The Issue The issue presented is whether subsections (1) and (4) of Rule 7D-32.002, Florida Administrative Code, are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
The Issue Whether Respondent, in providing housing or related services to Petitioner, failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner’s disability.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation doing business pursuant to chapter 718, Florida Statutes, as Daytona Beach Riverhouse Condominium Association. Respondent is responsible for the day-to-day operations and management of Daytona Beach Riverside Condominiums. In May 2009, Petitioner rented Daytona Beach Riverhouse Condominium Unit B-103 from a third party who owns the unit. In that same month, Petitioner signed an application for lease/purchase with Respondent, which contains an acknowledgment of his receipt of the condominium association’s rules and regulations, declaration of condominium, and by-laws. There is also a pet registration form attached to the application which identifies one pet, a Jack Russell named “Peanut.” See Exhibit P-1. Petitioner alleges that he has a brain injury that requires him to have a dog as a service animal to assist him in his daily living. At the final hearing, Petitioner provided his own testimony to support his claim of a brain injury and need for a service dog. Petitioner’s testimony in that regard was unrebutted and is therefore credited. In addition, Respondent’s manager, Mary Cash, acknowledged receiving a letter from Petitioner’s doctor advising that Petitioner had a brain injury and needed a service dog. Petitioner otherwise, however, failed to prove the allegations of the Complaint. According to the Complaint, Respondent failed to make reasonable accommodation by refusing to allow Petitioner to use his two service animals (dogs) required because of Petitioner’s disability. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not submit any evidence indicating that Respondent failed to allow him to have one or more service dogs. Instead, Petitioner admitted that he lives in the condominium with two dogs, a service dog and a pet. Rather than submitting evidence in support of his Complaint, during the final hearing, Petitioner testified that Respondent, through employees, discriminated against him by harassing his dogs, entering his condominium unit without his permission, and moving or hiding his personal property within the unit. According to Petitioner, the personal property that Respondent moved in his condominium included his medications, a showerhead, a light in his dining room, and one of his dogs that he later found shut inside his walk-in closet. Respondent, through the testimony of Mary Cash, denied the allegations of the Complaint and testified that none of Respondent’s agents or employees had ever entered Petitioner’s condominium without his permission or moved any of Petitioner’s personal property. The testimony of the other witnesses besides Petitioner corroborated Mary Cash’s testimony. Mary Cash’s testimony is credited over Petitioner’s. While Petitioner may have believed that Respondent was harassing his dogs and going into his apartment, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s testimony in that regard was based on mere speculation. Other than his own testimony, Petitioner did not present any witness or evidence which supported his allegations against Respondent. The letter dated May 21, 2010, from Mary Cash to Petitioner, is written on behalf of Respondent. The letter discussed issues related to Petitioner’s two dogs causing disturbances. The letter also notified Petitioner that Respondent did not have a key to his top door lock and did not have a telephone number to reach Petitioner. The letter does not support the Complaint or any other allegation raised by Petitioner in this proceeding. In sum, Petitioner failed to submit evidence to support of his claim that Respondent failed to make reasonable accommodation for his disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2011. 1/ Mary Cash is Respondent’s manager. At the final hearing, Ms. Cash testified on behalf of Respondent. 2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2010 version. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry McIntire 719 South Beach Street, B-103 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 D. Michael Clower, Esquire 322 Silver Beach Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the violations as alleged and, if so, what civil penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. is the owner and operator of Four Oaks Mobile Home Village, a mobile home park located in Titusville, Brevard County, Florida. On or around June 27, 1986, Thomas Cayton, as President of T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. filed a prospectus for the park with Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. The filing statement provided that 49 lots would be offered for rent, and that none of the lots were occupied. The $10.00 per lot filing fee ($490.00) was paid. The filing was rejected as the form was deficient. Between the end of June 1986, and August 26, 1987, the date of the approval letter, eight versions of the prospectus were filed by the park owner and were reviewed by staff of the division. After each review, the owner was sent a letter outlining the deficiencies. At one point, sometime around June 1987, Mr. and Mrs. Cayton travelled to Tallahassee to meet with Selena Einwechter, the Supervisor of the Examination Section in the agency's Bureau of Mobile Homes. The prospectus submittals and correspondence to and from the Bureau comprise 425 pages. Between the filing of the first version of the prospectus and the final approval, approximately 14 months later, twelve lots were rented at Four Oaks Mobile Home Village. The lot numbers and dates of the rentals are: Lot #3 August 1, 1986 Lot #2 August 2, 1986 Lot #44 August 15, 1986 Lot #46 August 30, 1986 Lot #12 November 1, 1986 Lot #4 November 30, 1986 Lot #19 January 15, 1987 Lot #7 March 9, 1987 Lot #6 June 1, 1987 Lot #15 June 1, 1987 Lot #5 June 6, 1987 Lot #9 June 30, 1987 Six of the recitals are evidenced by written leases; the remainder were oral agreements, reflected in the office records of the park. All of the tenants commenced paying rent upon occupancy of the lot and no one was told that the leases were unenforceable. At the beginning of the process, on July 29, 1986, Thomas Cayton was sent a letter from the Bureau of Mobile Homes confirming that his prospectus filing had been received and was being examined. The bottom of the letter includes this statement, clearly displayed: NOTE: Section 723.011, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-31.01, Florida Administrative Code, requires the delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate by the Division prior to entering into enforceable rental agreements or renewal of existing rental agreements. Renewals of existing rental agreements or entering into new rental agreements without delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate will constitute a violation of the Florida Mobile Home Act. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1, composite) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Subsection 723.005(d)1., F.S. authorizes the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes to impose a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) against a mobile home park owner for each separate violation of Chapter 723, F.S. or regulation promulgated pursuant thereto. The statute and rule allegedly violated by Respondent provides as follows: 723.011 Disclosure prior to rental of a mobile home lot; prospectus, filing, approval.-- (1)(a) In a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots, the park owner shall file a prospectus with the diversion. Prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for a mobile home lot, the park owner shall deliver to the home owner a prospectus approved by the division. This subsection shall not be construed to invalidate those lot rental agreements for which an approved prospectus was required to be delivered and which was delivered on or before July 1, 1986, if the mobile home park owner had: Filed a prospectus with the division prior to entering into the lot rental agreement; Made a good faith effort to correct deficiencies cited by the division by responding within the time limit set by the division, if one was set; and Delivered the approved prospectus to the mobile home owner within 45 days of approval by the division. This paragraph shall not preclude the finding that a lot rental agreement is invalid on other grounds and shall not be construed to limit any rights of a mobile home-owner from seeking any remedies allowed by this chapter, including a determination that the lot rental agreement or any part thereof is unreasonable or unconscionable. (emphasis added) * * * 7D-31.001 Prospectus and Rental Agreement. * * * (13) The park owner shall deliver the prospectus to existing tenants prior to the renewal of their rental agreements or prior to entering into a new rental agreement. Once a tenant has been given a prospectus, the park owner shall not be required to provide another prospectus but shall provide amendments, as described in Rule 7D-30.004 and this rule. Because Four Oaks' prospectus was not approved until the end of August 1987, the 12 rental agreements entered between August 1, 1986 and June 30, 1987, violated the above provisions. Respondent claims that he thought that as long as the prospectus had been filed, he could enter into rental agreements. This would have been true under the original version of the Florida Mobile Home Act, passed by the Legislature in 1984. The relevant provision of that act is found in Section 720.302(1), F.S. (1984) as follows: Every mobile home park owner of a park which contains 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus or offering circular with the division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida, Part III) This section took effect on January 1, 1985, for parks with more than 100 lots, and on July 1, 1985 for parks with less than 100 lots. (Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida) The current version, reflected in Section 723.011, F.S., cited above, took effect on July 1, 1986. (Chapter 86-162, Laws of Florida) Respondent cannot avail himself of the "grand-father" provision of Section 723.011, since his rental agreements and prospectus approval occurred after July 1st. Further, the explicit language of the note on the July 29, 1986, letter should have put him on notice of the new requirements of the law. There are no guidelines for the imposition of a penalty, other than the $5,000.00 maximum per violation found in Section 723.006(5)(d)1. F.S. No evidence was presented as to prior violations by this Respondent. The extensive file evidences a good faith attempt to comply with a law that was still relatively new.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violation of Section 723.011(1)(a), F.S. (1986), as charged, and that a civil penalty of $100.00 per violation be imposed, for a total of $1,200.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coates, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas Cayton, Registered Agent 2475 Cheney Highway Titusville, Florida 3270 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed violations of The Condominium Act, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the appropriate action that should be taken by the Petitioner. Petitioner contends that the Respondent participated in board of directors' meetings regarding the Golden Lakes Village condominium, without first posting notice of the meetings and without maintaining minutes of the meetings as required by the provisions of The Condominium Act. Respondent denies the allegations.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Florida Planned Communities, Inc., is the developer of a condominium known as Golden Lakes Village, Phase B. The affairs of Golden Lakes Village are administered by a board of directors that is controlled by the developer. There are three members of the board. Two are selected by the developer, and one by unit owners within the condominium. The bylaws of the condominium provide that meetings of the board of directors shall be open to all unit owners and that notice of meetings shall be posted conspicuously at the condominium property forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting. The bylaws provide that a quorum of the directors means a majority of the entire board. The bylaws require that minutes of all meetings of the board of directors be kept. The condominium association maintains a minutes book. There are minutes from nine board of directors' meetings since 1979. Four of these meetings had as their purpose consideration of proposed budgets. Four were organizational meetings to elect officers. One was a special meeting called to consider a proposal to engage the services of a management company. Minutes were not kept for any other meetings of the board of directors that were conducted from 1979 until the present, neither was there any posting to advise unit owners of these meetings in advance. There were numerous meetings of the Board of Directors of Golden Lakes Village, Phase B, other than those that were properly noticed and for which minutes were taken. During these meetings, matters affecting the condominium were discussed. Many of the meetings were conducted on a very informal basis when the unit owners' representative on the board contacted one of the developer's representatives and asked for a meeting. Among the matters discussed were repairs to facilities, additional facilities, budget, and the like. It does not appear that business was conducted in this manner so as to hide the meetings from unit owners. Rather, the purpose appears to have been to conduct operations in a simple manner and to allow the unit owners' representative on the board ready access to the developer's representatives. While the motives of the developer do not appear to have been bad ones, conducting the meetings without first posting notice and without keeping minutes violated the provisions of the condominium bylaws.
The Issue Whether Respondents have violated Florida's Fair Housing Act by refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner because of her mental disability and familial status. If so, whether Petitioner should be granted the relief she has requested.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a single parent. She has three sons, aged 10, 12, and 14. At all times material to the instant case, her sons have lived with her in the same household. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has suffered from phobias and from anxiety and panic attacks. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has received social security disability benefits from the federal government based upon her mental disability. Summer Lakes is a rental apartment community in Oakland Park, Florida. Petitioner lived in an apartment at Summer Lakes with her three sons from June of 1994 to January of 1995. During the period of her tenancy, Petitioner experienced financial problems. As a result, she had difficulty making her rent payments. In January of 1995, she was evicted from her Summer Lakes apartment for nonpayment of rent. Following her eviction, she and her sons lived with her mother in her mother's house (where Petitioner and her sons still live). Petitioner's financial situation improved following her eviction. By August 12, 1996, she had been able to save a substantial sum of money. On or about that date (August 12, 1996), Petitioner returned to Summer Lakes to inquire about again renting an apartment in the community. Flags outside the rental office indicated that apartments were available for rent. Upon entering the rental office, Petitioner was greeted by Vicki Atkinson (now Keating), Summer Lakes' manager. Summer Lakes had had another manager when Petitioner had lived there previously. Petitioner filled out an application to lease an apartment in the community and handed it to Ms. Atkinson. She also presented to Ms. Atkinson various documents in an effort to show that she would be financially able to make the required rent payments. Among these documents were bank statements which reflected that Petitioner had approximately $25,000 in the bank. Petitioner, in addition, showed Ms. Atkinson paperwork Petitioner had received from the federal government regarding her social security disability benefits. The paperwork indicated that Petitioner had been awarded these benefits (monthly payments of $910.00) based upon the finding that she had a mental disability. Immediately after reviewing the paperwork, Ms. Atkinson told Petitioner, "We don't want your kind here." Petitioner pleaded with Ms. Atkinson to let her rent an apartment in the Summer Lakes community. She even offered to have someone co-sign her lease. Ms. Atkinson was unmoved. Claiming that Petitioner's income was insufficient, she refused to rent an apartment to Petitioner. Her refusal was actually based upon her desire not to rent to a person with a mental disability. In refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner, Ms. Atkinson was acting on behalf of the owner of Summer Lakes, Pittco Summer Lakes Associates, Ltd. (Pittco). Pittco no longer owns Summer Lakes and Ms. Atkinson no longer is its manager. Pittco sold Summer Lakes to SummerLake Oakland Park, Ltd., on or some time before July 1, 1998.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that, although Ms. Atkinson and Pittco committed a "discriminatory housing practice" by refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner because of Petitioner's mental disability and familial status, the Commission is without authority to grant the relief Petitioner has requested. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1998.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Lakeshore Club of Polk County Homeowners Association (Lakeshore Club), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Since 2004, Mr. Cosme has been a resident and homeowner in the Lakeshore Club of Polk County. He is of Hispanic descent with a national origin of Puerto Rico. Lakeshore Club is a homeowners' association located in Lakeland, Florida. A majority of the residents are Hispanic and of Puerto Rican origin. Ms. Jewell-Sanford, at all times relevant to the complaint, was the manager of Lakeshore Club. The record shows instances in 2005 and 2006 when Ms. Jewell-Sanford had directed that Spanish not be spoken in the homeowners’ association office. The record shows that, in 2005 an "English only" sign was posted and removed. Further, it was not disputed that, in 2006 Mr. Cosme had been asked by Ms. Jewell-Sanford to leave the office because he had been speaking Spanish to one of the office secretaries. In March 2010, Mr. Cosme went to the Lakeshore Club’s office to pick-up some papers. When Mr. Cosme entered the office, he walked past the receptionist to go to the back of the office. Ms. Jewell-Sanford told Mr. Cosme that he could not walk to the back of the office, because the office had rules. Mr. Cosme felt that action by Ms. Jewell-Sanford had been disrespectful to him. Ms. Horneck, the current president of the Lakeshore Club Board of Directors, credibly testified that Ms. Jewell- Sanford spoke little, if any, to Hispanic members of the homeowners’ association. On December 1, 2009, Lakeshore Club sent Mr. Cosme the following letter: Dear Mr. Cosme: This comes in reply to your "packet" of complaint that was given to the Board of Directors against our Association Manager, Elizabeth Jewell. Our attorney and management consultant both feel this is hearsay and opinion. The past boards were in disagreement with you on this issue as well as a majority of the currently seated board. We have been advised that should you continue in your harassment of any member of the association, its directors, agents or employees, the Board of Directors will be well advised to seek legal remedies up to and including injunctive relief. We regret that you have chosen to make this step necessary after coming to the agreement that the President of the Association handle these issues and it is our desire that we work things out peacefully from this point forward. Mr. Cosme felt this letter was threatening, because he feared that the homeowners’ association would seek to eject him from the community based on the terms "injunctive relief" contained in the letter. Ms. Horneck credibly testified that she had initialed the letter and that it was her intent that the parties get together and work out any problem. Mr. Cosme did not offer into evidence the information packet that he had provided the Board of Directors, which prompted the December 1, 2009, letter. Further, Mr. Cosme did not bring forward any evidence to show that Lakeshore Club had taken any action to deprive him of his home or any part of the community, or that it had taken any action against him. Ms. Jewell-Sanford had left her job as manager in April 2010.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================
