The Issue The central issue in this case is Petitioner's challenge to part III of the licensure examination as set forth in his letter dated September 8, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert E. Rosser, is a candidate for licensure as a general contractor. Petitioner has taken the examination to become a licensed general contractor consecutively over the last four years. As a result of the twelve attempts at the examination, Petitioner has passed parts I and II on two separate test dates. In his attempts to pass the examination Petitioner has enrolled in and studied for the examination with two approved construction schools. Petitioner scored a 68 on part III of the general contractor's examination for the June 16, 1994 test date. Petitioner timely challenged questions related to part III (Project Management) of the general contractor's examination given on June 16, 1994. Petitioner attended a review session and claimed that as to question 2 his scratch sheet from the examination demonstrates he had used formulas properly and that he had inadvertently marked the incorrect response on the answer grid sheet. The minimum score required to pass part III of the examination was 70. For each of the challenged questions in part III (2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, and 20) Respondent presented competent evidence to support the correct answer as scored by the Department. The Petitioner did not present credible evidence to dispute the accuracy of the answers which had been deemed correct by the Department. Based upon those answers, the Petitioner's score sheet was tabulated correctly. The questions challenged were clearly and unambiguously worded and contained sufficient factual information to reach a correct answer. The examination was open book and applicants were allowed to use reference materials. All current techniques were considered before the correct answer was chosen. All knowledge needed to reach a correct answer was within a candidate's expected range of expertise. The Department's scoring of part III was not arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of logic. For each of the challenged questions, the correct answer was scored at a higher percentage than the answers marked by Petitioner. In fact, for question 4, for example, 79 percent of the examinees scored the correct answer while only 3 percent marked the same answer as Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Bureau of Testing enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the general contractor's examination. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5214 Rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Petitioner did not number the paragraphs denoted as "STATEMENT OF FACTS AND FINDINGS". The lettered paragraphs are addressed as listed; but where no letter identified the paragraph, the rulings are as to the paragraphs in the order of presentation. Paragraph [A] is accepted. Paragraph [B] is accepted to the extent it identifies Petitioner as a candidate otherwise rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.005 is an error. It is accepted that the minimum passing grade for the challenged part is 70 percent out of 100 percent. Paragraph [C] is accepted in substance; however, Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.003 is an error. The next paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is accepted as a correct statement of procedural review. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 4 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 7 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 9 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 11 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 17 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 18 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 20 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph [D] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. Paragraph [E] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Department and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [F] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [G] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Division and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [H] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [I] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [J] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [K] is rejected as contrary to the record in this case since an order of prehearing instruction was not entered in this case and interrogatories were not served. Paragraph [L] is rejected as irrelevant, not a statement of fact, and contrary to the record. Moreover, Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. Paragraph [M] is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [N] is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [O] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [P] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 4 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 1 is accepted as statement of procedural information. Paragraph 2 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. Paragraph 3 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert E. Rosser P.O. Box 560541 Miami, Florida 33256-0541 William M. Woodyard Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Richard Hickok Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-6310
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Petitioner is qualified for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a greyhound owner; and, (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to waiver of the provisions in accordance to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Stephen M. Morris, submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a greyhound owner on or about February 24, 2005. On his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, Petitioner accurately reported that he had been convicted of the following three felonies: (1) possession and sale of a controlled substance, (2) trafficking in controlled substance (cannabis) in excess of 100 pounds, and (3) dealing in stolen property. The foregoing felony convictions were in or about 1976, 1984, and 1993, respectively, and were the result of offenses that occurred in Florida. Due to Petitioner's felony convictions, as noted in paragraph 2 above, his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license was subject to denial. Consequently, on February 24, 2005, in addition to his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, Petitioner also requested that a waiver be granted so that he could obtain the license. Petitioner's application and his request for waiver did not include any information which would establish his rehabilitation or demonstrate that he has good moral character. As part of the Division's review of Petitioner's request for waiver, on or about April 5, 2005, Mr. Toner interviewed Petitioner. During the interview with Mr. Toner, Petitioner had the opportunity to present information that established his rehabilitation and demonstrated his present good moral character, but he did not produce such information. In light of the information regarding Petitioner's felony convictions, which are undisputed and included in Petitioner's application, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements for the license which he seeks. By Petitioner's own admission, he was convicted of the felony offenses noted in paragraph 2 above. The number of felony convictions and the times that the offenses were committed, show a pattern of serious criminal behavior and recidivism. Petitioner may be rehabilitated and may have present good moral character. However, Petitioner did not testify at the final hearing and presented no evidence that he has been rehabilitated and has present good moral character. Absent from the record is any testimony from Petitioner or from Petitioner's friends, relatives, business associates, employers, or church members regarding Petitioner's good conduct and reputation subsequent to the date of his last felony conviction. In absence of any evidence that Petitioner has been rehabilitated and has present good moral character, the Division has no basis to grant Petitioner a waiver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Stephen M. Morris', application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license and his request for waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Stephen M. Morris 162 Warren Avenue New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32168 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issue for determination at the final hearing was whether the contracting license of the Respondent Konrad v. Ising should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined by the Petitioner Department of Professional Regulation, for alleged violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. At the final hearing Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2(a)-(g) were offered and admitted into evidence. The Respondent testified on his own behalf.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Konrad V. Ising is licensed to practice contracting in Florida, and is a licensed certified general contractor holding license number CG C009669, a license current and active from 1982 through the present. The Respondent qualified Master Craft Constructors using license number CG C009669. During 1982, the Respondent entered into an association with Carlton Mosher whereby the Respondent would use his contractor's license to obtain building permits for construction projects which Mosher had contracted. The Respondent hoped his association with Mosher would lead to a partnership and assist him in obtaining practical experience in the construction field. During his association with the Respondent, Mosher was not a licensed contractor. In December 1982, Mosher, doing business as Re-Builders, contracted with Russell Hirstins to construct a room addition on his home at 4034 27th Avenue, St. Petersburg, Florida. On December 3, 1982, an application for a building permit for the job was submitted to the City of St. Petersburg and permit number 88638 was issued. The permit was obtained using the Respondent's license number and Respondent is listed as the job contractor. However, the Respondent performed no work on the Hirstins job, maintained no control over Mosher's work, failed to adequately supervise the project, and failed to qualify Re-Builders with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. Since becoming licensed in 1975, the Respondent has not been involved in any other disciplinary proceedings. At the final hearing, the Respondent candidly acknowledged that his association with Mosher was a regrettable mistake. The project was completed by Mosher to the apparent satisfaction to the Hirstins.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Construction Industry Licensing Board finding the Respondent Konrad V. Ising guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes, and imposing a $250 administrative fine. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of January 1984, in Tallahassee. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Konrad V. Ising Post Office Box 1023 Maitland, Florida 323751 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a certified water and wastewater treatment operator whose certification renewal fees were increased by amended Rule 17-16.14. A notice of proposed rulemaking, a notice of a workshop on the proposed rule, and a notice of a public hearing on the proposed rule were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 20, May 20, 1983. Petitioner attended and made comments at both the public workshop on June 1, 1983, and at the public hearing on June 21, 1983. Although the June 21, 1983, public hearing on the amendment to Rule 17- 16.14 was held open for 14 days in order for the petitioner to provide additional information to the Respondent, Respondent indicated at the public hearing that it intended to adopt the rule after 14 days without further notice unless it received additional information. The proposed amendment to Rule 17-16.14 was adopted by Respondent on July 14, 1983, and filed with the Secretary of State on July 15, 1983. The Economic Impact Statement includes the statement, "Essentially, the burden of supporting the operator certification program will be shifted from all of the taxpayers of the state to the operators themselves." The Economic Impact Statement makes no mention of the fact that many public utilities may pass the increased certification cost on to the consumers of their services. Respondent currently charges a $15 fee for processing applications, a $25 biennial certification renewal fee, and no fee for certification itself. Prior to the amendment to Rule 17-16.14, Respondent charged a $20 biennial certification renewal fee. The increase in certification renewal fees provides a continuous, efficient, and increasing source of revenue for the certification program. The costs and administrative difficulties with collecting two fees or with increasing application processing fees make raising the certification renewal fee reasonable. Robert Hall, Respondent's Certification Officer, made several references at the June 21, 1983, public hearing to a report by the Auditor General which stated that Respondent should not charge two separate fees for processing and issuing certificates and further stated that renewal fees should be raised rather than processing fees. Following the hearing, it was discovered that Mr. Hall was in error in his references to the Auditor General report and that such a report from the Auditor General did not, in fact, exist.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Richard M. Woodley has two inactive contracting licenses numbered CB CA 17970 and CB CO 17970, and was so licensed in 1986. The Respondent's license CB CA 17970 qualified "Woodley Builders, Inc." with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent was no longer in the construction contracting business as a licensed contractor. With respect to case number 87-2809, on December 15, 1985, the Respondent, on behalf of Woodley Builders, Inc., entered into a contract with Catherine M. Richardson and Jonathan P. Richardson to build a residence in or near Orlando, Florida. The contract price was $90,000, with $20,000 attributable to the land. The contract specified that payments would be made to Woodley Builders, Inc. "in accordance with the disbursement schedule set forth by the construction lender." P. Ex. 1, paragraph 7. Woodley Builders, Inc. also agreed in the contract to furnish to the Richardsons lien waivers as required by the construction lender for disbursements. The construction lender disbursed the following amounts on the indicated dates: $10,200 March 17, 1986 $10,200 March 19, 1986 $17,000 March 27, 1986 $17,000 April 24, 1986 To induce these disbursements, a total of $54,400, the Respondent signed lien waivers stating that all bills for labor and materials used had been paid in full. P. Ex. 5. At the time of signing, the Respondent told the construction lender that he had paid all bills due to that time, but had not paid bills not yet presented. T. 89. Thus, the lien waivers were intended to be a certification of the partial completion and payment for the work billed to the date of the waiver, and a promise to pay other bills for work already completed as such bills were presented. Six claims of liens were filed by subcontractors. The Richardsons hired a lawyer, and the lawyer was able to defend against two of the liens for failure to properly comply with procedures for mechanic's liens. Four liens for the following amounts and for work beginning on the dates indicated ultimately had to be satisfied by the Richardsons: $ 2,851.45 March 19, 1986 $13,462.34 March 7, 1986 $ 1,944.57 April 8, 1986 $ 785.01 April 9, 1986 These liens were for work commenced before the last lien waiver was signed on April 24, 1986. Thus, the Respondent failed to comply with the oral representations he made at the time of signing the lien waivers. The Richardsons were forced to execute a second mortgage in excess of $17,000 to pay off the unpaid liens. The Richardsons terminated the contract with Woodley Builders, Inc. when subcontractors quit working for lack of payment by Woodley Builders, Inc. Some money was obtained from family loans. It cost the Richardsons about $30,000 to have the house finished, which has added about $325 per month to their mortgage obligations. The Respondent and Woodley Builders, Inc. have not paid anything on these liens. Woodley Builders, Inc. filed bankruptcy. The Richardsons sued the Respondent as trustee for Woodley Builders, Inc. and obtained a default judgment for $149,839, which was a judgment of $32,380 in compensatory damages, trebled, plus costs, interest, and attorney's fees. With respect to case number 87-2810, on June 11, 1986, Woodley Builders, Inc. entered into a contract with Tom Jamieson to construct an addition to his residence in Orlando, Florida. The price of the work was $18,500. The contract specified that the price was a cash price, and that draws were to be made according to a schedule stated in the contract. Mr. Jamieson paid to Woodley Builders, Inc. about $11,700 of the contract price. At some time before completion of the addition, the owner, Mr. Jamieson, evidently became dissatisfied with the Respondent's work. Mr. Jamieson was given the Respondent's copy of the contract and refused to return it to the Respondent. Mr. Jamieson then owed the Respondent a draw of $3500, but refused to give it to him, and refused to have it put in escrow for the payment of subcontractors. The date that this occurred is not in evidence. T. 35-36, 39. Since Mr. Jamieson had taken back the contract, the Respondent thought that he (the Respondent) no longer had any legal proof of the contract (either scope of work or amount due), and thus had no contract to complete the work. He also did not receive the draw that was due. The Respondent thus ceased work on the addition for fear that he would not be paid without a copy of his contract. T. 36-37. The Respondent offered to complete the work. T. 51. The drywall contractor, Rick's Drywall, Inc., filed a lien for $465 for work done from August 12, 1986 and August 20, 1986. The Respondent would have paid this lien had Mr. Jamieson not terminated the contract and refused to give the Respondent a draw still due of $3500. T. 49-50. There may be a claim for unpaid electrical work in July, 1986, see P. Ex. 15, but it is impossible to tell if this occurred before or after Mr. Jamieson terminated the contract, or whether the Respondent had received draw money that should have paid this claim. The only evidence is that the Respondent had an agreement with the electrical subcontractor to pay that subcontractor at the time of the final draw, a draw never received as discussed above. T. 53. P. Ex. 11 is insufficient evidence that there were unpaid claims for roof trusses. Moreover, it cannot be determined whether the Respondent received a draw before contract termination which should have been used to pay for roof trusses. The Respondent had been a contractor for eight years before he began to have financial difficulties resulting in the problems with the Richardson's residence. There is no evidence of any prior discipline.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter its final order finding in case number 87-2809 that the Respondent, Richard M. Woodley, violated sections 489.129(1)(m), 489.129(1)(j), and 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1986), misconduct in contracting by diversion of funds, and failure to supervise as a qualifying agent, and in case number 87-2810, dismissing the administrative complaint for failure of proof by clear and convincing evidence. It is further recommended for the violation set forth above that the license of the Respondent be suspended for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard M. Woodley 2521 Tuscaloosa Trail Maitland, Florida 32751 David Bryant, Esquire 1107 East Jackson, Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Nonroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of operating as a broker or salesperson without holding a valid and current license as a broker or salesperson, in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was licensed as a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida and held license number 0443677. She placed her license with Active One Realty, Inc. in 1990 for two months in the spring and, after a brief interval during which her license was not with Active One, one month in the early summer. Each time, Respondent terminated her license with Active One. On September 4, 1990, Respondent again placed her license with Active One. Respondent worked as a 100% commission agent. She retained 100% of the commission earned by her broker on sales or purchases on which she participated. In return, Respondent paid Active One $150 monthly and $100 per closed transaction. In late October, 1990, Respondent informed her broker that she had purchased a daycare center, which was taking a lot of her time. Accordingly, Respondent wanted again to terminate her license with Active One. The broker and Respondent agreed that her last day of work would be November 5, 1990. The broker offered to return a $450 deposit to Respondent, but she asked that the broker retain it until she returned to Active One, as she intended to do. Respondent terminated her license with Active One effective November 6, 1990. Since that date, Respondent's license has continuously been on current inactive status, meaning that she may not engage in real estate activities for which a license is required. By letter to Respondent dated November 8, 1990, Active One confirmed the effective date of the termination. The letter contains a copy of a completed form informing Petitioner of the termination of the license. On November 26, 1990, Respondent prepared a standard contract for sale and purchase in connection with a proposed purchase of real property by her husband. Respondent completed the portions of the contract showing the buyer's name, purchase price, and mortgage information. Respondent delivered the contract, together with a business card showing Respondent as a salesperson with Active One, to another salesperson who was employed by the broker representing the sellers. Respondent also signed the contract as a cooperating broker on behalf of Active One. Prior to the sellers' execution of the contract, which had already been signed by Respondent's husband, Respondent informed the sellers' agent that certain provisions of the contract needed to be changed. The sellers' salesperson prepared another contract, which Respondent's husband signed December 2, 1990. Over Respondent's objection, the sellers' salesperson insisted that the contract contain an addendum stating that Respondent would be participating in the commission and her spouse was the buyer. Respondent's husband, as buyer, also signed the addendum on December 2. Respondent failed to inform Active One of the contract, which the sellers signed on December 8, 1990. The closing was set for no later than January 30, 1991. Active One learned of the contract by chance. An employee of the title company writing the title insurance noticed the name of Active One on the contract. He mentioned the fact to his wife, who is a broker with Active One. When the broker called Respondent and asked her why she was writing a contract when she was no longer licensed, Respondent said only that she had not realized that she was not licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order determining that Respondent violated Sections 475.42(1)(a) and, thus, 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, issuing a reprimand, and imposing an administrative fine of $1000. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Jack McCray, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Poornawatie Tiwari 9916 N.W. 9th Ct. Plantation, FL 33322
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Gerardo Quintero, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, on December 6, 2006, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Prior to June 2005, Respondent received what appeared to be a valid Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency. Upon receipt, Respondent applied to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”) to obtain a registered contractor’s license using the Certificate of Competency. Based on the Certificate of Competency, the Department issued Respondent a registered contractor’s license bearing license number RF11067268. Respondent also applied for a certificate of authority for his business, Q Plumbing Services Corp. (hereinafter referred to as “QPSC”). Based on the Certificate of Competency and the registered contractor’s license being granted, the Department issued a certificate of authority to QPSC, QB 42825. Subsequent to the Department’s issuance of both the registered contractor’s license to Respondent and the certificate of authority for QPSC, Respondent and the Department learned that the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency (hereinafter referred to as the “BCCO”) obtained by Respondent was not a valid certificate. Respondent’s actions were not as a result of any fraud or intentional action on the part of Respondent; however, it is acknowledged by all parties that the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency obtained by Respondent was not valid. At no time during the application process or upon attesting to the qualified business license application did Respondent have knowledge that the Miami-Dade BCCO employees were engaged in a scheme to defraud the public. At no time during the application process or upon attesting to the qualified business license application did Respondent have knowledge that Respondent obtained the BCCO Competency Card in deviation of any state laws or rules, or local ordinances. At no time during the application process or upon attesting to the qualified business license application did Respondent have knowledge that the BCCO Competency Card was not a valid certificate. At no time during the application process or upon attesting to the qualified business license application did Respondent have knowledge that Respondent’s attestation on the application was inaccurate. At no time during the application process or upon attesting to the qualified business license application did Respondent have knowledge that the approved BCCO qualifying board did not approve the Competency Card. At no time did Respondent have knowledge that any documents Respondent submitted to the Department contained false, forged, or otherwise inaccurate information or material. At the time the Department issued the registered contractor’s license and subsequent certificate of authority on the sole basis of the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency presented by Respondent, the Department properly issued the registered contractor’s license based on the information submitted to it. The parties stipulated that the Respondent was not entitled to the registered contractor’s license and certificate of authority because the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency was not a valid certificate. At the time of application to the Department, Respondent was not qualified by any local jurisdiction or any other method necessary to receive a registered contractor’s license from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department finding that Gerardo Quintero violated the provisions of Sections 489.129(1)(a) and (m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I, III, and IV of the Administrative Complaint; dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint; requiring that Respondent pay the costs incurred by the Department in investigating and prosecuting this matter; giving Respondent 30 days to voluntarily relinquish his license; and revoking Respondent’s license if he fails to voluntarily relinquish it within 30 days of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew D. Morton Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Timothy Atkinson, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard A. Alayon, Esquire Alayon & Associates, P.A. 4551 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33146 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
