental payments to Plantlease pursuant to the lease. Since the first payment of rent in May, 1975, CPI has also been paying to Plantlease a sales tax of four percent of the amount of each payment pursuant to Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977). Plantlease, in turn, has remitted these payments to the Florida Department of Revenue with which it has registered as a dealer. Plantlease, as a potential claimant of a refund of the allegedly erroneously paid rental tax, has waived its right to a refund as reflected in its letter dated May 4, 1978, to the Florida Department of Revenue. Since May, 1975, CPI has paid sales taxes into the State Treasury in the amount of $861,322.55 which rental tax along with all other rental tax payments paid on the Plant since May, 1978, would be refunded if CPI were not liable for the rental tax. On May 8, 1978, CPI filed an Application for Refund with the Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida seeking a refund of the amount allegedly erroneously paid by CPI to the State Treasury and giving reasons for the claim for a refund. CPI bases its claim for a refund on the grounds that the Plantlease rental of the Plant to CPI constitutes an occasional or isolated sales transaction under Section 212.02 (9), Florida Statutes (1977). By letter dated May 30, 1978, the Comptroller's Office denied CPI's Application for Refund and determined that CPI's transaction with Plantlease was not exempt from Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), and the regulations pursuant thereto. On or about July 7, 1978, CPI timely filed a Petition for a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1977), hearing on the issue of whether, for aforementioned reasons, a refund was due on the sales tax paid on the Plant. By application dated May 9, 1975, and received by respondent on May 12, 1975, Plantlease applied to respondent for a certificate of registration to engage in or conduct business as a dealer. Item 10 on the form application calls for "Type of Business." In the blank provided, Plantlease's agent has supplied "Rental of personal property." Underneath the blank, in parentheses, are examples of types of businesses, "Grocery, hardware, jewelry " Exhibit A-I, attached to Joint Exhibit No. 2. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Except for the final paragraph, the findings of fact in the recommended order are based on the parties' stipulation, which was received as joint exhibit No. 2. Paragraphs one, two, three, five, nine and ten of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in toto. The first sentence of paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as not being supported by the evidence. The second sentence has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph six of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraph seven of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph eight of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraphs eleven and twelve of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as contrary to the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Alvarez, Esquire Gary P. Sams, Esquire Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams Post Office Box 5617 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether petitioner taxpayer is liable for delinquent sales tax, penalties, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Stat utes, as alleged by respondent Department in its notice of proposed assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Taxpayer Taxpayer is a family-operated Florida corporation which has engaged in retail sales at the Tampa Port Authority since 1975 or 1976; it is a licensed dealer registered with the Department. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) Taxpayer's Sales During Audit Period From June 1, 1977, through July 31, 1980 (the audit period covered by the Department's proposed assessment), Taxpayer had gross sales in the approximate amount of $691,013.46. (Testimony of Roberts; Exhibit 2.) During that period, Taxpayer filed the required DR-15 monthly sales tax reports and paid taxes on all retail sales transactions which took place on the premises of its store located at 804 Robinson Street, (Tampa Port Authority) Tampa, Florida. (Testimony of Roberts.) During the same audit period -- in addition to sales on its store premises -- Taxpayer sold goods to merchant seamen on board foreign vessels temporarily docked at the Port of Tampa. These vessels operated in foreign commerce, entering the port from and returning to international waters outside the territorial limits of the United States. Taxpayer did not report these sales on its monthly sales tax reports; neither did it charge or collect sales tax from the on-board purchasers. (Testimony of Marylis.) Taxpayer failed to charge or collect sales tax in connection with its on-board sales because it relied on what it had been told by Department representatives. Prior to forming Taxpayer's corporation Thomas Marylis went to the local Department office to obtain a dealer's certificate. While there, he asked Manuel Alvarez, Jr., then the Department's regional audit supervisor, whether he was required to collect sales tax on ship-board sales. Alvarez replied that he didn't have to collect sales taxes on sales made to seamen when he delivered the goods to the ship. 1/ (Testimony of Marylis.) The on-board sales transactions took place in the following manner: Taxpayer (through its owner, Thomas Marylis) would board the foreign vessel and accept orders from the captain, chief mate, or chief steward. (Earlier, one of these persons would have taken orders from the rest of the crew.) If individual crewmen tried to place orders, Marylis would refer them to the captain, chief mate, or chief steward. After receiving orders from one of these three persons, Marylis would return to Taxpayer's store, fill the order, and transport the goods back to the vessel. Whoever placed the order would then examine the goods and give Marylis the money /2 collected from the crew. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) The goods sold in this manner were ordinarily for the personal use of individual crew members; typical items were: shoes, underwear, working clothes, small radios, watches, suitcases, soap, paper towels, and other personal care products. (Testimony of Marylis.) Department Audit of Taxpayer In 1980, the Department audited Taxpayer's corporate books to determine if sales tax had been properly collected and paid. Taxpayer could produce no dock or warehouse receipts, bills of lading, resale certificates from other licensed dealers, or affidavits verifying that its on-board sales were made to out-of-state purchasers for transportation outside of Florida. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) Due to Taxpayer's failure to supply documentation demonstrating that its ship-board sales from June 1, 1977, to July 31, 1980, were exempt from sales tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the Department issued a proposed assessment on September 23, 1980. Through that assessment, the Department seeks to collect $21,201.01 in delinquent sales tax, $5,131.39 in penalties, and $3,892.18 in interest (in addition to interest at 12 percent per annum, or $6.97 per day, accruing until date of payment). (Exhibit 5.) Informal Conference with Department; Alvarez's Representations to Taxpayer In October 1980 -- after the audit -- Taxpayer (through Marylis) informally met with Manuel Alvarez, the Department's regional audit supervisor, to discuss the tax status of the shipboard sales. Specifically, they discussed the Department auditor's inability to confirm that Taxpayer delivered the items to the ships, as opposed to the buyers picking up the goods at the store. Alvarez told him: [I]f the buyers would come and just pick them up and take them. And I [Alvarez] think I told him that, if that was the case, it was taxable. But, if they just placed their orders there -- like we have had other ship supplies -- and they them- selves, or one of their employees, would take the items aboard ships, that would be an exempt sale. I did make that state ment. If we had any type of confirmation to that effect, when it comes to that. (Tr. 61.) 3/ (Testimony of Alvarez.) Alvarez then told Marylis to obtain documentation or verification that the sales were made on foreign vessels, i.e., proof that Taxpayer delivered the goods to the vessels. He assured Marylis that if he could bring such verification back, such sales "would come off the audit." (Tr. 62.)(Testimony of Alvarez.) Alvarez was an experienced Department employee: he retired in 1980, after 30 years of service. It was Alvarez's standard practice -- when dealing with sales tax exemption questions -- to reiterate the importance of documentation. He would always give the taxpayer an opportunity -- 30 days or more -- to obtain documentation that a sale was exempt from taxation. (Testimony of Alvarez.) Taxpayer's Verification In response to the opportunity provided by Alvarez, Taxpayer (through Marylis) obtained affidavits from numerous captains of foreign vessels and shipping agents. Those affidavits read, in pertinent part: I, [name inserted] , am the Captain aboard the vessel [name inserted] from [place of origin]. I am personally aware that Speros International Ship Supply Co., Inc. sells various commodities, supplies, clothing, and various sundry items to for eign ship personnel by delivering the said items to the ships docked at various termi- nals inside the Tampa Port Authority and other locations in Tampa, Florida from [date] to the present. (Testimony of Marylis; Exhibit 8.) Moreover, in an attempt to comply with the tax law and avoid similar problems in the future, Taxpayer printed receipt books to be used in all future on-board sales. The receipts reflect the type of goods sold, the date of delivery to the vessel, the foreign vessel's destination, and the total purchase price. Also included is a signature line for the individual who delivers and receives the goods. (Testimony of Marylis; Exhibit 7.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Department's proposed assessment of Taxpayer for delinquent sales tax, penalties, and interest, be issued as final agency action. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a real estate broker. After 18 years in the business in Michigan, Petitioner moved to Florida in August, 1988. After about one and one- half years working in residential real estate, Petitioner devoted his efforts exclusively to the sale of mobile homes. He soon began to specialize in the resale of mobile homes. In June 1990, Petitioner became self-employed and registered, or was required to register, as a dealer. He engaged in two types of mobile home sales: mobile homes with land and mobile homes without land. This case involves solely the sale of mobile homes without land. From June 20, 1990, through April 26, 1991, Petitioner was involved in the sale of 11 mobile homes without land, and these sales are the subject of the present case. In each transaction, Petitioner never took title or possession of the mobile homes; they remained on a rented lot in a mobile home park. In each transaction, Petitioner stated, on a notarized bill of sale, the sales price of the mobile home and the sales price of associated tangible personal property, such as sheds, carports, and furniture. The associated tangible personal property is typically referred to as "appurtenances." In most transactions, Petitioner listed the mobile home and found the buyer. At these closings, he collected a $2000 commission. In one transaction, which closed March 18, 1991, Petitioner did not secure the buyer, nor did he have the listing. The buyer and seller approached Petitioner and asked him to prepare the closing papers. In this case, Petitioner charged only $250. The sales price of this transaction was $18,900 with $7560 allocated to the appurtenances. The resulting additional tax liability was $453.60. In another transaction, Petitioner did not secure the buyer so he charged a reduced commission. In a third transaction, which closed April 5, 1991, Petitioner was not the listing agent, but agreed to prepare the closing documents because the listing broker was under sales tax audit and evidently did not wish to increase his potential liability. Only one more transaction followed the April 5 closing. The total sales price allocated to appurtenances in the 11 transactions is $145,280. The sales tax arising from these 11 transactions is $8716.80. On January 15, 1992, Respondent mailed to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes. The notice sought to impose additional sales taxes of $8716.80, penalties of $2179.20, interest through said date of $1034.94, and per diem interest thereafter of $2.87. Respondent maintained this position through subsequent informal conferences. Petitioner acted in the capacity of a dealer in all transactions except the one on March 18, 1991, when he closed the transaction as an accommodation and charged a nominal fee. After deducting the sales tax on the appurtenances from the March 18 transaction, the remaining sales tax liability is $8263.20. There is no doubt that at all material times the Lee County Tax Collector's Office misinformed Petitioner and other dealers that they were not required to collect the sales tax on the casual sale of appurtenances in connection with the casual sale of a mobile home on a rented lot. However, there is no evidence that the Lee County Tax Collector's Office is an agent of Respondent. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent misinformed him as to his liability as a dealer to collect the tax on the sale of the mobile home and appurtenances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing Respondent for $8263.20 in sales tax, plus interest, but waiving all penalties. ENTERED on October 18, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 18, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3: rejected as subordinate. 4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 6: adopted or adopted in substance. 7: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: rejected as subordinate. 10: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 11-13: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3-4: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6-16: rejected as subordinate. 17: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18: rejected as subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 James G. Decker Decker and Smith, P.A. P.O. Box 9208 Ft. Myers, FL 33902-9208 Lealand L. McCharen Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue This issue is whether proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, constitute a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Florida Home Builders Association, Inc. (FHBA), and Florida A.G.C. Council (FAGC) are trade associations. A substantial number of their members contract with governmental entities for construction services and related sales of tangible personal property. FHBA and FAGC were organized, in part, to represent their members on matters relating to the construction industry, including proceedings involving agency rules. Petitioner Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (Wackenhut) frequently contracts with governmental entities. The proposed rule amendments will result in greater tax liability for Wackenhut in its performance of governmental contracts. Intervenor Florida School Board Association, Inc. (FSBA) represents all 67 local school boards in the State of Florida. FSBA's purpose is to represent its members before governmental agencies, in part to ensure cost containment in the construction, maintenance, and improvement of school facilities. Petitioners and Intervenor will be substantially affected if Respondent adopts the proposed rule amendments. They all have standing in this case. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, imposes a tax on "retail sales" or "sales at retail." The statute also imposes a companion "use tax" when a retail sale does not occur in this state but the items sold are used here. Section 212.02(14), Florida Statutes, defines "retail sale" or "sale at retail" as a "sale to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than resale in the form of tangible personal property." Section 212.02(20), Florida Statutes, defines "use" as the "exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership thereof, or interest therein, except it does not include the sale at retail of that property in the regular course of business." Therefore, when tangible personal property is purchased and resold while still tangible personal property, the individual or company that resells the property is a dealer and has an obligation to collect, but not to pay, sales tax. See Sections 212.06(2) and 212.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The obligation to pay the tax rests on the final purchaser of the items while they are still tangible personal property. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, creates a sales tax exemption for direct sales to governmental entities. The statute also creates an exception to that exemption for sales to contractors who purchase or manufacture items for the purpose of installing them in a governmental project. At one time, governmental contractors benefited from the same sales tax exemption that governmental entities enjoyed, even when the contractor was the ultimate consumer. Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes (1957), stated as follows in relevant part: (7) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.--There shall also be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States government, the state or any county, municipality or political subdivision of this state, including sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed by any such government or political subdivision thereof where such tangible personal property goes into and becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof. (Emphasis added) Chapter 59-402, Section 2, Laws of Florida, amended this provision by deleting the word "including" and substituting "provided, this exemption shall not include." Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided as follows in relevant part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof, except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have been validated on or before August 1, 1959. Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, which implements Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended on August 10, 1992. The existing rule currently provides, as follows, in relevant part: 12A-1.094 Public Works Contracts. This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and materials for use in public works, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), This rule shall not apply to non- public works contracts as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1.051, F.A.C. . . . In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. "Contractor" is one who is engaged in the repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real property. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works where the sale of tangible personal property is made to or by contractors involved in public works contracts. Such contracts shall include, but not be limited to, building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard contracts. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or affixture to real property is determined by the objective and presumed intent of the parties, based on the nature and use of the project and the degree of affixation to realty. Mobile homes and other mobile buildings are deemed fixtures if they (1) bear RP license tags, or (2) have the mobile features (such as wheels and/or axles) removed, and are placed on blocks or footings and permanently secured with anchors, tie-down straps or similar devices. * * * (4) The exemption in subsection (3)(a) is a general exemption for sales made to the government. The exception in subsection (2)(a) is a specific exception for sales to contractors. A determination of whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is governed by subsection (2)(a) or is a sale to a governmental body as provided by subsection (3) of this rule based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will give special consideration to factors which govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Such factors include provisions which govern bidding, indemnification, inspection, acceptance, delivery, payment, storage, and assumption of the risk of damage or loss for the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss is a paramount consideration. A party may be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the party either: bears the economic burden of posting a bond or obtaining insurance covering damage or loss; or enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such bond or insurance. Other factors that may be considered by the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program include whether: the contractor is authorized to make purchases in its own name; the contractor is jointly or severally liable to the vendor for payment: purchases are not subject to prior approval by the government; vendors are not informed that the government is the only party with an independent interest in the purchase; and whether the contractors are formally denominated as purchasing agents for the government. Sales made pursuant to so called "cost-plus", "fixed-fee", "lump sum", and "guaranteed price" contracts are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program that such sales are, in substance, tax exempt sales to the government. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended by Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida. The statute currently states, as follows, in pertinent part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The department shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property. In developing these rules, assumption of the risk of damage or loss is of paramount consideration in the determination. Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida, was the result of Respondent's "map-tracking" exercise to ensure that its rules were supported by appropriate legislation. Proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, are at issue here. Those rules, as revised by the proposed amendments, read as follows: This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and material for use in public works contracts, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), F.S. This rule shall not apply to non-public works contracts for the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property, as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1,051, F.A.C. In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. 1. "Contractor" is one that supplies and installs tangible personal property that is incorporated into or becomes a part of a public facility pursuant to a public works contract with a governmental entity exercising its authority in regard to the public property or facility. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier, or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Contractor" does not include a person that furnishes tangible personal property that is not affixed or appended in such a manner that it is incorporated into or becomes a part of the public property or public facility to which a public works contract relates. A person that provides and installs tangible personal property that is freestanding and can be relocated with no tools, equipment, or need for adaptation for use elsewhere is not a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Contractor" does not include a person that provides tangible personal property that will be incorporated into or becomes part of a public facility if such property will be installed by another party. Examples. A vendor sells a desk, sofas, chairs, tables, lamps, and art prints for the reception area in a new public building. The sales agreement requires the vendor to place the furniture according to a floor plan, set up the lamps, and hang the art prints. The vendor is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the vendor is not installing the property being sold in such a way that it is attached or affixed to the facility. A security system vendor furnishes and install low voltage wiring behind walls, motion detectors, smoke alarms, other sensors, control pads, alarm sirens, and other components of a security system for a new county courthouse. The components are direct wired, fit into recesses cut into the walls or other structural elements of the building, and are held in place by screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The security system is installed and affixed in such a manner that it ha been incorporated into the courthouse. A vendor enters an agreement to provide and install the shelving system for a new public library. The shelves are built to bear the weight of books. The shelf configuration in each unit maximizes the number of books the shelves can hold. The number and size of the units ordered is based on the design for the library space. The units will run floor to ceiling and will be anchored in place by bolts or screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The shelving system will be affixed in such a manner that it becomes a part of the public library. e. A manufacturer agrees to provide the prestressed concrete forms for a public parking garage. A construction company is awarded the bid to install those forms and build the garage. The manufacturer is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the manufacturer will not install any tangible personal property that becomes part of the garage. The construction company is a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Governmental entity" includes any agency or branch of the United States government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state. The term includes authorities created by statute to operate public facilities using public funds, such as public port authorities or public-use airport authorities. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work that involves installing tangible personal property in such a manner that it becomes a part of a public facility. For purposes of this rule, a public facility includes any land, improvement to land, building, structure, or other fixed site and related infrastructure thereon owned or operated by a governmental entity where governmental or public activities are conducted. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works, although such projects are included within the term. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or fixture to real property will be determined by reference to the definitions contained in Rule 12A-1.051(2), F.A.C. * * * (4)(a) The exemption in s. 212.08(6), F.S., is a general exemption for sales made directly to the government. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a governmental entity or a taxable sale to or use by a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is a taxable sale to or use by a contractor or an exempt direct sale to a governmental entity based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The following criteria that govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property will be considered in determining whether a governmental entity rather than a contractor is the purchaser of materials: Direct Purchase Order. The governmental entity must issue its purchase order directly to the vendor supplying the materials the contractor will use and provide the vendor with a copy of the governmental entity's Florida Consumer's Certification of Exemption. Direct Invoice. The vendor's invoice must be issued to the governmental entity, rather than to the contractor. Passage of Title. The governmental entity must take title to the tangible personal property from the vendor at the time of purchase or delivery by the vendor. 5. Assumption of the Risk of Loss. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss by the governmental entity at the time of purchase is a paramount consideration. A governmental entity will be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the governmental entity bears the economic burden of obtaining insurance covering damage or loss or directly enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such insurance. Sales are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible division that such sales are, in substance, tax-exempt direct sales to the government. Respondent's staff assisted various industry groups in drafting proposed legislation for the 2001 and 2002 legislative sessions that would expand the sales tax exemption for public works contracts. The Legislature did not enact any of these proposals. The proposed rule amendments reflect Respondent's current practice regarding tax exemptions for public works contracts. The proposed amendments detail all factors, criteria, and standards that Respondent considers in determining whether transactions qualify for the exemption set forth in Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes. The existing version of Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, as revised in 1992, does not reflect these factors. In drafting the proposed revisions to Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent's staff considered statutory language, questions asked by taxpayers, and cases involving protests of audit assessments. Respondent's staff also considered areas that it believed failed to provide clear guidance as to how taxpayers could structure transactions to avoid the tax. Finally, Respondent's staff considered the decisions in Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 403 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 422 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1982). As a general rule, a for-profit corporation instead of the contractor is liable to pay sales tax when the contractor agrees to purchase items and to resell the items to the corporation such that the corporation takes possession and ownership thereof. This would be true regardless of whether the contractor or some other individual eventually installs the items on the for-profit corporation's property or in its facility. In either instance, the contractor, as a reseller of tangible personal property, is a dealer who has the obligation to collect the sales tax from the for-profit corporation. The for-profit corporation would be the ultimate consumer of the items. If a contractor resells items to a non-governmental customer, who enjoys tax-exempt status, while the items are still tangible personal property, no sales tax is due. In such a case, it makes no difference whether the contractor or some other individual later installs the items. The taxability of sales to or by contractors who repair, alter, improve and construct real property pursuant to non-public works contracts is governed by Rule 12A-1.051, Florida Administrative Code, which states as follows in relevant part: Scope of the rule. This rule governs the taxability of the purchase, sale, or use of tangible personal property by contractors and subcontractors who purchase, acquire, or manufacture materials and supplies for use in the performance of real property contracts other than public works contracts performed for governmental entities, which are governed by the provisions of Rule 12A-1.094, F.A.C. . . . Definitions. For purposes of this rule, the following terms have the following meanings: * * * (c)1. "Fixture" means an item that is an accessory to a building, other structure, or to land, that retains its separate identity upon installation, but that is permanently attached to the realty. Fixtures include such items as wired lighting, kitchen or bathroom sinks, furnaces, central air conditioning units, elevators or escalators, or built-in cabinets, counters, or lockers. 2. In order for an item to be considered a fixture, it is not necessary that the owner of the item also own the real property to which the item is attached. . . . * * * (g) "Real property" means land, improvements to land, and fixtures. It is synonymous with the terms "realty" and "real estate." Pursuant to the statute and the proposed rule amendments, contractors who purchase tangible personal property that goes into or becomes a part of a public works are not entitled to an exemption from paying sales tax. Such a contractor would be the ultimate consumer of the tangible personal property and not a dealer. The statute and the rule at issue here require Respondent to look at the substance instead of the form of each transaction to determine when sales tax is due. To say that no tax is due anytime a contractor agrees to purchase and resell items to a governmental customer, such that the governmental customer takes possession and ownership thereof before the same contractor installs the items, would be contrary to the statute. To find otherwise would place form over substance, allowing the contractor and the governmental entity to avoid the statutorily imposed tax by casting the transaction as a resale. The proposed rule amendments do not expand the sales and/or use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Instead, they implement the statutory provision requiring governmental contractors to pay sales tax when they supply and install items in a governmental project pursuant to a public works contract. Depending on the circumstances, "public works" include a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns the real property. It also includes a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns a public facility located on real property owned by a private individual. The term "public works" includes a public facility which is owned and operated by a governmental entity for the purpose of conducting governmental activities regardless of who owns the real property on which it is located. According to the statute, Respondent's rules must give special consideration to the status of tangible personal property "before its affixation to real property." This provision does not mean that a transaction is not taxable unless the tangible personal property becomes a "fixture" or "appurtenance" to real property. Instead, Respondent's proposed rule amendments properly implement the broader legislative intent to tax any sale to a contractor who supplies and installs tangible personal property in public works. Respondent looks first to see whether the tangible personal property will be a fixture or improvement to real property. Next, Respondent must determine whether the tangible personal property will be permanently attached and function as a part of a public works project that does not fit the definition of real property. For example, a port authority may operate an office out of a permanently docked ship. The statute directs Respondent to consider the assumption of risk of damage or loss to be most important but not the only factor in determining whether the sale of tangible personal property is taxable. In addition to the assumption of risk of loss, the proposed rule amendments require a nontaxable sale to show the following: (a) a direct purchase order to the vendor who will supply materials to the contractor; (b) a direct invoice from the vendor rather than the contractor; (c) direct payment to the vendor; and (d) passage of title at time of purchase or delivery. The five factors are inclusive of the elements that Respondent will consider when determining whether of a sale is, in substance, a direct nontaxable sale to a governmental entity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I hereby recommend that the Petitioner's challenge to the Department's determination of sales taxes due herein pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, be denied and that the revised assessment notices be upheld as issued. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Davis, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert F. Nunez, Esquire Post Office Box 12726 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Mercer Farrington, Esquire Post Office Box 1548 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc., is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate entity. Respondent, Roger L. Davis is now a registered real estate broker and from July 30, 1976 to the present time, has been a registered real estate broker, President and active firm member of Respondent, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. Respondent Davis, by and through agents of Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc., solicited from property owners in the Dade, Broward and Palm Beach County areas the payment of a fee in return for listings to sell their property in a magazine which was published by Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. The complaint alleges that in its solicitation efforts, Respondents advised property owners that the magazine would be published monthly and contain the property owners listing; that such representations were false and known to be false when made; that subscribers relied upon such representations which prompted them to simultaneously pay a listing fee; that none of said fees received subsequent to July 1, 1976 were held or maintained in a trust account and that by reason thereof, the Respondents are guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, false promises, etc. within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through President Davis is additionally guilty of collecting an advance fee without depositing 75 percent thereof in a trust account in violation of Subsection 475.452, Florida Statutes, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. The complaint alleges further that the Respondents, as a means to assure the receipt of said deferred payments, recorded the deferred payment contract amount as liens against the real property interest of those who chose this method of payment for the service to be performed by Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. Based thereon, the complaint alleges that the Respondents have placed upon the public records of the county, a lien which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, real property for the purpose of collecting a commission or to coerce the payment of money to the broker in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(j) Florida Statutes, and derivatively in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Further, the complaint alleges that approximately 207 contracts were recorded in Broward County as liens of which there presently remains outstanding approximately 187 liens against the real property interests of those who chose the deferred payment method of compensation to Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc.; that Respondent has failed to take any steps to remove said liens from the public records and that by reason thereof, Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through its President, Roger L. Davis, is guilty of false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The complaint also alleges that Ronald Kavin, during times material, was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc.; that pursuant to the terms of his (Kavin) employment agreement, Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through its President, Roger L. Davis, paid the sums of $250 and $150 by checks dated September 16 and 29, 1976, respectively to salesman Kavin which were returned for nonsufficient funds. Based thereon, the complaint alleges that the Respondents are guilty of dishonest dealing in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Based thereon, the complaint concludes that the Respondents are guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show that they are so dishonest and untruthful that the money, property transactions and rights of investors and those with whom they may sustain a confidential relation may not be safely entrusted to them, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(3), Florida Statutes. An examination of the record compiled herein reveals that sometime during the month of March, 1975, a corporate brokerage agreement was entered into between Jeff Davey, James McKay and Marylin Benjamin. As a means of doing business, the parties utilized a previously established Florida corporation, Macoda, Inc. James McKay was President of the corporation and Jeff Davey and Marylin Benjamin were Vice Presidents with Benjamin also serving as active broker. Jeff Davey was the son-in-law of President McKay who advanced the initial funds for capitalizing the corporation. Jeff Davey was charged with publishing and distributing the magazine, ensuring that signs were placed on the property of owners who utilized the service, and taking photos of such properties. Messr. McKay envisioned establishing a profitable, ongoing venture for his son-in-law and daughter. As originally conceived, the corporation planned to publish a magazine which would illustrate real property that was available for sale by owners in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties. The procedure simply stated involved putting the sellers of property in contact with buyers so that a viewing time could be arranged between them. Further negotiations between seller and prospective buyer were usually handled solely between them without any input or assistance from the personnel of Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. During the early days of the corporate venture, monies collected from advertisers and all publication expenses, office expenses and salaries were handled by Jeff Davis and/or James McKay. In the early months of the operation, Messrs. Davey and McKay, pursuant to guidance and counseling from their accountants and lawyers, collateralized the listing fee contracts and used them as receivables to defray the steadily mounting negative cash flow resulting from the business operations. Sometime in December, 1975, Jeff Davey left the country for personal reasons. Thereafter, Messr. McKay took a more active role in the publication of the magazine and took sole charge of financial matters and policy decisions. The best guesstimate is that during this period, the venture was operating at a deficit of approximately $200,000 and was committed to substantial fixed overhead expenses. Mr. McKay who was retired and wealthy, contacted Respondent Roger L. Davis, who was then the publisher of a business and financial opportunity magazine and engaged his services to try to sell the business. Respondent Davis advertised the business in his financial opportunity publication for the asking price of $50,000. After several months of screening prospects, it became apparent to Respondent Davis that he would be unsuccessful in his efforts to locate a prospective buyer for the business and so advised the owner, Messr. McKay. During June or July of 1976, Respondent Davis offered to purchase the business for the outstanding obligations which amounted to approximately $12,000. At the outset of his assumption, Messr. Davis satisfied outstanding obligations of approximately $7,000 which were due to the printer. That amount also represented outstanding bills for rent, phone, salaries and other current expenses. Respondent Davis testified that when he purchased the business in June, 1976, the books were in a shambles and it was extremely difficult to determine what receivables the corporation was due and what obligations were due and owing. His testimony which was corroborated by his ex-wife, Ann Davis, reveals that he (Davis) made an honest good faith effort to satisfy all outstanding obligations with the limited funds available. He was able to obtain extensions from the printer so that approximately 15,000 copies of the magazine's November issue was printed. Respondent Davis found difficulty in physically laying out the magazine due to his lack of experience in layout work. By this time, Davis had exhausted all of his available revenues from the service and he had no funds to hire personnel to perform those functions. He contacted several property owners who had a listing agreement with Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. after he took over its operations and was able to determine that approximately 50 - 60 property owners had in fact sold their houses and therefore no longer needed the service. He also testified that he was not responsible for filing the liens on the property of owners who utilized the deferred payment plan with Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. He related several instances wherein he, when confronted by a property owner and was advised that an outstanding lien was affecting the title to their property, gave a release or satisfaction for the lien. When Respondent Davis took over the operations of the business, he retained the services of Ronald Kavin for office and sales manager in overall charge of initiating sales. His overall responsibilities included training salesmen, making appointments for sales persons and assuring that they kept appointments. Approximately September 16, 1976, Messr. Kavin approached Respondent Davis for $250 which he needed to pay a garage repair bill. Messr. Davis credibly testified that he advised Messr. Kavin that although he had no money, he would issue him a check which should not be deposited until he assured him that sufficient funds were on deposit in the bank to cover the check. Approximately two weeks later, Messr. Kavin again approached Messr. Davis for $150 to defray expenses which he had incurred in his duties as office manager. Again Respondent Davis explained that while he had no money, he expected to obtain some money shortly from an investor whom he had arranged financing for some property which he owned and that he (Kavin) should not attempt to negotiate the check until he had prior clearance from Davis that he had sufficient monies on deposit in the bank. Messr. Kavin attempted to negotiate both checks which were returned for nonsufficient funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, I hereby recommend that the registration of the Respondent corporation, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. and the license and registration of Respondent Roger Davis be placed on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttmann, III, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Roger L. Davis, Esquire c/o "A" Inc. 1980 North Atlantic Boulevard Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, An agency of the state of Florida, Plaintiff, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 3218 BROWARD COUNTY DOAH CASE NO. 77-2065 HOME OWNERS DIRECT SALES INC. and ROGER L. DAVIS, Respondents. /
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against Respondent's real estate broker's license for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes and Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. In particular, Petitioner gains its authority from Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated in accordance with those chapters. Respondent is, and at all times material to this case, was a licensed Florida real estate broker, issued license number 05125020 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker t/a Spruce Creek Fly-In Realty, 210 Cessna Boulevard, Daytona, Florida 32124. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent served as a selling broker for N.E. Cornish related to property located in Volusia County, Florida. The property was described as lot M-211 and the North 1/2 of lot M-212, Fly-In Spruce Creek, Inc., subdivision unit 1, as recorded in MB 33, Page 108, the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. In furtherance of the sale of the property, Respondent prepared a real estate sales contract. Pursuant to the contract, Alan Wright and Sara Wright agreed to purchase the property from Mr. Cornish, subject to contingencies set forth in the contract. The contract was entered into by the principals and accepted by Respondent as real estate broker. The last person to sign the contract executed the contract on December 13, 1995. The Wrights paid a cash deposit of $1,000 at the inception of the contract. That money was placed in Respondent's escrow account for his real estate brokerage firm. Under the contract, the Wrights had the option to purchase the property at $180,000 until April 1, 1996, subject to other offers being presented to Mr. Cornish in the amount of $180,000 or more. In no event were the Wrights obligated to pay more than $195,000, should Mr. Cornish receive an offer from another buyer. As part of the contract option to purchase with the first right of refusal, should Mr. Cornish receive another bonafide offer equal to the $180,000 option to purchase by the Wrights, and should the Wrights exercise their option within two working days, the Wrights were obligated to make an additional deposit of $9,000 to perfect their purchase. Once the Wrights exercised the option and paid the additional $9,000, it was incumbent upon Mr. Cornish, at the buyer's expense, to have the lots combined as one, with one assessment obtaining for the monies owed to the property owners' association for annual assessments associated with the subdivision. Finally, the contract stated that the failure by the Wrights to exercise their option to purchase by April 1, 1996, would cause the forfeiture of the $1,000 deposit. Sometime in January 1996, Mr. Wright became convinced that the lots could not be combined for purposes of the property owners' association assessment. He expressed this sentiment to the Respondent in a letter dated January 24, 1996, which the Respondent received. In pertinent part, the correspondence stated: . . . I have been told by numerous property owners, and the Manager of the POA, that it is not possible to combine two single family lots into one lot with one assessment. I am told that it has never been done before and is not likely to happen now. Lenny, based upon the very real possibility that the lots cannot be combined to one assessment, I am requesting a resolution of this question now. Your suggestion that I initiate such action by giving you an additional $9,000 is unacceptable because Sara and I have not yet decided whether or not we will eventually purchase the lot. I am not asking that Mr. Cornish actually combine the lots at this time. I simply want written assurance from the POA that it can be done. I want to know now, not some time after we return to Michigan having decided to buy the lot. If you are unable or unwilling to obtain such written assurance from the POA, please return our $1,000 deposit. In response to the correspondence dated January 24, 1996, Respondent spoke to Mr. Wright, and in that conversation Respondent showed Mr. Wright information purportedly describing how lot M-220 in the subdivision had been a multiple family lot with eight assessments and the county had agreed to bring the zoning into a single lot, resulting in a single assessment. Respondent also told Mr. Wright that Mr. Cornish was not interested in combining the Cornish lots into one lot without a sale, because of the belief that it diminished the value of the property. Mr. Cornish was only interested in combining the two lots into one when there was a purchaser desirous of having a single lot. Consistent with the contract, Respondent reminded Mr. Wright that Mr. Cornish was willing to combine the two lots upon receipt of the additional deposit of $9,000. Following this conversation, Respondent believed that Mr. Wright was satisfied that the lots could be combined for purposes of achieving a single assessment by the property owner's association, but it was not resolved whether Mr. Wright would be willing to pay the additional deposit of $9,000. Respondent held the perception that Mr. Wright would make that decision at a later date. There were other conversations following the January 24, 1996, correspondence. In these conversations Mr. Wright demanded a refund of the $1,000 deposit. In conversations between Respondent and Mr. Wright, Respondent was unwilling to refund the $1,000 deposit because he believed the lots could be combined into one. Without Respondent's knowledge, Mr. Wright wrote to the Petitioner on March 15, 1996, to complain about Respondent's conduct. That correspondence enclosed a copy of the contract between Mr. Cornish and the Wrights. It related Mr. Wright's belief that the two lots could not be converted into a single lot for purposes of the property owner's association assessment. This belief was premised upon information purportedly obtained from the attorney representing the property owners' association to that effect. The complaint letter also referred to a perceived problem concerning suitability of the subject lots for placement of a hangar sufficiently large to accommodate an airplane which Respondent intended to place on the property. (The community where the subject property is located is a community in which the property owners are allowed to maintain airplanes and hangars for the airplanes on their real property.) The correspondence directed to Petitioner alludes to attempts made by Mr. Wright to have the Respondent return the $1,000 deposit. The letter to Petitioner from Mr. Wright refers to Respondent's refusal to return the deposit money based upon the assumption that the two lots could be converted into one lot for purposes of the property owners' association assessment. The complaint letter from Mr. Wright also alleges that Respondent had stated that the suitability of the lot for placement of the hangar and airplane was a case of "buyer beware" and not Respondent's problem. As a result of Mr. Wright's complaint, Petitioner wrote to Respondent with a copy of the March 15, 1996, letter from Mr. Wright attached to Petitioner's correspondence. The correspondence from Petitioner to Respondent was received by Respondent on April 3, 1996. The Petitioner's correspondence indicated that an investigator for Petitioner would visit Respondent's office concerning the complaint by Mr. Wright. Having received the Petitioner's correspondence dated April 3, 1996, with Mr. Wright's March 15, 1996, letter attached, Respondent replied to Petitioner with his own correspondence. Respondent's reply stated in pertinent part: . . .We are a Planned Unit Development with a Property Owners Association and we have common property for which there are assessments made to gain revenue to maintain. There are Single Family lots and homes with one assessment, Commercial Lots and buildings with three assessments and Multi Family lots with eight assessments. The larger Single Family lots have been sold and several residents have tried to combine several lots into one lot to avoid several assessments. This cannot be done as our rules state that combining of lots to avoid assessments is not permitted. Several Multi Family lots are presently being upgraded to Large Single Family lots. These lots are not being combined, they are being rezoned. After rezoning they will be Single Family with Single Family assessment. Many of our residents prefer this to have additional condominium units constructed. We also have residents with opposing views. Mr. Wright, who told me that he was in real estate in Michigan, looked at building sites at Spruce Creek and made a deposit on a lot that was multi family zoned. The contract was to hold the lot while he looked at other lots to insure he found the most suitable for his purpose and to see if the community was the one in which he wished to settle. Mr. Wright had stipulated that he wanted the lot to be changed to a single family lot and to have a single family Property Owners assessment. The owner agreed and that this would be done after Mr. Wright had decided that this lot was the one that he actually wanted. Mr. Wright was to make an additional deposit before April 1, 1996 indicating he wanted the lot and the owner would go ahead with the change. Mr. Wright did not make the additional deposit. Mr. Wright, during his two month visit, in which he and his wife rented a home from us, decided to mount his own investigation and unfortunately spoke mainly with persons with opposing views of the lot owner and not many of persons with the same views of the owner, who is incidentally one of the original developers of Spruce Creek, and Mr. Wright decided that the owner could not change the lot. My interpretation of the contract is hat [sic] upon the additional deposit, the owner of the lot had to perform to the satisfaction of the Buyer. If he could not the Seller had to return all deposits. I don't see anywhere where it says - upon determination of the Buyer, all the deposits will be returned. I kept the Seller apprised of the ongoing situation and he does not wish to return the deposit at this time. I, at this time can not see a dispute. I am holding the deposit money in my sales escrow account and am awaiting further contact by your office. According to Respondent, after April 1, 1996, Mr. Cornish asked Respondent whether Mr. Wright still intended to buy the property in question. Respondent told Mr. Cornish that Mr. Wright, "still wants the lot." In his testimony Respondent indicated that Mr. Cornish stated that Mr. Cornish wanted Respondent, "just to hang on to the money in the escrow account . . . ." Subsequently, by an administrative complaint signed October 16, 1996, FDPR Case No. 96-81064, Petitioner accused Respondent of violating Chapter 475, Florida Statutes and Rule 61J-10.032, Florida Administrative Code related to the $1,000 deposit paid by Mr. Wright. In correspondence dated October 24, 1996, Respondent addressed the administrative complaint in which he stated: Please be advised that the undersigned is having a dispute over escrow funds with a Mr. Allan Wright, I understand that you are aware of this fact but I have been told that I still should inform the Commission in writing. The undersigned knows that the Commission must be notified of any disputes over escrow funds but I was unaware that I had a dispute until receiving notice from Investigator James Pierce on April 3, 1996. Once receiving notice from I made the assumption that you were notified. In Leonard Ohlsson, d/b/a Spruce Creek Fly-In Realty, Plaintiff vs. Alan Wright and Sarah Wright, his wife and N. E. Cornish, Defendants, in the County Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Florida, Case No. 96-12238- COD1-71, Respondent filed a complaint for interpleader concerning the $1,000 deposit. This complaint was filed on December 18, 1996. On February 26, 1997, the Court disposed of the $1,000 deposit which had been interpled with the Court.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Rule 61J2-10.032(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $1,000 and requiring the Respondent to complete a 30-hour broker management course within 90 days of issuance of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea D. Perkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 William A. Parsons, Esquire Woerner & Parsons 2001 South Ridgewood Avenue South Daytona, Florida 32119 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation for profit located at 1933 Commonwealth Lane, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case Petitioner has operated a business in Florida. Respondent is a Florida state agency. Its duties include the administration of Community Development Block Grants in Florida, (hereinafter referred to as CDBG). Petitioner requested Respondent to reimburse money related to administrative services which Petitioner provided to Okaloosa County, Florida related to a CDBG. The petition for those monies was filed in February, 1993. The request for reimbursement was in the amount of $43,274.92. Respondent denied that request. In turn, by opportunity provided by Respondent, Petitioner sought an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge Respondent's preliminary agency decision denying the request for reimbursement. The case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings to assign a hearing officer to conduct a formal hearing to resolve the dispute between Petitioner and Respondent. The administrative proceeding concerning the reimbursement claim was considered in the case Clark, Roumelis & Associates, Inc., v. State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs, Respondent, DOAH Case No. 93-1306. At the time Petitioner initiated the action to seek reimbursement and was afforded the point of entry to contest the preliminary action denying the reimbursement request, Petitioner employed no more than twenty-five (25) full- time employees and had a net worth of not more than $2 million dollars. Following a formal hearing a recommended order was entered by the undersigned which recommended that Petitioner be paid $43,274.92. The recommended order was entered on September 29, 1993. In turn, Respondent's final order dated December 28, 1993 denied the petition for reimbursement. Petitioner took an appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, Case No. 94-0151. In an Opinion filed February 16, 1995, the First District Court of Appeal decided in favor of Petitioner by reversing Respondent's final order and remanding the case. Respondent sought rehearing and rehearing on en banc which was denied on March 24, 1995 by the First District Court of Appeal. Respondent sought further review before the Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 85,581, which denied that review by not accepting jurisdiction. That decision by the Florida Supreme Court was made on September 6, 1995. On September 13, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Through that action Petitioner sought the reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs associated with DOAH Case No. 93-1306 and the appeals that followed the December 28, 1993 final order denying the reimbursement. Contrary to the requirements set forth in Section 60Q-2.035(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent did not file a response to the petition within twenty (20) days of the filing of the petition seeking reimbursement attorney's fees and costs. Neither party has sought an evidentiary hearing for the Division of Administrative Hearings to consider Petitioner's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs. Therefore this case has proceeded without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code. In that setting Respondent is deemed to have waived its opportunity to contest whether the attorney's fees and costs claimed are unreasonable; whether Petitioner is not a prevailing small business party in DOAH Case No. 93-1306; whether Respondent's actions in denying Petitioner's claim for monetary reimbursement related to administrative services provided to Okaloosa County, Florida in the CDBG was a decision which was substantially justified in law and fact; whether circumstances exist which would make the award of attorney's fees and costs unjust and to present the defense that the Respondent was only a nominal party in DOAH Case No. 93-1306. See Rule 60Q-2.035(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Consistent with Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code the following additional facts are found for or against the award of attorney's fees and costs, based upon the pleadings and supporting documents in the files and records in the Division of Administrative Hearings: Petitioner is a small business party and a prevailing small business party in the matters considered in DOAH Case No. 93-1306 and the court appeals that followed. Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the administrative proceedings of this action, 140.8 hours were expended to the date of Respondent's Final Order of December 28, 1993. Total Fees: $21,120.00." Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the administrative proceedings of this action, $2,141.78 in costs were incurred to the date of Respondent's Final Order of December 28, 1993." Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the appellate proceedings in this action (First District Court of Appeal Case No. 94-0151 in Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 85,581), 79.0 hours were expended and $310.66 in costs were incurred to the date of the Supreme Court's denial of September 6, 1995. Total Fees: $13,258.00. Total Costs: $310.66." The affidavits submitted by Petitioner concerning the claim for attorney's fees and costs incurred to the date of Respondent's final order of December 28, 1993, failed to adequately " . . . reveal the nature and extent of the services rendered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, [and] hearings . . . in the proceeding" by "itemizing" the claim. Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes. By contrast, the attorney's affidavit filed for attorney's fees and costs in the appellate proceedings was adequate to identify services rendered by the attorney and costs incurred related to appeals in the proceeding. Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes. The amount of attorney's fees and costs for appellate proceedings is within the $15,000.00 cap for recovery of attorney's fees and costs as set forth in Section 57.111(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner completed an application for home energy assistance benefits in mid-November, 1983. The application was not submitted to the Respondent until December 12, 1983, but the information contained in the application was correct as of the date the Petitioner signed it, November 10, 1983. Shortly after completing the application, the petitioner was laid-off from his employment with McDowell Concrete. Specifically, Petitioner was unemployed from the end of November until the end of January, 1984. In December, 1983 Petitioner applied for and received food stamps and he began receiving unemployment benefits. On December 22, 1983, Respondent mailed a letter to Petitioner requesting income verification. However, the Petitioner and his family went out-of-state for the Christmas Holidays, departing approximately December 23, 1983 and returning approximately December 31, 1983. During this time period, mail was delivered to Petitioner's residence and was allowed to accumulate in the mailbox. Petitioner denies ever having received the letter which was admitted as Respondent's Exhibit 1. Additionally, Respondent presented evidence that the usual practice of the agency is to mail such letters in envelopes with returned addresses, but Respondent was unable to present any direct evidence that the letter requesting income verification was ever actually mailed to Petitioner. The HRS worksheet which was submitted with the Petition for Hearing further fails to indicate any other attempts to contact the Petitioner prior to denial of benefits. In fact, the HRS office in Fort Walton Beach, which accepted the application from Petitioner, was only a temporary office and was closed on December 23, 1983. Because Petitioner did not supply income verification by January 5, 1984, his application was denied. Petitioner was notified of the denial in February, 1984, and immediately wrote to the Respondent, questioning the denial. See Respondent's Exhibit 2. The income verification which Respondent sought had in fact been supplied to another office of Respondent in December, 1983, when Petitioner's household qualified for food stamps. As indicated on the application, the Petitioner authorized the Respondent to use the records from any other HRS program to determine eligibility for home energy assistance. Had Respondent checked its computer prior to denying this benefit, Respondent would have determined that the Williams household was eligible for home energy assistance based on a zero income for a family of four.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Nathaniel Williams, be declared eligible for participation in the Low Income Energy Assistance Program and that the appropriate benefits for which he is financially entitled be awarded to him. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5 day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Nathaniel Williams 116 Shell Avenue Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Maureen McGill, Esquire District I Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Post Office Box 12836 Pensacola, Florida 32576 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
