The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's intended decision to award low-income housing tax credits in Miami-Dade County through Request for Applications 2013-003 to HTG Miami-Dade 5, LLC, and Allapattah Trace Apartments, Ltd., is contrary to governing statutes, the corporation’s rules or policies, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Overview FHFC is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2013).1/ Its purpose is to promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, FHFC is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low-income housing tax credit program was enacted by Congress in 1986 to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. Tax credits are competitively awarded to housing developers in Florida for qualified rental housing projects. Developers then sell these credits to investors to raise capital (or equity) for their projects, which reduces the debt that the developer would otherwise have to borrow. Because the debt is lower, a tax credit property can offer lower, more affordable rents. Provided the property maintains compliance with the program requirements, investors receive a dollar-for-dollar credit against their federal tax liability each year over a period of 10 years. The amount of the annual credit is based on the amount invested in the affordable housing. These are tax credits and not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15 percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150. However, a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. Developers that are awarded tax credits can use them directly. However, most sell them to raise equity capital for their projects.2/ Developers sell these credits for up-front cash. A developer typically sets up a limited partnership or limited liability company to own the apartment complex. The developer maintains a small interest but is responsible for building the project and managing (or arranging for the management) of the project. The investors have the largest ownership interest but are typically passive investors with regard to development and management.3/ Because the tax credits can be used by the investors that provide the equity for 10 years, they are very valuable. When sold to the investors, they provide equity which reduces the debt associated with the project. With lower debt, the affordable housing tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rent. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government far exceeds the supply. FHFC has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule chapter 67-60, to govern the competitive solicitation process for several different programs, including the one for tax credits. Chapter 67-60 was newly enacted on August 20, 2013. It replaced prior procedures used by FHFC for the competitive process for allocating tax credits. FHFC has now adopted the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, as its process for allocating tax credits.4/ The Competitive Application Process Tax credits are made available annually. FHFC begins the competitive application process through the issuance of a Request for Applications.5/ In this case, that document is Request for Applications 2013-003. A copy of the RFA, including its Questions & Answers, is Joint Exhibit 1. The RFA was issued September 19, 2013 and responses were due November 12, 2013. According to the RFA, FHFC expected to award up to approximately $10,052,825 in tax credits for qualified affordable housing projects in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Knowing that there would be far more applications than available credits, FHFC established an order for funding in the three counties: The Applications will be considered for funding in the following funding order: first the highest scoring eligible Application located in Miami-Dade County that can meet the Funding Test, then the highest scoring eligible Application located in Broward County that can meet the Funding Test, then the highest scoring eligible Application located in Palm Beach County that can meet the Funding Test, then the highest scoring eligible unfunded Application located in Miami-Dade County that can meet the Funding Test and then the highest scoring eligible unfunded Application located in Broward County regardless of the Funding Test. If there is not enough funding available to fully fund this last Broward County Application, the Application will be entitled to receive a Binding Commitment for the unfunded balance. No further Applications will be considered for funding and any remaining funding will be distributed as approved by the Board. RFA at page 36. Applications were scored using a 27-point scale based on criteria in the RFA. RFA at page 37. This process was described in the RFA as follows: The highest scoring Applications will be determined by first sorting all eligible Applications from highest score to lowest score, with any scores that are tied separated first by the Application’s eligibility for the Development Category Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.4.c.(1)(a) of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference), then by the Application’s eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.9.e. of the RFA, (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications to [sic] do not qualify for the preference), then by the Application’s Leveraging Classification (applying the multipliers outlined in Exhibit C below and having the Classification of A be the top priority), then by the Application’s eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Preference which is outlined in Exhibit C below (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference), and then by lottery number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. RFA at page 36 (emphasis added). The way this process works in reality is that the developers know that they must first submit a project that meets all the eligibility criteria and does not have any significant omissions or errors.6/ Developers also strive to submit projects structured to receive all 27 points. The tiebreaker is then the luck-of-the-draw. At the time each application is filed, it is randomly assigned a lottery number7/ used to break the ties. The role of the lottery numbers is demonstrated by the following facts. One hundred and nineteen applications were filed in response to the RFA. All but six received the maximum score of 27 points. Seventy of the 119 were deemed eligible. Of those 70, 69 received the maximum score of 27 points. A copy of the RFA Sorting Order is Joint Exhibit 2.8/ As such, the lottery numbers are a big factor in deciding the winners and, concomitantly, the challengers are (1) the projects with high lottery numbers that were deemed ineligible; and (2) those with lottery numbers outside the funding range that are trying to displace those with lower lottery numbers. A copy of the final Review Committee Recommendations is Joint Exhibit 3. This document shows the developers selected, the county and the lottery number. The two Miami-Dade projects selected for funding are: HTG Miami-Dade 5, LLC d/b/a Wagner Creek - lottery number 3 Allapattah Trace Apartments, Ltd. - lottery number 6 The Petitioners/Intervenors in these consolidated proceedings are: Town Center Phase Two, LLC - lottery number 7 Pinnacle Rio, LLC - lottery number 9 APC Four Forty Four, Ltd. - deemed ineligible and with a lottery number of 10 The protests here center upon whether various applicants were correctly deemed eligible or ineligible. Applications are competitively reviewed, and so determinations as to one applicant affect other applicants’ positions. Each application, and the allegations against it, will be considered in turn. HTG’s Application APC argues that HTG should be found ineligible for allocation of tax credits because HTG failed to disclose its principals and those of its developer, as required by the RFA. The RFA at Section Four A.2.d. provides, in part, that each applicant will submit an application that identifies: d. Principals for the Applicant and for each Developer. All Applicants must provide a list, as Attachment 3 to Exhibit A, identifying the Principals for the Applicant and for each Developer, as follows: * * * (2) For a Limited Liability Company, provide a list identifying the following: (i) the Principals of the Applicant as of the Application Deadline and (ii) the Principals for each Developer as of the Application Deadline. This list must include warrant holders and/or option holders of the proposed Development. * * * This eligibility requirement may be met by providing a copy of the list of Principals that was reviewed and approved by the Corporation during the advance-review process. To assist the Applicant in compiling the listing, the Corporation has included additional information at Item 3 of Exhibit C. RFA at page 5. The RFA goes on to provide in Exhibit C 3.: 3. Principal Disclosures for Applicants and Each Developer The Corporation is providing the following charts and examples to assist the Applicant in providing the required list identifying the Principals for the Applicant and for each Developer. The term Principals is defined in Section 67-48.002, F.A.C. a. Charts: (1) For the Applicant: * * * (b) If the Applicant is a Limited Liability Company: Identify All Managers and Identify All Members and For each Manager that is a Limited Partnership: For each Manager that is a Limited Liability Company: For each Manager that is a Corporation: Identify each General Partner Identify each Manager Identify each Officer and and and Identify each Limited Partner Identify each Member Identify each Director and Identify each Shareholder and For each Member that is a Limited Partnership: For each Member that is a Limited Liability Company: For each Member that is a Corporation: Identify each General Partner Identify each Manager Identify each Officer and and and Identify each Limited Partner Identify each Member Identify each Director and Identify each Shareholder For any Manager and/or Member that is a natural person (i.e., Samuel S. Smith), no further disclosure is required. RFA at page 61. The RFA at Section Three F.3. Provides: 3. Requirements. Proposed Developments funded with Housing Credits will be subject to the requirements of the RFA, the Application requirements outlined in Rule Chapter 67-60, F.A.C., the credit underwriting and HC Program requirements outlined in Rule Chapter 67-48, F.A.C., and the Compliance requirements of Rule Chapter 67-53, F.A.C. RFA at page 3. The term “principal” is defined by rule 67-48.002(89)9/, as follows: (89) “Principal” means: (a) Any general partner of an Applicant or Developer, any limited partner of an Applicant or Developer, any manager or member of an Applicant or Developer, any officer, director or shareholder of an Applicant or Developer, * * * (c) Any officer, director, shareholder, manager, member, general partner or limited partner of any manager or member of an Applicant or Developer, and . . . . HTG received an “advance review” approval of its designation of principals on October 8, 2013. HTG submitted this stamped and approved list of principals with its application. Applicant HTG is a limited liability company, as is its developer, HTG Miami-Dade 5 Developer, LLC. In its submission of principals, HTG disclosed the names of the manager and member of the applicant and the manager and member of the developer, all of which were also LLCs. HTG also disclosed the names of the managers and members of these component LLCs. HTG did not disclose any officers of the applicant, the developer, or any of the component LLCs. Other documents submitted as part of the application indicate that Mr. Matthew Rieger is a Vice President of the applicant, HTG Miami-Dade 5, LLC, and that the component LLCs also have officers. APC contends that the rule’s definition of principal requires HTG to disclose not only the managers and members of the applicant and developer, and those of their component LLCs, but also the officers of any of these entities, if they also have officers. FHFC asserts that such disclosure is not required, arguing that the term “officer” as found in the rule’s definition of “principal” only applies to corporations. FHFC argues that there is no inconsistency between the rule and the charts of the RFA with respect to disclosure of principals. FHFC contends that the charts in the RFA, read in conjunction with the rule, indicate that officers must be disclosed only when the entity is a corporation, and that members and managers must be disclosed when the entity is a LLC. FHFC interprets rule 67-48.002(89) in a manner consistent with the charts. It does not interpret the rule to require that an LLC disclose its officers, even if it has them, but only that an LLC disclose its managers and members. Both Ms. O’Neill and Ms. Thorp testified to that effect. The examples provided in the RFA are also consistent with this interpretation. The rule certainly might have been drafted with more precision to expressly indicate that a principal is any officer, director, or shareholder if the entity is a corporation; any manager or member if the entity is an LLC; and any general partner or limited partner if the entity is a Limited Partnership. It cannot be said, however, that the Corporation’s interpretation of the RFA and its rule is impermissible. ATA’s Application Mr. Kenneth Reecy, Director of Multifamily Programs, testified that FHFC revised the “Universal Application Cycle” process that had been conducted in the past. Under the old universal cycle, most of the criteria were incorporated into the rule, and then there was a “cure” process that provided an opportunity to correct errors that didn’t necessarily have a bearing on whether a project was good enough to be funded. Under the newer process, several issues were moved out of the eligibility and scoring phase and into the credit underwriting phase.10/ Specifically relevant here, site plan issues and the availability of infrastructure, such as sewer service, were no longer examined as part of the eligibility and scoring phase set forth in the RFA. Mr. Reecy testified that these issues were complex and had been intentionally pushed to the “rigorous review” that takes place during the credit underwriting phase. In signing and submitting Exhibit A of the RFA, each applicant acknowledges and certifies that certain information will be provided to FHFC by various dates in the future. RFA at page 46. Section Four 10.b.(2)(b) provides in part that the following will be provided: Within 21 Calendar Days of the date of the invitation to enter credit underwriting: Certification of the status of site plan approval as of Application Deadline and certification that as of Application Deadline the site is appropriately zoned for the proposed Development, as outlined in Item 13 of Exhibit C of the RFA; Certification confirming the availability of the following for the entire Development site, including confirmation that these items were in place as of the Application Deadline: electricity, water, sewer service, and roads for the proposed Development, as outlined in Item 13 of Exhibit C of the RFA; Item 13 of Exhibit C goes on to provide: 13. Certification of Ability to Proceed: Within 21 Calendar Days of the date of the invitation to enter credit underwriting, the following information must be provided to the Corporation: a. Submission of the completed and executed 2013 Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification of Status of Site Plan approval for Multifamily Developments form. * * * c. Evidence from the Local Government or service provider, as applicable, of the availability of infrastructure as of Application Deadline, as follows: * * * Sewer: Submission of the completed and executed 2013 Florida Housing Finance Corporation Verification of Availability of Infrastructure — Sewer Capacity, Package Treatment, or Septic Tank form or a letter from the service provider which is dated within 12 months of the Application Deadline, is Development specific, and specifically states that sewer service is available to the proposed Development as of the Application Deadline. The 2013 Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification of Status of Site Plan Approval for Multifamily Developments Form (Site Plan Approval Form) and the 2013 Florida Housing Finance Corporation Verification of Availability of Infrastructure — Sewer Capacity, Package Treatment, or Septic Tank Form (Certification of Sewer Capacity Form) are incorporated by reference in the RFA. The Site Plan Approval Form requires (in the case of Miami-Dade County which does not have a preliminary or conceptual site plan approval process) that the local government confirm that the site plan was reviewed as of the application deadline. Pinnacle and APC assert that the site plan that ATA submitted to the City of Miami for review included a strip of land that is not legally owned by the current owner and will not be conveyed to ATA under the Purchase and Sale Agreement. As a result, they contend, the site plan review which was required on or before the application deadline did not occur. Pinnacle argues that ATA’s certification in its application was incorrect, that this was a mandatory requirement that was not met, and that it will be impossible for ATA to provide the Site Plan Approval Form in credit underwriting. TC similarly maintains that ATA could not “acknowledge and certify” as part of its application that it would later certify that it had “ability to proceed” because the RFA (at Section Four 10.b.(2)(b) quoted above) requires that “sewer service” be “in place” for ATA’s proposed development as of the application deadline. TC also asserts that the Certification of Sewer Capacity Form explicitly states (and that any service provider letter must, too) that no moratorium is applicable to a proposed development. ATA did not submit a Certification of Sewer Capacity Form. Miami-Dade County will not complete such forms. The “letter of availability” option was created to accommodate Miami-Dade County. The November 12, 2013, letter from Miami-Dade Water and Sewer regarding ATA’s development does not state that there is no applicable moratorium in effect. In fact, the letter affirmatively acknowledges that flow to the gravity system already connected to the property cannot be increased because there is a moratorium in effect as to the pumping station serving the abutting gravity sewer basin. The letter from the County states that, if the pumping station is still in Moratorium Status “at the time this project is ready for construction,” that a private pump station is acceptable. It is logical to conclude that this means sewer service would be available at that time and that sewer service was similarly available at the time of application deadline. The letter, therefore, implies, but does not specifically state, that “sewer service is available to the proposed development as of the application deadline.” The moratorium in effect at the application deadline was not a “general” moratorium. It applied only to the pump station serving the abutting gravity sewer basin, but it was applicable to the proposed development and precluded any increase in the flow to the gravity system connected to the property. A moratorium pertaining to sewer service applicable to ATA’s proposed development was in effect at the time that ATA’s application was submitted. Sewer capacity was otherwise available for the proposed development through use of a private pump station. ATA asserts, first, that ATA has not yet filed certification of ability to proceed or the required forms or letter, that it is not to do so until after it is invited to enter credit underwriting, that FHFC has consequently yet to make a determination as to ATA’s ability to proceed, and that therefore any issues as to site plan or sewer service are not yet ripe for consideration. As to the site plan, ATA further maintains that even if it had been required to provide evidence of ability to proceed as part of its application, the site plan submitted to the City of Miami did not represent that the alley was part of the ATA site. ATA, therefore, asserts that the site plan that was reviewed was the correct one, and that its application certification was correct. The plan of the site of ATA’s development project indicates that the site is bifurcated by a private alley, which is not dedicated as a street, avenue, or boulevard. The legal description of the development project, as submitted to the Department of Planning and Zoning of the City of Miami, included lots 2 through 7 and lots 19 and 20. It did not include the strip of land that lies between these lots (lots 2 through 7 lie to the West of the alley and lots 19 and 20 lie to the East of it.) As to sewer availability, ATA asserts that the 2011 Universal Cycle and the RFA are significantly different. ATA maintains that while the former provided that the existence of a moratorium pertaining to sewer service meant that infrastructure was unavailable, this language was removed from the RFA. ATA contends that a letter of availability need not “mimic” the Certification of Sewer Capacity Form and that the RFA allows a development to certify sewer availability by other means when a moratorium is in effect. Mr. Reecy testified that FHFC takes the certified application at face value, regardless of what other information the Corporation might have at hand. As to the site plan, he testified that even had site plan approval been a part of the scoring process, FHFC would not have found ATA’s application ineligible on that ground. He testified that the alley would not be a problem unless it was a “road” or something similar. He testified that it also could have been a problem if the measurement point to measure the distance to nearby amenities was not on the property, but he was not aware that that was the case in ATA’s application. As for sewer service, Mr. Reecy testified that a letter from the service provider does not have to say “exactly” what is on the form, but stated that it does have to give “the relevant information” to let FHFC know if sewer is “possible.” He testified that the only guidance as to what constituted sewer “availability” was contained in the criteria found on the Certification of Sewer Capacity Form. One of the four numbered requirements on the Certification of Sewer Capacity Form is that there are no moratoriums pertaining to sewer service that are applicable to the proposed development. Under the RFA, the Certification of Sewer Capacity Form could not be completed for a proposed development for which a moratorium pertaining to sewer service was in effect at the time the application was submitted. The form could not be certified by the service provider even if it was possible for such a development to obtain sewer service by other means. The text on the 2013 form is substantively identical to that on the form used during the 2011 Universal Cycle, that wording was specifically drafted to require that any moratorium on sewer infrastructure would be a disqualifying criterion, and the 2013 Certification of Sewer Capacity Form still has that effect. No challenge to the use of the form in the RFA was filed. Even though the language of the 2011 Universal Cycle which paralleled the text on the form does not appear in the RFA, that criterion remains as part of the RFA because of the incorporated Certification of Sewer Capacity Form. In any event, the site plan and sewer availability issues must await at least initial resolution by FHFC during the credit underwriting phase. The testimony of Mr. Reecy clearly indicated that FHFC interprets the RFA specifications and its rules to move consideration of site plan issues and infrastructure availability to the credit underwriting phase. It has not been shown that this is an impermissible interpretation. Town Center’s Application Pinnacle alleges that TC’s application fails to demonstrate site control, because the applicant, Town Center Phase Two, LLC, is not the buyer of the site it intends to develop. The RFA requires at Section Four A.7. that an applicant must provide a copy of a contract, deed, or lease to demonstrate site control: 7. Site Control: The Applicant must demonstrate site control by providing, as Attachment 7 to Exhibit A, the documentation required in Items a., b., and/or c., as indicated below. If the proposed Development consists of Scattered Sites, site control must be demonstrated for all of the Scattered Sites. a. Eligible Contract - For purposes of the RFA . . . the buyer MUST be the Applicant unless an assignment of the eligible contract which assigns all of the buyer's rights, title and interests in the eligible contract to the Applicant, is provided. If the owner of the subject property is not a party to the eligible contract, all documents evidencing intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, or conveyances of any kind between or among the owner, the Applicant, or other parties, must be provided . . . . RFA at page 23. The Contract for Purchase and Sale of Real Property submitted as Attachment 7 to TC’s application is signed by Mr. Milo, who is identified as Vice President. The Buyer on the signature page is incorrectly listed as RUDG, LLC. No other assignment, intermediate contract, agreement, option, or conveyance was included with TC’s application to indicate that TC otherwise had site control of the property. The applicant entity, Town Center Phase Two, LLC, is correctly listed in the opening paragraph of the Contract for Purchase and Sale of Real Property as the “Buyer.” RUDG, LLC, is the 99.99 percent Member of Town Center Phase Two, LLC, and is also the sole Member and Manager of Town Center Phase Two Manager, LLC, which is the .01 percent Managing Member of Town Center Phase Two, LLC. Mr. Milo is a Vice President of RUDG, LLC, a Vice President of Town Center Phase Two Manager, LLC, and a Vice President of the applicant, Town Center Phase Two, LLC. Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.008, provides that the Corporation may waive minor irregularities in an otherwise valid application. The term “Minor Irregularity” is defined by rule 67- 60.002(6), as follows: (6) “Minor Irregularity” means a variation in a term or condition of an Application pursuant to this rule chapter that does not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants, and does not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Mr. Reecy testified that FHFC interpreted the rule to mean that if information requested by the RFA is reasonably available within the Application, even if it was not provided exactly in the place where it was requested, the failure to have it in the particular place it was requested is a minor irregularity. Although the information on the signature page of the Contract for Purchase and Sale of Real Property identifying the Buyer as RUDG, LLC, was a discrepancy in the application, the contract elsewhere identified Town Center Phase Two, LLC, as the Buyer, and Mr. Milo was, in fact, authorized to sign for the true Buyer. Ms. Amy Garmon’s deposition testimony indicated that because she was able to determine from other places in the application that the Buyer was the applicant, and that Mr. Milo was authorized to sign for the Buyer, she found this portion of TC’s application to be compliant, and she didn’t see that there was a “minor irregularity” that needed to be waived. However, it is determined that FHFC actually did finally determine that the error in identification constituted a minor irregularity that was waived, in accordance with Mr. Reecy’s testimony. Although it was Ms. Garmon who called attention to the irregularity, Mr. Reecy is in a position of higher authority within the FHFC and is better able to address the Corporation’s actions with respect to TC’s application. Pinnacle also asserts that TC’s finance documents fail, based upon the same signature issue. TC submitted equity proposals detailing its construction funding sources that were addressed to Mr. Milo and endorsed by him as “Vice President.” FHFC similarly concluded that Mr. Milo had authority to endorse the finance letters on behalf of TC. There is evidence to support FHFC’s findings that TC was the actual Buyer, that Mr. Milo had authority to sign the contract and the equity documents, and that the discrepancies in the documents were minor irregularities. Pinnacle’s Application The equity commitment letter from Wells Fargo Bank regarding Pinnacle’s development, as submitted to FHFC, contained only pages numbered one, two, and four of a four-page letter. It is clear that page three is actually missing and the letter was not simply incorrectly numbered, because of discontinuity in the text and in the numbering of portions of the letter. APC contends that Pinnacle’s application should have been deemed ineligible for award because of the missing page. Mr. Reecy testified that even though a page of Pinnacle’s equity commitment letter was missing, all of the RFA requirements were set forth in the remaining pages. He acknowledged that the missing page might have included unacceptable conditions for closing or information that was inconsistent with the other things in the application, but stated that FHFC determined that the missing page from Pinnacle’s equity letter was a minor irregularity. There is evidence to support FHFC’s finding that the missing page was a minor irregularity. APC’s Application The RFA provides at Section Four, A.3.c., at page 5: c. Experienced Developer(s) At least one Principal of the Developer entity, or if more than one Developer entity, at least one Principal of at least one of the Developer entities, must meet the General Developer Experience requirements in (1) and (2) below. (1) General Developer Experience: A Principal of each experienced Developer entity must have, since January 1, 1991, completed at least three (3) affordable rental housing developments, at least one (1) of which was a Housing Credit development completed since January 1, 2001. At least one (1) of the three (3) completed developments must consist of a total number of units no less than 50 percent of the total number of units in the proposed Development. For purposes of this provision, completed for each of the three (3) developments means (i) that the temporary or final certificate of occupancy has been issued for at least one (1) unit in one of the residential apartment buildings within the development, or (ii) that at least one (1) IRS Form 8609 has been issued for one of the residential apartment buildings within the development. As used in this section, an affordable rental housing development, including a Housing Credit development that contains multiple buildings, is a single development regardless of the number of buildings within the development for which an IRS Form 8609 has been issued. If the experience of a Principal for a Developer entity listed in this Application was acquired from a previous affordable housing Developer entity, the Principal must have also been a Principal of that previous Developer entity. (2) Prior General Development Experience Chart: The Applicant must provide, as Attachment 4 to Exhibit A, a prior experience chart for each Principal intending to meet the minimum general development experience reflecting the required information for the three (3) completed affordable rental housing developments, one (1) of which must be a Housing Credit development. Each prior experience chart must include the following information: Prior General Development Experience Chart Name of Principal with the Required Experience Name of Developer Entity (for the proposed Development) for which the above Party is a Principal: ___ ___________ ___ Name of Development Location (City & State) Affordable Housing Program that Provided Financing Total Number Of Units Year Completed RFA at pages 5, 6. Exhibit A to the RFA, at 3.c., further provides: General Developer Experience For each experienced Developer entity, the Applicant must provide, as Attachment 4, a prior experience chart for at least one (1) experienced Principal of that entity. The prior experience chart for the Principal must reflect the required information for the three (3) completed affordable rental housing developments, one (1) of which must be a Housing Credit development. RFA at page 41. Ms. O’Neill, a Senior Policy Analyst at FHFC and member of the Review Committee responsible for scoring the applications’ developer information section, testified at hearing. When FHFC first started scoring applications, Ms. O’Neill was not taking any action to confirm principal developer experience, but rather was taking the information provided by applicants at face value, as it had been submitted on the chart. A colleague of Ms. O’Neill’s, not serving on the Review Committee, called her attention to the fact that a development that was then going through credit underwriting (following an award during the 2011 funding cycle) had recently requested that FHFC approve a change to the developer entity. Ms. O’Neill testified that this request raised a question at FHFC as to whether Ms. Wong, listed by APC as the principal with the required experience, met the requirements. FHFC decided to confirm that Ms. Wong had the required experience for the developments listed in the RFA. Ms. O’Neill stated that she did not make any inquiry to Ms. Wong or to Atlantic Pacific Communities as to whether Ms. Wong was, in fact, a principal of St. Luke’s Development, LLC, developer of St. Luke’s Life Center, because “we’re not really supposed to do that.” Ms. O’Neill instead looked at portions of a credit underwriting report on the St. Luke’s Life Center project that were researched and shown to her by a colleague. Ms. O’Neill did not see Ms. Wong listed in that report as a principal. She did find information in FHFC files that Ms. Wong was a principal on the other two listed developments. Ms. Thorp testified that she researched several documents in FHFC’s possession and found no information indicating that Ms. Wong was a principal for the St. Luke’s development. She testified that Ms. Wong or another representative of APC was not contacted about the issue because that would have given them an unfair advantage over other applicants. Based upon the information in its files, FHFC determined that Ms. Wong did not meet the requirements for principal developer experience. FHFC then similarly reviewed the files of other applicants who had listed in-state developments as their experience, but was unable to review out-of-state experience, so out-of-state experience continued to be accepted at face value. Ms. Wong was not originally a principal in the St. Luke’s development. However, it was demonstrated at hearing through documentary evidence that Ms. Wong was later appointed an officer of St. Luke’s Development, LLC, effective March 2007. That change was submitted to the credit underwriter, and Ms. Wong was a principal for the developer entity before it completed credit underwriting. Both Ms. O’Neill and Ms. Thorp testified that if the documents provided at hearing by APC had been in FHFC’s possession at the time APC’s application was scored, FHFC would have found that Ms. Wong was a principal of the St. Luke’s development and that her experience met principal developer experience requirements. In light of the evidence presented at hearing, it is clear that FHFC’s conclusion was wrong. The prior experience chart submitted by APC as part of its application provided all of the information requested by the RFA, and all of that information was accurate. The information available to FHFC in the application correctly indicated that Ms. Wong was a principle for the developer of the St. Luke’s Life Center development. APC’s application met all requirements of the RFA with respect to prior developer experience. The Corporation’s preliminary determinations that Ms. Wong was not a principal in the St. Luke’s development, and that the APC application did not, therefore, meet principal experience requirements to the contrary, made in good faith based upon incomplete information contained in its files, was clearly erroneous. FHFC’s contention that APC should have submitted explanations or further documentation of Ms. Wong’s developer experience at the time it submitted its application is untenable. APC submitted all of information requested of it. FHFC asked for a chart to be completed, which APC did, completely and accurately. An applicant cannot be found ineligible for failing to do more than was required by the RFA. Credit Underwriting A comparison of the RFA and rules with the 2011 Universal Cycle process shows that the Corporation has moved many requirements formerly required as part of the eligibility and scoring phase into a second review in the credit underwriting phase, as noted earlier. Rule 67-48.0072 provides in part: Credit underwriting is a de novo review of all information supplied, received or discovered during or after any competitive solicitation scoring and funding preference process, prior to the closing on funding, including the issuance of IRS Forms 8609 for Housing Credits. The success of an Applicant in being selected for funding is not an indication that the Applicant will receive a positive recommendation from the Credit Underwriter or that the Development team’s experience, past performance or financial capacity is satisfactory. The rule goes on to provide that this de novo review in the credit underwriting phase includes not only economic feasibility, but other factors statutorily required for allocation of tax credits, such as evidence of need for affordable housing and ability to proceed. These factors might cause an application to fail and never receive funding, even though it was nominally “awarded” the credits earlier. In that event, the RFA provides: Funding that becomes available after the Board takes action on the Committee’s recommendation(s), due to an Applicant declining its invitation to enter credit underwriting or the Applicant’s inability to satisfy a requirement outlined in this RFA, and/or Rule Chapter 67-48, F.A.C., will be distributed to the highest scoring eligible unfunded Application located in the same county as the Development that returned the funding regardless of the Funding Test. If there is not enough funding available to fully fund this Application, it will be entitled to receive a Binding Commitment for the unfunded balance. If an applicant nominally “awarded” funding in the eligibility and scoring phase fails credit underwriting, the next applicant in the queue of eligible applicants may still be granted funding, and so, is substantially affected by FHFC’s decisions in the credit underwriting phase.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order finding that APC Four Forty Four, Ltd., is eligible for funding, adjusting the Sorting Order accordingly, and otherwise dismissing the formal written protests of all Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a not for profit corporation, with physical facilities in Florida, holding tax exemption certificate 06-01290-00-58, issued November 16, 1977. By letter dated October 22, 1984, Respondent announced its intent to revoke the certificate. Petitioner is qualified as a non-profit entity under Section 501(c)(3) of the Federal Internal Revenue Code. The certificate at issue has been held continuously by Petitioner since 1977. Petitioner provides credit counseling assistance free of charge to any individual 1/ who is encountering difficulty paying his debts. Petitioner typically assists such individuals by contacting creditors, obtaining their agreement to accept smaller payments, and by taking temporary control of the client's income and making periodic payments on the client's behalf. Petitioner also gives educational presentations on personal financial management in the communities where it operates (Orange, Seminole, and Volusia Counties). Additionally, it provides counseling for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to persons facing foreclosure of home mortgages. It does not charge a fee for this service. Petitioner relies primarily on the United Way for its operating revenues. It also receives major support from the creditors it deals with, asking them to contribute 15 per cent of the amount sent to them on behalf of its clients. Additionally, Petitioner receives interest incomes on client trust funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order reissuing Certificate of Exemption Number 06-01290-00-58 to Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1985.
The Issue The issue for determination in this consolidated bid protest proceeding is whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“FHFC”) intended award of tax credits for the preservation of existing affordable housing developments was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact FHFC and Affordable Housing Tax Credits FHFC is a public corporation that finances affordable housing in Florida by allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. See § 420.504(1), Fla. Stat. (providing that FHFC is “an entrepreneurial public corporation organized to provide and promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing or refinancing housing and related facilities in this state.”); § 420.5099(2), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[t]he corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low-income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought.”). The tax credits allocated by FHFC encourage investment in affordable housing and are awarded through competitive solicitations to developers of qualifying rental housing. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150. In contrast, a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. Not surprisingly, the demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. A successful applicant/developer normally sells the tax credits in order to raise capital for a housing development. That results in the developer being less reliant on debt financing. In exchange for the tax credits, a successful applicant/developer must offer affordable rents and covenant to keep those rents at affordable levels for 30 to 50 years. The Selection Process FHFC awards tax credits through competitive solicitations, and that process is commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications (“RFA”). Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(2) provides that unsuccessful applicants for tax credits “may only protest the results of the competitive solicitation process pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 120.57(3), F.S., and Chapter 28-110, F.A.C.” For purposes of section 120.57(3), an RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67.60.009(4), F.A.C. FHFC issued RFA 2015-111 on October 23, 2015, and responses from applicants were due on December 4, 2015. Through RFA 2015-111, FHFC seeks to award up to $5,901,631 of tax credits to qualified applicants that commit to preserve existing affordable multifamily housing developments for the demographic categories of “Families,” “the Elderly,” and “Persons with a Disability.” FHFC only considered an application eligible for funding from RFA 2015-111, if that particular application complied with certain content requirements. FHFC ranked all eligible applications pursuant to an “Application Sorting Order” set forth in RFA 2015-111. The first consideration was the applicants’ scores. Each application could potentially receive up to 23 points based on the developer’s experience and the proximity to services needed by the development’s tenants. Applicants demonstrating that their developments received funding from a U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Rural Development program known as RD 515 were entitled to a 3.0 point proximity score “boost.” That proximity score boost was important because RFA 2015-111 characterized counties as small, medium, or large. Applications associated with small counties had to achieve at least four proximity points to be considered eligible for funding. Applications associated with medium-sized counties and those associated with large counties had to achieve at least seven and 10.25 proximity points respectively in order to be considered eligible for funding. Because it is very common for several tax credit applicants in a particular RFA to receive identical scores, FHFC incorporated a series of “tie-breakers” into RFA 2015-111. The tie-breakers for RFA 2015-111, in order of applicability, were: First, by Age of Development, with developments built in 1985 or earlier receiving a preference over relatively newer developments. Second, if necessary, by a Rental Assistance (“RA”) preference. Applicants were to be assigned an RA level based on the percentage of units receiving rental assistance through either a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or USDA Rural Development program. Applicants with an RA level of 1, 2, or 3 (meaning at least 75 percent of the units received rental assistance) were to receive a preference. Third, by a Concrete Construction Funding Preference, with developments incorporating certain specified concrete or masonry structural elements receiving the preference. Fourth, by a Per Unit Construction Funding Preference, with applicants proposing at least $32,500 in Actual Construction Costs per unit receiving the preference. Fifth, by a Leveraging Classification favoring applicants requiring a lower amount in housing credits per unit than other applicants. Generally, the least expensive 80 percent of eligible applicants were to receive a preference over the most expensive 20 percent. Sixth, by an Applicant’s specific RA level, with Level 1 applicants receiving the most preference and Level 6 the least. Seventh, by a Florida Job Creation Preference, which estimated the number of jobs created per $1 million of housing credit equity investment the developments were to receive based on formulas contained in the RFA. Applicants achieving a Job Creation score of at least 4.0 were to receive the preference. Eighth, by lottery number, with the lowest (smallest) lottery number receiving the preference. Rental assistance from the USDA or HUD is provided to existing developments in order to make up for shortfalls in monthly rent paid by tenants. For example, if an apartment’s base rent is $500 per month and the tenant’s income limits him or her to paying only $250 towards rent, then the USDA or HUD rental assistance pays the other $250 so that the total rent received by the development is $500. As evident from the tie-breakers incorporated into RFA 2015-111, the amount of rental assistance, or “RA Level,” played a prominent role in distinguishing between RFA 2015-111 applicants having identical scores. RFA 2015-111 required that applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter containing the following information: (a) the development’s name; (b) the development’s address; (c) the year the development was built; (d) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC;/3 (e) the total number of units that would receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development were to be funded; (f) all HUD or RD financing program(s) originally and/or currently associated with the existing development; and (g) confirmation that the development had not received financing from HUD or RD after 1995 when the rehabilitation was at least $10,000 per unit in any year. In order to determine an applicant’s RA Level Classification, RFA 2015-111 further stated that Part of the criteria for a proposed Development that qualifies as a Limited Development Area (LDA) Development to be eligible for funding is based on meeting a minimum RA Level, as outlined in Section Four A.7.c of the RFA. The total number of units that will receive rental assistance (i.e., PBRA and/or ACC), as stated in the Development Category qualification letter provided as Attachment 7, will be considered to be the proposed Development’s RA units and will be the basis of the Applicant’s RA Level Classification. The Corporation will divide the RA units by the total units stated by the Applicant at question 5.e. of Exhibit A, resulting in a Percentage of Total Units that are RA units. Using the Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart below, the Corporation will determine the RA Level associated with both the Percentage of Total Units and the RA units. The best rating of these two (2) levels will be assigned as the Application’s RA Level Classification. RFA 2015-111 then outlined a Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart to delineate between the RA Levels. That chart described six possible RA Levels, with one being developments that have the most units receiving rental assistance and six pertaining to developments with the fewest units receiving rental assistance. A development with at least 100 rental assistance units and greater than 50 percent of the total units receiving rental assistance was to receive an RA Level of 1. FHFC also utilized a “Funding Test” to assist in the selection of applications for funding. The Funding Test required that the amount of unawarded housing credits be enough to satisfy any remaining applicant’s funding request. In other words, FHFC prohibited partial funding. In addition, RFA 2015-111 applied a “County Award Tally” designed to prevent a disproportionate concentration of funded developments in any one county. As a result, all other applicants from other counties had to receive an award before a second application from a particular county could be funded. After ranking of the eligible applicants, RFA 2015-111 set forth an order of funding selection based on county size, demographic category, and the receipt of RD 515 financing. The Order was: One RD 515 Development (in any demographic category) in a medium or small county; One Non-RD 515 Development in the Family Demographic Category (in any size county); The highest ranked Non-RD 515 application or applications with the demographic of Elderly or Persons with a Disability; and If funding remains after all eligible Non- RD 515 applicants are funded, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Elderly demographic (or, if none, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Family demographic). Draft versions of every RFA are posted on-line in order for stakeholders to provide FHFC with their comments. In addition, every RFA goes through at least one workshop prior to being finalized. FHFC often makes changes to RFAs based on stakeholder comments. No challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. A review committee consisting of FHFC staff members reviewed and scored all 24 applications associated with RFA 2015-111. During this process, FHFC staff determined that none of the RD-515 applicants satisfied all of the threshold eligibility requirements. On June 24, 2016, FHFC’s Board of Directors announced its intention to award funding to five applicants, subject to those applicants successfully completing the credit underwriting process. Pineda Village in Brevard County was the only successful applicant in the Non-RD 515 Family Demographic. The four remaining successful applicants were in the Non-RD 515 Elderly or Persons with Disability Demographic: Three Round Tower in Miami-Dade County; Cathedral Towers in Duval County; Isles of Pahokee in Palm Beach County; and Lummus Park in Miami- Dade County. The randomly-assigned lottery number tie-breaker played a role for the successful Non-RD 515 applicants with Three Round Tower having lottery number one, Cathedral Towers having lottery number nine, and Isles of Pahokee having lottery number 18. While Lummus Park had a lottery number of 12, the County Award Tally prevented it from being selected earlier because Three Round Tower had already been selected for funding in Miami-Dade County. However, after the first four applicants were funded, only $526,880 of credits remained, and Lummus Park was the only eligible applicant with a request small enough to be fully funded. All Petitioners timely filed Notices of Protest and petitions for administrative proceedings. The Challenge by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns Woodcliff is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 34-unit development for elderly residents in Lake County.4/ Colonial is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 30-unit development for low-income families in Lake County.5/ St. Johns is seeking an award of tax credits to acquire and preserve a 48-unit development for elderly residents in Putnam County.6/ FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns to be ineligible because of a failure to demonstrate the existence or availability of a particular source of financing relied upon in their applications. Specifically, FHFC determined that the availability of USDA RD 515 financial assistance was not properly documented. For applicants claiming the existence of RD 515 financing, RFA 2015-111 stated: If the proposed Development will be assisted with funding under the United States Department of Agriculture RD 515 Program and/or RD 538 Program, the following information must be provided: Indicate the applicable RD Program(s) at question 11.b.(2) of Exhibit A. For a proposed Development that is assisted with funding from RD 515 and to qualify for the RD 515 Proximity Point Boost (outlined in Section Four A.6.b.(1)(b) of the RFA), the Applicant must: Include the funding amount at the USDA RD Financing line item on the Development Funding Pro Forma (Construction/Rehab Analysis and/or Permanent Analysis); and Provide a letter from RD, dated within six (6) months of the Application Deadline, as Attachment 17 to Exhibit A, which includes the following information for the proposed Preservation Development: Name of existing development; Name of proposed Development; Current RD 515 Loan balance; Acknowledgment that the property is applying for Housing Credits; and Acknowledgment that the property will remain in the USDA RD 515 loan portfolio. (emphasis added). FHFC was counting on the letter mentioned directly above to function as proof that: (a) there was RD 515 financing in place when the letter was issued; and that (b) the RD 515 financing would still be in place as of the application deadline for RFA 2015-111. FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns ineligible because their RD letters were not dated within six months of the December 4, 2015, deadline for RFA 2015-111 applications. The Woodcliff letter was dated May 15, 2015, the Colonial letter was dated May 15, 2015, and the St. Johns letter was dated May 5, 2015. FHCA had previously issued RFA 2015-104, which also proposed to award Housing Credit Financing for the Preservation of Existing Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments. The deadline for RFA 2015-104 was June 23, 2015, and Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns applied using the same USDA letter that they used in their RFA 2015-111 applications. Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns argued during the final hearing that FHFC should have accepted their letters because: (a) they gained no competitive advantage by using letters that were more than six months old; (b) waiving the six- month “shelf life” requirement would enable FHFC to satisfy one of its stated goals for RFA 2015-111, i.e., funding of an RD 515 development; and (c) other forms of financing (such as equity investment) have no “freshness” or “shelf life” requirement. However, it is undisputed that no party (including Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns) challenged any of the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. In addition, Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Programs) testified that there must be a point at which FHFC must ensure the viability of the information submitted by applicants. If the information is “too old,” then it may no longer be relevant to the current application process. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for FHFC to utilize a six-month shelf life for USDA letters.7/ Furthermore, Mr. Reecy testified that excusing Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns’ noncompliance could lead to FHFC excusing all deviations from all other date requirements in future RFAs. In other words, applicants could essentially rewrite those portions of the RFA, and that would be an unreasonable result. Excusing the noncompliance of Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns could lead to a “slippery slope” in which any shelf- life requirement has no meaning. The letters utilized by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns were slightly more than six months old. But, exactly when would a letter become too old to satisfy the “shelf life” requirement? If three weeks can be excused today, will four weeks be excused next year? St. Elizabeth’s and Marian Towers’ Challenge St. Elizabeth is seeking low-income housing tax credit financing in order to acquire and preserve a 151-unit development for elderly residents in Broward County, Florida. Marian Towers is an applicant for RFA 2015-111 funding seeking low-income housing tax credits to acquire and preserve a 220-unit development for elderly residents in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The same developer is associated with the St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers projects. In its scoring and ranking process, FHFC assigned St. Elizabeth an RA Level of two. RFA 2015-111 requires that Applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter from HUD or the USDA with specific information. That information is then used to establish an RA Level for the proposed development. As noted above, the RFA requires the letter to contain several pieces of information, including: (a) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC; and (b) the total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development is funded. RFA 2015-111 provided that a development with at least 100 rental units would receive an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth included with its application a letter from HUD’s Miami field office stating in pertinent part that: Total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC: 99 units. Total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed Development is funded: 100 units*. The asterisk in the preceding paragraph directed readers of St. Elizabeth’s HUD letter to a paragraph stating that: HUD is currently processing a request from the owner to increase the number of units subsidized under a HAP Contract to 100 by transferring budget authority for the one additional unit from another Catholic Housing Services Section 8 project under Section 8(bb) in accordance with Notice H-2015-03. Because of the foregoing statement from HUD, FHFC concluded that St. Elizabeth did not have 100 units receiving rental assistance as of the application deadline. Accordingly, FHFC used 99 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance when calculating St. Elizabeth’s RA Level, and that led to FHFC assigning an RA Level of two to St. Elizabeth’s application.8/ If St. Elizabeth had been deemed eligible and if FHFC had used 100 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance, then St. Elizabeth would have received an RA Level of one. Given the application sorting order and the selection process outlined in RFA 2015-111, St. Elizabeth (with a lottery number of six) would have been recommended for funding by FHFC, and that outcome would have resulted in Intervenors Isles of Pahokee and Lummus Park losing their funding. St. Elizabeth asserted during the final hearing that the 100th unit had obtained rental assistance financing since the application deadline on December 4, 2015. However, FHFC could only review, score, and calculate St. Elizabeth’s RA Level based on the information available as of the application deadline. While St. Elizabeth argues that the asterisk paragraph sets forth a “condition,” Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Housing) agreed during the final hearing that the asterisk paragraph was more akin to information that was not explicitly required by RFA 2015-111. FHFC did not use that additional information to declare St. Elizabeth’s application ineligible for funding. Despite being assigned an RA Level of two, St. Elizabeth’s application still could have been selected for funding because RFA 2015-111 merely established RA Level as a basis for breaking ties among competing applications. However, too many applicants for RFA 2015-111 had identical scores, and RFA 2015-111’s use of RA Level as a tiebreaker forced St. Elizabeth’s application out of the running. Under the circumstances, FHFC’s treatment of St. Elizabeth’s application was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. As noted above, tie- breakers are very important, because there is often very little to distinguish one application for tax credits from another. Given that there was a degree of uncertainty about whether St. Elizabeth’s would have 100 qualifying units, FHFC acted reasonably by assigning St. Elizabeth’s application an RA Level of two for this tie-breaker rather than an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers argue that other applications contained language that indicated a degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, those other applications received an RA Level of one. For example, FHFC assigned an RA Level of one to Three Round and Haley Sofge even though their HUD letters stated that both developments would be “subject to a Subsidy Layering Review to be conducted by HUD.” Marian Towers argued that if FHFC does not accept HUD or RD letters containing conditional language about the number of units that will be subsidized, then FHFC should have assigned an RA Level of six to Three Round and Haley Sofge. If Three Round and Haley Sofge had been assigned an RA Level of six, then Marian Towers (with a lottery number of five) would have been recommended for funding. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers cited another instance in which an application received an RA Level of one, even though its application contained a letter from the RD program stating that “USDA Rural Development will consent to the transfer if all regulatory requirements are met.” (emphasis added). However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate that the language cited above applied only to those particular applications rather than to all applications for tax credits. For example, if all applications are subject to a subsidy layering review and compliance with all regulatory requirements, then inclusion of such language in a HUD letter (in and of itself) should not prevent an applicant from being assigned an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers also cited a HUD Letter used in another recent RFA by an applicant that received an RA Level of one. The HUD letter in question contained an asterisk followed by the following statement: “It is HUD’s understanding that two separate applications are being submitted – one for each tower comprising St. Andrew Towers. If funded, HUD will consider a request from the owner to bifurcate the St. Andrew Towers HAP contract in order to facilitate the separate financing of each tower.” However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate why the language quoted directly above should have resulted in the applicant in question being awarded an RA Level less than one. There is no indication that the total number of units receiving rental assistance would change.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order awarding funding to Three Round Tower A, LLC; Cathedral Towers, Ltd; Isles of Pahokee Phase II, LLC; SP Manor, LLC; and Pineda Village. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G.W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether use tax is due on the cost price of mobile homes, which were initially purchased to be resold to an ultimate consumer, but were subsequently rented to individuals for residential purposes.1
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency of state government authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. The Department is authorized to prescribe the records to be maintained by all persons subject to taxes under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Such persons have a duty to maintain and preserve their records, and the records are required to be open to examination by the Department or its authorized agents at all reasonable hours, pursuant to Section 212.12(6), Florida Statutes. The Department is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers and to request information to ascertain the tax liability of the taxpayers, if any, pursuant to Section 213.34, Florida Statutes. Victoria Estates is a partnership and is headquartered in Buffalo, New York. During the period of January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2002, Victoria Estates' activity in Florida included the ownership and operation of a 200-site mobile home park (Park), located in the city of Port Charlotte, Florida. The Park site included a golf course and a restaurant. Victoria Estates also owned two commercial strip malls--one in Bradenton, Florida and the other one in Holmes Beach, Florida. Only the tax consequence of the Park activity is at issue in the instant case. On February 20, 2003, the Department initiated an audit of Victoria Estates to determine whether Victoria Estates was properly collecting and remitting sales and use tax to the Department. The audit covered the period of January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2002 (Audit Period). Victoria Estates' University Park operation was classified as a "mobile home park," as defined in Section 513.01(4), Florida Statutes. Victoria Estates’ mobile home Park was regularly inspected by the Charlotte County Department of Health, pursuant to Chapter 513, Florida Statutes, and a yearly operating permit was granted by Charlotte County. The Park was acquired in 1995. At that time, there were 130 sold units, with land rented, and 70 sites available for land lease. Victoria Estates initially purchased mobile homes tax exempt by extending a resale certificate to the manufacturer. No sales tax is paid on this transaction because it is recognized as a sale for resale. Such tax-exempt mobile homes were delivered to the Park, where they were setup on a lot and connected to utilities in accordance with the manufacturer's home installation procedure and the Code of Laws and Ordinances of Charlotte County, Florida. The tax-exempt mobile homes were furnished, and each lot was landscaped. Approximately $28,000 in costs was incurred in preparing a mobile home and lot for sale and lease. Victoria Estates' business plan was to sell the tax- exempt mobile home outright to the consumer and to rent the lot on which it was placed. Until the mobile home was sold, Victoria Estates listed the mobile home as inventory on its books and records. Victoria Estates allowed no mobile homes in the Park other than those it sold. Victoria Estates leased the unsold mobile homes in order to offset operating costs of the Park. Through September 2001, nine sites, with mobile home units, were leased over six months; 11 were leased for periods of less than six months; and 35 were available for sale/lease. Through March 2002, 15 sites, with mobile home units, were leased for periods over six months; 23 units were leased for periods less than six months; and 15 units were available for sale/lease. When a mobile home was rented, Victoria Estates would remove it as inventory from its books and records and would record the mobile home as a fixed asset. Victoria Estates utilized a written lease agreement with its tenants. By a lease agreement with each tenant, Victoria Estates leased the mobile home and the land on which the mobile home was situated. No separate charge was stated in the lease agreement for the land or the mobile home. The lease agreement included several conditions. The use of the land was restricted to residential purposes only. A limitation was placed on overnight guests of the tenant. Services, such as water, electric, cable, and phone utilities, were already connected and in the name of Victoria Estates, which paid for the services, but Victoria Estates billed each tenant for their respective share of the expenses. Compliance with building, housing and health codes was the responsibility of Victoria Estates. Further, because the leased mobile home remained for sale, if a mobile home in which a tenant was residing was sold, the tenant was required to vacate the mobile home, but would be given the option to lease another mobile home, under the same terms and conditions, or have the lease declared null and void, with the return of the security deposit. Most of the rentals of the mobile homes were seasonal in nature, and most of the revenue was received during the winter months of January through April. Furthermore, most of the renters were from out-of-state and were repeat renters. Sales of the mobile homes were not doing well and operating costs continued. In order to stimulate and promote sales and to offset operating costs, Victoria Estates decided to rent the mobile homes. By renting a mobile home, Victoria Estates removed the mobile home from its inventory and classified the mobile home as a capital asset, thereby receiving an economic benefit for federal income tax purposes as a result of a depreciation deduction. The Department's Senior Tax Specialist testified that Victoria Estate's action of renting the mobile homes to stimulate and promote sales of the mobile homes in the Park was in excess of what was necessary to sell the mobile homes. His testimony is found to be credible. After their initial placement in the Park, no mobile homes were moved to another site during the Audit Period. On April 2, 2004, the Department forwarded to Victoria Estates the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, with schedules, showing that Victoria Estates owed the Department additional sales and use tax and surtax in the amount of $77,854.22 and $2,363.12, respectively, with penalty in the amount of $39,927.14 on sales and use tax and $1,181.55 on surtax, and interest, through April 2, 2004, in the amount of $22,841.83 on sales and use tax and $646.63 on surtax, totaling an assessment in the amount of $143,814.49. A penalty compromise of $20,054.35 was applied to the total, reducing the total amount due to $123,760.14. The Department assessed sales tax on transient rentals, Schedule A01, and use tax on the cost price of the mobile homes, furniture, appliances, window treatment, and other furnishings, which were subsequently leased by Victoria Estates, as transient rentals in Schedule B010. Victoria Estates remitted $9,052.92 against this assessment. Also, as to transient rentals, Victoria Estates failed to collect the proper amount of tax on some of them. The Department identified those portions of the assessment in Schedule A01; and Victoria Estates did not contest those portions of the assessment and paid the tax and interest due thereon. Only the assessed amounts relating to the mobile home purchases are at issue in the instant case. On June 15, 2004, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment. Victoria Estates timely filed a written protest to the Department's proposed assessment. On July 21, 2005, the Department issued its NOD as to the protest of Victoria Estates. In the NOD, the Department sustained the assessment as originally issued. Victoria Estates filed for a reconsideration of the Department's decision. On January 2, 2007, the Department issued its NOR in which the Department sustained the assessment as originally issued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the assessment for tax and interest against Victoria Estates, Ltd. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008.
The Issue Whether Petitioner Janice Brice was the subject of housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's race, color, and familial status, in violation of Florida's Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African American female and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons subject to protection under Florida's Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2006).1/ Petitioner is a dark-skinned African American, which she claims was a second factor underlying the alleged unlawful housing practice by Respondent. Petitioner is a single mother, which she stated in her complaint filed with the Commission, was a third factor that caused her to be discriminated against by Respondent. Respondent Concord Management, Ltd. (Concord), is a management company that operates over 100 apartment complexes around the country. It is the managing agent for Regatta Bay Apartments (Regatta Bay) located in Kissimmee, Florida. Respondent Sharon Harper Ivey is the director of compliance for Concord. She was not hired by Concord until after the events which form the basis of Petitioner's claim of housing discrimination. She communicated with the Commission during its investigation of Petitioner's complaint against Concord and was subsequently listed by the Commission as a Respondent when the case was referred to DOAH. That listing was an error. Petitioner has never claimed that Ms. Ivey had any role in the alleged unlawful housing practice. On August 4, 2005, Petitioner applied for a lease at Regatta Bay. Petitioner filled out some application forms and waited for a response. Concord conducts a financial credit and criminal background check of persons applying to become tenants at Regatta Bay. The credit check is made to determine whether the applicant has good or bad credit history and has the ability to pay the rent. Concord also conducts a separate compliance check to verify that the applicant is a qualifying tenant for purposes of the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program which makes it possible for Concord to rent apartments at below-market rates. The information that Petitioner provided to the staff at Regatta Bay was sent to Concord's offices in Maitland, Florida, for review and handling. The Security Deposit and Surety Bond Concord completed its credit and criminal background check of Petitioner on August 22, 2005. Because Concord determined that Petitioner had poor credit history, based in part on being employed less than a year at her current place of employment, Petitioner was required to have someone co-sign her lease or pay a security deposit and purchase a security (surety) bond. Petitioner paid a security deposit of $873 and purchased a security bond in the amount of $175. Petitioner claims that it was an act of discrimination for Concord to have required both a security deposit and a security bond. The only basis for this claim, however, is Petitioner's interpretation of a form provided to tenants,2/ entitled "Frequently Asked Questions," which explains the security deposit and bond. Petitioner believes that the form explains that only the bond is needed, not a bond and a security deposit. However the form states that the bond "replaces (or supplements) a traditional security deposit." Sharon Ivey, Concord's director of compliance, testified that the requirement for a security deposit and security bond is applied uniformly to all tenants by Concord and produced exhibits showing that tenants at Regatta Bay who were not African Americans were required to pay a security deposit and purchase a security bond if they had poor credit histories. Petitioner produced no evidence to show that African Americans at Regatta Bay, dark-skinned African Americans, or single mothers, are treated differently by Concord with respect to security deposits and bonds. Qualification for Low Income Housing In order for Concord to qualify for the federal tax credits under the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program, all of the tenants of Regatta Bay must have personal incomes that fall below 60 percent of the median annual income for persons living in the Orlando Metropolitan Statistical Area, taking into account the number of persons in the household.3/ Petitioner has two children and, therefore, in order to qualify to rent an apartment at Regatta Bay, she had to have an annual income less than the median annual income for three-person households in the Orlando area. Based on statistics used by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation, Petitioner's income had to be less than $29,760. To verify that Petitioner would qualify for tenancy at Regatta Bay, an employment verification form had to be filled out and submitted by her employer, Quest Diagnostics, Inc. The human resources representative at Quest Diagnostics filled out "Part B" of the employment verification form on August 17, 2005, indicating that Petitioner worked 20 hours per week and made $12 per hour. Jessica Reyes, a rental agent at Regatta, called Petitioner and discussed the fact that the employment verification form indicated she was only a part-time employee. Petitioner informed Ms. Reyes that she had just become a full-time employee. Ms. Reyes requested that Petitioner have the human resources representative at Quest Diagnostics send Regatta Bay another employment verification form and complete "Part A" of the form which asks for the employee's anticipated annual income and year-to-date income. A second employment verification form was sent to Regatta Bay on August 18, 2005, indicating that Petitioner's anticipated annual salary was $25,708.80. The human resources representative did not fill in the space provided for year-to- date income. Ms. Reyes was unable to get the year-to-date earnings information from Quest Diagnostics. Ms. Reyes filled-in the figure $17,144 in the space provided for Petitioner's year-to- date earnings on the employment verification form. In a written statement obtained later from her, Ms. Reyes stated that she thought the absence of this information on the form might cause the form to be "kicked back" by the compliance auditors at Concord. She stated that she calculated the year-to-date earnings of $17,144 from Petitioner's annual income. It appears that Ms. Reyes did not realize that Petitioner had only worked at Quest Diagnostics for five months, and that a year-to-date income of $17,144 would translate to an annual income that was above the limit to qualify for low income housing. Even though only a credit check had been completed on Petitioner, and not a compliance check to verify that she had qualifying income for the federal tax credit program, Petitioner was allowed to sign a lease and move into Unit 101 at Regatta Bay on or about September 20, 2005. On September 15, 2005, Robert Green, a compliance auditor with Concord, reviewed the paperwork he received from Regatta Bay concerning Petitioner, including the employment verification form. He determined that, based on the year-to- date earnings figure, Petitioner's income was too high to qualify for housing at Regatta Bay. In Ms. Reyes' written statement of December 9, 2005, she said she was asked to get pay stubs from Petitioner. Ms. Reyes stated that Petitioner brought in her last pay stub, which included her year-to-date earnings. Ms. Reyes claims to have recalculated Petitioner's year-to-date earnings using her pay stub and, although not $17,144, the recalculated number was still too high. The community director at Regatta Bay, Christine Lombardi, testified that Petitioner came in on September 20 or 21, 2005, and spoke to Ms. Reyes about her income. Ms. Lombardi said she saw Ms. Reyes with pay stubs in her hand and with a calculator tape that Ms. Reyes had used to calculate Petitioner's year-to-date income. Ms. Lombardi testified that she asked Ms. Reyes to make a copy of the pay stubs, but Petitioner would not allow them be copied. Petitioner was unaware that Ms. Reyes had altered the employment verification form to add a year-to-date income figure, but it is undisputed that Petitioner was told that her annual income had been calculated to be a figure over $31,000. Petitioner's pay stub for work through September 3, 2005, shows year-to-date earnings, including overtime, of $12,489.60.4/ Because Petitioner had worked for Quest Diagnostics for five months, the year-to-date figure from her pay stub would result in an estimated annual income of about $29,976. This amount is just over the maximum income allowed, but it includes some overtime work. It was not shown how Ms. Reyes came up with an estimate of $31,000, and her own statement on that point is unclear. However, if Ms. Reyes assumed that Petitioner had been working at Quest Diagnostics since January 1, 2005, the income shown on Petitioner's last pay stub would support an estimated annual income of about $32,000. Petitioner denies that she brought in her pay stubs to show Ms. Reyes, but she testified that Ms. Reyes "had her calculator in front of her, and she calculated it up." Petitioner asked Ms. Reyes to add her adult daughter to her household, so that she could qualify under the higher income allowed for a four-person household. On September 21, 2005, Ms. Lombardi sent Petitioner a letter informing Petitioner that she would have to move out of Regatta Bay because her income was too high. At the final hearing, Petitioner repeatedly referred to a comment in the letter that "we would like to point you in the right direction," which Petitioner took great offense to and perceived almost as a racial slur. However, the comment appeared in the following context: Whereas we are sincerely sorry for any inconvenience this may cause you, there are other communities in the area that do not have the same income guidelines. These communities might be able to accommodate you and we would like to point you in the right direction. In context, there is nothing about the comment that shows animus towards Petitioner's race, color, or familial status. On September 26, 2005, Ms. Lombardi sent Petitioner a letter stating "Per our conversation today . . . you and your daughter need to come into the office to fill out the proper paperwork." This letter indicates that Ms. Lombardi was willing to pursue Petitioner's suggestion to have Petitioner's daughter added to her household so that Petitioner would qualify to stay at Regatta Bay. However, Petitioner apparently abandoned this idea after she consulted with a lawyer. Petitioner refused to vacate the apartment. On October 13, 2005, Regatta Bay served Petitioner with a Seven Day Notice to Cure Noncompliance to satisfy the requirements of Section 83.56, Florida Statutes. On October 26, 2005, Regatta Bay served Petitioner with a Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance Without Opportunity to Cure. On November 5, 2005, Regatta Bay filed a Complaint for Tenant Eviction in the circuit court for Osceola County. Concord showed that it has filed eviction actions against non-African Americans that resided in Regatta Bay when Concord discovered that they were not qualified for low income housing at the time they began their tenancies. Before Petitioner received the first "seven day notice," she contacted a legal aide attorney to assist her regarding her dispute with Regatta Bay. She also contacted Florida Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC) for help. On November 30, 2005, Janet Peterson of FHFC made a request of Robin Robuck, senior vice president of Concord, for a written explanation of how Concord "arrived at the conclusion that [Petitioner] was ineligible." In her response, Ms. Robuck referred to the year-to- date income figure of $17,144 on the employment verification form prepared by Quest Diagnostics. Ms. Robuck made no mention of the recalculation of a $31,000 figure. The communication between Concord and FHFC soon revealed the discrepancy between the employment verification form prepared by Quest Diagnostics and the form that was altered by Ms. Reyes. Ms. Reyes was asked for an explanation of the discrepancy on December 9, 2005, which she then put in writing. On that same day, Ms. Reyes was fired by Concord for altering the employment verification form. Regatta Bay then voluntarily dismissed its eviction action against Petitioner in the circuit court. Petitioner claims that Jessica Reyes and Christine Lombardi were motivated by racial discrimination to prevent Petitioner from renting an apartment at Regatta Bay. Petitioner claims that racial discrimination was the motive for Ms. Reyes putting the figure of $17,144 on the employment verification form and the motivation for Ms. Lombardi to continue to demand that Petitioner move out despite having sufficient information to know that Petitioner qualified for housing at Regatta Bay. Petitioner raised several questions about the timing of and reason for certain events that occurred, which were never fully answered by the evidence presented by the parties. For example, why was Petitioner allowed to move in before the compliance review? Why wasn't the issue of Petitioner's income simply resolved by getting more information from the human resources representative at Quest Diagnostics? Did Ms. Reyes or Ms. Lombardi ever explain to Petitioner exactly how they determined that she made too much income? Why didn't Ms. Reyes or Ms. Lombardi tell Ms. Robuck about the recalculation of a $31,000 figure when Ms. Robuck was making her internal investigation? Unanswered questions, however, are not a sufficient basis to prove housing discrimination. Petitioner failed to establish that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race. No evidence was presented by Petitioner on her claims that Respondent discriminated against her because of her dark skin color or her familial status as a single mother. Mistreatment, even if proven, may have other motivations than discrimination. In this case, all that was proven by Petitioner was a fact never contested by Concord, that Ms. Reyes improperly altered the employment verification form. Petitioner did not prove that Ms. Reyes was motivated by discrimination. The evidence suggests that Ms. Reyes and Ms. Lombardi were inept at explaining to Petitioner how it was determined that her income was too high, but Petitioner's demeanor and testimony at the final hearing indicate that she was probably partly responsible for the poor communication between them on that subject. Petitioner remained a tenant at Regatta Bay until she voluntarily moved out in July 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Sharon Harper Ivey be dismissed from the case; and The Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Having heard oral argument on the issues and considered the record transmitted to the respondent by the BTA, as supplemented by the testimony of Mr. Kurtgis, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner is the owner of that property located at 114 S.W. 10th Street in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, more particularly described as "Lot's 15, 17 Block 7 /Croissant Park, River Station 7-50B. Lot's 19, 21, 23 Block 16 Croissant Park, River Section 7-50B" Byron P. Kurtgis was the petitioner's Secretary from July of 1972 through July of 1973. In February of 1973, Kurtgis experienced a broker finger and was unable to use his hand for at least one month. For this reason, he got behind in his affairs and was unable to process the exemption application or to turn necessary documents over to the Club's certified public accountant. His regular employment took precedence over his club work, and he turned the papers over to the CPA when he realized he would not make the April 1st deadline. The exemption application and return was dated April 12, 1973, and received by the Tax Assessor on April 16, 1973. On June 1, 1973, the Tax Assessor notified petitioner that the application for tax exemption had been denied for the reason that it was received after April 1st. Were it not for the untimely filing of the exemption application, the Tax Assessor would have granted petitioner a charitable exemption from ad valorem taxation. Upon appeal by petitioner to the Broward County BTA on the stated grounds of "clerical error and mistake in failure to file return on time, and denial was contrary to law," the BTA granted the tax exemption to petitioner on July 18, 1973. The BTA notified the respondent of the change in the assessor's action. The staff recommendation of the respondent was to invalidate said change on the ground that petitioner failed to demonstrate that it came within an exception to the waiver rule of 196.011 and therefore the change by the BTA lacked legal sufficiency and/or the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome the assessor's presumption of correctness. Petitioner requested a hearing to review the staff recommendation, the Executive Director of the respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing, and the undersigned was assigned as the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the action of the Broward County Board of Tax Adjustment granting the exemption be invalidated. Respectfully submitted and entered this 12th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Charles G. Brakins, Esquire ROGERS, MORRIS & ZIEGLER 800 East Broward Boulevard 700 Cumberland Building Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Stephen Mitchell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Gaylor Wood, Esquire WOOD & GOHEN 603 Courthouse Square Building 200 Southeast Street, 6th Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether Rule 67-48.005, Florida Administrative Code, and Section VII on Page 16 of Form 1 of the 1999 Housing Credit Application Package adopted by Rule 67-48.002(10) Florida Administrative Code, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. If so, whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Part V of Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, consisting of Sections 420.501 - 420.517, Florida Statutes, is the Florida Housing Finance Corporation Act. Respondent, Florida Housing Corporation (FHFC), is a public corporation created by the provisions of Section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, FHFC is the designated housing agency for the State of Florida. FHFC administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and other housing programs in Florida pursuant to other provisions of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation Act. Pursuant to Section 420.504(2), Florida Statutes, FHFC is an agency of the State of Florida for the purposes of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. FHFC is governed by an independent member Board of Directors appointed by the Governor. The Board members come from specifically designated industries and backgrounds as set forth in Section 420.504(3), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 420.507, Florida Statutes, FHFC has all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation Act, including the power to enact rules. 2/ Petitioner submitted an application to the FHFC for 1999 Low Income Housing Tax Credits. The parties stipulated that Petitioner has standing to challenge the validity of the rules at issue in this proceeding. The parties further stipulated that Shepland does not have standing to challenge the validity of the rules at issue in this proceeding. Intervenors, Miami River Park, Ltd., and Wynwood Tower Apartments, Ltd., submitted applications to FHFC for 1999 Low Income Housing Tax Credits. The parties stipulated that these two entities have standing to intervene in this proceeding. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program is a federal program whose purpose is to encourage the development of housing for low-income families in the various states. 3/ Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the United States Code) creates federal income tax credits that are allocated to each state and are awarded through state-administered programs to developers of low-income housing projects. The tax credits equate to a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the holder's tax liability which can be taken each year that the project satisfies the Internal Revenue Code requirements, for up to ten years. The developer typically sells or syndicates the tax credit to generate funding for the proposed project. Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that each state adopt a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) establishing procedures to be followed in awarding low-income credits allocated to the states. Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: The Florida Housing Finance Corporation is designated the housing credit agency for the state within the meaning of s. 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and shall have the responsibility and authority to establish procedures necessary for proper allocation and distribution of low-income housing tax credits and shall exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of such credits. The corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low-income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought. The corporation may request such information from applicants as will enable it to make the allocations according to the guidelines set forth in subsection (2), including, but not limited to, the information required to be provided the corporation by chapter 9I-21, Florida Administrative Code. The executive director of the corporation shall administer the allocation procedures and determine allocations on behalf of the corporation. Any applicant disputing the amount of an allocation or the denial of a request for an allocation may request an appeal to the board of directors of the corporation. For purposes of implementing this program in Florida and in assessing the property for ad valorem taxation under s. 193.011, neither the tax credits, nor financing generated by tax credits, shall be considered as income to the property, and the rental income from rent restricted units in a low-income tax credit development shall be recognized by the property appraiser. The corporation is authorized to expend fees received in conjunction with the allocation of low-income housing tax credits only for the purpose of administration of the program, including private legal services which relate to interpretation of s. 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, FHFC has established rules for processing applications for housing tax credits. These rules, found in Chapter 67-48, Florida Administrative Code, constitute Florida's QAP. A prime consideration in developing the application process is that the process be completed in a timely manner, since the failure of a state to use all of its allocated credits in a timely manner will result in a loss of housing tax credits. Such a loss is contrary to the statutory mandate that FHFC ensure the maximum use of available tax credits. Petitioner has challenged FHFC's Rule 67-48.005, Florida Administrative Code, which is entitled Applicant Administrative Appeal Procedures, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Following the Review Committee's determination of preliminary scores and ranking, notice of intended funding or denial of funding will be provided to each Applicant with a statement that: Applicants who wish to contest the decision relative to their own Application must petition for review of the decision in writing within 10 calendar days of the date of the notice. The request must specify in detail the forms and the scores sought to be appealed. Unless the appeal involves disputed issues of material fact, the appeal will be conducted on an informal basis. The Review Committee will review the appeal and will provide to the Applicant a written position paper which recommends either no change in score or an increase or decrease in a score which it deems to be in error. If the Applicant disagrees with the Review Committee's recommendation, the Applicant will be given an opportunity to participate in the informal administrative appeal hearings scheduled by the Review Committee. If the appeal raises issues of material fact, a formal administrative hearing will be conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Failure to timely file a petition shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Applicant to such an appeal. Applicants who wish to notify the Corporation of possible scoring errors relative to another Applicant's Application must file with the Corporation, within 10 calendar days of the date of the notice, a written request for a review of the other Applicant's score. Each request must specify in detail the assigned Application number, the forms and the scores in question. Each request is limited to the review of only one Application's score. Requests which seek the review of more than one Application's score will be considered improperly filed and ineligible for review. There is no limit to the number of requests which may be submitted. The Review Committee will review each written request timely received and will prepare a written position paper, which will be provided to each Applicant who timely filed a notification and to the Applicant whose score has been questioned, which recommends either no change in score or an increase or decrease in a score which it deems to be in error. Failure to timely and properly file a request shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Applicant to such a review. Notice will be provided to all Applicants whose score is reduced or whose Application is deemed ineligible pursuant to 67-48.005(1)(b) that they may contest the decision relative to their own Application by petitioning for review of the decision in writing within 10 calendar days of the date of the notice. The request must specify in detail the forms and the scores sought to be appealed. Unless the appeal involves disputed issues of material fact, the appeal will be conducted on an informal basis. The Review Committee will review the appeal and will provide to the Applicant a written position paper which recommends either no change in score or an increase or decrease in a score which it deems to be in error. If the Applicant disagrees with the Review Committee's recommendation, the Applicant will be given an opportunity to participate in the informal administrative appeal hearings scheduled by the Review Committee. No Applicant or other person or entity will be allowed to intervene in the appeal of another Applicant. If the appeal raises issues of material fact, a formal administrative hearing will be conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Failure to timely file a petition shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Applicant to such an appeal. Petitioner has also challenged the following portion of the application form which has been adopted by reference by FHFC's Rule 67-48.002(10), Florida Administrative Code: . . . In consideration for the Corporation processing and scoring this Application, the Applicant and all Financial Beneficiaries hereby understand and agree that the Corporation will hear appeals only on the Applicant's own score. . . . In 1996, FHFC combined the application processes for the subject low-income tax credit program, the State Apartment Incentive Loan (SAIL) Program (Section 420.587, Florida Statutes) and the Home Investment Partnership (HOME) Program (Section 420.5089, Florida Statutes) to make the application process easier and more efficient. Each year FHFC initiates rulemaking to refine the application process from the previous year and to implement any changes in the application process. The administrative rules, with any amendments, are adopted annually. All prospective applicants under any of the three combined programs are invited to attend rulemaking workshops. After the allocation of tax credits for Florida is known, a Notice of Funding Availability setting forth that allocation, is published in the Florida Law Weekly. For the 1999 allocation period, the notice was published on October 23, 1998. Due to the limited number of housing credits available in each annual application cycle and the number of applications for those credits, there are not enough credits available for distribution in Florida for all applicants to receive housing credits in the year in which they apply. Consequently, applicants are competing for a fixed pool of resources. For the 1999 period, the application cycle was opened and the application form was available to interested persons on October 30, 1998. From November 9 through 11, 1998, application workshops were held in Tallahassee, Miami, and Orlando, to address any questions regarding the application process. Applicants are given what is referred to as the Application Package, which contains all pertinent forms and sets forth the instructions and criteria by which the applications will be evaluated by FHFC staff. Applicants were required to complete the applications and submit them to FHFC by January 7, 1999. Ninety applications for the three combined programs were filed. Each application was evaluated by FHFC staff pursuant to the instructions and criteria contained in the Application Package. Partly because FHFC staff is required to verify information reflected in each application, the evaluation process takes six to eight weeks to complete. The evaluation process results in a score for each application. The scores are reviewed and approved by a Review Committee, consisting of FHFC staff. On March 12, 1999, after scores were approved by the Review Committee, a pre-review score was mailed to each applicant. After the applicants were notified of their pre-review score, they had the week beginning March 15, 1999, to review the scoring of all applications. FHFC rules provide an opportunity for an applicant to question its pre-review score and to challenge the pre-review scores received by other applicants. The challenge to an applicant's own score is referred to as a Direct Appeal. The challenge by an applicant to another applicant's score is referred to as a Competitive Appeal. All Direct and Competitive Appeals were due on or before March 22, 1999. Upon receipt of the Direct Appeals and Competitive Appeals, FHFC staff first review the Competitive Appeals and draft a Competitive Appeal Position Paper for each unique issue raised. The Competitive Appeal Position Papers are approved by the Review Committee before being released, which, for 1999, was on April 5, 1999. The same process is followed for the Direct Appeals. The Direct Appeal Position Papers were approved by the Review Committee and released on April 7, 1999. An applicant whose application was adversely affected by a Competitive Appeal Position Paper (as the result of a Competitive Appeal filed by a competing applicant) has the opportunity to file what is referred to as a Direct Appeal of a Competitive Appeal (DACA). Thereafter, FHFC staff evaluates all issues raised by the Direct Appeals and by the DACAs, and prepares a position paper for each issue. On April 27, 1999, the Review Committee approved the Direct Appeal and DACA position papers. On May 4, 1999, these position papers were mailed to the interested parties. An applicant who was not satisfied with the Direct Appeal or DACA position paper for its application was given a limited period to request a proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. If there were no disputed issues of material fact, the matter proceeded as an informal hearing. If there were disputed issues of material fact, the matter proceeded as a formal hearing. On June 11 and July 30, 1999, the Board of Directors of FHFC considered the Recommended Order that resulted from each administrative hearing and entered a Final Order, which determined the final scores for each application. Thereafter, the final ranking of the competing applications were completed and approved. Preliminary approval of a tax credit allocation to an applicant is based on the final ranking. An applicant selected for a tax credit allocation is thereafter "invited" by FHFC to a "credit underwriting" whereby the credit-worthiness of the applicant and the proposed project is further scrutinized by a credit underwriter and a draft credit underwriting report is prepared. The credit underwriting process takes fifty to sixty days to complete. For the 1999 cycle, the draft credit underwriting reports were due September 28, 1999. Once the credit underwriting reports are finished, the successful applicant is given a preliminary tax credit allocation. For the 1999 cycle, the applicant then must complete its project or certify that it has expended at least ten percent of its reasonably expected tax credit basis. If the project cannot be completed by the end of the calendar year, the applicant must enter into a Carryover Agreement. The applicant must have expended ten percent of its reasonably expected tax credit basis before it can enter into a Carryover Agreement. The applicant typically has to be prepared to spend large sums of money in a relatively short period of time to meet these requirements. An applicant does not have the opportunity for an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, on the scoring of a competing application after the Competitive Appeal Position Paper has been issued by FHFC staff. 4/ Pursuant to the challenged rules, an applicant who was not satisfied with the Direct Appeal or DACA position paper for another applicant's application is not permitted a Chapter 120 proceeding and is not permitted to intervene if the other applicant has requested a Chapter 120 proceeding. Such appeals, referred to as Cross Appeals, were once permitted by the rules of FHFC. FHFC determined that Cross Appeals disrupted the application process and placed too great a burden on the FHFC staff. Cross Appeals resulted in a process that was difficult to bring to closure and resulted in litigation expenses that were assessed against the total project cost for the development. Using rule development workshops that were appropriately advertised, FHFC adopted rules permitting Competitive Appeals, but prohibiting Cross Appeals. FHFC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in adopting these rules.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the actions of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (“Florida Housing”) concerning the review and scoring of the responses to Request for Applications 2016-110, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Medium and Small Counties (the “RFA”), was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious. Specifically, the issue is whether Florida Housing acted contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the RFA specifications in finding that the applications of Petitioners JPM Outlook One Limited Partnership (“JPM Outlook”) and Grande Park Limited Partnership (“Grande Park”) were ineligible for funding.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: JPM Outlook is a Florida limited partnership based in Jacksonville, Florida, that is in the business of providing affordable housing. Grande Park is a Florida limited partnership based in Jacksonville, Florida, that is in the business of providing affordable housing. Hammock Ridge is a Florida limited liability company based in Coconut Grove, Florida, that is in the business of providing affordable housing. Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. For the purposes of this proceeding, Florida Housing is an agency of the State of Florida. Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low income housing tax credit program was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects that qualify. The credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. The effect of this sale is to reduce the amount that the developer would have to borrow otherwise. Because the total debt is lower, a tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the tax credits. Housing tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150, while a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. Florida Housing is authorized to allocate housing tax credits and other funding by means of a request for proposal or other competitive solicitation in section 420.507(48). Florida Housing has adopted chapter 67-60 to govern the competitive solicitation process for several different programs, including the program for tax credits. Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing allocate its housing tax credits, which are made available to Florida Housing on an annual basis by the U.S. Treasury, through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3). In their applications, applicants request a specific dollar amount of housing tax credits to be given to the applicant each year for a period of 10 years. Applicants will normally sell the rights to that future stream of income tax credits (through the sale of almost all of the ownership interest in the applicant entity) to an investor to generate the amount of capital needed to build the development. The amount which can be received depends upon the accomplishment of several factors, such as a certain percentage of the projected Total Development Cost; a maximum funding amount per development based on the county in which the development will be located; and whether the development is located within certain designated area of some counties. This, however, is not an exhaustive list of the factors considered. Housing tax credits are made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications. A Request for Applications is equivalent to a “request for proposal,” as indicated in rule 67-60.009(3). The RFA in this case was issued on October 7, 2016. A modification to the RFA was issued on November 10, 2016, and responses were due December 2, 2016. A challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of the RFA by parties not associated with the instant case, but that challenge was dismissed prior to hearing. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated $12,312,632 of housing tax credits to qualified applicants to provide affordable housing developments in Medium Counties, as well as up to an estimated $477,091 of housing tax credits to qualified applicants to provide affordable housing developments in Small Counties other than Monroe County. By the terms of the RFA, a review committee made up of Florida Housing staff reviewed and scored each application. These scores were presented in a public meeting and the committee ultimately made a recommendation as to which projects should be funded. This recommendation was presented to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (“the Board”) for final agency action. On March 24, 2017, all applicants received notice that the Board had approved the recommendation of the review committee concerning which applications were eligible or ineligible for funding and which applications were selected for awards of housing tax credits, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. The notice was provided by the posting on Florida Housing’s website (www.floridahousing.org) of two spreadsheets, one listing the “eligible” and “ineligible” applications and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund. Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to 10 developments, including Intervenor Hammock Ridge. Petitioners JPM Outlook and Grande Park were deemed ineligible. If JPM Outlook and Grande Park had been deemed eligible, each would have been in the funding range based on its assigned lottery number and the RFA selection criteria. If Grande Park had been deemed eligible, Hammock Ridge would not have been recommended for funding. Petitioners JPM Outlook and Grande Park timely filed notices of protest and petitions for administrative proceedings. The scoring decision at issue in this proceeding is based on Florida Housing’s decision that Petitioners failed to submit as Attachment 1 to Exhibit A the correct and properly signed version of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment Form. Petitioners’ admitted failure to submit the correct Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form was the sole reason that Florida Housing found Petitioners’ applications to be ineligible for funding. Section Four of the RFA was titled, “INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN APPLICATION.” Listed there among the Exhibit A submission requirements was the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form, described as follows: The Applicant must include a signed Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form as Attachment 1 to Exhibit A to indicate the Applicant’s certification and acknowledgement of the provisions and requirements of the RFA. The form included in the copy of the Application labeled “Original Hard Copy” must reflect an original signature (blue ink is preferred). The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form is provided in Exhibit B of this RFA and on the Corporation’s Website http://www.floridahousing.org/Developers/ MultiFamilyPrograms/Competitive/2016- 110/RelatedForms/ (also accessible by clicking here). Note: If the Applicant provides any version of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form other than the version included in this RFA, the form will not be considered. The final sentence of the quoted language is referred to by Florida Housing as the “effects clause.” The November 10, 2016, modifications to the RFA were communicated to applicants in three ways. First, Florida Housing provided a Web Board notice. The Florida Housing Web Board is a communication tool that allows interested parties and development partners to stay apprised of modifications to procurement documents. Second, each RFA issued by Florida Housing, including the one at issue in this proceeding, has its own specific page on Florida Housing's website with hyperlinks to all documents related to that RFA. Third, Florida Housing released an Official Modification Notice that delineated every modification, including a “blackline” version showing the changes with underscoring for emphasis. Brian Parent is a principal for both JPM Outlook and Grande Park. Mr. Parent received the Web Board notification of the RFA modifications via email. Upon receiving the email, Mr. Parent reviewed the modifications on the Florida Housing website. The modification to the RFA, posted on Florida Housing’s website on November 10, 2016, included the following modification of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form, with textual underscoring indicating new language: Pursuant to Rule 67-60.005, F.A.C., Modification of Terms of Competitive Solicitations, Florida Housing hereby modifies Item 2.b.(4) of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form to read as follows: (4) Confirmation that, if the proposed Development meets the definition of Scattered Sites, all Scattered Sites requirements that were not required to be met in the Application will be met, including that all features and amenities committed to and proposed by the Applicant that are not unit- specific shall be located on each of the Scattered Sites, or no more than 1/16 mile from the Scattered Site with the most units, or a combination of both. If the Surveyor Certification form in the Application indicates that the proposed Development does not consist of Scattered Sites, but it is determined during credit underwriting that the proposed Development does meet the definition of Scattered Sites, all of the Scattered Sites requirements must have been met as of Application Deadline and, if all Scattered Sites requirements were not in place as of the Application Deadline, the Applicant’s funding award will be rescinded; Note: For the Application to be eligible for funding, the version of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form reflecting the Modification posted 11-10-16 must be submitted to the Corporation by the Application Deadline, as outlined in the RFA. Rule 67-48.002(105) defines “Scattered Sites” as follows: “Scattered Sites,” as applied to a single Development, means a Development site that, when taken as a whole, is comprised of real property that is not contiguous (each such non-contiguous site within a Scattered Site Development, is considered to be a “Scattered Site”). For purposes of this definition “contiguous” means touching at a point or along a boundary. Real property is contiguous if the only intervening real property interest is an easement, provided the easement is not a roadway or street. All of the Scattered Sites must be located in the same county. The RFA modification included other changes concerning Scattered Sites. Those changes either modified the Surveyor Certification Form itself or required applicants to correctly provide information concerning Scattered Sites in the Surveyor Certification Form. Each Petitioner included in its application a Surveyor Certification Form indicating that its proposed development sites did not consist of Scattered Sites. The Surveyor Certification Forms submitted were the forms required by the modified RFA. There was no allegation that Petitioners incorrectly filled out the Surveyor Certification Forms. However, the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form submitted by each of the Petitioners was the original form, not the form as modified to include the underscored language set forth in Finding of Fact 20 regarding the effect of mislabeling Scattered Sites on the Surveyor Certification Form. The failure of JPM Outlook and Grande Park to submit the correct Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form was the sole reason that Florida Housing found them ineligible for funding. In deposition testimony, Ken Reecy, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Programs, explained the purpose of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form: There’s a number of things that we want to be sure that the applicants are absolutely aware of in regard to future actions or requirements by the Corporation. If they win the award, there are certain things that they need to know that they must do or that they are under certain obligations, that there’s certain obligations and commitments associated with the application to make it clear what the requirements--what certain requirements are, not only now in the application, but also perhaps in the future if they won awards. At the conclusion of a lengthy exposition on the significance of the modified language relating to Scattered Sites, Mr. Reecy concluded as follows: [W]e wanted to make sure that if somebody answered the question or did not indicate that they were a scattered site, but then we found out that they were, in fact, a scattered site, we wanted to make it absolutely clear to everyone involved that in the event that your scattered sites did not meet all of those requirements as of the application deadline, that the funding would be rescinded. Petitioners argue that the failure to submit the modified Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form should be waived as a minor irregularity. Their simplest argument on that point is that their applications did not in fact include Scattered Sites and therefore the cautionary language added to the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form by the November 10, 2016, modifications did not apply to them and could have no substantive effect on their applications. Petitioners note that their applications included the substantive changes required by the November 10, 2016, modifications, including those related to Scattered Sites. Petitioners submitted the unmodified Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form as Attachment 1 to their modified Exhibit A. Petitioners further note that the “Ability to Proceed Forms” they submitted with their applications on December 2, 2016, were the forms as modified on November 10, 2016. They assert that this submission indicates their clear intent to acknowledge and certify the modified RFA and forms, regardless of their error in submitting the unmodified Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form. Petitioners assert that the Scattered Sites language added to the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form by the November 10, 2016, modifications was essentially redundant. Mr. Reecy conceded that the warning regarding Scattered Sites was not tied to any specific substantive modification of the RFA. The language was added to make it “more clear” to the applicant that funding would be rescinded if the Scattered sites requirements were not met as of the application deadline. Petitioners point out that this warning is the same as that applying to underwriting failures generally. Petitioners assert that the new language had no substantive effect on either the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form or on the certifications and acknowledgements required of the applicants. Even in the absence of the modified language, Petitioners would be required to satisfy all applicable requirements for Scattered Sites if it were determined during underwriting that their applications included Scattered Sites. Petitioners conclude that, even though the modified Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form was not included with either of their applications, the deviation should be waived as a minor irregularity. Florida Housing could not have been confused as to what Petitioners were acknowledging and certifying. The unmodified Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form was submitted with a modified Attachment 1 that included all substantive changes made by the November 10, 2016, modifications to the RFA. Petitioners gained no advantage by mistakenly submitting an unmodified version of the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form. The submittal of the unmodified version of the form was an obvious mistake and waiving the mistake does not adversely impact Florida Housing or the public. Mr. Reecy testified that he could recall no instance in which Florida Housing had waived the submittal of the wrong form as a minor irregularity. He also observed that the credibility of Florida Housing could be negatively affected if it waived the submission of the correct form in light of the “effects clause” contained in Section Four: Due to the fact that we did have an effects clause in this RFA and we felt that, in accordance with the rule requirements regarding minor irregularities, that it would be contrary to competition because we wanted everybody to sign and acknowledge the same criteria in the certification; so we felt that if some did--some certified some things and some certified to others, that that would be problematic. And the fact that we had very specifically instructed that if we did not get the modified version, that we would not consider it, and then if we backed up and considered it, that that would erode the credibility of the Corporation and the scoring process. Mr. Reecy testified that the modification to the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form was intended not merely to clarify the Scattered Sites requirement but to strengthen Florida Housing’s legal position in any litigation that might ensue from a decision to rescind the funding of an applicant that did not comply with the Scattered Sites requirements as of the application deadline. He believed that waiving the “effects clause” would tend to weaken Florida Housing’s legal position in such a case. Petitioners had clear notice that they were required to submit the modified Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form. They did not avail themselves of the opportunity to protest the RFA modifications. There is no allegation that they were misled by Florida Housing or that they had no way of knowing they were submitting the wrong form. The relative importance of the new acknowledgement in the modified form may be a matter of argument, but the consequences for failure to submit the proper form were plainly set forth in the effects clause. Florida Housing simply applied the terms of the modified RFA to Petitioners’ applications and correctly deemed them ineligible for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order confirming its initial decision finding JPM Outlook One Limited Partnership and Grande Park Limited Partnership ineligible for funding, and dismissing each Formal Written Protest and Petition for Administrative Hearing filed by JPM Outlook One Limited Partnership and Grande Park Limited Partnership. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be issued a sales tax exemption certificate either as a "church" or as a "religious organization."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, In His Service, is a not-for-profit organization formed to give structure to a Bible study and prayer group Shirley B. Cole leads. Cole is the Petitioner's "pastor," but she is not ordained, does not officiate at weddings or funerals, and has no formal religious training other than participation in similar study groups in the past. The Petitioner is affiliated with an organization called the Federation of Independent Churches, which has an office on East Bird Street in Tampa, Florida. (In a post-hearing submission, Cole asserted that the Petitioner's "outreach is from Greater Ministries International, basically functioning as a satellite church, but there was no evidence regarding Greater Ministries International.) Portions of the Petitioner's by-laws were admitted in evidence at the final hearing. The by-laws make reference to three officers--president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer--but Cole testified that she was the secretary and that someone else was the treasurer, and she did not seem to know anything about a president or vice-president. In addition, while the by-laws refer to a board of directors and meetings of the board of directors, Cole does not know anything about either. The Petitioner is small (not more than 15 members). It consists primarily of Cole and her friends and neighbors and some others who hear about the meetings. The group has met in various locations, including Cole's home at 5155 20th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida, and the homes of other members of the group. In addition to Bible study and prayer, the group discusses health issues and other topics of interest and shares reading materials and tapes on topics of interest. From time to time, the group collects items of donated personal property for the use of members of the group and others in need who could use the items. In late June 1998, the Petitioner applied for a sales tax exemption certificate as a church. In response to a question from a representative of the Respondent DOR Cole stated that the Petitioner held services in her home every Thursday from 7:30 to 9:30 or 10 p.m. A DOR representative attempted to confirm Cole's representation by attending a meeting in Cole's home on Thursday, October 8, 1998, but no services were being held there, and no one was home. If there was a meeting on that day, it was held somewhere else. On or about December 28, 1998, DOR issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner's application because the Petitioner did not have "an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities are regularly conducted and carried on." In January 1999, Cole requested an administrative proceeding on the Petitioner's application, representing that she was holding the Petitioner's meetings at her home every Monday from 7:30 p.m. On Monday, April 5, 1999, a DOR representative visited Cole's home at 7:30 or 7:35 p.m., but no one was home. At final hearing, Cole testified that she went to pick someone up to attend the meeting and was late returning. Cole had an April 1999 newsletter admitted in evidence. It indicates that she holds weekly Bible study meetings on Mondays at her home. It also indicates: "The week of April 19th will be our maintenance [health] meeting." It also indicates that the Monday, April 26, 1999, meeting would be a "covered dish dinner with prayer and praise fellowship afterward." Cole also had a book/tape loan check-out list admitted in evidence. The list indicates that two items were checked out on January 21, one on February 8, two on February 14, one on February 15, one on March 8, one on March 21, two on March 22, one on April 4, one on April 5, and four on April 12, 1999. (Two entries dated April 13 precede two on April 12, so it is assumed that all were on April 12, 1999). Cole owns her home, pays the taxes, and pays the utility bills. Cole also claims a homestead exemption. There are no signs, no physical attributes, or anything else that would identify Cole's house as a church. No part of the home is set aside for the Petitioner's exclusive use. The Petitioner pays no rent to Cole and does not reimburse Cole for any of her expenses (such as taxes and utility bills) of home ownership. Under local City of St. Petersburg zoning ordinances, Cole would have to obtain a special exception from the Environmental Development Commission to use her home as a church. Cole has not attempted to do so. Had she tried, the special exception would be denied because her home does not meet the ordinance's minimum lot and yard size criteria for such a special exception. (It is not clear whether Cole's home would meet the ordinance's parking, maximum floor area ratio, and maximum surface ratio criteria for a special exception for a church.) In light of past discrepancies between the Petitioner's representations and the facts, it was not clear from the evidence presented in this case that meetings have taken place, are taking place, or will take place in Cole's home on a regular basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the DOR enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for a tax exemption certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Cole, Pastor In His Service 5155 20th Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Kevin ODonnell, Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
