The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's insurance licenses based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). On September 15, 1989, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent seeking disciplinary action against Respondent's license as a result of his alleged employment of a convicted felon identified as Ira Stern. That case, Department of Insurance Case No. 89-L-650RVE, was settled pursuant to a Consent Order entered on January 2, 1990, pursuant to which Respondent was fined $500 and placed on probation for one year. Respondent also agreed not to employ any individual disqualified by Section 648.44(7)(a) to work at his bail bond agency and agreed that no unlicensed person employed by his bail bond agency would be permitted to engage in any activity for which a license was required. The Consent Order incorporated a Settlement Stipulation which specifically provided that the settlement was entered to avoid the costs and uncertainty of litigation and did not constitute an admission by Respondent of any violation of the insurance code. At the time of the hearing in this case, Respondent's license was apparently under suspension pursuant to an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by the Department in Department Case No. 93-ESO-005JDM. The Emergency Order of Suspension is not referenced in the Administrative Complaint and no copy of that Emergency Order has been provided. The basis for entry of that Emergency Order was not established in this case and the parties stipulated that the Emergency Order was not a part of this proceeding. For at least two years prior to the hearing in this case, Respondent was appointed to write bail bonds by American Bankers Insurance Group ("American Bankers"). Respondent previously operated a company known as Barry's Bail Bonds. Apparently as a result of some unsatisfied judgements, Respondent did not issue any bail bonds in his name or in the name of Barry's Bail Bonds during the first 6 months of 1992. At the time of the transactions alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was married to Linda Ratner. Linda Ratner was a qualified and appointed agent of American Bankers. She was also the principle of Linda's Bail Bonds, Inc. The evidence established that Respondent was a primary contact for American Bankers on behalf of Linda's Bail Bonds. It appears that Linda's Bail Bonds and Barry's Bail Bonds were operating out of the same office in Fort Lauderdale for some periods during 1991 and 1992. Other businesses were also apparently operated out of this office. The evidence established that an individual by the name of Ira Stern was involved in the operations of that office during late 1991 and the first nine months of 1992. The evidence was inconclusive as to who actually employed Ira Stern. The evidence did establish that Respondent and Ira Stern primarily handled the day to day operations of the office, including the bail bond business transacted out of the office. No evidence was presented that Ira Stern was a convicted felon and/or that he was the same individual identified in the prior Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. Respondent solicited and issued bail bonds through Linda's Bail Bonds on several occasions from January 1992 through July 1992. The evidence established that Linda Ratner signed several American Banker's power of attorney forms in blank. As discussed in more detail below, Respondent utilized several of these forms on behalf of clients during the time period in question. Respondent's authority to write bonds for American Bankers was terminated by American Bankers on or about July 24, 1992. At that same time, the authority of Linda Ratner and Linda's Bail Bonds, Inc. was also terminated. At some point after this termination, Respondent turned over to American Bankers certain tangible collateral that had been held in a safe deposit box. This collateral was turned over sometime between July and September of 1992. The exact date was not established. On September 11, 1992, employees of American Bankers accompanied by a Department investigator, went to Respondent's office and collected all of the files and tangible collateral in the office relating to the outstanding bonds written by Respondent and/or Linda's Bail Bonds for American Bankers. No cash collateral was recovered in connection with those files. Upon arriving at the office, representatives of American Bankers and the Department investigator dealt exclusively with a man who identified himself as Ira Stern and who claimed to be the office manager. As noted above, Respondent was previously disciplined by Petitioner for employing an Ira Stern, who was allegedly a convicted felon. No direct evidence was presented to establish the identity of the person in the office on September 11, 1992 nor was there any evidence that the person who identified himself as Ira Stern was a convicted felon and/or the same individual whom Respondent was accused of improperly employing in the previous disciplinary case. Moreover, no conclusive evidence was presented to establish who actually employed the individual in question. On or about July 9, 1992, Anna Agnew and her husband called Linda's Bail Bonds to obtain a bond to get their nephew out of jail. Respondent responded to the call and told the Agnews that he would issue a bond in return for $100 cash and the delivery of a $1,000 check which was to serve as collateral for the bond. Respondent told the Agnews that he would hold the check as collateral without cashing it until their nephew's case was resolved. To obtain the release of the Agnews' nephew, Respondent submitted American Bankers power of attorney number 0334165 which had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner and filled out by Respondent. The amount of the bond was $1,000. Shortly after the Agnews' nephew was bonded out of jail, Mrs. Agnew discovered that the check they gave to Respondent had been cashed. After the Agnews' many attempts to contact Respondent regarding the check were unsuccessful, Mrs. Agnew wrote to the Department complaining of the situation. On August 17, 1992, the Agnews' nephew's case was resolved. Respondent failed to return the Agnews' collateral within the time provided by law. In an attempt to retrieve their collateral after their nephew's case was completed, Mrs. Agnew testified that her husband unsuccessfully attempted to contact Respondent at his office on a least one occasion. At the time of Mr. Agnew's visit, Respondent's office was allegedly not open. No conclusive evidence was presented as to who cashed the Agnews' check or what happened to the proceeds. On or about January 8, 1993, the managing general agent for American Bankers returned $1,000 to the Agnews in repayment of the collateral. On or about June 21, 1992, American Bankers' power of attorney form number 0333494 was submitted to the Broward County Circuit Court to obtain the release from jail of Wentworth McNorton. The amount of the bond was $1,000. The power of attorney form had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner and was filled in by Respondent. Mr. McNorton's mother, Linnette, arranged for the issuance of the bond by paying Respondent $100 in cash. In addition, she gave Respondent a diamond ring appraised in excess of $10,000 as collateral for the bond. Linnette McNorton asked Respondent to hold the ring as collateral until she could arrange to substitute some other collateral. Liability on Mr. McNorton's bond was discharged by the court on July 14, 1992. Respondent did not return Mrs. McNorton's ring within twenty-one days of discharge of liability on the bond as required by law. Linnette McNorton continued to call Respondent for several months after her collateral was due to be returned. At no time during this period did Respondent return Mrs. McNorton's calls or inform her of the whereabouts of her ring. Approximately five months after Wentworth McNorton was released, Linnette McNorton and her husband went to Respondent's home and confronted him. Respondent advised the McNortons that he did not have the ring and that it had been turned over to the insurance company. Sometime prior to September of 1992, employees of American Bankers took possession of Mrs. McNorton's ring along with other tangible collateral held by Respondent in a safe deposit box. As noted in paragraph 9 above, the evidence did not establish the exact date American Bankers took control of the collateral in the safe deposit box. At the time, Mrs. McNorton's ring was marked improperly and the staff of American Bankers was unable to identify which file it belonged with. Mrs. McNorton's ring was finally returned to her on April 15, 1993 by American Bankers after they had determined that the mislabelled and unidentified ring in their possession was Mrs. McNorton's. On or about March 13, 1992, American Bankers power of attorney numbers 0295546, 0295547, and 0295548 were executed for the issuance of three bail bonds on behalf of Kevin Krohn, the principle. The total face value of these three bonds was $3,000. The powers of attorney had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner. The other handwriting on the powers of attorney appears to be Respondent's, however, the circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of these powers was not established. The records obtained from Respondent's office on September 11, 1992 indicate that Jeanette Krohn, the indemnitor, paid $300 in premiums for the three bail bonds described in paragraph 24 and also put up $3,000 in cash collateral. The handwriting on the collateral receipts appears to be Ira Stern's however, the circumstances surrounding the execution of these documents was not established. The last of the bonds described in paragraph 24 was discharged by the court on April 22, 1992. In July of 1992, the Department received a complaint that Jeanette Krohn was unable to obtain the return of her $3,000 cash collateral. The Department notified American Bankers of the complaint and a representative of the insurance company contacted Respondent who advised that the collateral had been repaid on June 22, 1992 by check no. 1021 drawn on the trust account of Linda's Bail Bonds. June 22, 1992 was well beyond the twenty-one days provided by law for return of the collateral. The check which Respondent told the insurance company was issued to return Ms. Krohn's collateral was purportedly signed by Linda Ratner. The check was dishonored by the bank. The signature of Linda Ratner on the check given to Ms. Krohn was forged. The evidence was insufficient to establish who forged the signature. American Bankers paid Jeanette Krohn $3,000 on or about January 8, 1993 as repayment for the cash collateral placed for the bonds. In March of 1992, M. T. Heller contacted Respondent to procure a bail bond. Respondent arranged for the issuance of the bond. When the bond was discharged, Mr. Heller returned to Respondent's office, where he dealt with Ira Stern in attempting to obtain return of the collateral.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, and III of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing Counts IV and V. As a penalty for the violations, an administrative fine of $1,500 should be imposed and the license issued to the Respondent, Barry Seth Ratner, under the purview of the Florida Department of Insurance should be suspended for a period of two years, followed by a two year probationary period. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 3. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. The second sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. The third sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11 and 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17-23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2 and 31-34. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Interamerican Financial Corporation is guilty of six types of violations of the Florida Retail Installment Sales Act alleged in the Department's Administrative Complaint of June 23, 1992, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Interamerican Financial Corporation (Interamerican) is a Florida corporation with its sole place of business at 2600 S.W. 3rd Avenue, Suite 730, Miami, Florida. Interamerican is registered with the Department as a Retail Installment Seller, under license number HI-0004299/SF-592236293 000. The Department is authorized by the Florida Retail Installment Sales Act (Chapter 520, Florida Statutes) to examine licensees engaged in the retail installment financing business. Interamerican is in the business of financing automobile loans. Most of its loans are ones banks will not make because of the age of the automobile or because of the borrower's lack of a credit history. Borrowers are often first time retail installment purchasers. The purchase price of the vehicles financed ranges from about $2,000.00 to $5,000.00. Interamerican is owned by Raul Lopez and his wife. Mr. Lopez is President of the corporation. Its affairs are conducted on a day to day basis by Ms. Iris Hernandorena, who has been an employee of Interamerican since its inception twelve years ago in December 1980. There are 3 employees other than Ms. Hernandorena, two of whom are full time employees. Interamerican has flexible criteria for reviewing applications when deciding whether to make loans. Interamerican weighs the length of the applicant's employment, the length of residence at the applicant's present address, personal references, and the applicant's salary. Applicants often speak little or no English. They depend on Ms. Hernandorena to explain each element of the transaction to them. They are highly dependent on the good faith of Ms. Hernandorena, and their limited fluency in English leaves most of them ill-equipped to protect their own interests in the financing transaction. The Department conducted an examination of Interamerican on February 10 and February 27, 1992. This examination covered the period from November 1, 1990, through January 31, 1992. The examining officer examined 7.6 percent of Interamerican's 314 financing contracts for the examination period. Ms. Iris Hernandorena is a single mother with three children, is a naturalized American citizen and a native of Argentina. As a practical matter, Ms. Hernandorena runs the affairs of Interamerican for Mr. Lopez with little supervision. Ms. Hernandorena reviews and approves applications for credit using the criteria set out in Finding 4, pays the automobile dealers when an application has been approved, and handles face-to-face dealings with the borrowers. Before the time period covered by the examination, Interamerican was an authorized agent for Bankers Insurance Group to issue credit life insurance certificates to Interamerican borrowers who elected to purchase credit life insurance. It was Interamerican's practice to include credit life insurance on the retail installment contracts at the time they were initially presented for a borrower's consideration. Credit life insurance was always explained to the customer by Ms. Hernandorena. Whenever a borrower requested it, the credit life insurance and the premiums were deleted from the retail installment contract. Fewer than 4% of Interamerican's borrowers declined credit life insurance. When the loan documents were signed, the borrowers signed Franchise Creditor Insurance Certificate applications which disclosed credit life insurance premiums. These premiums were also disclosed on the face of the retail installment contracts. If a borrower elected credit life insurance, a certificate of insurance was issued and Interamerican forwarded one half of the premium disclosed on the financing contract to Bankers Insurance Group. Because the premium was included in the total amount financed by borrowers, this payment to Bankers was an additional cash outlay by Interamerican. Over the life of the loan, the borrower repaid the full amount financed and Interamerican recovered pro rata in each payment its cash outlay to Bankers (the first 1/2 of the insurance premium financed), and its commission (the second 1/2 of the premium financed). During its examination, the Department made its random sampling of 314 Interamerican customer files. It found four which contain the following information concerning charges for credit life insurance: Bankers Credit Life Amount of Credit Insur. Account Buyer's Date of Life Insurance Certif. Number Name Contract Premium Charged Number TA 388 Maria E. Arias 12-24-91 $60.22 FLO 44341 VE 165 Juan A. DelVilla 11-25-91 $74.38 FLO 43482 BEN 603 Julio C. Figueroa 05-06-91 $32.52 FLO 43378 HON 178 Darryl D. Pride 02-27-91 $70.38 FLO 43018 (Administrative Complaint, Paragraph 6) The monies received from these customers for credit life insurance policies were never remitted to Bankers Insurance Group. Bankers Insurance Group had no record of franchise creditor insurance certificates issued on behalf of these borrowers, or of any payments from Interamerican to Bankers for the period January 1, 1991, to February 26, 1992. Franchise credit life insurance certificates on the borrowers were not submitted to Bankers Insurance Group, nor do any of the certificate numbers match any series of numbers issued by Bankers during the past five years. The standard credit life insurance policies which had been issued through Bankers Insurance Group before the credit period had provided that Interamerican was named as beneficiary in the event of the borrower's death. The amount of the insurance coverage automatically reduced during the life of the loan so that the benefits due under the policy in the event of the death of the borrower equaled the amount of the loan balance at all times. Before the period covered by the Department's examination, Interamerican had two occasions when a borrower died and Interamerican had to make application to Bankers Insurance Group for payment of the proceeds due on the credit life insurance the borrower had purchased. In both instances, Interamerican had a difficult time collecting the remaining portion of the loan from Bankers Insurance Group. As a result of these experiences, before the audit period at issue here, Ms. Hernandorena decided on her own that Interamerican should become "self-insured," rather than send Bankers Insurance Group fifty percent of the credit life insurance premium financed by the borrower at the signing of the retail installment contract. After Interamerican ceased sending credit life insurance premiums to Bankers Insurance Group, it was the intention of Ms. Hernandorena to use the funds collected for credit life insurance premiums as a sort of reserve for bad debts out of which to pay the uncollected loan balances of borrowers who died, after having paid for credit life on their retail installment contracts. No specific escrow or reserve account was established with the funds, however. Because so few borrowers decline credit life insurance (see Finding 7), for about 96% of the 314 financing contracts entered into during the credit period, borrowers were charged for credit life insurance which was never put in force. Ms. Hernandorena reasoned that borrowers were not harmed by this arrangement. Borrowers never would have received any payment from Bankers Insurance Group if the credit life insurance became payable--Interamerican was the only beneficiary of the insurance, which would pay only the outstanding loan balance. They received a substitute of equal value in her eyes, the waiver by Interamerican of any claim for the remaining balance due on the loan if the borrower died after having paid for what appeared to be "credit life" insurance issued through Bankers Insurance Group. The Department examined the following four Interamerican customers' files which disclosed that these customers were charged premiums for credit life insurance on their retail installment contracts apparently placed with Bankers Insurance Group after August 31, 1991 in excess of the uniform rate permitted by the Department of Insurance for credit life insurance contracts: Credit Life Uniform Account Buyer's Date of Insurance Rate Amount of Number Name Contract Premm Chrgd Permitted Ovrchrge VE 163 Early H. Wims 11-21-91 $57.66 $48.05 $ 9.61 TA 395 Reyna I. Boyd 01-27-92 $64.60 $53.84 $10.76 HON 236 A. Sarrantos 01-08-92 $58.93 $49.10 $ 9.83 TA 388 Maria E. Arias 12-24-92 $60.22 $50.19 $10.03 & Mario F. Carrion (Administrative Complaint, Paragraph 7) How these overcharges came about were not explained at the hearing. The Department submitted no evidence that these overcharges were part of a scheme to intentionally overcharge customers. There was no evidence that these four instances of overcharge in the sample of contracts audited equate to any specific likely percentage of overcharges in contracts not selected for audit. Contrast Finding 13, above. Interamerican failed to journal payment for and to affix documentary stamps to the following three customer contracts: Interamerican Account Buyer's Number Name Date of Charge Amount of Documentary Stamps Charged on Contract TA 395 Reyna I. Boyd 01-27-92 $6.15 TA 388 Maria E. Arias 12-24-91 $5.70 VE 159 Maria A. Reyes 10-25-91 $8.40 (Administrative Complaint, Paragraph 8) Interamerican did purchase the requisite amount of documentary stamps from the Florida Department of Revenue. The explanation given for the error in not affixing the stamps was that stamps of small denomination were not always on hand. Since the examination was in February 1992, this reason is not persuasive. Two of the contracts involved were ones from October and December of 1991. There had been adequate time to exchange larger stamps for smaller ones or to purchase more small denomination stamps. The amount involved, however, is trivial ($20.25). Interamerican negligently failed to maintain credit insurance acknowledgment forms, since it was not actually placing credit life insurance in force. See Findings 13 through 14, above. Contrary to the allegations of Paragraph 9 of the Administrative Complaint, Interamerican did not charge finance charges in excess of the legal maximum permitted by law. The contracts for the borrowers set forth below contained an "amount charged" on the face of the contract which is slightly in excess of the legal maximum charge. This came about because the machine used to calculate the amount placed on the contact had a limited number of decimal places. Each of these borrowers was later furnished with a payment coupon book by Interamerican which contained an amount charged within the maximum rate. These payment books were prepared with computer programs using more decimal places, and the payment books are what borrowers used in repaying their loans. No additional notification was given to the borrowers calling attention to the small differences, indicating that the payment books, rather than the contracts, stated the correct amount due. The payment books served as a notice of correction to the borrowers. No Interamerican customer has paid any finance charges in excess of the legal maximum (Tr. 23). The customer contracts examined contained the following information: Account Number Buyer's Name Total Amount Charged Per Contract Legal Maximum Differences VE 178 Sonia E. Vanturyl $2,152.86 $2,147.84 $5.02 VE 173 Monique D. Jordan $1,715.13 $1,711.16 $3.97 VE 165 Juan A. Delvilla $1,481.37 $1,477.99 $3.38 VE 152 Edward Mantilla $1,712,56 $1,708.56 $4.40 Jannette S. Williams $1,347.97 $1,344.84 $3.13 The Department conducts an examination of Interamerican and other retail installment sellers on a periodic basis. The prior examinations by the Department revealed no violations by Interamerican before the examination that is the subject of this proceeding. Throughout this examination by the Department, Interamerican furnished the Department with all the information and documents requested, made no attempt to conceal anything from the examiner, and was cooperative throughout the examination. This is consistent with Ms. Hernandorena's belief that on the credit life insurance charges, Interamerican had done nothing wrong.
Recommendation A final order should be entered finding Interamerican guilty of violations of Sections 520.995(1)(a), (b) and (c) and 520.07(4), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.) as alleged in Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Administrative Complaint, and dismissing the charges made in Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the Administrative Complaint. The Department has suggested that the appropriate penalty in this case is to find Interamerican guilty of all allegations made in the Administrative Complaint and impose a cease and desist order enjoining Interamerican from future violations of the Retail Installment Sales Act, and to impose an administrative fine of $1,000 for each violation. It is difficult to determine whether the Department suggest a fine of $6,000.00, one for each paragraph in the Conclusions of Law in its Administrative Complaint (Paragraphs 11-15), or whether a separate fine of $1,000.00 is meant to be imposed for each violation alleged in each contract containing a violation, which would be a fine of approximately $16,000.00. Based on the belief that Interamerican was guilty of all the violations alleged, the Department also recommended that the retail installment sellers license of Interamerican be revoked. It seems pointless to enter an order that Interamerican desist from future violations of the act, and at the same time revoke its authority to engage in business under the act. The penalty of revocation is too draconian. Revocation is certainly a penalty available under the statute, but revocation is appropriate where there is a pattern of misconduct which indicates that the licensee will not conform to applicable rules and statutes in the future, or that the misconduct is so egregious that, without consideration of the likelihood of future misconduct, severe discipline is warranted. This is not such a case. Moving from the less serious to more serious charges, the three instances of failure to attach documentary stamps to contracts is only proof of lack of attention to detail, since a sufficient supply of stamps had been purchased from the Department of Revenue. There was no violation of the disclosure requirements of Section 520.07(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.). With respect to charging, in four instances, credit life insurance premiums in excess of those permitted by the uniform rates filed with the Department of Insurance, in those four cases the amount of each overcharge was approximately $10.00. Interamerican should be required to refund the excess amounts due to the borrowers, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the contract. Due to the small amounts involved, for each instance Interamerican also should be assessed a fine of $250.00, for a total fine of $1,000.00 for that class of violations. No penalty can be imposed on the allegation that Interamerican charged excess finance charges, because it did not do so. Neither can a penalty be imposed for failure to maintain credit insurance acknowledgment forms, since no insurance was placed to be acknowledged by an insurer. Although it is true that those forms were not maintained, the real violation, which is the most serious violation, is the failure to have purchased the insurance at all. The Administrative Complaint alleges in Paragraph 7 four instances where charges were made for credit life insurance where no insurance was actually purchased. Ms. Hernandorena had mistakenly decided that by charging the amount permitted for credit life insurance, without purchasing it, and waiving the right of Interamerican to obtain payment from any borrower who died after paying for credit life insurance, the borrowers were receiving what they paid for. In a rough sense, this was true, but the transaction documents simply were not structured that way. Had the evidence been convincing that borrowers were being charged for credit life insurance as a ruse to obtain additional money from them, when they were receiving nothing in return, I would not hesitate to recommend that the Department revoke the license of Interamerican, especially when the evidence demonstrates that the overcharge occurred not only in the four cases alleged, but in 96% of all contracts Interamerican entered into. On the other hand, Interamerican's evidence was persuasive that the borrowers were receiving something of value for the credit life insurance premiums, even though the insurance was never purchased. The testimony of Ms. Hernandorena was sincere, and I simply do not believe that her explanation of what was done was an after-the-fact justification concocted in an attempt to excuse Interamerican's misconduct. Ms. Hernandorena made a serious error in doing what she did, but she did not engage in a scheme to defraud borrowers. On this charge, Interamerican should be required to repay the amount of credit life insurance premiums plus interest at the legal rate to the four borrowers listed in Paragraph 6 of the Administrative Complaint, and to review its records and make similar refunds to all borrowers who paid for credit life insurance, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of each contract. An administrative fine in the amount of $4,000.00 should also be imposed, the maximum fine for the four instances of overcharge alleged and proven. Had the Department undertaken to allege and prove additional instances of overcharges, the fine would be larger, but that is not how the complaint was drafted. Although the conduct proven does not rise to the level of an intentional scheme to defraud, the misconduct is sufficiently serious that a significant penalty, less severe than revocation, ought to be imposed. That Interamerican has otherwise conducted its affairs over the years in conformity with the law weighs in its favor. The appropriate penalty here is to suspend the licensure of Interamerican for 30 days, to place its licensure on probation for the following 11 months, and to restrict its licensure to prohibit the "waiver of liability" plan created by Ms. Hernandorena and to require submission of all credit life insurance premiums to an appropriate insurer. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of December, 1992. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN DOAH CASE NO. 92-4404 The following are my rulings on findings proposed by the parties: Findings proposed by the Department: 1.-4. Adopted in Findings of Fact (FOF)1. 5. Adopted in FOF 5. 6.-7. Rejected as unnecessary. 8.-9. Adopted in FOF 5. 10.-11. Rejected as recitations of testimony, not findings of fact. Adopted in FOF 6. Implicit in FOF 6. Adopted in FOF 3. Adopted in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in FOF 4. Adopted in FOF 8. Adopted in FOF 13 and 14. Adopted in FOF 7. Adopted in FOF 4. Adopted in FOF 13. Rejected as unnecessary-Interamerican never contended it was an insurance company. Findings proposed by Respondent: Adopted in FOF 1. Adopted in FOF 2 and 4. Adopted in FOF 5. Adopted in FOF 3, 4 and 6. Adopted in FOF 7. Adopted in FOF 9. Adopted in FOF 10. Adopted in FOF 12. Adopted in FOF 13 and 14. The Borrower was the insured, Interamerican was the beneficiary. Adopted in FOF 11. Adopted in FOF 13. Adopted in FOF 15. Adopted in FOF 16. Adopted in FOF 17. Adopted in FOF 18. Adopted in FOF 19. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven R. Walker, Esquire Office of Comptroller Suite 708-N 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Ted Bartlestone, Esquire Suite 1550, 1 Biscayne Tower 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
