Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact: By its Administrative Complaint filed herein dated July 6, 1982, the Petitioner, Electrical Contractors Licensing Board, seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent, J. Hugh Smith, a registered electrical contractor, who holds license number ER 0004272. The Respondent is the President of Electric Hugh Company, Inc. Electric Hugh Company is the entity through which the Respondent engaged in the business of electrical contracting in the City of Jacksonville. On March 3, 1982, the Construction Trades Qualifying Board for the City of Jacksonville met and considered charges filed against the Respondent for failure to use certified craftsmen. A Mr. Etheridge, an employee of Respondent, was permitted to engage in electrical contracting work unsupervised by a certified craftsman without being licensed as a certified craftsman. By so doing, Respondent violated Section 950.110(a), Ordinance Code of the City of Jacksonville, Florida. 1/ For that code violation, Respondent's certificate was suspended for a period of six (6) months. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1 and testimony of John R. Bond, Executive Director -- Construction Trades Qualifying Board for the City of Jacksonville) On June 2, 1982, the Construction Trades Qualifying Board convened another meeting to consider other charges filed against Respondent based on an alleged failure (by Respondent) to pull electrical permits on four instances wherein a permit was required. At that time, Respondent's certification was revoked effective June 2, 1982, and that revocation remains in effect. The action by the Construction Trades Qualifying Board, City of Jacksonville, has been reviewed by Petitioner. By way of mitigation, Respondent opined that he considered the two years in which his license has been revoked by the City of Jacksonville as sufficient penalty for the violation. Respondent did not substantively contest the charges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's registered electrical contractor's license number ER 0004272 be suspended for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April 1984.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent has been licensed as a professional engineer in the State of Florida since 1964 (license number PE 0010812), having become licensed by examination in the field of mechanical engineering. He has practiced professional engineering since 1964 in and around Fort Walton Beach and Okaloosa County, Florida, as an individual practitioner and as an officer of the Royster Construction Company. The Respondent's formal education and professional experience are in the fields of civil, structural, and mechanical engineering. Although testimony indicates that the Respondent has had some contact with the field of electrical engineering, he lacks significant formal education or professional experience in that specialty. Findings regarding Count I In July 1984 plans for a proposed project to be known as the White Sands Bowling Center were prepared, signed, and sealed by the Respondent in his capacity as a professional engineer. The plans included sheets numbered 1 through 9, of which sheet number 6 and sheet number 9 depict electrical components of the proposed structure. Findings regarding Count II The electrical engineering plans (sheet number 6 and sheet number 9) contain errors and omissions including the following: The "symbol legend" necessary to define components depicted on the plans has been omitted. Fixture types and wattage specifications necessary to determine adequate and appropriate loading of circuits have been omitted. Electrical component and fixture circuit identification numbers necessary to identify such components and fixtures have been omitted. Specifications necessary to determine air conditioning connections have been omitted. Details of fire alarm circuitry required by applicable building codes in force at the time of design have been omitted. Emergency exit fixtures and circuitry required by applicable building codes in force at the time of design have been omitted. Electrical panel details necessary to complete construction have been omitted. Details of connections necessary for installation of indicated aluminum wiring have been omitted. The specification depicted for grounding of the electrical system is not in compliance with applicable building codes in force at the time of design. The electrical riser depicted on the plans is incomplete and does not provide sufficient information to complete construction. The Respondent failed to meet a standard of due care in the preparation of the plans depicting electrical engineering for the White Sands Bowling Center and was negligent in his preparation of those plans. Findings regarding Count III The mechanical engineering plans (sheet number 7, air conditioning, and sheet number 8, plumbing) contain errors and omissions including the following: Specifications of air conditioning units and associated ducting are in conflict and do not provide details necessary to complete construction. Details showing "returns" from outside air are in conflict with known standards of design and do not provide details sufficient to complete construction. Specifications of condensation features do not provide sufficient detail to complete construction and are not in compliance with applicable building codes in force at the time of design. Toilet exhaust system details are not sufficient to complete construction and are not in compliance with applicable building codes in force at the time of design. Details of water supply system source and sanitary collection and disposal required by applicable building codes in force at the time of design have been omitted. The Respondent failed to meet a standard of due care in the preparation of the plans depicting mechanical engineering for the white Sands Bowling Center and was negligent in his preparation of those plans. Findings regarding Count IV The structural engineering plans (sheet number 3) do not contain details sufficient to complete construction, and if built as designed, there is no reasonable assurance that the structure would comply with applicable building codes in force at the time of design. The Respondent failed to meet a standard of due care in the preparation of the plans depicting structural engineering for the White Sands Bowling Center and was negligent in his preparation of those plans.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensure and regulation of contractors and electrical contractors operating within the State of Florida. During the period at issue in this case, the Respondent was not licensed as a contractor or as an electrical contractor. Beginning in 2003, the Respondent provided home remodeling and repair services for houses owned by Ms. Enid Shaw. Ms. Shaw, a resident of New York who visits Florida regularly, apparently planned to permanently relocate to Florida at some time in the future. The Respondent met Ms. Shaw during one of Ms. Shaw's visits to Florida, when he was working on the house of an acquaintance of Ms. Shaw. Between 2003 and 2006, Ms. Shaw paid approximately $30,000.00 to the Respondent for the work he performed on her homes. Some of the work performed by the Respondent was outside the jurisdiction of the Petitioner. The Respondent submitted written estimates and invoices to her and, other than a $3,500.00 wire transfer referenced elsewhere herein, Ms. Shaw paid the Respondent by personal check. Ms. Shaw did not obtain receipts from the Respondent, but retained the estimates, invoices, and the processed checks. Ms. Shaw owned a house located at 3411 Silverwood Drive, Orlando, Florida (hereinafter "Silverwood"), and desired to have some repair work performed on the house. Ms. Shaw contacted the Respondent who agreed to meet her at the Silverwood house and tour the house. As they walked through the house, the Respondent made suggestions about how to remedy the deficiencies in the structure. They agreed that he would commence the repair work. Because she did not reside locally, Ms. Shaw was not always present at the home when the work was being done, and she provided a key to the Respondent so that he could enter in her absence. There were water stains on the family room ceiling, and Ms. Shaw knew that, when it rained, water came through the ceiling and would be collected in buckets. The Respondent advised Ms. Shaw that the roof was leaking and offered to repair the roof. Roof repairs were supposedly made, but the roof continued to leak during rain. The Respondent eventually called Ms. Shaw and told her that the entire roof needed to be replaced, that he had already ordered the materials required to replace the roof, that he had already secured the services of an assistant, and that the roof replacement would commence on the day following the telephone call. He informed Ms. Shaw that, because the work was commencing immediately, he needed to have payment by a wire transfer into his account. Ms. Shaw wired $3,500.00 to the Respondent's bank account as requested by the Respondent, but the Respondent did not replace the Silverwood roof on the next day, or on any other day. When the roof repair did not occur, Ms. Shaw began to ask for the return of the $3,500.00, but the Respondent failed to return the money. Though he did not explain his entitlement to retain the money, the Respondent told Ms. Shaw that someone to whom he had loaned his truck had abandoned the vehicle and that his tools had been stolen from the truck. There was no evidence to suggest that the Respondent was entitled to retain the $3,500.00 transfer from Ms. Shaw to his bank account. The Respondent did not replace Ms. Shaw's roof or return the funds to her. Additionally, the Respondent performed other work for Ms. Shaw at the Silverwood home. The Respondent installed a ceiling fan purchased by Ms. Shaw to replace one supposedly removed by previous residents from the Silverwood dining room. Ms. Shaw observed the Respondent turn off the power to the house and connect the fan to the existing electrical wiring. The Respondent also repaired a range hood ventilation fan and replaced a leaking faucet in the Silverwood kitchen. Ms. Shaw owned a house located at 6001 Denson Drive, Orlando, Florida (hereinafter "Denson"). She asked the Respondent to perform repairs on the Denson property, and, as they had done at the Silverwood house, they toured the home, and the Respondent made suggestions as to the work that needed to be done. The Denson roof was not functioning properly. The ceiling was water-stained in several rooms, and a wall in the screen porch was water-damaged. The Respondent repaired the roof deficiencies and the damage caused to the house by the water intrusion. Although Ms. Shaw was not always present at the time of these repairs, she observed the Respondent on one occasion taking a container of an otherwise unidentified black substance to the roof to patch one of the leaks. The interior water damage repaired by the Respondent included removal and reinstallation of ceiling fans and light fixtures in the rooms where the ceiling was repaired. The stove in the Denson kitchen was not functional, and Ms. Shaw purchased a replacement appliance. Although the stove purchased by Ms. Shaw apparently had an electrical plug incompatible with the existing outlet, Ms. Shaw observed the Respondent install the appliance by cutting into the stove's electrical cord and splicing the wiring into the existing outlet, after turning off the power to the house. Ms. Shaw was also present when the Respondent installed a jetted bathtub into an area previously occupied by a bathroom shower stall. The installation included turning off the water supply and the removal and replacement of plumbing lines. At the hearing, Ms. Shaw admitted that the tub she bought was incorrect for the installation location, apparently because the repair access area was on the wrong side of the tub and placed against a wall. She complained that the Respondent installed it nonetheless and that any repairs to the tub will require removal of a portion of a bedroom wall. Ms. Shaw also observed the Respondent remove and replace a bathroom toilet at the Denson house. The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent replaced a malfunctioning swimming pool "generator" at the Denson house, but the testimony presented on this issue was not sufficient to establish the actual nature of the pool equipment replaced, if any, by the Respondent. The Petitioner also asserted that the Respondent replaced an electric garage door opener at the Denson house, but the evidence failed to establish that the Respondent did anything other than replace an existing opener with a new opener and plug the power unit into an existing electrical outlet. Ms. Shaw owned a house located at 5006 Tam Drive, Orlando, Florida (hereinafter "Tam"). As at the other houses, Ms. Shaw asked the Respondent to tour the property and make the repairs on which they agreed. At the Tam house, the Respondent replaced a bathroom toilet and sink. As at the Denson house, the Petitioner asserted that the Respondent replaced an electric garage door opener at the Tam house, but the evidence again failed to establish that the Respondent did anything other than replace the existing opener with a new one and plug the power unit into an existing electrical outlet. There is no credible evidence that Ms. Shaw ever asked the Respondent whether he was licensed by the Petitioner; however, based on the Respondent's statements related to another customer, she believed he had some sort of license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that Donald Whyte violated Subsection 489.126(1), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $10,000.00, and, further, violated Subsection 489.531(1), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $3,000.00, for a total administrative fine of $13,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Maura M. Bolivar, Esquire Leigh Matchett, Qualified Representative Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Donald Whyte 6811 Thousand Oaks Road Orlando, Florida 32818 Amy Toman, Hearing Officer Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this case, the Respondent, William Cooper, was licensed as an electrical contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number ER 0007444. In October 1986, Dr. and Mrs. Gadi Gichon contracted with a general contractor named Construction Pros in connection with the remodeling of the Gichon residence in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Respondent was hired by Construction Pros as the subcontractor for the electrical work on the residence. Respondent completed a portion of the electrical work pursuant to his subcontract. Prior to July 16, 1987, the Gichons fired Construction Pros as their general contractor. On July 16, 1987, the Respondent contracted in writing with the Gichons to complete the work he had started as the electrical subcontractor for Construction Pros and to do certain additional work specified by the contract. The Gichons agreed to pay Respondent the sum of $5,345.54 to complete the work he had started as a subcontractor and to do the additional work. The contract price included labor and materials. The Gichons paid Respondent $4,500.00 on July 16, 1987, and agreed to pay Respondent the balance of the contract price upon completion of the job. Respondent's work on the Gichon residence progressed very slowly after July 16, 1987, despite repeated telephone calls to Respondent by the Gichons. In response to the telephone calls Respondent would send one or two men to placate the Gichons by making a brief appearance at the Gichon residence. These men did not do any meaningful work on the project. On October 1, 1987, the Gichons sent Respondent a certified letter demanding that Respondent complete the work in 10 days. Respondent telephoned Dr. Gadi Gichon at his office in response to the letter of October 1, 1987. Respondent told Dr. Gichon that he had not returned to complete the project because he had not been paid for certain fixtures by the fired general contractor. Respondent made no further effort to complete the work. The Gichons hired another electrical contractor to complete the work started by Respondent and to do additional work. The second electrical contractor found Respondent's work incomplete but ready for a punchlist inspection. The second electrical contractor received its takeover permit on November 24, 1987, and completed the work started by Respondent in less than a week. Palm Coast Electrical charged the Gichons approximately $200.00 more than the Gichons would have paid had Respondent completed his contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.533(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes, and which imposes an administrative fine of $1,000.00 against Respondent and which further issues a reprimand to Respondent for his violations of Section 489.533(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed With the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-738 The findings of fact contained in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, and 16 of Petitioner's proposed findings are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The findings of fact contained in Paragraphs 5, 13, 15, 17, and 18 of Petitioner's proposed findings are immaterial. The finding of fact contained in Paragraph 8 of Petitioner's proposed findings is unsubstantiated by the evidence. The finding of fact contained in Paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposes findings that the Gichons had live electrical wires in their home is unsubstantiated by the evidence. The finding of fact contained in Paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposed findings that the Gichons had incomplete work in their home is adopted in substance. The finding of fact contained in paragraph 12 of Petitioner's proposed finding that Respondent did not complete the Gichon's job is adopted. The finding of fact contained in Paragraph 12 of Petitioner's proposed findings that Respondent did not respond to the letter of October 1, 1989, is rejected as being contrary to the evidence. The finding of fact contained in Paragraph 19 of Petitioner's proposed findings is subordinate. Respondent's statement in his letter filed May 8, 1989, is rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 William Cooper 4400 Northwest 15th Street Lauderhill, Florida 33313 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Pat Ard, Executive Director Electrical Contractors Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent’s certification as an electrical contractor should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board was the county agency responsible for the regulation of the construction industry in Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent, William L. Crump, Jr., was certified as an electrical contractor under license C-1217 (ER003415), and was on record as qualifying contractor for Crump Electrical Service, which he owned. On September 25, 1997, a representative of Crump Electrical Services submitted a Proposal to Mrs. Christina Windsor, wife of the complaining witness herein, for the upgrading of the electrical panel in the Windsor’s home to 200 amperes. The price quoted for this service was $875.00. Small print on the proposal form indicates that permit fees, if required, are in addition to the cost cited. That same day, September 25, 1997, Mrs. Windsor authorized the work to be done. The work was done as called for. Respondent claims the proposal was made and the work done in response to an emergency call from the Windsors. September 25, 1997, was a Thursday. The city permitting office was open and a permit could have been obtained. No permit for the work was pulled at the time by either the Windsors or Respondent. Mr. Crump was of the opinion that because the Windsors had no power, the work should be done immediately without the delay of getting a permit. Though, he claims, he did not know of it at the time, he has subsequently learned that at the time in issue, the city had a policy whereby, in an emergency situation, a contractor could call in and get oral permission to do work requiring a permit, subsequently paying for and receiving the written permit. This was not done by either the Windsors or the Respondent. Mr. Crump did not pull the required permit after the work was done, or cause it to be pulled by an employee, because of the provision in the proposal form that the property owner was responsible for the cost of the permit. He claims to have advised the Windsors of the need for the permit and believed they had pulled it. The Windsors did not provide him with the extra funds for the permit and did not advise him they had not, or would not, obtain the permit. Though required, at no time was the permit pulled. Mr. Crump’s son and business associate, Todd Crump, contends that the real dispute in this issue relates not to whether the required permit was obtained, but to the Crumps’ failure to provide a statement as to the actual cause of the fire which necessitated the placement of the new electrical panel in the Windsor’s house. Todd contends that after talking with Mr. Dennison, the company’s representative who obtained the purchase order, shortly after the work was done, he got the impression the Windsors were going to obtain the permit. He did not find out that the permit had not been pulled until a month or so after he turned the request for the above-mentioned cause statement over to his father. Todd admits he should have followed up to see if the permit was pulled, but did not. Subsequent to the hearing, Mr. Crump filed a statement denying any intentional wrongdoing, and indicating his intent to give up his “personal business.” It is not known just what the term “personal business“ means. He claims that over the years he has donated significant amounts of professional service to the homeless and other needy persons in his area, but has ceased doing so because of the actions of the Board in attempting to discipline him. He contends the charges against him are unjustified and unwarranted and he implies there is a vendetta against him by the Executive Director of the Board. No independent evidence of this was presented. In a submittal subsequent to hearing, the Board Director recommended imposition of the maximum administrative fine of $1,000, a reprimand, and a one-year probation period with the requirement to file monthly reports on all work contracted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board enter a Final Order imposing on Respondent William L. Crump, Jr., an administrative fine of $500.00 and a reprimand, and placing Respondent’s license on probation for a period of one year under such terms and conditions as the Board may proscribe. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: William J. Owens Executive Director Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board 11701 Belcher Road Suite 102 Largo, Florida 33773-5116 William L. Crump, Jr. 2112-J Sunnydale Boulevard Clearwater, Florida 34625
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the City of Tampa (Respondent) unlawfully discriminated against Royce A. Pauley (Petitioner), based upon race, by failing to promote him to the position of "electrical inspector I" in November, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a white male, began employment with Respondent as a "maintenance repairer II" on March 3, 1987. Respondent is an employer within the terms of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, found at Sections 760.01 through 760.10, Florida Statutes. In filling positions within its various departments, Respondent follows a uniform system which is initiated by completion of Form 263, entitled "Request for Position Change", by the department that has a position vacancy. The department identifies the positon it has available, as well as its requirements, and then forwards Form 263 to the Budget Office for authorization. Finally, it is forwarded to the Personnel Division for its approval, and for the preparation of a list of eligible employees from persons who have an application on file. The Personnel Division sends Form 263 back to the requesting department for that department to conduct interviews and to make the hiring decision. Part III of Form 263 contains a place for the EEO Office to note "underutilization" derived from a statistical comparision, based upon race and sex, of individuals in positions with the Respondent's "expectations" for a particular job classification. The underutilization notation "1 B/M" means that the EEO Office has determined that there is an underutilization of one black male for the vacancy being advertised. On or about September 11, 1989, the Respondent advertised a "current opening" for the position of "electrical inspector I" (Position 2601), in response to which the Petitioner timely filed an employment application. Other applicants for this position included Alfred Trujillo, a hispanic male, John Michael, a white male, and Wayne Shabazz, a black male. The Form 263 for this position was approved by the Personnel Division and returned with a list of eligibles, including Petitioner, Trujillo, Michael and Shabazz, and with the notation, "EEO Underutilization, 1 B/M". Trujillo was selected for this position and was offered employment with Respondent. He initially accepted, and passed his physical examination. However, before beginning his employment, Trujillo decided to decline this position. Thereafter, Michael was offered the position, but he also declined due to a schedule conflict with a course he was teaching in St. Petersburg at the time. After further considering the remaining applicants, Shabazz was selected for, and accepted, this position. On or about April 5, 1988, Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations against Respondent alleging that he had not been selected for promotion to the position of "electrical inspector I" due to his race. Petitioner is white, and he contends that Shabazz, who is black, was selected for this position because of his race due to the Respondent's designation of this position as "EEO Underutilization, 1 B/M". Petitioner's position is that this underutilization notation indicates that the Respondent had predetermined that it would only hire a black male for this position. After investigation, the Executive Director of the Commission made a determination of "no cause" concerning Petitioner's complaint, on or about December 28, 1988. However, a supplemental investigation was conducted by an investigative specialist with the Commission who determined, on or about May 11, 1989, that Respondent's stated position with regard to Shabazz's selection was pretextual and racially motivated. Petitioner has filed a Petition for Relief alleging discrimination by the Respondent in employment practices based on race, and this matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Commission for formal hearing. While Trujillo, Michael and Shabazz were interviewed by Nick D'Andrea, Manager of Inspectional Services, and Chris E. "Gene" Scaglione, Chief Electrical Inspector, for this position of "electrical inspector I", Petitioner was not. This was due solely to the fact that Petitioner had been interviewed by D'Andrea and Scaglione within the prior six months when Petitioner applied for the position of Chief Electrical Inspector, for which he was not selected. During this previous interview, Petitioner had been asked specific questions about his knowledge of the electrical code book (Book 70, National Fire Protection Association Manual). Petitioner did not demonstrate to D'Andrea or Scaglione a sufficient knowledge of the electrical code, and lacked the ability to fully and correctly answer questions about the code which were posed to him by Scaglione, who has approximately 37 years of electrical experience. Scaglione determined from a review of previous employment which Petitioner showed on his application for this position, as well as his answers to questions in his interview for the Chief Electrical Inspector position, that Petitioner did not have a minimum of ten years experience in electrical contracting required for all electrical inspector positions by Section 553.22(3), Florida Statutes. No affirmative contacts were made by Respondent's representatives to Petitioner's previous employers to verify his prior electrical experience prior to their decision to offer the "electrical inspector I" position to Trujillo, Michael and Shabazz, rather than Petitioner. However, no efforts were made to verify any of these other applicants' prior experience either. Scaglione and D'Andrea took the prior experience listed by all applicants on their applications at face value, and made no attempts to contact previous employers. Petitioner was treated no differently than other applicants in this regard. Specifically, Petitioner was not credited for his prior experience with the Navy Seabees, Compton Electric of Huntington, West Virginia, Harris-McBurney Telephone Contractors, and as qualifier for All-Pro Electric of St. Petersburg. Scaglione's decision to exclude this prior experience was based upon Petitioner's answers to questioning about this experience in his interview for the Chief Electrical Inspector position, and also upon Scaglione's knowledge of the telephone industry, which is considered to be separate and distinct from electrical contracting. His decision to exclude Petitioner's experience with All-Pro was based on the fact that Petitioner admitted All-Pro did not do much work, and also because he was working full time with the Respondent at the same time he listed All-Pro as an employer. Without credit for these prior jobs, Petitioner had only approximately 80-90 months prior electrical experience, rather than the required 10 years, or 120 months. Shabazz's answers to questions posed to him about the electrical code during his interview exhibited a working knowledge of the code, and an ability to communicate his knowledge. Previous employment shown by Shabazz on his application totaled more than ten years of electrical contracting experience, and based upon his answers to questions in his interview, as well as his previous experience, Shabazz was chosen over Petitioner after Trujillo and Michael declined the position. At the time Shabazz was selected for this position, neither Scaglione nor D'Andrea understood what the terms "underutilization" or "1 B/M" on Form 263 meant. In addition, the evidence is uncontroverted that such notations are advisory only, and there was no effort by anyone in the Personnel Division, or elsewhere in the employ of the Respondent, to counsel or instruct Scaglione or D'Andrea to hire a black male for this position of "electrical inspector I". In fact, they initially offered the position to Trujillo, a hispanic male, and when he declined, they offered the position to a white male, Michael. It was only after these two individuals declined this position that they offered it to Shabazz, a black male. Their decision was based solely upon Shabazz's superior knowledge of the electrical code, as demonstrated in his interview, when compared with the knowledge Petitioner demonstrated in his previous interview within the past six months, and Shabazz's ten years of electrical experience as shown on the face of his application as compared with Petitioner's failure, on the face of his application, to meet the ten year experience requirement. Neither Shabazz nor Petitioner were certified as electrical contractors in Hillsborough County, where the City of Tampa is located, but possession of such certification was not a prerequisite for this position, as long as the person hired obtained certification within a prescribed period of time after being hired. Thus, race was not the reason Shabazz was selected for this position over Petitioner. The Petitioner stipulated at hearing that he is no longer pursuing his charge of retaliation, and no evidence in support of said claim was offered. In April, 1988, Petitioner applied for the position of "electrical inspector II" with the Respondent. As part of the selection process for this position, D'Andrea did telephone some of Petitioner's listed references, as he also did with the successful applicant, Fred Martin, a black male. This was a change in the procedure used to evaluate an applicant's prior experience from the process used when Petitioner applied for the position at issue in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Gardner W. Beckett, Jr., Esquire 123 Eighth Stret North St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire James M. Craig, Esquire P. O. Box 639 Tampa, FL 33601 Margaret A. Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-4387) Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 4-5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 7, 9, and 11, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 6. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4, 6 and 11, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 9-10. Rejected as simply a restatement or summary of evidence and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and evidence. Rejected as irrelevant based upon Finding of Fact 12, and otherwise as immaterial and unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 8, 10 and 11, and also as speculative and as simply a statement from the evidence rather than a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as a partial excerpt from the record and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 11, but otherwise Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and evidence in the record. Rejected as simply an excerpt of testimony and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant to the issue in this case regarding alleged discrimination in hiring to fill position number 2601, and as incompetent to prove any alleged pattern of discriminatory hiring practices. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 11. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3-4. Rejected as unnecessary. 5-6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 8-10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 12-16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 9. Rejected as unnecessary Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 9. 19-20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 21-22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 23. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 8. 24-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 27-33. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 11. 34-35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13.
