Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.011 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, in violation of section 120.52(8).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, FHBPA, is a Florida not-for-profit corporation created to advance, foster, and promote the sport of thoroughbred horse racing in the State of Florida. FHBPA’s membership includes over 200 Florida-licensed horse trainers and over 5,000 Florida-licensed horse owners, and has associational standing to file and prosecute actions on behalf of its members. Respondent has not challenged FHBPA’s standing to bring this proceeding. Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (PMW), is the state agency charged with the regulation of pari-mutuel wagering in the State of Florida, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapter 550, Florida Statutes. The question to be decided in this proceeding is what the Legislature meant when it amended section 550.2415(7) in 2015, and whether rule 61D-6.011 carries out the legislative directive it contains. Before the 2015 legislative session, section 550.2415 stated, in pertinent part: (3)(a) Upon the finding of a violation of this section, the division may revoke or suspend the license or permit of the violator or deny a license or permit to the violator; impose a fine against the violator in an amount not exceeding $5,000; require the full or partial return or the purse, sweepstakes, and trophy of the race at issue; or impose against the violator any combination of such penalties. The finding of a violation of this section in no way prohibits a prosecution for criminal acts committed. * * * (7)(e) The division may, by rule, establish acceptable levels of permitted medications and shall select the appropriate biological specimens by which the administration of permitted medication is monitored. * * * The division shall adopt rules to implement this section. The rules may include a classification system for prohibited substances and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations. Except as specifically modified by statute or by rules of the division, the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, revised February 14, 1995, as promulgated by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., is hereby adopted by reference as the uniform classification system for class IV and V medications. (Emphasis added). During the 2015 legislative session, the Legislature substantially amended section 550.2415. Ch. 15-88, § 1, Laws of Fla. Not all of the changes made are germane to the challenge at issue here, but the amendments to subsections (3) and (7) are critical: (3)(a) Upon the finding of a violation of this section, the division may revoke or suspend the license or permit of the violator or deny a license or permit to the violator; impose a fine against the violator in an amount not exceeding the purse or sweepstakes earned by the animal in the race at issue or $10,000, whichever is greater; require the full or partial return of the purse, sweepstakes, and trophy of the race at issue; or impose against the violator any combination of such penalties. The finding of a violation of this section does not prohibit a prosecution for criminal acts committed. * * * (7)(a) In order to protect the safety and welfare of racing animals and the integrity of the races in which the animals participate, the division shall adopt rules establishing the conditions of use and maximum concentrations of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances identified in the Controlled Therapeutic Medication Schedule, Version 2.1, revised April 17, 2014, adopted by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. Controlled therapeutic medications include only the specific medications and concentrations allowed in biological samples which have been approved by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., as controlled therapeutic medications. * * * (c) The division rules must include a classification system for drugs and substances and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations which incorporates the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, Version 8.0, revised December 2014, by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. The division shall adopt laboratory screening limits approved by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications, the presence of which in a sample may result in a violation of this section. (Emphasis added). The title page of the ARCI Document states, “Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances and Recommended Penalties and Model Rule.” Each of the remaining pages of the ARCI Document, including those pages that encompass the ARCI Recommended Penalties, identifies the ARCI Document as the “Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances.” The Notes Regarding Classification Guidelines, found at page ii, states that “Where the use of a drug is specifically permitted by a jurisdiction, then the jurisdiction’s rule supersedes these penalty guidelines.” (Emphasis added). Rules 61D-6.011 and 61D-6.008 were amended in 2016, in response to the amendments to section 550.2415. Rule 61D-6.008 addresses permitted medications allowed for horses, and rule 61D- addresses the penalties to be imposed for drug violations. Relevant portions of rule 61D-6.011 provide: The penalties in this rule shall be imposed when the stewards or the Division finds that the following substances have been identified by the state laboratory in a urine sample or blood sample collected from a horse participating in a pari-mutuel event: (a) Any medication listed in subsection 61D-6.008(2), F.A.C. [1.-3. provide penalty ranges for first, second, and third offenses] The penalty for any medication or drug which is not described in subsection (1) above shall be based upon the classification of the medication or drug found in the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, revised December 2014, as promulgated by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., which is hereby incorporated and adopted herein by reference, https://flrules.org/Gateway/ reference.asp?No=Ref-06400, www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/pmw or by contacting the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 2601 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The penalty schedule shall be as follows: Class I substances: First violation of this chapter Second violation of this chapter Third or subsequent violation of this chapter Class II substances: First violation of this chapter $3,000 to $5,000 fine and suspension of license 90 days to one year, or revocation of license; $4,000 to $5,000 fine and suspension of license of no less than one year, or revocation of license. $5,000 to $10,000 fine and revocation of license. $250 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 180 days; Second violation of this chapter Third or subsequent violation of this chapter Class III substances: First violation of this chapter Second violation of this chapter Third or subsequent violation of this chapter Class IV or V substances: First violation of this chapter Second violation of this chapter $500 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license of no less than 180 days, or revocation of license; $1,000 to $5,000 fine and suspension of license of no less than one year, or revocation of license $300 to $500 fine; $500 to $750 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days, or revocation of license; $750 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 180 days, or revocation of license. $100 to $250 fine; $250 to $500 fine and suspension of license zero to 10 days; Third violation of this chapter $500 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 60 days. The Division may consider mitigation or aggravation to deviate from these penalty guidelines. * * * Absent mitigating circumstances, the stewards or the Division shall order the return of any purse, prize, or award from any pari-mutuel event for redistribution when a positive test for a drug or medication described in paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b), (2)(a), or (2)(b) is reported by the state laboratory and confirmed through the hearing process. The stewards or the Division may order the return of any purse, prize, or award for redistribution when the positive test of a drug or medication reported by the state laboratory is not described in paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b), (2)(a), or (2)(b) of this rule. In the event the stewards or Division orders the return of the purse, prize, or award for redistribution as described in this subsection, the reason(s) for the redistribution shall be provided in writing. (Emphasis added). Rule 61D-6.011 varies from the penalty provisions in the ARCI Recommended Penalties in several respects. First, in the drug classification tables in the ARCI Document, which the rule incorporates by reference, there are columns to identify the drug or substance; trade name, if any; drug class; and penalty class. Not all drugs in a drug class are in the same penalty class. For example, all class 1 drugs are in penalty class A, with the exception of cocaine, morphine, and strychnine, which are in penalty class B. The majority of class 2 drugs are also in penalty class A, with the exception of caffeine, carisoprodol, diazepam, hydroxyzine, ketamine, levamisole, lidocaine, mepivacaine, and romifidine, which are in penalty class B. Class 3 drugs are generally split between penalty classes A and B, and class 4 drugs include both penalty classes B and C. Similarly, class 5 drugs are split between penalty classes C and D. It is clear from the text of the ARCI Document that the drug classifications and the penalty guidelines are intended to work together as a comprehensive approach to the impermissible drugging of racing horses. In the Recommended Penalty and Model Rule portion of the ARCI Document, there are separate penalties recommended for licensed trainers and for owners. For trainers, class A penalties include a minimum fine of $10,000 or 10% of the total purse, whichever is greater, absent mitigating circumstances, to a maximum of $25,000 or 25% of the purse with aggravating factors for a first offense. For a second offense in any jurisdiction, the fine amount is $25,000 or 25% of the total purse, whichever is greater, absent mitigating circumstances, and may increase with aggravating circumstances to a maximum of $50,000 or 50% of the purse, whichever is greater. For a third offense in any jurisdiction, the minimum fine is $50,000 or 50% of the total purse, whichever is greater, absent mitigating circumstances, and may increase with aggravating circumstances to a maximum of $100,000 or 100% of the purse, whichever is greater. For owners, the first and second offenses include disqualification and loss of purse. The penalty for a third offense includes disqualification, loss of purse, and a $50,000 fine. For owners and trainers, the monetary penalties may exceed the maximum permitted under section 550.4215(3), which authorizes a fine not exceeding the purse or sweepstakes earned by the animal, or $10,000, whichever is greater. The parties have submitted the House and Senate Bill analyses that address the amendment to section 550.2415 at issue here.1/ The House of Representatives Final Bill Analysis for CS/HB 239 includes the following statements: The bill changes the maximum fine for violations from $5,000 to $10,000 or the amount of the purse, whichever is greater. The bill also reduces the time for the division to begin administrative prosecutions for violations from 2 years to 90 days. The bill requires the division to adopt the Association of Racing Commissioners International (ARCI) rules regarding the medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances given to race animals, including a classification system for drugs that incorporates ARCI’s Penalty Guidelines for drug violations, and updates current methodologies used in testing procedures. . . . * * * Effect of Proposed Changes * * * The bill requires that the penalty schedule for violations must incorporate the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, Version 8.0, revised December 2014, by the ARCI. These guidelines are “intended to assist stewards, hearing offices and racing commissioners in evaluating the seriousness of alleged violations of medication and prohibited substance rules. ” The bill analysis for CS/SB 226 contains similar provisions stating that the ARCI Penalty Guidelines must be incorporated into a rule adopted by Respondent. The penalty guidelines included in rule 61D-6.011 do not incorporate the ARCI Recommended Penalties. The PMW’s website includes a listing of statutes and rules, with links to the rules. Included in that list is a statement that “The Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. ‘Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances and Recommended Penalties and Model Rule’ is adopted and incorporated by rule.” Notwithstanding this statement, the ARCI Recommended Penalties are not incorporated into rule 61D-6.011 or any other rule identified in this proceeding. The rule provides for consideration of a number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, when warranted, that allow for deviation from the identified penalty guidelines. As noted above, rule 61D-6.011(1) refers to the medications listed in rule 61D-6.008. Rule 61D-6.008 provides in pertinent part: Permitted medications for horses: The prescription medications defined in this rule shall be permitted under the conditions set forth to conserve and protect the health of the horse which is entered to race. All such medications shall be procured and administered by a licensed veterinarian, except where a valid prescription or dispensing occurs in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 474, F.S. The following permitted medications at concentrations less than or equal to the following schedule shall not be reported by the racing laboratory to the Division as a violation of Section 550.2415, F.S. [list of medications and concentration levels for each one]. Thus, subsection (1) of rule 61D-6.011 addresses violations where too much of a permitted medication is found in a race day sample, whereas subsection (2) addresses violations based upon prohibited medications. Petitioner presented the testimony of Scott Hay and Edward Martin in support of its contention that the penalty guidelines adopted by PMW are arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Scott Hay is a veterinarian who has worked with thoroughbred racehorses since 1988. He is a member of the American Association of Equine Practitioners, the American Veterinary Medical Association, and the Florida Veterinary Association. He serves as co-chair on the scientific advisory committee for the Racing Medication and Testing Consortium, which worked on the development of the ARCI Document. Dr. Hay was familiar with the ARCI Document and described the process used to determine threshold levels for medications. He testified that the scientific advisory committee relied extensively on the expertise of some of its members to determine the appropriate levels of medications that would be appropriate under the drug classifications. On the other hand, while he is familiar with PMW’s rules and was involved in the rulemaking workshops when the rules were first amended after the 2015 statutory change, he did not believe that he made any comments on these particular rules during that process. He did not provide any testimony that provided information on what methodology PMW used when formulating its penalty guidelines. Mr. Martin works for the Association of Racing Commissioners International as its president and has done so since 2005. He testified that the Racing Medication and Testing Consortium is a consortium of racing industry organizations that advises ARCI and regulatory entities on medication and anti-doping policies. He described the process by which the scientific advisory committee meets and considers recommendations on changes to policies. According to Mr. Martin, the scientific advisory committee relies on the collective judgment of the pharmacologists, chemists, toxicologists, and veterinarians to provide advice and expertise about appropriate public policy. The controlled therapeutic medication schedule is an attempt to provide some consistency in the regulation of some commonly used medications that are considered appropriate for equine care. The schedule recommends a threshold for testing, and only if that threshold is exceeded, is there a violation of the rules of racing. Mr. Martin pointed to the reference in rule 61D-6.011 to rule 61D-6.008. He testified that what “struck him” about the Florida rules is that rule 61D-6.008 encompasses the controlled therapeutic list, but rule 61D-6.011(1) appears to provide the same penalty for any violation of a substance itemized in 61D- 6.008. This treatment is not consistent with ARCI’s penalty schedule, but Mr. Martin did not know whether Florida made a conscious decision to impose a different recommended penalty than what is contained in the ARCI Document, and did not know the intent of the drafters with respect to the rule.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Theodore Lazier, Jr., committed the violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, and dated June 18, 2004, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, certifying individuals for employment or appointment as a law enforcement officer and investigating complaints against individuals holding certificates as law enforcement officers in the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 943.3195, Florida Statutes. At the times pertinent to this matter, Respondent, Theodore Lazier, Jr., was certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 138687 on August 20, 1993. Since being certified, Mr. Lazier as been employed as a correctional officer at the Dade Correctional Institution (hereinafter referred to as the "Correctional Institution"), a state facility. On and between November 14, 1999 and September 24, 2003, Mr. Lazier, while working as a recreational supervisor, brought items declared to be contraband into the Correctional Institution. Those items included movies, candy, razor blades, and one pair of athletic shoes with cleats. When the items of contraband were discovered by Correctional Institution officials, Mr. Lazier admitted bringing the items to the facility, a fact which he also admitted at the final hearing. He also explained why he had introduced the items into the facility and, while his explanation does not exonerate him from the charges in this case and apparently constituted grounds to terminate his employment at the facility, his explanation at least dispelled any thought that he had introduced the items for any purpose other than assisting him in the discharge of his duties. As for the movies, Mr. Lazier testified convincingly and without any evidence to the contrary being offered by the Commission that he had been given specific permission to show movies to inmates as long as those movies did not contain sex or violence. That permission was given by the individual who served as warden prior to the current warden's employment. The candy consisted of small pieces of primarily hard candy which Mr. Lazier used to reward inmates that assisted him as "aides" and other inmates who gave him "thoughts for the day." The razor blades, which are the most troublesome items of contraband he brought into the facility, were used by inmates, under Mr. Lazier's supervision to work on sports equipment, like the weight-lifting benches. The razor blades were collected, accounted for, and stored under lock and key after their use. Finally, the one pair of shoes introduced into the facility by Mr. Lazier was used by inmates participating in football. The bringing of the items of contraband into the Correctional Institution, other than the movies, constituted an act which would constitute a felony offense as specified in Section 944.47(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Commission finding that Theodore Lazier, Jr., violated Section 943.1395(7); dismissing the allegation that he violated Section 943.1395(6); and suspending his certification for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore Lazier, Jr. 225856 South West 132d Court Naranja, Florida 33032 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Jeffrey D. Ahl, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0155081. The last license issued was as a broker-salesperson, c/o Data Pak Systems & Services, Inc., 1050 South Federal Highway, Delray Beach, Florida 33483. On September 12, 1991, respondent was found guilty of eleven counts of lewd assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes. The Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, adjudicated the respondent guilty on each count and committed the respondent to the Palm Beach County Jail for a term of 364 days, followed by a term of probation of 10 years. Notwithstanding his conviction on September 12, 1991, it was not until March 13, 1992, that respondent, through his attorney, informed petitioner of his conviction of the aforesaid felony. According to respondent, whose testimony is credited, the myriad of personal problems that befell him during this time period, including the remorse he was suffering, his divorce, a foreclosure, and his conviction, preoccupied his mind such that he overlooked his obligation to notify petitioner upon his conviction. Notably, respondent did not practice such profession following his conviction, and upon receipt of the renewal notice for his broker's license immediately recognized his oversight and had his attorney promptly inform petitioner of his conviction. Respondent served eight months and one week of his 364-day sentence in the Palm Beach County Jail, and was released from custody in May 1992. Currently, pursuant to the court's commitment order, respondent is on probation for a term of 10 years, the first year of which he is under community control. So controlled, respondent is required to report to his probation officer every Monday and secure approval of his weekly schedule of activities. Except for work, church and two hours of shopping each week, respondent is confined to his residence. Following successful completion of community control, respondent will be on a more relaxed form of probation, with monthly reporting to his probation officer. The court's commitment order further required that respondent continue psychological/psychiatric treatment, pay any medical expenses for his daughter's psychological/psychiatric treatment, and remain current on his child support payments. Respondent has duly abided by such obligations. The offense for which respondent stood convicted involved the touching and fondling of his daughter during times when he believed her to be asleep. Such activity occurred during the period of time she was 9 to 13 years of age, and ceased in approximately 1986, when respondent realized his daughter knew what was occurring. Disclosure of his activities apparently occurred in September 1990, during the course of his divorce proceedings. Upon disclosure of what had occurred, respondent was referred by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to Helen Bush, a marriage, family and sex therapist, for counseling. Since such initial referral in September 1990, respondent has been regularly and responsibly counseled through Ms. Bush, except for that period of time in which he was incarcerated. In the opinion of Ms. Bush, which is credited, respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, regressed pedophilia, which, precipitated by stress, was the cause for his misconduct towards his daughter. Such disorders are treatable and where, as here, the offender is genuinely remorseful about what occurred, has the motivation to rehabilitate himself, and the support of his family, the likelihood of respondent being successfully treated is great. Currently, respondent has remarried, and continues to fulfill his responsibilities to continue treatment and to remain current in his support obligations. It is respondent's desire to once again practice as a real estate broker so that he might reasonably support his new family, as well as remain current with his obligations, and he would like to associate himself with William W. Harris, another licensed real estate broker. Mr. Harris testified at hearing, is aware of respondent's conviction, and is most amenable to respondent being associated with his office. Considering the quality of proof offered in this case, it is found that, notwithstanding respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, respondent possesses the requisite honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, good character and good reputation for fair dealing required for licensure as a real estate broker. In reaching such conclusion the seriousness of the offense with which respondent stands convicted has not been overlooked; however, neither has the fact that the conduct which precipitated such offense had its genesis in a psychiatric disorder that is treatable and that respondent is currently experiencing success in such treatment. Under such circumstances, respondent's conviction does not detract from the conclusion that he possesses those worthy attributes of honesty, trustworthiness and fair dealing the public is entitled to expect when dealing with a real estate broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered finding respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes, not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(n), Florida Statutes, and imposing the penalty set forth in paragraph 18, supra. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of September 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September 1992.
The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether the crimes of which Respondent was convicted are directly related to the practice of medicine. If so, it will be necessary to determine an appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Algirdas Krisciunas, M.D., was licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida. His office was located in Broward County. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed physicians such as Dr. Krisciunas. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. Exercising its prosecutorial authority, the Department has charged Dr. Krisciunas with one such offense, namely, being tried and found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of medicine. It is an undisputed fact that, on October 13, 2010, in a case styled United States v. Krisciunas, No. 0:10-6007-CR- DIMITROULEAS-001, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered a judgment of conviction which adjudicated Dr. Krisciunas guilty of five counts of unlawfully dispensing oxycodone, a narcotic pain medication, and one count of conspiring to distribute oxycodone. Based on this conviction, the court sentenced Dr. Krisciunas to a term of 97 months' incarceration in a federal prison. At the time of the final hearing in this case, Dr. Krisciunas was serving his sentence in the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. The crimes of which Dr. Krisciunas was convicted are directly related to the practice of medicine——a fact that Dr. Krisciunas concedes is true. Because it is undisputed that Dr. Krisciunas was convicted of crimes that directly relate to the practice of medicine, the conduct which gave rise to Dr. Krisciunas's conviction is relevant only for the limited purpose of determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed in this proceeding. In this regard, the undersigned finds that the principal events which gave rise to Dr. Krisciunas's conviction occurred on July 13, 2009; August 6, 2009; and September 9, 2009. On each of these dates, Detective William Schwartz of the Broward County Sheriff's Office, working undercover, presented to Dr. Krisciunas as "Bill Rix." During each visit, Dr. Krisciunas gave "Bill Rix" prescriptions for oxycodone and the anxiolytic alprazolam despite the absence of any legitimate medical justification for prescribing these medications. "Bill Rix" (Detective Schwartz) paid Dr. Krisciunas's staff in cash for the drugs, which he received in Dr. Krisciunas's office at the conclusion of each visit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Krisciunas guilty the offense described in section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, i.e., being convicted of a crime that directly relates to the practice of medicine. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine revoke Dr. Krisciunas's medical license and impose an administrative fine of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 2011.
