Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Ralph Thomas West was a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0364011, and Charles De Menzes was a licensed real estate broker with license number 0174324. De Menzes was operating as qualifying broker and officer of De Menzes Realty, Inc., 2116 East Silver Springs Boulevard, Ocala, Florida, license number 0208877. De Menzes Realty, Inc. was a corporation licensed as a broker in Florida. From approximately September 3, 1981 to approximately June 14; 1984; West was licensed and operating as a real estate salesman in the employ of De Menzes Realty, Inc. On March 31, 1984, West obtained an exclusive right of sale listing contract from James M. and Grace Bell for the sale of certain real property. The listing contract was for six months, ending on September 30, 1984, and specified that the listing would be placed with Multiple Listing Service. West had the Bells sign the listing contract, gave them a copy, and returned to De Menzes Realty where he signed the listing and then placed it on the secretary's desk for presentation to, and signature by, De Menzes. Standard office practice was that all listings were placed in a file folder after the salesman and De Menzes had signed them, other required authorization forms were placed in the file and it was returned to the salesman who was then responsible for having all required forms in the file·assigned. The salesman then was supposed to return the file to the secretary who would place the listing with the Multiple Listing Service (MLS). De Menzes told his salesmen that they were responsible for following up on the file and making sure the listing had been placed with MLS. De Menzes does not routinely follow up on listings to insure that salesmen carry out these responsibilities, and he took no action on the Bell listing after executing the exclusive listing. After De Menzes signed the Bell listing, it was placed in a file folder along with Key Box Authorization and Notice to Sellers forms which had to be signed by the Bells. West gave these forms to the Bells on April 1, 1984, and they signed them on that date. They also gave West a key to their property and he placed a lock box on the property door. On April 7, 1984, an auction of the Bell property was held by Max Heubner, who was a licensed real estate salesman working in the employ of De Menzes Realty, Inc. as an auctioneer. Huebner arranged for the auctions himself, including the advertising, and conducted them himself. He did not seek or obtain De Menzes' approval to hold auctions. Huebner would routinely give De Menzes a copy of his auction fliers so that De Menzes would be aware that an auction was being held in case someone called the office about it. The Bell property was not sold as a result of this auction. The Bell listing was never placed in MLS. West did show the property to two people following the auction but never followed up to be sure the listing was entered in MLS. After West left the employ of De Menzes Realty, Inc., on or about June 14, 1984, no efforts were undertaken by De Menzes Realty to sell the Bell property. De Menzes Realty, Inc. and Charles De Menzes were unaware of the Bell listing until early July, 1984, when Grace Bell called the office to inquire about progress in selling the property. Gail Barbee, broker- salesperson at De Menzes Realty, told Grace Bell that there was no listing on file with De Menzes Realty, Inc., and no listing of their property had ever been placed with MLS. Barbee sent Bell a new listing contract on July 19, 1984, but the Bells decided not to reexecute another listing. On October 4, 1984, Barbee returned pictures of the property, as well as a key which Bell had sent her in response to Barbee's letter in July. In early May, 1985, West was going through his briefcase and found the entire Bell listing file; including the original listing contract. This was not a file which he prepared on the subject property but was the actual office file prepared on this listing by personnel of De Menzes Realty, Inc. West had placed the file in his briefcase by mistake and did not realize he had it until May, 1985. He subsequently submitted this file to Petitioner on May 30, 1985. The file had been in his sole possession for approximately a year, during which time he had completely forgotten about the listing, and had left the employ of De Menzes Realty.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that Respondents, Charles De Menzes and De Menzes Realty, Inc., each be reprimanded. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of October, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1985. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 and 4. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 and 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire 333 N.W. 3rd Avenue Ocala, FL 32670 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Richard B. Watson holds a license issued by petitioner and has since 1976. He holds license No. 0163723, and has, at all pertinent times, worked as a broker-salesman for Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., 126- 128 Eglin Parkway Southeast in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On June 13, 1983, Lloyd H. Waldorff executed an employment contract under which Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. was to have the exclusive right to sell the 25 units Waldorff Properties of Ft. Walton proposed to build as "phase two" of its La Mar West Townhouse Project in Mary Ester, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Nobody signed the written agreement on behalf of the broker, but Mr. Waldorff's testimony that Ms. Caldwell or somebody in the agency "accepted" it was uncontradicted, and fully consonant with the other evidence adduced. Mr. Waldorff or his organization needed agreements from prospective buyers to purchase units when built, in order to induce a lender to lend money for construction of phase two. One Saturday, probably in mid-July of 1983, Ms. Caldwell presented him with 18 such agreements. It seemed peculiar to Mr. Waldorff, getting 18 purchase agreements at once; and he was also struck by the number of Californians and other non- Floridians among the putative purchasers. But he had nevertheless signed the agreements himself before Ms. Caldwell gave them to Mr. Watson for attestation; and he later furnished all of the purchase agreements to Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Panama City in support of an eventually successful application for a $1,100,000.00 construction loan. (T.90) Mr. Waldorff signed the purchase agreements in a back room within the Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. offices. At hearing he remembered that a woman was present. He did not recall respondent's being there. Seventeen of the 18 agreements furnished the lender were purportedly signed by persons to whose signatures, except in one instance, respondent Watson attested. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On 16 of the 17 purchase agreements on which he signed as a witness to putative purchasers' signatures, respondent also signed as a witness to Mr. Waldorff's signature in a blank provided under the heading "signed in the presence of:". Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Respondent was aware at the time that Mr. Waldorff, whom he considers a friend, needed such agreements in order to obtain financing. As time for closing on the purchase agreements approached, Mr. Waldorff testified, he became suspicious, and asked Ms. Caldwell to see her escrow account statements, but she put him off. Eventually he asked her if the purchase agreements were "bogus," and she answered by nodding affirmatively. It was at this point, Mr. Waldorff said, that he notified the lending institution of their falsity, and asked for an extension of time in which to repay the construction loan. But the weight of the evidence established that the purchase agreements were shams from their inception and that Mr. Waldorff knew it before he obtained the loans. On September 9, 1985, Paul R. Bratton, III, an investigator for DPR, asked Mr. Watson about the purchase, agreements on which he had witnessed purported parties' signatures. In this interview, Mr. Watson said, with respect to some of the contracts which he had signed as a witness, "that he did not see the buyers or the sellers sign the contract." (T.63) In a deposition he gave in the course of related civil litigation, respondent Watson testified that it was "(p)retty much," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, p.10, "standard procedure" for him to witness signatures which he had not seen being affixed. In response to the question, "Does that mean also you wouldn't know whether these people exist in real life or not?", Mr. Watson answered, "It could be. ..." Id. as 15. Mr. Waldorff told Mr. Watson he was going to use the 18 purchase agreements, all but one of which respondent had signed as a witness, to secure a construction loan even though they were "bogus." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This conversation antedated the loan closing. Id.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Holly Sanders is licensed by the Department as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0324563. In June, 1992, Ms. Sanders and Loren L. and Rose Thompson entered into an agreement whereby Ms. Sanders would have the exclusive right to rent an apartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Thompson. This apartment, unit A-2012 in Brickell Place Condominium, Phase II, was located across the hall from the apartment in which Mr. and Mrs. Thompson resided. Ms. Sanders visited Mr. and Mrs. Thompson periodically to discuss matters relating to the rental, and she grew very fond of Mrs. Thompson. The tenant leasing apartment A-2012 did not intend to renew the lease when it expired in the summer of 1993. Ms. Sanders offered to purchase the apartment for $125,000, a figure which she based on the value of the property used to calculate the ad valorem tax.1 Ms. Sanders prepared a Contract for Sale and Purchase, dated August 16, 1993, reflecting a contract sales price of $125,000, to be paid in cash at closing. Mrs. Thompson retained Richard Olsen, an attorney, to represent her and her husband in the transaction.2 On August 19, 1993, Ms. Sanders, Mr. Olsen, and Mr. and Mrs. Thompson met in the Thompsons' apartment. At the time, both Mr. and Mrs. Thompson were incapacitated. Mrs. Thompson suffered from multiple sclerosis and was in a wheelchair.3 Mr. Thompson was bedridden; he had suffered a stroke and needed full-time care. Both Mr. and Mrs. Thompson are retired attorneys. At the August 19 meeting, Mr. Olsen examined the contract Ms. Sanders had prepared and went over the terms and conditions with Mr. and Mrs. Thompson,4 including the $125,000 contract price and the fact that it was to be a cash transaction. Neither Mr. Thompson nor Mrs. Thompson indicated any dissatisfaction with the terms of the contract. After Mr. Olsen went over the contract, Mr. and Mrs. Thompson and Ms. Sanders signed either four or five originals in his presence. Ms. Sanders gave one duplicate original executed contract to Mr. and Mrs. Thompson5 and one duplicate original to Mr. Olsen. She kept the remaining duplicate original executed contracts. Ms. Sanders did not make any photocopies of the contract. Ms. Sanders was aware that the condominium association had a right of first refusal on the apartment and that she had to be approved by the association in order to purchase the apartment.6 Ms. Sanders personally delivered an application and one of the duplicate original executed contracts showing a contract price of $125,000 to Consuelo Boet, the administrative assistant in the office of Arnold Rabin, the Brickell Place building manager. Ms. Boet did not examine the documents when they were delivered by Ms. Sanders but put them directly into a file containing other applications pending approval. When all of the required documents for apartment A-2012 had been received, Ms. Boet gave them to Mr. Rabin but, again, did not examine the contract. A Certificate of Approval dated October 18, 1993, indicates that the condominium association approved Ms. Sanders as purchaser of the apartment; the contract sales price was not included in this document. Mr. Olsen visited the Thompsons' apartment several times between the time the contract for sale was executed on August 19 and the time the transaction closed on October 20, 1993. The purpose of these visits was to locate the documents relating to Mr. and Mrs. Thompson's purchase of apartment A-2012 in 1988. They had extensive real estate holdings throughout the world, and Mr. Olsen went through many boxes of files trying to locate the title documents needed for the closing. Ms. Sanders was present during each visit Mr. Olsen made to the Thompsons' apartment prior to the closing. During one visit, Mr. Olsen was present when Ms. Sanders asked Mrs. Thompson if she would be willing to accept a $75,000, one-year mortgage on the property. Mr. Olsen discussed this proposal with Mrs. Thompson and explained to Mrs. Thompson that the mortgage Ms. Sanders was proposing would result in her receiving only $50,000 when the transaction closed and then two payments of $50,000 and $25,000, respectively. Mrs. Thompson told him she would accept the mortgage but did not want Ms. Sanders to pay interest. She refused to change her mind even though Mr. Olsen told her that it would not be in her best interest to take a non-interest-bearing note. Chicago Title Company was the closing agent for the transaction, and the closing took place at their offices on October 20, 1993. Mr. Olsen was present at the closing on behalf of the Thompsons, who were not able to attend. At closing, both Mr. Olsen, on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Thompson, and Ms. Sanders signed the HUD-1 Settlement Statement, which was computed using a purchase price of $125,000. The cash payable to the Thompsons at closing is shown on the settlement statement as $46,289.48, and the statement reflected a purchase money mortgage for $75,000, as well. Ms. Sanders executed a mortgage and note in the amount of $75,000 dated October 20, 1993. These documents were prepared by Mr. Olsen, and he notarized them on October 20. The terms of the mortgage note called for a payment of $50,000 on April 19, 1994, and a payment of $25,000 on October 19, 1994; the note did not bear interest. Mr. Olsen had one original set of the closing documents bound in a legal-sized folder; the documents included an original signed closing statement, a copy of the deed, and a copy of the mortgage and note. He delivered this folder to Mrs. Thompson and explained the documents, specifically going over the closing statement with her. Mrs. Thompson expressed no dissatisfaction with the transaction or the amount of money she received at closing. Mr. Olsen believes that, during the time he represented her, Mrs. Thompson was fully aware that the contract sales price was $125,000 and that she had taken a mortgage instead of all cash. At some point, the association's Certificate of Approval of Ms. Sanders' purchase and a copy of the HUD-l Settlement Statement were placed in the file maintained by the association for apartment A-2012. Ms. Boet does not recall when the documents came into the office or who provided the copy of the settlement statement. She did not examine the documents at the time she placed them in the association file for apartment A-2012. However, when Mr. Rabin reviewed the file some months after the closing, it contained a copy of an HUD-1 Settlement Statement which had obviously been altered in several places to show a contract sales price of $185,0007 and a copy of a Contract for Purchase and Sale showing a contract price of $185,000.8 The file did not contain a duplicate original executed Contract for Sale and Purchase. The greater weight of the evidence in this case supports Ms. Sanders' contentions that the Contract for Sale and Purchase of apartment A-2012 in the Brickell Place Condominium, executed on August 19, 1993, by Loren L. and Rose Thompson, specified a contract sales price of $125,000, to be paid in cash, and that Mrs. Thompson accepted a one-year note and mortgage on the property in the amount of $75,000 and $50,000 in cash in lieu of $125,000 in cash. Furthermore, the uncontradicted evidence establishes that Ms. Sanders delivered a duplicate original executed contract to Ms. Boet as part of her application to the condominium association for approval of her purchase of the apartment. The uncontradicted evidence also establishes that, some months after the October 20, 1993, closing on the apartment, Mr. Rabin reviewed the association's file and found that it contained a copy of a Contract for Sale and Purchase which specified a contract sales price of $185,000 in cash and an HUD-1 Settlement Statement obviously altered to show a contract sales price of $185,000. There is, however, no compelling evidence establishing when the documents were altered or establishing that Ms. Sanders is the person who made the alterations. Therefore, the Department has failed to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Sanders violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, either with respect to Mr. and Mrs. Thompson or to the Brickell Place Condominium Association.9
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Holly Sanders. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1996.
Findings Of Fact On July 2nd, 1974, Closet Maid Corporation (CMC) acquired Beechcraft model BCO from Elliott Flying Service under an agreement which was not introduced into evidence at this hearing. Respondent contends that this is a lease agreement with option to purchase at the expiration of sixty (60) months. Exhibit 3 is a transfer of CMC's interest in this aircraft to NOS Corporation. The Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 1) claims a tax due of $9,633.70, penalties of $481.69, and interest of $1,011.54 or a total tax due of $11,126.93. The accuracy of this sum was not contested. CMC is a corporation the majority of whose stock is owned by Norman Sauer. NOS Corporation was formed to be the transferee of CMC's interest in the airplane and the stock of NOS is wholly owned by Sauer. CMC and Nodorana Farms, another corporation wholly owned by Sauer, entered into agreements with NOS to lease back the aircraft at a guaranteed minimum monthly rental in excess of $8,000.00, which will provide NOS with sufficient revenues to make the monthly payments on the aircraft of $4,214.89 plus operating expenses. Elliott Flying Service is the registered owner of the aircraft. The only documentary evidence presented regarding the agreement between CMC and Elliott Flying Service is Exhibit 3. Exhibit 3 is a Beech Acceptance Corporation, Inc. (BAC) Transfer of Interest Agreement form which states that the "note, conditional sale contract, lease, chattel mortgage, or other security agreement, herein called 'Instrument'", representing the agreement between CMC and Elliott, requires the consent of BAC for its transfer to NOS. At the date shown on Exhibit 3 of August 1st, 1976, Exhibit 3 recites the balance due on the aircraft of $240,842.39 "is payable in forty-seven (47) consecutive monthly installments of $4,214.89 each, first installment payable August 2nd, 1976, and one final installment of $42,742.56." Exhibit 3 further shows BAC to be the assignee of the "instrument" executed between CMC and Elliott. Exhibit 2C is headed NOS CORPORATION and shows monthly aircraft expenses. Included therein is depreciation of $2480.00 and interest expense of $2192.00. Accounting procedures prescribed by AICPA provide that equipment held on long term lease be capitalized. Accordingly, essentially the same accounting procedures would be used whether the aircraft was obtained on lease or conditional sales contract.
The Issue Whether Respondent, as Mayor of the City of Oviedo, violated Sections 112.313(8) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, David Knickerbocker (Knickerbocker) served as the elected mayor of the City of Oviedo (City), Seminole County, Florida, from September 1991 to September 1993. The mayor of the City attends and participates in City Council (Council) meetings but does not have a vote in Council matters. Knickerbocker is and has been at all times material to this case, a state-registered real estate broker and part-owner of Oviedo Realty, doing business as Century 21 Oviedo Realty, in Oviedo Florida. The property involved in this case consists of three tracts of commercial/industrial zoned property on Evans Street within the city limits of Oviedo. The three tracts consist of two vacant parcels of property (Tracts I and III), which flank a center parcel of property (Tract II) upon which a warehouse structure has been built. In 1984 Knickerbocker was the real estate agent involved in the sale of Tract II to Rudy Vuckovic. In 1985, Mr. Vuckovic constructed a large warehouse-type building on Tract II. Knickerbocker was also the real estate agent involved when Mr. Vuckovic purchased the adjacent vacant lots, Tracts I and III, in 1984 and 1986, respectively, from Harry O. Hall for the price of $45,000 each. From October, 1991 until January, 1993, Knickerbocker's company, Century 21 Oviedo Realty, Inc., listed for sale, Tracts I, II, and III. From December 1992 until the end of May 1993, Duke Realty also listed for sale Tracts I, II, and III. As of June 7, 1993, the three parcels of property had not been sold. Mr. Vuckovic telephoned Knickerbocker the morning of June 7, 1993, to say that he needed to obtain contracts for sale of Tracts I and III that week. He agreed to pay ten percent commission to Knickerbocker if Knickerbocker sold the lots for him. Vuckovic's asking price for each lot was $35,000. At the regular public meeting of the Council on Monday evening, June 7, 1993, city manager Eugene Williford (Williford) requested and obtained the Council's authorization to explore the possibility of purchasing an 8,000 square feet building on Evans Street for use as a public works facility. The Evans Street building which the City Manager was discussing on June 7, 1993 was the large warehouse-type building that Mr. Vuckovic had constructed on Tract II. In his brief presentation, the City Manager attempted to minimize the information he divulged publicly, being careful not to compromise the City's future bargaining position. During the Council's public discussion of Tract II, there was no mention made by Williford, Knickerbocker, or anyone else of Mr. Vuckovic's two vacant lots, Tracts I and III, nor was there any indication that Williford was interested in pursuing the purchase of those two lots. Knickerbocker did not mention during the meeting that he had knowledge concerning any of the three tracts. After the June 7 Council meeting concluded, Knickerbocker, Williford, and Councilman Hampton walked out together to the parking lot behind city hall. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the three men did discuss the purchase of Tracts I, II, and III. Williford advised Knickerbocker that if the City purchased Tracts I and III, that one of the lots could be used as a compound for confiscated vehicles and the other lot could be used for storing materials. The possible means of financing the vacant lots and the building on Tract II was also discussed. The information concerning the City's interest in purchasing Tracts I and III were divulged to Knickerbocker because of his position as mayor. The post-meeting discussion between Knickerbocker and Williford about Tracts I, II and III took place in the presence of Councilman Hampton but was not a duly noticed public hearing open to the public and recorded as a public meeting. No other persons were present. At no time during the evening of June 7, 1993, did Knickerbocker tell the city manager or any city council member that Mr. Vuckovic was desperate to quickly sell Tracts I and III. Within a few days after June 7, 1993, Knickerbocker tried unsuccessfully to find investors who would be interested in purchasing Tracts I and III. On Thursday, June 10, Knickerbocker called Williford to tell him that Orange Bank now owned Tract II and that Milton West of Orange Bank would be contacting Mr. Williford to discuss selling the building to the City. During his June 10 conversation with Williford, Knickerbocker did not tell Williford that Mr. Vuckovic owned Tracts I and III nor did Knickerbocker tell Williford that Mr. Vuckovic was in a hurry to sell those two lots. On Thursday, June 10, 1993, Knickerbocker told his mother, Dorothy Knickerbocker, that Mr. Vuckovic had two vacant lots adjacent to Tract II that he needed to sell in a hurry and that the two lots were a "very good buy." Knickerbocker further told his mother that the City was interested in purchasing the building between the two lots. No evidence was presented that Knickerbocker directly divulged to his mother that the city was interested in purchasing Tracts I and III. Shortly after his conversation with his mother on June 10, 1993, Knickerbocker called Mr. Vuckovic and negotiated a purchase price of $31,000 each for Tracts I and III. Knickerbocker had agreed with his mother that he would forego his commission on the sale of the property. Knickerbocker drafted two contracts for sale of Tracts I and III, and on Saturday, June 12, 1993, delivered those contracts to his mother for her signature and then to Mr. Vuckovic for his signature. Both signed the contracts in Knickerbocker's presence. On Monday, June 14, 1993, Knickerbocker advised Williford that his mother and brother, Tom Knickerbocker, had contracted to buy Tracts I and III. Prior to his June 14 conversation with the city manager, Knickerbocker had not told the city manager of his family's interest in purchasing Tracts I and III. The night of Monday, June 14, 1993, Knickerbocker asked Councilman Hampton, a surveyor, to survey Tracts I and III. Knickerbocker did not tell Mr. Hampton at that time that Mrs. Knickerbocker and her son, Tom, were buying the property. On Wednesday, June 16, 1993, Knickerbocker delivered the two contracts for sale to Attorney Joseph Scuro so he could take them to closing on June 30, 1993, the closing specified on the contracts. In attempting to bring the sale to closure, Attorney Scuro learned of some significant encumbrances on the property and encountered difficulty in contacting the attorneys of other parties who had interests in the property. Mr. Scuro advised Knickerbocker of the problems that he was having in closing the property sale. On July 9, 1994, Attorney Scuro left a message at Knickerbocker's office that he was withdrawing from representing Knickerbocker's mother in the purchase of Tracts I and III. On July 22, 1994, Mr. Scuro talked with Knickerbocker concerning his withdrawal of representation of Knickerbocker's mother. He advised Knickerbocker that there were problems with encumbrances on the vacant lot and that the contracts to purchase the lots in which the city was interested had become a political issue. At that time, Knickerbocker advised Mr. Scuro that Mrs. Knickerbocker had decided not to buy the two lots. On or about Thursday evening, July 22, Knickerbocker telephoned Williford at his house and told him that his mother had withdrawn her offer to purchase Tracts I and III. On Friday, July 23, 1993, Knickerbocker telephoned the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) office in Tallahassee and sought an opinion from the Commission's staff. He talked with Public Information Officer, Helen Jones and advised her, among other things, that he had told his mother and brother not to buy the lots because of appearances. Knickerbocker also contacted the State Attorney's Office for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit and asked a prosecutor there if it would be possible for the State Attorney to conduct an investigation of his conduct relative to Tracts I and III. On Monday, August 2, 1993, during a regularly scheduled public meeting, the Council approved the contract the city manager had negotiated for the purchase of Tract II.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that David Knickerbocker violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.313(8), Florida Statutes; imposing a civil penalty of $2,000 per allegation ($4,000 total); and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1786EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-31 (Stipulated Findings of Fact): Accepted. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance to the extent that Knickerbocker initiated the discussion initially concerning the building, which led to a discussion of all three tracts. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 10: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 11: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 12-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 19-21: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-23: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25: The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraphs 8-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 11-12: Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 15-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 19: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is accepted in substance to the extent that these may have been things that Knickerbocker considered but rejected to the extent that it implies that he was unaware of the City's interest in purchasing the vacant lots. It is obvious the City's interest in the vacant lots would have an impact on the value of the lots. Paragraphs 23-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: Rejected to the extent that it is representative of the entire conversation between Hampton, Williford, and Knickerbocker. All three men discussed the interest in the purchase of the vacant lots by the city and the financing of such a purchase. Paragraph 26: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Rejected as constituting argument and recitation of testimony. Paragraph 28: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 29: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses the first sentence is rejected. The first portion of the second sentence is accepted in substance. The second portion of the second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 30-32: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 33-34: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 35: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 36: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 37-38: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 39: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 40: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 43: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 44-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 47: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 48: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 50: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 51: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 52: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 53-55: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance to the extent that one of the reasons that Mrs. Knickerbocker did not go through with the transaction was because of the encumbrances on the property, but rejected to the extent that it implies that was the only reason. Tom Knickerbocker testified that his mother told him that one of the reasons she was not going to continue with the purchase was that it did not look good with Knickerbocker running for mayor. Paragraph 57: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance as to what Knickerbocker told Scuro but not to the extent that it implies that that was the only reason she did not continue with the purchase. Paragraph 58: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 59-60: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 61: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, it is rejected. Paragraph 62: The first sentence is accepted in substance that Knickerbocker told Scuro that he was unaware of the City's interest in the vacant lots but rejected to the extent that the statement was true. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I reject the last two sentences. Paragraph 63: The first two sentences are accepted in substance as to what Knickerbocker told Williford, but rejected to the extent that it implies that what Knickerbocker told Williford about being unaware of the City's interests in the lots was true. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 64-65: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 66: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that Ms. Jones relayed the opinion of the attorney who had reviewed her typed notes of the conversation and that the attorney's opinion was based on those notes. It should be noted that the attorney did opine that there would probably be no problem with Section 112.313(8) as long as the information used came from public records or public meetings and that the attorney did not give an opinion concerning Section 112.313(6). Paragraph 67: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 68: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 69: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 70: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Marty E. Moore, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael L. Gore, Esquire 20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Orlando, Florida 32801 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahasee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether Respondent, Andrey Barhatkov, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed Florida real estate sales associate issued License No. 660647 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a sales associate with All American Realty, Inc., 227 North John Young Parkway, Kissimmee, Florida 34741. On or about July 5, 2005, Respondent prepared a residential sale and purchase contract on behalf of a buyer and faxed the contract to Jerome Fortson, who is not a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, broker associate, or broker, for Mr. Fortson to present to the buyer and obtain the buyer's signature. Having obtained the buyer's signature, Mr. Fortson later appeared on behalf of the buyer at the closing. Respondent was not present at the closing. Respondent admitted that he had Mr. Fortson show the real estate property to the buyer, that he had an arrangement with Mr. Fortson to show properties for him, and that Mr. Fortson was to report back to him for follow-up. Respondent acknowledged that Mr. Fortson was a mortgage broker and that they had an informal business referral agreement wherein Mr. Fortson would arrange financing for buyers that he had shown properties. In the course of this activity, Mr. Fortson, who represented himself as a sales representative for the buyer, contacted the listing agent for information regarding the property and showed the property. Respondent never met the buyer. The real estate agent representing the seller was not aware of Respondent's involvement in the transaction until he requested his share of the commission.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final order finding that: (1) Respondent, Andrey Barhatkov, violated Subsections 455.227(1)(j) and 475.42(1)(e), Florida Statutes; Respondent's license as a real estate salesperson be suspended for one year, followed by one year of probation; Respondent be fined $2,000; (4) Respondent be required to attend such remedial ethics and educational courses as are determined appropriate by Petitioner; and (5) Respondent be required to pay the costs of the investigation and prosecution of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division on Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Andrey Barhatkov 408 Pinewood Drive Davenport, Florida 33896 Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated February 5, 2007, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Board is created within the Department of Business and Professional Regulation and is the state agency responsible for regulating and imposing discipline on auctioneers and auction businesses. See §§ 468.384 and 468.189(2), Fla. Stat. At the times material to this matter, the Auction Depot was a licensed auction business in the State of Florida. The auction business license of Auction Depot expired effective November 30, 2007, and has been considered delinquent since December 1, 2007. Anton Rechner was the president of Auction Depot at the times material to this proceeding. Kathy Murphy is the owner of Endless Treasures Estate Sales and Service ("Endless Treasures"). On December 29, 2005, Mrs. Murphy consigned a number of items with Auction Depot for sale at auction. Auction Depot conducted an auction on January 5, 2005, and sold a number of the items Mrs. Murphy had put on consignment on December 29, 2005. On January 6, 2006, Mrs. Murphy picked up from Auction Depot a list of items sold at the auction on January 5, 2005. The list included the items Mrs. Murphy had put on consignment, with the lot numbers for each item, the sales price for each item sold, the Auction Depot's commission for each item sold, and the total due to Mrs. Murphy for each item sold. Among the items shown sold on the list Mrs. Murphy picked up on January 6, 2006, were two mahogany hutches; the sales price was shown as $600.00 for each hutch, and $450.00 was owed to Mrs. Murphy for each hutch. The list Mrs. Murphy picked up on January 6, 2006, also included several items that were not sold at the January 5, 2006, auction, and no sales price or the notation "$0.00" was shown on the list. The total amount owed to Mrs. Murphy stated on the list of items Mrs. Murphy picked up on January 6, 2006, was $4,976.25, on total sales of $6,635.00. Mrs. Murphy did not receive payment of the $4,976.25 from Auction Depot shown on the list she picked up on January 6, 2006. In February 2006, she received a check for $4,113.75, together with a revised list showing that the mahogany hutches had not been sold. Mrs. Murphy was told that the person who purchased the mahogany hutches had not paid for them. On January 10, 2006, Auction Depot picked up additional items from Endless Treasures on consignment. The items were auctioned on January 12, 19, and 26, 2006. A list of the items sold at the January 12, 2006, auction shows that two mahogany "bookcases" were sold for $450.00 each. Mrs. Murphy was at the auction and identified the "bookcases" as the mahogany hutches that she sent to Auction Depot on December 29, 2005. These two items were sold in a telephone auction, but there was no speakerphone, so that the only person who could hear the telephone bids was Mr. Rechner. Mrs. Murphy later saw the hutches for sale in an antique gallery owned by Mr. Rechner. According to the list provided by Auction Depot of the items sold at the January 12, 2006, the gross sales totaled $2,292.50, minus Auction Depot's commission of $573.13, for a total owing to Mrs. Murphy of $1,719.38. Mr. Rechner wrote a check to Endless Treasures for $1,719.38 and gave it to Mrs. Murphy; the check was dated January 12, 2006, but it was not signed, and Mrs. Murphy could not cash it. When she returned to Auction Depot and asked Mr. Rechner to sign the check, he refused with a rude remark and told her that he would see her in court. Mrs. Murphy finally received a check from Auction Depot for the $1,719.38 owed for the items sold on January 12, 2006; the check was dated January 1, 2006, and signed by Mr. Rechner. It was sent to Mrs. Murphy through the Board, after she filed a complaint against Auction Depot. The total amount owning Mrs. Murphy for the items sold on Mrs. Murphy's behalf on January 19 and 26, 2006, was $53.13 and $105.00, respectively. Mrs. Murphy received payment of these amounts in February 2006. A number of the items Mrs. Murphy placed with Auction Depot were not sold at the auctions held on January 5, 12, 19, or 26, 2006. Although Mrs. Murphy and her husband asked several times that Auction Depot return the unsold items, they were told that they had been broken or could not be found. Mrs. Murphy never received the unsold items from Auction Depot. The evidence presented by the Board is sufficient to establish with a high degree of certainty that Mrs. Murphy did not receive payment for the items sold on January 5, 2006, within a reasonable amount of time. The evidence presented is also sufficient to establish with a high degree of certainty that Auction Depot committed acts of bad faith and dishonesty in connection with the sales of Mrs. Murphy's property by not returning unsold items to Mrs. Murphy and by manipulating the sale of the two mahogany hutches for his own benefit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Board of Auctioneers enter a final order finding that Auction Depot violated Section 468.389(1)(e) and (c), Florida Statutes, in connection with the transactions involving Endless Treasures Sales and Service and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2009.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by inducing a seller to enter in a contract for sale of real estate, based on a $50,000.00 earnest money deposit that was never made.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred Marberry, Jr. is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0369879 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Bernon Earl Thomas is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433736 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Fred Marberry was President of Marberry and Mack Development, Inc., and maintained an office in Altamonte Springs, Florida. James Mack was the Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer of the company. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Bernon Thomas was a real estate salesman with General Realty Management Corporation. His office was in Kissimmee, Florida. In 1985, the two Respondents had worked together on the potential sale and development of a multi-family project in Kissimmee. Thomas was aware of the availability of some commercial property in Kissimmee known as Cross Creek that he felt would be a good deal and shared that information with Marberry. Thomas got his information on Cross Creek from Larry Heninger, who was working with the owner, R. S. Futch, in putting together a development package to present to potential buyers and developers. Heninger had expended considerable effort in working with an engineer and permit agencies and had made contacts with a number of businesses interested in locating on the property. The engineering reports, correspondence and figures supplied to Marberry by Thomas indicated that the parcel comprised 14.75 usable acres. There were letters from the City saying that sewage capacity, utilities and similar public services would be based on this amount. Marberry told Thomas that the development package looked good and to continue working on it. Some time in mid-July 1985, Larry Heninger informed Thomas that some third parties were also interested in the Cross Creek property and that if Marberry and Mack, Inc., wanted to present an offer, they would need to do so immediately as Mr. Futch was leaving on a vacation for several weeks. Thomas called Marberry to relay this information. The details of the conversation are in dispute, but it is uncontroverted that Thomas was made a Vice-president of Marberry and Mack, Inc., for the sole purpose of executing a sales contract immediately. Arrangements were made for Thomas to draw up the contract/offer and have it taken to the Orlando airport where R. S. Futch was either leaving or was en route on his vacation. Marberry and Thomas disagree on what was discussed with regard to an escrow deposit. Thomas contends that Marberry authorized him to provide for a $50,000.00 escrow deposit to be held by Fred Marberry, licensed real estate broker upon acceptance of contract. Marberry denies this and claims that he never maintained an escrow account, that escrow funds were always handled by his (Marberry's) attorney. Marberry claims that the day after signing, when he actually saw the contract, he said something to Thomas about his failure to delete the escrow language on the contract form. Thomas denies this. Both Marberry and Thomas agree that all parties should have known that the deposit could not be escrowed upon acceptance, since Marberry was not there for the signing. The contract was prepared and signed by Thomas in Thomas' Kissimmee office and was taken to the Orlando airport. The contract, prepared on the standard Florida Bar and Association of Realtors approved form, provided a purchase price of $1,600,000.00, the $50,000.00 escrow deposit, and closing on August 25, 1985. The contract provided that closing could be extended by the buyer for 30 days with an additional $50,000.00 deposit. The contract contained the following special clauses: Contingent upon financing. Above described property of [sic] being viable to building Comm. Prop. with all necessary zoning and available utilities. [Pet. Ex. #5] At the airport, R. S. Futch accepted the offer by Marberry and Mack, made a few changes on the contract, initialled them and signed the contract; the changes were also initialled by Bernon Thomas. Later Thomas called Marberry and told him about the changes. The morning after the contract was signed, Marberry and Thomas visited Heninger's engineer to review the project. They reviewed the engineering plans and learned that the property was in a floodplain. Drainage was a problem and parking was a problem and it appeared that only 4.3 acres was actually buildable. On leaving the engineer's office Marberry told Thomas that there was no way the project could work; they could never get financing for a $1.6 million parcel of 14.75 acres, with only 4.3 buildable acres. Marberry felt the contingencies in the contract could not be met and the contract was off. Thomas still believed in the project, and since he had already put so much time and effort in it, he wanted to keep working on pulling it together. Marberry did not dissuade him, but said only to keep him informed on what was going on. Thomas told Heninger that Marberry didn't want the contract. Heninger said he wanted the contract to stay intact and encouraged Thomas to keep working on it. He also tried to get Thomas to do the deal himself, but Thomas told him he did not have the funds. Thomas claims that Heninger told him not to worry about the $50,000.00; Heninger denies this. Nothing was communicated in writing regarding the contract being terminated. The $50,000.00 deposit was never made. The deadline for closing passed, and sometime in September 1985, Larry Heninger arranged a meeting between R. S. Futch and Fred Marberry in a motel in Orlando. The purpose of the meeting was to either extend the contract entered in July (according to R. S. Futch), or to negotiate a new contract for the property (according to Fred Marberry). During the meeting Futch was told that no $50,000.00 deposit had been made on the original contract. The meeting apparently terminated and shortly later Futch filed suit for the $50,000.00. The testimony of the principal witnesses in this case: Marberry, Thomas, Futch and Heninger, establish a picture of lack of communication, misunderstanding, bungling, and unprofessionalism. It is impossible to determine from the rambling and disjointed stories of these witnesses, that either Fred Marberry or Bernon Thomas, individually or together, engaged in "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust..."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against both Fred Marberry and Bernon Thomas, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert D. Gatton, Esquire Maitland Center 1051 Winderley Place Maitland, Florida 32751 Bernon Earl Thomas 4226 Match Point Drive Augusta, Georgia 30909 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
