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JOHNNY L. TORRENCE vs HENDRICK HONDA DAYTONA, 14-005506 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Nov. 19, 2014 Number: 14-005506 Latest Update: May 26, 2015

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Johnny L. Torrence, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Hendrick Honda Daytona, on account of his race or his age in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is African-American. There was no direct evidence of Petitioner’s age. However, Petitioner worked at the automobile dealership currently owned by Respondent since October 1987. During Petitioner’s questioning of Mr. Moreford, Petitioner indicated that the two had worked together at the dealership for virtually that entire period, beginning when they were 18 years of age, a statement with which Mr. Moreford appeared to agree. Thus, a reasonable inference can be drawn that Petitioner is more than 40 years of age. Respondent owns and operates an automobile dealership located in Daytona Beach, Florida, having purchased the dealership in September 2011. Respondent is part of a larger group of dealerships, with its corporate offices, including that of its human resources department, located in Charlotte, North Carolina. Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was initially employed by Respondent in October 1987. He worked as a detailer for some period, and more recently was employed as a lot attendant. His duties were generally to greet customers and take vehicle information, and move vehicles from place to place as needed by sales and maintenance personnel. On May 2, 2013, a customer brought his vehicle to Respondent for maintenance. The customer was a former employee of Respondent, and was known by Petitioner. The customer was initially met by an advisor other than Petitioner. The customer asked that his vehicle mileage be listed on the service ticket as 1,000 miles less than its actual mileage.2/ Recording a vehicle’s mileage as anything other than its actual mileage is contrary to Respondent’s policies. Thus, the request was refused. Petitioner was assigned to deliver the customer’s vehicle and paperwork to the service lane. After having his request to reduce the vehicle’s mileage on the service ticket refused, the customer asked Petitioner to do the same. Petitioner complied with the request, scratched through the correct mileage written on the service ticket, and wrote in the lower mileage requested by the customer. Upon delivery of the service ticket to the service lane manager, the scratched- through mileage was noticed. Petitioner was asked whether the mileage he had written on the ticket was correct, to which he replied in the affirmative. The vehicle’s mileage was subsequently confirmed as being 1,000 miles more than that written by Petitioner. Petitioner was called into a meeting by Respondent’s management to explain the situation. Petitioner explained that he only did what the customer wanted him to do -- a variant of “the customer is always right.” As a result of his action, Petitioner was given a written reprimand. Based on the testimony of Mr. Moreford, it was determined that the Employee Counseling Report was a business record as defined in section 90.802(6). In late September 2013, a customer brought her vehicle in to Respondent for two new tires. Her old tires were removed and taken to the dealership’s holding area, at which all used tires are marked for identification and collected for delivery to a used tire recycling facility. Respondent does not allow employees to take used tires from the holding area. After the customer’s new tires were mounted, the customer indicated that she wanted one of her old tires for use as a spare. An employee was sent to the holding area to retrieve one of the tires. Since the tires are marked, there would have been no mistaking them. After a search, the employee was unable to locate the used tires. Several employees, including Petitioner, were asked if they knew the whereabouts of the used tires. Petitioner admitted that his sister needed better tires on her car, and that he had given the customer’s used tires to her. Petitioner was instructed to retrieve the tires and return them so they could be provided to the customer. Petitioner left the premises to retrieve the tires. After having waited a reasonable period of time for Petitioner to return, Respondent was compelled to give the customer a new tire from its inventory for her to use as her spare. After the customer left, Petitioner returned to the dealership with two used tires that were not the ones removed from the customer’s vehicle. On or about October 2, 2013, Petitioner was called into a meeting with the service lane manager, Mr. Sandrowicz, along with Dale Lockwood and Ralph Moreford. Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Moreford had worked at the dealership, under its current and prior owners, for most if not all of the years of Petitioner’s employment. During the meeting, the attendees discussed the incident with the tires, which was a violation of Respondent’s policies. Petitioner stated that a younger Caucasian employee, Brandon Swift, had done the same thing without repercussions. Nonetheless, Mr. Moreford advised Petitioner that he was terminated from employment as a result of the incident. On October 7, 2013, Petitioner was provided with a Separation Report describing the incident and its consequences. Based on the testimony of Mr. Moreford, it was determined that the Separation Report was a business record as defined in section 90.802(6). After the meeting was over, Mr. Swift was asked if he had taken any tires from the used tire holding area. Mr. Swift denied that he had done so. The used tire holding area was searched, and the tires alleged to have been taken by Mr. Swift were located. Petitioner speculated that Mr. Swift may have returned the allegedly purloined tires in time to avoid detection, though there was no support for that supposition. Thus, Mr. Swift is not a useful comparator of any dissimilar disciplinary action based on race or age. Mr. Moreford and Mr. Lockwood testified that Petitioner’s race and age had no bearing on the decision to terminate Petitioner. Rather, they testified credibly that the decision was based solely on the fact that Petitioner had violated company policy after having recently received a written warning for a different violation. Mr. Lockwood knew of no employee other than Petitioner having taken used tires. Petitioner identified no instance of any racially disparaging comments directed at himself or any other employee by anyone affiliated with Respondent. Petitioner identified no instance of any ill-treatment directed at him due to his age. Petitioner identified two instances in addition to that involving Mr. Swift that he believed support his claim of discrimination. For some period of time, “J.D.” was Respondent’s service manager. Petitioner did not like the way J.D. talked to him. On one occasion, J.D. came to the back of the shop area and said all of the employees gathered there were “ignorant and stupid.” The group of employees included three African- Americans and one or two Caucasians. In Petitioner’s view, J.D. was generally unpleasant to everyone. Thus, Petitioner’s testimony supports a finding that J.D.’s disagreeable nature was visited equally on all subordinate employees regardless of race or age. As a second comparator, Petitioner alleged that Respondent’s African-American employees were charged for washing their cars at Respondent’s car wash, while Caucasian employees washed their cars, trucks, boats, and motorcycles free of charge. There was no corroborating evidence for Petitioner’s statement and, standing alone, it is insufficient to support a finding that such occurred. Furthermore, the allegation, even if proven, was not so similar to that forming the basis for the adverse employment action as to provide a useful comparison. Petitioner argued that “it wasn’t right the way they fired me.” He asserted that Respondent should have given him a written warning for the tire incident rather than firing him. While the act of taking two used tires that, but for the customer’s request to keep one as a spare, would have been destined for a recycling facility seems a relatively minor infraction, it was nonetheless a violation of Respondent’s policies. More to the point, regardless of the severity of the infraction and the perceived fairness of the sanction, Respondent’s decision to fire Petitioner was not based on racial animus or age bias. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race or age. Rather, the decision was based on Petitioner’s decision to take two tires from Respondent’s used tire holding area in violation of Respondent’s policies, and his eventual return to the dealership with two tires that were not those taken. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that persons who were not African-American or were under the age of 40 were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Hendrick Honda Daytona, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Johnny L. Torrence, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00303. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2015.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.10760.1190.802
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CLINTON E. POWELL vs ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 92-002098 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Apr. 02, 1992 Number: 92-002098 Latest Update: Aug. 05, 1993

The Issue Whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice.

Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1992, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the date, time, and place for the formal administrative hearing. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner and his counsel at the addresses listed in the Petition for Relief and accompanying information. Petitoner's attorney appeared at the hearing. However, even though Petitioner received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Petitioner did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Respondent was present at the hearing. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned or his attorney that he would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. Petitioner was allowed fifteen minutes to appear at the hearing. As a consequence of Petitoner's failure to appear, no evidence was presented to support Petitioner's case. Specifically, no evidence of discrimination based on handicap or race was forthcoming. Therefore, Petitioner's attorney was advised that the Petition for Relief would be dismissed and a Recommended Order entered recommending the Commission do likewise.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Allen, Esquire 322 West Cervantes Street P.O. Box 12322 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Margaret A. Jones Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1992.

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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ADRIAN RICO vs DILLARD'S, 17-001550 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 14, 2017 Number: 17-001550 Latest Update: Apr. 12, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s (“Dillard’s”), discriminated against Petitioner based upon his national origin or disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).2/

Findings Of Fact Dillard’s is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Dillard’s is a department store chain. Petitioner, a Mexican male, was hired as a sales associate in the men’s department of Dillard’s store at Tallahassee’s Governor’s Square Mall on May 13, 2014. Petitioner’s job was to sell men’s fragrances directly to customers at the store. Allen Gustason was manager of the Dillard’s store at Governor’s Square Mall during the time Petitioner was employed there. Dee Thomas was the assistant store manager. Mark Kronenberger, who testified at the final hearing, was the men’s department sales manager and was Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the entire time that Petitioner worked at Dillard’s. Petitioner started at a salary of $12.00 per hour as a sales associate. His job performance and pay increases were assessed primarily on the basis of sales. On January 6, 2015, Petitioner received a raise to $12.60 per hour. On April 14, 2015, Petitioner was promoted to the position of fragrance specialist and received a raise to $14.50 per hour. Petitioner’s promotion did not change his basic duties, i.e., direct sales to customers. Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s ended on November 28, 2015. Dillard’s did not dispute Petitioner’s testimony that he was a good and effective salesperson. Petitioner developed a regular clientele of Spanish-speaking customers who liked his ability to communicate with them in their native language. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received, read, and agreed to abide by Dillard’s Associate Work Rules and General Policies, which among other things forbade insubordination by sales associates. “Insubordination” was defined to include failure to follow lawful instructions from a supervisor and engaging in contemptuous or taunting conduct that undermines the authority of management. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Petitioner claims that he is a Mexican male with a disability. The claimed disability is the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Dillard’s did not dispute that Petitioner has HIV. Petitioner claims that he was harassed by fellow employees because of his Mexican national origin. Petitioner claims that he complained to his supervisors, Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Gustason, about the harassment. Petitioner claims that no effective action was taken to curb the harassment. Petitioner described a pervasive sense of discrimination at Dillard’s of which he became conscious only after about a year of working there. He testified that he is from California and had no real concept of being discriminated against because of his Mexican heritage. It took some time for him to realize and acknowledge to himself that it was happening. However, Petitioner was unable to describe many specific instances of discriminatory behavior by fellow employees. People were “mean,” or “picked on me,” or “didn’t like me,” but few of Petitioner’s complaints pointed toward racial discrimination as opposed to personal dislike. He complained that co-workers planned parties and get-togethers away from work but never asked him along, even for Mr. Kronenberger’s birthday party, but could only speculate as to the reason for his exclusion. Petitioner testified that he was an aggressive and successful salesperson. While its salespeople are assigned to specific departments, Dillard’s allows them to cross-sell in other departments. Several of the incidents described by Petitioner began when he took customers to other departments to sell them something. The undersigned infers that at least some of the bad feelings toward Petitioner were due to his perceived “poaching” of sales from other sections of the store. Petitioner testified that an employee named Carol would yell at him, apparently without provocation, so consistently that he went out of his way to avoid crossing her path. Petitioner stated that one day Carol screamed that he was good-for-nothing and was a “damn Mexican,” in front of customers and co-workers. Petitioner testified that he had no idea why she did this because he had done nothing to provoke her. He walked away, covering his ears from her abuse. Petitioner testified that he went upstairs and spoke to Mr. Gustason about the incident but that nothing was done. Petitioner stated that he returned to the sales floor. Other employees told him that Carol had worked for Dillard’s for many years and was a friend of Mr. Gustason and that he should not expect anything to be done about her behavior. Petitioner testified that an employee named Eric, who worked in the men’s department, made fun of his accent, particularly Petitioner’s difficulty in pronouncing “Saturday.” Petitioner testified that another fellow employee, a white woman named Amber who also worked in fragrance, was constantly rude and mean to him. In front of customers, Amber would say that she did not know why Petitioner was there, that he was only good for cleaning the counters. Petitioner repeatedly complained to Mr. Kronenberger about Amber. Mr. Kronenberger told him to continue doing a good job and not to focus on Amber. Petitioner stated that Mr. Kronenberger directed Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter, but she ignored the order and continued to harass him. Petitioner stated that matters came to a head when he was helping some female customers and went to Amber’s counter one day. He reached behind her to get the fragrance the customers wanted and Amber struck him with her elbow. The customers were aghast and complained to Dillard’s management despite Petitioner’s entreaties that they let the matter drop. Petitioner and Amber were called to the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Yami Yao, the manager of women’s cosmetics. Amber denied everything. The supervisors told Petitioner and Amber to get along. They told Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter. Petitioner testified that Amber ignored the instruction and continued to harass him. Petitioner testified that on another day he was approached by a customer who wanted to pay Petitioner for a pair of shoes. Petitioner testified that he asked Mr. Kronenberger about it, because he did not want to steal a sale or anger anyone. Mr. Kronenberger told him that he was there to sell and that cross-selling was fine. As Petitioner was completing the sale, an older white man working in the shoe department threw a shoe at Petitioner and said, “You damn Mexican, I’m going to raise hell against you.” Petitioner testified about an altercation with Risa Autrey, a fragrance model who worked in Dillard’s and who Petitioner stated was another longtime friend of Mr. Gustason. One day, Ms. Autrey approached Petitioner--again, with zero provocation, according to Petitioner--and began berating him, saying that she had no idea why Dillard’s kept Petitioner around. This occurred in front of co-workers and customers. The customers went upstairs and complained to Mr. Gustason, who followed up by admonishing Petitioner to stop telling people to complain to him because nothing was going to come of it. Petitioner testified that a day or so after the incident with Ms. Autrey, he met with Mr. Gustason and Mr. Thomas.4/ During the course of this meeting, Petitioner disclosed his HIV status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Gustason’s attitude towards him changed immediately, and that Mr. Gustason had him fired two weeks later on a pretextual charge of stealing and insubordination. Petitioner testified that he got sick a few days before Black Friday, which in 2015 was on November 27. When he returned to work on November 25, he attempted to give Mr. Gustason a doctor’s note that would have entitled Petitioner to paid leave, but Mr. Gustason would not talk to him. Petitioner worked a long shift on Black Friday. On Saturday, November 28, 2015, he was called to Mr. Thomas’s office about an altercation he had on November 25 with Ms. Yao, the woman’s cosmetics manager. Mr. Kronenberger was also in the office. Petitioner testified that Mr. Thomas accused him of stealing, as well as insubordination to Ms. Yao, and fired him. Two mall security officers, the Dillard’s security officer, and Mr. Kronenberger escorted Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner testified that he was given no paperwork to memorialize his firing or the reasons therefor. Mr. Kronenberger testified at the final hearing. He testified that Petitioner constantly complained about someone not liking him or picking on him. Petitioner never gave him specifics as to what happened. Mr. Kronenberger stated that Petitioner never complained about racial slurs or that any of his alleged mistreatment had a discriminatory element. It was always, “This person doesn’t like me.” Petitioner had issues with tardiness and absenteeism throughout his employment with Dillard’s. Mr. Kronenberger testified that there would be days when Petitioner simply would not show up for work, or would send a text message to Mr. Kronenberger saying that he had things to do or someone he had to meet. Employment records submitted by Dillard’s supported the contention that Petitioner was frequently late for, or absent from, work. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner was erratic in his communications. Petitioner would send a text message saying he could not come in. Then he would send a text telling Mr. Kronenberger how happy he was to have the job. Mr. Kronenberger recalled once receiving a text from Petitioner at midnight that read, “I know I’ve been bad.” In November 2015, Petitioner had six unexcused absences, including four consecutive days from November 21 through 24. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner finally admitted that he needed to cut his hours in order to qualify for some form of public assistance. Mr. Gustason told Petitioner that something could be worked out to cut his hours, but that just not showing up for work was unfair to Mr. Kronenberger and the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Dillard’s would normally terminate an employee with six unexcused absences in one month under the heading of job abandonment. He stated that Mr. Gustason bent over backward to work with Petitioner and keep him on the job. When Petitioner was absent, Mr. Gustason would leave messages for him, asking him to call and let him know what was going on. During the string of November absences, Mr. Kronenberger phoned Petitioner, who said that he was afraid to come into work for fear that Mr. Gustason would fire him. Mr. Kronenberger assured Petitioner that Mr. Gustason had no such intent, but that in any event no one would have to fire him because he had not been to work in a week. Petitioner was effectively “firing himself” by abandoning his position. Petitioner showed up for work on November 25, 2015, at 4:50 p.m. He had been scheduled to come in at 9:45 a.m. Mr. Kronenberger testified that he was not present for Petitioner’s altercation with Ms. Yao, but that Ms. Yao reported she had attempted to counsel Petitioner about gifts with purchases. The promotional gifts were to be given away only with the purchase of certain items, but Petitioner was apparently disregarding that restriction and giving the gifts with non-qualifying purchases. Ms. Yao told Mr. Kronenberger that Petitioner quickly escalated the counseling into a shouting match in front of customers and co-workers. He yelled, “You’re not going to talk to me that way.” Ms. Yao told Petitioner that she worked in another department and did not have to deal with his antics. She told him that she was going to report the matter to Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas.5/ Mr. Kronenberger testified that his conversation with Ms. Yao was brief because there was no need to give many particulars. He was used to getting reports of employee run-ins with Petitioner and did not need much explanation to get the gist of what had happened. Mr. Kronenberger decided not to raise the issue with Petitioner on Black Friday, the busiest day of the year at the store. On the next day, November 28, Petitioner was called into the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas. Mr. Kronenberger testified that this meeting was not just about the incident with Ms. Yao but also Petitioner’s absences. In Mr. Kronenberger’s words, “[I]t was to follow up with the incident with Yami, and it was to follow up with, ‘Hey, you’ve just missed a week, you’ve been back a day, and you’re having this blow-up with a manager on the floor.’ Like, ‘What’s going on?’” Mr. Kronenberger testified that neither he nor Mr. Thomas went into this meeting with any intention of terminating Petitioner’s employment. However, two minutes into the conversation, Petitioner was on his feet, pointing fingers, and shouting that he knew what they were trying to do and he was not going to let them do it. He was quitting. Petitioner walked out of the office. Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Kronenberger to walk Petitioner out of the store so that there would be no incidents on the floor with the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger accompanied Petitioner to the fragrance area, where Petitioner retrieved some personal items, then walked him to the door. They shook hands and Petitioner left the store. Mr. Kronenberger was firm in his testimony that no security personnel were involved in removing Petitioner from the store. Petitioner was not accused of stealing. His parting with Mr. Kronenberger was as cordial as it could have been under the circumstances.6/ After Petitioner left his office, Mr. Thomas prepared a “Separation Data Form” confirming Petitioner’s dismissal for “violation of company work rules.” The specific ground stated for Petitioner’s dismissal was violation of the Associate Work Rule forbidding insubordination. Mr. Kronenberger testified that in his mind the “insubordination” included not just the scene with Ms. Yao, but the explosion Petitioner had in the meeting with Mr. Thomas. At the time of Petitioner’s dismissal, Mr. Kronenberger was unaware of Petitioner’s HIV status. Mr. Kronenberger credibly testified that Petitioner’s HIV status had nothing to do with his dismissal from employment at Dillard’s. Mr. Gustason, who apparently was aware of Petitioner’s HIV status, was not at work on November 28, 2015, and was not involved in the events leading to Petitioner’s dismissal. Mr. Thomas, the assistant store manager, made the decision to treat Petitioner’s situation as a dismissal for cause.7/ Mr. Kronenberger’s testimony is credited regarding the circumstances of Petitioner’s dismissal and as to the general tenor of Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s. Petitioner was constantly in the middle of conflicts, but never alleged until after his termination that these conflicts were due to his national origin or disability. Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was extremely emotional. He cried frequently and seemed baffled that Mr. Kronenberger was disputing his testimony. The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s version of events was genuine in the sense that it conveyed Petitioner’s subjective experience of his employment as he recollected it. However, the undersigned must also find that Petitioner’s subjective experience did not conform to objective reality. However, Petitioner internalized the experiences, it is not plausible that Dillard’s employees were yelling at Petitioner without provocation, hitting him, throwing shoes at him, and calling him a “damn Mexican” in front of customers. It is not plausible that Petitioner’s superiors would ignore such flagrant discriminatory behavior when it was brought to their attention. Petitioner’s feelings about the motives of his co-workers and superiors cannot substitute for tangible evidence of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner offered the testimony of two Dillard’s customers, neither of whom saw behavior from Petitioner’s co- workers that could be attributed to anything beyond personal dislike or sales poaching. Santiago Garcia testified that he noted other Dillard’s employees rolling their eyes at Petitioner, but he thought the reason might be that Petitioner talked too loud. Mr. Garcia also saw “bad looks” from other employees and believed that the atmosphere among Dillard’s employees was “tense,” but did not offer a reason for the tension. Claudia Pimentel testified, through a Spanish language interpreter, that she always went directly to Petitioner because she speaks only Spanish and Petitioner was able to help her. Ms. Pimentel noted that a female Dillard’s employee got mad at Petitioner because he sold Ms. Pimentel a cream from her counter. During the years 2015 and 2016, the Dillard’s store in Governor’s Square Mall terminated two other sales associates for insubordination. Neither of these sales associates was Mexican. One was a black female and the other was a black male. Neither of these sales associates had a known disability at the time of termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by Dillard’s for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s national origin or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s discriminated against him because of his national origin or his disability in violation of section 760.10.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s, did not commit any unlawful employment practices, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.02760.10760.50
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LYNELL CAMPBELL-METCALFE vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 00-004764 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 29, 2000 Number: 00-004764 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 2004

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent was discriminated against by the Petitioner based upon reasons of her gender, on an alleged violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a female who was employed by the Florida Department of Education (Department), the Respondent in this case. She was employed in a temporary position in late 1995 through early 1996. The Petitioner had been a participant in a program designed to provide an opportunity for those receiving public assistance to obtain employment. The Petitioner volunteered to work for the Respondent, which is an agency of the State of Florida, in 1995. Jerry Moore was the Respondent's personnel director at that time. He oversaw the activities of several volunteers working as a part of that program. At that time the Department's mail room was short of staff members and the Petitioner was placed in an emergency position, working in the mailroom of the Department. Robert Lane was the "lead worker" in the mail room at that time. An emergency position is a time-limited position. That is, the position had a definite expiration date after which the occupant of the position cannot be employed any longer in that position. The Petitioner's duties included making deliveries and pickups at the Capitol Building and the main agency location in the Turlington Building in Tallahassee. Her duties involved picking up, delivering, and processing outgoing mail. The Petitioner stated to her co-workers on at least one occasion, in the presence of Mr. Lane, that "a man should be lifting these heavy boxes." Another female employee, Veronica Thomas, did much the same work that male employees did. Ms. Thomas has worked in the mailroom for approximately 14 years and her current position of senior clerk requires her to lift heavy weights, depending on the type of mail that has come in for the day. That includes lifting heavy boxes and assisting co-workers when the mailroom is short-handed. She has not been adversely treated by her supervisor for asking male co-workers to assist her in lifting extremely heavy boxes. While the Petitioner was working in the emergency position, she applied for an advertised vacant Motor Vehicle Operator position in the mailroom. Approximately 20 people applied for that position. The job description for that position included delivering and picking up mail and packages. Ultimately Terrance Anderson, a male, was selected for that position. Witness Robert Lane assisted in the decision for hiring for that position, but Bureau Chief Don Griesheimer made the final decision to hire Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson had prior experience working for the Department and working in the mailroom. He worked as a warehouse clerk with the Department from 1989 through 1992, with duties that included assisting in the Department's mailroom "by stamping mail, delivery of incoming and outgoing mail." He also worked for the Department in the mailroom in a temporary position as a Motor Vehicle Operator for two months in 1994. His duties included posting, delivering, and picking up mail at that time. Mr. Moore spoke with the Petitioner when she was notified that her time-limited emergency position was about to end and he discussed with her the fact that another individual had been selected for the Motor Vehicle Operator position. He offered to find another position for her with the Department, such as an OPS or "other personnel services" position. Contrary to the Petitioner's contention, the Respondent attempted to locate another position for the Petitioner with the Department prior to her filing of the charge of discrimination. The search for an alternative position for her was not done as a means of acknowledgement that the Department had wrongfully terminated or failed to hire the Petitioner for the position that Mr. Anderson secured, but as a way of carrying out its general policy to assist those whose jobs have expired in finding alternative employment. Ultimately the Petitioner chose to refuse the OPS job. The Petitioner's assertion that Mr. Lane spoke about her negatively "behind her back" was not corroborated by other witnesses or evidence. In fact, the Petitioner admitted that she did not hear Mr. Lane make such statements. Other employees stated that the Petitioner "complained a lot." The Petitioner's assertions that Mr. Lane did not hire her because she was a woman or because he did not believe that a woman could lift heavy weights are not supported by the evidence. Mr. Lane's concerns were about having to stop to help the Petitioner with regard to items or packages that were not excessively heavy and that the Petitioner could have easily lifted. He did not expect employees to pick up packages by themselves, if they were excessively heavy, but did expect them to handle packages of manageable sizes. The Petitioner, however, did not appear to always be willing to lift even small or light weight packages. In particular, Mr. Lane established an instance where the Petitioner picked up packages from the Capitol Building, drove to the Turlington Building in the vicinity of the mailroom, and then asked another employee to help her bring the packages into the building. She apparently contended that they were excessively heavy. Mr. Lane weighed the packages later and found that most of them were in the range of 15 or 20 pounds. Several female employees have worked in the mailroom and their gender has not been a consideration when making hiring decisions. They have handled most of the packages with relative ease, and when they required assistance from male (or female) employees in handling heavier packages, there is no evidence that their need to do so has resulted in any discriminatory treatment of them on account of their gender or otherwise.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2004.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.10760.1195.11
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IAN SIMPSON vs AUTO NATION/COURTESY CHEVROLET, 11-000641 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 09, 2011 Number: 11-000641 Latest Update: Mar. 25, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner because of his age and in retaliation for complaining about age discrimination, or whether, instead, Respondent had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner that was not a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a male whose date of birth is June 23, 1958. Petitioner completed high school and had specialized training in welding. He has been working since he was 14 years old and has a varied employment history. Before 2006, Petitioner was a welder for a few months with Gencor Industries. He left that position because of what he described as unsafe working conditions. Before working for Gencor, he was a warehouse manager and shop foreman for Structural Waterproofing, but was terminated when he had a disagreement with the boss. Before that job, he was self- employed in construction and photography. In 2006, Petitioner was hired as a sales consultant with the Holler Classic Group, a car dealership. Petitioner had never had a job in car sales previously, but had worked as a travel agent for 13 years. He explained that there was no money to be made in travel anymore, but he heard that there was money to be made in car sales, so he thought he would try it. Petitioner left Holler Classic after about two years, because he found it was getting hard to compete against salespersons who he claimed "were being given deals by management." Petitioner was hired on July 11, 2008, as a sales associate at Courtesy Chevrolet on West Colonial in Orlando. Courtesy Chevrolet is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act and is a subsidiary of Respondent AutoNation. Petitioner was hired by Courtesy Chevrolet as an at-will employee. The terms of his employment were that he would be paid by commissions earned on car sales and would be given a draw against commissions so that there would be compensation in case there were periods of low sales. According to Petitioner, there was no fixed amount of cars he had to sell, except that, as he acknowledged, "[y]our commissions had to outdo your draw[.]" In other words, Petitioner understood that while the draw might cover an occasional low-sales month, there could not be continual low-sales months such that earned commissions were not sufficient to cover the draw. Petitioner also testified that shortly after he started at Courtesy Chevrolet, in August 2008, the manufacturer, General Motors (GM) imposed a rule that required car salesmen to sell at least six cars per month. Petitioner testified that he was aware this rule went into effect in August 2008, but that he did not think that the new rule applied to him, because he believed he was under the "old system." No evidence was presented to establish that certain car salespersons were allowed to continue under an "old system" that was exempt from the new minimum monthly sales quota. Instead, the more credible, consistent testimony of all witnesses, besides Petitioner, was that the six-car minimum monthly sales quota applied to all dealerships with GM franchises and to all car salespersons at Courtesy Chevrolet, including Petitioner. When Petitioner began working at Courtesy Chevrolet, the general manager was Paul Letso, who was eight or nine years older than Petitioner. Shortly thereafter, Mike Taylor was hired as the sales manager, and he was Petitioner's supervisor. Mike Taylor also was older than Petitioner, approximately 59 years old. Right away, Petitioner had problems working as a car salesman at Courtesy Chevrolet. Within a month or so after starting, he complained of "theft of my commissions" by other employees. He first spoke with the local human resources person at the dealership. She told him to report the problem to Bibi Bickram, who was the head of human resources for the region. Petitioner was given Ms. Bickram's cell phone number, and he contacted her, reaching her while she was at an airport. She got back with him a month later and told him that his manager, Mike Taylor, was handling the complaint. However, Mr. Taylor denied having heard about it, and Petitioner was not happy with the handling of his complaint. When Petitioner was first hired, he underwent training and orientation and was given a large amount of material, including an AutoNation Code of Business Ethics and an Associate Handbook, for which Petitioner signed acknowledgement forms. The form that Petitioner signed to acknowledge receipt of the Code of Business Ethics informed Petitioner that he had a number of options for reporting complaints, problems, or suspected violations of the code, of the law, or of any company policies. These options included notifying a manager, contacting someone in AutoNation's corporate or regional human resources departments, or calling the ACT-AlertLine. The ACT-AlertLine is a third-party administered, tip/complaint hotline where problems or complaints regarding any AutoNation dealership can be raised, anonymously or otherwise. The toll-free number for the ACT-AlertLine was provided in the document signed by Petitioner. In addition, the undisputed testimony was that flyers with the ACT-AlertLine are on display at the Courtesy Chevrolet employee break room. There was no credible evidence that before Petitioner was notified that he was being terminated, Petitioner ever utilized any of these options to notify anyone of problems or complaints, except for the single instance discussed above when Petitioner called Ms. Bickram's cell phone to complain about theft of his commissions. Petitioner's first full calendar quarter at Courtesy Chevrolet was October to December 2008. Based on his sales figures for his first full quarter, Petitioner was given a documented verbal counseling for inadequate work performance, followed by a written corrective action record. In pertinent part, this record provided: Facts and Events: Your performance for the months of October, November and December of 2008 were below target. They were as follows: ** October - you saw 20 customers, sold 1 unit - 5% closing ** November - you saw 22 customers, sold 3 units - 13.6% closing ** December - you saw 15 customers, sold 2 units - 15.1% closing Dealership closing percentage is 27%. Due to your low performance, it has negatively impacted your income and you are currently in the rears [sic: arrears] $2751.54. Required Improvement: The level of performance is below target and you must take action to improve. As a Sales Associate of Courtesy Chevrolet West Colonial, you are responsible for utilizing the company's processes and tools while maintaining an acceptable level of performance. You must maintain a 20% closing ratio each month. . . . Failure to achieve sustained improvement in units sold or other performance issues related to your role as Sales Associate . . . will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Petitioner signed this corrective action record, without commenting in the space provided. At the final hearing, Petitioner claimed that some of the sales figures may have been incorrect, although Petitioner was not specific in this regard and presented no evidence to support his vague claim. Petitioner's claim, more than two years after the fact, is not credible, in light of Petitioner's failure to attempt to correct any errors that may have been in the report at the time he signed it or to otherwise complain about errors in his sales figures. Petitioner acknowledged that he was having trouble meeting his sales goals, but claimed that it was because he "was being harassed" by Paul Letso and Mike Taylor. Petitioner admitted that this asserted harassment had nothing to do with age discrimination, as he was substantially younger than either one of his managers. Petitioner claimed that these two older managers were always trying to blow up his deals, such as by starting arguments with Petitioner in front of potential customers. Business was not good in the auto industry during the time that Petitioner was employed by Courtesy Chevrolet in 2008 and 2009. Overall, there was a lot of consolidation in the industry and staff reductions. Several Chrysler dealerships closed as a result of Chrysler's bankruptcy, including two AutoNation dealerships in the region: Courtesy Chrysler Jeep in Casselberry and Courtesy Chrysler Jeep in Sanford. Other dealerships were under pressure as well. As noted above, one example of how the industry pressures came to bear on the dealerships was the establishment by GM of a new requirement in August 2008 that all car salespersons at its franchise dealerships had to sell at least six cars each month. Courtesy Chevrolet was not doing well. By May 2009, the general manager of Courtesy Chevrolet (one of the managers whom Petitioner claimed had been harassing him), was terminated. In June 2009, several managers and sales associates from the closed Chrysler dealerships were brought over to Courtesy Chevrolet, consolidating the sales forces. Todd Tyree, former manager of the Casselberry Chrysler dealership, was made general manager of Courtesy Chevrolet. Mr. Tyree, though young--in his 30s--had nearly 20 years of experience in the car dealership business, with substantial managerial experience. He was charged with the task of overhauling the dealership to upgrade its facilities, improve its operations, and conform its processes to AutoNation standards, which had been loosely followed or not followed at all previously. Two former managers from the Sanford Chrysler dealership, Mike Stachowicz and Ryan Matthews, were brought over to serve in managerial/supervisory positions in the sales department. Mr. Stachowicz was in his late 40s, approximately three years younger than Petitioner, with 28 years of experience in the car business. Mr. Matthews was younger, but he still had seven years' experience in the car business. The three managers embarked on an immediate effort to tighten up on procedures, spruce up the facilities, review and evaluate employees, and work with the sales staff to turn around the performance of the dealership. According to Petitioner, a sales meeting was held the day after the new managers arrived at Courtesy Chevrolet. Petitioner claims that at this meeting, Mr. Tyree stated that he wanted a young, aggressive sales staff. Petitioner stated that all three of the new managers were present at this meeting and that there were a number of other witnesses to the statement. Despite Petitioner's claim that there were many witnesses to Mr. Tyree's statement, no witness corroborated Petitioner's claim. Mr. Tyree denied making that statement and his testimony was credible in this regard. Messrs. Stachowicz and Matthews confirmed that they never heard Mr. Tyree make such a statement, although according to Petitioner, they were present at that meeting. Petitioner did not produce any other witness who could support Petitioner's claim that the statement was made. There is no evidence that Petitioner complained to anyone in the human resources department, to someone at the dealership, at a regional or national AutoNation office, or even anonymously to the ACT-AlertLine, right after Petitioner claimed the statement was made by Mr. Tyree on June 6, 2009. The first mention by Petitioner of the alleged statement by Mr. Tyree about a "young, aggressive" sales staff was after Petitioner received a monthly sales associate evaluation on June 15, 2009, putting in writing to him for the second time that improvement was needed for his sub-par sales performance; after Petitioner received another monthly sales associate evaluation on July 8, 2009, giving him the lowest rating of "below target" in the categories of meeting sales objectives and meeting profit objectives; and after Petitioner received a "final warning" counseling and corrective action record on July 13, 2009, reporting another three-month period of below-par sales and commissions that did not cover Petitioner's draw. Petitioner's June 15, 2009, evaluation was signed by Ryan Matthews, who was the general sales manager. It indicated that Petitioner had only "sometimes" achieved acceptable performance goals for sales and profit margins, a grade of "C" on a scale of "A" to "D." The evaluation comment was that one-on-one training was needed to improve performance. Mr. Matthews confirmed that he conducted one-on-one training sessions with Petitioner, including sales menu training, which focuses on how numbers are presented to customers; and training in product knowledge, an area found to be critically lacking at this dealership when the three new managers arrived. However, Mr. Matthews testified, as did the other new managers, that Petitioner was not at all receptive to training, improvement, or doing anything to change how he was used to doing things. Instead, he was stubbornly resistant to change and very combative with the new managers. Petitioner apparently resented being told that he was not performing up to standards and needed to improve. Petitioner tacitly acknowledged the new managers' point by testifying that he did not understand how the new managers could come in and evaluate sales associates after only a few short days at the new dealership and expressing skepticism that they could have any kind of meaningful perspective. However, it should have been clear to Petitioner from his prior evaluation, counseling, and corrective action record issued by the prior management team that the focal point for the dealership, and the measure of his performance, would, in large part, be on sales statistics: how many cars were sold and how big was the profit margin. The recent sales information for Petitioner that was available for the new management team to review in June 2009 showed that Petitioner was credited with selling a total of 10.5 cars during the months of February, March, April and May 2009. His best month, and the only month in his employment history with Courtesy Chevrolet in which the evidence showed that he met a six-car sales minimum, was in March 2009, when he sold six and one-half units. In February, he sold three cars; in April, he did not sell a single car; and in May, he sold one car. After Mr. Tyree arrived at Courtesy Chevrolet, he had Petitioner sign a written acknowledgement memorializing the GM requirement that sales associates had to sell six cars each month, with a rolling average of 18 cars every three months. Mr. Tyree testified that he had all of the Courtesy Chevrolet sales associates sign the form that he had utilized at his prior dealership to impress upon them what they already should have been aware was the requirement imposed by GM for the dealership.3/ As noted above, Petitioner was indeed aware of this requirement, acknowledging that GM adopted this rule in August 2008, although Petitioner continued to assert that he was somehow exempt. The monthly sales associate evaluation signed by Petitioner on July 8, 2009, was signed by Mike Stachowicz. This evaluation of continued low sales production, as well as low profit-per-vehicle, was based on Petitioner's sales performance in the month of June 2009, during which he sold two cars. By the end of June 2009, Petitioner had the highest amount of arrears (draws exceeding earned commissions), more by far than any other salesperson at Courtesy Chevrolet. Petitioner signed this evaluation and wrote the following comment on it: "WILL BE FILING COMMENTS BY NEXT WEEK." Petitioner did not elaborate, or explain the nature of the comments he intended to file. Petitioner's consistent sub-par performance continued, as did his resistance to changing how he went about his business so as to be open to improving his performance. For example, despite the fact that Saturdays are the busiest days of the week for car sales, Petitioner took off Saturdays once a month to pursue his hobby of bird-watching. While the new management was willing to accommodate Petitioner's request, the expectation was that Petitioner would be receptive to making changes to improve his car sales, whether it be giving up his bird-watching Saturdays or making up for it in other ways. When this did not happen, Petitioner received his "final warning" and corrective action record on July 13, 2009, from Michael Stachowicz. This record summarized Petitioner's below-target performance in April, May, and June, with an average car sale of only one car per month. The report reminded Petitioner: "You must maintain a level of 6 units sold monthly." Petitioner remained in arrears by several thousands of dollars. Petitioner signed this record, and his sole written comment in the space provided for comments was: "WILL BE FILING COMPLAINT SOON." Petitioner did not explain his comment or volunteer any information about the nature of the complaint he was going to file. The corrective action record signed on July 13, 2009, stated that there would be a meeting in 30 days to evaluate Petitioner's progress and review his "implementation of specific actions to improve units sold." However, after just a few weeks in which the managers saw no sign of any specific actions being taken by Petitioner to improve his overall performance and no change in his attitude with regard to being resistant to change and combative, Mr. Tyree made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. Through the month of July, Petitioner's three-month rolling average was 2.166 units per month, well below the target of six units per month, and Petitioner was still in arrears by several thousands of dollars. Indeed, there was no evidence presented that Petitioner ever earned more commissions, for any period of time, than he took out in draws.4/ The termination action record was signed July 31, 2009, which was Petitioner's last day of employment, and he was terminated effective August 1, 2009. On August 3, 2009, a written complaint by Petitioner that he sent on July 28, 2009, to the AutoNation Human Resources Department in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was received and provided to the ACT-AlertLine to log in. The complaint was then turned over to Bibi Bickram, the human resources specialist, to conduct an investigation. This written complaint by Petitioner was a five-page, single-spaced, rambling diatribe, which lobbed assorted accusations of harassment by the three new managers at Courtesy Chevrolet. The complaint alleged that Mr. Tyree "gawked" at another employee; that the female employee who was "gawked" at had violated safety regulations by coming to work in flip flops; that Michael Stachowicz showed favoritism to another female employee; that some salespersons had to work more hours than other salespersons; that one employee was absent too much; that gay customers had been made fun of; and that some employees have already been given evaluations by the new managers that had "no reflections on actual reality." Ms. Bickram conducted a thorough investigation in which she interviewed numerous sales associates, reviewed records, talked to the managers, contacted Petitioner to see if he wanted to add anything, and then prepared a detailed report that analyzed, point by point, each and every complaint raised in Petitioner's written complaint. Ms. Bickram found all of the complaints unsubstantiated, with the exception of one complaint regarding scheduling inequity, found to be partially substantiated and corrected. None of the complaint issues raised and investigated had anything to do with age discrimination. Months later, in October 2009, in connection with proceedings regarding Petitioner's entitlement to unemployment compensation, Petitioner prepared another detailed document setting forth a timeline of his view of events at Courtesy Chevrolet. This document was also logged in with the ACT-AlertLine and turned over to Ms. Bickram as a follow-up complaint to the written complaint received on August 3, 2009. The October 2009 timeline document included Petitioner's claim that in a June 6, 2009, sales meeting, the day after Mr. Tyree assumed the position of general manager, he had allegedly stated that he wanted a "young, aggressive sales staff." This claim was investigated for the first time by Ms. Bickram as part of her follow-up complaint investigation; Petitioner did not include this allegation in the July 28, 2009, written complaint. Ms. Bickram's report, issued on December 4, 2009, found that in her interviews of numerous sales associates regarding the sales meetings conducted by the new general manager, none of the associates mentioned anything about inappropriate comments. Ms. Bickram also interviewed Mr. Tyree and reported that he denied making any such statement. Further, Ms. Bickram noted that the "current sales staff ranges in age from 33 to 54," so there had been no youth movement under the new management, as one would assume would have occurred following that alleged statement. Petitioner submitted to the FCHR as part of his complaint in 2010 and offered into evidence at the hearing, a two-page letter from Petitioner to "Bebe" in human resources. On the first page, the date is typed in as "July [day obscured], 2009." On the second page, just above Petitioner's signature, the following date reference is typed in: "Post dated July 9, 2009 to be changed and signed at a later date." In this letter of uncertain actual date, Petitioner reported to "Bebe" that since his first verbal complaint to her "regarding thief [sic] of my money," he had "been subject [sic] to NON-STOP harassment" including the following itemized examples: Deliberately blowing deals by 2 General Managers, 2 General Sales managers and 3 Sales Managers. Prejudice towards GAY customers. . . Lying to customers. Having other employees, who were friends of Ian M. Simpson's, harassed and written up . . . At a meeting on June 6, 2009, Todd Tyree made a comment which insulted most of the employees at the meeting. He stated that he wanted a young and aggressive, sales staff. . . . Petitioner testified that he hand-wrote the number "13" in the date on the first page so that the letter was dated July 13, 2009. However, a handwritten date, whether 13 or some other number, cannot be discerned on the letter admitted into evidence. Petitioner's testimony was that he put the letter on Ms. Bickram's desk in her office at the Courtesy Chevrolet dealership on July 13, 2009. Petitioner claims to have personally laid the letter on her desk. While Petitioner said that he "never saw [Ms. Bickram] in the office," he also claimed that he "saw her later on that day reading the complaint." He admits he did not discuss the complaint with her at that time, stating that he "thought she would have to have time to review it." Petitioner's testimony regarding his delivery of the letter on July 13, 2009, was not credible. Ms. Bickram testified that she never received the letter Petitioner claims to have left for her on her desk. Ms. Bickram explained, credibly, that she is in her office that she maintains at Courtesy Chevrolet one or two times per week and that when she is not in the office, even if she is just out for lunch, she keeps the office locked. Others do not enter her office to leave her mail or to take items from her desk; she uses her other office at a different Courtesy location as the primary office where she receives and processes her mail. Therefore, it would not have been possible for Petitioner to have entered her office when she was not there, as he claimed, to leave a letter on her desk. It is also not credible that Petitioner would not have attempted to discuss the complaint with Ms. Bickram if, as Petitioner claimed, he had seen her reading the letter later that day. Petitioner had recently received two sub-par evaluations from the new management, and on that same day, Petitioner had received his "final warning" based on his failure to approach meeting the stated sales target of six cars per month. Petitioner had to know, with nothing but sub-par performance evaluations, below-target sales, and consistent draws exceeding commissions, his time was running out. The more credible testimony and evidence establish that Petitioner did not lodge his complaint of an age-related comment by Mr. Tyree until well after Petitioner was terminated, and that claim was contrived and not genuine. With the exception of Petitioner's claim of a single age-related comment attributed to Mr. Tyree and found not credible, Petitioner presented no direct or circumstantial evidence of any discrimination against him based on his age. To the contrary, Petitioner complained equally about harassment by former managers who were older than he and by the new management team who were younger than, or about the same age as, Petitioner. Petitioner claimed that younger and older managers alike tried to blow up his sales, started arguments with him while he was with customers, gave deals away to other salespersons, and were to blame for Petitioner's consistent sub-par sales performance and Petitioner's consistent failure to earn enough commissions to cover his draws. Petitioner's complaints have nothing to do with his age; instead, Petitioner's complaints are his attempt to blame all others, young and old alike, for his consistent failure to achieve the work performance standards set by Respondents. No credible evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner's termination was in retaliation for Petitioner's complaint about age discrimination. The more credible evidence established that Petitioner did not communicate any complaint about age discrimination until after he was given his termination notice. After Petitioner was terminated from Courtesy Chevrolet, he was hired as a car salesman at Toyota of Orlando, He started working there on December 15, 2009. After about a month and a-half, he was terminated. The reason for Petitioner's termination was not established in the record. Petitioner has been unemployed since being terminated by Toyota of Orlando and has gone back to school. No evidence was presented regarding Petitioner's efforts, if any, to obtain substantially equivalent employment, besides his brief experience with Toyota of Orlando.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ian Simpson's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2011.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68760.10
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JESSE BLOUNT vs CEMEX/RINKER MATERIALS, 09-001212 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 06, 2009 Number: 09-001212 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact On May 23, 2005, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a ready-mix concrete truck driver at Respondent’s Gainesville plant. Petitioner was a good employee. He had a clean driving record, and he did not have any disciplinary problems while working for Respondent. On or about July 27, 2007, Petitioner had a “mild” heart attack and was placed on medical leave by Respondent. In September 2007, Petitioner was released by his personal physician to return to work. Thereafter, Petitioner returned to work for a couple of days and began the process of being recertified for his driving duties. He reviewed safety materials and videos and did “ride- alongs” with other drivers. Before Petitioner could return to his driving duties, he was required by federal Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations to pass a physical and be certified as “physically qualified.” Recertification is required every 24 months and after an injury that impairs the driver’s ability to perform his/her normal duties, such as the heart attack suffered by Petitioner. Petitioner understood that he could not return to his job as a ready-mix concrete truck driver until he passed a physical and received his DOT certification. On September 12, 2007, Respondent sent Petitioner to a DOT-approved physician in Ocala for his physical. Petitioner did not pass the physical. The DOT-approved physician expressed concerns about Petitioner’s cardiac surgery, possible sleep apnea (based upon a questionnaire filled out by Petitioner), and blood pressure issues. There is no credible evidence that Respondent influenced the DOT-approved physician’s decision in any way. Petitioner’s suspicion that Respondent had something to do with the decision is unfounded. Petitioner’s personal physician disagreed with the concerns expressed by the DOT-approved physician, and after Petitioner underwent a series of tests, it was determined that he did not have sleep apnea. On November 9, 2007, Respondent laid Petitioner off based upon his “failure to meet job qualifications.” Petitioner was 48 years old at the time of the lay- off. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s age or medical condition played any role in Respondent’s decision to lay Petitioner off. Rather, the decision was based solely upon Petitioner’s failure to have the DOT certification that was required for him to drive a ready-mix concrete truck. Respondent gave Petitioner ample time to obtain his DOT certification before it laid him off. Approximately two months passed between the time that Petitioner was cleared to return to work by his personal physician and the time that he was laid off for not having his DOT certification. Petitioner did not obtain his DOT certification until some point in January 2008. Petitioner was treated no differently by Respondent than other drivers -- both older and younger than Petitioner -- who lost their DOT certification. Like Petitioner, those drivers were fired because they did not meet the applicable job qualifications. Petitioner testified that he was told that he would be rehired when he got his DOT certification. This testimony is corroborated by the comment on the Employee Separation Notice for Petitioner, which stated “Jesse has been unable to get his DOT card/when he does he will be rehired.” By the time Petitioner obtained his DOT certification in January 2008, Respondent’s business had declined due to the slow-down in the economy and the building industry, and it did not have any work for Petitioner. Respondent laid off three drivers at its Gainesville plant in December 2007, and it laid off an additional five drivers at the plant in February 2008 because of the decline in its business. Six of the eight drivers who were laid-off were younger than Petitioner. After these lay-offs, there were still three drivers employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who had less seniority than Petitioner, but in order to rehire Petitioner, Respondent would have had to fire one of those drivers. There were also a number of drivers still employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who were older and had more seniority than Petitioner. Respondent’s decision not to fire one of the other drivers in order to re-hire Petitioner was reasonable under the circumstances. And, more importantly, there is no credible evidence that this decision was motivated in any way by Petitioner’s age or a perceived disability based upon his heart attack. Respondent has not hired any drivers at its Gainesville plant since the lay-offs described above. Petitioner has not worked since he was laid off by Respondent. He testified that he has tried to find another truck-driving job, but that like Respondent, most companies are not hiring drivers because of the slow-down in the economy and the building industry. Petitioner would likely still be employed by Respondent if he had obtained his DOT certification before Respondent started laying off drivers because Petitioner was a good employee with more seniority than all but one of the drivers who were laid off in December 2007 and February 2008. Petitioner believes that Respondent could have put him to work in the warehouse or on the yard until he obtained his DOT certification and could return to driving duties. However, the record does not reflect whether any positions were available in the warehouse or on the yard or whether Petitioner was qualified for those positions. Petitioner testified that he was told by other employees that they overheard Respondent’s managers stating that they did not intend to return Petitioner to his driving duties because his heart attack made him a “high risk driver.” No evidence was presented to corroborate this hearsay-based testimony. Petitioner also testified that a supervisor made a critical comment to him regarding his use of a cane immediately after he returned to work. The supervisor denied making the comment, and even if the comment was made, there is no credible evidence that it was anything more than an isolated comment.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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HARVEY G. RINIER, D/B/A YESTERDAYS AND TODAYS AUTO SALES vs DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, 96-004454 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Sep. 25, 1996 Number: 96-004454 Latest Update: Oct. 20, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should be licensed as an independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida.

Findings Of Fact By stipulation of fact, the parties agreed: Petitioner applied for a motor vehicle dealer's license for a dealership to be operated at 2401 Central Avenue in St. Petersburg, Florida. The application was denied by the Department because it appears the applicant has no experience in the motor vehicle business and, in fact, applied for the license to allow an individual by the name of Lloyd Blocker to operate and have continued involvement in the motor vehicle business. Petitioner was aware at the time of his application that Mr. Blocker had been denied a motor vehicle license in Florida in February 1994 and had been convicted of a felony in Alaska involving the unlawful rolling back of odometers in motor vehicles. In addition, Mr. Rinier was aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles would not allow Mr. Blocker to hold a license to deal in motor vehicles in Florida. Mr. Rinier and Mr. Blocker have an ongoing business dealing with the sale of motor vehicles. Mr. Rinier knows and knew at all times pertinent hereto that Mr. Blocker could not operate such a business on his own. The Department of Motor Vehicles contends that Mr. Blocker cannot operate or be involved in any facet of the motor vehicle business in any capacity. If Mr. Rinier were to provide written assurances that Mr. Blocker would not be involved in any way with a business operated under a license if issued, it would issue a license, assuming Mr. Rinier were otherwise qualified for licensure. Mr. Rinier is unwilling to provide that assurance in writing. However, Petitioner contends his sole desire is to make money from the operation of a dealership. If the license were issued, ownership of the business would be and remain in the Petitioner's name. He had already paid lease costs and all other costs relating to the business, and he will not operate it without Mr. Blocker's participation in some form. The present relationship with Mr. Blocker involves sale of the buildings where the dealership would operate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order denying a motor vehicle dealer license to Petitioner, Harvey G. Rinier. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Waller, Esquire John L. Waller, P.A. 467 Second Avenue, North _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1997. St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Gabrielle L. A. Taylor, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500

Florida Laws (2) 120.57320.27
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DIANA J. SEXTON vs ST. AUGUSTINE TRANSFER/GAMSEY CARRIAGE COMPANY, 08-004560 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Sep. 17, 2008 Number: 08-004560 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 2009

The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Diana Sexton and Freddie Sexton were carriage drivers for Gam-San, Inc., which was known by the fictitious name of St. Augustine Transfer Company. They conducted ghost tours and history tours in the historic district of St. Augustine. No evidence was presented regarding Mr. Sexton's race or either Petitioners' age. At the time of the incident giving rise to this proceeding, Diana Sexton had worked for Respondent for approximately one and a half years. Freddie Sexton has worked for the company in the same type of position for a shorter period of time. Petitioners are married to each other. Petitioners drove carriages pulled by horses, and gave tours to the public. They sometimes stayed overnight at the barn owned by Respondent in order to water the horses. They did not have permission to stay at the barn, but Ms. Sexton considered it to be a benefit in exchange for watering the horses at night. Diana Sexton acknowledged that Petitioners had been informed that they were expected to find another place to stay before the end of the "Nights of Lights" (although no explanation was provided regarding what time frame this entailed), but denied that Petitioners were ever told to leave or not to stay at the barn. Employees hired by St. Augustine Transfer were usually hired as carriage drivers, stall people, or barn managers. Both stall people and barn managers were paid minimum wage. Carriage drivers, like waitresses, receive tips from customers as part of their pay. Generally, with tips, drivers are the highest paid employees of the business. It would not be considered a promotion to go from a position as driver to either stall person or barn manager. Petitioners did not work on December 25, 2007. They apparently spent the night at the barn the night before and left the work premises in the morning. At some time in the evening, Petitioners returned to the business premises, ostensibly to retrieve some of their belongings that were in the barn. While they were present on the property, the police came, indicating that they had received a call complaining of a disturbance. Petitioners were believed to be the cause of the disturbance and were asked to leave. Petitioners refused to leave without speaking to Stuart Gamsey, and denied creating any type of disturbance. Eventually they left the premises at the insistence of the police. They claim they were not allowed to return to retrieve their belongings for several days, and were discharged from their jobs. The evidence is in conflict over what, if anything, was occurring on the premises of the business the evening of December 25, 2007. However, the more credible admissible evidence indicates that at least two calls were made to Stuart Gamsey, the then owner of St. Augustine Transfer Co. The calls involved complaints about Petitioners' drinking, yelling, and generally creating a disturbance on the property. One call was made by police officers on the scene. Mr. Gamsey had not given Petitioners, or any other employees, permission to stay on the premises when not working. He could not say whether there was actually a disturbance on the premises, but confirmed that in response to the calls he received, he asked the police to do "whatever it took" to get Petitioners to leave the property. His goal was simply to end whatever disturbance might be occurring. Petitioners' employment was terminated by St. Augustine Transfer. It is not entirely clear from the evidence presented whether the December 25, 2007, incident formed the basis for the termination or whether other factors were involved. It is clear, however, that Petitioners resisted leaving the premises at a time when they did not have permission to be there. Stuart Gamsey sold the business in the summer of 2008. He currently has no responsibility for the hiring practices of St. Augustine Transfer Co. or its successor. No competent, credible evidence was presented indicating that any other employee was allowed to stay on the premises outside of work hours. Petitioners also claim that Mr. Sexton was discriminated against based upon his marital status because someone, presumably another employee, left K-Y jelly in his carriage, and on one occasion, a patron tipped another employee to make sure she could ride in his carriage and engage in inappropriate behavior designed to seduce him. However, no competent, credible evidence was presented to show who placed the K-Y jelly in Mr. Sexton's carriage or for what purpose, if any, it was left. Likewise, no competent, credible evidence was presented to support the allegation that placing the patron in Mr. Sexton's carriage was for any discriminatory purpose. No evidence was presented regarding any other proceedings of any type involving Petitioners and Respondent.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petitions for Relief and denying Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Freddie J. Sexton Diana J. Sexton Post Office Box 105 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Regina Sargeant, Esquire 2820 US 1 South, Suite F St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.595760.02760.10
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JM AUTO, INC., D/B/A JM LEXUS vs DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, 07-000603RX (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 02, 2007 Number: 07-000603RX Latest Update: Oct. 19, 2009

The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.005 is a invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C- 17.005, which became effective March 3, 1996. The Rule has not been amended since its initial adoption. JM Lexus and Lexus of Orlando are both licensed franchised motor vehicle dealers in the State of Florida. Lexus of Orlando has filed a complaint in the Ninth Circuit Court, Orange County, Florida, alleging, that JM Lexus violated Rule 15C-7.005 in connection with the alleged sale for resale of new Lexus vehicles to non-Lexus dealerships. FADA and SFADA are trade associations whose members are licensed motor vehicle dealers in the State of Florida and are substantially affected by the rule. Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.005 provides the following: 15C-7.005 Unauthorized Additional Motor Vehicle Dealerships - Unauthorized Supplemental Dealership Locations. An additional motor vehicle dealership, as contemplated by Sections 320.27(5) and 320.642, Florida Statutes, shall be deemed to be established when motor vehicles are regularly and repeatedly sold at a specific location in the State of Florida for retail purposes if the motor vehicle dealer transacting such sales: Is not located in this state, or Is not a licensed motor vehicle franchised for the specific line-make, or Is a licensed motor vehicle dealer franchised for such line-make, but such sales are transacted at a location other than that permitted by the license issued to the dealer by the Department. Such sales are not subject to this rule, however, when a motor vehicle dealer occasionally and temporarily (not to exceed seven days) sells motor vehicles from a location other than the motor vehicle dealer's licensed location provided such sales occur within the motor vehicle dealer's area of sales responsibility (except a motor vehicle dealer who may be deemed a licensee under this rule). For the purpose of this rule, a sale for retail purposes is the first sale of the motor vehicle to a retail customer for private use, or the first sale of the motor vehicle for commercial use, such as leasing, if such commercial motor vehicle is not resold for a period of at least ninety days. Furthermore, this rule shall apply regardless of whether the titles issued, either in this or another state, pursuant to such sales are designated as "new" or "used." An additional motor vehicle dealership established in this fashion is unlawful and in violation of Section 230.642, Florida Statutes. A licensed motor vehicle dealer of the same line-make, as the vehicle being sold in violation of this rule, may notify the Department of such violation. The notice shall include motor vehicle identification numbers or other data sufficient to identify the identity of the selling dealer and initial retail purchaser of the motor vehicles involved. Within 30 days from receipt of a request from the Department containing motor vehicle identification numbers or other data sufficient to identify the motor vehicles involved, the licensee shall provide to the Department, to the extent such information is maintained by the licensee, copies of documents showing the dealer to whom each vehicle was originally delivered, any inter- dealer transfer and the initial retail purchaser as reported to the licensee. Upon a showing of good cause, the Department may grant the licensee additional time to provide the information requested under this paragraph. Examples of good cause include, but are not limited to, request for information on more than 100 vehicles, information on vehicle sales which accrued more than 2 years prior to the date of the request, and information which is no longer maintained in the licensee's current electronic data base. Within forty days of receipt of notice from the motor vehicle dealer, the Department shall make a determination of probable cause and if it determines that there is probable cause that a violation of this rule has occurred, the Department shall mail, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the line-maker motor vehicle dealership or dealerships involved a letter containing substantially the following statement: Pursuant to Rule 15C-7.005, F.A.C., the undersigned has received a notice that you have allegedly supplied a substantial number of vehicles on a regular and repeated basis, which were sold at a location in the State of Florida, at which you are not franchised or licensed to sell motor vehicles. If these allegations are true, your conduct may violate Florida law including, but not limited to, the above-mentioned rule, Sections 320.61 and 320.642, Florida Statutes. It may also cause you to be deemed a licensee, importer and/or distributor pursuant to Florida law and subject you to disciplinary action by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, including fines and/or suspension of your Florida Dealer license, if applicable. The Division of Motor Vehicles is putting you on notice, if you are conducting such activity, that you cease and desist such activity immediately. If you fail to do so, this agency will take appropriate action. If the dealer supplying vehicles in violation of subsections (1) and (4) is not located in the State of Florida, the Department shall notify such dealer in writing that they may be operating as a distributor of motor vehicles without proper authorization in violation of Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, and may be violating Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. A motor vehicle dealer, whether located in Florida or not, which supplies a substantial number of vehicles on a regular and repeated basis which are sold in the manner set forth in subsection (1), shall be deemed to have established a supplemental location in violation of Section 320.27(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 15C-7.005, F.A.C. Furthermore, a motor vehicle dealer which supplies vehicles in this manner shall be deemed to have conducted business within the State of Florida and acted as a "licensee," "importer" and "distributor" as contemplated by Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, and thus such activity shall constitute a violation of Sections 320.61 and 320.642, Florida Statutes. Furthermore, this paragraph neither imposes any liability on a licensee nor creates a cause of action by any person against the licensee, except a motor vehicle dealer who may be deemed to have acted as a licensee under this paragraph. Furthermore, no provision of this entire rule creates a private cause of action by any person against a licensee, other than a dealer who is deemed a licensee pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule, for civil damages; provided, however, if a licensee fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3)(a) of this rule, the Department may bring an action for injunctive relief to require a licensee to provide the information required. No other action can be brought against the licensee pursuant to this entire rule other than a dealer who is deemed to be a licensee pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule. Any franchised motor vehicle dealer who can demonstrate that a violation of, or failure to comply with, the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule by a motor vehicle dealer, or a motor vehicle dealer which pursuant to subsection (4) shall be deemed to have conducted business and acted as a licensee, importer, and distributor, has adversely affected or caused pecuniary loss to that franchised motor vehicle dealer, shall be entitled to pursue all remedies against such dealers, including, but not limited to the remedies, procedures, and rights of recovery available under Sections 320.695 and 320.697, Florida Statutes. Rule 15C-7.005 identifies as specific authority Section 320.011, Florida Statutes. Section 320.011 states: The department shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement them. The Rule lists as "Law Implemented" Sections 320.27 and Sections 320.60-.70, Florida Statutes. Sections 320.60 through 320.70, Florida Statutes, are commonly referred to as the Motor Dealers Act. Section 320.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides the following definitions for a motor vehicle dealer and a franchised motor vehicle dealer: (c) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale at wholesale or retail, or who may service and repair motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in s. 320.60(1). Any person who buys, sells, or deals in three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period or who offers or displays for sale three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period shall be prima facie presumed to be engaged in such business. The terms "selling" and "sale" include lease-purchase transactions. . . The transfer of a motor vehicle by a dealer not meeting these qualifications shall be titled as a used vehicle. The classifications of motor vehicle dealers are defined as follows: 1. "Franchised motor vehicle dealer" means any person who engages in the business of repairing, servicing, buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in s. 320.60(1). Subsection 320.27(2), Florida Statutes, requires motor vehicle dealers to be licensed. Subsection (5) of this same provision requires that "any person licensed hereunder shall obtain a supplemental license for each permanent additional place or places of business not contiguous to the premises for which the original license is issued." Section 320.27(9) authorizes the Department to discipline motor vehicle dealers for a variety of enumerated offenses. Among those enumerated offenses is the willful failure to comply with any administrative rule adopted by the department or the provisions of Section 320.131(8), Florida Statutes. § 320.27(9)(a)16., Fla. Stat. Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, provides definitions for terms used in Sections 320.61 through 320.70, Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case are the following: "Agreement" or "franchise agreement" means a contract, franchise, new motor vehicle franchise, sales and service agreement, or dealer agreement or any other terminology used to describe the contractual relationship between a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or importer, and a motor vehicle dealer, pursuant to which the motor vehicle dealer is authorized to transact business pertaining to motor vehicles of a particular line-make. * * * (5) "Distributor" means a person, resident or nonresident, who, in whole or in part, sells or distributes motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers or who maintains distributor representatives. * * * "Importer" means any person who imports vehicles from a foreign country into the United States or into this state for the purpose of sale or lease. "Licensee" means any person licensed or required to be licensed under s. 320.61. * * * (10) "Motor vehicle" means any new automobile, motorcycle, or truck, including all trucks, regardless of weight . . . the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred by a manufacturer, distributor, importer, or dealer to an ultimate purchaser; (11)(a) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person, firm, company, corporation, or other entity, who, Is licensed pursuant to s. 320.27 as a "franchised motor vehicle dealer" and, for commission, money, or other things of value, repairs or services motor vehicles or used motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in subsection (1), or Who sells, exchanges, buys, leases or rents, or offers, or attempts to negotiate a sale or exchange of any interest in, motor vehicles, or Who is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling motor vehicles, whether or not such motor vehicles are owned by such person, firm, company, or corporation. * * * (14) "Line-make vehicles" are those motor vehicles which are offered for sale, lease, or distribution under a common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the manufacturer of same. Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, requires all manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers to be licensed. Section 320.63, Florida Statutes, describes the application process for obtaining licensure for manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers. The section authorizes the Department to require certain enumerated information as well as "any other pertinent matter commensurate with the safeguarding of the public interest which the department, by rule, prescribes." § 320.63(7), Fla. Stat. Section 320.64, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: 320.64 Denial, suspension, or revocation of license; grounds.--A license of a licensee under s. 320.61 may be denied, suspended, or revoked within the entire state or at any specific location or locations within the state at which the applicant or licensee engages or proposes to engage in business, upon proof that the section was violated with sufficient frequency to establish a pattern of wrongdoing, and a licensee or applicant shall be liable for claims and remedies provided in ss. 320.695 and 320.697 for any violation of any of the following provisions. A licensee is prohibited from committing the following acts: * * * (3) The applicant or licensee willfully has failed to comply with significant provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 or with any lawful rule or regulation adopted or promulgated by the department. * * * A motor vehicle dealer who can demonstrate that a violation of, or failure to comply with, any of the preceding provisions by an applicant or licensee will or can adversely and pecuniarily affect the complaining dealer, shall be entitled to pursue all of the remedies, procedures, and rights of recovery available under ss. 320.695 and 320.697. Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, provides the process for a licensee to establish additional motor vehicle dealerships or to relocate existing dealerships to a location where the same line-make vehicle is presently represented by a franchised motor vehicle dealer or dealers. Section 320.642, does not, by its terms, authorize rulemaking. Section 320.69, Florida Statutes, states in its entirety that "the department has the authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of this law." Section 320.695, Florida Statutes, which contains no additional grant of rulemaking authority, provides: In addition to the remedies provided in this chapter, and notwithstanding the existence of any adequate remedy at law, the department, or any motor vehicle dealer in the name of the department and state and for the use and benefit of the motor vehicle dealer, is authorized to make application to any circuit court of the state for the grant, upon a hearing and for cause shown, of a temporary or permanent injunction, or both, restraining any person from acting as a licensee under the terms of ss. 320.60-320.70 without being properly licensed hereunder, or from violating or continuing to violate any of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70, or from failing or refusing to comply with the requirements of this law or any rule or regulation adopted hereunder. Such injunction shall be issued without bond. A single act in violation of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 shall be sufficient to authorize the issuance of an injunction. However, this statutory remedy shall not be applicable to any motor vehicle dealer after final determination by the department under s. 320.641(3). Section 320.697, Florida Statutes, which also contains no additional grant of rulemaking authority, provides: Civil damages.--Any person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of ss. 320.60-320.70, notwithstanding the existence of any other remedies under ss. 320.60-320.70, has a cause of action against the licensee for damages and may recover damages therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction in an amount equal to 3 times the pecuniary loss, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the court. Upon a prima facie showing by the person bringing the action that such a violation by the licensee has occurred, the burden of proof shall then be upon the licensee to prove that such violation or unfair practice did not occur.

Florida Laws (32) 120.52120.536120.54120.56120.57120.68253.001253.03320.011320.02320.025320.0657320.08053320.084320.0848320.131320.27320.60320.61320.63320.64320.641320.642320.69320.695320.697320.70373.414468.802550.0251550.2415944.09 Florida Administrative Code (1) 15C-7.005
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JULIE WALLACE vs HEARTLAND PONTIAC, BUICK, CADILLAC, GMC TRUCK, INC., ET AL., 90-001137 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Feb. 23, 1990 Number: 90-001137 Latest Update: Jun. 18, 1990

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of marital status.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Julie Wallace. She was employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson from the last week of June, 1987, until September 12, 1988. Respondent is an automobile dealership, Heartland Pontiac-Buick- Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. Its corporate president at the time of Petitioner's employment termination was Nancy Cosgrove. Respondent hired Petitioner on June 18, 1987. Respondent's corporate president at that time was Steven Cosgrove, then husband to Nancy Cosgrove. Petitioner and her husband were married in July, 1987, shortly after she began her employment with Respondent. At the time, Petitioner's husband was also employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson. The wedding ceremony took place at the Cosgrove home. Respondent does not have a work practice prohibiting nepotism and there are several examples of Respondent's employment of married couples, as well as employment of other multiple members of individual families. Petitioner fared well in Respondent's employment initially. She was recognized by the dealership as the "salesperson of the month" in August, 1987. She was awarded a trip to the "Indy 500" in May, 1988. In spite of Petitioner's productivity during the first year of her employment, Respondent lost a great amount of money for a period of approximately 14 months prior to terminationof Petitioner's employment. Respondent's financial losses resulted from insufficient sales overall in the dealership during that period of time. The separation and subsequent divorce of the Cosgroves coincided with Ms. Cosgrove's assumption of the presidency of Respondent. Ms. Cosgrove took over the dealership in order to prevent it from collapsing financially. For approximately two to four weeks prior to termination of Petitioner, sales records were abysmal for the entire sales force. Further, morale of the sales force was poor as the result of management changes and efforts to cut unnecessary expenses. In conjunction with management attempts to strengthen the dealership's dwindling finances, traditional assignment of demonstrator automobiles to salespeople were eliminated a few days prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment. The elimination of the demonstrator automobiles, coupled with the change in management from Mr. Cosgrove to Ms. Cosgrove, resulted in a verbal altercation between Petitioner's husband and Ms. Cosgrove on September 12, 1988. The upshot of that confrontation was the firing of Petitioner's husband by Ms. Cosgrove. A short time, perhaps an hour later, the sales manager employed by Ms. Cosgrove requested to see Petitioner. He asked Petitioner whether she might prefer to resign in theaftermath of her husband's termination. Petitioner said she did not wish to leave her employment. After Petitioner and Respondent's sales manager concluded their discussion, the sales manager returned later in the day and explained that Petitioner's employment was terminated in view of Petitioner's lack of production or automobile sales. Later, Respondent's sales manager provided Petitioner with a letter erroneously stating that Petitioner had been employed by Respondent for two years. The letter correctly stated that Petitioner was always in the top one third of the sales force in her performance, but did not elaborate on the extent to which performance of all members of the sales staff had plummeted prior to Petitioner's termination. At the time of Petitioner's employment termination, there was only one other salesperson, in addition to the sales manager, remaining on Respondent's sales staff. Through attrition and previous terminations, Ms. Cosgrove had virtually eliminated the sales force inherited from her ex-husband's management by the time of Petitioner's termination. The world of automotive salespersons is extremely competitive and pressurized. Individuals are constantly urged to produce or seek other employment. The fact of previous sales accomplishments provides salespersons no cushion for future periods of sale failures. As stated by Ms. Cosgrove, in a somewhat cold and dispassionate manner, at the final hearing, "you're either a hero or a zero." The discharge of sales personnel after a change of management and an extended period of financial non-profitability is not unusual in the automobile dealership business. Such a movement on the part of Ms. Cosgrove was also motivated by a desire to increase sales and improve morale with salespersons of her own choosing. Salespeople, such as Petitioner, working at Respondent's dealership are "at will" employees, possessing no employment contracts of a specified term, or conditions governing the termination of their employment. Sales employees at the dealership did have a payment plan or agreement with Respondent. The plan in effect during Petitioner's employment permitted her to draw a salary against commissions, provided she had accumulated commissions in-house and elected to utilize this draw procedure versus direct commission payment. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had no accumulations against which to draw a salary. The payment plan did not provide a set term of employment or address standards for employment termination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX It should be noted that both parties incorrectly filed their proposed findings with the Commission On Human Relations as opposed to the Division Of Administrative Hearings. Upon discovery of the error, the parties were permitted to have the proposed findings forwarded to the abovesigned by Commission personnel. Upon review of the proposed findings, it was noted that neither party's proposal is presented in the form of separately numbered paragraphs which would permit a referenced comment or ruling on each proposed finding. Each party's proposed findings have been reviewed and addressed to the extent possible by the foregoing findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Julie Wallace 1406 Chloe Terrace Sebring, FL 33870 E. Mark Breed III, Esq. 335 South Commerce Sebring, FL 33870 Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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