The Issue Whether the certificate of need (CON) applications filed by New Port Richey Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Community Hospital of New Port Richey (Community Hospital) (CON No. 9539), and Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc., d/b/a North Bay Hospital (North Bay) (CON No. 9538), each seeking to replace and relocate their respective general acute care hospital, satisfy, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria.
Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA AHCA is the single state agency responsible for the administration of the CON program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes (2000). The agency separately reviewed and preliminarily approved both applications. Community Hospital Community Hospital is a 300,000 square feet, accredited hospital with 345 licensed acute care beds and 56 licensed adult psychiatric beds, located in southern New Port Richey, Florida, within Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital is seeking to construct a replacement facility approximately five miles to the southeast within a rapidly developing suburb known as "Trinity." Community Hospital currently provides a wide array of comprehensive inpatient and outpatient services and is the only provider of obstetrical and adult psychiatric services in Sub-District 5-1. It is the largest provider of emergency services in Pasco County with approximately 35,000 visits annually. It is also the largest provider of Medicaid and indigent patient days in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital was originally built in 1969 and is an aging facility. Although it has been renovated over time, the hospital is in poor condition. Community Hospital's average daily census is below 50 percent. North Bay North Bay is a 122-bed facility containing 102 licensed acute care beds and 20 licensed comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds, located approximately one mile north of Community Hospital in Sub-District 5-1. It serves a large elderly population and does not provide pediatric or obstetrical care. North Bay is also an aging facility and proposes to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Notably, however, North Bay has spent approximately 12 million dollars over the past three years for physical improvements and is in reasonable physical condition. Helen Ellis Helen Ellis is an accredited hospital with 150 licensed acute care beds and 18 licensed skilled nursing unit beds. It is located in northern Pinellas County, approximately eight miles south of Community Hospital and nine miles south of North Bay. Helen Ellis provides a full array of acute care services including obstetrics and cardiac catheterization. Its daily census average has fluctuated over the years but is approximately 45 percent. Mease Mease operates two acute care hospitals in Pinellas County including Mease Dunedin Hospital, located approximately 18 to 20 miles south of the applicants and Mease Countryside Hospital, located approximately 16 to 18 miles south of Community and North Bay. Each hospital operates 189 licensed beds. The Mease hospitals are located in the adjacent acute care sub-district but compete with the applicants. The Health Planning District AHCA's Health Planning District 5 consists of Pinellas and Pasco Counties. U.S. Highway 41 runs north and south through the District and splits Pasco County into Sub- District 5-1 and Sub-District 5-2. Sub-District 5-1, where Community Hospital and North Bay are located, extends from U.S. 41 west to the Gulf Coast. Sub-District 5-2 extends from U.S. 41 to the eastern edge of Pasco County. Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida and steadily grows at 5.52 percent per year. On the other hand, its neighbor to the north, Pasco County, has been experiencing over 15 percent annual growth in population. The evidence demonstrates that the area known as Trinity, located four to five miles southeast of New Port Richey, is largely responsible for the growth. With its large, single- owner land tracts, Trinity has become the area's fuel for growth, while New Port Richey, the older coastal anchor which houses the applicants' facilities, remains static. In addition to the available land in Trinity, roadway development in the southwest section of Pasco County is further fueling growth. For example, the Suncoast Highway, a major highway, was recently extended north from Hillsborough County through Sub-District 5-1, west of U.S. 41. It intersects with several large east-west thoroughfares including State Road 54, providing easy highway access to the Tampa area. The General Proposals Community Hospital's Proposal Community Hospital's CON application proposes to replace its existing, 401-bed hospital with a 376-bed state- of-the-art facility and relocate it approximately five miles to the southeast in the Trinity area. Community Hospital intends to construct a large medical office adjacent to its new facility and provide all of its current services including obstetrical care. It does not intend to change its primary service area. North Bay's Proposal North Bay's CON application proposes to replace its existing hospital with a 122-bed state-of-the-art facility and also plans to relocate it approximately eight miles to the southeast in the Trinity area of southwestern Pasco County. North Bay intends to provide the same array of services it currently offers its patients and will not provide pediatric and obstetrical care in the proposed facility. The proposed relocation site is adjacent to the Trinity Outpatient Center which is owned by North Bay's parent company, Morton Plant. The Outpatient Center offers a full range of diagnostic imaging services including nuclear medicine, cardiac nuclear stress testing, bone density scanning, CAT scanning, mammography, ultrasound, as well as many others. It also offers general and specialty ambulatory surgical services including urology; ear, nose and throat; ophthalmology; gastroenterology; endoscopy; and pain management. Approximately 14 physician offices are currently located at the Trinity Outpatient Center. The Condition of Community Hospital Facility Community Hospital's core facilities were constructed between 1969 and 1971. Additions to the hospital were made in 1973, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1992, and 1999. With an area of approximately 294,000 square feet and 401 licensed beds, or 733 square feet per bed, Community Hospital's gross area-to-bed ratio is approximately half of current hospital planning standards of 1,600 square feet per bed. With the exception of the "E" wing which was completed in 1999, all of the clinical and support departments are undersized. Medical-Surgical Beds And Intensive Care Units Community Hospital's "D" wing, constructed in 1975, is made up of two general medical-surgical unit floors which are grossly undersized. Each floor operates 47 general medical-surgical beds, 24 of which are in three-bed wards and 23 in semi-private rooms. None of the patient rooms in the "D" wing have showers or tubs so the patients bathe in a single facility located at the center of the wing on each floor. Community Hospital's "A" wing, added in 1973, is situated at the west end of the second floor and is also undersized. It too has a combination of semi-private rooms and three-bed wards without showers or tubs. Community Hospital's "F" wing, added in 1979, includes a medical-surgical unit on the second and third floor, each with semi-private and private rooms. The second floor unit is centrally located between a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit and the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU) which creates security and privacy issues. The third floor unit is adjacent to the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU) which must be accessed through the medical-surgical unit. Neither intensive care unit (ICU) possesses an isolation area. Although the three-bed wards are generally restricted to in-season use, and not always full, they pose significant privacy, security, safety, and health concerns. They fail to meet minimum space requirements and are a serious health risk. The evidence demonstrates that reconfiguring the wards would be extremely costly and impractical due to code compliance issues. The wards hinder the hospital's acute care utilization, and impair its ability to effectively compete with other hospitals. Surgical Department and Recovery Community Hospital's surgical department is separated into two locations including the main surgical suite on the second floor and the Endoscopy/Pain Management unit located on the first floor of "C" wing. Consequently, the department cannot share support staff and space such as preparation and recovery. The main surgical suite, adjacent recovery room, and central sterile processing are 25 years old. This unit's operating rooms, cystoscopy rooms, storage areas, work- stations, central sterile, and recovery rooms are undersized and antiquated. The 12-bay Recovery Room has no patient toilet and is lacking storage. The soiled utility room is deficient. In addition, the patient bays are extremely narrow and separated by curtains. There is no direct connection to the sterile corridor, and staff must break the sterile field to transport patients from surgery to recovery. Moreover, surgery outpatients must pass through a major public lobby going to and returning from surgery. The Emergency Department Community Hospital's existing emergency department was constructed in 1992 and is the largest provider of hospital emergency services in Pasco County, handling approximately 35,000 visits per year. The hospital is also designated a "Baker Act" receiving facility under Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, and utilizes two secure examination rooms for emergent psychiatric patients. At less than 8,000 total square feet, the emergency department is severely undersized to meet the needs of its patients. The emergency department is currently undergoing renovation which will connect the triage area to the main emergency department. The renovation will not enlarge the entrance, waiting area, storage, nursing station, nor add privacy to the patient care areas in the emergency department. The renovation will not increase the total size of the emergency department, but in fact, the department's total bed availability will decrease by five beds. Similar to other departments, a more meaningful renovation cannot occur within the emergency department without triggering costly building code compliance measures. In addition to its space limitations, the emergency department is awkwardly located. In 1992, the emergency department was relocated to the front of the hospital and is completely separated from the diagnostic imaging department which remained in the original 1971 building. Consequently, emergency patients are routinely transported across the hospital for imaging and CT scans. Issues Relating to Replacement of Community Hospital Although physically possible, renovating and expanding Community Hospital's existing facility is unreasonable. First, it is cost prohibitive. Any significant renovation to the 1971, 1975, 1977, and 1979 structures would require asbestos abatement prior to construction, at an estimated cost of $1,000,000. In addition, as previously noted, the hospital will be saddled with the major expense of complying with all current building code requirements in the 40-year-old facility. Merely installing showers in patient rooms would immediately trigger a host of expensive, albeit necessary, code requirements involving access, wiring, square footage, fireproofing columns and beams, as well as floor/ceiling and roof/ceiling assemblies. Concurrent with the significant demolition and construction costs, the hospital will experience the incalculable expense and loss of revenue related to closing major portions, if not all, of the hospital. Second, renovation and expansion to the existing facility is an unreasonable option due to its physical restrictions. The 12'4" height of the hospital's first floor limits its ability to accommodate HVAC ductwork large enough to meet current ventilation requirements. In addition, there is inadequate space to expand any department within the confines of the existing hospital without cannibalizing adjacent areas, and vertical expansion is not an option. Community Hospital's application includes a lengthy Facility Condition Assessment which factually details the architectural, mechanical, and electrical deficiencies of the hospital's existing physical plant. The assessment is accurate and reasonable. Community Hospital's Proposed Replacement Community Hospital proposes to construct a six- story, 320 licensed beds, acute care replacement facility. The hospital will consist of 548,995 gross square feet and include a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit connected by a hallway to the first floor of the main hospital building. The proposal also includes the construction of an adjacent medical office building to centralize the outpatient offices and staff physicians. The evidence establishes that the deficiencies inherent in Community Hospital's existing hospital will be cured by its replacement hospital. All patients will be provided large private rooms. The emergency department will double in size, and contain private examination rooms. All building code requirements will be met or exceeded. Patients and staff will have separate elevators from the public. In addition, the surgical department will have large operating rooms, and adequate storage. The MICU and SICU will be adjacent to each other on the second floor to avoid unnecessary traffic within the hospital. Surgical patients will be transported to the ICU via a private elevator dedicated to that purpose. Medical-surgical patient rooms will be efficiently located on the third through sixth floors, in "double-T" configuration. Community Hospital's Existing and Proposed Sites Community Hospital is currently located on a 23-acre site inside the southern boundary of New Port Richey. Single- family homes and offices occupy the two-lane residential streets that surround the site on all sides. The hospital buildings are situated on the northern half of the site, with the main parking lot located to the south, in front of the main entrance to the hospital. Marine Parkway cuts through the southern half of the site from the west, and enters the main parking lot. A private medical mall sits immediately to the west of the main parking lot and a one-acre storm-water retention pond sits to the west of the mall. A private medical office building occupies the south end of the main parking lot and a four-acre drainage easement is located in the southwest corner of the site. Community Hospital's administration has actively analyzed its existing site, aging facility, and adjacent areas. It has commissioned studies by civil engineers, health care consultants, and architects. The collective evidence demonstrates that, although on-site relocation is potentially an option, on balance, it is not a reasonable option. Replacing Community Hospital on its existing site is not practical for several reasons. First, the hospital will experience significant disruption and may be required to completely close down for a period of time. Second, the site's southwestern large four-acre parcel is necessary for storm-water retention and is unavailable for expansion. Third, a reliable cost differential is unknown given Community Hospital's inability to successfully negotiate with the city and owners of the adjacent medical office complexes to acquire additional parcels. Fourth, acquiring other adjacent properties is not a viable option since they consist of individually owned residential lots. In addition to the site's physical restrictions, the site is hindered by its location. The hospital is situated in a neighborhood between small streets and a local school. From the north and south, motorists utilize either U.S. 19, a congested corridor that accommodates approximately 50,000 vehicles per day, or Grand and Madison Streets, two-lane streets within a school zone. From the east and west, motorists utilize similar two-lane neighborhood streets including Marine Parkway, which often floods in heavy rains. Community Hospital's proposed site, on the other hand, is a 53-acre tract positioned five miles from its current facility, at the intersection of two major thoroughfares in southwestern Pasco County. The proposed site offers ample space for all facilities, parking, outpatient care, and future expansion. In addition, Community Hospital's proposed site provides reasonable access to all patients within its existing primary service area made up of zip codes 34652, 34653, 34668, 34655, 34690, and 34691. For example, the average drive times from the population centers of each zip code to the existing site of the hospital and the proposed site are as follows: Zip code Difference Existing site Proposed site 34652 3 minutes 14 minutes 11 minutes 34653 8 minutes 11 minutes 3 minutes 34668 15 minutes 21 minutes 6 minutes 34655 11 minutes 4 minutes -7 minutes 34690 11 minutes 13 minutes 2 minutes 34691 11 minutes 17 minutes 6 minutes While the average drive time from the population centroids of zip codes 34653, 34668, 34690, and 34691 to the proposed site slightly increases, it decreases from the Trinity area, where population growth has been most significant in southwestern Pasco County. In addition, a motorist's average drive time from Community Hospital's existing location to its proposed site is only 10 to 11 minutes, and patients utilizing public transportation will be able to access the new hospital via a bus stop located adjacent to the proposed site. The Condition of North Bay Facility North Bay Hospital is also an aging facility. Its original structure and portions of its physical plant are approximately 30 years old. Portions of its major mechanical systems will soon require replacement including its boilers, air handlers, and chillers. In addition, the hospital is undersized and awkwardly configured. Despite its shortcomings, however, North Bay is generally in good condition. The hospital has been consistently renovated and updated over time and is aesthetically pleasing. Moreover, its second and third floors were added in 1986, are in good shape, and structurally capable of vertical expansion. Medical Surgical Beds and ICU Units By-in-large, North Bay is comprised of undersized, semi-private rooms containing toilet and shower facilities. The hospital does not have any three-bed wards. North Bay's first floor houses all ancillary and support services including lab, radiology, pharmacy, surgery, pre-op, post-anesthesia recovery, central sterile processing and supply, kitchen and cafeteria, housekeeping and administration, as well as the mechanical, electrical, and facilities maintenance and engineering. The first floor also contains a 20-bed CMR unit and a 15-bed acute care unit. North Bay's second and third floors are mostly comprised of semi-private rooms and supporting nursing stations. Although the rooms and stations are not ideally sized, they are in relatively good shape. North Bay utilizes a single ICU with ten critical care beds. The ICU rooms and nursing stations are also undersized. A four-bed ICU ward and former nursery are routinely used to serve overflow patients. Surgery Department and Recovery North Bay utilizes a single pre-operative surgical room for all of its surgery patients. The room accommodates up to five patient beds, but has limited space for storage and pre-operative procedures. Its operating rooms are sufficiently sized. While carts and large equipment are routinely stored in hallways throughout the surgical suite, North Bay has converted the former obstetrics recovery room to surgical storage and has made efficient use of other available space. North Bay operates a small six-bed Post Anesthesia Care Unit. Nurses routinely prepare patient medications in the unit which is often crowded with staff and patients. The Emergency Department North Bay has recently expanded its emergency department. The evidence demonstrates that this department is sufficient and meets current and future expected patient volumes. Replacement Issues Relating to North Bay While it is clear that areas of North Bay's physical plant are aging, the facility is in relatively good condition. It is apparent that North Bay must soon replace significant equipment, including cast-iron sewer pipes, plumbing, boilers, and chillers which will cause some interruption to hospital operations. However, North Bay's four-page written assessment of the facility and its argument citing the need for total replacement is, on balance, not persuasive. North Bay's Proposed Replacement North Bay proposes to construct a new, state-of-the- art, hospital approximately eight miles southeast of its existing facility and intends to offer the identical array of services the hospital currently provides. North Bay's Existing and Proposed Sites North Bay's existing hospital is located on an eight-acre site with limited storm-water drainage capacity. Consequently, much of its parking area is covered by deep, porous, gravel instead of asphalt. North Bay's existing site is generally surrounded by residential properties. While the city has committed, in writing, it willingness to assist both applicants with on-site expansion, it is unknown whether North Bay can acquire additional adjacent property. North Bay's proposed site is located at the intersection of Trinity Oaks Boulevard and Mitchell Boulevard, south of Community Hospital's proposed site, and is quite spacious. It contains sufficient land for the facilities, parking, and future growth, and has all necessary infrastructure in place, including utility systems, storm- water structures, and roadways. Currently however, there is no public transportation service available to North Bay's proposed site. Projected Utilization by Applicants The evidence presented at hearing indicates that, statewide, replacement hospitals often increase a provider's acute care bed utilization. For example, Bartow Memorial Hospital, Heart of Florida Regional Medical Center, Lake City Medical Center, Florida Hospital Heartland Medical Center, South Lake Hospital, and Florida Hospital-Fish Memorial each experienced significant increases in utilization following the opening of their new hospital. The applicants in this case each project an increase in utilization following the construction of their new facility. Specifically, Community Hospital's application projects 82,685 total hospital patient days (64,427 acute care patient days) in year one (2006) of the operation of its proposed replacement facility, and 86,201 total hospital patient days (67,648 acute care patient days) in year two (2007). Using projected 2006 and 2007 population estimates, applying 2002 acute care hospital use rates which are below 50 percent, and keeping Community Hospital's acute care market share constant at its 2002 level, it is reasonably estimated that Community Hospital's existing hospital will experience 52,623 acute care patient days in 2006, and 53,451 acute care patient days in 2007. Consequently, Community Hospital's proposed facility must attain 11,804 additional acute care patient days in 2006, and 14,197 more acute care patient days in 2007, in order to achieve its projected acute care utilization. Although Community Hospital lost eight percent of the acute care market in its service area between 1995 and 2002, two-thirds of that loss was due to residents of Sub- District 5-1 acquiring services in another area. While Community Hospital experienced 78,444 acute care patient days in 1995, it projects only 64,427 acute care patient days in year one. Given the new facility and population factors, it is reasonable that the hospital will recapture half of its lost acute care market share and achieve its projections. With respect to its psychiatric unit, Community Hospital projects 16,615 adult psychiatric inpatient days in year one (2006) and 17,069 adult inpatient days in year two (2007) of the proposed replacement hospital. The evidence indicates that these projections are reasonable. Similarly, North Bay's acute care utilization rate has been consistently below 50 percent. Since 1999, the hospital has experienced declining utilization. In its application, North Bay states that it achieved total actual acute care patient days of 21,925 in 2000 and 19,824 in 2001 and the evidence at hearing indicates that North Bay experienced 17,693 total acute care patient days in 2002. North Bay projects 25,909 acute care patient days in the first year of operation of its proposed replacement hospital, and 27,334 acute care patient days in the second year of operation. Despite each applicant's current facility utilization rate, Community Hospital must increase its current acute care patient days by 20 percent to reach its projected utilization, and North Bay must increase its patient days by at least 50 percent. Given the population trends, service mix and existing competition, the evidence demonstrates that it is not possible for both applicants to simultaneously achieve their projections. In fact, it is strongly noted that the applicants' own projections are predicated upon only one applicant being approved and cannot be supported with the approval of two facilities. Local Health Plan Preferences In its local health plan for District 5, the Suncoast Health Council, Inc., adopted acute care preferences in October, 2000. The replacement of an existing hospital is not specifically addressed by any of the preferences. However, certain acute care preferences and specialty care preferences are applicable. The first applicable preference provides that preference "shall be given to an applicant who proposes to locate a new facility in an area that will improve access for Medicaid and indigent patients." It is clear that the majority of Medicaid and indigent patients live closer to the existing hospitals. However, Community Hospital proposes to move 5.5 miles from its current location, whereas North Bay proposes to move eight miles from its current location. While the short distances alone are less than significant, North Bay's proposed location is further removed from New Port Richey, is not located on a major highway or bus-route, and would therefore be less accessible to the medically indigent residents. Community Hospital's proposed site will be accessible using public transportation. Furthermore, Community Hospital has consistently provided excellent service to the medically indigent and its proposal would better serve that population. In 2000, Community Hospital provided 7.4 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.8 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. Community Hospital provided the highest percentage and greatest number of Medicaid patient days in Sub-District 5-1. By comparison, North Bay provided 5.8 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.9 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. In 2002, North Bay's Medicaid patients days declined to 3.56 percent. Finally, given the closeness and available bed space of the existing providers and the increasing population in the Trinity area, access will be improved by Community Hospital's relocation. The second local health plan preference provides that "[i]n cases where an applicant is a corporation with previously awarded certificates of need, preference shall be given to those which follow through in a timely manner to construct and operate the additional facilities or beds and do not use them for later negotiations with other organizations seeking to enter or expand the number of beds they own or control." Both applicants meet this preference. The third local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that provide AHCA with documentation that they provide, or propose to provide, the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in the sub-district." Community Hospital provides the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in Sub-District 5-1, and therefore meets this preference. The fourth local health plan preference applies to "Certificate of Need applications that demonstrate intent to serve HIV/AIDS infected persons." Both applicants accept and treat HIV/AIDS infected persons, and would continue to do so in their proposed replacement hospitals. The fifth local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that commit to provide a full array of acute care services including medical-surgical, intensive care, pediatric, and obstetrical services within the sub-district for which they are applying." Community Hospital qualifies since it will continue to provide its current services, including obstetrical care and psychiatric care, in its proposed replacement hospital. North Bay discontinued its pediatric and obstetrical programs in 2001, does not intend to provide them in its proposed replacement hospital, and will not provide psychiatric care. Agency Rule Preferences Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.038(6) provides an applicable preference to a facility proposing "new acute care services and capital expenditures" that has "a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so." As the largest Medicaid provider in Sub-District 5-1, Community Hospital meets this preference better than does North Bay. North Bay's history demonstrates a declining rate of service to the medically indigent. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed in relation to the applicable district health plan District 5 includes Pasco and Pinellas County. Pasco County is rapidly developing, whereas Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida. Given the population trends, service mix, and utilization rates of the existing providers, on balance, there is a need for a replacement hospital in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(2), Florida Statutes: The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant Community Hospital and North Bay are both located in Sub-District 5-1. Each proposes to relocate to an area of southwestern Pasco County which is experiencing explosive population growth. The other general acute care hospital located in Sub-District 5-1 is Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point, which is located further north, in the Hudson area of western Pasco County. The only other acute care hospitals in Pasco County are East Pasco Medical Center, in Zephyrhills, and Pasco Community Hospital, in Dade City. Those hospitals are located in Sub-District 5-2, east Pasco County, far from the area proposed to be served by either Community Hospital or North Bay. District 5 includes Pinellas County as well as Pasco County. Helen Ellis and Mease are existing hospital providers located in Pinellas County. Helen Ellis has 168 licensed beds, consisting of 150 acute care beds and an 18-bed skilled nursing unit, and is located 7.9 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 10.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. Access to Helen Ellis for patients originating from southwestern Pasco County requires those patients to travel congested U.S. 19 south to Tarpon Springs. As a result, the average drive time from Community Hospital's existing and proposed site to Helen Ellis is approximately 22 minutes. Helen Ellis is not a reasonable alternative to Community Hospital's proposal. The applicants' proposals are specifically designed for the current and future health care needs of southwestern Pasco County. Given its financial history, it is unknown whether Helen Ellis will be financially capable of providing the necessary care to the residents of southwestern Pasco. Mease Countryside Hospital has 189 licensed acute care beds. It is located 16.0 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 13.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. The average drive time to Mease Countryside is 32 minutes from Community Hospital's existing site and 24 minutes from its proposed site. In addition, Mease Countryside Hospital has experienced extremely high utilization over the past several years, in excess of 90 percent for calendar years 2000 and 2001. Utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital has remained over 80 percent despite the addition of 45 acute care beds in April 2002. Given the growth and demand, it is unknown whether Mease can accommodate the residents in southwest Pasco County. Mease Dunedin Hospital has 189 licensed beds, consisting of 149 acute care beds, a 30-bed skilled nursing unit, five Level 2 neonatal intensive care beds, and five Level 3 neonatal intensive care beds. Its former 15-bed adult psychiatric unit has been converted into acute care beds. It is transferring its entire obstetrics program at Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease Dunedin Hospital is located approximately 18 to 20 miles from the applicants' existing and proposed locations with an average drive time of 35-38 minutes. With their remote location, and the exceedingly high utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital, neither of the two Mease hospitals is a viable alternative to the applicants' proposals. In addition, the construction of a replacement hospital would positively impact economic development and further attract medical professionals to Sub-District 5-1. On balance, given the proximity, utilization, service array, and accessibility of the existing providers, including the applicants, the relocation of Community Hospital will enhance access to health care to the residents. Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes: The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care As stipulated, both applicants provide excellent quality of care. However, Community Hospital's proposal will better enhance its ability to provide quality care. Community is currently undersized, non-compliant with today's standards, and located on a site that does not allow for reasonable expansion. Its emergency department is inadequate for patient volume, and the configuration of the first floor leads to inefficiencies in the diagnosis and treatment of emergency patients. Again, most inpatients are placed in semi-private rooms and three-bed wards, with no showers or tubs, little privacy, and an increased risk of infection. The hospital's waiting areas for families of patients are antiquated and undersized, its nursing stations are small and cramped and the operating rooms and storage facilities are undersized. Community Hospital's deficiencies will be effectively eliminated by its proposed replacement hospital. As a result, patients will experience qualitatively better care by the staff who serve them. Conversely, North Bay is in better physical condition and not in need of replacement. It has more reasonable options to expand or relocate its facility on site. Quality of care at North Bay will not be markedly enhanced by the construction of a new hospital. Sections 408.035(4)and(5), Florida Statutes, have been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes: The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds available for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that both Community Hospital and North Bay have available health personnel and management personnel for project accomplishment and operation. In addition, the evidence proves that both applicants have sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures. Community Hospital proposes to rely on its parent company to finance the project. Keith Giger, Vice-President of Finance for HCA, Inc., Community Hospital's parent organization, provided credible deposition testimony that HCA, Inc., will finance 100 percent of the total project cost by an inter-company loan at eight percent interest. Moreover, it is noted that the amount to be financed is actually $20 million less than the $196,849,328 stated in the CON Application, since Community Hospital previously purchased the proposed site in June 2003 with existing funds and does not need to finance the land acquisition. Community Hospital has sufficient working capital for operating expenditures of the proposed replacement hospital. North Bay, on the other hand, proposes to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group which includes Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc.; Mease; and several other hospital entities. Its proposal, while feasible, is less certain since member hospitals must approve the indebtedness, thereby providing Mease with the ability to derail North Bay's proposed bond financing. Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The evidence proves that either proposal will enhance geographical access to the growing population in the service district. However, with its provision of obstetrical services, Community Hospital is better suited to address the needs of the younger community. With respect to financial access, both proposed relocation sites are slightly farther away from the higher elderly and indigent population centers. Since the evidence demonstrates that it is unreasonable to relocate both facilities away from the down-town area, Community Hospital's proposal, on balance, provides better access to poor patients. First, public transportation will be available to Community Hospital's site. Second, Community Hospital has an excellent record of providing care to the poor and indigent and has accepted the agency's condition to provide ten percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid recipients To the contrary, North Bay's site will not be accessible by public transportation. In addition, North Bay has a less impressive record of providing care to the poor and indigent. Although AHCA conditioned North Bay's approval upon it providing 9.7 percent of total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients, instead of the 9.7 percent of gross annual revenue proposed in its application, North Bay has consistently provided Medicaid and charity patients less than seven percent of its total annual patient days. Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes: The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate financial feasibility refers to the availability of funds to capitalize and operate the proposal. See Memorial Healthcare Group, Ltd. d/b/a Memorial Hospital Jacksonville vs. AHCA et al., Case No. 02-0447 et seq. Community Hospital has acquired reliable financing for the project and has sufficiently demonstrated that its project is immediately financially feasible. North Bay's short-term financial proposal is less secure. As noted, North Bay intends to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group. As a member of the group, Mease, the parent company of two hospitals that oppose North Bay's application, must approve the plan. Long-term financial feasibility is the ability of the project to reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable achievable point in the future. Big Bend Hospice, Inc. vs. AHCA and Covenant Hospice, Inc., Case No. 02-0455. Although CON pro forma financial schedules typically show profitability within two to three years of operation, it is not a requirement. In fact, in some circumstances, such as the case of a replacement hospital, it may be unrealistic for the proposal to project profitability before the third or fourth year of operation. In this case, Community Hospital's utilization projections, gross and net revenues, and expense figures are reasonable. The evidence reliably demonstrates that its replacement hospital will be profitable by the fourth year of operation. The hospital's financial projections are further supported by credible evidence, including the fact that the hospital experienced financial improvement in 2002 despite its poor physical condition, declining utilization, and lost market share to providers outside of its district. In addition, the development and population trends in the Trinity area support the need for a replacement hospital in the area. Also, Community Hospital has benefited from increases in its Medicaid per diem and renegotiated managed care contracts. North Bay's long-term financial feasibility of its proposal is less certain. In calendar year 2001, North Bay incurred an operating loss of $306,000. In calendar year 2002, it incurred a loss of $1,160,000. In its CON application, however, North Bay projects operating income of $1,538,827 in 2007, yet omitted the ongoing expenses of interest ($1,600,000) and depreciation ($3,000,000) from its existing facility that North Bay intends to continue operating. Since North Bay's proposal does not project beyond year two, it is less certain whether it is financially feasible in the third or fourth year. In addition to the interest and depreciation issues, North Bay's utilization projections are less reasonable than Community Hospital's proposal. While possible, North Bay will have a difficult task achieving its projected 55 percent increase in acute care patient days in its second year of operation given its declining utilization, loss of obstetric/pediatric services and termination of two exclusive managed care contracts. Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness Both applicants have substantial unused capacity. However, Community Hospital's existing facility is at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the market place. In fact, from 1994 to 1998, Community Hospital's overall market share in its service area declined from 40.3 percent to 35.3 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' overall market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 7.2 percent to 9.2 percent. From 1995 to the 12-month period ending June 30, 2002, Community Hospital's acute care market share in its service area declined from 34.0 percent to 25.9 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' acute care market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 11.7 percent to 12.0 percent. In addition, acute care average occupancy rates at Mease Dunedin Hospital increased each year from 1999 through 2002. Acute care average occupancy at Mease Countryside Hospital exceeded 90 percent in 2000 and 2001, and was approximately 85 percent for the period ending June 30, 2002. Some of the loss in Community Hospital's market share is due to an out-migration of patients from its service area to hospitals in northern Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties. Market share in Community's service area by out-of- market providers increased from 33 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2002. Community Hospital's outdated hospital has hampered its ability to compete for patients in its service area. Mease is increasing its efforts to attract patients and currently completing a $92 million expansion of Mease Countryside Hospital. The project includes the development of 1,134 parking spaces on 30 acres of raw land north of the Mease Countryside Hospital campus and the addition of two floors to the hospital. It also involves the relocation of 51 acute care beds, the obstetrics program and the Neonatal Intensive Care Units from Mease Dunedin Hosptial to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease is also seeking to more than double the size of the Countryside emergency department to handle its 62,000 emergency visits. With the transfer of licensed beds from Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital, Mease will also convert formerly semi-private patient rooms to private rooms at Mease Dunedin Hospital. The approval of Community Hospital's relocated facility will enable it to better compete with the hospitals in the area and promote quality and cost- effectiveness. North Bay, on the other hand, is not operating at a distinct disadvantage, yet is still experiencing declining utilization. North Bay is the only community-owned, not-for- profit provider in western Pasco County and is a valuable asset to the city. Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes: The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods or energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the project costs in both applications are reasonable to construct the replacement hospitals. Community Hospital's proposed construction cost per square foot is $175, and slightly less than North Bay's $178 proposal. The costs and methods of proposed construction for each proposal is reasonable. Given Community Hospital's severe site and facility problems, the evidence demonstrates that there is no reasonable, less costly, or more effective methods of construction available for its proposed replacement hospital. Additional "band-aide" approaches are not financially reasonable and will not enable Community Hospital to effectively compete. The facility is currently licensed for 401 beds, operates approximately 311 beds and is still undersized. The proposed replacement hospital will meet the standards in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-3.081, and will meet current building codes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Guidelines for Design and Construction of Hospitals and Health Care Facilities, developed by the American Institute of Architects. The opponents' argue that Community Hospital will not utilize the 320 acute care beds proposed in its CON application, and therefore, a smaller facility is a less- costly alternative. In addition, Helen Ellis' architectural expert witness provided schematic design alternatives for Community Hospital to be expanded and replaced on-site, without providing a detailed and credible cost accounting of the alternatives. Given the evidence and the law, their arguments are not persuasive. While North Bay's replacement cost figures are reasonable, given the aforementioned reasons, including the fact that the facility is in reasonably good condition and can expand vertically, on balance, it is unreasonable for North Bay to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes: The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Community Hospital has consistently provided the most health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital agreed to provide at least ten percent of its patient days to Medicaid recipients. Similarly, North Bay agreed to provide 9.7 percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients combined. North Bay, by contrast, provided only 3.56 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients in 2002, and would have to significantly reverse a declining trend in its Medicaid provision to comply with the imposed condition. Community Hospital better satisfies the criterion. Section 408.035(12) has been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Adverse Impact on Existing Providers Historical figures demonstrate that hospital market shares are not static, but fluctuate with competition. No hospital is entitled to a specific or historic market share free from competition. While the applicants are located in health planning Sub-District 5-1 and Helen Ellis and the two Mease hospitals are located in health planning Sub-District 5- 2, they compete for business. None of the opponents is a disproportionate share, safety net, Medicaid provider. As a result, AHCA gives less consideration to any potential adverse financial impact upon them resulting from the approval of either application as a low priority. The opponents, however, argue that the approval of either replacement hospital would severely affect each of them. While the precise distance from the existing facilities to the relocation sites is relevant, it is clear that neither applicants' proposed site is unreasonably close to any of the existing providers. In fact, Community Hospital intends to locate its replacement facility three miles farther away from Helen Ellis and 1.5 miles farther away from Mease Dunedin Hospital. While Helen Ellis' primary service area is seemingly fluid, as noted by its chief operating officer's hearing and deposition testimony, and the Mease hospitals are located 15 to 20 miles south, they overlap parts of the applicants' primary service areas. Accordingly, each applicant concedes that the proposed increase in their patient volume would be derived from the growing population as well as existing providers. Although it is clear that the existing providers may be more affected by the approval of Community Hosptial's proposal, the exact degree to which they will be adversely impacted by either applicant is unknown. All parties agree, however, that the existing providers will experience less adverse affects by the approval of only one applicant, as opposed to two. Furthermore, Mease concedes that its hospitals will continue to aggressively compete and will remain profitable. In fact, Mease's adverse impact analysis does not show any credible reduction in loss of acute care admissions at Mease Countryside Hospital or Mease Dunedin Hospital until 2010. Even then, the reliable evidence demonstrates that the impact is negligible. Helen Ellis, on the other hand, will likely experience a greater loss of patient volume. To achieve its utilization projections, Community Hospital will aggressively compete for and increase market share in Pinellas County zip code 34689, which borders Pasco County. While that increase does not facially prove that Helen Ellis will be materially affected by Community Hospital's replacement hospital, Helen Ellis will confront targeted competition. To minimize the potential adverse affect, Helen Ellis will aggressively compete to expand its market share in the Pinellas County zip codes south of 34689, which is experiencing population growth. In addition, Helen Ellis is targeting broader service markets, and has filed an application to establish an open- heart surgery program. While Helen Ellis will experience greater competition and financial loss, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it will experience material financial adverse impact as a result of Community Hospital's proposed relocation. In fact, Helen Ellis' impact analysis is less than reliable. In its contribution-margin analysis, Helen Ellis utilized its actual hospital financial data as filed with AHCA for the fiscal year October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2002. The analysis included total inpatient and total outpatient service revenues found in the filed financial data, including ambulatory services and ancillary services, yet it did not include the expenses incurred in generating ambulatory or ancillary services revenue. As a result, the overstated net revenue per patient day was applied to its speculative lost number of patient days which resulted in an inflated loss of net patient service revenue. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Helen Ellis' analysis incorrectly included operational revenue and excluded expenses related to its 18-bed skilled nursing unit since neither applicant intends to operate a skilled nursing unit. While including the skilled nursing unit revenues, the analysis failed to include the sub-acute inpatient days that produced those revenues, and thereby over inflated the projected total lost net patient service revenue by over one million dollars.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Community Hospital's CON Application No. 9539, to establish a 376-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub- District 5-1, be granted; and North Bay's CON Application No. 9538, to establish a 122-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub-District 5- 1, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Hauser, Esquire R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Metz, Hauser & Husband, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Richard J. Saliba, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Darrell White, Esquire William B. Wiley, Esquire McFarlain & Cassedy, P.A. 305 South Gadsden Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10432 filed by East Florida-DMC, Inc. (DMC), to build an 80-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, or CON Application No. 10433 filed by The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida d/b/a Jackson Hospital West (JW), to build a 100-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, on balance, satisfy the applicable criteria; and, if so, whether either or both should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties’ stipulations, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, other evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Hospital West and Jackson Health System (JHS) JHS is a taxpayer-funded health system located in and owned by Miami-Dade County. It is governed by The Public Health Trust of Miami Dade-County, Florida (PHT), a seven-member board. JHS owns and operates three acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County--Jackson Memorial Hospital (JMH); Jackson North Medical Center (JN); and Jackson South Medical Center (JS)--as well as three specialty hospitals: Holtz Children’s Hospital (Holtz); Jackson Rehabilitation Hospital; and Jackson Behavioral Health Hospital. JHS also owns and operates numerous other non- hospital healthcare facilities within Miami-Dade County. JHS’s applicant in this proceeding is JW which, if approved, will be another acute care hospital in JHS. JHS is an academic teaching institution, and the University of Miami (UM) is JHS’s affiliated medical school. Over 1,000 UM residents staff JMH pursuant to an operating agreement with JHS. JN and JS are not academic medical centers. JHS annually receives sales tax and ad valorem tax revenues from Miami-Dade County in order to help fund its operations. JS and JN are community hospitals operated as part of JHS. JS was acquired in 2001. JS is licensed for 226 beds and is also home to a verified Level II trauma center. The JN facility was acquired by JHS in 2006. The facility is licensed for 382 beds. East Florida (DMC) DMC is an affiliate of HCA Healthcare, Inc. (HCA), the largest provider of acute care hospital services in the world. DMC will operate within HCA’s East Florida Division (EFD), which is comprised of 15 hospitals, 12 surgery centers, two diagnostic imaging centers, four freestanding emergency departments, nine behavioral health facilities, and one regional laboratory, along with other related services. There are three HCA-affiliated hospitals in Miami-Dade County: KRMC; Aventura Hospital and Medical Center (Aventura); and Mercy Hospital, a campus of Plantation General Hospital (Mercy). Kendall Regional (KRMC) KRMC, which is located at the intersection of the Florida Turnpike and Southwest 40th Street in Miami-Dade County, is a 417-bed tertiary provider comprised of 380 acute care beds, 23 inpatient adult psychiatric beds, eight Level II neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds, and five Level III NICU beds. It is a Baker Act receiving facility. KRMC is a verified Level I trauma center. It also has a burn program. KRMC is also an academic teaching facility, receiving freestanding institutional accreditation from the Accrediting Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in 2013. KRMC currently has six residency programs including, among others, surgery, internal medicine, podiatry, anesthesia, and surgical critical care. Its teaching programs are affiliated with the University of South Florida, Nova Southeastern University, and Florida International University. KRMC also participates in scholarly and clinical research. In 2017, KRMC had over 82,000 Emergency Department (ED) visits. It treated over 115,000 total inpatients and outpatients that year. There are 850 physicians on KRMC’s medical staff. It offers a full range of medical surgery services, interventional procedures, obstetrics (OB), pediatric, and neonatal care, among many other service lines. KRMC primarily serves southern and western portions of Miami-Dade County but also receives referrals from the Florida Keys up through Broward County, Palm Beach County, and the Treasure Coast. Its main competitors include, but are not limited to: Baptist Hospital; Baptist West; South Miami Hospital; PGH; Hialeah; CGH; JS, and Palm Springs General Hospital. The Tenet Hospitals PGH, Hialeah, and CGH are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Tenet South Florida. These are all for-profit hospitals. PGH is a 368-bed tertiary facility that opened in the early 1970s. It has 297 licensed acute care beds, 48 adult psychiatric beds, 52 ICU beds, and 15 Level II NICU beds. It is located at the Palmetto Expressway and Northwest 122nd Street in Hialeah, Florida. The hospital employs about 1,700 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH is a tertiary-level facility offering a variety of specialty services, including adult open heart surgery, a comprehensive stroke center, and robotic surgery. It has inpatient mental health beds and serves the community as a Baker Act receiving facility. It also offers OB and Level II NICU services with approximately 1,500 births a year. It has approximately 70,000 ED visits and between 17,000 and 18,000 inpatient admissions per year. In addition to its licensed inpatient beds, PGH operates 31 observation beds. PGH is ACGME accredited and serves a significant teaching function in the community. It has approximately 89 residents and fellows. The hospital provides fellowships in cardiology, critical care and interventional cardiology, and also has rotations in neurology and gastroenterology. Residents from Larkin General Hospital also rotate through PGH. PGH generally serves the communities of Opa Locka, Hialeah, Miami Lakes, Hialeah Gardens, Doral, and Miami Springs. In reality, all of the hospitals in the county are competitors, but more direct competition comes from Palm Springs Hospital, Memorial in Miramar, Mount Sinai, Kendall, and even its sister hospital, Hialeah. Hialeah first opened in 1951 and is a 378-bed acute care facility. It has 356 acute care beds, 12 adult psychiatric beds, and 10 Level II NICU beds. The ED has 25 beds and about 40,000 visits per year. It has approximately 14,000 inpatient admissions and 1,400 babies delivered annually. It offers services including cardiac, stroke, robotic surgery, colorectal surgery, and OB services. The hospital has a Level II NICU with 12 beds. CGH is located in the City of Coral Gables and is near the border between Coral Gables and the City of Miami on Douglas Road. It first opened in 1926. Portions of the original structure are still in use. CGH has 245 licensed beds, over 725 employees, 367 physicians, and over 100 additional allied providers on its medical staff. The hospital has a full-service ED. Its service lines include general surgery, geriatrics, urology, treatment of cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, and others. The hospital has eight operating rooms and offers robotic surgery. The ED has 28 beds divided into the main area and a geriatric emergency room. It had about 25,000 ED visits last year, which is lower than prior years, due in part to the presence of over a dozen nearby urgent care centers. CGH has over 8,500 inpatient admissions per year and is not at capacity. While patient days have grown slightly, the average occupancy is still just a little over 40%, meaning, on average, it has over 140 empty inpatient beds on any given day. The hospital is licensed for 245 beds, but typically there are only 180 beds immediately available for use. Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA) AHCA is the state health-planning agency charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.31-408.0455, Florida Statutes. The Proposals Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC proposes to build an 80-bed community hospital situated within the residential district of Doral. The hospital will be located in southwestern Doral in zip code 33126 and will serve the growing population of Doral, along with residential areas to the north and south of Doral. The hospital will be located in the City of Doral’s residential district on Northwest 41st Street between Northwest 109th Avenue to the east, and Northwest 112th Avenue to the west. Doral has seen significant growth in the past 15 years and has been consistently included on the list of the fastest growing cities in Florida. The new facility will have a bed complement of 80 licensed acute care beds, including 72 medical/surgical and eight OB beds. The proposed acute care hospital will be fully accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Facilities and licensed by the State of Florida. No public funds will be utilized in construction of the hospital and it will contribute to the state, county, and municipal tax base as a proprietary corporation. DMC will offer a full range of non-tertiary services, including emergency services, imaging, surgery, intensive care, cardiac catheterization, and women's services, including an OB unit, and pediatric care. DMC will be a general medical facility that will include a general medical component and a surgery component. Although DMC will operate an OB unit, NICU services will not be offered at DMC. If DMC’s patients need more advanced services, including NICU, the EFD hopes they will receive them from KRMC. The open medical staff will be largely community-based, but University of Miami physicians would be welcome at DMC. Before the hospital is built, KRMC will construct and operate a freestanding emergency department (FSED) at the location that will eventually become the ED of DMC. Construction of the FSED is now underway, and Brandon Haushalter, chief executive officer (CEO) of KRMC, estimated that it will open in March or April of 2019. Jackson West JHS proposes to build a community hospital to be known as “Jackson West” near the eastern edge of Doral. The proposed 100-bed general acute care hospital would have medical surgical and obstetrical beds and offer basic acute care services. JHS is a public health system owned by Miami-Dade County. All of JHS’s assets, as well as its debts, belong to the county. JHS is a not-for-profit entity, and therefore does not pay taxes, though it receives hundreds of millions of dollars from property taxes and sales taxes in Miami-Dade County. JHS’s main campus is a large health campus located near the Midtown Miami area in between Allapattah (to the north) and Little Havana (to the south). In addition to JMH, the campus includes Holtz Children’s Hospital, a behavioral health hospital, an inpatient rehabilitation hospital, and several specialty clinics. Bascom-Palmer Eye Institute, a Veterans Administration hospital, and University of Miami Hospital are also located adjacent to Jackson West’s main campus. JMH is a 1,500-bed hospital with a wide array of programs and services, including tertiary and quaternary care, and a Level I trauma program, the Ryder Trauma Center. JMH receives patients from throughout Miami-Dade County, elsewhere in Florida, and internationally. JMH is a teaching hospital and has a large number of residents, as well as professors from the University of Miami, on staff. UM and JMH have had a relationship for many years, and in addition to research and teaching, UM provides physician staffing to JMH. JN is a 342-bed community hospital located in between Miami Gardens and North Miami Beach, just off of I-95 and the Turnpike. JS is a 252-bed community hospital located in the Palmetto Bay area just south of Kendall. It has stroke certification and interventional cardiology, and was recently approved for a trauma program, which began in May 2016. Both JN and JS were existing hospitals that were acquired by JHS. JHS has never built a hospital from the ground up. In 2014, JHS leadership directed its internal planning team to review the healthcare needs of county residents. JHS’s analysis identified a need for outpatient services in western Miami-Dade, the only remaining quadrant of the county in which JHS did not have a hospital or healthcare program at the time. As part of its due diligence, JHS then consulted healthcare firm Kurt Salmon & Associates (KSA) to independently evaluate the data. KSA’s investigation validated a need in the west county for adult and pediatric outpatient services, including need for an FSED. This prompted JHS to explore opportunities for expansion of outpatient services where needed: in the western corridor of Miami-Dade. This was also the genesis of JHS’s long-range plan to first build an FSED in the Doral area, to be followed ultimately by the addition of a general acute care hospital at the site. The JW site is a 27-acre parcel of land located just west of the Palmetto Expressway and north of 25th Street. The site is in an industrial area only a short distance from the western end of the runways at Miami International Airport. The site is located in zip code 33122, which is very sparsely populated. JW proposed a primary service area (PSA) consisting of zip codes 33126, 33144, 33166, 33172/33122, 33174, 33178, and 33182, and a secondary service area (SSA) of zip codes 33155, 33165, 33175, and 33184. JW intends to serve general, acute care non-tertiary patients and OB patients. Detailed below, trends in the JW service area do not demonstrate need for its proposed hospital. The location of the JW site will not contribute to the viability of the proposed hospital. According to 2010 census data, only 328 people live within a one-mile radius of the JW site. Since 2000, only 32 total people have moved into that same area around the JW site--an average of three per year. There are virtually no residences within a one-mile radius of the JW site. From 2000 to 2010, the population within a two- mile radius of the JW site decreased by a rate of 9.4%. The JW health planner projects JW’s home zip code of 33122 will have a total population of only eight (8) people in 2022. From 2012 to 2014, the use rate in the JW service area for non-tertiary patients decreased by 3.9%. That decline continued at a steeper pace of 4.2% from 2014 to 2017. This was largely due to the 65+ age cohort, the demographic of patients that utilize inpatient services the most. The 65+ age cohort is growing at a slower pace in the JW service area than in Miami- Dade or Florida as a whole. Non-tertiary discharges in the JW service area are declining at a greater pace than that of Miami- Dade County--negative 4.2% compared to negative 1.9%. The rate of projected population growth in the JW PSA is decreasing. The projected rate of growth for the JW service area is lower than that of Miami-Dade County and Florida as a whole. The OB patient base JW intends to rely on is projected to remain flat. The inpatient discharges for all ages in the JW service area have declined from 2014 to 2017. For ages 0-17, discharges in the JW service area declined 21.4% during that time period. The discharges for ages 18-44 declined by 4.8%, and the discharges for ages 45-64 declined by 8.9%. The discharges for the important 65+ age cohort declined by 0.1%. Specifically, the discharges for ages 65-74 declined by 6.5%, and the discharges for ages 75-84 declined by 3.3%. The discharges for ages 85+ are the only age cohort that has not declined from 2012 to 2017. Overall, the non-tertiary discharges per 1,000 population (i.e., use rate) for all ages in the JW service area declined from 2012 to 2014 by 6%, and from 2014 to 2017 by 7.8%. Despite these declines in discharges in the JW service area, the health planners who crafted the JW projections used a constant use rate for the 0-17, 18-44, and 45-64 age cohorts. The JW health planners used a declining use rate for the 65+ age cohort. These use rates were applied uniformly across all zip codes, despite wide variance in actual use rates in each zip code. Applying the zip code specific use rates in conjunction with the other assumptions used by the JW health planner demonstrates that the JW projections are unreasonable. For instance, JW’s reliance on a uniform use rate over-projects the number of discharges in JW PSA zip code 33178 by nearly 1,000 patients. This occurs because the population is only growing at a 2% rate in the zip code, but JW’s reliance on service area-wide projections cause the discharges to grow at an extraordinary rate of 8.9% per year. Applying actual use rates across all zip codes causes a drastic change in the JW PSA and SSA definition. Section 408.037(2) requires a CON applicant to identify its PSA and SSA by listing zip codes in which it will receive discharges in descending order, beginning with the zip code with the highest amount of discharges, then proceeding in diminishing order to the zip code with the lowest amount of discharges. The zip codes, which comprise 75% of discharges, constitute the PSA; and the remaining zip codes, which consist of the remaining 25% of discharges, makes up the SSA. However, JW did not project its utilization in this manner. In its application, JW did not define its service area, PSA, and SSA zip codes in descending order by number or percentage of discharges. When this correct adjustment is made, its PSA consists of zip codes 33126, 33172, 33178, 33174, 33144, and 33165; and its SSA consists of zip codes 33175, 33166, 33155, 33182, and 33184. Zip codes 33166 and 33182 were in the original JW PSA, and zip code 33165 was in the original JW SSA. As such, JW’s home zip code should actually be in its SSA. JW health planners call this illogical, but it demonstrates that the JW site is located within a zip code that has almost no population of potential patients. JHS is developing an FSED and outpatient/ambulatory facilities on the JW site regardless of whether its CON application for a hospital is approved. Construction has begun on the JW site, and JHS is actually building a “shelled in” structure intended to house a future hospital, notwithstanding lack of CON approval for the hospital. There is no contingency plan for use of the shelled-in hospital space if CON approval is not obtained. JHS executives unequivocally stated that they intend to continue pursuing CON approval for the JW hospital, even if the proposed DMC hospital is approved. Indeed, JHS has filed third and fourth CON applications for its proposed JW hospital. The budget for the JW campus is $252 million. Sixty to $70 million is being funded from a bond issuance approved by voters in Miami-Dade County. Notably, the bond referendum approved by voters made no mention of a new hospital. The remaining $180 to $190 million is being funded by JHS, which has chosen to only keep 50 days cash-on-hand, and put any surplus toward capital projects. This is well below the number of days cash-on-hand ws advisable for a system like JHS. The specific programs and services to be offered at JW have not been finalized, but it is clear that JW will be a small community hospital that will not offer anything unique or different from any of the existing hospitals in the area, nor will it operate NICU beds. Patients presenting to JW in need of specialized or tertiary services will need to be transferred to another hospital with the capability of serving them, most likely JMH. The Applicants’ Arguments Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC’s arguments in support of its proposed hospital may be summarized as follows: Geographic features surrounding Doral create transportation access barriers for the residents of the area; Doral is a densely-populated community that is growing quickly and lacks a readily accessible hospital; KRMC, which is the provider of choice for Doral residents, is a growing tertiary facility that cannot sufficiently expand to meet its future demands. DMC will serve much of the same patient population currently served by KRMC and help decompress KRMC’s acute care load so KRMC can focus on its tertiary service lines; From a geographic standpoint, the Doral community and its patients are isolated from much of Miami-Dade County to the north, west, and east, and the nearest hospitals. East Florida-DMC is a subsidiary of HCA and would be a part of the HCA EFD. Michael Joseph is the president of the EFD, which includes 15 hospitals and other facilities from Miami north through the Treasure Coast. Mr. Joseph authorized the filing of the DMC CON application, which proposes an 80-bed basic acute care hospital that includes 72 medical surgical and eight OB beds. As noted, there will be neither unique services at DMC nor any tertiary services, such as a NICU. HCA anticipates that DMC patients needing tertiary services would be referred and treated at KRMC. The proposed hospital would be built on 41st Street, between Northwest 109th Avenue and Northwest 112th Avenue. This site is located on the western edge of Doral, just east of the Everglades. When the consultants were retained to write the first DMC CON application, HCA had already made the decision to go forward with the project. Mr. Joseph described Miami-Dade County as one of the most competitive markets in the country for hospital services. There is robust competition in the Miami-Dade market from the standpoints of payors, physicians, and the many hospitals located in the county, including Jackson, HCA, Tenet, Baptist and others. HCA is not proposing this project because any of the existing hospitals in the area do not provide good quality care. HCA is currently building an FSED on the DMC site that will open regardless of whether the DMC hospital is approved. Mr. Joseph acknowledged that there is a trend toward outpatient rather than inpatient care. Inpatient occupancy of acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County has been declining in recent years. Managed care has added further pressure on reducing inpatient admissions. Surgical advances have also resulted in fewer inpatient admissions. Surgeries that formerly required an inpatient stay are now often done on an outpatient basis. Mr. Joseph agreed that 30 minutes is a reasonable travel time to access an acute care hospital. The home zip code for the proposed DMC hospital is 33178. KRMC’s market share for that zip code is 20%. Individuals in that zip code are currently accessing a wide variety of hospitals. PGH is only 6.7 miles away and has the fourth highest market share in that zip code. HCA’s healthcare planning expert, Dan Sullivan, acknowledged that, if approved, DMC would likely have an adverse financial impact on KRMC and other area hospitals. Several witnesses testified that the travel time from the DMC site to KRMC is about 10 minutes, and that an ambulance could do it in as little as five minutes. As to the argument that the residents of Doral face geographic access barriers, the evidence did not indicate that there is anything unique about Doral from a traffic standpoint compared to other parts of Miami-Dade County. People come in and out of Doral on a daily basis in significant numbers for work and other reasons via various access points. Witnesses agreed that 25 to 30 minutes is a reasonable drive time for non-tertiary acute care services, and the evidence showed that residents of Doral, and the DMC service area, are well within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals providing more intensive services than are proposed by DMC. Indeed, many residents of DMC’s service area are closer to other hospitals than to the DMC site. None of the DMC witnesses were able to identify any patient in Doral who had been unable to access acute care services, or had suffered a bad outcome because of travel from Doral to an area hospital. The evidence did not establish that there currently exists either geographic or financial access barriers within the service area proposed to be served by DMC. Jackson West As in its Batch One application, JW advances six arguments as to why its proposed hospital should be approved. They are: It will serve a significant amount of indigent and Medicaid patients. JHS already serves residents of the proposed service area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented,” in that residents go to a number of different hospitals to receive services. Development of the freestanding ED and ambulatory center is under way. JW would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and FIU. There is physician and community support for the project. JW will add to the financial viability of JHS and its ability to continue its mission. JW presented very little analysis of the types of factors typically considered in evaluating need for a new hospital. JW did not discuss existing providers and their programs and services, the utilization of existing hospitals, and whether they have excess capacity, or other important considerations. Instead, JW advanced the six arguments noted above, for approval of its proposed hospital, none of which truly relate to the issue of need. First, JW states that its proposed hospital will serve a significant level of Medicaid and indigent patients. While it is true that JHS serves a significant amount of Medicaid and indigent patients, there are a number of reasons why this is not a basis to approve its proposed hospital. As an initial matter, JW treads a fine line in touting its service to Medicaid and indigent patients, while also targeting Doral for its better payer mix and financial benefit to JHS. JHS also receives an enormous amount of tax dollars to provide care to indigent and underserved patients. While other hospitals in Miami-Dade County provide care to such patients, they do not receive taxpayer dollars, as does JHS, although they pay taxes, unlike JHS. Also, Medicaid is a good payer for JHS. With its substantial supplement, JHS actually makes money from Medicaid patients, and it costs the system more for a Medicaid patient to be treated at a JHS hospital than elsewhere. More significantly, there is not a large Medicaid or indigent population in Doral, nor evidence of financial access issues in Doral. Second, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because JHS already serves patients from the Doral area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented” because area residents go to several different hospitals for care. This so- called “fragmentation” is not unique to Doral, and is not unusual in a densely-populated urban market with several existing hospitals. The same phenomenon occurs in other areas of Miami-Dade County, some of which actually have a hospital in the localized area. The fact that Doral residents are accessing several different hospitals demonstrates that there are a number of existing providers that are accessible to them. As discussed in greater detail below, residents of the Doral area have choices in every direction (other than to the west, which is the Everglades). JHS itself already serves patients from the Doral area. If anything, this tells us that patients from Doral currently have access to the JHS hospitals. Third, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because development of the JW campus is under way. This is irrelevant to the determination of need, and is simply a statement of JHS’s intent to build an FSED and outpatient facilities on a piece of land that was acquired for that purpose, regardless of CON approval. Fourth, JW argues for approval of its proposed hospital because it would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and Florida International University (FIU). However, the statutory criteria no longer addresses research and teaching concerns, and JHS’s relationship with UM or FIU has no bearing on whether there is a need for a new hospital in the Doral area. Moreover, JW did not present any evidence of how it would partner with UM or FIU at JW, and there does not seem to be any set plans in this regard. Fifth, JW claims that there is physician and community support for its proposed hospital, but it is very common for CON applicants to obtain letters in support for applications. Indeed, the DMC application was also accompanied by letters of support. Sixth and finally, JW argues that its proposed hospital will add to the financial viability of HSA and allow it to continue its mission. However, JW provided no analysis of the projected financial performance of its proposed hospital to substantiate this. The only financial analysis in the record is from KSA, a consulting firm that JHS hired to analyze the programs and services to be developed at JW. The KSA analysis posits that the JW FSED project will lose millions of dollars and not achieve break-even unless there is an inpatient hospital co-located there so that JW can take advantage of the more lucrative hospital-based billing and reimbursement. The sixth “need” argument relates to the issue of JHS’s historical financial struggles, which bear discussion. Only a handful of years ago, the entire JHS was in dire financial trouble, so much so that selling all or parts of it was considered. Days cash-on-hand was in the single digits, and JHS fell out of compliance with bond covenants. JHS’s financial difficulties prompted the appointment of an outside monitor to oversee JHS’s finances. Price Waterhouse served in that role, and made several recommendations for JHS to improve its revenue cycle, make accounting adjustments, and improve its staffing and efficiency. As a result of these recommendations, JHS went through a large reduction in force, and began to more closely screen the income and residency of its patients. As a result of these measures, overall financial performance has since improved. Despite its improved financial position, JHS still consistently loses money on operations, including a $362,000,915 loss as of June 30, 2018. JHS clearly depends upon the hundreds of millions of non-operating tax-based revenues it receives annually. JHS’s CEO expressed concerns over decreases in the system’s non-operating revenue sources, and claimed that JHS needs to find ways to increase its operating revenue to offset this. JW is being proposed as part of this strategy. However, JHS’s chief financial officer testified that “the non-operating revenues are a fairly stable source of income.” In fact, JHS’s tax revenues have gone up in the last few years. JHS sees the more affluent Doral area as a source of better paying patients that will enhance the profitability of its new hospital. Beyond this aspiration however, there is no meaningful analysis of the anticipated financial performance of its proposed hospital. This is a glaring omission given that a significant impetus for spending millions of public dollars on a new hospital is to improve JHS’s overall financial position. The KSA analysis referenced above determined that changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System rule would result in the JW campus losing hundreds of millions of dollars and never reaching “break even,” absent an inpatient hospital on the campus for “hospital based” billing and reimbursement. Though a financial benefit to the system, the increased reimbursement JHS would receive by having an inpatient hospital on the JW campus would be a financial burden on the healthcare delivery system since it would cost more for the same patient to receive the same outpatient services in a hospital- based facility. Reports by KSA also state that a strategic purpose of JW is to attract patients that would otherwise go to nearby facilities like PGH and Hialeah, and to capture tertiary or higher complexity cases which would then be sent to JMH. JW’s witnesses and healthcare planning experts fully expect this to happen. In 2015, and again in 2017, JHS conducted a “Community Health Needs Assessment,” which is required by law to be performed by public safety net hospitals. The assessments were conducted by gathering responses to various questions from a wide array of community leaders and stakeholders, including the CEOs of JHS’s hospitals, about the healthcare needs of the community. The final Community Health Needs Assessment documents are lengthy and cover a variety of health-related topics, but most notable for this case is that: (1) nowhere in either the 2015 or 2017 assessment is the development of a new hospital recommended; and (2) expansion into western Miami-Dade County scored by far the lowest on a list of priorities for JHS. In its application and at hearing, JW took the position that JW can enter the Doral area market without impacting existing providers to any meaningful extent. While JW acknowledges that its proposed hospital would impact the Tenet Hospitals, it argues that the impact is not significant. The evidence established that the financial impact to the Tenet Hospitals (calculated based upon lost contribution margin) would total roughly $3 million for lost inpatients, and $5.2 million including lost outpatients. While these losses will not put the Tenet Hospitals in financial peril, they are nonetheless significant and material. The Existing Healthcare Delivery System Miami-Dade County is home to 18 freestanding acute care hospitals, comprising a total of 7,585 licensed and approved acute care beds. With an average annual occupancy of 53.8% in calendar year 2017, there were, on average, approximately 3,500 unoccupied acute care beds in the county on any given day. While the countywide occupancy rate fluctuates from year to year, it has been on a downward trend in the past several years. As pointed out by several witnesses, the lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need. In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. The population of Doral currently is only about 59,000 people. It is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. As set forth in JW’s CON application, the better payer mix in Doral was a significant factor behind its decision to file its CON application. Although there is not a hospital within the Doral city limits, there are a number of healthcare providers in Doral and several hospitals nearby. PGH and Palm Springs Hospital are just north of Doral. KRMC is just south of Doral. Hialeah is northeast of Doral. CGH, Westchester General, and NCH are southeast of Doral. JMH and all of its facilities are east of Doral. And there are others within reasonable distance. KRMC is only six miles due south of the proposed DMC site, and PGH is just eight miles north of the DMC site. As to the JW site, PGH is 6.9 miles distant, CGH is 8.6 miles distant, and Hialeah is 7.4 miles distant. Residents of the Doral area have many choices in hospitals with a wide array of services, and they are accessing them. The parties to this case, as well as other existing hospitals, all have a share of the Doral area market. JW calls this “fragmentation” of the market and casts it in a negative light, but the evidence showed this to be a normal phenomenon in an urban area like Miami, with several hospitals in healthy competition with each other. Among the experts testifying at the hearing, it was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates are on the decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing use rates for inpatient services, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. Recognizing the need for outpatient services in the Doral area, both JW and DMC (or, more accurately, their related entities) have proposed outpatient facilities and services to be located in Doral. Kendall Regional Medical Center KRMC is currently the dominant hospital provider in the Doral area. Regarding his motivation for filing the DMC application, Mr. Joseph readily admitted “it’s as much about protecting what I already currently provide, number one.” KRMC treats Medicaid and indigent patients. KRMC has never turned away a patient because it did not have a contract with a Medicaid-managed care company. The CEO agreed that there is no access problem for Medicaid or charity patients justifying a new hospital. It was argued that KRMC is crowded, and the DMC hospital would help “decompress” KRMC, but the evidence showed that KRMC has a number of licensed beds that are not being used for inpatients. In addition, its ED has never gone on diversion, and no patient has ever been turned away due to the lack of a bed. Moreover, the census at KRMC has been declining. It had 25,324 inpatient admissions in 2015, 24,649 admissions in 2016, and 23,301 in 2017. The most recent data available at the time of hearing reflected that KRMC has been running at a little less than 75% occupancy, before its planned bed additions. KRMC is between an eight to 10 minute drive from Doral, and currently has the largest market share within the applicants’ defined service areas. KRMC is readily available and accessible to the residents of Doral. KRMC currently has a $90 million dollar expansion project under way. It involves adding beds and two new floors to the West Tower--a new fifth floor which will add 24 ICU beds and 24 step-down beds, and a new sixth floor which will house the relocated pediatric unit and 12 new medical-surgical beds. KRMC is also adding a new nine-story, 765 parking space garage and other ancillary space. This expansion will reduce the occupancy rate of KRMC’s inpatient units, and in particular its ICUs. These bed additions, in conjunction with increasing emphasis on outpatient services and the resultant declining inpatient admissions, will alleviate any historical capacity constraints KRMC may have had. There are also a number of ways KRMC could be further expanded in the future if needed. The West Tower is designed so it could accommodate a seventh floor, and the East Tower is also designed so that an additional floor could also be added to it. In addition, KRMC recently completed construction of a new OR area that is built on pillars. The new construction includes a third floor of shelled-in space that could house an additional 12 acute care beds. Moreover, this new OR tower was designed to go up an additional two to three floors beyond the existing shelled-in third floor. It is clear that KRMC has implemented reasonable strategies for addressing any bed capacity issues it may have experienced in the past. Decompression of KRMC is not a reason to approve DMC. Palmetto General Hospital Evidence regarding PGH was provided by its CEO Ana Mederos. Ms. Mederos is a registered nurse and has lived in Miami-Dade County for many years. She has a master of business education from Nova University and has worked in several different hospitals in the county. Specifically, she was the chief operating officer (COO) at Cedars Medical Center, the CEO at North Shore Medical Center, the CEO at Hialeah Hospital, and has been the CEO at PGH since August of 2006. Ms. Mederos is one of the few witnesses that actually lives in Doral. She travels in and out of the area on a daily basis. Her average commute is only about 15 minutes, and she has multiple convenient options in and out of Doral. PGH is located just off the Palmetto Expressway at 68th Street. It opened in the early 1970s and has 368 licensed beds, including 52 ICU beds. The hospital employs about 1,800 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH’s occupancy has declined from 79.8% in 2015 to 64% in 2016, and even further to 56.7% in 2017. There are many reasons for this decline, including pressure from managed care organizations, the continued increase in the use of outpatient procedures, improvements in technology, and increased competition in the Miami-Dade County market. Ms. Mederos expects that inpatient demand will continue to decline into the foreseeable future. PGH recently activated 31 observation beds to help improve throughput and better accommodate the increasing number of observation patients. PGH offers high-quality care and uses various metrics and indicators to measure and monitor what is going on in the hospital. The hospital has also been recognized with numerous awards. Through its parent, Tenet, PGH has contracts with just about every insurance and managed care company that serves the community. The hospital treats Medicaid and indigent patients. PGH’s Medicaid rate of $3,580 per patient is significantly lower than the rate paid to JMH. PGH has an office dedicated to helping patients get qualified for Medicaid or other financial resources, which not only helps the hospital get paid for its services, it also assists patients and families to make sure that they have benefits on an ongoing basis. Roughly 9-10% of PGH’s patients annually are completely unfunded. PGH only transfers patients if there is a need for a service not provided at the hospital, or upon the patient’s request. PGH does not transfer patients just because they cannot pay. PGH pays physicians to take calls in the ED which also obligates those physicians to provide care to patients that are seen at the hospital. PGH is a for-profit hospital that pays income taxes and property taxes, and does not receive any taxpayer subsidies like those received by JHS. Ms. Mederos reviewed the applications of JW and DMC, and articulated a number of reasons why, in her opinion, neither application should be approved. She sees no delays in providing care to anyone in the area, as there are hospitals serving Doral in every direction. There are a multitude of FSEDs available and additional FSEDs are being built in Doral by both applicants. There is another FSED being built close to PGH by Mount Sinai Medical Center. NCH has also opened an FSED that has negatively affected the volume of pediatric patients seen at PGH. There are also multiple urgent care centers. It was Ms. Mederos’ firm belief that persons living in Doral have reasonable geographic access to both inpatient and outpatient medical services. Ms. Mederos’ testimony in this regard is credited. There are no programs or services being proposed by either applicant that are not already available in the area. Ms. Mederos also noted that there is currently no problem with access to OB services in the area. However, she has a particular concern in that both applicants propose to offer OB services, but neither is proposing to offer NICU services. The evidence showed that most all of the hospitals that provide OB services to the Doral area offer at least Level II and some Level III NICU services. Thus, in terms of OB care, both proposed hospitals would be a step below what has developed as the standard of care for OB patients in the county. Ms. Mederos acknowledged that PGH does not have a huge market share in the zip codes that the applicants are proposing to serve, but that does not mean that the impact from either would not be real and significant. If a hospital is built by either applicant, it will need physicians, with some specialists in short supply. There are tremendous shortages in certain medical fields, such as orthopedics and neurology. In addition, there will be additional competition for nurses and other staff, which will increase the cost of healthcare. The loss of $1.3 to $2 million in contribution margin, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, is a negative impact on PGH as hospital margins become thinner, and those numbers do not include costs like those needed to recruit and retain staff. PGH is again experiencing a nursing shortage, and losing nurses, incurring the higher cost for contract labor, paying overtime, and essentially not having the staff to provide the required services is a serious potential adverse impact from either proposed new hospital. JHS also tends to provide more lucrative benefits than PGH, and a nearby JW hospital is a threat in that regard. As a final note, Ms. Mederos stated that her conviction that there is no need for either proposed hospital in Doral is even more resolute than when she testified in the Batch One Case. With continued declines in admissions, length of stay and patient days, the development of more services for the residents of Doral, the shortages of doctors and nurses, the ever increasing role of managed care that depresses the demand for inpatient hospital services and other factors, she persuasively explained why no new hospitals are needed in the Doral area. Coral Gables Hospital (CGH) Maria Cristina Jimenez testified on behalf of CGH, where she has worked in a variety of different capacities since 1985. She was promoted to CEO in March 2017. She has lived in Miami her entire life. Ms. Jimenez has been involved in initiatives to make her hospital more efficient. She is supportive of efforts to reduce inpatient hospitalizations and length of stay, as this is what is best for patients. Overall, the hospital length of stay is dropping, which adds to the decreasing demand for inpatient services. CGH is accredited by the Joint Commission, has received multiple awards, and provides high-quality care to its patients. It also has contracts with a broad array of managed care companies as do the other Tenet hospitals. CGH treats Medicaid patients, and its total Medicaid rate is less than $3,500 per inpatient. The hospital has a program similar to PGH to help patients get qualified for Medicaid and other resources. CGH also provides services to indigent patients, and self-pay/charity is about 6% of the hospital’s total admissions. The hospital does not transfer patients just because they are indigent. Physicians are compensated to provide care in the emergency room and are expected to continue with that care if the patients are admitted to the hospital, even if they do not have financial resources. CGH also pays income and property taxes, but does not receive any taxpayer support. CGH generally serves the Little Havana, Flagami, Miami, and Coral Gables communities, and its service area overlaps with those of the applicants. In order to better serve its patients and to help it compete in the highly competitive Miami-Dade County marketplace, CGH is developing a freestanding ED at the corner of Bird Road and Southwest 87th Avenue, which is scheduled to open in January 2020. This will provide another resource for patients in the proposed service areas. Ms. Jimenez had reviewed the CON applications at issue in this case. She does not believe that either hospital should be approved because it will drain resources from CGH, not only from a financial standpoint, but also physician and nurse staffing. CGH experiences physician shortages. Urologists are in short supply, as are gastrointestinal physicians that perform certain procedures. Hematology, oncology, and endocrinology are also specialty areas with shortages. The addition of another hospital will exacerbate those shortages at CGH. While CGH does not have a large market share in the proposed PSA of either applicant, anticipated impact from approval of either is real and substantial. A contribution margin loss of $1.2 to $2.2 million per year, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, would be significant. The drain on resources, including staff and physicians, is also of significant concern. Hialeah Hospital Dr. Jorge Perez testified on behalf of Hialeah. Dr. Perez is a pathologist and medical director of laboratory at the hospital. More significantly, Dr. Perez has been on the hospital’s staff since 2001 and has served in multiple leadership roles, including chair of the Performance Improvement Council, chief of staff; and since 2015, chair of the Hialeah Hospital Governing Board. Hialeah offers obstetrics services and a Level II NICU with 12 beds. Approximately 1,400 babies a year are born there. Hialeah’s occupancy has been essentially flat for the past three years, at below 40%, and it clearly has ample excess capacity. On an average day, over 200 of Hialeah’s beds are unoccupied. Like other hospitals in the county, Hialeah has a number of competitors. The growth of managed care has affected the demand for inpatient beds and services at Hialeah. Hialeah treats Medicaid and indigent patients. Approximately 15% of Hialeah’s admissions are unfunded. As with its sister Tenet hospitals, Hialeah is a for- profit hospital that pays taxes and does not receive tax dollars for providing care to the indigent. Dr. Perez succinctly and persuasively identified a variety of reasons why no new hospital is needed in Doral. First and foremost, there is plenty of capacity at the existing hospitals in the area, including Hialeah. Second, both inpatient admissions and length of stay continue trending downward. Care continues to shift toward outpatient services, thereby reducing the demand for inpatient care. According to Dr. Perez, if a new hospital is approved in Doral it will bring with it adverse impacts on existing hospitals, including Hialeah. A new hospital in Doral will attract patients, some of which would have otherwise gone to Hialeah. Moreover, Doral has more insured patients, meaning the patients that would be lost would be good payors. There would also be a significant risk of loss of staff to a new hospital. Dr. Perez’s testimony in this regard is credible. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria In 2008, the Florida Legislature streamlined the review criteria applicable for evaluating new hospital applications. Mem’l Healthcare Grp. v. AHCA, Case No. 12- 0429CON, RO at 32 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 7, 2012). The criteria specifically eliminated included quality of care, availability of resources, financial feasibility, and the costs and methods of proposed construction. Lee Mem’l Health System v. AHCA, Case No. 13-2508CON, RO at 135 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 28, 2014). The remaining criteria applicable to new hospital projects are set forth at section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes. Section 408.035(1)(a): The need for the healthcare facilities and health services being proposed. Generally, CON applicants are responsible for demonstrating need for new acute care hospitals, typically in the context of a numeric need methodology adopted by AHCA. However, AHCA has not promulgated a numeric need methodology to calculate need for new hospital facilities. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) provides that if no agency need methodology exists, the applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology, which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory and rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Both applicants propose to build small community hospitals providing basic acute care and OB services in the Doral area of western Miami-Dade County. Both applicants point to the increasing population and the lack of an acute care hospital in Doral as evidence of need for a hospital. The DMC application focuses largely on geographic access concerns, while the JW application is premised upon six arguments as to why JHS contends its proposed JW hospital should be approved. The lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need.3/ In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals, and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. Doral is in the west/northwest part of Miami-Dade County, in between the Miami International Airport (to the east) and the Everglades (to the west). It is surrounded by major roadways, with US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road running diagonally to the north, US Highway 836/Dolphin Expressway running along its southern edge, US Highway 826/Palmetto Expressway running north-south to the east, and the Florida Turnpike running north- south along the western edge of Doral. To the west of the Turnpike is the Everglades, where there is minimal population and very limited development possible in the future. The City of Doral itself has an area of about 15 square miles, and is only two or three times the size of the Miami International Airport, which sits just east of Doral. Much of Doral is commercial and industrial, with the largest concentration of residential areas being in the northwest part of the city. While there is unquestionably residential growth in Doral, the population of Doral is currently only about 59,000 people. Doral is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. JW proposes to locate its hospital on the eastern side of Doral, just west of Miami International Airport, while the DMC site is on the western side of Doral, just east of the Everglades. JW’s site is located in an industrial area with few residents, while the DMC site is located in an area where future growth is likely to be limited. Both sites have downsides for development of a hospital, with both applicants spending considerable time at hearing pointing out the flaws of each other’s chosen location. Both applicants define their service areas to include the City of Doral, but also areas outside of Doral. Notably, the entire DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, with the exception of one small area. While the population of Doral itself is only 59,000 people, there are more concentrated populations in areas outside of Doral (except to the west). However, the people in these areas are closer to existing hospitals like PGH, Hialeah, KRMC, and others. For the population inside Doral, there are several major roadways in and out of Doral, and area residents can access several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity within a 20-minute drive time, many closer than that. It was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates continue to decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing inpatient use rates, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. These trends existed at the time of the Batch One Case. As observed by Tenet’s healthcare planner at hearing: “The occupancy is lower today than it was two years ago, the use rates are lower, and the actual utilization is lower.” Both applicants failed to establish a compelling case of need. While there is growth in the Doral area, it remains a relatively small population, and there was no evidence of community needs being unmet. Sound healthcare planning, and the statutory criteria, require consideration of existing hospitals, their availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization. These considerations weigh heavily against approval of either CON application, even more so than in the prior case. Section 408.035(1)(b): The availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing healthcare facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant; and Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare for residents of the service district. As stated above, there are several existing hospitals in close proximity to Doral. Thus, the question is whether they are accessible and have capacity to serve the needs of patients from the Doral area. The evidence overwhelmingly answers these questions in the affirmative. Geographic access was a focal point of the DMC application, which argued that there are various barriers to access in and around Doral, such as a canal that runs parallel to US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road, train tracks and a rail yard, industrial plants, and the airport. While the presence of these things is undeniable, as is the fact that there is traffic in Miami, based upon the evidence presented, they do not present the barriers that DMC alleges. Rather, the evidence was undisputed that numerous hospitals are accessible within 20 minutes of the proposed hospital sites, and some within 10 to 15 minutes. All of Doral is within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals. These are reasonable travel times and are not indicative of a geographic access problem, regardless of any alleged “barriers.” In addition, existing hospitals clearly have the capacity to serve the Doral community, and they are doing so. Without question, there is excess capacity in the Miami-Dade County market. With approximately 7,500 hospital beds in the county running at an average occupancy just over 50%, there are around 3,500 beds available at any given time. Focusing on the hospitals closest to Doral (those accessible within 20 minutes), there are hundreds of beds that are available and accessible from the proposed service areas of the applicants. KRMC is particularly noteworthy because of its proximity to, and market share in, the Doral area. The most recent utilization and occupancy data for KRMC indicate that it has, on average, 100 vacant beds. This is more than the entire 80-bed hospital proposed in the DMC application (for a service area that is already served and subsumed by KRMC). Moreover, KRMC is expanding, and will soon have even more capacity at its location less than a 10-minute drive from the DMC site. From a programmatic standpoint, neither applicant is proposing any programs or services that are not already available at numerous existing hospitals, and, in fact, both would offer fewer programs and services than other area hospitals. As such, patients in need of tertiary or specialized services will still have to travel to other hospitals like PGH, KRMC, or JMH. Alternatively, if they present to a small hospital in Doral in need of specialized services, they will then have to be transferred to an appropriate hospital that can treat them. The same would be true for babies born at either DMC or JW in need of a NICU. Similarly, there are bypass protocols for EMS to take cardiac, stroke, and trauma patients to the closest hospital equipped to treat them, even if it means bypassing other hospitals not so equipped, like JW and DMC. Less acute patients can be transported to the closest ED. And since both applicants are building FSEDs in Doral, there will be ample access to emergency services for residents of Doral. This criterion does not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital. To the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly established that existing hospitals are available and accessible to Doral area residents. Section 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (i): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare, the extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness, and the applicant’s past and proposed provision of healthcare services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. It goes without saying that any new hospital is going to enhance access to the people closest to its location; but as explained above, there is no evidence of an access problem, or any pressing need for enhanced access to acute care hospital services. Rather, the evidence showed that Doral area residents are within very reasonable travel times to existing hospitals, most of which have far more extensive programs and services than either applicant is proposing to offer. Indeed, the proposed DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, and KRMC is only 10 minutes from the DMC site. Neither applicant would enhance access to tertiary or specialized services, and patients in need of those services will still have to travel to other hospitals, or worse, be transferred after presenting to a Doral hospital with more limited programs and services. Although it was not shown to be an issue, access to emergency services is going to be enhanced by the FSEDs being built by both applicants. Thus, to the extent that a new hospital would enhance access, it would be only for non-emergent patients in need of basic, non-tertiary level care. Existing hospitals are available and easily accessible to these patients. In addition, healthy competition exists between several existing providers serving the Doral area market. That healthy competition would be substantially eroded by approval of the DMC application, as HCA would likely capture a dominant share of the market. While approval of the JW application might not create a dominant market share for one provider, it would certainly not promote cost-effectiveness given the fact that it costs the system more for the same patient to receive services at a JHS hospital than other facilities. Indeed, approval of JW’s application would mean that the JW campus will have the more expensive hospital-based billing rates. Florida Medicaid diagnosis related group (DRG) payment comparisons among hospitals are relevant because both DMC and JW propose that at least 22% of their patients will be Medicaid patients. Data from the 2017-18 DRG calculator provided by the Medicaid program office was used to compare JHS to the three Tenet hospitals, KRMC, and Aventura Hospital, another EFD hospital in Miami-Dade County. The data shows that JHS receives the highest Medicaid rate enhancement per discharge for the same Medicaid patients ($2,820.06) among these six hospitals in the county. KRMC receives a modest enhancement of $147.27. Comparison of Medicaid Managed Care Reimbursement over the period of fiscal years 2014-2016 show that JHS receives substantially more Medicaid reimbursement per adjusted patient day than any of the hospitals in this proceeding, with the other hospitals receiving between one-third and one-half of JHS reimbursement. In contrast, among all of these hospitals, KRMC had the lowest rate for each of the three years covered by the data, which means KRMC (and by extension DMC) would cost the Medicaid program substantially less money for care of Medicaid patients. Under the new prospective payment system instituted by the State of Florida for Medicaid reimbursement of acute care hospital providers, for service between July 1, 2018, and March 31, 2019, JHS is the beneficiary of an automatic rate enhancement of more than $8 million. In contrast, KRMC’s rate enhancement is only between $16,000 and $17,000. Thus, it will cost the Medicaid program substantially more to treat a patient using the same services at JW than at DMC. Furthermore, rather than enhance the financial viability of the JHS system, the evidence indicates that the JW proposal will be a financial drain on the JHS system. Finally, JHS’s past and proposed provision of care to Medicaid and indigent patients is noteworthy, but not a reason to approve its proposed hospital. JW is proposing this hospital to penetrate a more affluent market, not an indigent or underserved area, and it proposes to provide Medicaid and indigent care at a level that is consistent with the existing hospitals. JHS also receives the highest Low Income Pool (LIP) payments per charity care of any system in the state, and is one of only a handful of hospital systems that made money after receipt of the LIP payments. HCA-affiliated hospitals, by comparison, incur the second greatest cost in the state for charity care taking LIP payments into consideration. Analysis of standardized net revenues per adjusted admission (NRAA) among Miami-Dade County acute care hospitals, a group of 16 hospitals, shows JHS to be either the second or the third highest hospital in terms of NRAA. KRMC, in contrast, part of the EFD/HCA hospitals, is about 3% below the average of the 16 hospitals for NRAA. DMC’s analysis of standardized NRAA using data from 2014, 2015, and 2016, among acute care hospitals receiving local government tax revenues, shows JHS receives more net revenue than any of the other hospitals in this grouping. Using data from FY 2014 to FY 2016, DMC compared hospital costs among the four existing providers that are parties to this proceeding and JMH as a representative of JHS. Standardizing for case mix, fiscal year end, and location, an analysis of costs per adjusted admission shows that the hospitals other than JMH have an average cost of between a half and a third of JMH’s average cost. The same type of analysis of costs among a peer group of eight statutory teaching hospitals shows JHS’s costs to be the highest. It should also be noted that if JW were to fail or experience significant losses from operations, the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County will be at risk. In contrast, if DMC were to fail financially, EFD/HCA will shoulder the losses. When the two applications are evaluated in the context of the above criteria, the greater weight of the evidence does not mitigate in favor of approval of either. However, should AHCA decide to approve one of the applicants in its final order, preference should be given to DMC because of its lower costs per admission for all categories of payors, and in particular, the lower cost to the Florida Medicaid Program. In addition, the risk of financial failure would fall upon EFD/HCA, rather than the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County. Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e): Need considerations. Many of the considerations enumerated in rule 59C- 1.008(2)(e) overlap with the statutory criteria, but there are certain notable trends and market conditions that warrant mention. Specifically, while the population of Doral is growing, it remains relatively small, and does not itself justify a new hospital. And while there are some more densely populated areas outside of the city of Doral, they are much closer to existing hospitals having robust services and excess capacity. Doral is a more affluent area, and there was no evidence of any financial or cultural access issues supporting approval of either CON application. The availability, utilization, and quality of existing hospitals are clearly not issues, as there are several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity accessible to Doral area residents. In terms of medical treatment trends, it was undisputed that use rates for inpatient hospital services continue trending downward, and that trend is expected to continue. Concomitantly, there is a marked shift toward outpatient services in Miami-Dade County and elsewhere. Finally, both applicants are proposing to provide OB services without a NICU, which is below the standard in the market. While not required for the provision of obstetrics, NICU backup is clearly the most desirable and best practice. For the foregoing reasons, the considerations in rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) do not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Healthcare Administration enter a final order denying East Florida-DMC, Inc.’s CON Application No. 10432 and denying The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida, d/b/a Jackson Hospital West’s CON Application No. 10433. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) should grant the application of Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital, Inc. (WUESTHOFF), for a Certificate of Need (CON) (CON 8597) to establish a new 50-bed general acute care hospital in South Brevard County, District 7.
Findings Of Fact WUESTHOFF is a 303-bed, acute care hospital in Brevard County, Florida. In addition to its hospital, WUESTHOFF has three home health locations, eight or nine walk-in clinics, a hospice, a durable medical equipment business, an ambulatory surgery center, two freestanding diagnostic centers, and outpatient labs throughout Brevard County. HRMC is a JCAHO accredited, 528-bed, regional, not-for- profit community hospital based in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. HRMC is comprised of two acute care campuses: a 468- bed tertiary hospital in Melbourne, and a 60-bed, general acute care hospital in Palm Bay. The Melbourne campus operates a 10-bed, Level II, neonatal, intensive care unit, and 428 general medical and pediatric beds. The Proposed Project WUESTHOFF chose to establish a satellite hospital complex in South Brevard County by applying separately for: (1) a certificate of need (CON) to decertify and de-license 100 general acute care hospital beds and undertake certain renovations and improvements at its existing Rockledge hospital facility; (2) a CON for a medical office building (MOB); (3) a non-reviewability letter for a $35 million diagnostic and treatment center (DTC), which would provide all of the ancillary services for the new satellite hospital; and (4) the CON to establish the 50-bed hospital (CON 8597) which is at issue in this case. In CON 8597, WUESTHOFF has asked AHCA to treat the $35 million DTC as the “sunk” costs of an existing facility, and to review the CON application at issue in this case incrementally— i.e., as consisting of only the inpatient tower and the additional ancillary activities that would take place at the complex, over and above those that would take place at the DTC without the inpatient tower. Viewing CON 8597 in this way, WUESTHOFF presented total project costs of only $13 million. In preparing the financial schedules for CON 8597, WUESTHOFF presented the revenues and expenses of the entire hospital operation (including the DTC), except for the additional activities (inpatient and ancillary) that would result from the addition of the inpatient tower, and the revenues and expenses of the entire hospital operation, including the additional activities (inpatient and ancillary) that would result from the addition of the inpatient tower. By presenting the financial schedules in this manner, WUESTHOFF never presented the revenues and expenses of the entirety of the new satellite hospital it is proposing to establish, and AHCA has not had the opportunity to review those revenues and expenses. WUESTHOFF planned to build the MOB, the DTC and the inpatient tower in one continual course of construction and to open the entire complex at the same time; the complex, when completed, was planned to function as a single, integrated hospital facility. AHCA granted the first three applications comprising WUESTHOFF’s project but denied CON 8597. In a subsequent batch, WUESTHOFF filed a letter of intent for a single CON application that the combined the DTC and inpatient tower projects at a total cost of approximately $50,000,000. Need In Relation To State And District Health Plans: Section 408.035(1)(a) Florida Statutes State Health Plan The first State Health Plan preference favors applicants who demonstrate that the subdistrict occupancy rate is at or exceeds 75 percent, or in the case of existing facilities, where the occupancy rate for the most recent 12 months is at or exceeds 85 percent. WUESTHOFF failed to meet this preference. For the applicable period, the subdistrict occupancy was approximately 53 percent; however, more recent data shows that occupancy is below 53 percent, which suggests a continuing decline in inpatient occupancy rates in the subdistrict. During the applicable period, the occupancy rate at WUESTHOFF’s Rockledge facility was only slightly more than 45 percent. The second State Health Plan preference favors an applicant with a history of providing a disproportionate share of the subdistrict’s acute care and Medicaid patient days, and further meets the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital criteria. WUESTHOFF failed to meet this preference, as it is not a disproportionate share provider. The third State Health Plan preference favors an applicant that provides or proposes to provide disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals within the district or subdistrict. WUESTHOFF’s existing facility is not a disproportionate share hospital. (Although WUESTHOFF’s CON application proposes to condition award of the CON setting aside 15 percent of its discharges for Medicaid, charity, and indigent patients, its application does not provide percentages for each category.) The fourth State Health Plan preference considers the current and projected indigent inpatient case load, the proposed facility size, and the case and service mix, WUESTHOFF’s application partially complies with the preference in that it proposes to provide some indigent care. The fifth State Health Plan preference favors proposals that would not negatively affect the financial viability of an existing, disproportionate share hospital. This preference is not applicable in this case. The sixth State Health Plan preference favors applicants with a record of accepting indigent patients for emergency care. WUESTHOFF meets this preference. The seventh State Health Plan preference favors applicants for any type of hospital project if the facility is verified as a trauma center. WUESTHOFF does not meet this preference. WUESTHOFF claims that it operate the emergency room at the proposed facility with “the same level of services as WUESTHOFF’s existing emergency room.” WUESTHOFF does not currently operate a Level II trauma center at its Rockledge campus. The eighth State Health Plan preference favors applicants who can document that they provide a full range of emergency services. WUESTHOFF’s Rockledge facility offers a range of emergency services, but the emergency department at the proposed facility will necessarily offer a limited range of services, as the proposed facility will not be a tertiary care hospital, and emergency patients in need of those services will have to be transferred. The ninth State Health Plan preference favors applicants who can document that it has not been fined by HRS for any violation of the emergency services statutes. WUESTHOFF meets this preference. Local Health Plan Preferences The District 7 Local Health Plan sets forth five preferences to be used in evaluating CON applications for the transfer/relocation/delicensure of acute care beds. The health plan provides that “[p]reference shall be given to applications for transfer of existing acute care beds, delicensure/conversion of existing acute care beds and/or relocation of an entire facility if the applicant can provide substantial documentation of: The need for acute care beds or specialty beds in the service area proposed to receive the beds. Need should address specific populations, access consideration, etc. The impact of the proposed project on the parent facility including projected occupancy declines, curtailing of service effect on operating cost, use of vacated space at the main campus and charge changes. The proposed service improving access by at least 25 minutes to at least 10 percent of the population or a minimum of at least 35,000 people. This should be substantiated by analyses of patient origin to existing providers, physician referral practices and location of physician offices. Commitment to provision of care to both no-pay and low-pay medically indigent patients and Medicaid patients at a minimum of no more than 2 percent below the most recent HCB publication for the District of the charity/uncompensated care percentage of net revenues. Agreement to participate in any indigent care programs which exist in the county or counties proposed to be served. Participation should be at a rate equal to or greater than the average for the general hospitals also serving that area. As to the first preference, WUESTHOFF failed to demonstrate a need for the proposed 50-bed general acute care hospital. Even with the delicensure of 100 acute care beds as a result of WUESTHOFF’s companion application, there still is an oversupply of 215 acute care beds in the county. The evidence presented at the final hearing failed to demonstrate any geographic or other barriers to accessing acute care services that would warrant the expenditure proposed by WUESTHOFF to construct the proposed project. Indeed, WUESTHOFF’s own evidence was clear that every resident of Brevard County has access to a general acute care hospital within a maximum drive time of 30-40 minutes and, in almost all instances, to two different acute care facilities within a 30-40 minute drive time. WUESTHOFF contends that its proposed 50-bed general acute care hospital is needed for four reasons: (1) to provide a high quality alternative inpatient health care provider in south Brevard County; (2) to introduce competition into the south Brevard area; (3) to enhance access to care to Medicaid, charity, and indigent population, as well as to enhance access for the managed care segment of the population; and (4) to enable WUESTHOFF to remain competitive in the marketplace. The evidence is clear that HRMC provides high quality inpatient health care in south Brevard County. See Findings 30- 44, infra. In addition, WUESTHOFF already serves some patients, residing in south Brevard County, and so does Sebastian River Medical Center, located in the adjacent county to the south. The evidence also is clear that there already is competition for inpatient hospital services in south Brevard County. HRMC serves a much greater percentage of those patients primarily due to its location and the high quality and low costs of HRMC’s services. In view of the excess capacity of hospital beds in the county, it does not make sense to add a satellite WUESTHOFF hospital in south Brevard County that would duplicate the services of the existing providers. WUESTHOFF also attempted to show that its proposed acute care hospital was needed in order to provide services for managed care participants. However, WUESTHOFF failed to offer any competent evidence to show that participants in managed care programs are a traditionally underserved population group and did not prove that WUESTHOFF’s ability to participate in managed care networks is a valid basis for determining the need of additional acute care services in south Brevard County. To the contrary, the evidence tended to show that the expansion of managed care programs would result in a decrease in the utilization of inpatient acute care services. Furthermore, there is no barrier to WUESTHOFF’s participating in managed care programs with one or more facilities in the southern portion of Brevard County, and in fact WUESTHOFF has aligned itself with Sebastian River Medical Center in a number of managed care contracts serving residents of southern Brevard County. While WUESTHOFF is offering a larger discount to managed care payers, its charges are higher, resulting in net revenue per managed care case that is still higher than HRMC’s. The price the managed care providers pay to HRMC is actually 14 percent lower than what they pay to WUESTHOFF. Not only does HRMC provide a better “deal” to managed care payers, but HRMC’s managed care volume is also greater than WUESTHOFF’s, indicating HRMC’s willingness to negotiate and work with managed care companies. At the time WUESTHOFF submitted its CON application, the penetration of managed care in Brevard County was approximately 8.6 percent. However, more recent data from 1996 shows a significant increase in the penetration of managed care to 15 percent, without the allegedly needed new hospital. A primary thrust of WUESTHOFF’s case for the need for its proposed project was that patients in the southern portion of Brevard County cannot be admitted into HRMC’s Palm Bay facility because its physicians do not enjoy staff privileges at that facility. Each hospital establishes criterion for staff privileges. In order to be eligible for staff privileges, it is normally required that the physician reside or have his or her office within certain geographic boundaries surrounding the hospital. The primary reason for such requirement is to ensure that the physician is capable of responding to patient needs within a time certain and that the physician will be able to provide coverage for his or her patients admitted into a facility. Dr. Arnold, a physician with staff privileges at WUESTHOFF who operates an office in West Melbourne, conceded that if his physician group associated with a physician living within HRMC’s geographic boundaries who was able to meet response time criteria, the physician group could admit patients into HRMC. Dr. Arnold also conceded that his physician group is not eligible for staff privileges at other Brevard hospitals, based on geographic considerations. The Availability, Quality Of Care, Efficiency, Appropriateness, Accessibility, Extent Of Utilization, And Adequacy Of Like And Existing Health Care Services In The Service District: Section 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes. There is no need for another hospital in South Brevard County. The county already has more than enough hospitals. Even in light of a 27-29 percent increase in population, utilization of Brevard County hospitals has dropped 10 percent in the last five years. There has been a marked shift in the Brevard County area away from inpatient services toward outpatient services. That shift is still growing. HRMC is the only hospital in Brevard County which has been nationally recognized for quality care by the National Research Corporation. According to AHCA’s hospital report card, HRMC was shown to be a consistent, low-charge provider, operating within the expected range of outcomes. According to a study done by AHCA, HRMC performs as one of the top five hospitals in Florida for reducing overall C-section births and increasing vaginal births after Cesarean (“VBAC”). This is important because vaginal births are safer for both mother and baby and save approximately $3,000 per delivery when compared with Cesarean births. HRMC has the lowest Cesarean Section rate and the highest VBAC rate in Brevard County and is one of the five lowest charging hospitals in the State for these services. Wuesthoff, on the other hand, has some of the highest costs in the county for these services. HRMC is providing efficient hospital services when compared with WUESTHOFF and other markets where competition is a factor. Of the zip codes addressed in WUESTHOFF’s travel study, there is no zip code in Brevard County that is more than 30 minutes from an existing hospital. Of the fourteen intersections tested, the addition of the proposed project would decrease travel times from only three intersections, with the greatest decrease in travel time being only nine minutes. Thus, the construction of WUESTHOFF’s proposed facility would not significantly increase access for Brevard County patients. HRMC delivers the majority of Medicaid babies in the county and is also a contract provider for Children’s Medical Services. HRMC worked with the Public Health Department to develop a better system for giving prenatal care and delivery to Medicaid and indigent mothers. HRMC offered to subsidize the salary of a doctor, and eventually two midwives, to work with the Public Health Department for this purpose. HRMC’s HOPE programs provides access to Medicaid and indigent patients. HOPE clinic and HOPE van expenses are direct expenses of HRMC. In addition to medical care, the HOPE program also provides free medication to those who cannot afford it. HRMC’s HOPE van provides services to the homeless every Tuesday, seeing as many as 40 patients each visit. Patients are provided with an examination, medications, and referrals to specialists or the hospital, if necessary. This care is provided at no charge to the patient. HRMC’s HOPE program was given the Nova award by the American Hospital Association for its ground-breaking effort in community health improvement. It is the only program in Florida which has been so recognized. The HOPE program has also received the Heartland Award from Governor Chiles for its work at improving the status of life in Florida. HRMC supports a variety of agencies to provide care to indigent AIDS patients. HRMC provides services to a nonprofit outpatient AIDS services organization, which offers reduced-rate and free lab services. HRMC, along with the Public Health Unit, funded a dental clinic for the AIDS organization. The hospitals in Brevard County do a good job in regard to taking care of the patients who are incapable of paying, with HRMC going the extra mile to provide services to the poor. There was no evidence that persons in need of quality, general acute care services are not able to access those services at any existing provider in Brevard County. There is no lack of availability or access to general acute care services based on either geographic or financial grounds. WUESTHOFF’s proposed 50- bed general acute care hospital is not needed to accomplish this. The Ability Of The Applicant To Provide Quality Of Care And The Applicant’s Record Of Providing Quality Of Care: Section 408.035(1)(c), Florida Statutes. It is clear that WUESTHOFF is capable of providing quality inpatient health care services. However, it is found that HRMC is providing higher quality services (and at a lower cost). As shown in AHCA’s hospital report card, WUESTHOFF performed in the lowest 15 percent in the State in 5 of 6 serviced lines where mortality was measured. On the other hand, HRMC was indicated to be consistently a low-charge provider, operating within expected outcomes. HRMC’s C-section rate is significantly lower than WUESTHOFF’s, and its VBAC rate much higher. The results of a low C-section rate are lower lengths of stay and less risk to both mom and baby. The Availability And Adequacy Of Other Health Care Facilities And Services In The District Which May Serve As Alternatives For The Services To Be Provided By The Applicant: Section 408.035(1)(d), Florida Statutes. WUESTHOFF already has three home health locations, 8 or walk-in clinics, a hospice, a durable medical equipment business, an ambulatory surgery center, 2 freestanding diagnostic centers, and outpatient labs in Brevard County. In addition, WUESTHOFF plans to construct a new outpatient and diagnostic center in south Brevard County. In addition, inpatient surgeries have shifted to private, for-profit outpatient centers and ambulatory surgery centers that have opened in the last five years in Brevard County. The competent, substantial evidence presented at the final hearing demonstrates that within Brevard County, there are available and adequate alternatives to the inpatient services proposed by WUESTHOFF. First, as discussed above, the existing providers of acute inpatient health care services have capacity to absorb any increase in the utilization of acute care services in the County. Second, data introduced at the final hearing demonstrate that overall utilization for the types of services WUESTHOFF proposes to offer are declining and demonstrate that residents are seeking out alternatives to inpatient hospital services. For example, from 1993-1996, inpatient surgery services in Brevard County showed a marked decline of approximately 20 percent, both in number of patients and procedures. This trend is not unique to Brevard County, but is occurring throughout the state. Health care providers are seeking alternatives to hospitalization, with procedures being performed in physician offices and ambulatory surgical centers. Likewise, there has been a decline in utilization of several other services WUESTHOFF is proposing for its 50-bed hospital. During the period 1993-1996, while the population of Brevard County was growing at a rate of approximately 2.4 percent per year, the rate of obstetric admissions as a percentage of admissions to Brevard hospitals declined. There is excess capacity for pediatric and obstetrical services in Brevard County. The average daily census in obstetrical beds has dropped from approximately 34 patients per day to approximately 29 per day. With 66 reported available obstetrical beds in Brevard County, that means that on any day only 44 percent of the available capacity is being utilized. Likewise, pediatric census has gone from approximately 32 patients per day to only about 25. With 78 reported pediatrics beds, a demand for only 25 beds means that approximately 32 percent of available capacity is utilized. Probable Economies And Improvements In Service That May Be Derived From Operation Of Joint, Cooperative, Or Shared Health Care Resources: Section 408.035(1)(e), Florida Statutes. WUESTHOFF does not propose the operation of a joint, cooperative, or shared program with any other entity. WUESTHOFF contends that its application is consistent with this criterion because it proposes the sharing of certain resources with its main facility. But the construction of a satellite facility will result in the duplication of certain services. It is actually less efficient for a hospital to operate two campuses. The Need in the Service District for Special Equipment and Services Which Are Not Reasonably and Economically Accessible in Adjoining Areas: Section 408.035(1)(f), Florida Statutes. WUESTHOFF’s CON application does not propose to provide special equipment. This criterion is not met. The Need For Research And Educational Facilities, Health Care Practitioners, And Doctors Of Osteopathy And Medicine At The Student, Internship, And Residency Training Levels: Section 408.035(1)(g), Florida Statutes. This need is already being met in the community. WUESTHOFF, HRMC, and other Brevard County hospitals are already active in community training programs through their links with Brevard Community College and the University of Central Florida. HRMC has institutional training programs with the University of Florida, all Children’s Hospital, the local vo- tech, and University of Central Florida, in addition to other community programs. The Immediate And Long-Term Financial Feasibility Of The Proposal: Section 408.035(1)(i), Florida Statutes. The immediate financial feasibility of a proposed project is satisfied by showing that the applicant has adequate financial resources to fund the capital costs of the project and the financial ability to fund short-term operating losses. WUESTHOFF has demonstrated that its proposed project is financially feasible in the short-term. Long-term financial feasibility is established by demonstrating that projected revenues can be attained in light of the projected utilization of the proposed service and average length of stay. WUESTHOFF has not demonstrated that it can achieve its projected revenues by the second year of operation and has, therefore, failed to demonstrate long-term financial feasibility. It is impossible to tell from the information contained in WUESTHOFF’s CON application 8597 what the revenues and expenses of the new hospital will be. Staffing and supply costs associated with the ancillary building, but which will be used by the hospital when constructed and which amount to millions of dollars, are not broken out in the application. The application also does not show the totality of the costs associated with the 50-bed hospital WUESTHOFF seeks to establish. For example, provision for bad debt expense does not appear in the application, nor does the indigent care tax expense. Furthermore, the application does not provide for any administrative staff for the new hospital, nor has all other necessary staff been provided for. If these positions are included under “other,” then the salary expense projected is not enough. Also, the salaries listed on Schedule 6 do not include benefits. The preopening expenses figure shown in WUESTHOFF’s application is reasonable only if the entire facility, the ancillary, outpatient, and inpatient tower would open all at the same time. It is very difficult to analyze the reasonableness of the financial projections because the revenues and expenses do not match. All the revenue from the proposed new facility appears to be included, but not all of the expenses. Schedule 8A shows that daily ancillary expenses are $470 at WUESTHOFF’s existing hospital but only $82 at the new, proposed hospital. It is implausible that the new hospital would have costs this much lower than the existing hospital. WUESTHOFF’s staffing projections do not account for a significant number of nursing and other staff necessary for the operation of the facility as a hospital. The projections only address nursing positions for the 50-bed, inpatient tower. The schedule fails to show those nurses assigned to the ancillary services areas in the outpatient diagnostic center who will be working with inpatients. For example, the scrub nurses in the emergency department who will be working on inpatients are not included in the schedule, and the nurses working in radiology who will be caring for inpatients are not shown. The schedule fails to include a director of nursing at the proposed hospital facility. Although WUESTHOFF claimed that it will assign a director of nursing when patient volumes reach 50%, it failed to include projections for that position in this second year projections, even though patient volumes are projected to reach 50% in the second year. Wuesthoff also failed to include benefits in its computation of salaries on Schedule 6, even though it expects to pay benefits at a rate of 20% of salary. Interest expenses are also significantly understated. The project is financed with 100 percent debt, which should amount to an interest expense of approximately $850,000.00 per year. However, the application shows interest in year one as $197,000.00 and for year two, $393,000.00. It is unusual that interest would be higher in year two than year one. There is no way to tell from looking at the schedules or assumptions in the application what the utilization of the new hospital will be, or how the patient days break out by payor. Therefore, reasonableness of the financial projections cannot be tested. Without additional information, one cannot determine if the average charges projected are reasonable. There are unusual projections, such as the charges during construction, year one, and year two, in the application which without explanation are not reasonable. The financial projections as to the whole facility are unreasonable. They show that WUESTHOFF, which currently makes $7 or $8 million dollars each year, will lose money once the new facility is open but that, in its second year, the new facility will make $6.9 million. Such a projection is unreasonable. By focusing only on the incremental effect of adding an inpatient tower to a presumed existing DTC, WUESTHOFF’s financial projections are not sufficient to allow a conclusion to be drawn as to the financial feasibility of the new 50-bed hospital. However, it would appear that, if those schedules had been presented, they would have shown the new satellite hospital, taken in its entirety, not to be financially feasible in the long term. The Special Needs Of Health Maintenance Organizations: Section 408.035(1)(j), Florida Statutes. The application is not made on behalf of an HMO, and this criterion is not applicable. The Needs And Circumstances Of Those Entities Which Provide A Substantial Portion Of Their Services Or Resources, Or Both, To Individuals Not Residing In The District: Section 408.035(1)(k), Florida Statutes. The CON application does not address serving a substantial number of persons or providing a substantial portion of services to individuals residing outside the district, and this criterion is not applicable. The Probable Impact Of The Proposed Project On The Costs Of Providing Health Services Proposed By The Applicant, Including The Effect On Competition: Section 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes. There is significant competition for managed care services in Brevard County. HRMC seeks and desires to enter into managed care contracts and is as competitive in the managed care arena as WUESTHOFF is. In fact, HRMC’s managed-care, patient volume is higher than WUESTHOFF’s. Managed care penetration in Brevard County has increased over the last five years and especially in the last two years. One particular HMO in Brevard County that is just getting started has received an acceptable managed care offer from HRMC. If they did not receive an acceptable offer from WUESTHOFF. Brevard County does not need another inpatient facility to allow the County to achieve higher levels of managed care penetration. There are no barriers in Brevard County to increasing HMO and other managed care penetration. Even though HRMC has an 82 percent market share in South Brevard County, that by itself does not indicate HRMC is charging non-competitive prices. In fact, HRMC’s charges are much lower than WUESTHOFF’s. Both the State of Florida and the FTC found that HRMC’s merger with Cape Canaveral when Health First was formed did not create an adverse, competitive effect on the marketplace. Because HRMC’s charges are so much lower than WUESTHOFF’s, the addition of the proposed hospital would not introduce price competition into the market. The majority of the proposed hospital’s patients are likely to come from South Brevard County-–an area where HRMC has an 82.5 percent market share. Thus, the bulk of the proposed hospital’s patients will come from HRMC. If the proposed hospital meets its projected utilization, HRMC stands to lose somewhere between $4 and $5 million a year. While that loss may not put HRMC into bankruptcy, it will have a significant adverse effect. The Costs And Methods Of The Proposed Construction And The Availability Of Alternative, Less Costly, Or More Effective Methods Of Construction: Section 408.035(1)(m), Florida Statutes. WUESTHOFF’s proposal to establish a 50-bed, general, acute care hospital entails the construction of a 3-story, 50-bed patient tower adjoining an outpatient diagnostic center. The outpatient diagnostic center, and not the inpatient tower, will encompass virtually all of the ancillary services necessary for WUESTHOFF to obtain a license to operate its facility as a hospital. As more fully discussed below, WUESTHOFF’s proposed 50- bed inpatient hospital will require substantial design modification and increased square footage in order to obtain licensure as a general, acute care hospital. The Applicant’s Past And Proposed Provision Of Health Care Services To Medicaid Patients And The Medically Indigent: Section 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. The evidence showed that all acute care hospitals in Brevard County provide a fair level of Medicaid and indigent care in comparison to the remainder of the state. In its CON application, WUESTHOFF proposes to condition approval of its 50- bed, general, acute care hospital on providing 15 percent Medicaid and charity care, but did not provide a breakdown of each. There was no documented access problems for Medicaid or indigent patients that would warrant a new health care facility. Because indigent care is reported to the State based on a hospital’s charges, WUESTHOFF and HRMC could be doing the same amount of indigent care, but WUESTHOFF could appear to be doing more because its charges are higher. Whether Less Costly, More Efficient, Or More Appropriate Alternatives To The Proposed Inpatient Services Are Available: Section 408.035(2)(a), Florida Statutes. HRMC’s average charges are significantly lower than WUESTHOFF’s on both a per case and per patient day basis. HRMC’s costs are also lower, indicating it is more efficient. Therefore, the addition of another less-efficient, higher- charging WUESTHOFF hospital into the market would be more costly and less efficient than what it is there now. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that denial of WUESTHOFF’s proposed 50-bed, general acute care hospital is the least costly, more efficient, and appropriate alternative. The existing providers of acute care services in Brevard County are operating efficiently and have unused capacity that is available to serve Brevard residents. Data suggests that while the population of Brevard County is growing, there is no corresponding increase in utilization of general, acute care services. While Brevard enjoys a proportionately higher growth rate than the rest of the State, the growth does not translate into higher utilization of general acute care services. Further, the age 65+ population, those most likely to use hospital services, has experienced an annual growth of approximately 3.7 percent between 1990-1996, which is higher than the overall rate of growth for Brevard. While there has been a significant growth in the number of elderly and Medicaid eligible population, only approximately percent of those eligible for Medicaid in the 14 zip codes targeted as the service area of WUESTHOFF’s proposed hospital actually use hospital services. In 1993, the last year of available data, the actual county-wide use rate for Medicaid eligible residents was only 8.4 percent. This is expected to remain constant in subsequent years, as the demand for inpatient acute care services has not increased, but has in fact decreased. There is insufficient utilization of the inpatient acute care services which already exist in Brevard County, with approximately 50 percent of the available beds unoccupied. The addition of another health care facility will not improve access, improve delivery of services, or make services available to a population that is not presently being adequately and appropriately served by existing providers. In a market where inpatient volume is going down, length of stay is going down, and utilization is going down, it does not make sense to spend scarce dollars on new inpatient services. Whether The Existing Facilities Providing Similar Inpatient Services Are Being Used In An Appropriate And Efficient Manner: Section 408.035(2)(b), Florida Statutes. The greater weight of the evidence established that there is available capacity for inpatient services like those proposed by WUESTHOFF at the existing, general, acute care facilities in Brevard County. WUESTHOFF did not demonstrate that any provider is suffering from over utilization or that any patient has not been able to access general acute care services when such services were necessary. On the contrary, there was a consensus among the experts, even WUESTHOFF’s experts, that there is no problem with geographic or financial access to existing providers. Between 1993 and 1996, hospital utilization dropped from 63 percent to 52 percent. AT WUESTHOFF’s Rockledge campus, utilization fell from a high of 63 percent in 1993, to approximately 46 percent in 1996. During this same period, the population of Brevard County grew at a rate of approximately 2.4 percent per year, which was proportionately higher than for the rest of the state. At HRMC, its occupancy dropped, but not quite as dramatically. Between 1993 and 1996, HRMC’s occupancy went from 67 percent to approximately 62 percent. The satellite facility, operated by HRMC in Palm Bay and located in the same service area where WUESTHOFF proposes to construct its 50-bed general acute care hospital, has never experienced occupancy above 31 percent. That Patients Will Experience Serious Problems In Obtaining Inpatient Care Of The Type Proposed, In The Absence Of The Proposed New Service: Section 408.035(2)(d), Florida Statutes. There was no evidence to show that any population group in Brevard County is unable to access quality health care services at any of the subdistrict’s existing facilities. Further, WUESTHOFF failed to establish that its proposed facility was needed to provide general acute care services not currently provided or currently accessible to residents of south Brevard County. WUESTHOFF maintains that participants in managed care contracts may not be able to access WUESTHOFF’s general acute care services without approval of the proposed project, but there was not demonstration that those individuals would not otherwise have access to quality affordable health care in Brevard County. WUESTHOFF also failed to demonstrate that participants in managed care programs are a “traditionally underserved” population group for a determination of need under not normal circumstances. CON Application Content And Procedures: Section 408.037, Florida Statutes And Rule 59C-1.008, Florida Administrative Code. The parties stipulated as to the timeliness of the submission of WUESTHOFF’s Letter of Intent, initial CON application and response to omissions. However, the board resolution required by Section 408.037, Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.008, Florida Administrative Code, is fatally defective. The applicant is required to provide certification that its governing board enacted a resolution to license and operate the proposed facility. In this case, the proposed 50- bed, inpatient tower cannot be licensed by the applicant as a hospital. In order to obtain hospital licensure, the proposed project would necessarily include the $35+ million that WUESTHOFF proposes to spend on its outpatient diagnostic center. WUESTHOFF’s CON application also fails to comply with Section 408.037(2)(c), which requires detailed financial projection including a statement of the revenues and expense for the period of construction and the first two years of operation after completion of the project. The proposed project is a “hospital.” The hospital will report all of the revenues and expenses of the inpatient and outpatients to the state in its actual report, and those same projected revenues and expenses should be in the pro forma of a certificate of need application for a new hospital project. Instead, the projected revenues and expenses in the pro formas take an “incremental” approach and focus only on the 50-bed tower and an unspecified portion of the diagnostic center. WUESTHOFF’s own financial expert admitted that one cannot determine the revenues and expenses of the new hospital from the information contained in the application. AHCA does not have sufficient information with respect to revenues and expenditures in the pro formas to determine the financial feasibility of the hospital project. The pro formas do not meet the statutory requirement contained in 408.037(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and are fatally defective. Neither AHCA nor its predecessor agency ever have approved a CON to establish a hospital without ever seeing projections of the revenues and expenses of the hospital as a whole. Additions to hospitals have been approved on a strictly incremental basis; but, in those cases, the revenues and expenses of the hospital as a whole already had been reviewed and approved. Inpatient cardiac catheterization programs also have been approved, based on a strictly incremental review of the financial impact of converting from an existing outpatient to an inpatient program. But there is a meaningful difference between the approval of a program in a hospital facility that already has been reviewed and approved as a whole and what WUESTHOFF is seeking to have done in this case. There also is a difference between treating the costs of an existing and operating facility or program as being “sunk” and treating the $35 million capital cost and additional operating costs of the proposed DTC in this case as being “sunk.” In the former, the costs have been or are being spent and truly are “sunk”; in the latter, despite WUESTHOFF’s assurances, the DTC money has not been spent, and the DTC has not been established. Indeed, the decision properly before AHCA in this case is whether those expenditures should be made for purposes of establishing a hospital. If not, the hospital should not be approved. If WUESTHOFF still wants to build and operate its proposed $35 million anyway, as it has assured AHCA that it will do, it is free to do so. Criteria Used In Evaluation Of CON Applications: Rule 59C-1.030, Florida Administrative Code. AHCA’s rules set forth additional criteria used to evaluate CON applications which focus on whether there is a need for the proposed service in the population to be served and whether the proposed project is accessible to those in need of the service. The evidence in this case showed that there was no unmet need in Brevard County for inpatient, general, acute care services and that the target population is adequately served by the existing providers of general acute care services. Furthermore, the evidenced showed that the anticipated population growth in Brevard County is not likely to generate additional numbers of inpatient admissions, based on the decline in utilization during a period when Brevard County was experiencing unprecedented annual growth at a rate of 2.4 percent overall and 3.7 percent in the 65+ population. Any attendant increase in demand for inpatient general acute care services can be easily accommodated by the existing providers in Brevard County. The rule also examines the extent to which an applicant provides services to Medicare, Medicaid, and the medically indigent patients. The evidence showed that WUESTHOFF provides a fair amount of general acute care services to Medicare, Medicaid, and charity patients, as do the other existing providers in Brevard County. Hospital Physical Plant Requirements For Licensure: Rule 59A-3, Florida Administrative Code. WUESTHOFF’s 50-bed, general, acute care hospital, as proposed, cannot meet licensure standards without significant adjustment to the design to bring it into compliance with the licensure rules. Rule 59A-3.081(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, specifically requires that the critical care nurse’s station be situated so that nurses have visual control of each patient from common spaces. The schematics provided by WUESTHOFF indicate that there is no visual control of two patient rooms located in the northwest end of the unit. As to functionality of the space, there is no observation from the nurses station to trauma rooms located at the end of the unit and inadequate proximity to support spaces, such as soiled and clean utility and med prep, to the trauma rooms. Seriously injured patients would necessarily be transported up to surgery through what would be public corridor spaces in order to access elevators and then through additional public spaces on the second floor. Inpatient access to the CT scan room and MRI room appears to be made through a narrow, 5-foot wide corridor. Hospital licensure regulations require inpatient access through an 8-foot corridor. The only 8-foot corridors available for inpatient use, the service corridor off the housekeeping and staff facilities area to the rear of the unit and the corridor located between radiology and dietary, do not appear to be appropriate means for inpatients to access these rooms. On the third floor of the facility, WUESTHOFF proposes to locate an aerobics and exercise room, directly above the second floor patient recovery area and two of the operating rooms. With an exercise area located above such critical areas, there is the possibility that vibrations would transmit to operating room lights, ceiling mounted microscopes, and other instruments. It would be costly to sufficiently stiffen the structure to minimize vibrations. In order to bring the proposed project into compliance with hospital licensure regulations, material changes to the plans must be made, which will necessarily increase the square footage of the facility. The square footage of the facility would likely be increased by approximately 5,000 square feet, and many of the areas would have to be significantly redesigned to accommodate concerns with compliance to ADA and hospital licensure regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter the final order denying WUESTHOFF’s CON 8597. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: David C. Ashburn, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli and Stewart, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 830 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Stephen K. Boone, Esquire Boone, Boone, Boone and Hines, P.A. Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Blank, Rigsby & Meenan 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: In November of 1983, HMA filed its application for a Certificate of Need to construct and operate a 60-bed adolescent treatment center in Orlando, Florida. An omissions response was filed by HMA in January of 1984. Thereafter, HRS issued its initial intent to grant the application and PIO requested an administrative hearing. HMA is a privately held corporation which owns or manages twelve or thirteen acute care hospitals in the States of Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Texas and Florida, several of which are psychiatric hospitals. The proposed long-term psychiatric treatment facility for adolescents is patterned after a 55-bed program currently operated by HMA in Arlington, Texas. The proposed facility will be a freestanding campus-like setting located on ten to fifteen acres of land in the southern portion of Orlando. The precise site has not yet been selected. The single-story facility will have a total size of approximately 45,000 to 50,000 square feet and will be divided into two separate units which connect into a core area containing various support services, such as offices, a gymnasium, a swimming pool, a media center, and an occupational therapy area. While the location finally selected for the facility will have a bearing on the site costs of the project, the estimated construction costs of approximately 3.1 billion do contain a contingency factor and are reasonable at this stage of the project. Each unit will be served by two interdisciplinary treatment teams headed by a physician or a psychiatrist. Key personnel for the facility, such as department heads and program directors, will most likely be recruited from outside the Orlando area in order to obtain persons with experience in long-term care for adolescents. The treatment program is designed to serve adolescents between the ages of 10 and 19, though the bulk of patients will be middle school and high school individuals between the ages of 13 and 17. While the primary service area will be adolescents in District 7, the remainder of the central Florida region is identified as a secondary service area. A full educational program at the facility is proposed. The concept of the hospital will be to treat the whole person, not just his psychiatric problems, and the treatment program will include and involve family members and other factors which may have a bearing on the adolescent's ability to fit into society. The form of treatment is based upon a "levels" approach -- a form of behavior modification wherein privileges are granted for appropriate behavior and the patient is allowed to move up to the next succeeding level of privileges. It is contemplated that the average length of stay for a patient will be approximately six months -- the average time anticipated for a patient to move from the admission level to the level of discharge. HMA intends to seek accreditation of its proposed facility from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The total estimated project cost for the proposed facility is $6,307,310.00. Financing is to be obtained either through a local bond issue or by a private lending institution. Based upon an evaluation of HMA's audit reports for the past three years, an expert in bond financing of health care facilities was of the opinion that HMA would be eligible either for a private placement or a bond issue to finance the proposed project. HMA intends to charge patients $325.00 per day, and projects an occupancy rate of 80 percent at the end of its second year of operation. This projection is based upon a lack of similar long-term psychiatric facilities for adolescents in the area, the anticipated, experience at the Arlington, Texas adolescent facility and the anticipated serving of clients from CYF (Children Youth and Families -- a state program which; serves adolescents with psychiatric and mental problems). Although no established indigent care policy is now in existence, HMA estimates that its indigency caseload will be between 3 and 5 percent. It is anticipated that the proposed facility will become a contract provider for CYF for the care and treatment of their clients and that this will comprise 20 percent of HMA's patient population. HRS's Rule 10-5.11(26), Florida Administrative Code, relating to long- term psychiatric beds, does not specify a numerical methodology for quantifying bed need. However, the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee (GMFNAC) methodology for determining the need for these beds is generally accepted among health care planners. The GMENAC study was initially performed in order to assess the need for psychiatrists in the year 1990. It is a "needs- based" methodology, as opposed to a "demand-based" methodology, and attempts to predict the number of patients who will theoretically need a particular service, as opposed to the number who will actually utilize or demand such a service. Particularly with child and adolescent individuals who may need psychiatric hospitalization, there are many reasons why they will not seek or obtain such care. Barriers which prevent individuals from seeking psychiatric care include social stigma, the cost of care, concerns about the effectiveness of care, the availability of services and facilities and other problems within the family. Thus, some form of "demand adjustment" is necessary to compensate for the GMENAC formula's overstatement of the need for beds. The GMENAC formula calculates gross bed need by utilizing the following factors: a specific geographic area's population base for a given age group, a prevalency rate in certain diagnostic categories, an appropriate length of stay and an appropriate occupancy factor. In reaching their conclusions regarding the number of long-term adolescent psychiatric beds needed in District 7, the experts presented by HMA and PIO each utilized the GMENAC formula and each utilized the same prevalency rate for that component of the formula. Each appropriately used a five-year planning horizon. However, each expert reached a different result due to a different opinion as to the appropriate age group to be considered, the appropriate length of stay, the appropriate occupancy factor and the factoring in of a "demand adjustment." In calculating the long-term adolescent psychiatric bed need for District 7 in the year 1989, HMA's expert used a population base of ages 0 to 17, lengths of stay of 150 and 180 days, an occupancy level of 80 percent and an admissions factor of 96 percent. Utilizing those figures, the calculation demonstrates a 1989 need for 158 beds if the average length of stay is 150 days, and 189 beds if the average length of stay is 180 days. If the population base is limited to the 10 to 19 age bracket, the need for long-term psychiatric beds is reduced to between 70 and 90, depending upon the length of stay. From these calculations, HMA's expert concludes that there is a significant unmet need for long-term adolescent psychiatric beds in District 7. This expert recognizes that the numbers derived from the GMENAC formula simply depict a statistical representation or indication of need. In order to derive a more exact number of beds which will actually be utilized in an area, one would wish to consider historical utilization in the area and/or perform community surveys and examine other site-specific needs assessment data. Believing that no similar services or facilities exist in the area, HMA's need expert concluded that there is a need for a 60-bed facility in District 7. In applying the GMENAC methodology, PIO's need expert felt it appropriate to utilize a base population of ages 10 through 17, an average length of stay of 90 days and an occupancy rate of 90 percent. Her calculations resulted in a bed need of 37 for the year 1990. Utilizing a length of stay of 120, 150 and 180 days and a 90 percent occupancy rate, a need of 50, 62 and 75 beds is derived. If an occupancy rate of 80 percent is utilized, as well as a population of ages 10 - 17, the need for beds is 42, 56, 70 and 84, respectively, for a 90, 120, 150 and 180 day average length of stay. The need expert for PIO would adjust each of these bed need numbers by 50 percent in order to account for the barriers which affect the actual demand for such beds. Since the HMA proposed facility intends to provide service only to those patients between the ages of 10 and 19, use of the 0 - 17 population would inflate the need for long-term adolescent psychiatric beds. Likewise, PIO's non-inclusion of 18 and 19 year olds understates the need. PIO's use of a 90-day average length of stay would tend to understate the actual need in light of HMA's proposed treatment program which is intended to last approximately six months. While some demand adjustment is required to properly reflect the barriers which exist to the seeking of long-term adolescent psychiatric care, the rationale of reducing by one-half the number derived from the GMENAC methodology was not sufficiently supported or justified. Even if HMA's calculations were reduced by one-half, a figure of between 79 and 94 beds would be derived. The existence of other long-term adolescent psychiatric beds in District 7 was the subject of conflicting evidence. West Lake Hospital in Longwood, Seminole County, holds a Certificate of Need and a license as a special Psychiatric hospital with 80 long-term beds. However, the Certificate of Need was issued prior to the adoption of Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, when anything in excess of 28-days was considered long- term. The West Lake application for a Certificate of Need referred to a four- to-six week length of stay -- or a 28 to 42 day period --for adults, and a ten week, or 70 day length of stay for children and adolescents. In preparing inventories for planning purposes, HRS considers the 40 child and adolescent psychiatric beds at West Lake Hospital to be acute or short-term beds. The West Lake facility is not included in HRS's official inventory of licensed and approved long-term care beds as of October 1, 1984. In fact, the only long-term care beds listed for District 7, in addition to HMA's proposed psychiatric facility, are beds devoted to the treatment of substance abuse. PI0 is the holder of a Certificate of Need to construct and operate a 60-bed short-term adolescent psychiatric hospital in Southwest Orange County, and is currently planning the actual development and construction of the facility. If PIO is not able to reach the census projections contained in its Certificate of Need application, its ability to generate earnings could be adversely impacted. Even a five percent decrease in PIO's census projections would require PIO to either raise its rates or make reductions in direct costs. This could include a decrease in staffing, thus affecting a reduction in the available programs, problems in attracting quality staff and ultimately a reduction in the quality of care offered at the PIO facility. In a batch subsequent to the HMA application, PIO requested the addition of 15 long-term adolescent psychiatric beds and 15 substance abuse beds. When an adolescent psychiatric patient is evaluated for placement in a hospital setting, it is generally not possible to determine how long that patient will require hospitalization. The adolescent psychiatric patient is often very guarded, distrusting both parents and other adults, and it is difficult to obtain full and necessary information from both the patient and the parents. Several weeks of both observation and the gathering of data, such as school records, are necessary in order to access the adolescent patient's degree of disturbance. With respect to treatment programs, there is no sharp medical demarcation between a 60-day period and a 90 day period. Patients in short-term facilities often stay longer than 60 days and patients in long term facilities often stay less than 90 days. The length of stay is very often determined by the parents, in spite of the treatment period prescribed by the physician. The treatment programs in both short-term and long-term psychiatric facilities are very similar, and short- and long-term patients are often treated in the same unit. Staffing for the two types of facilities would be basically the same, with the exception, perhaps, of the educational staff.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that HMA grant HMA's application for a Certificate of Need to construct and operate a 60-bed long-term adolescent psychiatric facility in Orlando, Florida. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of July, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Gary Williams and Michael J. Glazer P. O. Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John M. Carlson Assistant General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert S. Cohen O. Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the Agency For Health Care Administration (the "Agency") concerning Certificate of Need ("CON") Application No. 10131 filed by The Shores Behavioral Hospital, LLC (hereinafter “The Shores”) to establish a 60-bed adult psychiatric hospital and CON Application No. 10132 The entity is a limited liability company according to the Division of Corporations. Filed March 14, 2012 2:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings to establish a 12-bed substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds pursuant to CON application No. 10131. The Agency preliminarily approved CON Application No. 10131 and preliminarily denied CON Application No. 10132. South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Regional Hospital (hereinafter “Memorial”) thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary approval of CON 10131, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). The Shores thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Agency’s preliminary denial of CON 10132, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (‘DOAH”). Upon receipt at DOAH, Memorial, CON 10131, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0424CON and The Shores, CON 10132, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0427CON. On February 16, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order of Consolidation consolidating both cases. On February 24, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based on _ the _ parties’ representation they had reached a settlement. . The parties have entered into the attached Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1). It is therefore ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Agency will approve and issue CON 10131 and CON 10132 with the conditions: a. Approval of CON Application 10131 to establish a Class III specialty hospital with 60 adult psychiatric beds is concurrent with approval of the co-batched CON Application 10132 to establish a 12-bed adult substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds in one single hospital facility. b. Concurrent to the licensure and certification of 60 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 12 adult substance abuse beds and 30 adolescent residential treatment (DCF) beds at The Shores, all 72 hospital beds and 30 adolescent residential beds at Atlantic Shores Hospital will be delicensed. c. The Shores will become a designated Baker Act receiving facility upon licensure and certification. d. The location of the hospital approved pursuant to CONs 10131 and 10132 will not be south of Los Olas Boulevard and The Shores agrees that it will not seek any modification of the CONs to locate the hospital farther south than Davie Boulevard (County Road 736). 3. Each party shall be responsible its own costs and fees. 4. The above-styled cases are hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this 2. day of Meaich~ , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELIZABETH DEK, Secretary AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
The Issue Whether an out-of-state corporation doing business as a psychiatric hospital located out of state and as a counseling servico located in Florida's District I is entitled to formal administrative proceedings on an application for certificate of need filed by another party seeking a certificate of need to construct an 80-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in District I? For present purposes Bay Psychiatric's well-pleaded, factual allegations in its petition for formal hearing are assumed to be true. The petition alleges essentially the following ASSUMED FACTS Bay Psychiatric proposes to build an 80-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in Bay County, Florida, and HRS proposes to grant it certificate of need No. 3204 authorizing it to do so. The proposed hospital's primary service area is to be HRS Districts l and 2. Petitioner operates a free standing psychiatric hospital in Dothan, Alabama, which "includes beds defined as long-term psychiatric beds by Rule 10- 5.11(26), Florida Administrative Code, and beds defined as short-term psychiatric beds by Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code." Approximately one quarter of the Dothan hospital's patients come across the state line from HRS Districts l and 2. Last year the Dothan hospital experienced less than an 80 percent occupancy rate of its long-term beds, less than a 75 percent occupancy rate of its adult short-term beds, and less than a 70 percent occupancy rate of its other short-term beds. If Bay Psychiatric receives a certificate of need, the Dothan hospital "will be substantially and adversely affected because any patients admitted to the proposed UNITED MEDICAL facility would otherwise likely have been admitted to CHARTER WOODS HOSPITAL. Petitioner also operates a "counseling and intervention facility located in Panama City, Florida, "offering various outpatient services which "at least in part" are the types of outpatient services Bay Psychiatric would offer at its proposed hospital. Because of "a finite patient population" petitioner's counseling facility would also be "substantially and adversely affected " if Bay Psychiatric receives a certificate of need.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative dismiss the petition for formal proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas L. Mannheimer, Esquire 318 North Calhoun Street Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3300 William E. Hoffman, Jr. James A. Dyer Bondurant Miller Hishon and Stephenson 2200 First Atlanta Tower Two Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30383 F. Philip Blank, Esquire 241 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chris H. Bentley, Esquire Fuller & Johnson, P.A. 300 East Park Avenue Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winuwood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed by the State of Florida to practice medicine and surgery, having been issued license number NE 14637. Respondent was born in Cuba and is a Catholic. He specializes in gynecology and obstetrics and, until March 1983, had hospital privileges at Mercy Hospital in Miami, Florida. Respondent is married and has seven children, most of whom are adults. He is supporting all of them, including grandchildren, and at the time of the formal hearing in this cause there were 12 people living in Respondent's home whom he was supporting. Respondent has not had a vacation since 1970. In approximately the late summer of 1982, Dr. Jose Carballo was walking from his office at the Mercy Hospital complex to the hospital when he encountered Respondent. Respondent grabbed Carballo's arm and appeared extremely agitated. Respondent advised Carballo that the administration at Mercy Hospital was anti-Catholic or anti-Christian, since several of the stained glass windows in the chapel in the hospital had been covered with plywood. Respondent further advised Carballo that Respondent had asked the priest in the chapel why that had been done, and the priest had advised Respondent the windows on that side of the chapel had been covered as a precaution and would remain covered until the end of the hurricane season. The windows on the side of the chapel opposite the direction of potential hurricane winds had not been covered. Although the priest had given that explanation to Respondent, Respondent still insisted that the real reason was a conspiracy on the part of the hospital administration to prevent Catholics from looking at the windows. Since Carballo had known Respondent for a number of years, he noted on that occasion that Respondent acted and appeared to be a different person. At the time, Carballo believed that Respondent was on the verge of a breakdown. During late 1982 and early 1983, both the chief of obstetrics at Mercy Hospital and the chief of the department of anesthesiology at Mercy Hospital noted a number of occasions when Respondent appeared to be engaged in bizarre behavior. They observed incidents of violent behavior and heard much talk of Communists, Zionists, and conspiracy on different occasions when they encountered Respondent. Respondent was seen in the hospital on occasions when he appeared to be very heavily medicated, and observations were made of the changes in Respondent's demeanor, in his coordination, and in his speech. Respondent appeared depressed and introverted, and even his manner of walking had slowed. Respondent's violent behavior was triggered by small incidents, and he would accuse someone of being a Communist simply if that person wore a red tie. On one occasion, Respondent accused one of the labor room nurses of poisoning his cup of tea. By late 1982, both the chief of obstetrics and the chief of the department of anesthesiology had formed the opinion that Respondent was unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. In January 1983, Respondent performed an emergency cesarean section at Mercy Hospital. During the course of that delivery, he cut the baby's ear and the area of the baby's head behind his ear. Dr. Roger Walker saw Respondent when he entered the operating room and saw him again when he left the operating room. Respondent appeared depressed, introverted, and slowed. On March 18, 1983, Respondent's hospital privileges at Mercy Hospital were suspended. During late 1982 and early 1983, Respondent realized that he was depressed and started treatment with Dr. Carlos Diaz Silvia. Diaz-Silvia believed at the time that Respondent might present a danger to himself and to others and placed him on anti psychotic drugs. Subsequent to Mercy Hospital's suspension of Respondent's staff privileges, the Department of Professional Regulation ordered Respondent to undergo a three-day evaluation at South Miami Hospital's addiction treatment program under Dr. Delores Morgan. As a result of the mental and physical examinations conducted during that three-day evaluation, it was determined that Respondent had no chemical dependency on alcohol or drugs but rather that Respondent was suffering from a major depression episode. It was further determined that the medication given to Respondent by Dr. Diaz-Silvia had been one of the major causes of the determination by the administration at Mercy Hospital that Respondent was incompetent to practice medicine. Instead, Respondent was placed on Elavil, an antidepressant drug which affects the mood centers of the brain and removes depression and allows a person to function. It was also determined that Respondent must, in addition to taking the Elavil, remove the stressors which had caused his depression by reducing his medical practice, by requiring some of his grown children and their families to begin supporting themselves so Respondent would not have to work continuously with no vacations in order to support all of the adult members of his family, and by Respondent undergoing regular therapy with a psychiatrist who could help Respondent resolve some of his problems and monitor Respondent's need for an antidepressant drug. Respondent was released from South Miami Hospital's program to the care of psychiatrist Paul Daruna. Respondent started treatment with Daruna on a weekly basis on June 1, 1983. During the next 11 sessions, Respondent showed marked improvement with the Elavil prescribed for him: his sleep pattern improved, and his mood visibly improved. It was determined that Respondent had become able to make rational decisions and presented no danger to himself or to others. By October 13, 1983, Respondent's prognosis was excellent, and Daruna believed that Respondent would be able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety so long as he continued his treatment regimen, including both therapy and the antidepressant drug, and so long as Respondent took whatever steps were necessary to remove the stressors in his life caused by his heavy practice and the burdensome demands of his family. Daruna has not seen Respondent since October 13, 1983, and Respondent has not been under the care of any other psychiatrist. Dr. Delores Morgan saw Respondent on February 8, 1984, two days before the formal hearing in this cause. Respondent was still taking his Elavil but was not treating with a psychiatrist. Respondent had voluntarily reduced his office practice and had relocated his office so that he was now practicing with a general practitioner, Dr. Harry Rosado, who was voluntarily monitoring Respondent's practice. Although Respondent's privileges were still under suspension at Mercy Hospital, Respondent was practicing at Baptist Hospital and had performed approximately 54 deliveries during 1983 while practicing only three days a week. Dr. Morgan noted Respondent's marked improvement and Respondent's continued cooperation. However, she determined that Respondent was still in need of psychiatric follow-up so long as he was on medication in order that he could be monitored for change. She further believed that Respondent's practice of medicine should remain restricted to the level it is at this time until his treating psychiatrist had determined that it was appropriate for him to again engage in the full-time practice of medicine. She further recommended that monitoring of Respondent's practice continue, and believed most strongly that it was still imperative that Respondent's family, comprised primarily of grown children, start to assume some responsibility for their own lives and not continue to place the total burden on their father. Although Respondent admitted at the formal hearing that he agrees with Dr. Morgan's assessment of his prognosis and that he has voluntarily restricted his practice and is voluntarily taking his medication, Respondent still does not believe that he was impaired during the approximate six-month period in question, does not believe he was "slowed down" during that time period, and does not believe that he was irrational or paranoid concerning the stained glass window episode. Accordingly, although Respondent has voluntarily imposed on himself some of the restrictions recommended in order that he continue to function well, it appears that Respondent still does not fully appreciate the extent to which his mental state had deteriorated during the time before he was involved in any treatment regimen. During late 1982 and early 1983, Respondent was mentally incompetent due to a severe depressive state and inappropriate treatment which made him more incompetent to the extent that he was unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and placing Respondent's license to practice medicine on probation under such terms and conditions as may be considered necessary by the Board of Medical Examiners, including continued psychiatric care and reporting to the Board of the status of the health of Respondent, with restrictions upon his medical practice as may be recommended in the future by his treating physicians in light of his mental and physical status. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Luis Fernandez, Esquire 2600 SW Third Avenue, Suite 203 Miami, Florida 33129 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
