Findings Of Fact Cilla McCray, is a resident of Gadsden County. The parties have stipulated that on December 3, 1977, she was admitted to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital in an emergency medical condition, and that the treatment performed by the hospital was of an emergency nature. The parties have further stipulated that the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital is a regional referral hospital within the meaning of Section 154.304(4) , Florida Statutes (1977). Cilla McCray was admitted to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital on December 3, 1977, and was discharged on January 9, 1978. The total bill for her services amounted to $8,753.80. The Hospital submitted a bill to Gadsden County in the amount of $1,521.48 for the services. This latter amount is the maximum allowed to be billed in accordance with the Florida Health Care Responsibility Act. Gadsden County has refused to pay the bill, contending that the patient was not indigent. The patient has not paid the bill. Cilla McCray is married to Lawrence McCray. They have three children but only two of them reside at home. The oldest child is not supported by his parents. During the six months preceding the hospitalization of Cilla McCray her husband had average earnings of $80.00 per week as a logger. Mrs. McCray had earned a total of $732.60 for employment during the six months prior to her hospitalization. The McCray's thus had average monthly earnings during that period in excess of $450.00 per month.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered rejecting the bill submitted by the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital for medical services performed for Cilla McCray. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Shaw Curry, Esquire Post Office Box 706 Quincy, Florida 32351 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Chairman Board of County Commissioners Gadsden County Courthouse Quincy, Florida
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent was overpaid by the Medicaid program as set forth in Petitioner's Final Audit Report dated May 18, 2009, for the period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006.
Findings Of Fact AHCA audited certain of Nationwide's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006, hereinafter the audit period. Nationwide was an authorized Medicaid provider of home health services to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. During the audit period, Nationwide had been issued Medicaid provider number 650065000. No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Nationwide had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA (Agreement). No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Nationwide received payment for services to Medicaid recipients, including for the services that are being disputed in the Amended FAR. The Agreement provided, among other things, that the submission of Medicaid claims by Nationwide for payment constituted a certification that the services were provided in accordance with state and federal laws, as well as rules and regulations applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medicaid provider handbooks issued by AHCA. Pursuant to the federal Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contracted with Catapult Consultants, LLC (Catapult) to conduct several audits in Florida in cooperation with AHCA's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI). MPI's primary responsibility is to audit healthcare providers who participate in the Florida Medicaid Program and to ensure that Medicaid providers are only reimbursed for services that are in accordance with Florida Medicaid handbooks and rules. Catapult conducted the audit on Nationwide. MPI oversaw and reviewed Catapult's audit of Nationwide. Nationwide was noticed by CMS that Catapult would be conducting an audit on Nationwide for the audit period. MPI provided Catapult with a list of sample claims to be audited. Catapult requested from Nationwide (a) documentation and complete medical records for the recipients of the service, and (b) dates of service in the sample claims. Catapult reviewed the documents and records received from Nationwide to determine (a) what services were provided, and (b) whether the services were provided in compliance with Medicaid policies and procedures. Catapult prepared a draft audit report and provided it to CMS. CMS reviewed the draft audit report and forwarded it to MPI for review. On July 7, 2008, CMS sent a Preliminary Audit Report (PAR) to Nationwide. The PAR included seven findings and identified an overpayment of $367,097.10 for claims that, in whole or part, were not covered by Medicaid. Nationwide was requested, among other things, to provide a response, including additional documentation, i.e., documentation not previously provided, that Nationwide wanted considered. Nationwide responded and provided additional documentation for Catapult to consider. Catapult, in cooperation with MPI, reviewed the additional documentation. Catapult completed a final audit report and provided it to CMS for review. CMS reviewed the final audit report and forwarded it to MPI. On May 18, 2009, MPI issued the FAR. The FAR included four findings: Finding No.1, Inadequate Information in the Treatment Plan; Finding No. 2, Services Billed Without a Valid Plan of Care (POC); Finding No. 3, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse; and Finding No. 4, Maintaining Records. The FAR identified and demanded repayment of an overpayment of $326,866.72 and imposed a fine of $2,500.00, totaling a repayment of $329,366.72. Subsequently, Nationwide again submitted additional documentation. On January 7, 2010, MPI issued an Amended FAR which included three findings: Finding No. 1, Services Billed Without a Valid POC; Finding No. 2, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse; and Finding No. 3, Maintaining Records. The Amended FAR identified and demanded repayment of an overpayment of $31,765.20 and imposed a fine of $2,500.00, totaling a repayment of $34,265.20. The Amended FAR and the work papers associated with the audit, which were in the form of a spreadsheet containing contemporaneous notes of the auditor, were admitted into evidence. Only claims included and considered in the FAR were included and considered in the Amended FAR. Finding No. 1, Services Billed Without a Valid POC Three sub-findings were included in Finding No. 1, Services Billed Without a Valid POC: Sub-Finding No. 1, POC Not Signed by a Physician; Sub-Finding No. 2, Rubber Stamp Used for the Physician's Signature; and Sub-Finding No. 3, Billed for Hours Outside the POC Authorization. Eighteen claims, considered overpayments by AHCA, were associated with Finding No. 1. One of the 18 claims, claim 351, was associated with Sub-Finding No. 1. The POC for claim 351 was signed by a nurse practitioner, not a physician, in violation of the Medicaid handbook. Nationwide does not dispute that claim 351 is an overpayment. Seven of the 18 claims were associated with Sub- Finding No. 2: claims 6, 12, 46, 71, 120, 189, and 219. Nationwide disputes that the claims were overpayments. All of the seven claims were for the same recipient of the services provided, T. S. T. S.'s attending physician, Carlos Diaz, M.D., approved the care for T. S. Dr. Diaz admitted that the signatures on the POCs were rubber stamped; and that the POCs were rubber stamped either by him or the nurse practitioner, but that he was not always present with the nurse practitioner when she stamped the POCs. Also, Dr. Diaz did not initial the rubber stamped signatures. Ten of the 18 claims were associated with Sub-Finding No. 3: claims 281, 298, 119, 72, 145, 167, 176, 274, 210, and Only claim 2 is disputed by Nationwide as an overpayment. Regarding claim 2, Nationwide billed for services that were rendered after the date that the recipient of the services was discharged by Nationwide.1 Finding No. 2, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse The basis for Finding No. 2, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse, is that more hours were billed than were supported by the documentation. Fourteen claims were associated with Finding No. 2: claims 333, 381, 388, 669, 27, 47, 701, 52, 6, 18, 36, 44, 500, and 82. Only claims 333, 27, 47, 701, 6, 18, 36, and 44 are disputed by Nationwide as overpayments. Regarding claim 333, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. As to claim 27, Nationwide billed for 12 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 11.5 hours of service. Regarding claim 47, Nationwide billed for 12 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 11 hours of service. As to claim 701, Nationwide billed for 15 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 14 hours of service. Regarding claim 6, Nationwide billed for 12 hours of service. Nursing notes indicate that the recipient of the service received radiation therapy for two hours. The evidence demonstrates 10 hours of service. As to claim 18, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. Regarding claim 36, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. As to claim 44, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. The private duty nurses were LPNs. Private duty nurses are paid an hourly rate. No evidence was presented that payment was authorized for a portion of an hour. For total service hours that were one-half of an hour, AHCA rounded down to the nearest hour. As a result, claims 333, 18, 36, and 44 were rounded to six hours of service; and claim 27 was rounded to 11 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates that claims 333, 18, 36, and 44 were appropriately rounded to six hours of service; and claim 27 was appropriately rounded to 11 hours of service. Finding No. 3, Maintaining Records Three claims were associated with Finding No. 3: claims 622, 30, and 507. Nationwide failed to maintain records to support the services provided. Nationwide does not dispute that the three claims were overpayments. Accuracy of the Formula No dispute exists as to the accuracy of the formula used to calculate the total overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Nationwide Healthcare Services, Inc., received overpayments from the Medicaid program in the amount of $31,765.20 for the audit period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006; imposing a fine of $1,500.00; and requiring Nationwide Healthcare Services, Inc., to repay the overpayment of $31,765.20, plus a fine of $1,500.00, totaling $33,265.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2011.
Findings Of Fact On February 4, 1980, the Office of Medicaid Quality Control advised Respondent that a review of his Medicaid claims revealed that he billed the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services and further advised him that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program for such services. The letter further requested that Respondent provide Petitioner with a copy of his Board certification. (Although the letter admitted in evidence bears the date of February 4, 1979, it is obvious that the date contains a typographical error, since the letter pertains to services previously rendered in April of 1979, and refers to a rule which became effective January 1, 1980.) By letter dated February 8, 1980, Respondent replied, by advising Petitioner that he was neither Board-certified nor Board-eligible. Respondent included in his letter a recitation of his extensive experience and qualifications as a psychiatrist. In spite of Petitioner's failure to reply to his letter or to authorize him to do so, Respondent continued to bill Petitioner for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. During the summer of 1981, Petitioner determined that ineligible psychiatrists were billing the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients. In order to ascertain those qualified to bill the Program, form letters were sent to all providers of psychiatric services requesting documentation of Board eligibility or Board certification and further advising that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program. On August 5, 1981, that form letter was sent to Respondent. On August 11, 1981, Respondent replied to the August 5 form letter by again advising Petitioner that he was not Board-certified or Board-eligible and his extensive background and qualifications as a psychiatrist. Although no reply was made to his August 1981 letter to Petitioner, Respondent continued to bill the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. Respondent is not presently, and has never been, a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification. During the period from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982, Respondent billed for and was paid $38,252.75 by the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner never advised Respondent that he was entitled to bill the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients notwithstanding the fact that he was not a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered directing Respondent to reimburse to Petitioner the sum of $38,252.75 for payments received by him for psychiatric services rendered from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Medicaid Program Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 233 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce M. Boiko, Esquire 1000 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 212 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or AHCA) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid funds paid to Lee Memorial Health System, d/b/a Lee Memorial Hospital (Respondent or Lee Memorial), for services provided to undocumented aliens: between January 1 through December 31, 2006, as alleged in AHCA’s Amended Final Audit Report, dated July 25, 2014 (DOAH Case 14-4171); and January 1 through December 31, 2007, as alleged in AHCA’s Final Audit Report, dated March 12, 2015 (DOAH Case 15-3271).
Findings Of Fact THE PARTICIPANTS Lee Memorial was, at all relevant times, an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered goods and services provided to Medicaid recipients. As an enrolled provider, Lee Memorial’s participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of the Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Florida Medicaid Program requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to aliens. As indicated, the Agency is the single state agency responsible for administering or supervising the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program (Medicaid). § 409.901(15), Fla. Stat. PRELIMINARY: FLORIDA MEDICAID PROGRAM Section 409.901(16), Florida Statutes, provides that the Medicaid program is “authorized under Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act which provides for payments for medical items or services, or both, on behalf of any person who is determined by the Department of Children and Families, or, for Supplemental Security Income, by the Social Security Administration, to be eligible on the date of service for Medicaid assistance.” The Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal government and the individual states that have elected to participate in the program, of which Florida is one. Federal payments to the states for a portion of the cost of Medicaid are referred to as federal financial participation (FFP). AHCA administers the Medicaid program. AHCA is authorized to make payments to Medicaid providers for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. However, in order to receive Medicaid assistance, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) must determine the eligibility of applicants for that assistance. Pursuant to section 409.902(1), DCF has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.715 which addresses Medicaid eligibility for aliens. This rule provides: Aliens who would be eligible for Medicaid but for their immigration status are eligible only for emergency medical services. Section 409.901(10) F.S., defines emergency medical conditions. The Utilization Review Committee (URC) or medical provider will determine if the medical condition warrants emergency medical services and, if so, the projected duration of the emergency medical condition. The projected duration of the emergency medical condition will be the eligibility period provided that all other criteria are continuously satisfied. Emergency services are limited to 30 consecutive days without prior approval. For continued coverage beginning with the 31st day prior authorization must be obtained from the Agency for Health Care Administration (Medicaid Program Office). [Emphasis added]. The eligibility period for alien recipients is also described in rule 65A-1.702, which states: (2) Date of Eligibility. The date eligibility for Medicaid begins. This was formerly called the date of entitlement. The date of eligibility includes the three months immediately preceding the month of application (called the retroactive period). Eligibility for Medicaid begins the first day of a month if an individual was eligible any time during the month, with the following exceptions: * * * (c) Coverage for individuals eligible for the Emergency Medicaid for Aliens program begins the first day of a covered emergency and ends the day following the last day of the emergency medical situation. [Emphasis added]. DCF is performing an administrative function, solely to determine if the alien is eligible to receive medical assistance. DCF does not determine the duration of the emergency medical condition. DCF does not make a clinical medical determination regarding any patient because it does not have medical professionals to verify the information received. DCF has the dates of eligibility, but AHCA determines which bills are paid. AHCA relies on licensed medical physicians to determine the duration of the emergency medical services. Undocumented aliens do not qualify to receive full Medicaid benefits. As detailed in Agency handbooks, the aid is limited to the treatment of an emergency medical condition up to the point that condition has been alleviated. According to section 409.902(2), Medicaid eligibility is restricted to U.S. citizens and lawfully admitted noncitizens who meet the criteria provided in section 414.095(3), Florida Statute.4/ The criteria mean that undocumented or illegal aliens are generally not eligible for Medicaid assistance. All of the claims in dispute in this case involve payments on behalf of undocumented noncitizens who will be referred to herein as "aliens." As an exception to the general rule, episodic eligibility is available to an alien who is either pregnant or seeking "services [which] are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition." § 409.902(2)(b), Fla. Stat. "The eligibility of . . . a recipient [who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services] is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." § 409.904(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). An alien is eligible for medical assistance only if he has an "emergency medical condition" requiring "emergency medical services"--and then only for those services "necessary to treat [the] emergency medical condition" that are provided during the "period of the emergency," the conclusion of which terminates the alien's eligibility. The term "emergency medical condition" (EMC) is defined in section 409.901(10)(a) as: A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain or other acute symptoms, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following: Serious jeopardy to the health of a patient, including a pregnant woman or a fetus. Serious impairment to bodily functions. Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Section 409.901(11) provides the following definition of “emergency services and care”: [M]edical screening, examination, and evaluation by a physician, or, to the extent permitted by applicable laws, by other appropriate personnel under the supervision of a physician, to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists and, if it does, the care, treatment, or surgery for a covered service by a physician which is necessary to relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition, within the service capability of a hospital. Section 409.904(4) provides: A low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services. The eligibility of such a recipient is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations. Section 409.905(5) has, since 2005, consistently provided that AHCA shall pay for “all covered services provided for the medical care and treatment of a recipient” admitted as an inpatient by a licensed physician to a licensed hospital. However, covered payments can be determined by the patients’ physical condition. AHCA is authorized to “conduct or cause to be conducted . . . reviews, investigation, analyses, audits, or any combination thereof, to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, . . . in the Medicaid program and shall report the findings of any overpayments in audit reports as appropriate . . . . Medical necessity determination requires that service be consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of illness or injury under treatment and not in excess of the patient’s needs.” § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to mean “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” As found in section 409.913(1)(a)1, “abuse” means “[p]rovider practices that are inconsistent with generally accepted business or medical practices and that result in an unnecessary cost to the Medicaid program or in reimbursement for goods or services that are not medically necessary or that fail to meet professionally recognized standards of health care.” Further, under section 409.913(5), a Medicaid provider “is subject to having goods and services that are paid for by the Medicaid program reviewed by an appropriate peer-review organization designated by the agency. The written findings of the applicable peer-review organization are admissible in any court or administrative proceeding as evidence of medical necessity or the lack thereof.” AHCA has authority to “adopt any rules necessary to comply with or administer ss. 409.901-409.920 and all rules necessary to comply with federal requirements.” § 409.919, Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160 provides that all enrolled hospital providers must comply with the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. As found on page 2 through 7 of this handbook: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Dialysis is considered an emergency service. [Emphasis added]. Rule 59G-5.020 provided for the use of the Florida Medicaid Provider Handbook. On page 3 through 22 under the heading, “Emergency: Medicaid for Aliens,” it provides: Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. All claims must be accompanied by documentation of the emergency nature of the service. Exceptions are labor, delivery, and dialysis services. These are considered emergencies and are payable without documentation when the emergency indicator is entered on the claim form. [Emphasis added]. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS In 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), conducted a “Review of Florida’s Medicaid Payments for Emergency Services to Undocumented Aliens” (review). The review was directed to AHCA for the purpose of determining “whether AHCA’s billing for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens in the State of Florida complies with applicable Federal statutes and CMS’ regulations.” One of the review’s findings was that “AHCA is claiming FFP for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens provided beyond what Federal statutes and regulations define to be an emergency.” CMS recommended that “AHCA should review all emergency services for undocumented alien amounts claimed for FFP during Federal Fiscal Years 2005, 2006, and 2007 and re-determine allowability of these claims utilizing the required Federal criteria” and that AHCA “promptly implement the necessary system edits so that services provided as emergent care [could] be differentiated from services provided after the point the patients are stable, and then bill to the proper Federal programs.” In September 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, published its “Review of Medicaid Funding for Emergency Services Provided to Nonqualified Aliens” (report). The report described existing internal controls at AHCA that needed to be improved in order to assure that “all claims for services provided to undocumented aliens are for conditions that the State agency defines as emergency services.” RN Ryder explained that AHCA’s internal controls, mainly the computer program, prevented the reviewers from adjusting a claim’s length of stay to the point where the emergency condition had been alleviated. Rather, the computer would only allow for the approval or denial of a claim. AHCA’s response to the report provided: The Agency’s contracted quality improvement organization began reviewing all requests for Medicaid reimbursement of inpatient emergency services for undocumented aliens on July 1, 2010. These reviews determine the point at which the emergency no longer exists, consistent with federal regulations and deny Medicaid reimbursement for the remainder of the inpatient stay. The Agency is also undertaking a retrospective review of all inpatient alien claims from July 2005 through June 30, 2010, to determine point of stabilization. Any payments made in error will be recouped, and the federal share will be adjusted on the Form CMS-64. The retrospective reviews will begin October 1, 2010. In August 2012, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront I, ended with the December 12, 2012, Final Order that AHCA’s use of “the ‘point of stabilization’ standard was an interpretation or an implementation of the existing statutes and rules and not merely a restatement of them.” As such, AHCA discontinued reliance on the “stabilization standard.” In October 2014, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a second Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy or In the Alternative for Determination of the Invalidity of a Rule. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront II, ended with the April 20, 2015, Final Order5/ that AHCA, having provided notice that it was going to start enforcing it statutes and rules, did not change “an interpretation or way of applying a statute or its rules. It is just starting to enforce them, as they are written, after years of neglecting to enforce them.” See Bayfront Med. Ctr., et al. v. AHCA, Case No. 14-4758, FO at 69 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 20, 2015). PROCESS One method the Agency uses to discover Medicaid overpayments is by auditing billing and payment records of Medicaid providers. Such audits are performed by staff in the Agency's MPI. MPI is responsible for reviewing providers to assure that paid claims for services rendered were in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations and handbook(s). MPI looks to ensure that the provider is enrolled, the recipient is eligible, the service billed is covered, and the service is billed appropriately. As an example: An alien is in need of medical care, emergent or otherwise. The alien applies through DCF to become eligible for medical services, and is deemed eligible. An EMC arises, and the alien immediately presents to a duly enrolled Medicaid Provider, a health care facility of some type.6/ The alien is admitted as an inpatient on day one, and emergency health care services are provided. The EMC is alleviated as of day three, yet the alien remains in the health care facility for ten more days, receiving medical services, but not of the emergent type. The alien is discharged from the facility on day The facility bills the Medicaid program for 13 days of service. It is not uncommon for the alien’s eligibility to be determined after the hospitalization has ended, and the provider is seeking to cover its costs. PEER REVIEW When a claim was presented for peer review, the peer reviewers were directed to base the review on the standards governing emergency Medicaid for Aliens under state and federal laws, rules, and regulations. The peer reviewers had three issues to determine: whether an EMC existed, the length or duration of the emergency services (when the EMC was alleviated), and whether there were sufficient medical documentation/records to perform a medical review of the rendered services. The peer reviewers were all Florida-licensed physicians, either allopathic or osteopathic, who were matched by specialty or subspecialty to the claims they were reviewing. Each physician testified as to his or her medical or osteopathic education, background and training. Petitioner offered each physician as an expert, and each was accepted as such. The physicians were trained by their peer review organization on the statutes and rules regarding emergency Medicaid for aliens. The physicians then applied the standards contained in the statutes and rules with their education, training and experience to determine whether an EMC existed, the date on which the EMC was alleviated, and whether there were sufficient medical records upon which to make those determinations. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 14-4171 Adam Berko, D.O, a Board-certified family practitioner (a/k/a general practitioner), credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 3, an 18-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 5, 2006, complaining of shortness of breath, chest pain, body aches and abdominal pain. He was diagnosed with acute renal failure and leukocytosis with bandermia. Patient 3 was discharged from the hospital on December 14, 2006. Dr. Berko credibly testified that Patient 3’s EMC had been alleviated as of December 9, 2006. Mark Kanarek, M.D., a Board-certified pediatric physician credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an 11-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 6, 2006, with abdominal pain and emesis (vomiting). It was medically necessary to admit Patient 4. An x-ray was taken which showed a subacute intestinal obstruction secondary to adhesions. A follow-up x-ray on December 7, showed there was a resolution of the small bowel distention. By December 8, Patient 4 was having regular bowel movements, which signified no further obstruction. She remained in the hospital until December 10, 2016; however, when Patient 4’s bowel obstruction was alleviated on the 8th, the EMC was alleviated. Claim (Patient) 21, a four-year-old male with Down’s syndrome presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 18, 2006, with a fever following a diagnosis of leukemia. It was an emergent condition for which hospitalization was necessary. Patient 21 continued to have fever spikes through July 23, 2006, which placed the child at a continued risk for life-threatening sepsis. The blood cultures returned as negative and the child was fever-free. Patient 21 remained in the hospital until July 26, 2006, however when the patient’s fever broke, on the 23rd, and the blood cultures returned as negative, the EMC was alleviated. Michael Phillips, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 5, an 86-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 11, 2006, with nausea, vomiting and dehydration. Given Patient 5’s age and condition, it was medically necessary to admit her. Patient 5 received IV fluids, which were stopped on April 12, 2006. As such, on April 12, Patient 5’s EMC was alleviated, and she was discharged on April 13, 2006. Claim (Patient) 8, a 31-year-old male presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 6, 2006, complaining of weakness and dizziness since that morning. Patient 8 was found to have new onset diabetes, after having lost approximately 47 pounds in the preceding four or five months. The admitting diagnosis was “syncope and collapse,” but without mention of a loss of consciousness. There was discussion regarding the signs of the significant weight loss. Patient 8 was discharged on October 12, following his receipt of insulin,7/ oral hypoglycemics8/ and education for his diabetic condition. Patient 8 had “a chronic medical condition that required treatment, but again, it wasn’t something that required immediate emergency care.” There was no EMC. Claim (Patient) 11, a 26-year-old male with a history of testicular cancer, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 29, 2006, for his fifth cycle of chemotherapy. Patient 11 was admitted to a regular nursing floor for his scheduled chemotherapy treatment. Patient 11 was discharged on September 4, 2006. Patient 11 did not have an EMC nor did he receive any emergency services; rather, he had a scheduled medical treatment. Claim (Patient) 27, a 43-year-old female presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 9, 2006, with complaints of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and chills. She had a two-month history of abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, and was diagnosed as having colitis. Patient 27 was admitted to Lee Memorial, had an abdominal scan and was treated with IV infusions. She did not require immediate surgery or any emergency services during the admission. Patient 27 did not receive any emergency services. She was discharged on September 4, 2006. Steve Beiser, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 13, a 28-year-old male was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 9, 2006, for an elective surgery. Patient 13 underwent an anterior mediastinal germ cell tumor resection and was discharged on October 14, 2006. Patient 13 did not receive any emergency services. Bruce Shephard, M.D., a Board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 18, a 23–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on March 3, 2006, with complaints of being unable to void or have a bowel movement, abdominal pain, and pelvic pain. She was admitted on March 3, and her EMC presented on March 8, when she underwent surgery. Patient 13 was discharged on March 9. The EMC was alleviated on March 8, 2006. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 15-3271 Dr. Berko credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 7, a 52-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 30, 2007, with complaints of epigastric pain, anemia and alcohol abuse. During his December 1, 2015, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 21), Dr. Berko testified there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Berko was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 23, 2016, Case Detail Report (CDR). Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 66, the CDR which contained Dr. Berko’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 7, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 7. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an eight-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial with bone pain, fever and a refusal to walk on December 26, 2007. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records and Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 65, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 4, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 4. Claim (Patient) 12, a 17-year-old male, was admitted to Lee Memorial on January 17, 2007, for a mediport placement, bone marrow biopsy on January 18, and the initiation of chemotherapy. (Patient 12 had been diagnosed with undifferentiated sarcoma with metastasis to the lungs.) There was no EMC for Patient 12, but rather a planned hospitalization for his cancer treatment. Following his chemotherapy, Patient 12 was discharged on January 22, 2007. Claim (Patient) 24, a six-year-old Down’s syndrome male with leukemia, was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 11, 2007, with fever and pancytopenia. He was discharged on October 15, 2007, after he had been fever-free for 48 hours on October 14. Dr. Kanarek determined that Patient 24’s EMC was alleviated on October 14. Claim (Patient) 27, a two-year-old male, was presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 5, 2007, following a near drowning event which required cardiopulmonary resuscitation. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 67, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 27, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 27. Claim (Patient) 40, a seven-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 26, 2007, with a one- week history of left-sided facial swelling, following a tooth extraction. Although the child had been given oral antibiotics following the tooth extraction, that course of treatment failed, and his facial swelling and pain increased. When hospitalized, Patient 40 was started on IV antibiotics, and by November 28, 2007, his blood culture was negative, he remained afebrile, and his facial swelling had subsided. The EMC was alleviated on November 28, 2007. Patient 40 was discharged on December 10, 2007. Claim (Patient) 44, a 13-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 13, 2007, with a two and one-half month history of weight loss, increased thirst and urination, and a blood glucose of 534. He was admitted to the hospital, given IV normal saline bolus, started on insulin, and received diabetic instruction. Patient 44 did not present with an EMC; he presented with new onset diabetes. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified that Patient 44 never exhibited any signs of diabetic ketoacidosis, an imminently life-threatening condition, and he never required intensive or emergent care. Patient 44 was discharged on August 17, 2007. Thomas Wells, M.D., a Board-certified surgeon and family practitioner, who engages in emergency medicine, family practice and surgery, credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 6, a 26-year-old female, was admitted to Lee Memorial on May 14, 2007, for a scheduled gastric cancer surgery. This patient had a medical condition, but there was no evidence that she presented with an EMC. Patient 6 was discharged on May 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 46, a 20-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 10, 2007, following a motor vehicle crash. Patient 46 was admitted to the hospital with a traumatic brain injury, bilateral chest trauma, blunt abdominal trauma with liver injury, and multiple bone fractures complicated by cocaine use. His hospital stay was complicated by the surgically repaired wounds opening, and he required additional surgeries. By July 2, 2007, Patient 46’s cardiology workup was completed, his arrhythmia was resolved, his abdominal wound was improving, and he was tolerating food by mouth. Dr. Wells determined that his EMC was alleviated by July 2. Patient 46 was discharged from the hospital on July 7, 2007. Claim (Patient) 50, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 13, 2007, with upper quadrant abdominal pain radiating to his back. Patient 50 was admitted and underwent testing protocol. By July 20, 2007, Patient 50’s white blood count had improved, his temperature was improved and his condition was no longer emergent. Dr. Wells determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 20, 2007. Patient 50 was discharged from the hospital on July 21, 2007. Dr. Beiser credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 9, a 54-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room and was admitted on September 4, 2007. Prior to the admission, Patient 9 had been non-compliant with his health care provider’s instructions, and he was told to “go to the ER.” Although he came in through the emergency department, there was no EMC to address, or to be alleviated. Rather, Patient 9 was a non-compliant patient who needed to comply with his physician’s directions. Patient 54 was discharged on September 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 11, a 33-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 6, 2007, with a recurrent deep vein thrombosis of her left lower extremity. Her condition was an EMC, and she was admitted. Her physician promptly administered anticoagulation medication and her condition improved, so much so that she was walking well and without chest pain or shortness of breath the following day, April 7. She was discharged on April 9, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 15, a 35–year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 7, 2007, following a motor vehicle accident involving alcohol intoxication. Patient 15 had a left ankle contusion and a closed head injury, which on imaging identified a large brain mass. The mass was determined to be a cyst and no emergent intervention was indicated. The following day, April 8, Patient 15 was alert and oriented with no apparent alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Dr. Beiser determined that his EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claims 17 and 18 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 17/18, a 51–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 5, 2007, with complaint of abdominal pain after gastric bypass surgery. She was admitted to the hospital and noted to have ascites, jaundice and diabetes. Patient 17/18 was found to have liver failure and bacterial peritonitis. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated by September 11, when Patient 17/18’s abdominal pain had resolved and there was significant improvement in her overall condition. On October 13, Patient 17/18 again presented to Lee Memorial with complaints of abdominal pain for four days’ duration. She was known to have severe liver disease. Her abdominal pain was suspected to be bacterial peritonitis and this EMC was treated. By October 15, Patient 17/18 was found to be afebrile with no abdominal tenderness. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on October 15, and the patient was discharged on October 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 31, a 25-year-old male with a history of meningitis, neurosyphilis and underlying human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 14, 2007, with an acute febrile illness and neck mass. He was admitted to the hospital and started on IV antibiotics, and a neck biopsy was performed. Patient 31 had a complicated hospital stay as he had persistent fevers, headaches, episodes of hypotension, and sepsis. Through treatment, his condition improved and he was discharged on July 3, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on June 27, 2007. Claims 33 and 34 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 33/34 is a 67-year-old female who presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on May 21, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. She underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated by May 22. Patient 33/34 was discharged on May 23, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 22, 2007. Patient 33/34 presented to Lee Memorial on July 5, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. Patient 33/34 underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated on July 6. Patient 33/34 refused any further medical procedures, and she was discharged on July 8, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 6, 2007. Claim (Patient) 37, a 27–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 12, 2007, with complaints of severe abdominal pain. On October 14, her condition was “improved,” and she denied any abdominal pain, nausea or vomiting. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on October 14. Patient 37 was discharged on October 15, 2007. Claim (Patient) 38, a 32-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 28, 2007, with complaints of excessive thirst and urination, with some slight weight loss and weakness. He was admitted to the hospital for uncontrolled diabetes. Although Dr. Beiser determined that uncontrolled diabetes is not an EMC, Patient 38’s records demonstrated that he had diabetic ketoacidosis, which is an EMC. With insulin, Patient 38’s EMC was alleviated on September 29, 2007. He was discharged on October 1, 2007. Claim (Patient) 49, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 30, 2007, with complaints of right mid-lower quadrant abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting and diarrhea for two days prior to presentation. Patient 49 was admitted to rule out appendicitis. Patient 49 was taken to surgery on May 2, 2007, where an appendectomy was successfully performed. He had an uneventful recovery, and Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 2, 2007. Patient 49 was discharged on May 4, 2007. Dr. Shephard credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 36, an 18-year–old female, presented to, and was admitted to Lee Memorial on July 14, 2007, at 31 weeks gestation with a heart condition and mild pre-eclampsia. Her medical condition became emergent on July 26, when she experienced congestive heart failure and decreased oxygen levels. She was transferred to the intensive care unit, and she delivered by emergency C-section on July 28, 2007. Patient 36 was extubated on July 29, and her cardiopulmonary status continued to improve. She was discharged on August 3, 2007. Dr. Shephard determined that Patient 36’s EMC started on July 26 and was alleviated on August 2, 2007. RECOUPMENT OF MEDICAID OVERPAYMENTS Based upon the foregoing findings, and the persuasive weight of the evidence presented by the parties, it is determined: As to Patient 3, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 9, 2006; As to Patient 4, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 8, 2006; As to Patient 21, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to July 25, 2006; As to Patient 5, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to April 12, 2006; As to Patient 8, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 11, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 27, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 13, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 18, although admitted on March 3, 2006, the EMC presented on March 8, and Patient 13 was discharged on March 9, 2006; (The following patients were seen in 2007.) As to Patient 7, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 4, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 12, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 24, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; As to Patient 27, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 40, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to November 28, 2007; As to Patient 44, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 6, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 46, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 2, 2007; As to Patient 50, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 20, 2007; As to Patient 11, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 8, 2007; As to Patient 15, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 9, 2007; As to Patient 17, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 11, 2007; As to Patient 18, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 15, 2007; As to Patient 33, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 22, 2007; As to Patient 34, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 6, 2007; As to Patient 37, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; AA. As to Patient 38, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 29, 2007; BB. As to Patient 49, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 2, 2007; CC. As to Patient 36, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to August 2, 2007. With respect to both DOAH case numbers, Respondent offered no testimony or evidence to dispute or rebut the testimony on any of the claims presented above. Each expert credibly testified as to when each EMC presented and the date on which each EMC was alleviated. The experts provided the requisite support to both the AFAR and FAR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order sustaining the Medicaid overpayment in DOAH Case No. 14-4171 as $57,337.71, plus sanctions of $2,500, and costs of $2,062.04. With respect to DOAH Case No. 15-3271, the amount due should be recalculated based on only those claims that were found to be overpayments,9/ and costs of $3,528.41. Based on the oral stipulation announced at the hearing (found on Transcript, page 106), AHCA “remove[d] the claim for sanctions as to the 2007 case[s].” DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2016
The Issue Whether Florida Hospital Medical Center is entitled to reimbursement in the amount preliminarily determined by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, in a reimbursement dispute regarding bills submitted by Florida Hospital Medical Center to Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company for medical services provided to two individuals involved in work-related accidents; and Whether Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company properly adjusted those bills of Florida Hospital Medical Center in accordance with the requirements of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Florida Hospital is a full-service, not-for-profit hospital system located in Orlando, Florida, that operates a smaller satellite hospital in Winter Park, Florida. Florida Hospital is a “health care provider” within the meaning of Section 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Macy’s and Amerisure are “carriers” within the meaning of Sections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes. The Department has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between carriers and health care providers regarding payments for services rendered to injured workers, pursuant to Sections 440.13(7) and 440.13(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Qmedtrix is a medical bill review company.3/ Case No. 09-6871 R. P., an employee of Macy’s, slipped and fell at work on May 20, 2009, and presented to Florida Hospital Winter Park for evaluation and treatment where medical personnel documented vomiting, brain attack, and brain trauma. After evaluation and treatment, patient R. P. was diagnosed with a bruise to the head and released the same day. On September 16, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to R. P. totaling $5,547.20 to Macy’s for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Macy’s forwarded the bill to its workers’ compensation medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix reviewed the bill by comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by Florida Hospital with examples in the CPT book for billing of emergency department services. Florida Hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 920, which reads “contusion of face, scalp, or neck.” Use of this code means R. P. presented with a bruise or hematoma, but not a concussion. Florida Hospital also reported ICD diagnosis code 959.01 (“head injury, unspecified”) which also means that R. P. did not present with a concussion, loss of consciousness, or intracranial injuries. Florida Hospital’s bill included a charge of $2,417 with CPT code 99285 for emergency department services. The bill also included separate charges for a head CT, and various lab tests, drugs, and IV solutions. According to Mr. von Sydow, the bill was sent through Qmedtrix’s computer program for review, and was flagged for review by a physician. Mr. von Sydow further testified that one of Qmedtrix’s medical director’s suggested that the CPT code of 99285 be reduced. The medical director, who Mr. von Sydow said reviewed the bill, however, did not testify and no documentation of his recommendation was submitted at the final hearing. Qmedtrix determined that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285. Qmedtrix found that, while the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285, its usual charge for an emergency department visit billed with CPT code 99284 is $1,354. Macy’s paid Florida Hospital a total of $2,683.55, which amount included $1,010.24 for the emergency department visit based on [approximately] 75 percent of Florida Hospital’s usual charge for CPT code 99284. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Macy’s (or its designated entity)4/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed,” and has columns designated as “BR Red,” “PPO Red,” “Other Red,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed” column. There is also a column entitled “Reason Code” which sets forth codes, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(o)3., that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.5/ The “reason code” set forth adjacent to the $2,417.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” There is also another code, “P506” listed in the “Reason Code” column adjacent to the same line item, which, according to the key provided on the EOBR, means “[a]ny questions regarding this Qmedtrix review, please call (800)-833-1993.” “P506,” however, is not a “reason code” listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 68L- 7.602(5)(o)3. The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Macy’s pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital in fact billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) for the proposition that “SB-50 amended section 440.13 . . . [revealing] legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographic area.” Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Macy’s also contended that “upcoding” and “unbundling” were additional grounds for adjustment or disallowance that were not identified on the EOBR. The response explained that “upcoding” refers to billing with a procedure code that exaggerates the complexity of the service actually provided; that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services; that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes; that the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285; and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a healthy, young adult patient who sustained a blunt head injury with local swelling and bruising without subsequent confusion, loss of consciousness or memory deficit” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99283. The response requested a determination by the Department that Macy’s payment equaled or exceeded the amount usual and customary for CPT code 99283. On November 13, 2009, the Department, through its Office of Medical Services (OMS) issued a determination (Determination in 09-6871) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $5,547.20 and the carrier reimbursed $2,683.55. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, references a manual not incorporated by rule, and provides CPT codes that the respondent alleges are correct. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $4,160.40 ($5,547.20 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$4,160.40). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Macy’s paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P., and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Macy’s is required to pay for such services, equals $1,476.85. The Determination in 09-6871 did not directly address Macy’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6871 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Macy’s timely requested a hearing. Case No. 09-6872 J. L., an employee of Major League Aluminum, was injured in a work-related accident on the evening of May 3, 2009, and visited the emergency department of Florida Hospital Orlando. After evaluation and treatment, J. L. was diagnosed with a bruise to the knee and released the next morning. On September 23, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to J. L. totaling $2,851 to Amerisure, Major League Aluminum’s workers’ compensation insurer, for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Amerisure forwarded the hospital bill to its medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix for review. Qmedtrix’s medical bill review in this case, as in the companion case, entailed comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book. The hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 924.11, which reads “contusion of . . . knee.” The hospital also reported ICD diagnosis codes 724.2 (“lumbago”), E888.1 (“fall on or from ladders or scaffolding”) and 959.7 (“injury, other and unspecified . . . knee, leg, ankle, and foot.”). Florida Hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 9924 for emergency department services and also billed for X-rays and various drugs and IV solutions. Comparing procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book, Qmedtrix concluded that billing with CPT code 99284 was not appropriate, but that billing with CPT code 99282 was. Qmedtrix also found that, while the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, the average charge in the community for a visit to the emergency department billed with CPT code 99282 is $721. Qmedtrix determined the “usual and customary charge” in the community from its own database compiled by entering all of particular hospital bills into Qmedtrix’s database, along with data from the American Hospital Directory. Qmedtrix derives the average charge in the community based upon zip codes of the hospitals. Amerisure paid Florida Hospital a total of $1,257.15, which amount included $524.70 for the emergency department visit codes based on 75 percent of what Qmedtrix determined to be the average charge in the community for CPT code 99282. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Petitioner Amerisure (or its designated entity)6/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed Charges,” and has columns designated as “FS/UCR Reductions,” “Audit Reductions,” “Network Reductions,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed Charges” column. There is also a column entitled “Qualify Code” which sets forth reason codes that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.7/ The code set forth adjacent to the $1,354.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99282 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99284 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Hospital Manual. Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Amerisure pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital, in fact, billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon, supra. Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Amerisure contended “upcoding” as an additional ground for adjustment or disallowance that was not identified on the EOBR. As in the companion case, the response explained “upcoding,” that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services, and that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes. The response further stated that the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a patient with a minor traumatic injury of an extremity with localized pain, swelling, and bruising” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99282. The response requested a determination by the Department that Amerisure’s payment equaled or exceeded the usual and customary charge for CPT code 99282. On October 20, 2009, the Department’s OMS issued a determination (Determination in 09-6872) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $2,851.00 and the carrier reimbursed $1,257.15. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, and references a manual not incorporated by rule. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. Therefore, the charges, as billed by the hospital, did not constitute billing errors. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $2,138.25 ($2,851.00 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$2,138.25). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Amerisure paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Amerisure is required to pay for such services equals $881.10. The Determination in 09-6872 did not directly address Amerisure’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6872 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Amerisure timely requested a hearing. Alleged “Upcoding” for Emergency Department Services The Petitioners’ responses in both cases allege that Florida Hospital “upcoded” its bill for emergency department evaluation and management services. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital, however, reported alleged “upcoding” as an explanation for the Petitioners’ adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. While the Dispute Determinations by the Department do not directly address the carrier’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding” raised in the Petitioners’ responses, they found that “Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment[, and that] [o]nly through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill.” According to Mr. von Sydow, who was offered by Petitioners as an expert in billing, coding, reimbursement, and payment issues,8/ the “reason codes” that workers’ compensation carriers are to use pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602, do not mention “upcoding,” and therefore an EOBR could not be generated with a reason code explaining reduction or disallowance based on “upcoding.” The following reason codes, however, are included in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602: 23 – Payment disallowed: medical necessity: diagnosis does not support the services rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: documentation does not substantiate the service billed was rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: level of evaluation and management service not supported by documentation. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital includes reason code 23, 40, or 41. And neither EOBR explains or otherwise suggests that that Florida Hospital’s level of billing was not supported by medical necessity, services rendered, or sufficient documentation. In fact, Petitioners did not disallow reimbursement and do not contend that reimbursement should be denied for any services rendered by Florida Hospital to R. P. and J. L. on the grounds that the billed services were not medically necessary for the injured employees’ compensable injuries. In addition, Petitioners did not adjust or disallow payment for any of the billed procedures on the grounds that the procedures were not provided. In sum, the EOBR’s did not give Florida Hospital notice that alleged “upcoding” was an issue. Even if Petitioner’s EOBR’s gave Florida Hospital notice that it was asserting “upcoding” as a reason to reduce or adjust the hospital’s bill, the evidence does not support a finding that Florida Hospital utilized the wrong code in its billing for emergency department evaluation and management services. The CPT® 2009 Current Procedural Terminology Professional Edition, (Copyright 2008), (CPT book), is adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(3)(d) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-7.020(2). The CPT book sets forth the procedure codes for billing and reporting by hospitals and physicians. The CPT book sets forth CPT codes ranging from 99281 through 99285 used to report evaluation and management services provided in a hospital’s emergency department, described as follows: 99281: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A problem focused history; A problem focused examination; and Straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self limited or minor. 99282: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. 99283: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate severity. 99284: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity, and require urgent evaluation by the physician but do not pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. 99285: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; and Medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity and pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. Mr. von Sydow testified that a Qmedtrix “medical director,” reviewed Florida Hospital’s bill for services rendered to R. P., but not the medical records, and recommended that the hospital’s charge for emergency department services under CPT 99285 be “re-priced” to Qmedtrix’s determination of the “usual and customary charge” for CPT 99284. Mr. von Sydow acknowledged the need for physician review for some cases (as opposed to review by non-physician coders) by testifying, “The more complicated the medicine, the more likely it is that he [a medical director at Qmedtrix] wants to see it.” Despite Qmedtrix’s original determination to “reprice” the bill from CPT code 99285 to CPT code 99284 (reflected in the reduced payment but not explained in the EOBR), Mr. von Sydow opined that the correct CPT code for emergency department services provided to patient R. P. was 99283, as opposed to 99285 billed by the hospital. Mr. von Sydow testified that his opinion was based upon his own review of the medical records, without the assistance of a medical director or medical expert, and review of examples for the CPT codes for emergency department services from the CPT book, and various provisions of ICD-9 and CPT book coding resources. Aside from the fact that Mr. von Sydow’s opinion differed from the purported recommendation of a Qmedtrix “medical director,” Mr. von Sydow is not a physician. Moreover, Qmedtrix failed to provide the testimony of the medical director, or anyone else with medical expertise to evaluate the medical records and services provided or to validate either the opinion of Mr. von Sydow or the original recommendation to “re- price” Florida Hospital’s use of CPT Code 99285 in its bill for emergency department services rendered to patient R. P. Mr. von Sydow offered similar testimony and examples to explain Qmedtrix’s “re-pricing” of Florida Hospital’s bill from CPT code 99284 to CPT code 99282 for emergency services rendered to patient J. L. on behalf of Amerisure. According to Mr. von Sydow, an internal Qmedtrix coder (not a medical director) reviewed the bill for emergency services rendered to J. L. and determined it should be re-priced to the usual and customary charge, as determined by Qmedtrix, using that CPT code 99282. While knowledgeable of the various codes and their uses, given the manner in which preliminary diagnostics under emergency circumstances drives Florida Hospital’s determination of the appropriate CPT code for billing emergency department services, without the testimony of a medical expert familiar with the medical records generated in these cases in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the emergency care rendered to patients R. P. and J. L., Mr. von Sydow’s testimony was unpersuasive. Ross Edmundson, M.D., an employee, vice-president, and medical manager for Florida Hospital, explained that, unlike other settings, hospitals generally do not have the medical histories of patients presenting for emergency hospital services. When a patient comes to Florida Hospital for emergency services, they are triaged by a nurse to determine the level of urgency, then a doctor sees the patient, conducts a differential diagnosis to rule out possible causes, obtains the patient’s history, and then performs a physical examination. While emergency room physicians at Florida Hospital do not decide which CPT code is utilized for the evaluation and management services provided by its emergency department, the various tests and procedures they undertake to evaluate and treat emergency department patients do. James English, the director of revenue management for Florida Hospital explained the process through his deposition testimony. Florida Hospital, like over 400 other hospitals, uses the “Lynx System” – a proprietary system for creating and maintaining medical records electronically. The program captures each medical service, supply, and physician order that is inputted into the electronic medical record. The hospital’s emergency evaluation and management CPT code is generated from the electronic record. A “point collection system” in the Lynx System translates physician-ordered services, supplies it to a point system, and then assigns the CPT code that is billed based upon the total number of “points” that are in the system at the time the patient is discharged from the emergency department. The level of the evaluation and management CPT code (99281 to 99285) that is reported on Florida Hospital’s bill is a direct reflection of the number and types of medical services that a patient receives from his or her arrival through discharge. In light of evidence showing the manner in which emergency services are provided and the importance of medical records in generating the appropriate billing code for emergency evaluation and management services, it is found that Petitioners failed to provide an adequate analysis of the medical records of either R. P. or J. L. to show that the appropriate CPT codes were not utilized by Florida Hospital in billing for those services. On the other hand, both Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute filed by Florida Hospital with the Department attached appropriately itemized bills utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. In addition, medical records for the evaluation and treatment provided by Florida Hospital for both patients R. B. and J. L. supporting the itemized bills were submitted to the Department. These documents were also received into evidence at the final hearing. Florida Hospital’s bills at issue correctly identified the hospital’s usual charges for each individual and separately chargeable item, service or supply, with the corresponding code assigned to such billable items as maintained in Florida Hospital’s “charge master.” In addition, Petitioners concede the compensability of both patients’ work-related injuries and do not dispute whether any service or supply rendered and billed by Florida Hospital for these two cases were “medically necessary.”9/ Unbundling As noted above, in Case No. 09-6871, Qmedtrix’s response to Florida Hospital’s petition for resolution of reimbursement dispute contended “unbundling” as a ground for adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. At the final hearing, Arlene Cotton, the nurse who issued the Dispute Determinations, explained that reason code 63 regarding “unbundling” is inapplicable to hospital billing, as there is no rule that requires hospitals to bundle bill for its services. Mr. von Sydow agreed that reason code 63 was inapplicable. In addition, footnote 2 of Petitioners’ Proposed Recommended Order states, “they did not pursue the allegations of unbundling.” Therefore, it is found that Petitioners did not prove and otherwise abandoned their claim of “unbundling” as a ground to adjust or disallow reimbursement to Florida Hospital. Usual and Customary Charges The Dispute Determinations issued by the Department found that correct payment in both cases equaled 75% of billed charges, citing “Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., [which] incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Both Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and the Hospital Manual provide that hospital services provided to patients under the workers’ compensation law “shall be reimbursed at 75 percent of usual and customary charges.” The Department interprets the term “usual and customary charges” as set forth in the Hospital Manual and Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, quoted above, to mean a hospital’s usual charges of the hospital, whereas Petitioners contend that “usual and customary charges” means the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area. While apparently not contending that Petitioners failed to raise the issue of “usual and customary” charges in their EOBR’s,10/ at the final hearing, the Department argued that “nowhere in [either Macy’s or Amerisure’s] response is the issue of customary charges raised.” A review of the responses filed by Qmedtrix to Florida Hospital’s reimbursement dispute petitions filed with the Department reveal that both raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Mr. von Sydow’s letter attached to both responses state: As you may know, the proposed adoption of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System as a methodology for reimbursing hospitals 60% and 75% of “usual and customary charges” follows from the decision of the First District Court of Appeals in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, No. 1D05-5459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (SB-50 amended section 440.13 to remove all reference to the charges of any individual service provider; this amendment reveals the legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographical area). This court decision requires DFS to define payment rates for out patient service that are uniformly applicable to all hospitals in a given geographic area. In addition, at the final hearing, the Department argued that the petitions for administrative hearing did “not raise as a disputed issue of fact or law whether or not usual and customary charges should apply in this case.” Indeed, a review of the request for relief set forth in the petitions for administrative hearings filed by Petitioners do not mention the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Rather, the relief requested by both petitions for administrative review of the Dispute Determinations, as summarized in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, is: Petitioner[s] seeks reversal of OMS’ Determination(s) and the matters remanded for the Department to: direct payment based upon the actual treatment required/provided and pursuant to the correct CPT code; find that the hospital upcoded and that Petitioner properly reimbursed (or exceeded amount due); and determine that the hospital has the burden of proof to substantiate its billing and the use of the chosen CPT code. Contrary to the Department’s argument, however, both petitions for administrative hearing raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Page 9 of Macy’s petition, in pertinent part states: Petitioner submits that in issuing the above findings OMS failed to consider the holding in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration (wherein the Court determined that reimbursement should not be based solely upon a mathematical equation [as found within the Reimbursement Manual] and applying it to the fee charged by a particular provider; and that by eliminating the reference to any one facility’s charges, the legislature intended that the charges be based on average fees of all providers in a geographical area as opposed to the fees of the particular provider in question). Likewise, review of Amerisure’s petition for administrative hearing reveals that the issue of “usual and customary charges” was raised. Pages 7 and 8 of Amerisure’s petition state, in pertinent part: Further, if the Hospital is permitted to utilize incorrect revenue codes it would be impossible to determine whether the charges are consistent with the Hospital’s own [usual and customary] charges for the service, procedure or supplies in question and, further, whether such charges are consistent with charges by other like facilities (in the same geographical area) for the same services, procedures, or supplies. See One Beacon Insurance, supra. In addition, Amerisure’s petition on page 12 states with regard to the Department’s determination: Such finding was issued without consideration of . . . the amounts charged for the same services in the Orlando area where this hospital is located. Petitioners further preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” in the first paragraph of their statement of position on page 3 of the Joint Prehearing Statement, as follows: Petitioners, Macy’s and Amerisure, take the position that the Determinations must be reversed as the Department has the duty to scrutinize the bills in question in order to determine, first, whether the hospital, in fact, charged its usual charge for the services provided, and second, whether the billed charges are in line with the customary charges of other facilities in the same community (for the same or similar services) and that the Department failed to do so. As such, Petitioners contend that payment for services provided by Florida Hospital should have been based upon 75% of usual and customary charges, not 75% of billed charges. Therefore, it is found that Petitioners have preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” for consideration in this administrative proceeding. Although preserved, Petitioners failed to demonstrate that their interpretation of “usual and customary charges” should prevail. The Department has consistently interpreted the term “usual and customary charges” as used in the Hospital Manual, Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and rules related to hospital reimbursement under the workers’ compensation law as the “usual and customary charges” of the hospital reflected on the hospital’s “charge master.” The Hospital Manual requires each hospital to maintain a charge master and to produce it “when requested for the purpose of verifying its usual charges. . . .” (Emphasis added). Petitioners did not conduct or request to conduct an audit to verify whether the charges billed by Florida Hospital corresponded with the Florida Hospital’s charge master. In fact, Mr. von Sydow conceded at the final hearing that Florida Hospital’s bills at issue were charged in accordance with Florida Hospital’s charge master. Nor did Petitioners institute rule challenge proceedings against the Department regarding the Hospital Manual, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-7.501. Instead, Petitioners assert that they should be able to reduce Florida Hospital bills based upon a different interpretation of the phrase “usual and customary charges” to mean the average charge in the community as determined by Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix is not registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and does not employ any Florida-licensed insurance adjuster, physician, or registered nurse. Qmedtrix earns 12 to 15 percent of “savings” realized by carriers utilizing their bill review services. For example, if a bill is reduced by $100, Qmedtrix is paid $12.11/ Qmedtrix uses a proprietary bill review system called “BillChek.” According to Qmedtrix’s website: BillChek reviews out-of-network medical charges for all bill types in all lines of coverage, including group health, auto, medical, and workers’ compensation. BillChek is a unique specialty cost- containment service that determines an accurate and reasonable reimbursement amount for non-network facility and ancillary medical charges. BillChek incorporates historical data to help determine reasonable payment recommendations across all sectors of the health care industry. All BillCheck recommendations are backed by extensive medical and legal expertise, and supported by Qmedtrix’s experienced Provider Relations and Dispute Resolution teams. According to the testimony of Mr. von Sydow, Qmedtrix collects and maintains data from various sources, including Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the American Hospital Directory (AHD.com), and HCFA 2552’s (data reported to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services on HCFA 2522) in order to construct a database of health care providers’ usual charges. Mr. von Sydow advised that AHD.com data was a principle source for constructing the database. He also advised that AHCA data was included in the database even though Qmedtrix found the AHCA data defective. Examples of data downloaded from AHD.com for Florida Hospital showing a profile of the facility was received into evidence as P-5. The data did not, however, show usual charges for the CPT codes for emergency department services at issue in this case. Petitioners also introduced into evidence Exhibits P-6 and P-7, which contained AHD.com data showing average charges for Florida Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, respectively, for Level 1 through Level 5 emergency room visits (corresponding to CPT codes 99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained that the data was part of the information Qmedtrix used to construct the average charge in the community. Petitioners failed to provide similar AHD.com data for other hospitals in the area Qmedtrix determined to be the “community.” In addition, Petitioners introduced AHCA’s Florida Health Finder Web-site, as Exhibit P-8, which ostensibly included average charges for all hospitals in Florida for the subject emergency department CPT codes (99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained, however, “[w]e find that [the AHCA data] is not refreshed very often, unfortunately, and some other defects in the scrubbing of the data by the agency, which they know, I will say. But this is incorporated in our database to a large extent.” The exhibit was received into evidence for the purpose of helping to explain how Qmedtrix constructed its database, with the recognition that it was largely composed of hearsay. In sum, while Petitioners showed their methodology of constructing the database, other than the AHD.com data for Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, Petitioners failed to introduce reliable evidence sufficient to show the “usual and customary charge” of all providers in a given geographical area as determined by Qmedtrix. In addition, the AHCA data, though characterized by Mr. von Sydow as unreliable, indicates that there is a wide range of differences in emergency room charges between hospitals in Florida. Petitioners’ interpretation of “usual and customary charge” to mean the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area does not take into account an individual hospital’s indigent care, cost of labor, overhead, number of beds, size, age, or various other differences between facilities that could affect amounts each hospital charges for emergency department and other services; the Department’s interpretation does.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a Final Order consistent with this Recommended Order that: Directs Macy’s Claims Services to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to patient R. P., and to submit proof of reimbursement of that amount within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received; Directs Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to patient J. L., and submit proof of reimbursement of that amount to the Department within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2010.
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the a l ah, of fiderd , 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 4% ‘ CA kh fo ELIZABETH DUDEK, SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed June 26, 2012 2:18 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Jeffries H. Duvall Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel (Interoffice) CYNTHIA A. MIKOS, ESQ. Allen Dell, P.A. 202 S. Rome Ave. - Suite 100 Tampa, FL 33606 cmikos@allendell.com (Electronic Mail) J.D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting Health Quality Assurance (via email) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail, Laserfiche or electronic mail on this the ZS" day of c JA » 2012. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630/FAX (850) 921-0158 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 11-5089MPI CI. NO. 11-1553-000 HILLSBOROUGH ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC., Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (‘AHCA” or “the Agency”), and Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. (“PROVIDER”), by and through the undersigned, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 1. The two parties enter into this agreement to memorialize the resolution of this matter. 2. PROVIDER is a Florida Medicaid provider, provider number 024102498 and was a provider during the audit period, January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. 3. In its Final Agency Audit Report (constituting final agency action) dated September 2, 2011, AHCA notified PROVIDER that review of Medicaid claims by the Division of Medicaid, Office of the Deputy Secretary, and Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI), Office of the AHCA Inspector General, indicated certain claims, in whole or in part, had been inappropriately paid. The Agency sought recoupment of this overpayment in the amount of $34,317.55. In response, PROVIDER filed a petition for formal administrative hearing. It was assigned DOAH Case No. 11-5089MPI. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.l. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 4. Subsequent to the original audit, in preparation for trial, AHCA re-reviewed the PROVIDER’s claims and evaluated additional documentation submitted by the PROVIDER. As a result of the additional review, AHCA determined the overpayment should be adjusted to $27,078.51, plus $5,415.70 in fines and $674.38 in costs for a total due of $33,168.59. 5. In order to resolve this matter without further administrative proceedings, PROVIDER and the AHCA agree as follows: (1) —AHCA agrees to accept the payment set forth herein in settlement of the overpayment issues arising from the captioned audit. (2) The amount in dispute that is now being resolved is twenty-seven thousand seventy eight dollars and fifty-one cents ($27,078.51) on the indebtedness, five thousand four hundred fifteen dollars and seventy cents ($5,415.70) in fines, plus six hundred seventy four dollars and thirty-eight cents ($674.38) in investigative costs for a total of thirty three thousand one hundred sixty eight dollars and fifty- nine cents ($33,168.59). PROVIDER will make an initial payment of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) and the remaining balance to be paid in 6 equal monthly installments. This amount due will be offset by any amount already received by the Agency in this matter. Furthermore, PROVIDER is advised that pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes, failure to pay in full, or enter into and abide by the terms of any repayment schedule set forth by the Agency may result in termination from the Medicaid program, withholding of future Medicaid payments, or other such remedies as provided by law. Any outstanding balance accrues at 10% interest per year. Full payment will fully and completely settle all claims in these proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.1. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 6. (DOAH Case No. 11-5089MPI). Should the provider’s enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (3) In the event any interim payments are received or withheld, by whatever means, prior to the entry of the Final Order, Medicaid Accounts Receivable shall make the adjustment to credit such amounts, dollar for dollar, as quickly as is practicable. (4) Compliance with this repayment agreement fully and completely settles all claims in these proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH Case No. 11-5089MPI). Should the provider’s enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (5) PROVIDER and AHCA agree that full payment, as set forth above, resolves and settles this case completely. It will release both parties from any administrative or civil liabilities or claims arising from the findings in audit C.I. 11-1553-000. (6) PROVIDER agrees that it will not rebill the Medicaid Program in any manner for claims that were not covered by Medicaid, which are the subject of the audit in this case. Questions regarding procedures for submitting payment should be directed to Medicaid Accounts Receivable, (850) 412-3901. The C.I. number listed on the first page of this agreement must be legibly entered on the check to assure proper credit. Please mail payment to: AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION Medicaid Accounts Receivable — MS # 14 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. 2, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.1. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 7. PROVIDER agrees that failure to pay any monies due and owing under the terms of this Agreement shall constitute PROVIDER’S authorization for the Agency, without further notice, to withhold the total remaining amount due under the terms of this agreement from any monies due and owing to PROVIDER for any Medicaid claims. 8. AHCA reserves the right to enforce this Agreement under the laws of the State of Florida, the Rules of the Medicaid Program, and all other applicable rules and regulations. 9. This settlement does not constitute an admission of wrongdoing or error by either party with respect to this case or any other matter. 10. Each party shall bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs, with the exception that the Respondent shall reimburse, as part of this settlement, $674.38 in Agency costs and $5,415.70 in fines. This amount is included in the calculations and demand of paragraph 5(2). 11. The signatories to this Agreement, acting in a representative capacity, represent that they are duly authorized to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the respective parties. 12. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the provisions of the laws of Florida. Venue for any action arising from this Agreement shall be in Leon County, Florida. 13. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between PROVIDER and AHCA, including anyone acting for, associated with or employed by them, concerning all matters and supersedes any prior discussions, agreements or understandings; there are no promises, representations or agreements between PROVIDER and the AHCA other than as set forth herein. No modification or waiver of any provision shall be valid unless a written amendment to the Agreement is completed and properly executed by the parties. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.1. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 14. This is an Agreement of settlement and compromise, made in recognition that the parties may have different or incorrect understandings, information and contentions, as to facts and law, and with each party compromising and settling any potential correctness or incorrectness of its understandings, information and contentions as to facts and law, so that no misunderstanding or misinformation shall be a ground for rescission hereof. 15. | PROVIDER expressly waives in this matter its right to any hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 or 120.57, Florida Statutes, the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Agency, and all further and other proceedings to which it may be entitled by law or rules of the Agency regarding this proceeding and any and all issues raised herein. PROVIDER further agrees that it shall not challenge or contest any Final Order entered in this matter which is consistent with the terms of this settlement agreement in any forum now or in the future available to it, including the right to any administrative proceeding, circuit or federal court action or any appeal. 16. This Agreement is and shall be deemed jointly drafted and written by all parties to it and shall not be construed or interpreted against the party originating or preparing it. 17. To the extent that any provision of this. Agreement is prohibited by law for any reason, such provision shall be effective to the extent not so prohibited, and such prohibition shall not affect any other provision of this Agreement. 18. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on each party’s successors, assigns, heirs, administrators, representatives and trustees. 19. All times stated herein are of the essence of this Agreement. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.|. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 20. This Agreement shall be in full force and effect upon execution by the respective parties in counterpart. ROUGH ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC. Dated: “A727 L ZZ 2012 py. UO CW “CCL FECL (Print name) ITS: SP OPC B22 20 Revi OLN 7 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, FL 32308-5403 ‘ Dated: G/al 2012 Miller Inspector General Dated: bl f .2012 William H. Roberts Dated: Z f_,2012
The Issue The issues in the case are whether certain provisions of the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) that exclude non-emergent services rendered in the emergency room from covered Medicaid outpatient services and require revenue Code 451 to be billed with CPT Code 99281 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Subsection 120.56(3), Florida Statutes (2010).1
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the Medicaid agency for the State of Florida as provided under federal law. § 409.901(2), Fla. Stat. “'Medicaid agency' . . . means the single state agency that administers or supervises the administration of the state Medicaid plan under federal law." § 409.901(15), Fla. Stat. AHCA must administer the Medicaid program pursuant to a state plan that is approved by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 and 1396a(a). AHCA reimburses Medicaid providers in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in rules promulgated by AHCA and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference in the rules. AHCA has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.030, which incorporates by reference the Florida Title XIX Outpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan, Version XIX (the Outpatient Plan), with an effective date of July 1, 2009. Reimbursement to participating outpatient hospitals, such as Petitioners, is to be provided in accordance with the Outpatient Plan. AHCA has issued the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. The Handbook is incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160. The Outpatient Plan and the Handbook identify those outpatient hospital services that are covered by the Medicaid program by revenue code. Only those revenue codes listed in Appendix A of the Outpatient Plan (Appendix A) and Appendix B of the Handbook (Appendix B) are covered outpatient services. Petitioners have challenged the following provisions of the Handbook: Handbook at page 2-7: EMTALA Medical Screening Exam The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requires emergency rooms to conduct a medical screening exam on any patient presenting to the emergency room for medical services . . . . If the medical screening exam determines that no emergency medical condition exists, Florida Medicaid reimburses only for the screening and the ancillary services required to make the determination (e.g., lab work or x-rays). Medicaid policy does not provide for reimbursement of non-emergency services beyond the medical screening exam required by EMTALA. Handbook at page 2-40: Non-Emergency Care in the Emergency Room Medicaid policy does not provide for reimbursement of non-emergency services beyond the medical screening exam required by Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires emergency rooms to conduct a medical screening exam on any patient presenting to the emergency room for medical services. The purpose of the medical screening exam is to determine if an emergency medical condition exists. If the screening determines that an emergency medical condition exists, the provider must either stabilize the condition or appropriately transfer the patient to a facility that can stabilize the condition. If the medical screening determines that no emergency medical condition exists, Florida Medicaid reimburses only for the screening and the ancillary services required to make the determination (e.g., lab work or x-rays). Recipients are responsible for a coinsurance on such claims. Handbook, Appendix B at pages B-6 and B-7: EMERGENCY ROOM 0450 General Classification Use General Classification code 0450 when recipients require emergency room care beyond the EMTALA emergency medical screening services. Code 0450 cannot be used in conjunction with 0451 (99281). All other appropriate and covered outpatient revenue codes can be billed with 0450 to reflect services rendered to the patient during the course of emergency room treatment. No MediPass authorization is required when billing 0450, if the type of admission in Form Locator 19 on the claims is "1" (Emergency). MediPass authorization is required when the condition of the patient is not an emergency. 0451(99281) EMTALA Emergency Medical Screening Services (Effective 7/1/96) Report the EMTALA Medical Screening code 0451 (99281) when, following the screening and exam, no further emergency room care or treatment is necessary. If ancillary services are not necessary to determine whether or not emergency or further treatment is required, report the ancillary charges using the appropriate revenue center codes in conjunction with code 0451 (99281). Note that 0451 (99281) cannot be used in conjunction with 0450. Effective 10/16/03, HCPCs code 99281 replaces code W1700, used prior to 10/16/03, when billing revenue code 0451. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160 provides that the specific authority for the promulgation of the rule is Section 409.919, Florida Statutes, and the law implemented is Sections 409.905, 409.908, and 409.9081, Florida Statutes. Petitioners are acute care hospitals that are and were enrolled as Medicaid providers of outpatient service in Florida at all times material to this proceeding.
